Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debate16:41 - Division on Motion A1. - Ayes: 248 / Noes: 233 - Motion A1 agreed.
17:26 - Division on Motion B1 - Ayes: 239 / Noes: 236 - Motion B1 agreed.
18:28 - Division on Motion D1. - Ayes: 231 / Noes: 243 - Motion D1 disagreed.
19:46 - Division on Motion E1 - Ayes: 214 / Noes: 205 - Motion E1 agreed.
20:11 - Division on Motion F1. - Ayes: 174 / Noes: 220 - Motion F1 disagreed.
21:48 - Division on Motion G1 - Ayes: 159 / Noes: 197 - Motion G1 disagreed.
22:33 - Division on Motion H1. - Ayes: 125 / Noes: 168 - Motion H1 disagreed.
23:12 - Division on Motion J1. - Ayes: 100 / Noes: 154 - Motion J1 disagreed.
Lord McNally
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 1 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 1A.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, today the House has the opportunity to consider the Commons reasons in response to the amendments passed by this House during its consideration of this Bill. We have engaged in complex, informed and sometimes passionate debate on a wide range of issues that are of fundamental importance. In so doing, this House has exercised its rights and responsibility as a revising and advisory Chamber. I would hope that, in turn, the Government and the House of Commons have responded attentively and constructively to the opinions of this House. In addition, my ministerial colleagues and I have had numerous meetings with individual Peers and interest groups. We have listened, and we have amended.
Before I deal with the details of Motion A, I would like to remind the House of some of the steps that we have taken to respond to its concerns and to make this a better Bill. From the start, our guiding principles have been to decide what kinds of case need public funding and what alternative routes are suitable for others. It is not all about cost savings, although they are clearly a vital factor; it is also about what kind of justice system we want for the future.
Successive Governments have concluded that the provision of legal aid in the current structure is too broadly drawn, and it encourages court-based litigation and the engagement of professional lawyers as a first, rather than a last, resort. With that in mind, the test that the Government have applied to amendments in both Houses is whether they strengthen or weaken the principles behind the Bill—what I have described many times as its central architecture. We have accepted amendments where they truly improve the Bill. The House has done much valuable work in correcting omissions and ensuring that the most serious cases continue to receive public funding, and I am grateful for the commitment that this House has put into the Bill.
As I have said, the Government have listened and have moved in important areas. We have accepted the arguments put forward by, among others, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, and adopted the definition of domestic violence used by ACPO. We have widened the forms of evidence of domestic violence that will be acceptable to secure legal aid funding in private law cases, and doubled the time limit within which such evidence may be presented. We have removed the power to means-test suspects in police custody, and retained legal aid funding for cases involving human trafficking and domestic child abduction.
We have agreed that legal advice and assistance should be made available to welfare benefit appellants whose cases are heard by the Upper Tribunal, the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court on points of law. We have committed to doing further work to see how we might provide funding for those appearing before the First-tier Tribunal whose case also turns on a point of law, and have retained legal aid for babies who are victims of clinical negligence. We have introduced further measures to put beyond doubt the extent of independence from Ministers enjoyed by the director of legal aid casework.
Many concerns have been listened to and many amendments made, but we have not been able to satisfy every demand. We have now reached the stage where the Government ask both Houses to disagree with amendments that, in our opinion, would undermine the rationale and principles underlying the Bill. The Government cannot accept amendments that use scarce resources on lower priority needs where other funding is available, where conflicts could be resolved by other means or where people can reasonably make provisions themselves. The Government have demonstrated their commitment to the not-for-profit sector, which does such invaluable work, by providing £20 million a year for the next two years, in addition to the £16.8 million we have allocated for this year. However, in a time of austerity, we must make responsible choices about spending public money. We must be rigorous in our decisions about allocating resources. We cannot rely on unrealistic thinking about alternative methods for achieving savings.
We have rehearsed the arguments at great length and in great depth. We are about to reflect on the House of Commons’ opinion of your Lordships’ amendments, and I will be asking the House to agree with the reasons of the House of Commons. I hope that this House will give good weight to that opinion. As I have said, we have listened and responded to the opinions of this House, which now has a responsibility to listen to the clear and settled view of the House of Commons.
Lord Higgins
If the noble Lord will allow me, he is saying that great attention has been given to the various issues that have been raised, for example by the noble Lord, Lord Alton. Is it not the case, however, that on some of these issues there was initially no debate in the Commons at all because it was programmed, and that when the matter returned from this House to the other place the Lords amendments were also programmed—that is, guillotined—and the debate was not brought to a conclusion in the usual way?
Lord McNally
My Lords, the debates came to a conclusion in the usual way. I must say that for a parliamentarian of the noble Lord’s experience, who must have carried through quite a few Bills himself on timetables and the rest—
Lord Higgins
When I was in the other place, we had a very sensible system. If the matter was being filibustered or was urgent, we had a half-day debate followed by a vote on whether there should be a guillotine. In total contrast, when I was carrying through legislation we certainly did not have the system of programming from which we are now suffering.
Lord McNally
I will leave it to the Opposition to explain fully the introductions that they made to timetabling,
Lord Cormack
I am most grateful for that flattering giving way. I point out to my noble friend that it was indeed a Labour Government who brought in automatic timetabling, but before the coalition Government were elected Sir George Young and others gave an assurance that any Conservative Government—or presumably any Government led by Conservatives—would not have timetabling. We still have it.
Lord McNally
This is an interesting side issue. Anybody who has read the debate in the other place will see that the amendments passed in this House were thoroughly discussed.
Lord McNally
The House is not doing itself much service by this, but do go on.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, on the issue of parliamentary procedure, is the noble Lord really happy that the first four amendments from this place that the Commons considered had only 26 minutes allocated to them? The House of Commons was allowed fewer than five hours to debate the 11 issues on which this House defeated the Government and offered its very earnestly considered advice.
The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Lord Strathclyde)
The Motion before the House is that we should deal with amendments that have come back from the House of Commons. If noble Lords wish to have a debate about process and procedure in the House of Commons, they can table questions and debate the issues. This is not the time for that; this is a time to deal with the amendments that we have before us.
Lord Alton of Liverpool
My Lords, before leaving that point, it was the Minister who raised the question of procedure and who said that these matters had been thoroughly dealt with in another place. The fact remains that the issue of mesothelioma, which was quite properly raised by the Minister’s noble friend Lord Higgins, was not debated on Second Reading, in Committee or on Report at all in another place. Had it not been for the amendment that your Lordships passed, it would not have been debated at all in another place. To give it only one hour at that stage and for it again to be timetabled is indicative of the need to reform not this place but, in light of what we heard earlier, the other place.
Lord McNally
The four interventions, interestingly, have all come from ex-Members of the other place.
Motion A and Amendment 1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, described by him on Report as a purpose clause, reflect that which features in the Access to Justice Act 1999. Amendment 1 would place a duty on the Lord Chancellor to secure within the resources made available and in accordance with Part 1 of the Bill that individuals have access to legal services that effectively meet their needs.
Despite what was said in the House of Commons by the shadow Justice Secretary, the basis for the Government’s opposition to this amendment has been clearly explained in this House. While I am grateful to the noble Lord for this new amendment, I am afraid that it has not addressed the issues with the original Amendment 1, and the Government oppose the new amendment on the same substantive grounds as we opposed the original construction. In addition to those issues which I will turn to in a moment, Amendment 1B would remove the duty in Clause 1(1) for the Lord Chancellor to secure that legal aid is made available in accordance with Part 1 of the Bill.
On Report I spoke at length about the technical issues with incorporating provisions of the Access to Justice Bill, where only excluded services are specified, to this Bill, where included services are specified. The Bill before us today, if enacted, will represent Parliament’s clear intention as to which services are to be capable of being made available to people by way of publicly funded legal aid services, and therefore to meet their needs in that regard. Any benefit of such a provision akin to that in Section 4(1) of the Access to Justice Act is simply not present in the context of this Bill. Further, both amendments conflate access to justice as a constitutional principle with the provision of legal aid. Access to justice means access to the courts, and does not mean access to a publicly funded lawyer whenever one is sought.
A further duty to provide unspecified legal services must also, in part, serve to muddy the waters and create uncertainty in respect of the services which might be funded under the Bill. It was said by the noble Lord when moving his original amendment that, as a result of the qualifications in it, the amendment,
“does not impose an independent duty which trumps the specific contents of Part 1”,
and that it,
“does not require any further expenditure by the Government”.—[Official Report, 5/3/12; col. 1559.]
I am afraid that we cannot agree with this analysis. By virtue of introducing a new duty on the Lord Chancellor, a potential cause of action must be created where such a duty is said to have not been met. Therefore, by definition, the Lord Chancellor must be at risk of being compelled to provide additional, and as yet unidentified, services to meet that duty or the duty would be a redundant one. This risk is heightened by the fact that both amendments refer to legal services, which are far broader than the legally aided services that the Bill is intended to provide. I acknowledge that this is the first time for the House to hear that observation. Such a scenario would entirely frustrate the Government’s intention of bringing certainty and clarity to the range of services that can be funded under legal aid. The amendment also has the potential to create a great deal of unhelpful and unnecessary litigation as the boundaries of that duty are tested in the administrative court.
The Bill’s purpose is clear, as are the Lord Chancellor’s duties under it. Therefore, I ask that this House does not insist on its Amendment 1. The Commons has decided against it and in my opinion the amendment in lieu from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will elicit the same response. Therefore, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his Motion.
Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A)
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
My Lords, I will explain briefly why I do not agree with the amendment. I quite agree with those who have said that it is inconceivable that it will give rise to effective judicial review because it imposes no legally enforceable duty and it is therefore inconceivable that anyone could threaten the Government by way of judicial review. However, my problem with it is that it imposes no legal duty and then does nothing else.
The amendment begins:
“The Lord Chancellor shall exercise his powers under this Part with a view to securing that individuals have access to legal services—”.
Pausing there, it is of course already the Lord Chancellor’s duty to do so under the Human Rights Act, as I pointed out in a brief question to my noble friend and colleague Lord Pannick. Under that Act, the Lord Chancellor has to act in a way that is compatible with Article 6 of the convention, which secures a right of access to justice. Existing law and Section 3 of the Human Rights Act require that all legislation, including this Bill, must be read and given effect in so far as it is possible to do so compatibly with the Human Rights Act. That first part of the amendment is already fully taken care of by that Act. In so far as the rule of law is in play, it is also taken care of by the Constitutional Reform Act.
The amendment goes on:
“that effectively meet their needs, subject to the resources which the Lord Chancellor decides, in his discretion, to make available, and subject to the provisions of this Part”.
That completely swallows up any suggestion that this is some new, important principle. I am afraid it is written in water and I do not approve of putting anything in the statute that is simply an unenforceable duty written in water.
