European Union Bill

Wayne David Excerpts

Monday 11th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

As the House debated in Committee and on Report, in the Bill it is the creation of a common European defence entity that goes beyond what is defined as a common security and defence policy, which as my hon. Friend knows is very limited in scope within the treaties as they stand. If there was to be a common European defence, that would clearly have to be defined in treaty terms, but sometimes, as he would be the first to note, language that appears quite generalised in scope, once written into a treaty, provides the basis on which numerous detailed measures can then be brought forward because there has been an overall extension of competence to the EU institutions. It could—I am not saying that it always would—spell the end of an independent UK defence policy, which was one of the previous Government’s red lines during their negotiations on the Lisbon treaty.

The amendments would also remove any decision to participate in a European public prosecutor from the referendum requirement. Hon. Members will recall the sensitivity and divergence in views across Europe over the idea of a European public prosecutor who would be able to launch prosecutions in the United Kingdom and other member states in areas affecting the EU’s financial interests. When we considered this issue earlier this year it was accepted that people should be asked for their approval before any Government could agree to participate and allow cases to be prosecuted independently in the UK’s legal system.

We have always guarded jealously—rightly, I think—the principle that decisions on whether to prosecute any individual or corporate entity should be taken by the designated independent prosecutors. To give those powers to some new European body that could come in and state whether a prosecution would or would not take place, irrespective of what the Crown Prosecution Service, the Director of Public Prosecutions or Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs said about a particular case, would be a very serious shift of power and competence away from this country to Brussels. It would be right for the British people to be asked to assent to that before a Government were allowed to ratify such a decision.

Before I move on from the Lords amendments to clause 6, I should like to express my amazement that, when the House of Lords voted for an amendment to remove from the referendum lock a decision to end the requirement for unanimity in agreement to the EU’s multi-annual financial frameworks, the official Opposition voted in favour of that proposal. I hope that the hon. Member for Caerphilly will explain on the record where the Opposition now stand on the matter. Everyone in the House, whatever their views on the EU, knows that in the next couple of years a key issue facing every Government in the EU and all the Brussels institutions is the negotiation on the new MFF which will effectively set budgetary decisions and ceilings for the next five or seven years in the EU’s life and development. It is vital that that remains subject to unanimity and that the British Government, whoever is in office, continue to have a right of veto.

[Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

indicated assent.

[Mr Lidington]

The hon. Gentleman is nodding, so he must explain why members of his party—not just Labour Back Benchers but official spokesmen in the House of Lords—trooped through the Lobby to say that they wanted to scrap the British veto and allow the fate, for example, of the UK’s rebate to be subject not to consensus but to qualified majority voting. That would be the impact of the measure. The hon. Gentleman is saying that he would remove from the referendum lock a decision to switch from unanimity to QMV on that matter.

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. The Opposition need to own up to where they are coming from. If the hon. Member for Caerphilly wants to intervene and say that his Front-Bench colleagues in the House of Lords had gone rogue and he was unable to control them, that he was sorry and he did not really mean it, a plea for forgiveness might be entertained. But if he really supports the proposal to remove decisions on the MFF from the referendum lock, he should say so clearly to the House, because the Labour party did not say that when the Bill was debated in the House of Commons.

[Mr David]

I will make a deal with the Minister. I am more than happy to explain the Labour party’s decision when I speak to the Lords amendments, but will he explain to the House the comments of Members of the other place such as Lord Brittan, or the actions of Lord Heseltine, both of whom expressed complete disagreement with fundamental aspects of the Bill?

[Mr Lidington]

I have huge respect for Lord Brittan, Lord Heseltine and those senior Liberal Democrats in the House of Lords who have devoted their political lives to support for European integration—they have a consistent and honourable point of view on this. I do not agree with them. There is a key difference—and the hon. Gentleman may wish to challenge me—between the way in which Lords Brittan and Heseltine spoke and voted and the way in which his colleagues did so. My noble Friends gave distinguished service in government, but many years ago, and they are no longer ministerial spokesmen. The hon. Gentleman must explain why the Labour party’s official spokesmen in the House of Lords spoke and voted in the Lobby for an amendment that he appears very unwilling to support.

[Mr David]

I find it amusing and surprising that the Minister is dismissive of senior Members of the House of Lords such as Lord Brittan, who not only had reservations and disagreed with parts of the Bill, but said that there was nothing in the Bill at all with which he could agree.

[Mr Cash]

He has got a pension too.

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[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend is inviting me to comment on the subject matter of the third group of amendments. I hope that he will forgive me if I delay commenting in that fashion until we reach those amendments.

