Korean Peninsula

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 5th September 2017 Commons Chamber

[Boris Johnson]

I join the right hon. Lady in the sentiments she expresses about the victims of terror across our continent over the summer months. There is a lot in her reply with which I agree, and she is certainly right to commend a measured tone in these things. In her focus on Washington and the pronouncements of Donald Trump, it is important that we do not allow anything to distract this House from the fundamental responsibility of Pyongyang for causing this crisis. It is a great shame that there should be any suggestion of any kind of equivalence in the confrontation—I am sure she did not mean to imply that—and it is important that we do not allow that to creep into our considerations.

The current situation is so grave because it is the first time in the history of nuclear weaponry that a non-P5 country seems to be on the brink of acquiring the ability to use an ICBM equipped with a nuclear warhead. This is a very grave situation, which explains why we are told, and we must agree, that theoretically no options are off the table, but it is also essential—the right hon. Lady is right about this—that we pursue the peaceful diplomatic resolution that we all want.

In the history of North Korea’s attempts to acquire a nuclear weapon over the past 30 years there have been flare-ups and crises, and then they have been managed down again. We hope that in the UN, with the help of our Chinese friends and the rest of the international community, we can once again freeze this North Korean nuclear programme and manage the crisis down again. I share the emphasis on peaceful resolution that the right hon. Lady espouses.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s statement. I associate myself very much with his hopes, but I should lay out some of my concerns.

I find myself, for the first time, talking in this House about nuclear weapons that may be used, because we are talking not about a state but about a family cult with a kingdom. This is a very different type of relationship between the leaders and the led. It is a country that is prepared to see its people starve and is perfectly happy to see them literally eat grass. We are not dealing with a rational actor. That imposes an enormous amount on Her Majesty’s Government, of course, and on partners in the region.

I particularly welcome the Foreign Secretary’s conversation with the Chinese. What indications are there that they are prepared actually to apply the sanctions to which they have agreed? At the moment, the indications are poor. As we are one of the few nations with an embassy in Pyongyang, what assistance is our ambassador there giving to other members of the Security Council? This is a time for as much openness as possible among allies, in order to manage a very dangerous situation. Perhaps I may ask a more specific question, given the proximity of our relationship with the United States: will the Foreign Secretary mention the presence, or otherwise, of British troops serving alongside American troops in South Korea and Japan? Will he discuss whether those embeds are in any way operationally involved in the American chain, and whether or not they would be? This is a moment for the Helsinki example of the 1980s. I very much hope he can find a way for the supports to Kennedy and Khrushchev to be seen today.

[Boris Johnson]

I thank my hon. Friend for his compendious question. He rightly says that we are one of the few countries to have an embassy in Pyongyang—we are the only P3 country with an embassy there. As such, we are determined to keep that embassy going, and I hope the House will share our determination to keep it going, along with support for other P5 countries, and for other western interests in that city and in North Korea. Let me pick out his most important question; I do not wish to comment on British forces’ operational activities. I think he is really driving at the question of whether the Chinese have yet played all the cards they have in their hand. China controls 93% of North Korea’s external trade. It is a simple fact that North Korea is wholly dependent on imported oil. In the end, the Chinese do have much further to go on this. There are ways in which they can tighten the economic ligature; they can make more of a difference. The question in their minds is whether they can do that without incurring serious political convulsions within North Korea. We think there is room for further Chinese effort. We are working with our Chinese friends to persuade them to do this. To be fair to the Chinese, I must say that they have shown a much greater willingness than they have hitherto to understand the threat that North Korea poses and to take action. To that extent, the Chinese should be commended.

Venezuela: Political Situation

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 5th September 2017 Westminster Hall

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

Hon. Members have made absolutely evident the problem we face regarding Venezuela, so they will forgive me if I do not repeat the claims and statements that have been so clearly pronounced. Members on both sides of the House have rightly condemned the brutality of the regime and have called for the UK Government to do more, and I welcome the opportunity to hear the Minister’s views on that. I also look forward to hearing how he is working with our European partners—as they still are—on getting joint action, particularly on the sanctions and prosecutions.

If I may be permitted one small reminder: the hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden (Siobhain McDonagh) focused on her constituents and she is, of course, right that that is what we are here to do, but it is also right that we remember that these distant places are not so distant. The drugs that the hon. Member for Hyndburn (Graham Jones) spoke about kill people in our country. The drug money that goes back into the FARC pays to train the IRA—at least it certainly used to—and that brought death to the streets of Northern Ireland. The links between the UK and South America may appear distant, but they are not. Our history, as my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Mr Clarke) described, links us to the revolutionary era and the end of the Spanish empire. Our present, through air, communications, friendship and marriage, links us to some of the most wonderful people in the world, in some amazing countries in one of the most beautiful continents but, sadly, also to the destruction, the failure of Governments, the abuse and the violence caused by people like Maduro.

So today, we should perhaps remember some of the names that deserve to be mentioned, not the ones that should be forgotten. We should remember names such as that of Leopoldo López, who has done so much for the cause of democracy in Venezuela, and that of his wife, Lilian Tintori, who has been refused permission to enter Europe to talk to the leaders of some of our European partners by an abusive and despotic regime.

