Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
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Lord Newby (LD)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to respond to this fascinating debate. I should say at the outset that the Government are committed to greater competition and diversity in the UK banking sector, both locally and nationally. Effective competition is essential for ensuring that customers get suitable and affordable products.
It is not true to say that there has been no fundamental thinking by the Government on the structure of banking and the need for greater competition. That is why we asked the Independent Commission on Banking to investigate competition issues in the UK as a key part of its work. Half of its report covered competition issues. It identified a number of issues and areas which needed action and we are taking forward its recommendations for dealing with these. For example, we are removing the competitive advantage big banks get from being seen by the market as too big to fail through the ring-fence. We have secured a new seven-day switching service, delivered by industry to tackle inertia in the personal current account and SME business account market. This service was launched on 16 September. We have introduced a strong competition regulator by giving the FCA an objective to promote effective competition.
The new regulators have already brought forward big changes on the regulatory side through their barriers to entry work. I commend the report that they produced earlier in the year to the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, in particular. This will make it easier for new banks to enter the market, to grow and to compete with the large incumbent banks. These changes have been greatly welcomed by the industry and will make a big difference going forward for those who want to start a new bank, be it to serve the local community or to compete nationally.
I should highlight here the PRA’s consultation on an initial capital exemption for some small specialist banks. The proposed exemption would allow some banks to gain authorisation with minimum capital of as little as £1 million, and to do so much more quickly than has ever been the case in the past. These are not small changes. Within the narrow world of bank authorisation, these are revolutionary changes which will make it much easier for new entrants to come forward. There have been some extremely successful new entrants. Metro Bank is one of the most successful and I suspect that its competitors consider that it is being disruptive by making a number of changes in the way it does banking which will affect the whole system, in many cases for the better.
The actions that we have already taken will be supplemented by what we are doing in the Bill. We are creating a new payments regulator to ensure fair and transparent access for new and smaller banks to the payment systems. We shall discuss that later today. The Government have announced that they will ask the new payments systems regulator to look at the case for and against introducing full account portability as an early priority, as well as the case for requiring the big banks to give up, in whole or part, ownership of the payments systems.
We are giving the PRA a secondary competition objective to strengthen its role in ensuring that we have competitive banking markets. We will provide the FCA with further competition powers so that it has even more appropriate tools in that area.
As to the OFT, it has brought forward its investigation into SME banking and the competition issues affecting these markets. This is arguably the most contentious area in terms of the lack of appropriate products and volume for that market. The study is part of its ongoing programme of work to investigate concerns over competition in banking and to inform the decision on whether key banking markets should be referred to the Competition Commission for a formal market investigation. In January it reported on its review of the personal current account market, so it is not true to say that no work is being done on looking at competition on current accounts.
The review raised significant concerns over concentration levels. However, it concluded that the important changes being implemented, such as the ring-fence and the new account switching service, meant that market referral was not appropriate at this time.
The OFT aims to conclude its programme of work by 2015 and will make a decision then as to whether a market referral to the Competition Commission is needed. In consideration of the significant measures currently being implemented to improve competition, along with the importance of allowing the OFT to complete its current investigations, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, will feel that his Amendment 102 is not necessary and will not seek to press it.
Turning now to Amendment 43, I have already detailed the extensive action the Government are taking to improve competition.
Lord Eatwell
I wonder whether the Minister will allow me to comment on the series of measures he just outlined. All are worthy in their little way, but will he acknowledge that the Government have actually rejected the commission’s recommendation that there be,
“a full public consultation on the extent of competition and its impact on consumers”.?
This is what the Government are not giving.
Lord Newby
The Government are saying that the OFT is in the process of undertaking a series of pieces of work. We believe that the appropriate way forward is for it to complete that work and to decide whether it wishes to make a referral. We think that that is a sensible approach; it is already in train and we think it should reach its logical conclusion.
To help increase diversity in business lending, the Government have introduced several important schemes, which include the business finance partnership and the introduction of the business bank. The Government are promoting alternative finance to boost overall lending through investments and various innovative non-bank channels, including two peer-to-peer firms, Funding Circle and Zopa, as part of a small business programme. Peer-to-peer platforms enable people to lend money directly to businesses and consumers; they can therefore offer a more effective way for businesses to access finance. They are certainly disrupted in terms of the way in which finance is going directly into many small businesses.
The business bank is drawing together existing government initiatives under one roof and deploying £1 billion of capital to address gaps in the supply of finance to SMEs. So far, £75 million is being invested in venture capital and £300 million in new sources of lending. The Government are also taking action to support local banking—for example, through a credit union expansion project which includes a £38 million funding package from the Department for Work and Pensions.
Community development finance institutions are also providing loans in support of those struggling to access finance from the commercial banks. The regional growth fund is supporting their work through £60 million of wholesale funding and the Government also provide tax relief worth up to 25% on investments. Both credit unions and CDFIs typically operate in quite a tightly defined geographic area and have that special focus.
At national level, both RBS and Lloyds are already in the process of divesting part of their UK banking businesses as a requirement of EU state aid rules, creating new challenger banks. The divestments are part of a package designed to improve competition in the banking sector. The Government have taken the first step to return Lloyds to the private sector and are actively considering options for further share sales. The reintroduction of the TSB brand on the high street is a major step forward for retail competition. This action is further evidence of the Government’s stated aim not to be a permanent investor in the UK banking sector. This is an important step in further normalising the sector and continuing the process of removing government from the extraordinary measures taken during the crisis.
For RBS, the Government are already investigating the case for creating a so-called “good bank/bad bank” split. We will report the findings of this review shortly, later in the autumn. We do not believe that the case for breaking the core operations of any bank in which the Government have a stake into regional entities meets the objectives of maximising the bank’s ability to support the British economy, getting the best value for the taxpayer while facilitating a return to private ownership. The cost of any reorganisation would be attributable to the banks, and, as a result, to the taxpayer. In addition, the time required to execute such a reorganisation would be lengthy, further delaying the Government’s ability to return the banks to private ownership. As a result, the amendment would run directly contrary to the Government’s stated objectives.
This does not, however, mean that we do not see a role for regionally or subregionally focused banks. I have been impressed, for example, by the work of the Cambridge & Counties Bank, which is based in Leicester and is using its local expertise to support SMEs in Leicester and the broader East Midlands region. Its capital comes from a combination of a Cambridge college and a local authority pension fund, which seems to me a model that could with benefit be replicated elsewhere.
I was extremely interested to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, about the success of the Airdrie Savings Bank. I am happy to work with officials to see how that bank is faring and whether anything that the Government are doing is making its life unnecessarily difficult.
The challenge, however—looking at that model on the one hand, and on the other saying that in Germany there are a lot of regionally successful banks—is that that is not where we are starting from now. It is very difficult for government to change a culture single-handedly. If banks such as Cambridge & Counties are successful and other people see that they are, we will see more regional banks, but I do not think that government either can or should try to impose a new overall structure on the banking sector against competitive forces and what people in the banking sector want to do.
I do, however, welcome the news that Santander wants to regionalise decision-making. RBS has for some time been trying to re-educate its SME bank managers about the virtues of relationship banking. It is amazing that that was lost, but the penny has dropped, and I very much hope that the statement by Santander is part of a broader process to push down decision-making to regional and local levels.
I hope that I have been able to persuade my noble friend that the Government have considerable sympathy with his amendment, but that much is already happening to bring greater diversity into the banking sector. Frankly, the pace of change—the number of new entrants, the change in the way that the system is operating and the way that people are doing banking—is quicker than at any previous point in our lifetime. I hope that, on that basis, he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Higgins
My Lords, my noble friend seems to be implying that the study by the OFT is in some sense a substitute for the amendment. In that context, one is bound to ask what the OFT has been doing on this for the past 25 years. Is that what he is saying and, if so, when are we likely to have a decision on whether there should be a referral? Is there any possibility that the OFT report would give us the kind of information asked for in the amendment?
Lord Newby
My Lords, as I said, the OFT is undertaking its work and expects to have formed a view by 2015 about whether to have a broader referral. I think that at one level everybody finds it easy to criticise the failures of virtually every regulatory body in the past. It is unfair to suggest that the OFT has learnt no lessons from the past 25 years in the way that it undertakes its work. The Government have considerable confidence in the work that it is now doing.
Lord McFall of Alcluith
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, has a real point here. If we look at the timeline with PPI, consumer groups were complaining about it in the late 1990s. There was a supercomplaint in 2005. The Treasury Committee highlighted it in 2003. The OFT and the Competition Commission looked into it. It was 2012-13 before something was sorted out. That is a generation. We are making these points against the background of a sclerotic system and we really need a commitment from the Government that they are considering the matter. Otherwise, we will be back here in 10 or 15 years’ time and nothing whatever will have moved.
