Pension Schemes Bill

Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank everyone for their contributions. It might take 300 years to get it right, but we do not have 300 years; we are trying to get it right in the course of a few meetings, as the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, pointed out. The noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, gave us the view from the coalface with regard to the decisions that trustees have to take and about trustees working on behalf of their members. The key concern, which is why I support these amendments, is that the default should be shaped around members’ needs and outcomes, not regulatory convenience or market consolidation by default.

The amendments in this group emphasise the importance of competition, innovation and transparency. They highlight the need for clear member communication before defaults are subject to mandation, for a value-for-money framework to be in place first and, I am afraid, for Ministers to justify why mandation is limited to automatic enrolment defaults. The amendments seek to put some meat on to what this Bill is meant to do. They are, I think, necessary to make sense of the precautions that are needed if this Bill goes forward.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I hope that the Committee will think that it makes sense if I begin with the four amendments in this group tabled in my name. I start with our probing stand-part question on Clause 45. This is a short clause, but an important one. It makes changes to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The purpose of the question is simply to understand the practical effect of those changes, particularly in the context of the wider programme of consolidation and reform of assimilated European Union law.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, who I am pleased to say is in her place and has spoken so eloquently, may feel a certain sense of déjà vu, having spent a considerable time on the Front Bench examining precisely these issues. My questions to the Minister are therefore straightforward. What, in practical terms, does Clause 45 change in the operation of the Act?

I start with some fairly basic questions for clarification. Will further secondary legislation be required to give effect to these provisions? If so, do the Government have a timetable over which they envisage this process taking place? How does this clause interact with the statutory instruments recently considered by the Grand Committee as part of the wider reform programme? This is a live and important area. As assimilated European Union law becomes domestic law and increasingly interacts with our financial institutions, the FCA and other relevant regulators, it is essential that Parliament has clarity on how these changes fit together and where accountability lies.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I have just a short comment. The Minister needs to explain why existing protections are insufficient and how this power will be constrained in practice. The concern is that lowering the evidential bar for intervention risks undermining legal certainty, which we have before intervention, and then trust in the scheme governance. An override of contractual terms should be firmly evidence-based and used sparingly. When there is a contract and we are saying that the contract could be overridden, we need to know with some facts in what circumstances it can be overridden for some wider purpose which the Government think is needed. I do not think that is proven as yet.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I speak briefly to Amendment 175, tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. This amendment relates to new Section 117D, the best interests test as set out in Clause 48. This new section establishes the test that must be satisfied before a unilateral change can be made. It requires a provider to reasonably conclude that such a change is reasonably likely to lead to

“a better outcome for the directly affected members … (taken as a whole)”

and to

“no worse an outcome for the other members of the scheme”,

also taken as a whole.

Many of the questions that my noble friend and the noble Baroness have raised reflect concerns that have been put to us during scrutiny of the Bill. In particular, there remains uncertainty about what, in practice, is meant by a better outcome, and how that judgment will be assessed, evidenced and challenged. I say again, as we have said on different parts of the Bill, that we believe we need definitions and clarity.

We will listen carefully to the Minister’s response on this point. The clarity and robustness of the best interests test are critical, particularly where changes may occur without the explicit consent of individual members. If that clarity is not forthcoming, this may well be an issue to which we will need to return.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and others for their contributions. Clause 48 inserts new Part 7A, on

“Unilateral changes to pension schemes”,


referred to as “contractual override”, into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. As has been clear, that will enable providers of FCA-regulated DC workplace pension schemes to override the terms of a pension scheme without the consent of individual members. To be clear, that will mean that providers will be able to transfer members to a different pension scheme, to make a change that would otherwise require consent, or to vary the terms of members’ contracts. The Bill provides important protections around the use of such powers, which I will come on to.

The noble Lord, Lord Palmer, asked why we want to do this—why change anything? I will explain. Providers can have thousands of DC arrangements for different employers, which will include a large number of legacy schemes that predate the introduction of auto-enrolment. Some of those arrangements will be delivering poor value for members but, due to the challenges of engaging with members, there is often little that providers can do about it. That is because, currently, providers have to gain individual consent from each member of the scheme to enact the changes that will be allowed under this part. That is time-consuming, costly and often simply impractical. In many cases, members will not even have kept their contact details updated.

Contractual override aims to address that issue and, in doing so, it would establish broad equivalence with the trust-based market, where trustees already have the power to conduct bulk transfers. The measure is necessary to help drive better outcomes for members and help to establish fewer larger pension schemes that are delivering value for money, supporting the scale measures and value-for-money framework also implemented by the Bill.

We want to protect consumers, so the Bill introduces a number of important safeguards, including the best interests test, which must be met and certified by an independent person with sufficient expertise before a contractual override can occur. That test is the focus of the amendments. Amendment 175 from noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, probes the test to assess whether this should proceed. She asked about the relationship to the FCA’s consumer duty—I think she asked why we need it at all if we have the FCA consumer duty. The answer is to provide an additional and clear safeguard. We believe that that is necessary given the nature of what is being provided for here.