Saudi Arabia: Anticipated Executions

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Monday 17th July 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Tom Tugendhat.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

Thank you very much, Mr Speaker.

We have heard—over the years, indeed—Her Majesty’s Government talk about the influence they have had over the actions of the Saudi Government in terms of capital offences. I would be very grateful if the Minister could from his place today give some examples of how that has paid off, because, on days like this, it does leave some questions to be answered.

[Alistair Burt]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on his election to the office of Chairman of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs. It is an important office, which was well held by his predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Crispin Blunt), to whom we would all pay tribute. These are difficult jobs done by colleagues, and my hon. Friend did it particularly well, but we are very pleased to see my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) in his place.

It is so difficult to try to prove a negative. The authorities with which we deal in Saudi Arabia are not necessarily in a position to make their judicial decisions dependent on external pressure, and nor would we be in a similar situation. We know that allegations are made about possible executions, including those of minors, and that they then do not happen, but we do not know whether that can be laid at the door of any specific representation. I can assure my hon. Friend and the House that these representations are regularly made to a changing society and a changing judicial process in Saudi Arabia, which must, of necessity, be theirs and not ours.

Oral Answers to Questions

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 11th July 2017 Commons Chamber

[Boris Johnson]

I completely share the hon. Gentleman’s zeal and passion. The UK has in fact been in the lead on this for several years now, and we will continue to push the agenda, not just at the G20, as the Prime Minister did, but at the IWT summit that we will host in October 2018 in London.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend talk a little about his strategy on this issue, because the link between the illegal wildlife trade, smuggling, people trafficking, and lawlessness and violence in many countries is extremely real? Addressing the illegal wildlife trade may seem esoteric, but it is not: it is about the stability of many nations that are firm partners of the United Kingdom.

[Boris Johnson]

My hon. Friend is right: this is far from esoteric. It not only touches the hearts of millions of people in our country—as the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) said—but helps to cause increased human misery. The same people are involved in trade in drugs, arms and people, worth up to £13 billion a year, and we are playing a major part in frustrating that trade.

Counter-Daesh Campaign: Iraq and Syria

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 3rd November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Boris Johnson]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point that I know the whole House will want to echo. The families of our servicemen and women face hardship, anxiety and, of course, terrible personal risk.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

What a splendid troika. Tom Tugendhat.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Would my right hon. Friend care to mention whether he feels that the inaction of the west over the crimes being committed in Aleppo has empowered the Russians, should they get the opportunity in coming weeks, to seek further territorial expansion?

[Boris Johnson]

My hon. Friend, who is a student of military history, will probably agree that a critical moment for this House, and indeed for the west, came in 2013 when we could have taken another path. The military space was effectively filled 18 months ago by the Russians, and indeed by Daesh, and we are now living with the consequences of that failure.

Yemen

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Wednesday 26th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Ms Ahmed-Sheikh]

I will actually make reference to that work in a few moments. I simply cannot understand, though, why the Government are so averse to an independent UN-led inquiry into what is happening. What is the problem? What is there to hide if there is so much confidence on the Government Benches about how we are conducting ourselves?

It is clearly and undeniably the case that the Saudi-led coalition forces have bombed funerals, weddings and markets, and used banned cluster bombs on populated areas and on protected sites such as power stations. They have systematically targeted Yemen’s agriculture economy—as alluded to by the shadow Foreign Secretary—in what academics have called a programme for the destruction of the rural livelihood of Yemeni civilians. They have killed men, women and children who have been gathered at family celebrations, and they have specifically targeted bombs and missiles on sick and dying hospital patients.

The reason why that is materially different from the actions of the al-Houthi forces is that the UK does, indeed, train and support Saudi pilots. We have military personnel embedded in Saudi Arabian military command and control rooms giving advice on the selection of targets. We sell Saudi Arabia the weapons and bombs it is using and the jet planes that deliver them. We have a material stake in this disastrous conflict. We therefore have a responsibility to the people of Yemen to do the right thing. On this, the Government are failing—but do not take my word for it.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Ms Ahmed-Sheikh]

Let me make some progress, and then I will.

According to the January 2016 UN Panel of Experts report on Yemen, the coalition airstrikes have failed to uphold the cornerstone principles of proportionality and distinction in any armed attack, and have clearly failed to take all necessary precautions to avoid civilian casualties. In March this year, Amnesty International released new field-based research documenting the further use of cluster munitions by the Saudi-led coalition, including the first reported use of UK-manufactured cluster munitions in any conflict for nearly two decades.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ms Ahmed-Sheikh]

I am not giving way. The report continues:

“We recommend that the Ministry of Defence carry out its own investigation into the evidence of a UK-supplied cluster bomb found in Yemen.”

The Committee also believes that there should be an independent, UN-led investigation.

[Tom Tugendhat]

rose—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. There can be only one person on their feet. You have indicated that you want someone to give way, but if they do not, you must take your seat again.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)]

Although my heart is breaking looking at the violence and humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen, I am very proud of this Parliament. In the past seven days we have discussed Yemen twice, and 60 Members of the House are here today.