Lord McNally
My Lords, we have had a very interesting debate on this. I hope when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, has time to read his own remarks, which contain some fairly harsh strictures about the Lord Chancellor, he will reflect that the question of financial privilege is not a matter for the Government or for the Lord Chancellor. As the Clerk of the Commons explains, an amendment that infringes privilege would be the only reason that would be given. That is because giving other reasons suggests either that the Commons has not noticed the financial implications or that it somehow attaches no importance to its financial primacy.
We had a debate very like this one when we discussed the Welfare Reform Bill. I do not have figures at my fingertips—perhaps we can give the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, the task of looking at the record of respective Administrations in using financial privilege—but when we last discussed the matter it was made clear that this is a matter for the Commons. As the Companion states:
“Criticism of proceedings in the House of Commons or of Commons Speaker’s rulings is out of order, but criticism may be made of the institutional structure of Parliament or the role and function of the House of Commons”.
I think noble Lords have exercised that procedure today.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, the Minister said that financial privilege is not a matter for the Government but for the House of Commons. We understand—we are very familiar with the convention—that when the House of Commons rejects a Lords’ amendment it may state reasons of financial privilege and give no further explanation. However, that does not explain or justify why the Minister, Mr Djanogly, in opening the debate on the Lords’ Amendment 1 last Tuesday, began his speech by drawing to the attention of the other place that:
“Lords amendments 1 and 24 impinge on the financial privilege of this House. I ask the House to disagree to them and will ask the Reasons Committee to ascribe financial privilege as the reason for doing so”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/4/12; col. 200.]
That was his argument, essentially because he could not think of a better one. It is very unusual for the Government to rely blatantly on financial privilege during the debate.
We have to contend with a new situation. We are not criticising the constitutional arrangements, the conventions or the manner of the relationship between the two Houses, but we are saying that the Government should not hide behind this formula, this antique convention, but should deal fairly and squarely with the merits of the argument.
Lord McNally
The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, has wandered—I shall come to some of his comments later—into interesting fields. The financial privilege of the House of Commons may be antique, but as an old House of Commons man I am rather attached to financial privilege. Kings have lost their heads and revolutions have taken place to protect financial privilege and I do not airily sweep it away as an antique remnant of a bygone age. It is an important part of the relationship between the two Houses.
Lord Howarth of Newport
Can the Minister explain how financial privilege applies in this case? Of course the Bill concerns public expenditure, and in that sense financial privilege applies, as it does to virtually every item of legislation, but how do the Government contrive to justify making it the basis of their argument to Members in another place? They asked them to reject the amendment on the grounds of financial privilege as if it were at risk of incurring unaffordable increases in public expenditure, which is simply not the case.
Lord McNally
My Lords, we can go round in circles. The qualification of financial privilege is a matter for the Clerks of the House of Commons. Former Mr Speaker Martin, when we last discussed this matter at the time of the Welfare Reform Bill, made very clear where the line is drawn.
I might not have had as long and continuous a place in the House of Commons as my noble friend but I have been around this place for the past 40 years, and one of the reasons why I teased some former Members of Parliament is that for the past 40 years, under various Administrations, I have heard these debates about the paucity of the way in which the House of Commons discussed a matter and the brutality with which the guillotine was used. That may well be one day—perhaps soon—the reason for a proper parliamentary reform Bill that takes in both Lords and Commons, but it is not an excuse for assuming that somehow, on this particular Bill and this particular issue, the Government are using chicanery or arguments that are not well understood in the relationship between these two Houses.
I also point out to the House that the one thing I have not done, and certainly did not do in my remarks at Report stage, Third Reading or today, is to hide behind financial privilege. I do not think that the Pannick amendment stands up to scrutiny and I was grateful for the contribution of a number of my noble friends in that. Part 1 of the Bill, the Lord Chancellor’s functions, states:
“The Lord Chancellor must secure that legal aid is made available in accordance with this Part”.
This seems to me a very clear statement of intent. The difference between the Act being replaced and this Bill is that the Act being replaced is an open-ended Act. It does not restrict where legal aid would apply. The whole point of the Bill—what makes it different from the previous Act—is that it limits, specifies and draws attention to where legal aid will apply and what will be out of scope. That is the danger of the Pannick amendment—that in its general good will to all men approach, it leaves the idea that things may be added. Indeed, both the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, and to a certain extent the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that when better days are here this whole circumstance may change. It may change, but not under a vaguely-worded Part 1 of the Bill. We have, in the course of the Bill, accepted an amendment from my noble friends that removed the ratchet and left a regulator in terms of what can be put back into the Bill, but that will be a matter for reflection and discussion in the future.
What worries me is that all the learned Lords who have spoken may be absolutely right, and if they are right we will all live happily ever after. But if they are wrong it is a future Lord Chancellor and the taxpayer who will have to pick up the consequences. Therefore, I think at this stage in the passage of the Bill, the Lord Chancellor of the day and the Government of the day see dangers in what, if it is anything, is either meaningless or has a meaning that has implications for the future; and if it does have implications for the future, in a Bill structured in this way, I think we are right to resist it.
I hope noble Lords will agree that the Lord Chancellor of the day and the Government of the day could and should have a sense of responsibility and care for the central architecture of the Bill, which we keep on talking about. The Bill is not open-ended but specific and the Pannick amendment is not something that should show on the face of the Bill. I hope that noble Lords reflecting on this, and the fact that it has been well considered and well debated and that I have not tried to hide behind financial privilege in addressing your Lordships either previously or today, will support the Government and the Commons in their amendment.
Lord Pannick
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this full debate. I am grateful to the Minister for his consideration of the amendment and for meeting me last week to discuss the issues raised. The other place rejected the amendment and the Minister invites the House to reject the amendment because of a concern or belief that it would impose further obligations on the Government. In this House, a number of noble Lords objected to the amendment on the precisely opposite ground that it would impose no obligations on the Government. Perhaps I may briefly reply to both those concerns.
First, on the concern that the amendment would impose further obligations and would somehow undermine the architecture of the Bill, to use the Minister’s words, with great respect I have enormous difficulty in understanding those concerns. I could understand the concern if the amendment had any adverse financial consequences, but it plainly does not. It says,
“subject to the resources which the Lord Chancellor decides, in his discretion, to make available, and subject to the provisions of this Part”.
I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks, Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Phillips of Sudbury, for their views, which I share, that it is impossible to understand how in the real world this amendment could result in litigation that had any prospect of getting off the ground—certainly any more so than the original Clause 1. So the only possible objection to the amendment is that it does not impose further obligations on the Government and that it does nothing. That was the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, and was a concern expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. I say to those noble Lords and to the House, with great respect, that that is to misunderstand the purpose of an objects clause. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that the Bill recognises that we are cutting back on legal aid, most regrettably, because of current financial stringency, but that the principle of securing that individuals have access to legal services that effectively meet their needs, which has been part of our law since 1949, has not been forgotten. It is still the purpose of legal aid and, when the economy improves, that is the principle by which Ministers and Parliament should assess—
Lord McNally
I hate to stop the noble Lord’s flow, but he has just put his finger on it. This is not an interim, pro tem measure, waiting for a return to the 1949 Act. Although, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, financial considerations of course have played a part, the main intention of the Bill is to restructure, reshape and re-point the direction of legal aid away from the open-ended nature of the 1949 Act and successive Acts and put it into a closed system. It is that closed system that the noble Lord’s amendment, with great skill aforethought, plans to undermine. That is why we are resisting it.
Lord Pannick
I entirely accept the Minister’s point that the Bill seeks to identify those subjects for which legal aid should be made available. But the Minister will recognise that, in the anxious debates that we have had through the progress of the Bill, we have considered a number of sensitive topics in respect of which the Minister’s argument has been that we would like to provide legal aid for this subject but, regrettably, we cannot do so because we do not have the money under the current financial stringency. The House has listened to that debate and accepted, with a heavy heart, that in relation to many of the subjects in respect of which legal aid has previously been made available it will regrettably no longer be made available. Having accepted that the Government must have their way for financial reasons on many of those very difficult areas, I believe that it is absolutely vital that we retain in this Bill a statement of the principle of why legal aid is made available so that when the economy improves—
Lord Pannick
I have given way to the noble Lord before. I anticipate that the House is anxious to move on. The House has heard the debate in relation to this matter. I say to the House that that part of the 27 minutes which the other place devoted—I am not giving way—
Lord Pannick
The House wants to move on. That part of the 27 minutes which the other place devoted to consideration of this amendment shows that the purpose and effect of this amendment were not understood. I think that we should ask the other place to think again on this important matter, and I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord McNally
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 2, 194 and 196 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reasons 2A, 194A and 196A, do not insist on its Amendment 192 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 193A, 219A and 220A.
Lord McNally
My Lords, Motion B contains amendments in relation to domestic violence. As I have previously made clear, the Government take domestic violence extremely seriously. We fund a range of programmes to help deal with and prevent this crime, many of which—I am happy to acknowledge—were put in place by the previous Administration. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, has previously made clear, there is nothing between the Government and the Opposition in principle here.
This was reflected in our initial proposals. First, legal aid to obtain a protective injunction against domestic violence should remain exactly as it is at present, so that those who need legal aid to protect themselves can get it regardless of their means. Secondly, while we have removed most of private family law from the scope of legal aid in favour of funding mediation and less adversarial proceedings, an important exception should be made for victims of domestic violence. This was because such victims could be intimidated during court proceedings about, for example, child contact or maintenance issues. Again, it is fair to say that these principles were welcomed.
There has been considerable debate in both this House and the House of Commons over how to decide who qualifies as a victim of domestic violence for the purpose of legal aid for private law family proceedings. Therefore, there has been much scrutiny of the definition of domestic violence used in the Bill, the types of evidence that would prove that someone was a victim and the length of time for which these should be valid. The contributions across the House have been informed, sometimes passionate and extremely helpful. The Government have listened and moved on several key points.
As set out in government Amendments 193A, 219A and 220A, we have accepted the ACPO definition of domestic violence in full. The Bill now defines domestic violence as,
“any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (whether psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between individuals who are associated with each other”.
This has been universally welcomed. We have also undertaken to widen the list of evidence, which will be reflected in regulations, to include: an undertaking given to a court by the other party in lieu of a protective order or injunction against that party for the protection of the applicant, and where there is no equivalent undertaking given by the applicant; a police caution for a domestic violence offence by the other party against the applicant; appropriate evidence of admission to a domestic violence refuge; appropriate evidence from a social services department confirming provision of services to the victim in relation to alleged domestic violence; and appropriate evidence from GPs or other medical professionals.
These are in addition to those forms of evidence already accepted by the Government, which are: that a non-molestation order, occupation order, forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction against the other party for the protection of the applicant is either in place or has been made in the past 12 months; a criminal conviction for a domestic violence offence by the other party against the applicant; ongoing criminal proceedings for a domestic violence offence by the other party against the applicant; evidence from a multi-agency risk assessment conference of the applicant having been referred as being at risk of domestic violence from the other party and action recommended; and a finding of fact by the court of domestic violence by the other party against the applicant.