However, the Government are committed to making sure that this works well. We will continue to work closely with the FCA as it beds in the consumer duty, and to engage with stakeholders about their experience of the duty and its impact. The FCA will develop its rules for contractual override in its usual manner and will consult on that, so there will be an opportunity for people to respond to the way that engages and to identify any of the issues that have been raised.

Amendment 175A from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would alter the threshold for the best interests test from requiring that a change is “reasonably likely” to achieve a better outcome to requiring that “there is evidence” that the change will achieve a better outcome. I will explain why the Government believe that our test strikes the right balance between providing robust consumer protections and still making it practical for schemes to carry out a contractual override where it is the right thing to do. The test itself allows for a contractual override to take place only when the provider has reasonably concluded that the change is reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for directly affected members and no worse an outcome for the other members of the scheme. I will break down some of the specific requirements that must be met for it to be satisfied. First, the provider must conclude that it is “reasonably likely” that the contractual override will lead to a better outcome for directly affected members, taken as a whole, and no worse an outcome for the other members taken as a whole.

The provision accounts for the fact that, although no provider can predict the future with certainty, they must conclude based on the information available, with a reasonable level of certainty, that the outcome is better for the directly affected members taken as a whole and no worse an outcome for the other members taken as a whole. That means that the provider must clearly evidence this assertion in order to proceed. We believe that changing the test from “reasonably likely” to “there is evidence”, as in the amendment, would lower the threshold of the test and reduce consumer protection, because the alternative wording provides no requirements about the strength of the evidence and leaves open the possibility that decisions could be taken on the basis of limited or poor evidence. By contrast, the existing wording requires providers to demonstrate that the outcome is a real prospect.

Secondly, a provider must reasonably conclude that the test is met. This requirement is deliberately included to address the risk of a provider reaching a conclusion that is not based on valid evidence or reasoning. The FCA, as the regulator responsible for contract-based workplace pensions, must make detailed rules regarding contractual override. That includes rules about the considerations and information that providers must take into account in determining whether the best interests test is met. As I have said, the FCA will develop those rules in its usual manner, which will include consultation.

Finally, new Section 117E requires that an independent person, with expertise to be defined in FCA rules, has to certify that the best interests test has been met, providing a further safeguard.

Overall, the contractual override policy establishes broad equivalence with the trust-based market and, in doing so, it delivers on a long-requested industry ask, promotes better member outcomes—which is key—and helps to achieve the wider goals for DC pensions that this Bill will deliver. We believe it strikes the right balance, and I hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.

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Moved by

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

176: Clause 49, page 68, line 4, leave out subsection (3)
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a probing amendment which seeks to test the definition of “default pension benefit solution”.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Scott of Needham Market) (LD)]

I should inform the Committee that, if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 177 for reasons of pre-emption.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak to this group of amendments on guided retirement. Perhaps I should begin by saying that we welcome the direction of travel set out in the Bill in this area. The Minister will perhaps be pleased to hear that.

Poor outcomes at decumulation have long represented one of the most persistent weaknesses in the defined contribution system, and there is a strong and widely accepted case for providing better support to savers who do not or cannot make active and confident choices at the point of retirement. We will continue to engage constructively with the Government to ensure that these reforms succeed. However, their success will depend not on intent alone but on whether the framework is workable in practice, sufficiently clear in its operation and properly aligned across regulatory regimes. It is in this constructive and probing spirit that I have tabled Amendment 176, together with clause stand part notices on Clauses 49, 50, 51 and 57, which I will take together for the sake of brevity.

Amendment 176 seeks to probe the definition of a default pension benefit solution, and in particular how such defaults will be framed in practice. The Bill recognises, rightly, that default solutions will not be suitable for everyone, and it therefore requires trustees to consider members’ circumstances, needs, interests and characteristics when designing them, including the possibility of different defaults for different cohorts of members. That principle is sound, but it immediately raises an important practical question: how, in reality, are trustees expected to carry out these assessments in a consistent, proportionate and defensible way?

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I do not know who we had in mind when we were designing this measure, but I am pretty confident that it was not the noble Baroness. If she were to ring up and say, “I want to take my pension pot”, and we said, “Here is a solution”, she would absolutely be able to say, “Do you know what? I don’t want to do that, thank you very much. I already know what I want to do with it”, or to have a conversation about the alternatives. This is really aimed at and concerned with those who would not be in a good position to make these complex decisions.

However, the consultation will explore these things. We have already talked about what kinds of thing trustees might have to take into account. There will be a range of things. If there is anything specific on which I can write to the noble Baroness, I will do so, but the intention is to consult on the nature of how this will work in practice and all of the design requirements. That is one of the reasons for keeping so much in regulations: to keep it flexible.

We are already finding, though, that providers are coming up with interesting, innovative solutions. Some schemes are offering flex then fix, which would give some flexibility in the years ahead. There are schemes that are doing different things, and we do not want to shut those down because we want there to be alternatives. I do not want to give the impression that we are forcing people into it, that they have to do only one thing before being allowed to take their pension or that their pension freedom has been taken away; none of that has happened because that is not what we are trying to do. I thank the noble Baroness for giving me the opportunity to clarify that.