Lord Newby
My Lords, everybody would have a great deal of sympathy with the general point that the system has worked very slowly in the past. The FSA was extremely slow in many ways, but one of the features of the way the new system works is that a greater degree of urgency is injected. I give as an example the document on consumer credit published by the FCA last week. The FCA does not take responsibility for consumer credit until next April, but well in advance of that date it has produced a comprehensive plan of how it wants to proceed. This is much more rigorous than anything we have seen in that area in the past. To a considerable extent, the regulators have learnt lessons about the need to move with all due deliberation, yet also with due speed.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, if I may, I would add that my noble friend talked of being too slow, but in this debate several noble Lords have made the point that it is not slowness which has afflicted the large clearing banks but immorality. Whether you are talking about trying to manipulate the LIBOR rate or PPI or identity insurance—you can go on and on—there is the sheer scale, impersonality and lack of relationship or any sort of customer allegiance. I fear that these have rotted the foundations of so many of these colossal banks. Does he not therefore understand that the gist of these amendments is to try to replace that state of affairs?
Lord Newby
My Lords, as far as immorality is concerned, later we will deal with amendments on the reversal of the burden of proof and on the new criminal offence which will be available should banks behave in a grossly immoral way. That is the way to deal with the narrow point my noble friend makes. The whole question of the culture of the banks is addressed only partially in the legislation because it is by definition a cultural issue. We are taking very significant steps to regulate individual senior managers and hold them to account for what they do in a way that has never been the case in the past. Again, that is quite a revolutionary change. Regarding the specific point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Flight, I believe that local authorities at least can bank wherever they choose, but I will look into the point and write to him. I simply do not know what the position is.
Lord Sharkey
My Lords, I will be brief because I see that I am holding back an avalanche of 158 government amendments. There have been a lot of strong, very well argued and diverse views, but there have also been some general themes. For example, there was a feeling that getting close to the customer is absolutely critical. I entirely agree with that. In fact, I fear that without this there is little chance of reforming the banking culture at all. There also seems to have been a general desire in the Chamber to discuss again the issues raised and to see whether on Report there could be a way of advancing some of the arguments put forward today. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Newby
“Part 3Bail-in stabilisation optionBail-in stabilisation option
(1) Schedule (Bail-in stabilisation option) (which contains amendments relating to a new stabilisation option in Part 1 of the Banking Act 2009) has effect.
(2) The Treasury may by order make any provision they consider appropriate in consequence of the application to building societies of the amendments made by this Part.
(3) An order may, in particular, amend section 84 of the Banking Act 2009, or amend or modify the effect of any other enactment to which this subsection applies.
(4) Subsection (3) applies to any enactment (including a fiscal enactment) passed or made—
(a) before the passing of this Act, or(b) on or before the last day of the Session in which this Act is passed.(5) In this section “building society” has the same meaning as in section 84 of the Banking Act 2009.”
Lord Newby
My Lords, this clause and the new schedule to the Bill in Amendment 105 have the effect of amending the Banking Act 2009 to provide the Bank of England with a new stabilisation option—the bail-in option. Bail-in involves shareholders of a failing bank being divested of their shares or having their holdings severely diluted and creditors of the bank having their claims cancelled, reduced or deferred to the extent necessary to restore the bank to financial viability. During the financial crisis it was not possible simply to allow banks which failed to enter insolvency, as other companies do when they fail. This is because of how interconnected the banking system is and because of the need to protect the banks’ customers by ensuring that they could continue to access essential banking services. This protection came at a very high cost to the taxpayer. These new powers will provide one solution to that problem by offering an alternative to insolvency which exposes shareholders and creditors to the losses of the bank, while enabling the bank to continue to operate as a going concern. This will help to ensure that taxpayers are never again required to bear all the costs of resolving failing banks.
It has long been the Government’s policy to develop such bail-in powers. This was an important strand of the Government’s response to the recommendations of the Independent Commission on Banking. The UK has also been at the forefront of the international development of bail-in. Along with other G20 countries, we endorsed the Financial Stability Board’s recommendation on bail-in in November 2011. We have also worked hard at ensuring that the EU would agree a feasible and credible bail-in tool, and have made substantial progress recently in this area. We believe that EU agreement on a common resolution recovery directive is near and, for this reason, the Government are now confident enough about the content of the directive to be able to bring forward bail-in powers through this Bill.
On the details of the amendments, paragraph 1 of the schedule introduces the bail-in option as an additional stabilisation option in the Banking Act 2009. When the bail-in option is deployed, the Bank of England can cancel, reduce or defer liabilities of the bank for the purposes of recapitalising it and restoring it to viability. It may also transfer some or all of the bank’s securities to a bail-in administrator to hold securities of the bank, or to perform other tasks as specified by the Bank of England, on a temporary basis. In any event, shares held by the original shareholders would be expected to be transferred or severely diluted in the course of resolution.
Paragraph 3 of the schedule sets out the conditions for use of the bail-in option. These are that the bank is failing or is likely to fail to satisfy the conditions for authorisation, that no action is likely to be taken to restore the bank to compliance and that the exercise of the power is necessary having regard to the public interest in: the stability of financial systems in the UK; the maintenance of public confidence in the stability of those systems; the protection of depositors; or the protection of any client assets that may be affected.
Paragraph 4 defines the power to make a special bail-in provision cancelling, modifying or changing the form of a liability of the bank in resolution. This power can be exercised only for the purpose of or in connection with cancelling, reducing or deferring a liability of the bank in question. Proposed new Section 48B also specifies a set of liabilities that are excluded from the power to make special bail-in provision. These liabilities are excluded for one of two main reasons: either because they would not have been exposed to losses in insolvency or because exercising the bail-in powers on them would be likely to impede the resolution of the firm or create wider market instability. This includes deposits protected by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme or similar overseas deposit guarantee schemes, liabilities to the extent that they are secured, client assets, short-term liabilities owed to certain financial institutions outside the affected firm’s group, certain liabilities arising in respect of central counterparties and settlement systems, and certain debts owed to employees and trade creditors. The Treasury has the power to amend this list by order.
When the Bank of England exercises its special powers to bail in liabilities of a failing bank, it must make a report to the Chancellor explaining why it has done so. A bail-in should in general be done in a way that respects the treatment that creditors would have received if the bank had been allowed to fail and enter insolvency. In terms of economic effects, this means that the failing bank’s shareholders would be divested of their shares, or otherwise have their claims severely diluted, and subordinated debt holders would be exposed to losses. Senior debt holders would generally be exposed to losses only after subordinated debt holders. It would also generally be the case that creditors in the same class would bear losses on an equal footing.
In common with the existing stabilisation options in the Banking Act, the Bank of England may depart from these general principles where appropriate. If the Bank of England does so in exercising the special bail-in powers, this report could explain the reasons for doing so. The Chancellor will lay a copy of any such report before Parliament.
New Section 48H gives the Bank of England the power to require a bail-in administrator or one or more of the directors of the bank to draw up a business plan that includes an assessment of the factors that led to the failure of the firm and outlines a plan for addressing these problems. The plan must be approved by the Bank of England after consulting the PRA and the FCA and may require changes to be made before approving it.
New Section 48L specifies further powers available to the Bank of England, including powers to modify and convert securities that fall within the scope of the bail-in powers. New Section 48N enables the Bank of England to remove a director from a bank in resolution, or to terminate or vary a director’s contract. It also allows the bank to appoint new directors. New Section 48O enables the Bank of England to issue directions to directors of the bank.
New Section 48P gives the Treasury the power to make an order relating to the treatment of protected financial arrangements in a bail-in. Protected arrangements are defined as security interests, title-transfer collateral arrangements, and set-off and netting arrangements. These arrangements are entered into by the counterparties in order to minimise the risks associated with the financial instruments. Therefore it is right that these arrangements are respected to the extent possible while pursuing the special resolution objectives. This is analogous to the existing power for the Treasury under the Banking Act 2009 to specify protections in the case of transfers of some but not all of the business of the bank under resolution.
The Treasury will be required to put in place compensation arrangements for affected shareholders and creditors following an application of the bail-in powers. These will include a no-creditor-worse-off safeguard that broadly provides that no shareholder or creditor should be left worse off as a result of the exercise of the bail-in powers than they would have if the bank had simply failed and entered insolvency. In addition, the Bank of England may exercise the bail-in option in respect of a banking group company if certain conditions are met.
First, the authorities must be satisfied that a bank in the same group meets the conditions for resolution. Secondly, the authorities must be satisfied that acting only in respect of the bank itself is not sufficient to achieve the special resolution objectives. The actions should seek to minimise the effects of the exercise of the power in relation to group companies on other undertakings in the group. It should only be to the extent necessary in order to achieve the resolution objectives.
I apologise for setting out the details of these provisions in some detail, but they are relatively new to your Lordships’ House and one of the essential components of the menu of provisions contained in the Bill to give a safer and more secure banking system. I commend the amendments to the House.
Lord Higgins
My Lords, these clauses give the Bank of England very considerable powers and responsibilities, which we will need to consider very carefully; we are going somewhat into uncharted waters. At a purely quantitative level, will my noble friend, if not today then on some other occasion, indicate how the system would have worked if it had been applicable in the recent financial crisis? That is to say, in the case of the bailed-out banks, would it have been sufficient to mean that there would have been no charge on the taxpayer, or is it likely that there would still have been a charge?
We will consider in particular the question of the hierarchy of debts. The briefs that we have had from the Treasury have been very helpful, but it might be helpful if my noble friend could in some way or another give us some idea of how the new hierarchy is now likely to work or, to avoid any doubt, perhaps to write the hierarchy into the legislation.