This Bill places Parliament at the heart of every decision to be considered. Each decision will need parliamentary approval, whether by Act or by resolution. The sunset clause would take that power away from Parliament, and until such time as part 1 was revived, none of the controls in part 1—not just the referendum lock but none of them—would apply. Some colleagues in the other place claim that the Government are binding future Governments and not themselves. However, we have already said that we will use the Bill to ratify the current treaty change on the eurozone stability mechanism, and we will also use it to consider the treaty change required for Croatia’s accession. Once the legislation is enacted, this Government, too, will be bound by it.

There is another reason why a sunset clause is unnecessary. The previous Government set up a system of post-legislative scrutiny under which the Government of the day are required to publish a memorandum to Parliament on the operation of each Act of Parliament up to five years after the commencement of that Act. This is examined by relevant parliamentary Committees, which can decide whether to conduct a detailed examination of that legislation. I am happy to put on record that we think that this is a good idea and that a future Government must publish a full report on how this Bill has been used within five years of its becoming law. That will result in the clarity and the reflection that colleagues in the other place seek, but without arbitrarily depriving the British people of their say.

The case for this Bill is simple: it is to give the British people the chance to have their rightful say over future changes to the EU treaties, whether through formal revision or use of the passerelles that transfer competence or power from this country to the EU. The Bill does not substitute the British people for Parliament, for Parliament will continue to have a central and strengthened role in approving such key decisions, but it provides a vital opportunity to address the disconnection that has developed over the years between the British people and the decisions taken in their name by Parliament and Government. This group of Lords amendments would not help us to achieve these goals—indeed, they would seriously jeopardise our chances of doing so—and that is why I hope that this House will disagree with them.

[Mr David]

I would like to comment briefly on Lords amendments 3 and 5 regarding the 40% threshold and on Lords amendments 6 to 13 regarding the number of referendums. I will then focus on Lords amendment 15 regarding the so-called sunset-sunrise clause.

Some people in both Houses say that a reasonable turnout in referendums is necessary to ensure a demonstrable degree of legitimacy. That argument was advanced during the alternative vote referendum debate, but it has weaknesses. We have already heard that there is a certain perverse incentive to encourage a lower turnout than might usually be the case, and that is a fair point. It is important to remember that there has been a threshold of 40% on only one occasion—the devolution referendums for Wales and Scotland in 1979. Wales rejected the then Government’s devolution proposals by a majority of four to one, while in Scotland there was a turnout of less than 40% but a narrow majority in favour of the proposals. The result in Scotland brought this question to the fore: when is a win not a win? That is a real dilemma, and it is one of the reasons that many Labour Members have reservations about the use of the 40% threshold.

Reference was made to my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant). I should point out that Rhondda is in south Wales and Ronda, as it was pronounced by the Minister for Europe, is in Spain. My hon. Friend tells me that, although he speaks Spanish, he represents to the best of his ability the constituency in south Wales.

Amendments 6 to 13 would reduce the number of theoretically possible topics for referendums from more than 50 to three: the single currency, the creation of a single EU integrated military force, and border controls and the Schengen protocols. As Labour Members argued consistently on Second Reading and in Committee, there is an overwhelming argument for referendums to be held if ever a British Government wanted this country to join the single currency, which is extremely unlikely, and when there is a proposal for a major constitutional change. In Committee, we proposed an amendment for a Joint Committee of both Houses to examine whether a proposed treaty change was a significant constitutional change. Unfortunately, that proposal was not successful in this House, and nor did it gain sufficient support in the other place. However, that remains our position. Of course, Members in the other place are entitled to their views, but we have reservations about the proposal that referendums should be confined to these three subject areas, and it is important to put on the record that my comments set out the Labour party’s position.

That brings me to the sunset-sunrise clause. In the other place, Lord Kerr, the distinguished former head of the diplomatic service, put forward three arguments for such a clause, one of which related to foreign policy. He argued with conviction that were the provision enacted, other European Governments could freeze Britain out of the debate through enhanced co-operation or by acting outside the treaties altogether. That might happen, he said, when a British negotiator in Brussels is unable to agree to something

“because his Government back home will tell him, ‘Don’t be silly. That would trigger a referendum.’”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 15 June 2011; Vol. 728, c. 810.]

He argued that a regular assessment and decision at the start of a new Parliament on whether such a system was working would be a reasonable measure to adopt. That is worthy of consideration.

[Charlie Elphicke (Dover) (Con)]

A Government would say that only if they did not think that they could win such a referendum, so how can it be right for his lordship to put the case that the British people, if they were minded to vote against such a thing, should have their role entirely negated? That seems to be the essence of the argument, and surely that is wrong.

[Mr David]

That is not entirely fair. When Lord Kerr presented his argument, he suggested that referendums could be triggered on what are universally considered as fairly technical, minor matters. It is a hypothetical situation. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that in the minutiae of negotiations, we negotiate effectively for the United Kingdom only when we do not have it in the back of our minds that there might be hurdles to be overcome at a later stage.

