Pension Schemes Bill

Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts

Monday 23rd February 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

207: After Clause 117, insert the following new Clause—
“Review of impact of this Act on retirement incomes(1) The Secretary of State must, within five years of the passing of this Act, carry out a review of the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes.(2) Further reviews must be carried out at intervals of not more than five years thereafter.(3) Each review must consider—(a) the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes, and(b) whether additional measures are required to ensure that pension scheme members receive an adequate income in retirement.(4) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of each review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I hope noble Lords have had a restful recess. It is a pleasure to open the first debate on the final day in Committee on this Bill, and I look forward to hearing further and final contributions from noble Lords on this stage of the Bill.

Today, we continue to discuss important issues relating to pension schemes which of course ultimately matter greatly to the millions of individuals who are saving for, or who have saved for, their pensions, and who rely hugely if not wholly on these funds until the end of their lives. With that thought in mind, I turn first to Amendment 207, tabled in my name, which calls for a review of the impact of this legislation on retirement incomes.

When one reflects on the debates we have had in recent weeks, it is clear that they have been concerned not with procedure for its own sake but with the underlying architecture of the pensions system. The question before us has been whether the framework we are constructing will in practice enable schemes to deliver outcomes for their members. The provisions in this legislation are intended to change behaviour and outcomes: if they were not, there would be little purpose in legislating. The Government do not bring forward measures of this scale merely to rearrange, streamline or clarify administrative detail; they do so because they believe the system can and must function better.

So the objective, surely, should be clear: pension schemes should deliver stronger, more reliable outcomes for their members over the long term. Costs should be considered, but they must not become a proxy for value. The true measure of success is whether savers receive adequate and sustainable incomes—for example, the tax decisions by the Government of the time, or for inflation. Above all, schemes must operate with a single disciplined focus to act in the long-term interest of those whose savings they are entrusted to manage. If the Bill, on becoming an Act, succeeds in that ambition, it will deserve praise; if it falls short, as some noble Lords have cautioned it might, we must be able to say so clearly and respond accordingly. Amendment 207 would therefore simply ensure that we have the opportunity to assess whether the legislation has improved adequacy of income in retirement, and if not, to consider what further measures may be required.

I hope noble Lords will agree that this is a measured and sensible provision. It simply asks Ministers and departments to assess objectively what is working, to identify where improvement may be required, and to report their conclusions transparently to Parliament. In a policy area as long term, complex and consequential as pensions, that degree of accountability is essential.

I now turn to Amendment 211, which is more technical but no less important. It would require Ministers to undertake a full and transparent review of why employee and employer pension contributions are treated differently for the purposes of income tax and national insurance. If two forms of pension contributions are treated differently by the tax system, the Government should be able to explain why, clearly, publicly and with evidence. Tax design should be intentional, not simply the accumulated product of historical accident or, indeed, incremental drift.

The truth is that drift is not unique to any one Administration; it is often perceived as a feature or function of government itself. Complex systems evolve over decades; measures are introduced for sound reasons at the time, adjusted in response to fiscal pressure, amended again in the light of political compromise, and gradually layered one upon the other. In essence, “It seemed the right approach at the time” is a mantra, or even a cliché, which Governments in general find difficult to scrutinise as time marches on.

Reflection in government is not easy. Departments are occupied with immediate pressures, and many probably agree with me that those pressures have never been as great as they are at present. Chancellors face short-term fiscal constraints and Ministers must respond to events. In such circumstances, stepping back to ask first-principles questions can be difficult, yet it is precisely that discipline that Parliament should require.

In truth, we are all susceptible to accepting inherited structures without always interrogating whether the original rationale still holds. That is not a criticism; it is a recognition of institutional reality. But where differential tax treatment affects incentives, savings behaviour and long-term retirement outcomes, we have a responsibility to ask why the distinction exists and whether it remains justified. Amendment 211 offers a challenge to this Government: a transparent review would simply ensure that the current approach rests on deliberate policy choice.