I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) and for Edmonton (Kate Osamor), the shadow Foreign Secretary and shadow International Development Secretary, for agreeing to hold this debate. I thank the Foreign Secretary for his pivotal role in ensuring that we got a ceasefire when he met John Kerry and the Saudi Arabia Foreign Minister on 16 October. I also thank the spokesperson for the Scottish National party, the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire (Ms Ahmed-Sheikh), for the way in which she and her party have raised this issue over a number of months since the last election.

In the brief time that I have, I will concentrate on the ceasefire and the UN resolution that I hope will come on Monday. The ceasefire announced last week lasted only 72 hours. Fighting and bombings have swiftly returned at an intensity identical to that seen before the brief cessation of hostilities. The ceasefire had allowed food and humanitarian supplies to reach areas that had otherwise been completely inaccessible. The special envoy, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, begged both sides for an extension to the ceasefire, but violations by both sides rendered those efforts fruitless.

We are now at a critical stage in the history of Yemen. We have said this so many times before, but now, more than at any previous time, Yemen is on the brink of disaster. That is why our concern in this House should be to bring about a permanent ceasefire in Yemen, and why all our efforts should concentrate on that critical UN meeting that will take place on Monday in New York.

I am sorry that we are going to divide on this subject this evening. I put forward an amendment that I hoped would be selected. If the House could only vote as one in favour of peace in Yemen, I would be very happy.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Keith Vaz]

I will. The hon. Gentleman has been to Yemen; indeed, he learned Arabic when he stayed there.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for mentioning that. Peace is absolutely essential. May I remind hon. Members of the various elements of the combat in Yemen and the situation regarding arms? We are talking about Saudi Arabia in this debate, but the Houthis are being backed by Iran, so Iranian weapons are going in there. Can we remember that there are two sides and two foreign parties involved?

[Keith Vaz]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right—this is much more complicated. There are many sides to this, not just two. Anyone who has dealt with Yemen or lived there for a while will know that the tribal system is extremely important. It is important that we do not make this simplistic. What is very clear is the scorecard of shame that Members have talked about today: the 21.2 million people who require urgent humanitarian assistance, 9.9 million of whom are children; the more than 10,000 people killed in the last 18 months; and the 14.1 million people at risk of hunger, the equivalent of the combined populations of London, Birmingham and Glasgow.

I welcome what the Government and the International Development Secretary have done to ensure that more money has been pledged to Yemen, but it is critical that the money is used for supplies, and that those supplies reach the people who are hungry. Otherwise, all the money we raise will not be enough to deal with the crisis. Oxfam’s chief executive, Mark Goldring, who addressed the all-party group last week, called the situation in Yemen “Syria without cameras”. I thank the hon. Member for Portsmouth South (Mrs Drummond), who was born, as I was, in Aden; the hon. Member for Charnwood (Edward Argar), another officer of the group; and the hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) for all the work they have done.

On Monday, the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart), who is not in the Chamber, said to the Prime Minister that when 7,000 people were killed in 1995 in Srebrenica, the international community acted. That is why it is so important that we not only debate today’s motion, but follow through with a resolution that will be taken on board by the whole United Nations. Despite the incredible work of Islamic Relief, Oxfam, UNICEF, Médecins sans Frontières and many others, they simply cannot get the aid in. I hope that when the Minister, who has engaged fully with the all-party group, comes to wind up the debate, he will tell us more about what can be done to ensure that the aid gets through. He will say, I think, that unless we get the ceasefire, people will starve. I commend the international community for all the work that it has done to try to ensure that the ceasefire occurs. The issue of investigations has been raised, and while it is important that we get the investigations, we need to have the ceasefire. Once we have that, any investigations to deal with violations on all sides will need to be addressed, and we will need to address the question of what arms are being used.

What concerns me and what should concern the House—I know it concerns the Foreign Secretary—is what is going to happen on Monday. In my debate last week, we were told that Britain holds all the pens as far as Yemen is concerned. That is why the instruction that the Foreign Secretary gives to our permanent representative—the excellent Matthew Rycroft, who is leading for us in New York—will be so critical. I wish that the Foreign Secretary could go to New York on Monday and argue the case, but I do not manage his diary. I think that the presence of the British Foreign Secretary at the United Nations on Monday would be critical.

Members will raise all kinds of issues, all of them important, but unless we have a permanent ceasefire, Yemen will quite literally bleed to death while we discuss them. I beg everyone involved in the process to please move together in a united way, without dividing opinion, and concentrate on that one critical issue: getting the United Nations to back a permanent ceasefire. Then the people of Yemen can actually survive.

Oral Answers to Questions

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 18th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Boris Johnson]

The hon. Lady will be interested to know that at that European Council—I participated in it fully and, if I may say so, happily, because we are still fully paid-up members—the UK delegation introduced language specifically targeting Russia and took out language seeking to create a false equivalence between Russia and the US.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend remember that in 2005, Her Majesty’s Government, along with every other member of the General Assembly of the United Nations, signed up to the responsibility to protect? Having just voted to take back control in this country, is it not appalling that we are bowing down to a bully in the middle east who, instead of taking seriously their responsibility to protect, is brutalising and murdering millions of people in Syria?

[Boris Johnson]

My hon. Friend is quite right. As you will appreciate, Mr Speaker, the UK has been in the lead in the UN Security Council in bringing pressure to bear on Russia not just on its use of chemical weapons, but on its continuing refusal to get the Syrian regime to have a ceasefire. Furthermore, we are in the lead in trying to bring all responsible parties to the International Criminal Court.