On time limits, we intend to double the previously announced time limit from 12 months to two years, save in respect of a conviction for a domestic violence offence, where the only limit is that the conviction should not be a spent one. We think that some sort of time limit will still be needed—we are in the business of reducing rather than encouraging litigation—but we think that two years will make sure that those who need help get it.
I know that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, continues to have concerns and has tabled amendments in lieu of her original amendments which ask for our list of evidence to be exactly the same as the list of evidence used by the UK Border Agency in assessing domestic violence immigration applications. I know from my conversations with her that she is worried about consistency and about genuine victims missing out. I have enormous respect for the noble and learned Baroness but I really do think that her fears are now misplaced, given how far we have moved.
On consistency with the border agency, we need to understand that the decisions being made are different, as is the context in which they are made. When the border agency takes a decision on whether domestic violence has occurred, it is a decision on the case itself. This would be analogous with a court looking at an application for a domestic violence protection order and a judge deciding whether domestic violence had occurred, not with a legal aid decision about a private family law case.
We are talking here about a secondary issue—in this case, legal aid—that arises indirectly from a person being a victim of domestic violence, not a decision that directly relates to someone’s protection, such as in an immigration context or an injunction application. What is needed for a grant of legal aid is a set of clear rules, not the kind of case-by-case nuance that is needed to decide whether someone requires immediate direct protection.
Other government departments have to grapple with similar issues when it comes to these secondary issues. They do not use the border agency list but take a judgment on what works in their particular context. One example is the rules for jobseeker’s allowance for victims of domestic violence, over which individual local authorities have discretion.
I should also point out that the noble and learned Baroness has never objected to a very important addition that we have made to the border agency list—namely, “a finding of fact” by a court that domestic violence is a relevant feature. This partly highlights the different context that we are dealing with; such a finding of fact is much less likely to arise in an immigration context, but it also provides a very important safeguard in these cases. By definition in this context, if you are seeking legal aid, it is because there is the prospect of family proceedings. If you cannot show any of the evidence of domestic violence that we have asked for but the court decides, perhaps on the basis of police call-outs or other types of testimony, that domestic violence is a feature in the case, then legal aid will be available. This is also relevant when thinking about the time limits. Where a case relates to older incidents of domestic violence but a court considers that the matter is still relevant and it makes a finding of fact, legal aid will be triggered.
When I spoke last week with the noble and learned Baroness, she suggested that we would be missing a large number of victims with our time limit because of how long victims take to come forward. She mentioned that the average time for a victim coming forward was five and a half years. However, it does not follow, as she suggested, that a two-year time limit for evidence cuts out nearly two-thirds of people as a result, because the crucial point is that the evidence will be generated when people come forward—that is, when they seek an injunction, turn to their GP or decide to go to a refuge. It is when the evidence arises, not when the abuse occurs, that indicates the start of the time limit.
I stress again how far the Government have moved on this issue. We now have a system which will genuinely and generally ensure that victims of abuse get legal aid in these private family cases. We have accepted the ACPO definition of domestic violence—indeed, we have gone beyond that. We have significantly expanded the range of acceptable evidence and doubled the time limit. There is one in-built safety mechanism in the form of “finding of fact” hearings, and of course there is a second safety mechanism in the form of exceptional funding, for the more unusual cases. So I think we have now got this right. I want to pay tribute to those across the House, not least to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland—I know her well and I know her deep concern on this issue.
For the sake of completeness, I should add that we cannot accept that the evidential requirements should be in the Bill. Legislation of course needs to be precisely drafted, and because of the level of detail required, the evidential requirements are much better left to regulations, subject to the affirmative procedure, rather than primary legislation.
Sometimes at this Dispatch Box one has to make the government case with a heavy heart. I have looked at this from where we started, where we have moved to, and what we now cover in this very important area. I am proud of what the Government have done in carrying on the broader work against this evil crime, but I am also proud of what we have now finished with in terms of a package to help in this particular case. I hope the House will give us its support. I beg to move.
Motion B1 (as an amendment to Motion B)
Lord McNally
I have never doubted that. It is just that I keep getting nudged when I call someone learned and someone whispers in my ear that they are not.
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
Noble Lords are learned if they are in the Supreme Court or have been a Law Officer. Others, regrettably, may be learned in fact but are not learned in name.
Lord McNally
That helps me a great deal. I shall never refer to the noble Lord, Lord Bach, as learned again.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I have stated as clearly as I can why the Government and the Commons have put forward their reasons. The emotional span of this debate is sometimes extended to question whether we are in favour of victims and their children. The answer is that yes, we are in favour of them. As I said in my opening remarks, this debate is about how and whether and within which ambit we provide legal aid in private law cases. It is difficult to go beyond that into individual cases, which have been cited in debate at every stage. In many of these cases, the suspicion is that they would qualify either by application for an injunction or by a finding of fact by the court. The latter is extremely important in the additional list that we have put forward to qualify people for legal aid.
As I said in my opening remarks, when addressing an issue such as this one, and within the constraints under which the Government are operating, lines have to be drawn. It is legitimate for the Opposition to argue that that line has been drawn in the wrong place or that a time limit has been put in the wrong place. In the end, however, Governments have to make decisions—and we have made decisions. As I said, I hope that the House will look at the decisions we have made and see that we have listened and acted in a way that puts us on the side of victims and their children and that, in practice, those who face the problem of domestic violence and who want to obtain legal aid for decisions in private family law cases will find that the concessions we have made and the rules and the guidelines we have laid down will give the women and children—I accept that there may be others, but mainly women and children—who are affected by this scourge access to legal aid. I therefore ask the House to support Motion B.
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
I am disappointed that the Minister takes that view. As he will know from our previous debates, our assessment is that as a result of the changes that the Government are proposing, 54.4 per cent of victims currently obtaining legal aid and assistance for family proceedings will not be able to obtain such help and assistance in future. Although I absolutely accept that the Government intend, or wish, to be supportive, these provisions demonstrate the reverse—that they will not be supportive. I therefore wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord McNally
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 3 and 4 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 4A and 4B.
Lord McNally
My Lords, we now turn to Motion C and to Amendments 3 and 4, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pannick. The noble Lord is not learned, is he?
Lord McNally
The noble Lord’s amendments concern the independence of the director of legal aid casework. I am confident that we all share the sentiment that the Lord Chancellor should have no involvement in a decision about legal aid funding in an individual case. However, I share the view of the House of Commons that this amendment has undesirable and unforeseen consequences and that it is possible to provide the assurance and protection required without adopting the amendment.
The primary concern with these amendments is that they would have the effect of preventing the director being appointed as a civil servant. It is our strong view that the director will enjoy full independence from the Lord Chancellor yet can be appointed as a civil servant. For the avoidance of doubt, we are abolishing the Legal Services Commission and creating a new executive agency to provide Ministers with greater policy control and improved accountability for legal aid. Giving full independence to the director would run entirely contrary to this intention.
Clause 4 already provides protection in subsection (4) with a statutory bar on the Lord Chancellor’s involvement in making funding decisions in individual cases. The Bill also imposes a duty on the Lord Chancellor to publish any guidance and directions issued to the director, thereby providing transparency. Noble Lords will recall from Report stage that we amended the Bill to offer greater transparency by requiring the director to produce an annual report for the preceding financial year on the exercise of their functions during that period. This report will be laid before Parliament and published.
Baroness Northover
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 24 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 24A.
Baroness Northover
My Lords, noble Lords gave great attention to this issue in earlier stages. I hope that the discussions that have resulted, both within and outside the Chamber, have helped to reassure them.
I begin by saying that the Government have always agreed that telephone legal aid advice will not be suitable for everyone. That is why there will be exceptions to having to use the gateway to apply for legal aid—for example, for emergency cases. Those who are eligible for legal aid will be assessed on a case-by-case basis to identify whether they are suitable for telephone advice.
A key consideration in assessing suitability for receiving advice over the telephone will be whether a caller is able to give instructions and act on advice over the telephone. Trained and skilled assessors will assess this suitability, and a range of reasonable adjustments and service adaptations will also be available to assist callers in their contact with the gateway.
The gateway, based on the existing highly successful Community Legal Advice helpline, will be a two-stage process—not just, as some have called it, a “call centre” service. It may help noble Lords if I briefly set out how the process will work in practice.
Stage one: when applying for legal aid in one of the areas of law subject to the gateway, trained and skilled telephone operator service staff will engage with the caller to identify their problem and eligibility for legal aid, giving the caller the time needed to explain their problem. Organisations such as the Samaritans have contributed to training for current operator service staff. These staff will not provide legal advice, but will route clients to sources of help. If the problem is in an area of law subject to the gateway, the client will be transferred to a legally trained specialist for telephone advice.
In the second stage, as now, under the current Community Legal Advice Helpline contract, where an eligible caller is transferred to a specialist, legally trained telephone adviser, that adviser will speak to the caller to assess their needs, including their suitability for telephone advice. Where it is clear, having regard in particular to whether a caller is able to give instructions and act on advice over the telephone, that face-to-face advice is needed, the client will be referred to a face-to-face provider. I ask noble Lords to note that both the telephone operators and specialist telephone providers will have ongoing training, including awareness of different vulnerable callers, such as those with mental health issues and learning difficulties.
The Government have engaged and will continue to engage with stakeholders, including equality groups, to identify any additional reasonable adjustments for callers with specific needs. For those with little or no spoken English, a free three-way translation service in 170 languages can assist engagement with the gateway. Few face-to-face providers could offer this extensive range of languages. A third party, including a family member or advocate, can contact the gateway to speak for a person or help them explain their problem. To minimise costs, all potential callers can contact the gateway by mobile phone text or the internet to ask for a call back, and all callers can ask for a call back, too.
The use of new technologies such as Skype and webcam—wider than for just the British Sign Language service—are being investigated to enhance the service further. There will also be a service enabling an individual to contact the gateway by secure e-mail. The Government will raise awareness of the gateway to users, including the services and support it offers and we will also be monitoring its operation from day one of implementation and engaging with those using it to ensure that needs are indeed met. As we have also stressed, there will be a review of its implementation and operation, and the report of that review will be published. This will happen within two years of the implementation of the gateway and before any decision about any possible extension of the gateway to other areas of law is taken.
The Government are confident that a mandatory gateway can facilitate efficient and prompt access to legal advice, including advice for those vulnerable people in need of it. The effect of Amendment 24 and, in particular, the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, Amendment 24B in lieu, would be to impact severely on the provision of any legally aided advice services by telephone, including the existing Community Legal Advice helpline, the existing criminal defence service direct telephone scheme as well as the proposed mandatory gateway for certain areas of civil legal aid. These amendments are unnecessary and disproportionate to the concerns of the noble Baroness, which previously have centred on the mandatory gateway and vulnerable people.
