Pension Schemes Bill

Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 16th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, we again understand the intention behind this amendment from the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. We also recognise the strength of feeling that exists on the question of pre-1997 indexation; I listened carefully just now to that strength of feeling behind the noble Viscount’s remarks. It is an issue that has been raised in this House and, separately, we have had discussions ourselves with representatives of a number of the campaigns that have taken a close interest in this matter. We have heard the arguments that they have put forward and understand clearly where this amendment is coming from and why it has been tabled.

However, we feel that there is an important principle at stake here. The noble Viscount said that his amendment was not perfect, but I will continue. The foundation of the occupational pensions system is fiduciary duty. Trustees and scheme managers are entrusted with the stewardship of pension funds on the basis that they must act in the best interests of scheme members and beneficiaries. That is the basic and fundamental point on which the entire system operates. It is also the basis on which people engage with the system in the first place: members can have confidence that those responsible for managing their pension savings are legally bound to act in their interests.

Once we begin to qualify or redefine what those best interests are, however well-intentioned the objective may be, we risk undermining that principle. If Parliament starts directing or reshaping how that duty should be interpreted in particular circumstances, we may end up tying the hands of the very people who are trusted to make those judgments. Trustees could find themselves placed in a position where they are, effectively, required to act in a way that they themselves do not believe is in the best interests of members, based on their professional judgment and their understanding of the scheme’s funding position.

I believe that would represent a concerning precedent. The strength of the current framework lies precisely in the fact that those decisions are taken by trustees exercising their fiduciary responsibilities, not by central direction or legislative qualification of what those responsibilities ought to mean in practice. We will, of course, hear more about the point that I am making on Thursday.

For these reasons, although we recognise the concerns that have given rise to this amendment and the sincerity with which they are held, we are cautious about moving in a direction that could weaken the clarity and independence of fiduciary duty within our pensions system. We regret that we are therefore not in a position to support this provision becoming a feature of the pensions landscape. I am sorry to disappoint the noble Viscount to that extent.

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, for introducing his Amendment 22. Many members of defined benefit, or DB, schemes have seen inflation erode the value of their pensions, as he said. That is especially true where any uplift on older benefits depends on decisions made at the level of the scheme. I want him to know that I hear those concerns loud and clear. I have heard them expressed by affected pensioners, as many Members will, and I understand the strength of feeling among them.

As the House will know, schemes take different approaches to indexation: some schemes have to provide increases under their rules; some do not require them at all; and a significant number allow discretionary increases, but usually only where both trustees and the sponsoring employer agree. This amendment focuses on the role of trustees in relation to pre-1997 discretionary indexation. The fact is that, in many schemes, such indexation can be awarded only where the sponsoring employer provides consent, which reflects the scheme rules. It means that trustees may be unable to award uplifts where employers are unwilling to agree, even in well-funded schemes.

I recognise why many schemes give employers a central role. Employers ultimately stand behind the scheme and may have legitimate concerns about future affordability and their long-term liabilities. But the result is that when employers are unwilling to support discretionary increases, even when the scheme is in a strong funding position, trustees are, effectively, prevented from acting. I understand that that limitation creates concern, especially in schemes that appear well-funded and may be running surpluses but are not providing discretionary uplifts on older benefits.

However, although I understand the challenge, we cannot accept Amendment 22 because—the noble Viscount identified this himself—it would require a statutory review of trustees’ fiduciary duty in a complex area. Fiduciary duties underpin trustees’ responsibilities to protect all members and ensure the long-term solvency of their scheme. Changes that go beyond trustees freely acting in line with their fiduciary duties on this issue and removing trustee discretion, or removing the employer from any decisions, could have significant consequences for scheme funding, employer sustainability and member security. In any action they take, the Government have to consider all schemes, not only those that are well funded or have historically paid discretionary increases. Mandating a statutory review thus risks creating uncertainty for all trustees and employers, while we are undertaking wider work on surplus and helping schemes make endgame choices.

The key point, as I know the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, recognises, is that the difficulty in the hard cases is not typically that trustees lack the willingness or the legal ability to act. They are often acutely aware of the pressures their members are experiencing. However, I agree it would be helpful to develop a clearer understanding of the factors that prevent some well-funded schemes awarding discretionary increases, particularly where employer consent is not forthcoming. I am aware that the Pensions Regulator has been considering how it might build its evidence base in this area, and any insights from that work would be helpful in informing future thinking.

The Government recognise the importance of this issue. As I indicated in earlier debates, the wider package on surplus, including giving trustees the ability to agree surplus payments to employers, is intended to support more balanced negotiations so that both members and employers can benefit. I hope that has given at least an explanation to the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, as to the position that the Government are in but, for all those reasons, although I recognise the concerns he has raised, I hope he can withdraw his amendment.