At present, employer contributions receive more favourable treatment for national insurance purposes than employee contributions. That differential treatment shapes behaviour. It affects how remuneration is structured, how salary sacrifice operates and ultimately how pensions are accumulated. Pension saving is not a loophole; it is a public good. It reduces future dependency on the state, supports long-term investment and reflects the principle that income saved for retirement should not be taxed more heavily than income spent today. A structured review would require Ministers to demonstrate the behavioural impacts of the current system, its effect on savings rates and its interaction with automatic enrolment. It would ensure that we are not driven by short-term revenue considerations at the expense of long-term saving and fiscal sustainability.

This issue is especially relevant in light of the National Insurance Contributions (Employer Pensions Contributions) Bill, to which my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, who is not in her place, and my noble friend Lord Altrincham have been responding on behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition. Many of the arguments advanced in that debate bear directly on the substance of this amendment. Recent decisions to increase the tax burden associated with pension saving, including the reduction in the availability and attractiveness of salary sacrifice arrangements, will have consequences across this space. These measures do not operate in isolation: they alter incentives, shape behaviour and affect the very architecture of workplace saving.

It is immediately apparent to pension providers, employers and practitioners that such changes do not, in practice, fall solely on the highest earners. They bear down on those in the middle of the income distribution and, in some cases, below it. Those impacted include young professionals in high-cost cities and mid-career workers seeking to close gaps in their retirement provision, typically earning between £30,000 and £60,000 a year. Given that the average salary in the United Kingdom is just over £37,000, it is difficult to describe individuals within that range as high earners. They are lower-income and middle-income earners, doing precisely what successive Governments have encouraged them to do: to save consistently and prudently for their retirement.

If we reduce the incentives for employer pension contributions through national insurance changes, we must, at the very least, understand the wider implications for pension accumulation, automatic enrolment participation and long-term adequacy of retirement incomes. We should not allow pension policy to become a vehicle for short-term fiscal expediency, nor should we undermine confidence in long-term saving through uncertainty or opacity. Stability and clarity are essential if individuals are to commit a meaningful share of their income to retirement provision over decades.

So Amendment 211 does not seek to dictate an outcome; it seeks an explanation. It asks the Government to set out clearly the rationale for differential treatment within the pensions framework and to consider whether that treatment remains justified in light of our shared objectives: retirement adequacy, fairness between different earners, and sustainable economic growth.

A natural extension of that argument is my Amendment 213, which calls for a review of employment rates and pension adequacy. With the Pensions Commission, under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, reporting in 2027, we recognise that the Government have chosen then to opine and report on the structure of the pensions market before turning to questions of pensions adequacy as a stage two exercise. That is their sequencing decision. However, adequacy cannot remain a secondary consideration indefinitely. If the commission is to revisit the long-term sustainability of the system, it must also grapple with who the system is working for and who it is not. During previous discussions in Committee, the Minister pledged to write about the timeliness of stage two and adequacy. How is she getting on with that reply, and where are we on the timeline on adequacy?

Amendment 211 would specify that the review must consider the pension adequacy of workers who are in part-time or insecure work, the pension adequacy of those who take career breaks and parental leave, and the impact of regional labour market disparities on pension outcomes. If pension policy continues to assume linear, full-time, uninterrupted employment, it will systematically underserve large sections of the population.

In conclusion, adequacy matters. I will not rehearse the statistics relating to those who are not saving enough, but the figures are stark. I have spoken at length, as have others in this Committee, about the risks of drifting into a system that is technically sound in structure but insufficient in outcome. A pension system that does not deliver adequate retirement incomes will, in time, recreate the very pressures on the state that automatic enrolment was designed to reduce.

We believe that these amendments are modest. They ask for transparency, analysis and review, not prescription. They aim to ensure that fairness and adequacy sit alongside structural reform. For these reasons, I commend these amendments to the Committee and I beg to move.