Aleppo and Syria

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 11th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Andrew Mitchell (Sutton Coldfield) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in Aleppo and more widely across Syria.

Thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting this emergency debate on the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in Aleppo and more widely across Syria. Although it was I who moved the motion applying for the debate under Standing Order No. 24, it has the strong support of the all-party parliamentary group for Friends of Syria, particularly my co-chairman, the hon. Member for Wirral South (Alison McGovern), the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock), and my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart). I am most grateful to them for the work that they do in the all-party group.

I am particularly pleased to see that the Foreign Secretary is present. The whole House will be grateful for the importance that he attaches to the debate. He has written and spoken about Syria, and I know that it is a subject on which he feels strongly. We are very pleased that the House is to hear from him this afternoon on what I think will be his first debate as Foreign Secretary

Yesterday, Mr Speaker, you had a choice between a Standing Order No. 24 application for a debate on Brexit and another for a debate on Syria. Everyone in the House will know that you made the right decision, and you explained your reasons, but I now submit that the effects of the crisis in Syria on our children and our grandchildren will be every bit as great as the effects of Brexit. Today’s debate will be watched by many people: civil society across much of the world will take an interest in the tone and the view that the House of Commons adopts this afternoon, and that is a very good thing.

At about 10 o’clock this morning there was a series of further air raids on civilian areas in Aleppo, and there are already reports of yet further casualties, maimings and deaths. As we look back at the Syrian crisis over recent years, we see that, at every turn, progress towards a solution has, alas, eluded us. First, at a relatively early stage, there was the plan put forward by Kofi Annan, the former United Nations Secretary-General, who stated specifically that as Assad was part of the problem he would by definition be part of the solution. Kofi Annan believed that Assad should be part of the negotiations, but that was vetoed by the Americans, and indeed—alas—by the British Government. Now, many years later, we understand how important it is that Assad should at least be present at the initial negotiations. He is not going to be beaten militarily, in my view, and it is clearly right for him to be there for the early part of the negotiations, as the Syrian opposition accept. However, more time has been lost.

Secondly, there was Obama’s failure to stand by the red lines that he had clearly asserted on the use of chemical weapons. That was a disastrous decision, and one from which we will suffer in the future.

Thirdly, there was the failure to provide safe havens. Much of civil society believed in the importance of providing refuge for the—now—more than 5 million Syrian men, women and children who are on the move in Syria, having been driven out of their homes. Those safe havens could, with political will, have been set up in both Idlib, which is in the north of Syria, and Daraa, which is near the Jordanian border in the south. We could, as many people have advocated, have set up no-bombing zones, but we have not done so. Today, 5 million people in Syria and 6 million outside are on the move, often unprotected, unfed and unhoused. That is the reality: nearly half the country’s population of 22 million are on the move, either inside Syria or beyond its borders.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is making a powerful case. Does he agree that, militarily, there is no reason why we could not enforce a no-fly zone when so many people are being affected? The helicopters that are dropping barrel bombs could easily be brought down by rockets based in Turkey or Lebanon, or, indeed, by our own type 45s in the Mediterranean.

[Mr Mitchell]

My hon. Friend knows far more about such military matters than I do. That is my understanding of the position: that a no-fly zone—and I will say more about this later—is perfectly feasible. It is a question of whether the international community has the political will to face down the Russians and the Syrian helicopters by setting one up.

Fourthly, there was the failure to secure unfettered access for the United Nations. It is unprecedented in recent years for those bent solely on looking after their fellow citizens to be unable to gain unfettered access to very dangerous zones. This gives me an opportunity to pay tribute to the extraordinary bravery of those who work in the humanitarian world, doing nothing other than try to assist their fellow human beings and bring them sustenance, help, medicine and support.

--- Later in debate ---

[Emily Thornberry]

I am not a pacifist, personally. I believe in using military force when it can be effective, if we can achieve the ends that we have identified, and if we know what we want to achieve. I believe that in a multi-layered, multifaceted civil war such as that in Syria, the last thing that we need is more parties bombing. We need a ceasefire and for people to draw back.

[Tom Tugendhat]

While we all look for peace, does the hon. Lady agree that sometimes backing down, looking weak and hiding one’s head achieves quite the reverse? It encourages violence, treachery and the brutality that we are seeing today.

[Emily Thornberry]

Yes, I agree, but let us be strong about this and let us put forward a plan that might work. If the hon. Gentleman will give me a moment, I will explain what I am suggesting.

I was recommending that, despite the difficulties and the anger that many parties feel, we work with the Russian Government to restore the Kerry-Lavrov peace process. That means securing and maintaining a ceasefire, isolating the jihadis and opening safe channels for humanitarian aid—we should make that the basis to negotiate a lasting peace. Looking at the situation today, we accept that that could not look further away or seem more difficult, but we need to have that goal in mind. It is the only conceivable solution and the only way to bring relief to the people of Aleppo, so how do we do it?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mary Creagh]

Absolutely. The Russian war crimes in Grozny were bravely documented by Anna Politkovskaya and another woman journalist whose name escapes me, both of whom were assassinated by the Russian regime. Of course, truth is the first casualty of war, but we do not have the fog of war to hide behind in this case. People in Aleppo are tweeting their situation and their circumstances.