Other points give me some cause for concern, some of which have been made by the noble Lord on the opposition Front Bench. It seems that there is still a considerable risk of contagion if one suddenly bails in a particular bank, but the people who are its creditors will have repercussions elsewhere in the banking system. I am not entirely clear to what extent the Government have taken that particular risk of contagion into consideration. These are quite complicated matters, and we look forward with interest to the Minister’s reply.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords who have spoken on these extremely technical points. A number of the questions were themselves extremely technical, so if I do not answer them fully now I will of course write to noble Lords.
The first question the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, raised, was the question of contagion. My first point here is a general one. The markets now expect the bail-in powers to be one of the options available if banks get into difficulty. They seem generally to accept this as an option, and they are adjusting their own activities to the extent that they feel that is necessary in recognition that this will now be part of the environment in which they work. However, in an individual case, if the Bank felt that there was a risk to financial stability by exercising the full bail-in option, which covers all the assets or liabilities of the bank, it could decide not to bail in all of them but to be selective in a manner that would reduce the possibility of contagion.
In addition, in circumstances where a bank is going under, if you do not go down this other route, virtually whatever else you do with it, there is a risk of contagion. That is one of the considerations that will be in the mind of the Bank of England. Of course, if the Bank felt that there was a risk to the whole system if a particular bank went down, it has the powers under the Banking Act to nationalise it, which is another way of protecting the system and the stability of the system. This is another possible approach, but under the Banking Act it is now one of only four possible ways of dealing with the problem of a failing bank.
I am sorry if my answers are slightly out of order, but the noble Lord asked what the word “comparable” meant when we talked about other countries’ depositor protection. As he knows, all EU member states have depositor guarantee schemes with a common limit, and all those schemes will be considered comparable. Therefore it covers any schemes that will ensure small depositors in the event that the bank becomes insolvent and unable to pay its debts, in the same way as our FCA.
Lord Newby
I had not realised that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, was thinking of the Crown Dependencies. I will write to him about that.
The noble Lord asked whether the concept of no less favourable treatment was appropriate. This concept relates only to the insolvency counterfactual. It is reasonable that an investor should be no worse off due to an action of the authorities than in an insolvency. That is the option that might be facing investors if the bail-in was not taking place.
The noble Lord asked about temporarily high balances. This is an issue that we have debated over the years. As far as bail-in is concerned, the bank will have discretion not to bail in certain liabilities. In terms of the general issue about temporarily high balances, this is being pursued within the context of the EU. There is a very widespread recognition that it would be desirable to get protection for people who have such temporary high balances.
The noble Lord asked about transitional arrangements. The issue of bail-in has been debated at international level for some time. Markets know that bail-in is now an acceptable, and indeed a leading, tool for dealing with large banks in the European fora. We have agreed that there should be no transitional agreements, especially as the counterfactual would be insolvency.
The noble Lord asked about our response to the Select Committee. My noble friend Lord Deighton, as the noble Lord knows, is in China this week, so he will be replying formally when he returns. But the approach that the Treasury has taken so far in terms of working with parliamentarians who have a close interest in these matters has been to circulate draft secondary legislation at the point at which it has gone out for wider consultation. The current consultation exercise on the big draft statutory instruments under this Bill has, I think, now closed. We are drawing up a response to all the stakeholders who have made comments and the intention is that at that point the Treasury will directly contact noble Lords who have expressed an interest so that we can discuss where we have got to and consider any suggestions that noble Lords might have on the secondary legislation.
My view, having looked at it, is that this is highly technical legislation and the best way of getting an input is to have a conversation around it. The Treasury is very open at this point to any suggestions from your Lordships, or indeed Members of another place, in terms of the details of the secondary legislation. They are not set in stone. We are trying to get the best outcome. We think that that more discursive approach in the context of these highly technical instruments is the best way of getting the maximum positive involvement with parliamentarians in the process. As I said, my noble friend Lord Deighton will be writing to the noble Baroness, Lady Thomas of Winchester, about that.
The noble Lord, Lord Higgins, asked whether bail-in would mean that taxpayers would not have had to make any contribution. It is difficult, if not impossible, to say definitively since we do not know how much could have been bailed in. What is clear is that we would have substantially reduced any government contribution. Loss-absorbing capacity provisions in the Bill will further strengthen that concept. The ICB said that the 17% PLAC proposals would have been sufficient to deal with the problem last time in all but the most extreme cases.
The noble Lord, Lord Higgins, asked about the creditor hierarchy and whether it will be stated in the Bill. We have not stated it in the Bill, but we will be working on the statutory code of practice under the Act when it is enacted. The aim is that it will be set out more fully there.
The noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, asked what protection there was against inappropriate use of the powers by the Bank of England. The conditions before which the Bank can intervene are pretty stringent; they are that the bank is failing or likely to fail and that it is in the public interest to do so. If the Bank operated vexatiously or against the public interest, that would be an inappropriate use of its powers—but so it would if it acted in that manner under any other of its powers. Our view is that the conditions are clear enough and give the Bank sufficiently clear steer that we are reasonably confident that the problem that the noble Lord anticipated would not arise in practice.
The noble Lord, Lord Flight, asked whether the bail-in could work for big international banks. We believe that it could; the UK authorities are working with international counterparts to put in place resolution plans for large banks to ensure that the tool can be applied effectively. We see bail-in as being the leading tool for such banks.
The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, asked whether bail-in was necessary for all banks, including those outside the ring-fence. The truth is, obviously, that all banks can encounter difficulties, not just retail banks. We believe it appropriate that the Bank of England has the tool available for dealing with non-retail banks as well as retail banks, which this provision would do.
I am not sure that I have answered every last question that I have been asked. To the extent that I have not, I will write to noble Lords.
Lord Eatwell
I just take up the Minister on that last point. Surely one of the key arguments about the ring-fence is that there is an implicit guarantee from the public authorities not to allow institutions within the ring-fence to fail. That implicit guarantee is worth a lot of money to those banks that have been too big to fail. Surely the whole point about the ring-fence is that those outwith it would not benefit from that form of public continuity guarantee. But is the noble Lord saying that the Government wish to retain such measures, which would allow them to implement such continuity guarantees?
Lord Lawson of Blaby (Con)
The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said something which I think is profoundly wrong, but I can understand why he said it. Will my noble friend the Minister make it absolutely clear that it is not the position of Her Majesty’s Government, and it is not the purpose of this Bill, to ensure that no ring-fenced bank will ever be allowed to fail? That is not the position; it must not be the position and I do not believe that it is the Government’s intention.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I can confirm what the noble Lord, Lord Lawson says. It is not the intention to have a situation where it is impossible for a ring-fenced bank to fail. What we are doing, particularly through the guarantee scheme, is ensuring that ordinary depositors are protected in those circumstances. Through these potential provisions we hope to ensure that there will be continuity of activity, which might not be the case without them.
In terms of the scope of these provisions, they are the fourth of what are now four options in the Banking Act for dealing with a bank that is in danger of failing. One is sale to another bank; one is the bridge bank and the other is nationalisation. Those measures apply to all banks covered by that legislation. I believe that that extends the measures beyond the ring-fenced banks.
Lord Higgins
I am sorry but I am still not clear. Could bail-in provisions be applied by the Bank of England to banks which are not within the ring-fence?
Lord Newby
“Part 4Conduct of persons working in financial services sectorFunctions for which approval is required
(1) Section 59 of FSMA 2000 (approval for particular arrangements) is amended as follows.
(2) Omit subsection (5).
(3) For subsection (6) substitute—
“(6) The PRA may specify a description of function under subsection (3)(a) only if, in relation to the carrying on of a regulated activity by a PRA-authorised person, it is satisfied that the function is a senior management function as defined in section 59ZA.”
(4) After subsection (6A) (inserted by section 5 above) insert—
“(6B) If—
(a) a function of a description specified in rules made by the FCA under subsection (3)(a) or (b) is a controlled function in relation to the carrying on of a regulated activity by a bank, and (b) the FCA is satisfied that, in relation to the carrying on of a regulated activity by a bank, the function is a senior management function as defined in section 59ZA,the FCA must designate the function in the rules as a senior management function.(6C) If a function of a description specified in rules made by the PRA under subsection (3)(a) is a controlled function in relation to the carrying on of a regulated activity by a bank, the PRA must designate the function in the rules as a senior management function.”
(5) Omit subsections (7) to (7B) and (11).”
Lord Newby
My Lords, we now turn to the government amendments which implement another important part of the recommendations of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards on senior persons and banking standards rules. This group also contains a number of amendments to the amendments the Government have tabled. I begin by explaining how the government amendments will deliver the goal of improving standards of conduct in banking.
The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards concluded that the current system for approving those in senior positions in banks—the approved persons regime—had failed. It saw it as overly complex and unable to ensure that individual responsibilities were adequately defined or that clear expectations were set for those holding key roles. The commission’s central recommendation in this area is for the creation of a senior persons regime applying to senior bankers. The regime for senior managers in banks will have the following features. It will reverse the burden of proof so that senior bankers will have to show that they did what was reasonable when a bank fails to comply with regulatory requirements in their area of responsibility, or face regulatory action for misconduct. It will have mandatory statements of responsibility, so that whenever someone is a candidate to be a senior manager in a bank, the bank will have to set out clearly what aspects of the bank’s business they will be responsible for. There will be powers for the regulators to make conduct rules for senior managers in banks instead of the old system of statements of principles supported by codes of practice. There will be a requirement that the register kept by the FCA must state who is a senior manager in a bank and give details of regulatory action taken against them.