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, I will intervene briefly in support of my noble friend’s amendment—not on the specifics but because, having read again the 42nd report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which refers directly to this legislation, it has become ever more obvious that this skeleton, which has taken up an enormous amount of time and is in itself highly complex, leaves an enormous number of question marks. It leaves an enormous number of doubts and concerns, most of which the Government are placing at their own disposal through secondary legislation, which is at this point equally uncertain.

Therefore, it seems absolutely essential that, when there are proposals such as those we have just heard from my noble friend—to review the commencement of the legislation, or to have reviews on a five-yearly basis, or indeed in any other ways, of some of the more complex areas—the Government should concede that that is appropriate in a Bill of this kind. I do not think I have ever read in my time here such a clear statement as that made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee about the nature of legislation. It would be serious enough if it were dealing with a Bill with very few clauses and of little import, but this is of such a substantial nature. The report we have read condemning the nature of the Bill for not having the flesh around those skeletal bones is notable and important. The Government should therefore be much more amenable to the sort of sensible proposals being made in the amendments of my noble friend.

I do not wish to speak further on this, but it seems terribly important that—whether it is dealt with now or at a later stage—there be an understanding that the Bill is entirely dependent upon future secondary legislation. Standing alone is, I am afraid, an unacceptable set of provisions.

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This has been a very interesting debate but, given all that, I thank the noble Viscount and hope that he feels able to withdraw his amendment.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I am very conscious that I spoke at some length in my opening speech, so I will be brief in closing and do not intend to question the Minister too much on the points that she made. I will say only that, as my noble friend Lord Kirkhope rightly said, pensions are complex and need to be well thought through. This is a skeleton Bill, which we have pointed out in many of the debates, but I understand that, as the Minister said, it is important to look long term.

I have only one question. I may not be the only one who is confused about the timings of the commission. I think the Minister said that an interim report is being produced by the commission this spring and leading through to early 2027 pensions adequacy will be included in that report and the commission will set out options for the Government to comment on. I am putting words into the Minister’s mouth. I wonder whether she can confirm exactly where we stand on pensions adequacy. It may be that that will be in the letter that is being written, which might come my way.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

A letter is being prepared and will be sent after Committee. I want to put on record the timings and to be very clear about them. The interim report will be published this spring, and the aim is for the final report to be in early 2027. I will put any further detail in the letter to the noble Viscount.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I am sorry to labour this like a long-playing record, but will pensions adequacy be included in that report? Or are we looking for something further?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

The Pensions Commission is there to look at the adequacy and sustainability of the pension system; that is its job.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I would be grateful if the Minister would let me look at the letter, anyway; it is important to see that in detail.

To conclude, I want to pick up on Amendment 214 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, concerning a universal pension advice entitlement. The context for this amendment is certainly well understood. The structure of pension provision has altered fundamentally over recent decades, and most private sector workers are now members of defined contribution schemes rather than defined benefit schemes. As we know, defined benefit schemes provided a predictable income for life; by contrast, defined contribution schemes require individuals to determine contribution levels, investment choices, consolidation of pension pots and the manner and timing of drawing retirement income. The risks associated with investment performance and longevity now rest primarily with the saver rather than the sponsoring employer.

In that environment, the case for improved engagement is compelling. Without appropriate support, individuals might under-save, remain invested in default arrangements without appreciating the degree of risk involved or make irreversible decisions at retirement without a full understanding of the consequences. There are also wider public policy implications. Inadequate retirement provision can increase reliance on means-tested benefits, intensify pressure on the state pension and contribute to intergenerational fiscal strain. In that sense, the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, has identified a matter of genuine structural importance.