Amendment 24B would require every eligible client to receive face-to-face advice, regardless of their particular circumstances or personal preference. This would result in a very inflexible system that would invariably introduce a delay in clients receiving advice as not only would they have to locate a suitable provider, they would also need to contact them to make an appointment to see them. No longer, for example, would a client be able to make contact with and discuss their problem at a time and place convenient to them.
Noble Lords have already acknowledged the effectiveness of telephone advice itself. On 20 December, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, described the Community Legal Advice helpline as excellent and he was sure that noble Lords would be glad to see its work continue and expand. However, such a requirement would invariably mean the end of any telephone advice as it would be highly unlikely that any individual who has explained their problem to a face-to-face advice provider would then choose to switch to a different telephone advice provider at a later stage.
Not only would this amendment have the potential to eliminate all the savings from the gateway, it could add about £4 million to the legal aid bill for criminal cases and additional cost to civil legal aid for additional face-to-face advice—advice which is currently successfully provided by telephone. The specific duties contained in Amendment 24B are also unnecessary. I can assure the noble Baroness that the Government have complied with the public sector equality duty under Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 and we have published an equality impact assessment—at the time of the consultation on the legal aid reforms and at the time of the Government’s response—which includes consideration of the mandatory gateway policy. The public sector equality duty is a continuing one and we will continue to comply with it.
As noble Lords know, under the public sector equality duty it is necessary to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and other conduct that is prohibited by or under the Equality Act 2010, advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it, and foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it. The relevant protected characteristics for these purposes are age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation. These types of discrimination are all defined in the Equality Act 2010 and we are complying, of course, with that. For these reasons, I beg to move.
Motion D1 (as an amendment to Motion D)
Baroness Northover
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their attention to this very important area and I especially thank the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, for her kind words to my noble friend about his engagement with her concerns. I have a note that I need to correct the figure given for the costs of the noble Baroness’s amendment. The costs are likely to be in excess of £20 million per annum for both civil and criminal legal aid—I need to clarify that.
In reaction to what the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, said, I point out that stage 1 is where people come in and it is decided whether they need to go through the telephone system. Stage 2 is the detailed case assessment of suitability.
To my noble friend Lord Phillips I point out that the kind of cases to which he points may well be those that are then directed towards face-to-face advice. It is extremely important to bear in mind the flexibility that is built into this system and to contrast that with the lack of flexibility of insisting that the advice is face to face. This system means that when people are taken into the telephone system their cases can be assessed to see whether they are suitable for phone advice or face-to-face advice.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I did not explain myself adequately. I was trying to get across the point that people will not get as far as a telephone. That is the problem. Once they are there, I absolutely think that what my noble friend has explained to the House is fine. However, I am talking about the people who, for the reasons I tried to explain, will not have the confidence or the competence to say what their problem is over the phone because it is often so damn difficult to do so.
Baroness Northover
I understand what my noble friend means about getting to that point. I ask him to ask himself how they would get to face-to-face advice. There they are with a major problem. They may very well end up in a CAB, in which case the CAB may assist them in phoning the telephone gateway and may indicate in its call that this is a suitable candidate for face-to-face advice. My noble friend needs to go back a bit and ask how the person who is in such circumstances will access any advice and then see how this may route them through to the kind of suitable, appropriate and flexible advice that I hope I have laid out.
Lord Clinton-Davis
However, where someone is incapable of expressing themselves—I remember having to listen to such a person for more than an hour—would they not be excluded from what is being proposed?
Baroness Northover
Let us assume that that person has come to you as a constituency Member of Parliament—I think that is the kind of case the noble Lord is talking about. Again, the Member of Parliament could phone the helpline and say that, for the reasons given by the noble Lord, in this case the person is likely to need face-to-face advice. If someone else, such as a family member, were to phone up, it would become apparent that the person in question could not do this. For those reasons it becomes apparent that this person is going to need face-to-face advice.
As I said in my introductory remarks, there are clearly cases where, for all sorts of reasons—and noble Lords have experience of these kinds of cases—that person will not be best helped by the telephone. In other cases that might be exactly what a person prefers: the distance of telephone rather than face-to-face advice. They might not be able to get to wherever the face-to-face advice is, or they might find that Skype is what they want to use.
The other point to bear in mind is the provision of language translation. Some 170 languages can be provided on the phone line, and very few CABs or constituency advice surgeries have that kind of provision; so there are certain advantages to that provision that might be of help to other cases. The important thing to remember in all this is the equality duty—the diversity of people and their situations and our obligation to address those needs. Those needs will need to be met in different ways, and that is built into how the system operates. The very fact that the Samaritans have been involved in training the operators is an indication of how seriously we consider the responsibility towards people with those diverse needs. Of course, the Samaritans operate a phone system for their own advice line.
I assure the noble Lord that there will be no restriction on the length of time that a person can speak to a caller. If that is the problem—that it is a matter of time—it will not kick in here.
My noble friend Lord Phillips asked about the Budget, which announced £40 million and £20 million in each of the remaining years of the spending review. I think he sought assurance of provision for the CABs.
I have emphasised how operator service staff and specialist telephone advisers will be trained to be aware of the needs of callers, especially those with mental health and learning impairment problems. There will be reasonable adjustments and adaptations available to assist callers, including provision for a third party such as a family member to call on an individual’s behalf. As long as a person authorises someone to call on their behalf, the third party could equally be a member of a CAB or other support or advice service. If the caller is assessed as unsuitable for telephone advice, they will still have access to face-to-face assistance and be referred directly to that provider. That is an improvement over the current situation, in which they might be given three phone numbers of advisers whom they then have to contact. Again, they have to use the telephone to set up these appointments, whereas with this they could be referred directly to that provider and will not have to find the face-to-face provider themselves from those phone numbers, and those providers will have to make contact back to the person.
Noble Lords might bear in mind how flexible the system is within the new arrangements. In December, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, referred to the satisfaction rates with both the existing community legal advice helpline operator service and the specialist telephone advice service; 96 per cent of respondents found the operator service helpful, and the 2010 survey of clients advised by telephone showed that 90 per cent of respondents found the advice provided helpful. That is a very encouraging response.
As I emphasised, and as we will continue to emphasise, we will keep this under review so that we can make sure that it is working as effectively as possible. As my noble friend Lord McNally assured the House, I assure noble Lords that the telephone gateway will apply initially to only a limited number of areas of law and will be monitored from day one. Noble Lords have picked up on the review, but I assure them that we will keep a watching brief over this from the very beginning to make sure that it is working well. The engagement with stakeholders that has already taken place and the need to make sure that everyone’s needs are addressed is a reflection of that. I can give that further assurance.
I hope that noble Lords will support the Government in this area.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend again, but can she tell the House that the review will be undertaken by an independent experienced reviewer?
Baroness Northover
My noble friend assures me that we will review how this is working and publish the findings. I am sure that noble Lords will scrutinise that with the greatest of care. I reiterate that the operation of the system will be monitored from the very beginning. Therefore, noble Lords do not need simply to wait for the review at the end of two years to make sure that this is working in the way that we trust will assist people, as opposed to raising the concerns that noble Lords have expressed. I hope that the noble Baroness will be able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Grey-Thompson
I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this afternoon’s debate, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. Not for the first time, I wish that I had trained in the law rather than doing a politics degree. I accept that my wording could be slightly better but, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said, it has been improved since the last time I moved the amendment.
It seems that we are stuck in two slightly inflexible viewpoints. I wholeheartedly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Low, when he says that there is a place for a gateway. However, I also believe that there is a place for something else to help the most vulnerable. One idiosyncrasy of this system is that an individual could go into a citizens advice bureau and ask for help but be told to ring a phone number and be sent away. In an ideal situation, that person would be able to stay in the citizens advice bureau and make the call from there, and could even have that third-party support. If they are sent away, they may take that to mean that they are not eligible or that they do not understand some of the issues.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, for her comments. It is probably not the right time to debate this, but now that we have a system that can be accessed on the internet through www.directgov.com or by Skype and through phone calls—there is information coming back and forth—I wonder whether there are not almost too many options for people. Perhaps a gateway and the potential for a face-to-face interview might be the simplest way to do it.
I go back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. I am sure that everyone in your Lordships’ House knows one, two, or maybe more people who would struggle to make that first contact and might drop out of the system, finding it too much to cope with, and would therefore not be able to access the help that they need. So as much as there has been some positive movement today and some very positive comments, I am not reassured that the most vulnerable would be supported through this system. Very reluctantly, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord McNally
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 31 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 31A.
Lord McNally
My Lords, when we were opening this debate the noble Lord, Lord Alton, intervened to make the very valid point that it was only by him raising the issue of mesothelioma in debate in this House that this important issue has received the attention that it deserved. I pay tribute to him, having known him for a long time as an adept campaigner. Whatever happens, he can take great credit for the way that he has focused attention on this terrible disease. As with some of our other debates, however, this is not about whether you are in favour of or against mesothelioma victims. This is a debate about how our legal system is being reformed.
We are implementing fundamental reforms of conditional fee agreements, or CFAs, following the recommendations in Lord Justice Jackson’s review of civil litigation costs. The current regime allows for risk-free litigation for claimants and substantial additional costs for defendants. We want to restore a fair balance to the system, with meritorious cases being brought at proportionate cost. We are therefore abolishing recoverability of success fees and “after the event”, or ATE, insurance premiums. These reforms are intended to apply across the board and will cause a real shift in our society’s approach to litigation.
That is the general case, and it is important not to lose sight of it in considering respiratory disease claims, mesothelioma claims or others, but I want to repeat some specific points about mesothelioma. No one is suggesting that these tragic cases are contributing in any way to what has been described as a compensation culture—this is a horrible disease which acts very fast, and that suggestion has never been any part of my case in putting forward the Government’s position, as noble Lords know. It is a horrific disease and we have nothing but sympathy and compassion for its victims. Recent Governments of all colours have taken measures to help claimants in these cases, and this Government are continuing that work with due urgency.
Lord Bach
I am very grateful to the noble Lord—I think the whole House will be grateful to him—for shutting me up. That is the first thing that he succeeded in doing, but he also made the point that this is about whether this House believes that the other place should have a closer look at this. What worries me slightly is that, as I understand the programme Motion in the other place, there may be only one hour in the programme for all the matters that they have to consider; but I am not sure that I understand the procedures of this House, let alone those of the other place.
The noble Lord has persuaded me to sit down now. I think that was his intention. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response to the points that have been made. Surely the other place should take up this matter again—it is of such huge importance.
Lord McNally
I think it was the line, “I want to stop soon” that provoked my noble friend Lord Higgins to get to his feet.