The new regime for senior managers will also retain the tools which the regulators have under the existing approved persons regime. The regulators will also retain their tough powers under FSMA to impose unlimited fines on, or publish notices of censure about, senior managers in banks. It may sometimes still be appropriate for the regulators to approve people to perform functions that are not senior management functions but which still involve important responsibilities. The Government have therefore chosen to retain the power for the regulator to pre-approve individuals to perform functions outside the senior managers regime. It is for the regulators to determine what functions, if any, should be subject to pre-approval outside the senior managers regime. I am confident that noble Lords will agree that retaining this power is a sensible safeguard at a time when concerns about individual standards in financial services remain acute.
In addition to the regime for bank senior managers, the commission also recommended the introduction of a standards regime that would apply to a wider class of individuals who work in banks. The Government have therefore provided the regulators with a new power to make conduct rules for anyone who is employed by a bank, even if they are not a senior manager or other approved person. This is an extension of regulatory power in relation to individuals, and gives the regulators the power to impose a single set of banking standards rules for all who work in banks. Employees of banks could face disciplinary action if they breach these standards rules or if they are knowingly concerned in regulatory breaches by the bank. The regulators will not be compelled to make conduct rules. They will be able, quite properly, to exercise their supervisory judgment to determine who in a bank should be subject to rules, and what standards to impose.
Finally, the commission also recommended including provision for time-limited and conditional approvals of senior bankers, and longer time limits for the regulators to take disciplinary action against individuals. The Government also accepted these recommendations. Accordingly, the Bill will allow the regulator to grant approval to perform senior management functions in banks subject to conditions, as well as to take steps to vary an approval it has already given, for example by imposing new conditions.
Perhaps I may respond to the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Brennan, Lord McFall and Lord Watson. Amendments 46A, 46B and 47A seek to ensure that responsibility for preventing money laundering and other financial crime is also a senior management function. The Government agree with concerns that underpin these amendments. UK banks should uphold the highest standards in preventing criminal activity, and not facilitate it. Where there is evidence that banks have not lived up to those standards, the people at the top should be held to account. I reassure noble Lords that the new regime for senior managers will deliver precisely that accountability in relation to financial crime. Therefore, while we can all support the result that the noble Lords want to achieve, I can assure them that these amendments are unnecessary and there are no loopholes when it comes to such matters.
I shall try to explain why. The definition of “senior” is quite comprehensive. It encompasses all aspects of the bank’s operations and would therefore include responsibility for aspects of a bank’s operations that are concerned with the prevention of financial crime, where those aspects could involve serious consequences for the bank, for business or other interests in the United Kingdom. The amendments could in fact have the unintended effect of requiring junior staff with specific duties in relation to financial crime to be treated as senior managers. That would run in the opposite direction to what the parliamentary commission intended, which was to focus on senior persons in charge of all aspects of the bank’s activities.
Amendment 53A has two limbs. The first seeks to ensure the operational objectives that the FCA must consider when making rules of conduct for approved persons or bank employees. I can assure your Lordships that this part of that amendment is unnecessary. The reference to the operational objectives in new Section 64A(1) attracts all aspects of these objectives as defined in Sections 1B, 1C, 1D and 1E of FiSMA, without any additional words.
The second limb of Amendment 53A, and Amendment 53B, would require both regulators to use their new powers to make rules of conduct specifically about the conduct of individuals responsible for preventing money laundering or other financial crime. I am not sure what these changes would add. The Fraud Act 2006, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 already bite on bank senior managers. Adding regulatory rules mandating compliance with statutory requirements would add little. Further, the regulators already have a power to make conduct rules applying to persons in banks who have responsibility for compliance with money laundering regulations and other laws creating financial crimes. We certainly expect the regulators to use this power to make rules about aspects of conduct that include ensuring that firms comply with their obligations relating to money laundering and preventing financial crime. However, to single these areas out in primary legislation adds little bite to the existing regime and is, we believe, unnecessary. I hope, therefore, that noble Lords will agree not to press those amendments.
I also assure the noble Lords, Lord Brennan, Lord McFall and Lord Watson, that Amendment 54A is unnecessary. The reference to an application for approval in a context which refers to a person approved under Section 59 of FiSMA already always means an application under Section 60. There is no other section under which such an application can be made. I hope, therefore, that the noble Lords will agree not to press their amendment.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 100, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Eatwell and Lord Tunnicliffe. This amendment is the same as an amendment brought forward on Report in another place. The government amendments, which implement the commission’s key recommendations, go much further than the noble Lords’ amendment, which would really just rename the existing approved persons regime as a “licensed persons regime”, and that is all. It would not deliver the real improvements sought by the parliamentary commission. I hope therefore that the noble Lords will agree not to press this amendment. I beg to move Amendment 45.
Lord Turnbull
My Lords, an important finding of the commission was that the existing approved persons regime was flawed. After a debacle wiping billions of pounds off the value of shareholdings, requiring the state to inject billions of pounds into the industry and take huge financial exposures, and after several serious lapses of conduct, according to my researches one person has been fined and another person has negotiated an agreement not to practise.
Our conclusion was that the APR operates mostly as an initial gateway to taking up a post, rather than serving as a system through which regulators can ensure the continuing exercise of responsibility at the most senior levels within banks. A major cause of this flaw was that responsibilities were ill defined and were not joined up, so that those at the top could claim they “didn’t know” or, “It wasn’t me”.
We proposed a two-tier system: a senior persons regime, now called a senior managers regime, covering a meaningful chain of accountabilities, which we wanted to apply to all banks and holding companies operating in the UK; and, below that, a licensing regime, where no prior approval from the regulator would be required to employ anyone but banks would have to take responsibility for ensuring that those they did employ were properly qualified and trained and that they observed a code of conduct. This would apply to those who could seriously damage the bank or the bank’s reputation or harm a customer’s reputation.
The commission welcomes many of the Government’s proposals: defining the functions of senior management; requiring senior managers to have a statement of responsibilities; extending the limitation period for regulators to take enforcement action from three years to six; recording information on a person’s regulatory history so that a new employer can find out important details about whom they are recruiting; and the reversal of the burden of proof on whether a person is fit and proper.
However, serious issues are left unresolved. Amendment 55 provides a definition of a bank to which the regime applies. I found it impossible to discover what the definition means. Does it meet the commission’s objective of covering all banks and holding companies operating in the UK? Would the Minister clarify what he means by “bank”? Could it be a ring-fenced bank, a non-ring-fenced entity conducting investment activities within a group, a whole group or a freestanding investment bank? In our view, the new senior managers regime should apply to all such entities. It would make a mockery of the scheme if, as I suspect may be the case, it applied only to banks taking deposits from the general public—that is, ring-fenced banks. It would be completely unacceptable if the regime did not apply, for example, to the senior managers overseeing the LIBOR traders, to those overseeing rogue traders such as the “London Whale”, to those overseeing the marketing of highly dubious packages of sliced and diced mortgages or to those engaged in the mis-selling of interest rate swaps. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to give us an answer today or address this between now and Report.
There is no mention of the licensing regime, which the commission recommended. The Government said that they would ensure that regulators had the ability to take regulatory action against persons who were not senior persons—senior managers—or who were not subject to prior regulatory approval. There is no mention of the licensing regime in the government amendment. They have come up with something rather different in Amendment 53 on the rules of conduct. It states:
“If it appears … necessary or expedient for … advancing one or more of its operational objectives, the FCA may make rules about the conduct of the following persons”,
and those persons could be any employee of the bank.
I question whether that is the right answer. It is “may” rather than “must”, but I should have thought it essential that the FCA made rules. Is it right that it should apply to all employees from purely backroom or administrative staff? In some ways, the government scheme goes wider but it is possibly too permissive.
The final omission to highlight is that we propose that as well as an initial statement of responsibilities for each manager, there should be a handover note when people change jobs. We think that that is crucial because without it the chain of accountability breaks down, and when someone changes jobs we are back to, “I didn’t know”, or, “It wasn’t me”.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I support very much what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has just said. We need a clear and authoritative report from my noble friend the Minister as to who is right between the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, who is a highly distinguished lawyer, and those who are advising my noble friend. If there is any doubt about the matter, I see virtue in the amendments put down in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Brennan, Lord McFall and Lord Watson of Invergowrie. I commend the organisations that have helped to craft those important amendments. There again, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, seems to make a strong point. If on second thoughts the Minister cannot assure us that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, is superfluous, one would want him to assure the House that the noble Baroness’s concern is superfluous.
Lord Newby
My Lords, perhaps I may start by dealing with the three points on which the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, sought clarification. The first was on the definition of “bank” for the purposes of these amendments. The regime will apply to all UK institutions that have permission to take deposits. That covers ring-fenced banks, other banks, building societies, credit unions and some wholesale deposit takers, but it does not cover things which in popular parlance are called banks but which do not take deposits.
Lord Turnbull
If a bank divides itself under the new regime into a ring-fenced bank which takes deposits and puts its investment activities—derivatives, underwriting and proprietary trading—into a non-ring-fenced bank which does not take deposits, does it mean that that mass of activity will not be covered by the regime? Much of the malefaction took place in that area.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I repeat: it is limited to banks that take deposits, because the view is that they are of a different order of significance in the system. I think that we have a difference of view.