The other two arguments used in the other place were essentially constitutional. It was argued that the referendums envisaged in the Bill are essentially post-legislative. In other words, once the Government have negotiated a treaty change and Parliament has agreed to it, a referendum will be held. As the referendum is post-legislative, it is a lock. The electorate will have to decide whether to overrule the Government and Parliament of the day. Holding referendums post-legislatively in that way questions Parliament’s traditional role. Such a change should therefore be subject to constant review and reaffirmation or otherwise. That constitutional argument is worthy of consideration.

By far the most important and powerful argument concerns the principle that a Parliament cannot bind its successor. That is a vital principle of our parliamentary democracy. In the evidence taken by the European Scrutiny Committee, which is ably chaired by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash), a number of expert witnesses explained the importance of that principle. Michael Dougan, the dean of the Liverpool law school and a professor of European law at the university of Liverpool, concluded his evidence by saying:

“If there is a real concern about the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty that needs to be addressed during the passage of this Bill, it surely consists in an attempt by the Government to persuade the current Parliament to bind its successors in a manner which runs counter to accepted understandings of our constitutional order.”

That is a pretty powerful statement.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

Even though legislation can in a sense bind our successors, our successors can introduce legislation to annul previous legislation. There is a difference between the automatic disappearance of legislation at an election and an Opposition party coming into government with the commitment to reverse legislation. That is still possible, so our successors will not be bound absolutely.

[Mr David]

That is an important qualification, which I will come on to address specifically. It is important at this stage to make the general case that this is a central part of our unwritten constitution.

[Mr Cash]

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the question of fettering a future Parliament is secondary these days, unfortunately, to the fact that the Supreme Court could, as the European Scrutiny Committee examined in its evidence and report on this Bill, assert that it has ultimate authority in certain circumstances? That is the mischief that we must ensure does not happen under any circumstances. We will come on to debate clause 18 and the Government’s proposals, which open that door in an alarming fashion.

[Mr David]

Like the Minister, I do not want to stray into that debate. One thing that has been clear from this whole debate, including on Second and Third Reading, is the real threat to this institution comes from judicial activism. That threat does not come so much from the European Union as from our own judiciary. We must be mindful of that.

Another expert witness who gave evidence to the hon. Gentleman’s Committee was Vernon Bogdanor, a research professor at King’s college London and a former tutor of the Prime Minister. He said that

“the purpose of the bill must be to prevent a future government from supporting such an amendment or transfer without a referendum. The bill seeks, in other words, to bind a future government. That seems to me inconsistent with the declaratory proposition that Parliament is sovereign.”

That is an extremely powerful statement. We must consider the full impact of this legislation.

[Charlie Elphicke]

The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful case for Parliaments not binding their successors. The logic of his argument is surely that at the start of each Parliament, this country’s membership of the European Union and the legislation on the European Union should be reconfirmed.

[Mr David]

No, I do not think that that is the case. One thing that has come across clearly in the debates in this House is the sovereignty of Parliament. We are talking about the sovereignty of Parliament in a dualist system, but Parliament nevertheless has the right to determine what legislation has primacy over the people of this country. The ultimate decision rests with this country.

[Ian Swales]

The sovereignty of Parliament is obviously absolutely key. If we passed the sunset clause, sovereignty would in effect pass to the next Government, not the next Parliament. As the hon. Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins) said, a future Parliament has the power to change this legislation. The sunset clause would pass that power to the Government, not to Parliament.

[Mr David]

No, it would not pass to the Government, because we are talking about Parliament itself deciding. In our electoral system, it is the Executive who are accountable to Parliament. We are talking about parliamentary sovereignty.

[Mr Cash]

Will the hon. Gentleman please reflect on what he just said? Is he trying to maintain the fiction that it is Parliament that makes decisions, when most decisions are in fact taken at the direction of the Prime Minister and the Government through the Whips?

[Mr David]

I very much hope that in this Parliament that will not be the case. I have taken heart from the rebellious comments and actions of the hon. Gentleman. I very much hope that Parliament will assert itself through the course of this Parliament and that his concerns will prove to be mistaken.

I hope that most Members of this House would uphold the time-honoured doctrine, despite the qualifications that have been expressed, of one Parliament being unable to bind its successor. I hope that Members do not question that. We should never seek to dictate in one Parliament what should happen in the next. I concede that, strictly speaking, the European Union Bill does not bind future Parliaments because, as has been said, those future Parliaments could modify the legislation. Nevertheless, at the very least, the Bill questions that principle and strongly goes against its spirit. I say that because the heart of the Bill will effectively come into operation during the next Parliament.