Again, this has been a very useful debate, with two parallel arguments. I go back to my opening remarks: nobody underestimates the horror of mesothelioma and the importance of getting speedy redress for sufferers. Parallel to that, however, are the attempts that we are trying to bring forward to bring some order to the costs of litigation. It simply is not true that the Jackson reforms are intended just to catch dodgy whiplash claims. There was a general feeling that the amendments to CFAs which the previous Administration introduced brought in an overall inflation of costs in our legal system. We all pay for that inflation.
I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Wills, said, but the truth is that the present system which the sufferers have to use is slow and expensive. I repeat that the intention of this Government is to move as speedily as possible to get to where we can through agreement with the industry, to get litigation out of the way. It is true, as has been said by a number of noble Lords, that there was callous treatment of sufferers. There was slow movement in addressing the issue, but that accusation does not lie at this Government’s door. We have moved very quickly in our attempts to get agreement with the industry.
Lord Bach
As far as that is concerned, the setting up of a body in order to get a move on with this was mentioned in a White Paper from the previous Government two years ago. We have seen absolutely nothing after two years to suggest that that body will be set up soon. Indeed, every comment made by the insurance industry as a whole has been opposed to any organisation that would stand in, as it were, when they cannot find who is responsible for these diseases being caused.
Lord McNally
As I made clear in my opening remarks, my noble friend Lord Freud hopes to be able to make a Statement on this by the summer. The House, the insurance industry and sufferers from this disease should understand that we mean business on this. We are addressing this with a real sense of urgency. Whatever happens regarding this amendment, given the plight of sufferers from this disease, they deserve fairness and speed in settlement for the many reasons that have been put forward.
The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, said that there is no virtue in dogmatic consistency and he even had the strong support of my noble friend Lord Carlile in that. Certainly, there is no virtue in dogmatic consistency, but we need to consider the integrity of the legal system as a whole and fairness between different claimants. There are two parallel debates. There are the necessary Jackson reforms of legal costs, which will apply across the board, and the need to move with speed to get a system that deals with the problems of mesothelioma victims as quickly as possible. We can only make our impact assessments.
My noble friend Lord Carlile asked whether we thought that the Jackson reforms will prevent sufferers’ access to justice. We do not believe that. We would not have brought this forward if we had thought it. The point was made about success fees. I repeat that they are not compulsory. As my noble friend Lord Faulks has pointed out, there may be some proper, healthy competition among lawyers that will address the question of success fees.
It is not the responsibility of somebody suffering from a terminal illness to watch the clock as far as costs are concerned. It is the responsibility of government. The Jackson reforms take that responsibility away from claimants. Not just in this particular case but in the broad there was no responsibility on litigants or their lawyers to watch costs. That was the weakness of the whole system. The Jackson reforms put some emphasis back on to the responsibility to watch costs—not on somebody suffering from a terminal illness but through the reforms that we are putting through across the board in this area. For a claimant who does not have to pay a success fee, the 10 per cent uplift could mean more compensation than he or she would otherwise have got. I make no firm claim on that. It is not a question of being callous towards the sufferers. On the contrary, the Government are taking very speedy action to try to get in place an agreement which I am sure we all agree should have been in place many years before.
Sadly, this is not a problem that will go away. That is one of the reasons why I believe that we need a sense of urgency in our approach to this. Although we are now fully aware of the dangers of asbestos, this insidious disease can strike 20, 30 or 40 years after exposure. Therefore, there is a need not for a complicated, expensive, lawyer-based system of compensation, but for a system that will address the needs of sufferers. I am sorry that I cannot help more in relation to making it an exception. Horrific as the disease is, it is not an exception to the way in which the justice system should work. We should have a system in which lawyers get a proper return for the job that they do and in which those deserving compensation receive proper compensation. It is not a case of grabbing 25 per cent of that compensation. Competition and even some morality might drive that out of the system. Even bigger than that is the prize that the Government are seeking: a system that is not lawyer-based but one that is based on need, clearly agreed with the industry. As I have assured the House, we hope to make a Statement by the summer and we hope to have a system in place that brings speed and fairness to the sufferers of this disease. I ask the House to reject the amendment and to support the House of Commons resolution.
Lord Alton of Liverpool
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in this debate and in the earlier debates. The Minister has, with his usual courtesy, dealt with the arguments that have been put forward today. I reiterate my thanks to him for the time that he has spent with me, with Mr Paul Goggins last week and with the noble Lord, Lord Freud. He has said a number of things this evening on which the House should reflect, one of which was about the new scheme that it is hoped will be brought in in future and which will be a lot less reliant on lawyers. If we can achieve that, I think that there will be consensus in your Lordships’ House that it will be a very significant and purposeful step forward and it is certainly one that I will wholeheartedly support. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, has told us that that announcement will be made in the summer. However, it will require primary legislation, which is not before us, so there will be at least another 18 months from the time of the announcement before anything is on the statute book.
In the course of this evening’s proceedings, there has been dispute between different lawyers and different Members of your Lordships’ House about the practical effects of the law as now drafted on victims of mesothelioma. Pending the announcement in the summer and the new legislation that might come, I beg your Lordships not to play Russian roulette with the lives of people who have a terminal illness. I beg you not to be drawn into either side’s arguments about how this might work out and not to take chances but to preserve, as the noble Lord, Lord McNally, said the amendment would do, the status quo and keep things as they are at the moment until such time as we have something better to put in its place.
Success fees have been mentioned a great deal during the proceedings. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said that many lawyers would not want them, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, said that they should not take them, and the Minister said that they would not be compulsory. However, the Bill provides for lawyers to take, if they wish, up to 25 per cent in compensation. They can take that as their payment, not for the base fee—they will get that anyway—but in addition to the base fee if they are successful in pursuing a case.
I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, said earlier that it would be better if such a system were entirely swept away, but it has not been. If we are to wait for regulation, how do we know whether those regulations will be put forward by the Government or whether they will be successful? I do not think that we should do this on a wing and a prayer.
The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, thanked me for my persistence but, 40 years ago, in 1972, the noble Lord issued a pamphlet championing people who were suffering from mesothelioma. Thirty thousand people have died from the disease over the years. As the noble Lord, Lord McNally, has just intimated, probably the same sort of number will die before this is all over.
We are often accused of being preoccupied with fringe issues, but in a week or so, we shall have Workers’ Memorial Day. Surely, this evening, it would be fitting for us to recognise the sacrifice that workers have made in the service of their companies and this country in many heavy industries. This does not affect just those who have worked in heavy industries as even those who washed the clothes of people working in those industries have contracted this awful disease. Surely this is something on which we can raise our voices tonight, knowing that there are Members in another place who wish to pursue this further in the House of Commons and who were denied the opportunity to do so at earlier stages. Many of the issues that we have been debating this evening, which are new, should have been debated in Committee in another place much earlier on. We have been reassured that there are no financial questions. This is not about austerity; it is not about fraud; it is not about ambulance chasing; and it is not about a compensation culture. However, it is about elementary justice. I hope that your Lordships will agree with my Motion. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord McNally
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 32 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 32A.
Lord McNally
My Lords, Motion F contains Amendment 32, which seeks an exemption from Clauses 43, 45 and 46 for industrial disease claims. The Government cannot accept this very broad exemption to the provisions in Part 2, and the House of Commons has agreed with our position.
The suggested exemption is very wide and would cover all manner of conditions, including relatively minor problems that may be better resolved outside the courtroom. I take the point that there are all types of industrial disease claims with special factors. Where these exist, we can take specific actions, as I outlined earlier when speaking about mesothelioma, but industrial disease is potentially a very wide category, and I am not persuaded that it would be fair to treat the class of industrial disease claims differently from other types of personal injury claim. This may be of little comfort to individual victims of industrial disease, but we need to consider the integrity of the legal system as a whole and fairness between different claimants.
For all the sympathy that we have for sufferers of any industrial disease and the desire of all of us to make the legal process easier, particularly for those facing terminal illness, I cannot see that a system based on exceptions would be fair to other claimants. I fear that we would be failing in the wider duty of fairness in legal proceedings, which, as I mentioned in the earlier debate, is the key element behind the Jackson reforms. I urge the noble Lord not to insist on his amendment. I beg to move.
Motion F1 (as an amendment to Motion F)
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I can be very brief. There is a belief on this side that Amendment 32 would drive a coach and horses through the Jackson amendments, and we are broadly in support of the need to amend and reform conditional fee agreements and the like. I also draw the House’s attention to the fact that the wording of this amendment is extraordinarily wide. It will not apply just to cases of damages for industrial disease, as the heading would indicate; it will relate to any proceedings that include a claim for damages for a disease, condition or illness. That could be a minority part of the claim, and the rest, piggybacking on it, would also be outside the broad changes to these conditional fee agreements that have, in my view and in the view of the Government, had extremely unpropitious consequences for litigation generally, some of which we heard in discussion on the previous amendment. I am afraid that I oppose this amendment.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I am grateful for my noble friend’s support. We should move quickly to a decision on the matter. This is a very wide amendment. It ducks the issue that the Government have made central to this Bill and which I made in our debate on mesothelioma. Singling out a sector for special treatment is unfair across the board. We are looking in that case for non-legal solutions to the problems of the victims. The Government have taken action on a number of areas of specific industrial diseases and will continue to do so.
As I said at the beginning of my remarks, we will not undermine what most people saw in the system that is now in place: a very inflationary form of financing litigation where neither the claimant nor the lawyer has any need to concern themselves about cost. That is why Jackson was set up and why he came up with the solution that he has. As in previous cases, the idea that the 25 per cent is compulsory is not necessary. I should like to see much more competition and willingness to take these cases. Noble Lords have seen that it is easy to take very hard cases and then to say, “Well, we can’t go along with this”. If you do that, you dismantle the Jackson reforms. I believe that the debates in both Houses over the full period of this Bill have been mainly supportive of the central architecture of the Jackson reforms. I hope that when they vote on this amendment, noble Lords will see its flaws and will support what the Commons has proposed.
Lord Wigley
My Lords, I have listened carefully to what the Minister has said in this short debate, but the fact remains that if one considers the debates that took place at Second Reading, in Committee and on Report in the House of Commons, these issues have not been handled in depth and in detail. We have not seen the figures on how financial savings will arise in detail from the changes that are being made. If there are complexities in law with regard to many of the cases for compensation for injury or disease in a place of work, surely without financial support people will not be able to get the compensation to which they are entitled. If they are entitled to compensation, it is downright unacceptable that up to 25 per cent can be skimmed off.
Time after time the Minister has said that there is no compulsion to take up to 25 per cent. There may not be compulsion but it is available, and the Government have chosen to make it available. To my mind, and I believe to the minds of many noble Lords, that is unacceptable. The House of Commons needs to get its act in order and to apply itself in detail to these questions in a way that did not happen on 17 April when about one-third, at most, of an hour was allotted to the content of this amendment. For those reasons, I wish to test the will of the House.
Lord McNally
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 168 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 168A, do not insist on its Amendments 169 and 240 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 240A and 240B.