Lord Newby
I will take it back to the Treasury, but I want the noble Lord to be in no doubt as to what the Government are currently proposing.
Lord Lawson of Blaby
May I reinforce what others have said? I am horrified by the Minister’s explanation. He must take it back to the Treasury and get the Treasury to think again. I refresh his memory, for example, about the evidence that we took from UBS. Not only was it culpable to an extraordinary degree in the LIBOR scandal but its top management also said that it knew nothing about what its traders were doing. This was in spite of the fact that when it had its capital-raising exercise, it presented to all the funds that its great profit centre was trading in LIBOR derivatives. Then it said, “We know nothing about it”. This made it immensely culpable. The Minister is saying that if you had a bank that was not taking retail deposits but was doing just that, there would be no individual responsibility at all under this Bill. I am afraid that he must look at that again.
Baroness Noakes
Was the Minister talking about retail deposits, as I believe my noble friend Lord Lawson has interpreted him saying, or, as the legislation seems to me to say, about deposit-taking more widely? Deposit-taking is not confined to retail banking on ring-fenced operations. Deposit-taking occurs across the whole range of banking activities, as far as I am aware. Will he clarify to what kinds of activity he intend this to apply?
Lord Flight
Could I add my support? It seems to me that it is in investment banking territory where there is the greatest scope and where there has been the most inappropriate behaviour. It was Lehmans that nearly brought the whole system down. Part of the intent of the ring-fence is that what is in it is much simpler banking. The whole argument does not stand up unless investment banks are very much covered by the new regime.
Lord Eatwell
As clarification, given what the Minister has said about wholesale deposits, if there was an organisation providing banking services on a fee-based basis, would it be alone? Would it be exempt?
Lord Newby
My Lords, unless it was taking deposits it would be exempt under the amendments as they stand. It is fair to say that I have heard what the House has said and I will relay it with all force to my colleagues in the Treasury, who will not have had the privilege to hear it directly.
Lord McFall of Alcluith
It would be easy to put a note in the Library about which institutions will be affected and which will not, so that we can see for ourselves and there is no misinterpretation when we look at this further on Report.
Lord Newby
I am not sure that I can undertake to give a comprehensive list, but I am sure that I can undertake that we would explain which named organisations fall on both sides of that definition.
The next point made by the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, was about the licensing regime. He made a common point about “may” as opposed to “must”, something that we debate at huge length. There is no doubt that there will be not a licensing regime in his terms, but there will be rules of conduct that will cover all employees for whom they are relevant. The intention is not for the cleaners to be covered by these rules. It is perfectly well understood with the PRA that it will not only produce the rules but set out the scope of which employees will be covered by them.
The noble Lord asked about the handover note. Our view is that we do not need primary legislation to require handover notes. The regulators can require that in their rules, and I am sure that they plan to. When senior managers take on a new job, new statements of responsibilities are required so that there is absolute clarity on what the senior manager is responsible for. We see these as fulfilling the purpose that he had in mind, and which other people might colloquially think of as a handover note.
The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, raised the question about whether British banks would be at a disadvantage. I cannot really add to the comments of my noble friend Lord Lawson and others, other than to say that the Government believe that it is in the long-term interest not only of bank customers but of the City of London that the highest possible standards are followed here. If individual bankers feel that they do not want to operate to the highest possible standards, they should go somewhere else.
The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble Lord, Lord Flight, asked whether the senior management regime undermines collective responsibility. We do not think that it does. It ensures that individuals are held to account when things go wrong. It will not change the way in which decisions are taken in a collective manner.
The noble Lord, Lord Flight, raised a point that has been made a number of times: why did the regulatory system get away with it, and why has no action been taken? The answer is that the restructuring of the system was undertaken to try to ensure that we did not have the same problems again. The Government believe that that is how you stop the laxity of the past, and that we begin to instil a new culture by having different organisations, objectives and rules. The regulatory regime has not gone through this process unamended.
Moving on to the amendments introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, I assure him that there is no difference of view between him and other noble Lords who supported this amendment about the significance of money-laundering and the need for it to be tackled effectively, nor of the scale of it. The scale of money-laundering is very large, and the Government and the regulators are determined to cut it down.
I would like to make some points against the amendments and in response to some of the things that have been said. The most important point was that raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. The requirements for senior managers to stay within the law on money-laundering are no different from those to keep to the law in every other area where there is law. The noble Lord has a laudable interest in money-laundering while the noble Baroness is interested in anti-terrorism legislation. There may be an overlap, but they are distinct. Other noble Lords are interested in other things, where bankers have a legal responsibility to keep within the law. Singling out money-laundering, at a point where it is not required in order to be covered by the legislation, serves no useful purpose and can be positively unhelpful. However, I am happy to take up the sensible suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, that we provide a letter of comfort, as it were, between now and Report to confirm that the regulator takes this extremely seriously, and that we begin to explain how the obligation under the law will be undertaken.
The noble Lord, Lord McFall, repeated that in the past the trail could go cold. The great thing about these provisions is that they deal explicitly with that. To say that the trail goes cold will no longer be a defence.
Lord McFall of Alcluith
The reason I said that is that Tracey McDermott, the present FCA director of enforcement, came before the committee and answered that question in all honesty. She said that what is needed is a chart of organisations to determine who is responsible for what and a handover document. That is at the start at the moment; it has not been fleshed out. That is the reason why I brought that point to the Minister.
Lord Newby
When this amendment is enacted, it will ensure that a senior manager will have his or her areas of responsibility explicitly set out on appointment and that he or she will be held responsible for everything that happens on their watch in that area. It will no longer be a defence to say, “The trail ran cold” or “Nobody told me about it”, as long as they might reasonably be expected to know about it. That is a killer point in respect of this amendment.
The noble Lord, Lord Watson, said that the Government are complacent, as HSBC has shown. It is in part because of the HSBC experience that this series of amendments has been introduced. We are confident that they will stop that happening again.
The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, set out the arguments for a licensing regime. The Government believe that the code of conduct we are proposing, which will cover all those involved in banking activities, is a proportionate response to the need for the kind of principles followed by people on a day-to-day basis in the banking sector that the noble Lord wants covered by the licensing regime. We are confident that the Government will achieve that.
I hope that I have dealt with most of the points that were raised. I commend the amendment to the Committee.
Lord Newby
“Senior management functions
After section 59 of FSMA 2000 insert—“59ZA Senior management functions
(1) This section has effect for determining whether a function is for the purposes of section 59(6) and (6B) a senior management function.
(2) A function is a “senior management function”, in relation to the carrying on of a regulated activity by an authorised person, if—
(a) the function will require the person performing it to be responsible for managing one or more aspects of the authorised person’s affairs, so far as relating to the activity, and(b) those aspects involve, or might involve, a risk of serious consequences—(i) for the authorised person, or(ii) for business or other interests in the United Kingdom.(3) In subsection (2)(a) the reference to managing one or more aspects of an authorised person’s affairs includes a reference to taking decisions, or participating in the taking of decisions, about how one or more aspects of those affairs should be carried on.””
Lord Newby
“Statements of responsibilities
(1) Section 60 of FSMA 2000 (applications for approval) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) If—
(a) the application is for the approval of a person to perform a designated senior management function, and(b) the authorised person concerned is a bank,the appropriate regulator must require the application to contain, or be accompanied by, a statement setting out the aspects of the affairs of the authorised person concerned which it is intended that the person will be responsible for managing in performing the function.(a)The administrator must obtain the approval of the Bank of England to any proposals under sub-para. (1).(b)Treat the reference in sub-para. (2)(b) to the objective mentioned in para. 3(1)(a) or (b) as a reference to the objective in section (Objective of FMI administration) of this Act.(c)Ignore sub-para. (3)(b).(a)Before making an application in reliance on this paragraph the FMI administrator must give notice to the Bank of England, which is to be entitled to participate in the proceedings.(b)In making directions the court must have regard to the objective in section (Objective of FMI administration) of this Act.(a)Ignore sub-paras. (1) and (3).(b)The Bank of England may apply to the court for the variation or revocation of any directions given by the court.()“(2) Where a company is in FMI administration, a creditor or member of the company may apply to the court claiming that the FMI administrator is conducting himself or herself in a manner preventing the achievement of the objective of the FMI administration as quickly and efficiently as is reasonably practicable.”()“(1) On an application made by a person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2), the court may provide for the appointment of an FMI administrator of a company to cease to have effect from a specified time.()(2) The persons who may apply to the court under sub-paragraph (1) are— ()(a) the Bank of England;()(b) with the consent of the Bank, the FMI administrator.”(a) Para. 91(1) applies as if the only person who could make an application were the Bank of England.(b) Ignore para. 91(2).(a) in accordance with directions of the Bank of England, and(b) if the Bank is satisfied that they will not prejudice the objective in section (Objective of FMI administration) of this Act.(a) In considering making an order in reliance on section 241 the court must have regard to the objective in section (Objective of FMI administration) of this Act.(b)Ignore subsections (2A)(a) and (3) to (3C).(2B) A statement provided under subsection (2A) is known as a “statement of responsibilities”.
