The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (James Brokenshire)
I congratulate the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), as other Members have done, on securing the debate. As it is a Back-Bench debate, I am conscious of the need to allow him some time to respond at the end, so I will try to keep my comments to the point and respond as succinctly as I am able to a number of points that have been raised.
I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman also on the manner and tone that he has brought to this afternoon’s discourse. I certainly recognise his desire to represent his constituents and obtain answers on behalf of his community. I know from discussions that we had around the time of the riots that he has stood up for his community in doing so, and that has been reflected in the manner in which the debate has been conducted.
I hope the right hon. Gentleman understands that because of ongoing legal and other issues, I cannot really comment on the specifics of individual cases. I am aware that the pre-inquest hearing in the case that he mentioned is due to be held next Tuesday, and there is an ongoing IPCC investigation. I certainly recognise the sensitivity of the issues that he has brought before the House this afternoon.
I pay tribute also to my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), whom I had the privilege to work alongside in opposition. I know how keenly he feels about these issues and the amount of work that he continues to put into answering the challenging question of how we can use intercept evidence.
We had an important contribution by my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab). I certainly do not see the justice system as an impediment to fighting crime, and justice and security need to go hand in hand. I do not see them as somehow mutually inconsistent. The right hon. Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy), with his experience as a former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and in his role with the Intelligence and Security Committee, highlighted some of the genuine challenges that exist, which I shall discuss. We also heard contributions from the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Jim Fitzpatrick) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips), and a balanced and helpful contribution from the Opposition Front Bencher, the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson).
I underline that the Government are committed to maximising the amount of sensitive material, including intercept evidence, that can be handled in legal proceedings. That is why we set out in the coalition agreement our intention to
“seek to find a practical way to allow the use of intercept evidence in court.”
We have also proposed measures in the Justice and Security Bill to permit intercepted material to be adduced in closed material procedures and certain civil proceedings. In doing that, we remain acutely aware that lawful interception already plays a critical role in tackling serious crime and protecting the British public. It is used in almost all the highest priority counter-terrorist operations and many other serious crime investigations. It is no exaggeration to say that interception constitutes one of the most important and effective capabilities in tackling serious crime and threats to our national security, so it is crucial that we get it right.
We have heard about the Privy Council review and the differing legal and operational circumstances that apply in that regard and it is worth highlighting the considerable burdens on some of the intercepting agencies. Inter-agency co-operation, such as the sharing of sensitive techniques, is less well developed in other countries than it is in the UK, but the comparable examples in other jurisdictions suggest that fewer investigations could be supported and the value of intercept evidence as an intelligence tool might be reduced. It is right, however, that we should continue to examine the examples highlighted in a number of speeches and find our way through this important question.
I should make it clear that when there is relevant and sensitive material, the Government wish to find a mechanism that will enable it to be used in evidence. Finding a means of using intercept as evidence is challenging, however. There can be no clearer demonstration of that than the seven previous attempts that have been made to find a way forward. Any proposal to remove the prohibition on intercept evidence for inquests, for example, runs into a number of difficulties, and we and previous Governments have grappled with them as they relate to the general question of intercept evidence.
One option proposed by the right hon. Member for Tottenham is the disclosure of intercept product to a jury and properly interested persons, such as a family member. This Government considered that, as did our predecessor, and we do not believe that there is a practical way of preserving national security and the basic tenets of the make-up of juries. Crucially, intercept products shared with either a jury or properly interested party takes us back to the more general challenges presented by intercept as evidence, including preventing sensitive capabilities, techniques and approaches from becoming widely known. As things stand, we do not see that there is a viable way forward on that specific point.
The right hon. Gentleman also asked whether it would be possible for a coroner with the status of a judge to view sensitive material, including intercept evidence. We already have a mechanism through which a coroner may request the appointment of a serving judge as an assistant deputy. That enables the judge coroner to order the disclosure of intercept evidence to him or herself alone when a case’s exceptional circumstances make that disclosure essential in the interests of justice.
The judge coroner would have access to all sensitive material and could consequently be satisfied that the material provided in open court was all that was necessary to hold a proper thorough investigation. That independent assessment would give assurance to the jury and comfort to the family that all the relevant material had been placed before them. Of course, in a small number of cases that sensitive material would be centrally relevant and the article 2 investigative obligation would be engaged. In those circumstances, a statutory inquiry would be needed so that the inquiry panel, as the finders of facts, could see all relevant material. The independent examination of the material, however, together with the appointment of counsel to the inquiry, should ensure that proper account is taken of all the available material and that the interests of the family are properly protected, even if the material cannot be shared publicly.
Paul Goggins (Wythenshawe and Sale East) (Lab)
I apologise that I was not in the Chamber to hear some of the earlier speeches. I have listened carefully to the Minister. Given what he has just said, will the Government think again about their decision not to provide for a closed material procedure for inquests—something they are prepared to provide in a small number of civil cases?
James Brokenshire
As the right hon. Gentleman knows, that matter was considered during discussions on the Justice and Security Bill currently in the other place, but the Government have determined that at this time it is not appropriate to bring those procedures forward. I hope, however, that the right hon. Gentleman heard me say that there is an existing mechanism to assess sensitive material, either through the appointment of a judge coroner to assess the relevancy and centrality of the evidence, or through the inquiry process I have highlighted.
The intercept as evidence review is obviously key to this discussion. It is an extensive and detailed review to assess the benefits, costs, and risks of introducing intercept as evidence in criminal proceedings, compared with the present intelligence-only approach under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. It has a broader remit than previous reviews, thereby avoiding wasted effort on approaches that prove to be non-viable, or being artificially constrained by existing intercept practice. Instead, it will ensure a fair and comprehensive assessment of the pros and cons of intercept as evidence.
The issues are complex and difficult, and as we have heard, there have been seven previous attempts since 1993 to find a way forward. The work is being overseen by the independent cross-party Privy Council group, chaired by Sir John Chilcot, which was reappointed by the Government. As the review is still ongoing, I am not in a position to provide the House with an update on its likely findings, but we will consider issues raised in this debate carefully and return to the House on the matter in due course. We do not want some form of open-ended process, and we recognise the desire to find solutions and a way forward. This is a current review, and work is ongoing to consider whether there is a way to proceed in the face of the challenges we have heard about.
The current intercept as evidence review seeks to build on the findings of previous reviews and the potential impact of a need for terrorist prevention and investigation measures. One clear conclusion of that previous work is that intercept evidence is not a silver bullet that will negate the need for alternative ways to manage risk. We have heard some examples of that this afternoon, and I highlight recent evidence from David Anderson, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who reiterated that intercept as evidence would not be
“a silver bullet that makes terrorism prevention and investigation measures unnecessary”.
A number of issues have been highlighted this afternoon, but I fear that time will not allow me to go through them all in the detail I would have wished. Many overseas countries, both EU and Commonwealth, operate effective intercept as evidence regimes within their legal context. Their experience indicates, however, that the burdens on the intercepting agencies are considerable. The issues of disclosure and how to secure a fair trial are obviously central, and that has been highlighted this afternoon in relation to article 6 provisions. Disclosure, and the practical impact of that on agencies and their overall capabilities, is relevant and something that is being examined closely in the cost-benefit, overarching analysis on capabilities.
I will conclude by reassuring you, Mr Deputy Speaker, that the Government are committed to finding ways for intercept evidence of sensitive material to be heard in legal proceedings. I am grateful to the House and all right hon. and hon. Members for helping to inform the debate this afternoon, and for assisting in this important work.