Lord McNally
My Lords, the amendments in Motion G would bring the majority of welfare benefit matters back into scope. Before I get into the detail of this Motion, I want to remind the House that these amendments have been considered by the House of Commons. That House has disagreed with Amendment 168, ascribing financial privilege as the reason for doing so, and in place of Amendments 169 and 240 has accepted the Government’s amendments in lieu. Despite this, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, has tabled an amendment to Amendment 168 that would bring into scope advice and assistance for all welfare benefit appeals in the First-tier Tribunal. It is my opinion that this amendment will elicit the same response from the House of Commons.
As in our earlier debate, the fact that the amendment infringes privilege is the only reason that is given. I do not object to the amendment; as the Clerk of the House of Commons recently put it after a privilege reason, “That does not exclude a second try by the Lords”. However, as was said by the Joint Committee on Conventions, of which I was a member:
“If the Commons have disagreed to Lords Amendments on grounds of financial privilege, it is contrary to convention for the Lords to send back Amendments in lieu which clearly invite the same response”.
I put it to the House that the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, will invite the same response—in fact more enthusiastically, in that they are wider.
As I have said many times, the Government consider that, in most cases, appellants can and do present their welfare benefit appeals in the First-tier Tribunal in plain language and without legal assistance. The tribunals system has been designed precisely so that they can do this. Indeed, a report by the president of the Social Entitlement Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal has pointed out that Department for Work and Pensions decisions are most commonly overturned because the tribunal elicits additional factual information from the appellant, usually in the form of oral evidence provided by the appellant. This suggests that legal arguments are not the most common reason for a welfare benefit decision being overturned in the tribunal. Furthermore, in his 2008-09 report, the president stated:
“The availability of this additional information suggests that there should be more direct engagement with the appellant”.
We have committed to ensuring that not-for-profit advice remains widely available and we have supported this view, as I reported earlier, with further funding, making available £16.8 million for advice service funding, which is already helping 300 front-line advice organisations. In addition, £20 million of funding will be made available in each of the financial years 2013-14 and 2014-15.
Perhaps I could draw the attention of the House to the government amendments, which, as I have said, I think are a genuine response by the Government to points that were made, not least from my own Benches. We have listened very carefully to the arguments raised here and in the House of Commons about retaining legal advice and some representation for onward appeals on a point of law in relation to a welfare benefit matter. At this point, I pay particular tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, who has engaged in a constructive discussion on this topic with my noble friend Lord Freud. Her contribution has undoubtedly helped us to produce a sensible and workable solution.
We accept that legal aid may be justified in these cases and we offered government amendments in lieu in the House of Commons. These government amendments will make legal advice and assistance available for welfare benefit appeals on a point of law in the Upper Tribunal, including applications to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal. In addition, the amendments would bring into scope advice, assistance and representation for welfare benefit appeals in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, including applications to these courts for permission to appeal. It is worth noting that the right to appeal to the Upper Tribunal in relation to a welfare benefit matter is a right to appeal on a point of law arising from a decision made by the First-tier Tribunal.
The House of Commons also recognises that there may be cases—although the Government think that there will be very few—where appeals relating to welfare benefits in the First-tier Tribunal will be on points of law. The Government have listened to arguments on this and have undertaken to look into this issue and investigate whether we can devise a workable system whereby advice and assistance can be made available for certain welfare benefit cases in the First-tier Tribunal.
We believe that the government amendments in lieu address the specific concerns in this House and seek to prioritise funding on cases where legal advice and assistance is most needed. I beg to move.
Lord Martin of Springburn
My Lords, the noble Lord has made many very interesting points but, at the end, he said that it would be good if the House of Commons had another chance to look at this matter. If the amendment were carried, the other place would have a chance to look at this. I heard the Minister’s comments about financial privilege, but I do not share his point of view that if we put back the amendment we are being unfair to the House of Commons or to the traditions of this House.
I think of the situations that I had to face in my former constituency where there was a great deal of poverty. I heard many academics say that it was terrible that in the east end of Glasgow and in parts of the north end of Glasgow the life expectancy of people was such that you had a better chance of survival if you lived in Calcutta. It is all very well for an academic to say that, but people in areas of great poverty in my former constituency did not always get the benefits to which they were entitled. But if they go to the first line of appeal, it will be most unfair if they do not get legal aid. In the city of Glasgow, many lawyers recognise that people who have little or no income need the help of lawyers to articulate their cases.
We should not forget that when an appeal is made, often a recipient cannot speak up for themselves—perhaps because they are stroke victims—and cannot communicate, and therefore the carer has to worry about the benefits that they are losing. The carer has a 24-hour job. When someone says they are a carer it rolls off the tongue, but that carer can be up at three in the morning or may be denied the opportunity of a social life. They have to worry about going along to a tribunal on behalf of someone whom they love dearly and whom they are caring for seven days a week and it is a great relief to many of those people if they can get legal aid which will help them so much.
It used to be the case—I know it was a while ago—that if a working man or woman had to get the help of a solicitor, they had to go into the city centre but then lawyers realised that help was needed in the peripheral areas. Many legal companies operate in what used to be shops. They rent shops and now they are in the heart of very poor communities. It would be most unfortunate if people who need help, particularly carers, do not get assistance from those who are legally qualified and able to articulate a case for them.
Lord McNally
My Lords, when the Government launched their consultative Green Paper on this legislation nearly two years ago and I made one of my first ministerial responses from this Dispatch Box, I made it clear that I was aware that we were making some tough and difficult decisions about legal aid. We have heard many times in many debates over the past 18 months that X, Y, or Z is attacking, undermining, or damaging the most vulnerable in our society. I have listened to those debates, but I remain convinced that what would have damaged the most vulnerable in our society more would have been if we had not taken the tough economic decisions necessary to put our economy right. It is no use noble Lords opposite shaking their heads. We were a lot poorer than we thought we were and every government department has had to make tough decisions. My own has had to take cuts of 23 per cent across the board over this spending review. That has meant tough decisions not only in terms of legal aid, but in staff numbers and in other aspects of the Ministry of Justice’s work.
We have never ducked the fact that we have made some hard decisions in this matter. Neither have we ducked the fact that our approach to cutting the legal aid budget meant taking the bulk of social welfare law out of scope. We had taken the decision to focus on civil legal aid. The term “relatively low priority” refers to our view that in terms of criminal legal aid we are talking about people’s liberty and reputation. It is an important part of our system that people should have legal aid in this area.
Lord Howarth of Newport
Is the Minister therefore confident that there is no waste in the criminal legal aid budget and that there are no rackets there? Is he confident that this is an area that did not need the Government’s attention and that since the Treasury obliged his department to find savings of 23 per cent it really needed to focus its effort on the civil legal aid budget?
Lord McNally
On the contrary. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, is ready to leap to his feet to draw attention to the fact that we have carried through the savings in criminal legal aid that the previous Administration put in train.
Lord Bach
Yes, I am pleased that the Government have done that, but that figure is included in the 8 per cent that they have taken off criminal legal aid. They have taken 29 per cent off family legal aid, as well as 53 per cent off social welfare law. Why that distinction? Why take 8 per cent from a large amount on criminal legal aid, 29 per cent on family law but 53 per cent of a pretty small budget on social welfare law? That is deliberate, is it not?
Lord McNally
Of course it is deliberate. One of the things about that rather long opening speech is that it is the same speech that the noble Lord has been making for 18 months. I appreciate that he disagrees with our judgment on social welfare law, but we have never made any bones about the fact that that is where we took a tough decision. On criminal legal aid, I am quite sure that we will return to it, but the judgment we made was that since the previous Administration had made a series of quite significant cuts in criminal legal aid, we would allow them to bed in before returning to that matter. The fact is that the decisions have been tough, and we stand by the fact that tough decisions were required in the economic circumstances that we found ourselves in and also because successive Administrations have said that the legal aid system was in need of reform.
I do not know whether we have got the specific answers to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, about the balance in other common law countries. I have never used comparisons with continental legal things; I have always made the point that as far as Britain is concerned the comparison is with common law countries. Many months ago, on my return from the Commonwealth Law Conference in Sydney, I mentioned that the one message I brought back from Commonwealth countries with legal aid systems was their amazement at the generosity of the British system.
We are in a process in which we have had to take tough decisions. Some of the contributions today by the noble Lords, Lord Low and Lord Martin, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, almost made the case that the only practical help is legal advice. That is not something we accept. We think that in these cases there are other forms of advice that are just as valuable.
On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Martin, that I had said that we cannot give offence to the House of Commons, I think that if he checks Hansard he will find that I have never been against this House giving offence to the House of Commons. Indeed, I quoted the Companion earlier:
“Criticism of proceedings in the House of Commons or of Commons Speaker’s rulings is out of order”.
However, the Companion goes on to state that,
“criticism may be made of the institutional structure of Parliament or the role and function of the House of Commons”.
Lord Martin of Springburn
I think that the Minister suggested that for this House to send the amendment back again was against the conventions of this House.
Lord McNally
It is not. I quoted from the Cunningham committee which held that opinion. There was a point when it was against the conventions of the House.
Lord Martin of Springburn
That is an opinion of a committee; it is not a convention of this House. The opinion of a committee is just that: an opinion.
Lord McNally
Nobody is suggesting that if this House wants to send the amendment back, it is not entitled to do so. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Low, said about the importance of people’s Peers. He may know that it is my long-standing opinion that having a party-political label does not somehow lower one’s capacity to take views on legislation. Indeed, for many hours in this House the only people taking a detailed view of legislation are those on the party political Benches. I admit and acknowledge that recent appointments have brought valuable experience to this House.
Although my membership of the other place was brief, I remain at heart a House of Commons man in terms of where—
Lord Low of Dalston
With respect, in my remarks I said that I had no intention of disparaging other Peers. More than once I have gone on record as saying that the contribution of Peers appointed from political parties is indispensable to the effective working of this House. I am certainly not one of those who would like to see the House of Lords a politician-free zone.
Lord McNally
The point is that it is still an appointed House and is an advisory and revisory Chamber. As such, where this House decides to draw stumps on a particular issue is a matter for its judgment. Although financial primacy may occasionally irritate this House, again, as a House of Commons man and as I said earlier, this is not something recently drawn up by the coalition agreement or even by the 1911 Act. It is 300 years of our much-valued history during which kings have lost their heads and their throne in the primacy of the House of Commons on financial matters. Much as I should like to flatter the House on this matter, I still believe that it is important.
I understand the desire to see more legal advice in these cases. As I said in my opening remarks, we believe that in most cases individuals will be able to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal without formal legal assistance. I quoted the president of the tribunal in highlighting that in many cases eliciting additional information from the appellant was the most useful exercise that the tribunal carried out.