(2C) In subsection (2A) “designated senior management function” means a function designated as a senior management function under section 59(6B) or (6C).”
(3) After subsection (6) insert—
“(6A) Subsection (6) applies to references to a bank as it applies to references to the authorised person concerned.””
Lord Newby
“Power to give approval subject to conditions or for limited period
(1) Section 61 of FSMA 2000 (determination of applications) is amended as follows.
(2) For subsection (1) substitute—
“(1) The regulator to which an application for approval is made under section 60 may grant the application only if—
(a) it is satisfied that the person in respect of whom the application is made (“the candidate”) is a fit and proper person to perform the function to which the application relates, or(b) in a case where the application is for approval to perform a designated senior management function in relation to the carrying on of a regulated activity by a bank (a “bank-related senior management application”), it is satisfied that the condition in paragraph (a) will be met if the application is granted subject to one or more conditions (as to which, see subsection (2B)).”(3) In subsection (2), for “deciding that question” substitute “determining the application”.
(4) After subsection (2A) insert—
“(2B) The regulator to which a bank-related senior management application is made under section 60 may in particular—
(a) grant the application subject to any conditions that the regulator considers appropriate, and(b) grant the application so as to give approval only for a limited period.(2C) A regulator may exercise the power under paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (2B) only if—
(a) where the regulator is the FCA, it appears to the FCA that it is desirable to do so in order to advance one or more of its operational objectives, and (b) where the regulator is the PRA, it appears to the PRA that it is desirable to do so in order to advance any of its objectives.(2D) Consent given by the FCA for the granting of the application may be conditional on the manner in which the PRA exercises its power under subsection (2B).”
(5) After subsection (3) insert—
“(3ZA) In the case of a bank-related senior management application, the reference in subsection (3)(a) to granting the application is a reference to granting it without imposing conditions or limiting the period for which the approval has effect.”
(6) After subsection (5) insert—
“(6) In this section—
(a) “designated senior management function” means a function designated as a senior management function under section 59(6B) or (6C);(b) any reference to a bank includes a reference to a person who has applied for permission under Part 4A and will be a bank if permission is given.”(7) In section 62 of FSMA 2000 (applications for approval: procedure and right to refer to Tribunal)—
(a) in subsection (2), after “the application” insert “, or to grant the application subject to conditions or for a limited period (or both)”;(b) in subsection (3), after “the application” insert “, or to grant the application subject to conditions or for a limited period (or both)”;(c) in subsection (4), after “the application” insert “, or to grant the application subject to conditions or for a limited period (or both)”.”
Lord Newby
“Rules of conduct
(1) Part 5 of FSMA 2000 (performance of regulated activities) is amended as follows.
(2) Omit sections 64 and 65 (and the italic cross-heading preceding them).
(3) Before section 66 insert—
“Conduct of approved persons and others64A Rules of conduct
(1) If it appears to the FCA to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of advancing one or more of its operational objectives, the FCA may make rules about the conduct of the following persons—
(a) persons in relation to whom either regulator has given its approval under section 59;(b) persons who are employees of banks. (2) If it appears to the PRA to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of advancing any of its objectives, the PRA may make rules about the conduct of the following persons—
(a) persons in relation to whom it has given its approval under section 59;(b) persons in relation to whom the FCA has given its approval under section 59 in respect of the performance by them of a relevant senior management function in relation to the carrying on by a PRA-authorised person of a regulated activity;(c) persons who are employees of PRA-authorised banks.(3) In subsection (2)—
“PRA-authorised bank” means a bank that is a PRA-authorised person, and
“relevant senior management function” means a function which the PRA is satisfied is a senior management function as defined in section 59ZA (whether or not the function has been designated as such by the FCA).
(4) Rules made under this section must relate to the conduct of persons in relation to the performance by them of qualifying functions.
(5) In subsection (4) “qualifying function”, in relation to a person, means a function relating to the carrying on of activities (whether or not regulated activities) by—
(a) in the case of an approved person, the person on whose application approval was given, and(b) in any other case, the person’s employer.(6) In this section any reference to an employee of a person (“P”) includes a reference to a person who—
(a) personally provides, or is under an obligation personally to provide, services to P under an arrangement made between P and the person providing the services or another person, and(b) is subject to (or to the right of) supervision, direction or control by P as to the manner in which those services are provided,and “employer” is to be read accordingly.””(a)The administrator must obtain the approval of the Bank of England to any proposals under sub-para. (1).(b)Treat the reference in sub-para. (2)(b) to the objective mentioned in para. 3(1)(a) or (b) as a reference to the objective in section (Objective of FMI administration) of this Act.(c)Ignore sub-para. (3)(b).(a)Before making an application in reliance on this paragraph the FMI administrator must give notice to the Bank of England, which is to be entitled to participate in the proceedings.(b)In making directions the court must have regard to the objective in section (Objective of FMI administration) of this Act.(a)Ignore sub-paras. (1) and (3).(b)The Bank of England may apply to the court for the variation or revocation of any directions given by the court.()“(2) Where a company is in FMI administration, a creditor or member of the company may apply to the court claiming that the FMI administrator is conducting himself or herself in a manner preventing the achievement of the objective of the FMI administration as quickly and efficiently as is reasonably practicable.”()“(1) On an application made by a person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2), the court may provide for the appointment of an FMI administrator of a company to cease to have effect from a specified time. ()(2) The persons who may apply to the court under sub-paragraph (1) are—()(a) the Bank of England;()(b) with the consent of the Bank, the FMI administrator.”(a) Para. 91(1) applies as if the only person who could make an application were the Bank of England.(b) Ignore para. 91(2).(a) in accordance with directions of the Bank of England, and(b) if the Bank is satisfied that they will not prejudice the objective in section (Objective of FMI administration) of this Act.(a) In considering making an order in reliance on section 241 the court must have regard to the objective in section (Objective of FMI administration) of this Act.(b) Ignore subsections (2A)(a) and (3) to (3C).
Lord Newby
“Definition of “misconduct”
(1) In section 66 of FSMA 2000 (disciplinary powers)—
(a) after subsection (1) insert—“(1A) For provision about when a person is guilty of misconduct for the purposes of action by a regulator—
(a) see section 66A, in the case of action by the FCA, and(b) see section 66B, in the case of action by the PRA.”;(b) omit subsections (2), (2A), (6) and (7).(2) After that section insert—
“66A Misconduct: action by the FCA
(1) For the purposes of action by the FCA under section 66, a person is guilty of misconduct if any of conditions A to C is met in relation to the person.
(2) Condition A is that—
(a) the person has at any time failed to comply with rules made by the FCA under section 64A, and(b) at that time the person was—(i) an approved person, or(ii) an employee of a bank.(3) Condition B is that—
(a) the person has at any time been knowingly concerned in a contravention of a relevant requirement by an authorised person, and(b) at that time the person was—(i) an approved person in relation to the authorised person, or(ii) in the case of an authorised person that is a bank, an employee of the bank.(4) In this section “relevant requirement” means a requirement—
(a) imposed by or under this Act, or(b) imposed by any qualifying EU provision specified, or of a description specified, for the purposes of this subsection by the Treasury by order. (5) Condition C is that—
(a) the person has at any time been a senior manager in relation to an authorised person that is a bank,(b) there has at that time been (or continued to be) a contravention of a relevant requirement by the bank, and(c) the senior manager was at that time responsible for the management of any of the bank’s activities in relation to which the contravention occurred.(6) But a person (“P”) is not guilty of misconduct by virtue of subsection (5) if P satisfies the FCA that P had taken such steps as a person in P’s position could reasonably be expected to take to avoid the contravention occurring (or continuing).
(7) For the purposes of subsection (5)—
“senior manager”, in relation to an authorised person that is a bank, means a person who has approval under section 59 to perform a designated senior management function in relation to the carrying on by the bank of a regulated activity;
“designated senior management function” means a function designated as a senior management function under section 59(6B) or (6C).
(8) In this section—
“approved person”—
(a) means a person in relation to whom an approval is given under section 59, and(b) in relation to an authorised person, means a person in relation to whom such approval is given on the application of the authorised person;“employee”, in relation to a person, has the same meaning as in section 64A.
“66B Misconduct: action by the PRA
(1) For the purposes of action by the PRA under section 66, a person is guilty of misconduct if any of conditions A to C is met in relation to the person.
(2) Condition A is that—
(a) the person has at any time failed to comply with rules made by the PRA under section 64A, and(b) at that time the person was—(i) an approved person, or(ii) an employee of a PRA-authorised bank.(3) Condition B is that—
(a) the person has at any time been knowingly concerned in a contravention of a relevant requirement by a PRA-authorised person, and(b) at that time the person was—(i) an approved person in respect of the performance of a relevant senior management function in relation to the carrying on by the PRA-authorised person of a regulated activity, or(ii) in the case of an authorised person that is a bank, an employee of the bank.(4) In this section “relevant requirement” means a requirement—
(a) imposed by or under this Act, or(b) imposed by any qualifying EU provision specified, or of a description specified, for the purposes of this subsection by the Treasury by order.(5) Condition C is that—
(a) the person has at any time been a senior manager in relation to a PRA-authorised bank,(b) there has at that time been (or continued to be) a contravention of a relevant requirement by the bank, and(c) the senior manager was at that time responsible for the management of any of the bank’s activities in relation to which the contravention occurred. (6) But a person (“P”) is not guilty of misconduct by virtue of subsection (5) if P satisfies the PRA that P had taken such steps as a person in P’s position could reasonably be expected to take to avoid the contravention occurring (or continuing).