In the other place, Lord Howell said from the Government Front Bench that the Bill will be “operative” in this Parliament. He cited the Government’s commitment to bring forward an Act of Parliament on the European stability mechanism, the so-called bail-out mechanism, and its inclusion in the treaty. The Minister has just said that an Act of Parliament will be brought forward if Croatia accedes to the European Union. The Government have said consistently that they will not agree to any transfer of sovereignty to Brussels during this Parliament. That is an important qualification. There will therefore be no need to hold a referendum. Of course, we may see a significant transfer if the Government decide to opt in to the European Court of Justice opt-in provisions. The Government are illogically against holding a referendum if they decide to opt in. That reinforces the point that the main intention behind the Bill is to influence future Governments and Parliaments. What happens during this Parliament under the Bill will be relatively small beer. We are talking about a piece of legislation that will have a direct influence on the Governments and Parliaments of the future, after the next election. That is the fundamental point. Despite the qualifications that have to be expressed for the argument to hold up, that is an important and telling point.

[Mark Reckless]

Is not the key point about the Bill that it makes provision for referendums at some potential future date on various aspects of our relationship with the EU? What the British people really want is a referendum now on our membership or otherwise of the EU.

[Mr David]

That might be the true voice of the British Conservative party, but it is not the voice of the hon. Gentleman’s Government and it is most certainly not the voice of the Opposition.

[Mr Cash]

The little matter that the hon. Gentleman happened conveniently to leave out of that remark was the voice of the British people, was it not?

[Mr David]

It is important that we recognise that the British people have a voice, which is why we have been clear that it is important that referendums are held on major constitutional issues and the issue of a single currency. It is important that the British people are engaged in the debate about Europe in a way that they have not been for a good time. However, the way to do that is through constructive and rational debate. There is nothing wrong with having referendums on big, important issues, but we are firmly against having referendums on paper clips and minutiae.

[Andrea Leadsom (South Northamptonshire) (Con)]

Does the hon. Gentleman regret the fact, then, than when in government Labour did not give the British people a referendum on the Lisbon treaty?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. We are talking about amendments from the Lords on constitutional issues. I am sure, Mr David, that you were going to come to the Dispatch Box and focus on exactly those issues.

[Mr David]

I will restrain myself, Madam Deputy Speaker, and follow your strictures.

I shall refocus on the idea of a sunset-sunrise clause. It is all the more important that these sensible proposals from the other place be given due consideration because, as has been said, never before has a Bill been deliberately designed to influence future Parliaments. I am sure that good parliamentarians would not want to undermine or even question the doctrine of free-standing Parliaments, which is why I hope the House will support Lords amendment 15. An affirmative resolution at the start of each Parliament would both ensure the legitimacy of this Parliament in making a decision and reaffirm the doctrine that one Parliament cannot bind its successor.

[Charlie Elphicke]

I take the hon. Gentleman’s point about an affirmative resolution, but nevertheless, that resolution would depend upon the action of the Executive. Proposed subsection (2) in the Lords amendment states that

“the Secretary of State may by order provide”

that the provision continues, so it would be entirely up to the Government. I put it to him that his point is therefore not a good one.

[Mr David]

With due respect, I think it is a good one. Purely in terms of procedure, as the Government have conceded, there needs to be an assessment of how this innovative constitutional legislation works in practice. That is a good idea, and I welcome the Minister’s concession on it. However, the logical extension of that is an affirmative resolution at the start of the next Parliament. If the Bill is working well, that resolution should be agreed to. If it is not, there should be an opportunity to reconsider. I therefore hope that the House will look favourably upon Lords amendment 15. It is modest, sensible and pragmatic, and above all else it reflects the principles of parliamentary sovereignty to which we all adhere.

--- Later in debate ---

Today’s debate is partly about the fact that we remain a sovereign state, within which this Parliament—and the Queen in Parliament—remains the supreme and sovereign institution of our constitution. This sovereign Parliament is laying down new rules for future Governments that will require them to have referendums on certain issues before more powers are transferred to the European Union.

[Mr David]

But that is precisely the point. What makes the Bill special, different and innovative is that it departs from virtually all other legislation in that its main provisions are applicable not to this Parliament but to the next Parliament.

[Mr Jenkin]

But that applies to a great deal of legislation. I do not understand the distinction that the hon. Gentleman is attempting to make. Actually, what the Bill will do is restrict the ability of Governments to give away power and to reach decisions in the EU and present them to Parliament as faits accomplis without reference to the people. That seems to me a thoroughly good and democratic thing.

The hon. Gentleman has given the game away this evening about the future direction of the Labour party’s policy. What he has told the House tonight is that he is quite happy for aspects of the Bill to go through, but he is not happy for its provisions to apply to a future Labour Government. He does not want a future Labour Government to have their hands tied by the necessity of referendums before they give away more powers. He wants to go back to the system to which my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Andrea Leadsom) referred—of signing up to treaties, promising referendums on them and then ratting on those promises. That was the record of the Labour Government.