However—this chimes with the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Davies—there are practical considerations that cannot be ignored. The amendment refers to free and impartial pension advice. In regulatory terms, advice is distinct from guidance. Regulated advice requires authorisation by the FCA, entails suitability obligations and carries legal liability. To extend personalised regulated advice as a universal entitlement would require significant capacity, funding and oversight, and it would not be a modest undertaking. I reiterate that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, and the Minister. The complexity of the system is real but so too are the operational and financial implications of delivering such an entitlement at scale, although I appreciate the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, bringing this up; it has been a valuable debate.

With that, I will dwell on what has been said in this debate in Hansard to work out what we might bring back on Report but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 207 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

208: After Clause 117, insert the following new Clause—
“Review of pension communications and financial promotion rules(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, conduct a review of all legislation and regulatory rules governing marketing, financial promotion and member communications in relation to occupational and personal pension schemes.(2) The review must consider whether existing rules unduly restrict pension providers from—(a) communicating risks, warnings, and comparative information to scheme members;(b) providing guidance on fund choice, consolidation, and value for money;(c) supporting informed member decision-making without constituting regulated financial advice.(3) The Secretary of State must lay a report of the review before both Houses of Parliament.”

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the two amendments in this group, Amendments 208 and 210, tabled in my name. The proposed new clause in Amendment 208 would create a permissive power for Ministers to help employers to understand and navigate the different pension options available to them, including the choice between salary sacrifice and ordinary contributions.

Since the introduction of automatic enrolment, employers must provide workplace pensions as a default. This comes with an opt-out for employees, although opt-out rates are very low, happily. This reform has rightly been regarded as a success: participation has increased dramatically and millions more people are now saving for retirement. But although participation has improved, the structure through which those pensions are delivered remains complex. Employers may offer standard employee and employer contributions; operate salary sacrifice arrangements, whereby pension contributions are made before tax and national insurance; choose between different occupational schemes; use master trusts; or establish single-employer schemes. Each of those options carries different financial implications, administrative consequences and regulatory requirements.

For large firms with human resources departments and access to professional advisers, navigating these choices is manageable. However, for small and medium-sized enterprises, often it is not. This amendment simply gives Ministers the power to publish comparative guidance, provide decision-making tools, issue best practice principles and clarify regulatory compliance requirements. It does not mandate a particular scheme, it does not impose a new burden; it equips employers with information, and in short, reduces confusion.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for his remarks and support, and to the Minister for the details she provided in her response, which I appreciate. While I am of course disappointed that the Government are not able to accept these amendments today, I recognise that this is a matter of balance and practical implementation, rather than fundamental disagreement.

On Amendment 210 in particular, I appreciate that there is already a careful line between acting in members’ best interests and avoiding what might be construed as advertising or product steering. The noble Baroness made that distinction too. This is precisely why I believe that a structured review would be valuable, to ensure that we are getting that balance right as the system evolves. Picking up on an offer—I think it was an offer—from the Minister, I would be happy to work with her and the Government between now and Report to consider how this might be framed in a constructive and proportionate way, but I acknowledge what she said in her closing remarks.

More broadly, on helping employers, particularly smaller firms—the Minister also mentioned this—to navigate pension arrangements with greater clarity, I accept that work is under way through regulators and guidance bodies, but as the system grows more sophisticated, there is merit in ensuring that political focus and strategic direction remain strong. If employers are central to delivering retirement security, then supporting them effectively is surely not optional but integral to the success of the framework. However, with that, and in the spirit of continued engagement, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 208 withdrawn.

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[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I urge the Minister in her reply to stress the need for caution in this area. I am afraid I understand what the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, is saying: we do seem to have been waiting a long time for the dashboard. However, I have always had questions about the private sector dashboard, and I think they can be answered only as and when the MaPS dashboard is up and running. The problem at heart—and it may be a caricature—is about the point of a private sector dashboard. It could all too easily be a way of getting hold of data. It is the old saying that you are not the customer, you are the product. That is the fear with the private sector dashboard, which is why we have to get the public sector dashboard up and working. We know what the issues are. It may be necessary to have private sector dashboards, but I am still not totally convinced.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak in broad support of Amendment 218D, tabled by my noble friend Lady Coffey.