(7) For the purposes of subsection (5)—
“senior manager”, in relation to an authorised person that is a bank, means a person who has approval under section 59 to perform a designated senior management function in relation to the carrying on by the bank of a regulated activity;
“designated senior management function” means a function designated as a senior management function under section 59(6B) or (6C).
(8) In this section—
“approved person”—
(a) means a person in relation to whom—(a) the PRA has given its approval under section 59, or(b) the FCA has given its approval under section 59 in respect of the performance by the person of a relevant senior management function in relation to the carrying on by a PRA-authorised person of a regulated activity, and(b) in relation to an authorised person, means a person in relation to whom approval under section 59 is given on the application of the authorised person;“employee”, in relation to a person, has the same meaning as in section 64A;
“PRA-authorised bank” means a bank that is a PRA-authorised person;
“relevant senior management function” means a function which the PRA is satisfied is a senior management function as defined in section 59ZA (whether or not the function has been designated as such by the FCA).””
Lord Newby
“Meaning of “bank”
(none) In Part 5 of FSMA 2000 (performance of regulated activities), after section 71 insert—
““Bank”71A Meaning of “bank”
(1) In this Part “bank” means a UK institution which has permission under Part 4A to carry on the regulated activity of accepting deposits.
(2) But “bank” does not include an insurer.
(3) In this section—
(a) “UK institution” means an institution which is incorporated in, or formed under the law of any part of, the United Kingdom;(b) “insurer” means an institution which is authorised under this Act to carry on the regulated activity of effecting or carrying out contracts of insurance as principal.(4) Subsections (1) and (3)(b) are to be read in accordance with section 22, taken with Schedule 2 and any order under section 22.””
Lord Newby
“Offence relating to decision that results in bank failure
(1) A person (“S”) commits an offence if—
(a) at a time when S is a senior manager in relation to a bank (“B”), S—(i) takes, or agrees to the taking of, a decision by or on behalf of B as to the way in which the business of a group bank is to be carried on, or(ii) fails to take steps that S could take to prevent such a decision being taken,(b) at the time of the decision, S is aware of a risk that the implementation of the decision may cause the failure of the group bank,(c) in all the circumstances, S’s conduct in relation to the taking of the decision falls far below what could reasonably be expected of a person in S’s position, and(d) the implementation of the decision causes the failure of the group bank.(2) A “group bank”, in relation to a bank (“B”), means B or any other bank that is a member of B’s group for the purpose of FSMA 2000 (see section 421 of that Act).
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) are to be read with the interpretative provisions in section (Interpretation of terms used in offence).
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction—(i) in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months (or 6 months, if the offence was committed before the commencement of section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) or a fine, or both; (ii) in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;(iii) in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years or a fine, or both.”
Lord Newby
My Lords, we now turn to one of the key recommendations of the PCBS: the introduction of a new criminal offence of reckless misconduct in the management of a bank. The commission argued convincingly that existing sanctions for financial crime,
“do not cover the apparent mismanagement and failure of control by senior bankers”,
and that the risk of a criminal conviction and a prison sentence would give senior officers of UK banks pause for thought. As the Government made clear in our response to the commission, we believe that there is a strong case for the introduction of such an offence. Serious bank failure results in severe economic disruption and considerable losses for taxpayers.
In line with the commission’s recommendations, the new offence will be applicable only to individuals who are covered by the new senior managers regime. Senior managers could be liable if they take a decision which leads to the failure of the bank or fail to take steps available to them to prevent such a decision being taken. The offence will apply only to behaviour that falls far below the standard that could reasonably be expected of a person in their position, which is a similar test to that for corporate manslaughter. In addition, at the time when the decision was taken the senior manager must have been aware of a risk that its implementation may cause the failure of the bank. Limiting the application of the offence to individuals who are covered by the senior managers regime, and the precise definition of when a bank has failed for the purposes of the offence, mean that those affected should be in no doubt as to their potential criminal liability.
The maximum sentence for the new offence will be seven years in prison and/or an unlimited fine on indictment. This is in line with the recommendation of the commission, which argued that the offence must carry the possibility of a prison sentence to be effective, as with other offences of similar gravity under FiSMA, such as misleadingly manipulating benchmarks such as LIBOR. The commission said that it,
“would expect this offence to be pursued in cases involving only the most serious of failings ... and not predominantly against smaller operators where proving responsibility is easier, but the harm is much lower”.
The Government endorse this position, and the offence will therefore apply to banks and building societies but not to credit unions.
One area where we do not agree with the commission is on its proposal that there should be a time limit of one year within which criminal charges could be brought following successful civil enforcement action. I have considerable sympathy with its arguments that laws forbidding disclosure of information with regard to criminal proceedings could mean that the publication of information around a bank failure—information that it would be in the public interest to release—would be suppressed until court proceedings had concluded. However, it is very unusual to have a time limit on bringing charges relating to serious criminal offences such as this and, given the likely complexities of many of the cases that will be tried under this offence, such a time limit may seriously limit the regulators’ ability to prosecute. The offence introduced by this amendment will be a vital tool in ensuring that those at the top of our banks are focused on taking prudent and measured decisions and in holding them to account for reckless behaviour that falls short of that standard.
I now address the amendments in this group. On Amendment 58, the PCBS recommended an offence of reckless misconduct. In order for a person’s behaviour to be reckless, they must be aware of the risks that they are taking. The insertion of the text proposed by Amendment 58A would allow for the possibility that a manager acting without knowledge of the possible effects of their actions could also be guilty of the offence. A key aspect of making an offence prosecutable is that the person concerned must know that they are at risk of committing the crime. There are other, civil, sanctions, which FSMA provides for, which can apply if a senior manager has acted incompetently rather than criminally recklessly. For example, if a senior manager in a bank fails to comply with binding statements of principle issued by the regulator, they can be penalised. These penalties can be heavy, including up to an unlimited fine. In light of this, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
On Amendment 58B, we have thought very carefully about the wording of this offence, and have built upon robust precedent where possible. Referring to conduct that is “far below” that which would be expected has precedents in the Law Commission’s proposal for a statutory offence of killing by gross carelessness, and in legislation creating the offence of corporate manslaughter. So we have used this particular phrase knowing that it works and can be effectively interpreted by the courts. The offence must be precise enough to comply with principles of legal certainty and fairness. There is no precedent in UK criminal law for criminalising behaviour that is merely unreasonable. To do so would amount to an indiscriminate diffusion of criminal liability in a way that would make it hard for individuals to know with sufficient certainty when they might be committing an offence.
We also need to be very aware of the incentives that the offence creates. There would be a considerable risk that a broader, vaguer offence would put talented executives off taking on senior management positions, and the Government are keen to get the balance right between punishing genuine recklessness and supporting appropriate risk-taking. This would be a particular risk when people consider whether to take on a senior role in a troubled bank just when it was most important for it to have highly capable leadership.
I understand that the intention of Amendment 58C is to make the offence more objective. First, the reasonableness test as currently drafted gives a clear, objective test of when the crime has been committed by a senior manager. It will enable the jury to consider whether the defendant’s behaviour was reasonable, taking into account the position they were actually in. To be precise, it requires the jury to consider what conduct could, in all the circumstances, reasonably be expected of a person holding the position in the bank which that individual senior manager held.
This amendment would, arguably, remove this clarity and ask the jury to consider whether the person’s behaviour was reasonable in a more general way. Such a test would be likely to be harder to apply to particular cases, and in some cases could be inappropriate. It is important to note that there can be no one clear definition of what could be expected of a person in a senior management position in a bank. Such drafting fails to take account of, for example, which particular senior management role the defendant was undertaking, in what kind of banking institution and what the institution’s business model was. This amendment would change the current reasonableness test to one that it would be extremely difficult for a jury to apply in any meaningful way, making the offence less certain and prosecution more problematic.
On Amendment 59A, the Government are introducing this offence to close a gap in financial crime legislation. There are currently no criminal powers available to sanction senior managers who have recklessly caused their banks to fail. This is a clear shortcoming, which we are now remedying. As we have already debated, though, offences already exist for failing to comply with the Fraud Act, the Proceeds of Crime Act or the Money Laundering Regulations. Individuals can be prosecuted under these Acts, and any sentencing following the successful prosecution of these offences would take into account how serious these breaches were, so it is difficult to see what benefit this amendment would add. Further, if a bank is found to have committed an offence under the Fraud Act 2006 or under the Money Laundering Regulations 2007, senior managers of the bank could also be found guilty if they have consented to or connived in the commission of the offence by the bank. As previously noted, the new senior managers regime will also provide enhanced accountability in these areas. So there is no lack of individual accountability in cases where banks fail to comply with the requirements of the 2006 Act or the 2007 Regulations.
We believe that we have introduced a sensible definition and an important piece in the jigsaw of improved accountability for individuals by our amendments, and I commend them to the House.