I regard all these Lords amendments as completely unacceptable. Whatever shortcomings the Bill has—I am afraid there are many, because it is limited in scope—the amendments are designed to pull the guts out of this democratising measure. The vote threshold proposed in Lords amendment 3 is not a recognisable one but a perverse one. It does not suggest that unless the number of votes reaches a certain level, a decision cannot be taken. It suggests that if the votes do not reach a certain level, the Government and Parliament can carry on as they like. I thought the whole point of a threshold was to test whether there was a measure of consent for a particular constitutional change. The threshold in the amendment is not about testing whether there is a measure of consent but is more about testing whether there is a measure of resistance, or whether there is apathy.

Unfortunately, the people who have largely guided European policy in this country for the past 20, 30 or 40 years have got away with what they have done largely by relying on people’s apathy and ignorance. The proposed threshold is designed to create an incentive for a Government who wish to transfer more powers to the EU to maintain high levels of apathy and ignorance. I am reminded of my late noble Friend Lord Whitelaw, who during the 1975 referendum accused the right hon. Anthony Wedgwood Benn of going around the country stirring up apathy. The amendment is a charter for going around the country and doing just that. It is completely unjustified and should be given very short shrift.

Lords amendments 6 to 13, to clause 6, are simply designed to rip the guts out of the Bill. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe very properly went through some of the things that Governments in future would be able to do without a referendum if the amendments were not disagreed to. Under the amendments, Governments could, without a referendum, give up the veto over foreign policy and over almost anything else under article 48(7). The amendments would allow the UK to join the public prosecutor and to extend the role of the public prosecutor to any serious crime with a cross-border dimension. We should think about what that means for the criminal justice system of this country. The amendments would allow Governments, without a referendum, to give up the veto over labour laws, taxes and planning, and the multi-annual financial framework and spending of the EU. The Opposition should shed no crocodile tears over how much the EU is spending if they are prepared to give up that veto without proper consent.

The amendments would remove the veto from all the enhanced co-operation procedures, which would enable what is effectively majority voting to come into effect in a whole lot of areas. Clearly, that is an anti-democratic provision. If there is one thing that ardent advocates of the EU should have learned, it is that that structure lacks popular consent. It legislates without popular consent. If there is one thing that true Europeans should want it is that we reconnect the decisions on how powers are exercised with popular democratic consent. The Bill goes some way towards doing that.

The sunrise provision is simply the last gasp of a past generation who are trying to neuter what is today called Euroscepticism. The support of the hon. Member for Caerphilly for Lords amendment 15 gives the lie to the idea that the new Labour party, under its new leader, is flirting with Euroscepticism. It is not. It has no intention of following through. It might pretend to be, and to sound, sceptical, and it might even start talking of an in-out referendum, inviting one or two of my more radical hon. Friends to fall into the trap of thinking that that is the way out, when it probably is not. However, the fact is that we need a Government who are prepared to negotiate vigorously, and to do so with the extra leverage and strengthened hand that the requirement for a referendum gives them.

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[Mr Jenkin]

I know that my hon. Friend does not advocate an in-out referendum, but the general direction of the EU certainly merits a referendum at some stage. I still flirt with the idea that we should have a referendum on the proposed treaty amendment. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe adverted to the fact that four fifths of the British public think that we should have a referendum on any treaty amendment. That seemed to be the substance of the Government’s original commitment, which has been hedged in the Bill.

Perish the thought that I am straying from my support for the Government on the Lords amendments—I would rather stay where I am—but I would finally wish to remark that the authors of the Lords amendments have a track record of their own. The introducers of the amendments are not minor figures. The amendment on the threshold was introduced by Lord Williamson of Horton—he who was secretary-general of the Commission during the passage of the Maastricht treaty; he who was the secretary-general who pushed through the social action programme, which negated any effective UK Government opt-out from the social chapter; and he who was one of the architects of economic and monetary union, which is now collapsing around our ears.

In Lords amendment 8 to clause 6, which incidentally completely fails to define, as my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe said,

“a single, integrated military force”,

Lord Williamson is pretending that we should have a referendum on defence matters. However, I would just pose this question: does NATO constitute

“a single, integrated military force”?

I would submit that it probably does not. We could therefore form a NATO-style command structure in the EU, which successive Governments have set their face against, and pass such powers into the treaties of the EU, without a referendum. I hardly think that the British people would vote for that.

The noble Lord Hannay, former permanent secretary at the Foreign Office and former chief negotiator for the UK in the EU—an illustrious and distinguished person—is also an author of the Lords amendments. Do not mistake me: I have great admiration for the ability and sincerity of those people, but I just advert to their track record of advocating policy on the EU. Lord Hannay said quite recently that the single currency would be quite a good thing for the UK, as did Lord Kerr of Kinlochard. As recently as 26 May 2009, the latter delivered a lecture in Edinburgh on monetary union, in which he lamented that we were not trying to join the single currency.