We heard from the Secretary of State for Defence yesterday about how Daesh have used the conflict in Syria to recruit jihadi fighters from all over the world and to spread their terror across to Iraq. We know that the airstrikes that we are carrying out against them in Iraq and Syria, backed by a coalition of 67 countries, are slowly pushing them back in Iraq, but they will never be defeated in Syria until this conflict is sorted.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Lady is making some very powerful points. This is a fight not only for the people and the children of Aleppo—a point made so powerfully by my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell)—but very much for ourselves: the international order we all rely on, the migrant crisis we all see and the expansion of Russia we all feel. NATO, the west and the UK demand action.

[Mary Creagh]

I agree totally with the hon. Gentleman. Russia’s positioning of nuclear-capable warheads in Kaliningrad is another example of its aggression towards NATO countries.

A war that we wished was none of our business is our business. Syrian children have drowned in our seas and millions of Syrians have turned up in our continent seeking shelter. I am pleased that Wakefield has offered to take 100 Syrian refugees. We are a city of sanctuary and we look forward to welcoming them among us. These are people like us. They had cars, apartments, solar panels and satellite TV, but were forced to flee bombs, napalm, sarin gas and cluster munitions from a Government who target schools and hospitals—a Government who are aided and abetted by Russia, whose sole aim is to preserve access to the Mediterranean through its port at Tartus in Syria. Russia attacked the first humanitarian aid convoy to enter Aleppo for weeks, destroying lorries filled with baby milk and anti-lice medication.

I want to hear more from the Foreign Secretary about what plans he has for further sanctions against Russia, but we cannot claim ignorance or hide behind the fog of war. Washing our hands like Pontius Pilate and choosing not to act is no strategy at all. I was too scared to tweet from the Syrian border, but brave people in Syria are tweeting their lives and filming the deaths of others as they happen. Omar Ibrahim is a neurosurgeon, removing bomb fragments from the brains of children on the floor of a destroyed hospital, and one of 30 doctors left in eastern Aleppo. Bana Alabed, a seven-year-old girl from eastern Aleppo, tweeted last week. She wanted to live like the children of London: “No bombing!” It is not too late for us to save Omar and Bana. They are relying on us. We need to do what we should have done in 2013. We need a no-fly zone over the city of Aleppo and the skies of Syria. Omar and Bana are watching. We must not let them down again.

Humanitarian Law (Yemen)

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Monday 5th September 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Ellwood]

I recognise the interest and also the expertise that the hon. Gentleman brings to the House given his work as a Minister in the MOD. As a reservist and an ex-member of the regular forces, I would not go anywhere near any ordnance that was over 20 years old. The cluster munitions that are being discussed are well past their sell-by date. They are dangerous and should not be used by anybody.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I welcome the efforts that my hon. Friend’s Department has made in helping the Saudis with their application of international humanitarian law in the Yemeni armed conflict. Has he used any of our wonderful British imams who have served in the armed forces of the United Kingdom, many of whom have studied the sayings of Abu Bakr, the first caliph of Islam, who set out many of the rules of war that would apply very well in these circumstances, to remind the Saudis that these are not western concepts at all but actually Islamic themes?

[Mr Ellwood]

My hon. Friend touches on quite a deep issue that reflects his knowledge and expertise in this area, to which I pay tribute. I spent some of the summer reading the works of Gertrude Bell, which I know he has studied. She illustrates, and learned over a long period, the complexity that we are dealing with in today’s Saudi Arabia. We have to understand and recognise that it is a conservative society which is being obliged and encouraged to move at a far faster pace than many other countries in the world, not least in the legitimacy of running a complex and sustained campaign of war.

Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Emily Thornberry]

There is continuing debate about the matter. As long as we can be confident that a decision made in this House will not need to be taken off to the courts, for the judges, eventually, to decide whether we go to war—that would be entirely inappropriate—and as long as we can keep control of any such legislation so that it ensures that, where possible, the Government will come to Parliament and allow us to express our view, I think that that is right.

I understand that this is the system that we have at the moment, but I am concerned that although the convention continues to develop and strengthen as time goes on, it is still in the gift of the Executive to decide whether they will bring the matter to Parliament. There is an argument for putting the convention on a more formal footing, but there is the danger of court intervention. It is a moot point, and something that we must continue to look at.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s strategic lesson in the modern combat capability of Her Majesty’s armed forces. I was interested in her description of the use of special forces in almost-combat capability. Having served with various parts of Her Majesty’s forces in the past, I know that most foreign deployments are considered to be near to combat even if they are in a training role, because of the pressures on them. It is a very novel interpretation to suggest that hybrid warfare may not continue to exist.

We are getting into a rather bizarre discussion, if the hon. Lady will forgive me for saying so, on the strategy and use of the armed forces, when surely the focus should be on the legality and the appropriateness of the deployment. It might be best to stick to the areas that the House is qualified to talk about, rather than to dress up as armchair generals and pretend that we know what is going on in different areas.