I also think that we are not being idle while welfare benefit reforms are being brought forward. A number of proposals currently are being considered across government that should make it easier for people to receive the right provision of entitlement in areas such as welfare, benefits and education. The most notable of these is the universal credit which will help to reduce the scope of error significantly as it makes the whole benefit system simpler and easier to understand. We are working closely with DWP as part of its wider welfare reform programme to improve the quality and effectiveness of its initial decision-making.
As I have said, we have gone into this matter fully and it is not something that we have ducked. From the very beginning, from the first consultation paper, we took a decision that social welfare would be taken out of scope. I know how passionately the noble Lord, Lord Bach, feels about this matter. If he was in my position, it is not the road he would have taken to fulfil his party’s commitment to cut legal aid. That is the nature of things. This is the judgment of the Government.
We are not looking at complex points of law in other areas at the moment. As the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said, the problem is that if you make a concession somebody immediately stands up and says, “Why not look at it in other areas?”. We can build on what the Lord Chancellor promised about talks with the DWP. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, in explaining what he was proposing, illustrated why we have been careful in putting this matter forward. We will look at it carefully and I will draw to the attention of my right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor the specific proposals he made in his speech.
As I have said before, we have had a very thorough debate on this. It has certainly been very thoroughly debated in this place over the past year. I believe that it would be better now if the House were to accept the Commons amendments and the noble Lord were to withdraw his.
Lord Bach
I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. We have had the expertise of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Low, both of whom are experts on the disabled and the problems that they face. I am also very grateful to my noble friend Lord Howarth and the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, for their very knowledgeable contributions on this matter, and not least to the Minister for what he has had to say.
This is one of the central and most important debates of this whole Bill. It goes to the very heart of what the Government are seeking to do, which is effectively to ask whether social welfare law will survive in our jurisdiction. We currently have a system of social welfare law that we can be proud of. It is not perfect; it makes mistakes and it probably does not have enough money spent on it but it is not a bad system, where not-for-profit organisations around the country—CABs, law centres, other advice centres and some Law Society solicitors—do wonderful work at very low rates, giving advice to the most vulnerable, the disabled and the poorest in our country.
The issue is whether claimants will continue to get the advice that they have been entitled to in the past—because there has been a consensus of the political classes of all the parties that that is the proper way for a mature legal system to behave—which helps them decide whether or not they have a case when they are dealing with the state. Without that advice, how will these people get to the tribunal in the first place? The Minister quoted the president of the Social Entitlement Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal. Is that the same president who has publicly said that he is appalled at the prospect of more and more claimants coming before his tribunals who have not had the benefit of any legal advice?
Lord McNally
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 170 and 172 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reasons 170A and 172A.
Lord McNally
My Lords, the Motion contains amendments dealing with clinical negligence. We have debated the issue of clinical negligence at length, and I am grateful for the intensity and conviction of those who have spoken in support and those who have challenged the Government during the passage of this Bill. Before I go into the detail of this Motion, I remind noble Lords that we listened to their concerns and brought forward an amendment at Third Reading in this House which specifically addresses their concerns. This amendment puts beyond doubt that legal aid will remain available for babies who suffer brain injury at birth leading to a lifetime of care needs. This was in recognition that there are often difficulties in obtaining funding for these cases through conditional fee agreements due to the extent and expense of the investigations required.
Our amendment brings into scope claims where medical negligence causes a brain injury as a result of which the child is severely disabled. It is intended that this will cover cases of medical negligence where the child is at its most vulnerable, during its time in the womb, during the delivery, and immediately afterwards. The House of Commons raised concern that there might be arguments about whether a particular child falls within the scope of this amendment. We believe that the amendment is clear in this regard. It provides for funding where the negligence occurs in the period of time beginning with the point of the mother’s pregnancy until eight weeks after birth. In recognition of the fact that premature babies are particularly vulnerable, the government amendment also provides that where a baby is born prematurely, the eight-week period will be taken to start from the point at which the mother would otherwise have begun her 37th week of pregnancy.
We have also provided that where the negligence occurs beyond the eight-week point, a safety net will remain in the form of the exceptional funding scheme, in those cases where the failure to fund would amount to a breach of the individual’s rights under the ECHR. Contrary to the concern expressed in the other House it is right that all other cases should first seek a conditional fee agreement, and where one is not available—for example, due to high disbursement costs—then exceptional funding may be available, taking into account factors such as the complexity of the case and the capacity of the litigant or litigation friend to present their case. The Government’s amendment covers the vast majority of clinical negligence children’s cases currently funded through legal aid.
My noble friend Lord Cormack has tabled an amendment in lieu of his Lords Amendment 172, which seeks to bring into scope other children’s cases involving clinical negligence that occurred when the child was below the age of 16, rather than 18. We believe that this amendment would still bring into scope a whole range of less serious cases which do not involve lengthy and detailed investigations or multiple expert reports, which are caught by government Amendment 216, and which are more suited for funding through a CFA in exactly the same way as for adults. We believe this to be the case whether the child is 18 or 16. The Commons has decided against Lords Amendment 172, and it is my opinion that my noble friend’s amendment in lieu will elicit the same response. I urge my noble friend to withdraw his Motion.
On Amendment 170, the Government have already made special provision for expert reports in clinical negligence reports to the Jackson provisions in Part 2. This will mean that no one is required to pay up front for expert reports in clinical negligence cases. Providing for all expert reports would be more costly than the current legal aid arrangements. As I have said previously, at present solicitors have to choose whether to use legal aid or a CFA to fund the case. Only 18 per cent of cases where the funding method is known use legal aid. The amendment would open up legal aid for all of those cases which are currently funded by way of CFA. Lawyers would be able to claim their success fee while using legal aid to fund expert fees, and the legal aid fund would carry all of the solicitor’s or insurer’s risk. This could result in a significant expansion of the legal aid scheme and significant costs. We do not consider this a fair outcome for the taxpayer, who should not be required to pay where cases are already taken forward and paid for by alternative means. I beg to move.
Motion H1 (as an amendment to Motion H)
Lord Beecham
I was about to say precisely that. It was never implemented so it is open to the Government to lay regulations that would require that 25 per cent deduction. It is equally open to them to do what their predecessors did and not lay such regulations or make that deduction. I am entirely at one with the noble Lord in saying that that deduction should not be made, but that is the situation at the moment.
With respect to the noble Lord, I do not think that his argument takes us very far at all. The Opposition support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, despite the fact that it appears to contain a grammatical error. It refers to,
“clinical services which took place at a time when the individual was child”.
There is an indefinite article missing somewhere. However, that is a trivial point. The substantive point is one that was made effectively by the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, when we debated this on Report. In the debate on the amendment that was discussed on that occasion, she talked of the figures involved in legal aid expenditure for children. She pointed out that legal aid for clinical negligence claims involving children cost the Legal Aid Fund some £4.6 million, of which £3 million was spent on precisely the cases of neonatal injury to which the Minister referred and to which the Government have responded by restoring them within scope. Therefore, as the noble Baroness pointed out, the net saving would amount to £1.6 million for the Legal Aid Fund.
It is time to dispose of some of the shibboleths about tough decisions and the like. Apparently it is not a particularly tough decision for the Department for Communities and Local Government to spend £250 million on weekly bin collections. It seems to me and to the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, and presumably the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, a very tough decision to deny legal aid at a cost of £1.6 million to children under the age of 16 who suffer clinical negligence other than through the limited but welcome concession that the Government have made in respect of the injuries to which we have referred.
I also remind your Lordships of the view of the National Health Service Litigation Authority, which I quoted last time and will quote again. It stated:
“We have serious concerns over the proposal to withdraw legal aid from clinical negligence claims. Whilst we have seen an upsurge of claims brought under Conditional Fee Agreements … in recent years, we question whether CFAs are likely to be readily available to fund many of the more serious claims currently brought via legal aid”.
That view was about clinical negligence claims at large. Therefore, one might think that those concerns would surely apply to claims for children under the age of 16.
This does not remotely impinge on the huge problems that the Minister constantly reminds us of in relation to deficit reduction and the like. It is an almost trivial sum of money. By no conceivable stretch of the imagination could it be justified by financial privilege, which is the cover under which the Government approach this amendment. Let us be clear about financial privilege because it has been bandied around today and on previous occasions. Of course the Commons has the right to assert financial privilege, which is an objective process as far as the Clerks and the Speaker are concerned. However, it does not stop there. The Commons can waive financial privilege. If the Government wished for financial privilege to be waived, it would pass almost without opposition and frequently does. It is often waived. The Government choose not to waive it in connection with this and the other matters to which we have referred. It is a fig leaf behind which Ministers hide. I hesitate to convey an image of Ministers brandishing fig leaves; that would be an unwelcome variation on a theme. However, it is a pretty feeble and diminutive fig leaf for any Minister to hide behind. It is not an adequate defence for what they are doing.
I repeat: the figures show that the potential savings are minimal. Undoubtedly, justice will not be accessible for too many young people except in an expensive form potentially through a conditional fee agreement—even allowing for how the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, described it. I very much hope that the House will build on the Government’s welcome concession with this small additional financial burden and extend justice to those who need it.
Lord McNally
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, quoted the Reason, which states that the amendment,
“would alter the financial arrangements made by the Commons”,
and goes on to state that,
“the Commons do not offer any further Reason”.
As an old parliamentarian, he knows that if an amendment infringes privilege, that is the only reason that will be given. Obviously, when taken against the national economic crisis that we are dealing with, these various precise sums will always be able to be argued away as almost too trivial to worry about.
Perhaps I may relate to the House some other thoughts that have also motivated our approach in trying to reform legal aid in this area. Clinical negligence claimant lawyers’ bills, which the National Health Service Litigation Authority has to pay, have more than doubled from £83 million in 2006-07 to £195 million in 2010-11. As part of this, CFA success fees to claimant lawyers have more than doubled in the past four years from £28 million to £66 million, and the NHSLA pays out an estimated £33 million in claimant insurance premiums. However, damages paid to claimants have risen more slowly—from £579.4 million to £863.4 million over the same period—and the NHSLA has controlled its own defence legal costs much more carefully, rising only 26 per cent during the same period.
One motivation behind our approach in this whole area has been the impact that the system brought in by the previous Government in 2000 has had on the National Health Service, with an extraordinary rise in payments to lawyers. We are trying to address that. In doing so, early on we listened carefully to concerns about the specific issues faced by the most vulnerable children at the most vulnerable point in their lives, and we brought forward amendments to deal with that. Of course, in these areas there will always be disputes about where you draw the line and what happens to those on the other side of that line. However, in bringing forward our amendments our intention was to meet that initial lobbying, and we responded to it most positively. However, that was immediately followed by further lobbying that this should cover all children, but we do not believe that that is necessary.