I raise those points not to stray from the substance of the debate, but just to question whether the people who proposed the Lords amendments should not stop trying to get Britain further into the EU, and start apologising for the appalling judgment and advice that they have given to successive Governments. Their advice has put this country into a perilous economic position—because of the state of the EU and the euro—but they have also advised successive Governments to hand over more and more powers. I would not usually criticise civil servants in public, but they are now taking part in the political process having advised successive Governments to hand over more and more powers, as a result of which Governments have been in an ever-weaker position from which to defend our national interests.

The Bill is a small step towards starting to redress the balance in the relationship between the overweening power of the EU and the people in this country governed by the laws it makes.

[Mr David]

rose—

[Mr Jenkin]

I will give way briefly, but I am about to sit down.

[Mr David]

I like the hon. Gentleman as he likes me. However, although we might have disagreements with distinguished ex-civil servants, it is important to place on record that all the individuals he has mentioned have been great public servants and took the lead from the Government of the day.

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[Mr Lidington]

I make two points to my hon. Friend. First, the only reason the Supreme Court has power to adjudicate here on European Union matters is because Parliament has provided for directly effective and directly applicable EU law to have effect in the United Kingdom legal order by virtue of passing statutes that give European law that direct effect and application here. Secondly, as I think my hon. Friend knows—he is being a bit mischievous—he is trying to tempt me again on to a much broader issue, which is the important philosophical question of whether ultimate legislative supremacy lies with Parliament or whether parliamentary sovereignty is a construct of the common law controlled by judges. Speaking as an elected parliamentarian, I am quite clear and argue quite naturally that Parliament as the elected limb of body politic must have the ultimate say, but in making that case we are entering into a philosophical debate that goes way beyond the parameters of the European Union Bill, let alone Lords amendment 14.

Let me return to the Lords amendment. I am mindful of the arguments advanced by Lord Mackay of Clashfern and his supporters in the House of Lords, and I greatly appreciate their legal expertise. We considered Lord Mackay’s arguments very carefully both before the debate in the other place and following the Lords acceptance of the amendment. I sought further legal advice on this point, and the Government’s view remains that although the European Communities Act 1972 is indeed the principal means by which directly effective or directly applicable EU law takes effect in the UK, a number of other Acts of Parliament also give effect to EU law independently of the 1972 Act. For example, provisions of the Scotland Act 1998, of the Government of Wales Act 2006 and of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 put Ministers from the devolved Administrations under an obligation to act in accordance with EU law. Some of those settlements define EU obligations in a manner similar to the language used in section 2(1) of the 1972 Act—but, significantly, they do so not by reference to that Act.

The Government are therefore concerned that, were this House to agree with the Lords amendment as it stands, it could create the risk that the courts interpret this clause as restricting the ability of legislation other than the 1972 Act to incorporate directly applicable or directly effective EU law into UK law. That, in turn, could ultimately mean that clause 18 could be interpreted as being more than declaratory, which would rather undermine what we are trying to do with this Bill. This would not, in our view, reflect the law accurately, and so we seek to disagree with the Lords amendment as currently framed.

In that sense, I agree entirely with the arguments put forward by my hon. Friends the Members for Stone (Mr Cash) and for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd), but I also recognise Lord Mackay’s point that the 1972 Act is the primary conduit for directly effective and directly applicable EU law to take effect in the United Kingdom. In recognition of this concern, the Government propose a change of wording to the Lords amendment that would retain the reference to the European Communities Act 1972 but, importantly, also refer to the existence of other Acts of Parliament that also give effect to EU law.

[Mr David]

I understand the right hon. Gentleman’s point and I have sympathy with his argument. Crucial to the argument, it seems to me, are the words

“by virtue of an Act of Parliament”.

What is the difference between putting those words at the end rather than at the start of the clause, where they were initially?

[Mr Lidington]

I decided to include the words on the basis of the best legal advice available to me across Government at the time. When preparing the Bill for introduction into this House, I examined the wording and the question of whether a reference to the 1972 Act alone would be appropriate. I was given very clear legal advice that, because of the other statutes that make reference to the application of EU law, a simple reference to the 1972 legislation would not suffice. That explains the original wording of the Bill that came before the House of Commons.

What we have sought to do in framing our amendments to the Lords amendment is to recognise the view that the other place took that clause 18 should incorporate language that recognises the particular importance of the 1972 legislation. We see no reason why we should not amend the clause to make a specific reference to the 1972 Act so long as the clause also makes reference to those other Acts that give effect to EU law. This reflects the Government’s consistent position that other Acts of Parliament— independently of the European Communities Act 1972—might also allow for the incorporation of directly effective and directly applicable EU law into the UK legal order.

[Mr Lidington]

We believe that the original drafting met the tests that we had set to implement our policy of having a declaratory clause. What we are trying to do is to express through Government amendments the point made in the House of Lords that the 1972 legislation is of particular importance, while preserving the point of principle that we believe was incorporated in the original language as debated by the House of Commons.