[Emily Thornberry]

It is important that we look to tomorrow’s problems. Special forces are likely to be used increasingly. On the idea that we will send, for example, special forces into Libya in a training capacity, I agree with the hon. Gentleman about how that might end up a quasi-combat role. Presumably, if the training forces are in Libya, they will be in a camp. They may be in a part of Libya that is allegedly safe, but they will need to be guarded. Who will guard them? We can see how it is possible to slide down a slippery slope. At the moment, although it would be inappropriate in the case of a decision to send special forces or trainers into an area, if we can have parliamentary scrutiny of our secret service—if the behaviour of MI5 and MI6 is at least answerable to a Committee of this House—it is not beyond our wit to allow there to be similar accountability over special forces. I have written about this issue.

[Emily Thornberry]

I am grateful to the Foreign Secretary for making that point. I do not expect special forces, before they are used, to have to go before a Committee of Parliament and get permission, but I do think that there should be some form of accountability and some explanation. It was embarrassing, and it demonstrated the democratic deficit in relation to hybrid warfare, to read in the papers that the King of Jordan was gossiping with Congressmen in America about our special forces, when nobody in this House had officially been told about it. That highlights the democratic deficit in this country. We should learn lessons from Chilcot. We should learn lessons about accountability and about not simply trusting the Executive to get a decision right. We should make sure that there is more accountability, and that we are on our toes. We must be prepared to modernise our structures as necessary to reflect the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century.

Let me go back to my speech. I talked about the development of hybrid warfare and new mechanisms for holding the Executive to account, and I believe that all parties should work together on that. Another point was raised about American-British relations. Chilcot made it clear that American-British relations would not have been harmed had the UK not joined the US-led coalition. Chilcot argues that that was not a basis for joining the invasion. In my view, that is another lesson that we have not learned. In 2013, pressure from the United States played a major role in the Government’s rush to intervene in Syria. It became obvious that the US Administration’s efforts to persuade Congress to back intervention hinged on the Prime Minister’s success in persuading Parliament to do so. Speaking after our House declined to support the action in Syria, the then Defence Secretary—now the Foreign Secretary—said that the vote would “certainly” damage the Anglo-American relationship. In my view, the relationship has endured. We have got over it without any adverse consequences, and it serves as a reminder that our alliance with the United States rests on stronger foundations than an expectation of unquestioning British compliance with American wishes.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Lady speaks of the special relationship, and I would be the first to acknowledge that the relationship with the United States goes much deeper than one incident or one vote, but is it not also valid to listen to the words of various American generals, including General Jim Mattis, who, as she knows, commanded Centcom? After the vote, he pointed to the damaging impact that it would have on the enduring commitment and understanding between the US and British militaries. Does she recognise that just as that special relationship is made up of many threads, undermining it thread by thread will weaken it?

[Emily Thornberry]

I am sure that some American generals were disappointed that Harold Wilson would not agree to British involvement in Vietnam, but we got over it and our relationship is strong enough to endure differences of opinion. If we are to be good friends, it is important to recognise that good friends trust each other enough to disagree at times. The 2013 Syria vote made it clear that Parliament understood that; it also suggested that the Government did not. That is why it is such a tragedy that cuts to the Foreign Office budget have weakened Whitehall’s institutional knowledge of the world. It is important for our leadership role in the world to have proper understanding of it, and for hundreds of years we have had an insight into the world that other countries have not had. We have a leadership role, and we can have a voice that is different from that of the Americans because we will have a different understanding. To have 16% cuts in the Foreign Office year on year, and a hollowing out of our institutional knowledge, has in my view been a tragedy.

[Tom Tugendhat]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Clarke]

Two months, says my right hon. Friend. They delayed the invasion to give the British more time to get through this convoluted legal stuff—I use sarcastic words of the kind the occasional impatient American used at the time—before they could join in. The problem was that the Americans, although they went to the UN and got resolution 1441 and all the rest of it, began to lose patience, seeing that this could go on forever, and it reached the stage where they were going to invade in March 2003. They could not wait any longer. The Blair Government—those who knew what was going on—had to speed the thing up a bit, realising that if they were not careful, they would fail to get there in time.

One thing that surprises me in the Chilcot report concerns the advice the Government got from the Joint Intelligence Committee, which eventually produced enough intelligence that was plausible and no doubt believed by those putting it in the reports for the Attorney General to be persuaded—obviously quite reluctantly—that there probably was a basis for going ahead. The urgent debates then took place in this House, the last one being about two days before the date when everyone knew the troops, already in battle positions in the middle east, were about to go ahead with the operation.

We should learn the political lessons from all that. One of the first lessons relates to the ever-increasing rush to get into the position of being able to invade lawfully, so that everybody wanted to be persuaded that various things were correct and that various steps had been taken. If they had submitted themselves to slower, more challenged and more careful consideration, however, it would have led to a different conclusion.

What, then, is the outline of the main political lessons to be learned from all this? First, the American alliance should not be entered into blindly. Let me say briefly that I am as passionate a believer as Tony Blair that our alliance with the United States is crucial to this country’s future security and role in the world. There is not a trace of anti-Americanism in what I am saying; our alliance is one of the most valuable features of our foreign policy. That does not mean, however, that we should allow ourselves to go along blindly and always—right or wrong—with what the American President of the day wishes to do. I take that no further, but we might have a President Trump, so it is a question worth bearing in mind. I agree with the hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) that the American alliance will not be destroyed—it might be damaged for a month or two—if we do not absolutely go along with what the American President wants us to do.