The amendment purposely captures clinical negligence before, during and shortly after birth. We believe that that is a proportionate means of meeting the policy objective of targeting legal aid on the most serious and complex cases that would otherwise struggle to obtain a CFA. The eight-week period is an appropriate period of time at which to draw the line, because most of the serious and complex clinical negligence cases involving neurological injuries to infants are likely to arise from treatment or care administered during this period, when the infant can be considered to be most vulnerable. We have drawn the post-birth line at this point because of that. We also recognise that some children will be born prematurely and will need fairly intensive medical supervision in the first weeks of life. Any cases in which negligence occurs beyond this point will need to be considered under exceptional funding on a case-by-case basis. It is difficult—
Lord Faulks
I am very grateful to my noble friend for giving way. I wonder whether he can help the House on one point. Originally, before the welcome concession by the Government concerning babies damaged at or about the time of birth, the response was that exceptional funding might be available to meet those claims. Now that those claims are to be within the scope of legal aid, does it follow that more exceptional funding might be available to deal with the hard cases that may arise with children who are outside the scope of the eight-week period?
Lord McNally
I do not think that exceptional funding has ever been a specific amount of money and that therefore the amendment releases more of the exceptional funding pot to others. The exceptional funding is there to meet cases that fulfil the requirements for exceptional funding. I will not follow my noble friend because he leads me down a dangerous road. The exceptional funding is and will be there on the merits of the case. That is why we have confidence that the combination of the amendments that we have made, the CFAs, which, as was pointed out, some 82 per cent are already using, and a robust exceptional funding scheme will meet the needs in the cases that are covered by the amendment that we are opposing. Again, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment and to support the Commons.
Lord Cormack
My Lords, I felt very sad as I listened to a Minister, for whom I have both affection and respect, fail to answer this brief debate.
I am grateful to all those who have taken part. It has been brief, but that does not mean that the issue is unimportant. I apologise, incidentally, to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for the missing indefinite article, but we are talking about a definite proposition. That definite proposition is this: we often talk about rights and responsibilities, and certain people have particular rights and to them we have particular responsibilities. We are talking about children—those under the age of 16: children who are damaged as a result of clinical negligence within the National Health Service that the country provides for them and in which they and their parents place their trust. To limit the help, in a very small timeframe, to those who suffer brain damage is frankly not the hallmark of a civilised health service or a civilised society.
I know not whether the figure of £1.6 million given by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is right, but it is certainly around that figure. Indeed, the state would be the beneficiary in the long term. It would certainly be the beneficiary in the moral sense. We should concern ourselves about that. Of course the Government have problems. Of course they have great responsibilities for the economy. We are not, however, talking this evening about something that can in any way damage the financial strategy. What it can do is damage our reputation. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Northover
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 171 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 171A.
Baroness Northover
Motion J concerns legal aid for children. When the Government undertook their comprehensive review of legal aid, we looked at the principles of each type of case funded by the scheme and considered, first, the importance of the issue; secondly, the litigant’s ability to present their own case, including and especially any vulnerability; thirdly, the availability of alternative sources of funding; and, fourthly, the availability of other routes to resolution. We have used those principles to prioritise funding so that civil legal services will be available in the highest-priority cases—for example, as my noble friend Lord McNally said earlier, where people’s life or liberty is at stake, where they are at risk of serious physical harm or immediate loss of their home, or where children may be taken into care.
The application of these principles led us to protect the vast majority of funding in cases involving children. These include family cases where a child is at risk of abuse; child care and supervision cases; civil claims concerning the abuse of a child; special educational needs cases; clinical negligence claims concerning brain-damaged babies; cases concerning the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of children; cases concerning the unlawful removal of children from the UK; cases concerning EU and international agreements on children; and legal aid for children who are made parties to private family proceedings. That is why 96 per cent of the current spend on cases involving child claimants will continue. Because we have adopted the approach that I have outlined, we do not accept Amendment 171, which seeks to bring all cases back into the scope of legal aid where a child is a party. On current plans, the overwhelming majority of current support will continue, as I said.
The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, has tabled Amendment 171B, which is almost identical to Amendment 171, with the exception of immigration and consumer law cases, on which the House of Commons has offered a clear view. In our opinion, Amendment 171B will elicit the same response in the House of Commons. However, I will set out again the measures that are in place that will guard against the risk of children falling through the net.
As noble Lords know, we have committed to providing additional resources for citizens advice bureaux and similar groups that provide the general practical advice that can often prove more productive than drawn-out adversarial legal action. As I mentioned earlier today, we will be making a further £20 million available to the sector in each of the next two financial years. It is therefore not the case that there will be no or substantially reduced funding for cases involving children and young people.
Some in past debates have suggested that children might be left to fend for themselves in courts of law. Let me address that very clearly. It is already a requirement of the rules of civil litigation that a child must have a litigation friend to conduct a case on their behalf, usually a parent unless the court specifically orders otherwise. It will be only in exceptional circumstances that the court will make an order permitting the child to conduct proceedings on their own behalf. Any step taken before a child has a litigation friend is of no effect unless the court makes such an order. There is no requirement that a litigation friend must act through a solicitor. It is therefore open to a child’s parent, or other person caring for the child, for example, to act as the child’s litigation friend in proceedings where the child is a party.
In other scenarios—for example, tribunals that are addressed in the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness—where a child may be bringing an action without a litigation friend, this will of course be a relevant factor in deciding whether they have the ability to present their own case and whether exceptional funding for representation is required in order to avoid a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR. This means that the existing Civil Procedure Rules, combined with our exceptional funding system, will provide crucial safeguards against children being left to navigate court and tribunal hearings on their own. We believe that these measures, taken together, are sufficient to guard against the risk of children falling through the net where they do not fall into the vast majority of cases that are still covered by legal aid. I beg to move.
Motion J1 (as an amendment to Motion J)
Baroness Northover
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their very important contributions to this debate.
At the beginning of this discussion, I set out in some detail the reasons behind the Government’s position on legal aid for children, and that legal aid should apply to the highest priority cases, which has been at the heart of our reform proposals. I produced a long list of where funding is being retained for children as a result of the application of this principle. The fact that 96 per cent of current spend on cases involving child claimants will continue reflects the importance that the Government have placed on that.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I regret to interrupt my noble friend at this time of night, but she mentioned the figure of 96 per cent remaining in scope. The figure of 13 per cent taken out of scope was just mentioned. I wonder where the reconciliation is between those two figures, because it is significant.
Baroness Northover
It is very straightforward. As I have just said, 96 per cent of current spend on cases is included, and in terms of numbers of cases 13 per cent are outside. So 4 per cent of spend is outside, which represents 13 per cent of the number of cases.
The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, flagged up great concern about children in this situation and referred to the Children’s Commissioner saying that if this happened, it would breach the ECHR. Indeed, we agree. I hope my introductory remarks reassured her that this is not in breach, because if there was a failure to provide funding in such a situation that it was a breach, that would be covered either within that 96 per cent that I have just mentioned or through the exceptional fund. Any child qualifying for that kind of protection would qualify, under the European Convention on Human Rights, for that exceptional funding. I hope that that reassures her. The Children’s Commissioner may say that it would be abuse of children’s rights if that were not to be the case but we are saying that that is covered because of that protection.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee flagged up the area of immigration, and here the child’s interests are generally represented by the parent or guardian. In most cases where a child is unaccompanied, the issue is usually an asylum claim and legal aid is of course remaining for these cases. My noble friend asked what would happen if the case was not accepted as an asylum claim. In these cases unaccompanied children would have a social worker assigned to them, whose role would include helping the child access the same advice and support as a child permanently settled in the UK. They could also, for example, offer assistance in filling in forms, explaining terms and giving them emotional support. As my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness outlined previously, the Home Office will be working with the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner on how best to ensure that local authorities can assist children in their care with immigration applications if necessary. This could, for example, mean exempting local authorities from Office of the Immigration Services—
Baroness Lister of Burtersett
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness but we have gone over this a number of times. I remember the late Lord Newton questioning this issue of using social workers. Social workers are not trained for this kind of work and, as I understand, it would be totally wrong for them to provide legal advice for children in their care. It could create real problems of conflicts of interest.
Baroness Northover
The noble Baroness may be right about social workers providing legal advice but I am talking about the kind of support that a social worker can give to a child in that situation. Often it is not a matter of specific legal advice but of assisting that child and steering them through the necessary procedures. There has been a running theme through a lot of this discussion that it is not necessarily legal advice that is required; it may be another form of support, which is where, for example, the CAB may be able to assist. Noble Lords have a lot of experience of organisations such as these assisting people and we should not forget that. We are looking at how best to ensure that local authorities can assist children in their care in the kind of cases that my noble friend has flagged up.
The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, asked about care leavers. I am glad that he was reassured by what my noble friend could tell him. I reiterate that the exceptional funding scheme will ensure the protection of the individual’s right to legal aid under the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as those rights to legal aid that are directly enforceable under European Union law. The scheme will of course encompass children leaving care, where they meet the relevant legal tests. In considering whether exceptional funding should be granted on this basis in an individual case engaging Article 6 of the ECHR, the director will consider the ability of the client to present their own case, the complexity of the issues, the importance of the issues at stake and all other relevant circumstances.
Local authorities also have a range of duties to care leavers which will not be affected by the provisions of the Bill. It is late at night but I also recognise the huge commitment in this area of the noble Earl. If he would like further discussions we are happy to do that. I hope that I have addressed the concerns of most noble Lords and would like to remind them that 96 per cent of the current funding remains in place and that the principles of need and vulnerability, which underpinned the reasons for covering the areas that we have, remain the most important ones.
I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, will be reassured that children who are in need will be protected and that we will not see the concerns that she has flagged up come to fruition. On that basis, I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her Motion.
Baroness Grey-Thompson
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, for her response and all other noble Lords who have contributed this evening.
In my opening speech I did not mention clinical negligence because the issue had been eloquently argued in the previous Motion by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay.
The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, raised the important issue of children in care and children leaving care. However, this will raise more issues about where the costs will move to. The hope that local authorities will pick up the pieces concerning this group of children in care or leaving care is naive. Local authorities are already under huge amounts of pressure, and pushing the costs—and potentially greater costs—on them will not help the children who we want to see receive this help.
I am also deeply uncomfortable about the role of the litigation friend and the ability of children to access an appropriate person who is able to help them through very difficult times.
I am afraid that I am still not convinced by the arguments on exceptional funding. When we debated the percentages of cases, we learnt that 13 per cent of children’s cases will be out of scope. However, information provided by JustRights shows that, contrary to misleading government claims, the 5,000 to 6,000 children covered by this amendment will not be protected by the exceptional funding scheme. The Ministry of Justice has confirmed to JustRights that its figures on the number of children affected already account for those who would receive exceptional funding. If children were automatically entitled to legal aid, the Government would avoid the cost of administering children’s applications to the scheme, as well as possible delays that would be detrimental to children’s welfare.
I am conscious of the late hour. This issue has been extensively debated in many sessions, but we should ask the other place to think again about the thousands of children who will be seriously and negatively affected if the amendment does not go through. I beg to move.