[Mr David]

rose—

[Mr Lidington]

I want to make some progress.

It is not only the devolution legislation that mentions European Union law. The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, the Chiropractors Act 1994 and the Competition Act 1998 are further examples of legislation that allows European Union law to have direct effect in this country. Section 9A of the Company Directors Disqualification Act requires the United Kingdom to make a disqualification order against a person in certain circumstances, including circumstances in which an undertaking commits a breach of competition law under either article 81 or article 82 of the EC treaty—now articles 101 and 102 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. That Act refers directly to the treaty provisions without referring to the 1972 Act.

The amendment accepted by the other place removed the reference that makes it explicit that only by virtue of such Acts does directly effective and directly applicable EU law take effect in this country. Removing that reference leaves open the possibility of arguments that directly effective and directly applicable EU law could enter our law by other means, thus undermining the rationale behind the clause. The amendments that the Government propose seek to restore that important qualification, and to remove any doubt about whether directly effective or applicable EU law could enter United Kingdom law by other means.

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[Mr Cash]

I have no problem in acknowledging someone’s powerful views on constitutional questions. For example, I remember during the Maastricht proceedings that the noble Lord was quite clear on the question of whether the Maastricht treaty took us further and deeper into the integration process. He argued that it did not make any difference in principle because the 1972 Act already conceded that there had been a change in the constitutional position and, to all intents and purposes, there was, thus, no real change in the substance of the issue. That is not to accuse anybody; it is merely to recognise that they have a constitutional viewpoint and to recognise how they really regard the encroachments on our sovereignty, which were evident in the Jackson case, in the evidence that the Committee received from many distinguished witnesses and in the fact that the Government’s previous explanatory notes led us into a situation where we criticised the Government and they withdrew the offensive words, precisely for the reasons that I am presenting.

The reality is that we have caught out the Government on their wording and they have now acquiesced in other wording which opens the door to statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court. That is the kernel of this matter. Whether or not my right hon. Friend the Minister really likes the way in which I have expressed this is neither here nor there. The real question, on which I challenge him, is this: does he deny that the wording in the Government’s amendment, in response to the Lords amendment, imports the opportunity for the Supreme Court to apply statutory interpretation and, thereby, to create a situation that could be best avoided, as set out by Lord Howe of Aberavon, our European Scrutiny Committee and the evidence that we received from so many people, by having no clause at all, rather than the current clause 18?

The Minister knows that I feel very strongly about the fact that we promised in our manifesto a sovereignty Act, and that was the consequence of discussions at the very highest level with the leadership. We knew that that was put into the manifesto as a direct response to the promises that were made. The bottom line is that we were given a second-rate provision that is unnecessary and that has since been criticised by the European Scrutiny Committee and eminent constitutional experts, including Lord Howe of Aberavon, and what the Government are introducing merely acquiesces to a degree in what Lord Mackay of Clashfern has proposed. That simply is not good enough and the Government should withdraw the proposed clause while they have the opportunity to do so. It is for those reasons that I shall be voting against it.

[Mr David]

This long debate, which has taken place over a number of months, has almost come full circle. I recall that we began our deliberations with the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) and others saying that what had been originally promised was a sovereignty Act but what was proposed was a truncated, boiled-down and diluted version of their intention in the form of a solitary clause—clause 18. Whichever permutation of clause 18 one looks at, be it what was originally suggested by the Government, the Lords amendment or the Government amendment to the Lords amendment, one finds that it is basically a declaratory statement. It does not take us back or forward; it is a pious declaration, a statement of fact and a statement of the legal position at the moment. Therefore, it does not do any harm and, in fact, it could possibly be useful.

There has been a modest change of emphasis in Government amendment (b) to the Lords amendment, and it is a sensible one. The words “by virtue of an Act of Parliament” were omitted from the Lords amendment and we were concerned that the emphasis was being placed solely on the 1972 Act. Although we recognise that that is the most important piece of legislation regarding the primacy of European law, other items of legislation are involved here. I was particularly pleased that the Minister referred to the legislation on the devolved institutions, as that is important in ensuring that we take a comprehensive approach. Therefore, the Government have put forward a modest improvement to what was suggested by the Lords. I recognise that they have gone some way towards accommodating what the Lords have said and I welcome that, which is why we will be supporting the Government amendment.

[Mr Cash]

Is the hon. Gentleman actually saying that he agrees with the Government’s proposal, notwithstanding what has been said by the European Scrutiny Committee, Lord Howe of Aberavon and all the other people I have mentioned, and notwithstanding the most powerful legal advice that has been submitted, which suggests that this is a very unwise and dangerous move, for the reasons that I have set out?

[Mr David]

With all due respect, I say to the hon. Gentleman that I have read in great detail all the evidence that was given to the European Scrutiny Committee and I think that his summation of it is his interpretation of the evidence given. Most of the witnesses to the European Scrutiny Committee said, as I have said, that clause 18 is a statement of fact and that it does not take us forward or back. Therefore, we should not get hot under the collar about it.