Let me move on to something that is clear in Chilcot—though I have not made the point much myself—and was plain to see in how the Ministry of Defence behaved at the time. The advice of our defence chiefs is hugely important, and I share the support for and pride in them that keeps being expressed in these debates. Yet—subconsciously, I am sure—they always want to take part in any military activity that the Americans want them to join. It might be considered advice, but it always comes down to “We must ask the Americans to let us make as big a contribution as we can”. A trained military man is trained for the purpose of using military force in the national interest and further worthwhile objectives, and cannot help thinking, “This is our moment; this is the great action in which we must take part.”

It is the same with the intelligence services. They prize their relationship with the Americans above all other relationships they have with the outside world. They are dependent on co-operation in some ways, but they are anxious to please and to do what they think their American colleagues wish them to do. In this particular case, we had a Prime Minister and a Government who wanted to enter the war, so everybody was extremely anxious to find the facts, to be convinced of the situation and to enable the Prime Minister to go ahead and do what he wanted. That is an essential point, but it requires a simple politician like me to make it; it does not appear in the pages of the Chilcot report. When one is raising one’s eyebrows at what happened, I think that that answers a lot.

Particularly at the time we are talking about—and sometimes still today—there were not enough diplomats involved. There was not enough looking at the expertise of the Foreign Office. We had a lot of Arabists. The Americans had some, but they got rid of most of theirs and brought people in who had been involved in the Nicaraguan episode because they were seen as being ideologically more sound. Americans did not like the Arabists we had in the Foreign Office because they kept complicating things by talking about tribes and different sorts of Muslim, which the policy makers in Washington thought were irrelevant to the new era of western democracy in which they thought they were going to take the country.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Clarke]

I am sorry, but I do not have the time.

I shall not go on by adding more to the strictures about the Attorney General—[Hon. Members: “Go on!”]. The Attorney General was obviously giving the right advice. I am sitting alongside someone who was a very tough Attorney General—my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve)—who would not give the advice that eager Prime Ministers sometimes want, and neither would Michael Havers or quite a few others I recall being in government with. As has been said, that is what the Attorney General is for. I know Lord Goldsmith and he is perfectly all right. He must have felt so exposed in the end that he gave into the temptation to say, “Well, it’s just about lawful; it is just about satisfactorily proved.”

I am sorry to have taken a little longer than I intended, but let me conclude with my main point. The big thing that matters—and it matters very much as we are having a change of Government today—is how the Cabinet and Government processes come into the equation. What about accountability to Parliament? It was obvious at the time, obvious if anyone listened to what the Foreign Secretary said publicly, obvious in what half the Labour party said and obvious from listening to officials that Cabinet Government was not working properly in Tony Blair’s Government. He went in for sofa government. Margaret Thatcher got keener and keener on sofa government towards the end of her time, but Tony Blair had taken it to an art form by the time he got into issues such as Iraq. It was the same with Parliament. There was a reluctance to come to Parliament. Both were essentially seen as hurdles to be surmounted. Once you had your policy, how were you going to get it through the Cabinet and how were you going to get it past Parliament?

My suggestion for the future is that we should all agree that that is not the mindset that people should have. They should set the proposition, and, of course, advocate it to the Cabinet, and then, with the benefit of proper information, they should listen to it being debated and examined by those who have time to do so. Similarly, Parliament should be consulted when it can be, and given proper information. One should not rely on clever timing of the debate and the work of the Whips to get it through and afterwards say that there is a democratic endorsement. I have no time to apply all my strong strictures to the circumstances of the time, but I think that, if read with my arguments in mind, the Chilcot report feeds the impression that I had then, as someone who participated in debates.

Military action is difficult. There is no point in politicians being lightheartedly irresponsible and saying, “We have got to be involved in every decision.” There will be occasions when that is not possible. There will be occasions when someone has just attacked a British interest, and we have to fight back. You can tell the Cabinet and you can tell Parliament afterwards, and any sensible Cabinet and any sensible Parliament will of course endorse it. But this was not an emergency. For two years our allies had told us that they were going to invade Iraq. It had been planned. It had been worked on. It had been discussed. The reason there was not full Cabinet discussion, and the reason there was not timely parliamentary debate, was that someone who did that might not get it by them. We did not start debating the issue until Parliament until February 2003, and the final, key vote took place when the troops were in the field. That put a lot of Conservatives off the idea of voting against it, when they might otherwise have done so. Our boys were about to go into action, the next day—which is what occurred.

Some of those matters have been addressed. The National Security Council is a hugely beneficial innovation introduced by my right hon. Friend the outgoing Prime Minister, who is probably already the ex-Prime Minister. Now is not the time to debate it, but it still needs to be improved. It has not covered everything, although it is a lot better than it was. As for Cabinet government, I think that my right hon. Friends should ask themselves— if they are still in office under the next Prime Minister—whether they can ensure that adequate time is given to discuss things, and adequate information is given in advance. Cabinet government does not mean moving quickly from item to item; people must have some papers beforehand so that they can consider the issues properly.