Amendment 180 would remove regulation-making powers to enable the charging of fees for transfers to be prohibited or limited. The Government recognise that pension schemes rely on the charges they impose on members to operate the administration of the scheme effectively. There is an existing cap on charges, which can be placed on default funds under auto-enrolment, whose purpose is to shield individuals from high and unfair charges that could significantly erode their savings. The guided retirement measures were very conscious. They will introduce the concept of a default route and were, therefore, alive to the risk that individuals placed in a default plan may not scrutinise the costs involved. Therefore, we expect to consult on any detailed policy set out in regulations; we would test any assumptions about the impact of introducing a cap or a prohibition, including for transfers, as part of that consultation.

The Clause 51 and 57 stand part notices from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, seek confirmation that Clause 51 will provide members with clear and consistent information. I am very happy to provide that assurance. The Government understand the power of communications and the importance of members understanding the default pension plan provided by the scheme, alongside the other options. Through this clause, the Government have the power to specify the format and structure of communications. There is also a requirement that all communications issued by schemes are in clear and plain language to help members make better decisions regarding their retirement income when they wish to do so.

As the noble Viscount mentioned, Clause 53 requires the development of a “pensions benefit strategy” by relevant pension schemes, which will be expected to include details of how the scheme will communicate its default pension plans to its members. Schemes will have to make these strategies available to scheme members and to the regulator for effective scrutiny; the Bill includes corresponding arrangements in respect of FCA-regulated providers. As a minimum, we expect the strategy to present the evidence base for the chosen default or defaults to give the member the opportunity to compare their circumstances and those on which the default is based.

Clause 57 is the corresponding provision in relation to FCA-regulated schemes. This inserts into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 a new section that will deliver default pension benefit solutions to FCA-regulated pension schemes, ensuring that members on both sides of the market benefit from default solutions. Clause 57 requires the FCA to make rules, having regard to the rest of Chapter 6 of the Pension Schemes Bill, to make default plans available to members of FCA-regulated pension schemes. This helps ensure that regulatory frameworks are aligned and that members experience broadly equivalent outcomes; it also maintains fairness and consistency across the market. Clause 57 also requires the FCA to aim to ensure, as far as is possible, that the outcomes to be achieved by its rules in relation to this chapter achieve the same outcomes as the rest of this chapter achieves in relation to schemes regulated by TPR.

The noble Viscount asked how schemes will be supported rather than forced into defensive behaviour. The regulator will issue guidance for all trust schemes. DWP officials have been engaging, and will continue to engage, with industry ahead of introduction, including through formal consultation.

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked why the negative procedure and why the affirmative one. The affirmative procedure has been used for certain delegated powers where the power touches on a central aspect of the policy. For example, the power in Clause 49(4)(d) can be used to influence the defaults designed and offered by a scheme, so the affirmative procedure is used.

I have tried to answer all the questions that were asked. I hope that those explanations have been helpful and that noble Lords will feel able to withdraw or not press their amendments.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, before I conclude on this group, I thank in particular my noble friend Lady Noakes for her probing amendments, which ask a number of important questions.

I will make a few points and rounding-up comments but, before I do, I want to pick up on my noble friend Lord Trenchard’s remarks. I must admit that I was very surprised to hear the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on his view of the pensions landscape; they were fairly forceful. As he will expect, I entirely disagree with his comments. I just make the point that our party brought in improvements to auto-enrolment and introduced the dashboard system; I pay tribute to my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lady Stedman-Scott. I have more to say but I will give way.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I just want to pick up the noble Viscount’s point about auto-enrolment. It was a Labour Government and a Labour Bill that introduced automatic enrolment. The only change that the coalition made was to delay it, thereby reducing people’s future pensions.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

We brought this into effect. Of course, that takes us back to the coalition in 2010-15, but so much has been done since then. I will not go on but, if the noble Lord feels so strongly about this, why does he not probe his own Government more on why there is nothing in the Bill about saving more for retirement? I have not even mentioned the points in the Budget on salary sacrifice. I just wanted to get that in, as the noble Lord has become quite political.

Moving on swiftly, Amendment 177 probes whether all default pension benefit solutions are required to provide a regular income and whether that income must necessarily be for life. Here, I pay some respect to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, because he rightly used the expression “pathways for people”, which are what this is all about. I am grateful to the Minister for providing some clarification on this point. She used a very good expression, “freedom to choose”, which is key in our discussion on this particular group.

However, given the significance of this issue for members’ retirement outcomes, it is vital that this clarity is communicated, not just within this Committee but clearly and consistently to those whom these reforms are intended to serve. My noble friend Lord Fuller spoke about the importance of personalisation, which I think is a very good expression.

Communication will be especially important in the context of guided retirement, where members may reasonably assume that a default implies a particular structure or guarantee unless told otherwise. The use of the word “default” is more than semantic, as I know the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, has laid out in the past—I note she is not in her place. Ensuring that expectations are properly set will be central to building confidence and avoiding confusion at the point of retirement. Again, my noble friend Lord Fuller raised the importance of ensuring that certain cohorts must be particularly noticed and properly treated.