[Mr Jenkin]

I do not wish to detain the House for more than a few minutes. I had not intended to take part in this debate, as I took part extensively in the debate on clause 18 in Committee and I thought that we had covered all the issues then. I had become reconciled to accepting the clause as the Government had drafted it and I came to today’s debate expecting my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) to make a technical argument, but one that would not necessarily excite me—of course I was wrong. The hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr David) says that the clause does not take us back and it does not take us forward, but he has missed the fundamental point about the revised drafting of the clause. I am not a lawyer—I am an amateur lawyer—but ever since we started discussing this clause earlier this year, I have had the sinking feeling that we are in very deep water and that we are potentially creating completely unnecessary problems for this House and for Parliament. I say that because the sovereignty of Parliament is axiomatic; it is self-evident and it is a historical fact.

We do not need to legislate in any way to maintain the sovereignty of Parliament. There would have been some virtue in a declaratory Act with the legal effect of returning powers to the United Kingdom from the European Union to redress our relationship so that we had the ability to negotiate, but this clause, which has erroneously been nicknamed the “sovereignty” clause but is no such thing, does not even attempt to do that. In fact, it does not even refer to the word “sovereignty”.

The clause puts in statute issues that are contested by the European Union legal structures in a context that means that the Supreme Court might have to interpret them. We know that some justices of our Supreme Court question the very notion of the sovereignty of Parliament as I have described it and think it is a matter of common law rather than of history and fact. I believe they are wrong and that Parliament will always be able to prove them wrong by legislating, as statute law always overrides common law.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for drawing the House’s attention to that conversation. We are potentially engaged in the early skirmishes of a dispute between Parliament and the judiciary about which has supremacy. By legislating on this issue, which touches on the sovereignty of the Queen in Parliament, we are tempting the justices of the Supreme Court to begin toying with those concepts. They have already done so in some of their ancillary statements to cases—I forget the right word for such statements. We know that they are tempted in that direction and putting this clause into statute, as the evidence received by the European Scrutiny Committee showed, could be the red rag to the bull, providing meat for the justices of the Supreme Court to chew on.

[Mr David]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Jenkin]

I am just coming to the hon. Gentleman’s point.

I was minded to accept that we had done such a thing before I heard my hon. Friend the Member for Stone speak, but he has described how the situation might have been made worse than it would have been under the previous drafting of the clause. He referred to section 20 of the Interpretation Act 1978, which, if I understand it correctly, already stipulates that when an Act is referred to in an Act of Parliament that Act is deemed not to be constantly updated by subsequent amendments. The Act referred to in an Act of Parliament stands as it stood at the time of enactment and by specifying the European Communities Act 1972 in this clause we are opening up the possibility that at some stage in the future the 1972 Act will be amended but this clause will not apply to the amended Act or to the amendments to the Act, but only to the Act as it stands now. Should there be a dispute between the Supreme Court and Parliament about the sovereignty issues that touch on our relationship with the European Union, the question would be left open with more ambiguity rather than less.

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[Mr Lidington]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr David) and my hon. Friends the Members for Stone (Mr Cash) and for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) for their participation in the debate and I shall be brief in my response. I want to deal with the point of principle as well as the important point of detail about the interaction between this clause, the Government amendment and the Interpretation Act 1978.

[Mr David]

Before the Minister goes on, may I cast his mind back to the trenchant criticism from the European Scrutiny Committee about the explanatory notes that accompanied the Bill and, in particular, those on clause 18? I seem to recall the Minister giving the House a commitment that the explanatory notes would be examined and, if necessary, redrafted. Has that redrafting occurred and will there be further redrafting in the context of his amendment tonight?

[Mr Lidington]

The explanatory notes were changed when they were reprinted before the Bill was introduced in the House of Lords, just as I gave the House an undertaking that they would be. We amended the notes to make it clear that the references to common law in the relevant section were meant in contradistinction to statute law and that we were not commenting, as a Government and in either the Bill or the notes, on the important but much broader philosophical debate about the origins of parliamentary sovereignty.

Let me deal first with the point of general principle to which my hon. Friend the Member for Stone, in particular, referred. It has always been the Government’s position that clause 18 is declaratory of the existing state of our law in making it clear that European Union law has direct effect and application in this country for one reason and one reason only: namely, Parliament has given it that effect through primary legislation. I differ from my hon. Friend in that I continue to believe that it is valuable for us to have this declaratory clause on the statute book to serve as a clear expression of Parliament’s will and as an abiding point of reference for the courts if they are invited in future to consider again the sort of arguments that have previously been brought before them, most notably by the prosecution in the metric martyrs case, to the effect that European law has acquired over time an autonomous authority of its own that does not derive from Acts of Parliament.