The National Security Council is very valuable, because it contains defence and intelligence people alongside the politicians. I genuinely congratulate the outgoing Prime Minister: some of the best discussions in which I participated took place in the National Security Council, with my total approval. However, although I may be too sensitive, I think that it could be improved sometimes. There are occasions when a fait accompli is brought there and explained to you, and the defence and intelligence people explain why you should agree, and off you go.

I think it right to look into why we might have avoided what happened in Libya. The whole history of the middle east and north Africa involves our removing fascist dictatorships of the most poisonous kind from country after country, and then being surprised when they have been replaced by a situation that is, in some instances, even worse than the one that we have removed. A continuing answer to that problem needs to be sought, although at present we may have to confront even bigger problems.

I began by saying that this was the biggest foreign policy disaster of my time. We all have to ask why the institutions of the United Kingdom failed even to develop a hint of that. It was not particularly courageous for the House to vote in favour. Opinion polls showed that 70% of the British public supported the invasion. For the first week or two it was extremely popular. Had we held a referendum, which is now the fashionable way of governing the country—compared with this old-fashioned parliamentary democracy—it would have sailed through with an enormous majority. The danger of following opinion polls is shown by the fact that a year later I could not find a member of the public who had ever met anybody who agreed with the invasion of Iraq, because in the light of better information people suddenly realised it had been a terrible error.

There are Members sitting here now who were here at that time. I remember the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen) organising some of the opposition on the day I spoke in February. We voted against it, and we spoke against it. Needless to say, I have looked at my speech, and I am very sad to say that I think I predicted quite a lot of the consequences and what would happen. We all agree that, “Never again if we can avoid it,” but this is a big subject and it is no good reading the report and just saying we should have a look at the intelligence arrangements; we should have a look at other arrangements as well, such as the way our Government are run, the way this Parliament organises itself, and how we get sensible accountability to the House of Commons the next time the Government have to engage in such difficult decisions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I declare an interest in this report because I served in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and along with many colleagues from all parties in the House—some of whom are not here today—I was proud to serve my country and to stand with many enormously honourable men and women who did their best in very difficult circumstances.

I will not fight over and again the battles being fought this afternoon about Tony Blair and his guilt or otherwise, because I would rather move forward and speak about the United Kingdom’s strategy and how on earth we got ourselves into a position that meant we were so clearly acting against our own national interests. We seem to have got into a position where the only answer was to be as close as possible to the United States, and to use force at a time when other options were available. The only answer seemed to be to follow the wishes of a Prime Minister who, although he sounded powerful at the time, was clearly too weak to invite challenge, even in his own private Cabinet. For me, those are the real worries—how could we have got to that stage? There are, of course, many reasons for that, and Chilcot lists them. Today, the question is how we get out of that.

The National Security Council, introduced by the previous Prime Minister, was an excellent invention, and I look forward to our current Prime Minister taking it forward, and introducing to the various Departments that contribute to the NSC the elements that feed into it. In my former Department—I mean that as an employee rather than as a Minister, although the Prime Minister may yet call; the evening is young—the Chiefs of Staff Committee established an impressive group by going back to an old idea.

In the period between the two wars, the Chiefs of Staff Committee invented a group constantly to challenge the Treasury, the Foreign Office, and other Departments, so that they could be prepared should the worst happen. That meant that, although those Departments were not as ready as we would have liked, at least in 1939 the 10-year rule that the Treasury had imposed was no longer in force, and we were re-arming and able to defend ourselves against Nazi aggression. That Committee was reformed in the Ministry of Defence under the former Chief of the Defence Staff, General Richards. That is great, but other Departments have done less well. I will not run through them, but it seems incumbent on those who have the authority to command embassies, aid work and armies, also to be responsible for ensuring that the strategies they prepare and advise Ministers to follow are right for the United Kingdom, and not just expedient for a quick relationship with the US.

I very much welcome what my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) said about the Truman doctrine. He is right, but the Truman doctrine should not be simply a reassertion of Westphalian principles. It must today be updated with the concept of the Responsibility to Protect that the UN has made so clear over the past few years. It is right that we avoid Iraq, but it is also right that we avoid Rwanda or Srebrenica. The great error of Iraq is that it did exactly the reverse of the right to protect: it put people in greater danger. This did not happen everywhere. The Kurdish communities were often better defended because they were armed. The reality, however, was the spread of insurgency and trouble. It is hard to argue that we improved the situation, although it is very difficult to know whether we made it worse.

As we move on from that period, it is incumbent on us to consider the legal aspect. We have been talking today about the legality of the war and holding the leader in contempt, but I would like to look closely at how we hold soldiers to account. The spread of lawfare into combat zones has changed the nature of command dramatically in the past 50 to 60 years. The concept of combat immunity has been increasingly eroded. Young lieutenants and young corporals, junior leaders in the armed forces who took decisions at the age of 19, 20 or 21 in the heat of battle, are being tried today, five or 10 years later, in the cool of the courtroom. They are being tried by people who do not and cannot understand the pressures on them at that time and at that moment. They are being held to account in a way that is not only unfair but immoral. It is we here in this place who hold the responsibility for war, not the young men we send.