Let me start by recording my thanks to the Minister, the Pensions Dashboards Programme team and MaPS for the recent briefing session afforded to noble Lords, which was thorough; I felt that it was constructive, and, if I may say so, reassuring in so many respects. We heard that some three-quarters of workplace and personal pension memberships—that is, around 60 million people—are now connected to the ecosystem. This is no small achievement; we should acknowledge that. We were told that the October 2026 connection deadline remains on track, which is of course welcome.

Connecting schemes to the system is one stage, while ensuring that the dashboard operates effectively for consumers is another. Delivering the money helper dashboard, important though that is, is not the same as establishing a fully functioning marketplace that includes private sector dashboards. These are separate phases of the programme and ought to be treated as such.

In that context, we were taken through the money helper dashboard and its intended customer journey. It is a significant and necessary first step—no one disputes that—but it is explicitly designed to be the foundation, not the finished structure. The question that therefore arises is a straightforward one: what is the clearly defined pathway from that foundation to the wider ecosystem that Parliament was originally invited to envisage?

As my noble friend Lady Coffey said, the Government have confirmed, most recently in October 2024, that the money helper dashboard will be made available to the public before any private sector dashboards are permitted to launch. I understand this sequencing to some extent. It is sensible to test the system, assess customer behaviour and ensure that it is secure and reliable. To that extent, I understand the approach that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has taken; he used the word “caution”. However, mine is a slightly different point—it chimes with those from the noble Baroness and my noble friend Lady Coffey—which is that there should be at least a plan and a timetable.

The Government have stated their commitment to private sector dashboards in principle. A commitment in principle must now be matched by clarity in practice, which is why I think that my noble friend’s amendment is very much necessary. When do the Government expect private dashboards to be authorised? If a firm date cannot yet be provided, can the Minister at least set out the framework within which that decision will be taken? What are the stages? What are the criteria? What is the intended sequence of regulatory approvals? Over what period do the Government expect those steps to be completed?

We are told that private dashboards will proceed only once the service is judged to be reliable, safe and secure, and once, of course, it has satisfied the FCA, the Department for Work and Pensions, the Pensions Regulator and MaPS. This is entirely proper, but does that mean that no indicative timetable can be offered until every test has been passed? Surely not. Is there no internal planning assumption or projected window? How are industry participants expected to prepare if there is no sense of when authorisation might realistically occur? Is there not a risk that the programme becomes defined solely by the October 2026 connection deadline? What sits beyond that date? What is the Government’s intended next milestone? Without a clear forward plan—this is my point—how can Parliament assess progress?

My noble friend’s amendment does not seek to override safeguards. It simply seeks clarity and discipline. The proposal that the FCA should open the gateway to private dashboard operators within six months of the public dashboard going live would establish a reasonable and clear expectation. If the Government disagree with that period, what alternative do they propose? What is their preferred timetable?

There is also a practical issue, which cannot be ignored, because the successful introduction of private dashboards will depend heavily on data quality; that has been mentioned. What is the Government’s current assessment of the accuracy and completeness of data across connected schemes? Where are the known weaknesses, and what remedial action is under way? How frequently is data quality being tested and reported?

I know that this is a familiar question that has been asked as we have been taken through the progress on the dashboards programme—I have been very grateful for the updates—but what engagement is taking place with schemes and providers to ensure that preparation extends beyond technical connection and moves towards operational readiness? Are the communications with industry focused only on meeting connection deadlines, or do they also address the standards required for a competitive, consumer-facing environment?

In conclusion, this programme has significant potential, but potential must be matched by a structured plan. Parliament is entitled to understand not only where the programme stands today but where it is going and on what timetable. My noble friend Lady Coffey is right to press for that clarity and, unapologetically, I have asked a lot of questions that chime with her. I await the Minister’s response with interest.