Amendment 58A*
Baroness Noakes
My Lords, my first thought on seeing this new offence relating to bank failure was to be mildly appalled at something that might possibly impinge on one’s personal life, but I have tried to put that to one side and to look at this clause dispassionately. What concerns me is a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, which relates to causation. That is mentioned several times in this clause, but one of the conditions in subsection (1)(d) of the new clause proposed by Amendment 58 is that,
“the implementation of the decision causes the failure of the group”.
Is it clear that single decisions cause failures of the nature that we are talking about? I ask him to think, in the context of the failures that existed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, whether any one of those, had they occurred today and been dealt with under existing legislation, could have technically satisfied the wording in this offence. Even in the simplest case of failure, which was probably Northern Rock, it was not as simple as one decision or even one group of decisions. There were multiple points of decision which contributed. Certainly, when one gets to something as complicated as the failure of Lehman Brothers, I would be absolutely astonished if anybody could have pointed to one decision causing one failure.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I will try to sum up some of those points. One of the big challenges that we faced in producing the exact terms of this amendment was to produce a sanction which is a credible offence and could be successfully prosecuted. Setting the conditions to include that in all the circumstances the individual’s conduct fell far below what could reasonably be expected of them and that they were aware of the risk that a decision could cause the bank to fail gives us the clarity that we need. This will capture behaviour which in normal parlance or in normal view would be considered reckless.
The noble Lord, Lord Brennan, said that he was keen that this new offence should make people think. It will make people think, but equally it must have within it a degree of certainty that means that an offence could be prosecutable. This necessarily circumscribes the way in which we define it.
I can confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, that his interpretation of the provisions in the Bill is correct.
Lord Lawson of Blaby
May I ask my noble friend one question? The commission’s recommendations refer to this as reckless misconduct. The word “reckless” is very important. Speaking to this, the Minister used the word “reckless”, but I do not see it in the amendment. Can he explain why?
Lord Newby
Yes, I hope I can. As I was just saying, we had to put in the Bill a form of words that would create a credible offence that could be successfully prosecuted. The two requirements that an individual’s conduct had to fall far below what could reasonably be expected of them and that they were aware of the risk they were taking, would, in the view of the lawyers, capture recklessness. It is a definition of recklessness without the use of the word. The wording gives a greater chance of having a credible offence than using the word “reckless”. It is an attempt to make sure that we have got something that we could use, while capturing the concept.
The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, asked about the difference between the heading and the text. My understanding is that headings of sections of the Bill do not constitute part of the Bill for legal reasons. It may be possible to improve the heading, but the noble Lord should not worry about it. The noble Lord asked whether any restrictions on conditions which were imposed might be made public. At first sight, I cannot see any reason why that should not be the case, but I will write to him to confirm the position.
We have had a good debate on these amendments. I commend the government amendments to the House.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I do not think the Minister has adequately dealt with the point made by my noble friend Lady Noakes and partly by myself. Surely it is an inescapable point that if you say that someone has to cause the failure of a bank, that is a direct and hugely demanding test. If it had said instead that the decision significantly contributed to the failure of a bank then I think my noble friend and I would be content because it satisfies justice as well as practicality. Is he not concerned that this will undermine the whole purpose of this amendment?
Lord Newby
I do not think it undermines the whole purpose of the amendment. It obviously reduces the scope of cases which can be brought under this amendment, but the challenge that the lawyers have had is to make sure, as far as possible, that there is the certainty of what constitutes an offence, which is required under human rights legislation. That has been one of the principle drivers for the particular form of words that we have got. I accept the noble Baroness’s point that in some cases there will be a whole raft of contributory decisions which over a period lead to a bank failing. It will be, I accept, more difficult to bring a prosecution in those cases. It is not inconceivable, however, to argue, without having any particular case in mind, that if a senior executive of a bank persuaded the board to make an acquisition knowing that it was a very risky acquisition which if it went wrong could bring the bank down, that decision would fall squarely, as I understand it, within the scope of the Government’s proposals. I do not think it is outside the realms of possibility that a senior manager in the bank might take such a decision.
Lord Newby
“Interpretation of terms used in offence
(1) This section has effect for the interpretation of section (Offence relating to decision that results in bank failure).
(2) “Bank” means a UK institution which has permission under Part 4A of FSMA 2000 to carry on the regulated activity of accepting deposits.
(3) But “bank” does not include—
(a) an insurer, or(b) a credit union. (4) In subsections (2) and (3)—
(a) “UK institution” means an institution which is incorporated in, or formed under the law of any part of, the United Kingdom;(b) “insurer” means an institution which is authorised under FSMA 2000 to carry on the regulated activity of effecting or carrying out contracts of insurance as principal;(c) “credit union” means a credit union as defined by section 31 of the Credit Unions Act 1979 or a credit union as defined by Article 2(2) of the Credit Unions (Northern Ireland) Order 1985.(5) Subsections (2) and (4)(b) are to be read in accordance with section 22 of FSMA 2000, taken with Schedule 2 to that Act and any order under that section.
(6) A person is a “senior manager” in relation to a bank if, under an arrangement entered into by the bank, or by a contractor of the bank, in relation to the carrying on by the bank of a regulated activity, the person performs a function that is designated as a senior management function—
(a) by the FCA under subsection (6B) of section 59 of FSMA 2000 (approval for particular arrangements), or(b) by the PRA under subsection (6C) of that section.(7) A bank (“B”) is to be regarded as failing where—
(a) B enters insolvency,(b) any of the stabilisation options in Part 1 of the Banking Act 2009 is achieved in relation to B, or(c) B is taken for the purposes of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to be unable, or likely to be unable, to satisfy claims against B.(8) In subsection (7)(a) “insolvency” includes—
(a) bankruptcy,(b) liquidation,(c) bank insolvency,(d) administration,(e) bank administration,(f) receivership,(g) a composition between B and B’s creditors, and(h) a scheme of arrangement of B’s affairs.”
Lord Newby
“Institution of proceedings
(1) In this section “an offence” means an offence under section (Offence relating to decision that results in bank failure).
(2) Proceedings for an offence may be instituted in England and Wales only—
(a) by the FCA, the PRA or the Secretary of State, or(b) by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.(3) Proceedings for an offence may be instituted in Northern Ireland only—
(a) by the FCA, the PRA or the Secretary of State, or(b) by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland.(4) In exercising its power to institute proceedings for an offence, the FCA or the PRA must comply with any conditions or restrictions imposed in writing by the Treasury.
(5) Conditions or restrictions may be imposed under subsection (4) in relation to—
(a) proceedings generally, or(b) such proceedings, or categories of proceedings, as the Treasury may direct.”
Lord Newby
“Part 5Regulation of payment systemsOverview
(1) This Part contains provision for the establishment of a new body (the “Payment Systems Regulator”) to exercise functions in relation to payment systems.
(2) Section (The Payment Systems Regulator) provides for the establishment of the Payment Systems Regulator.
(3) Sections (Meaning of “payment system”) and (Participants in payment systems etc) contain definitions of “payment system” and related terms.
(4) Sections (Designation orders) to (Revocation of designation orders) make provision about designating a payment system as a regulated payment system.
(5) Sections (Regulator’s general duties in relation to payment systems) to (Regulatory principles) contain provision about the general duties of the Payment Systems Regulator under this Part.
(6) Sections (Directions) to (Amendments relating to Regulator’s competition powers) confer various regulatory and competition functions on the Payment Systems Regulator.
(7) Sections (Complaints by representative bodies) to (Complaints: guidance) contain provision about the making of complaints to the Payment Systems Regulator.
(8) Sections (Meaning of “compliance failure”) to (Enforcement of requirement to dispose of interest in payment system) contain provision about enforcement and appeals.
(9) Sections (Power to obtain information or documents) to (Reports) contain supplementary powers.
(10) Sections (Duty of regulators to ensure co-ordinated exercise of functions) to (Power of PRA to require Regulator to refrain from specified action) contain provision about the Payment Systems Regulator’s relationship with other regulators.
(11) Sections (Regulator’s general duty to consult) to (Competition scrutiny) contain provision about consultation, accountability and oversight.
(12) Sections (Relationship with Part 8 of the Payment Services Regulations 2009) to (Interpretation) contain miscellaneous and supplemental provision.”
Lord Newby
My Lords, these amendments will create a new competition-focused utility-style regulator equipped with the full range of powers to tackle the deeply rooted issues in the market for payment system. The Government have serious concerns about the structure of the payment systems market, which sees problems in three main areas: competition, innovation and responsiveness to consumer needs.
Under the existing self-regulatory framework, there is no systematic oversight holding the big banks, payment scheme companies and infrastructure providers to account. Large banks jointly own the payment system companies and the infrastructure provider, and they dominate the Payments Council, the pseudo-regulatory body responsible for setting industry strategy. This allows the incumbent players to erect barriers to entry, preventing challenger banks from competing on a level playing field. It also limits incentives for the systems to innovate and respond to consumer needs, as there is no competitive advantage to any bank in doing so. There are also competition concerns in the international card schemes, as highlighted by the European Commission’s proposed regulation capping multilateral interchange fees. The card schemes have an incentive to increase interchange fees to encourage banks to issue their cards, but merchants have little opportunity to influence this process, and have no real option but to accept the major payment cards.
The first objective of the regulator will be to address the problems arising from imperfect competition. To tackle barriers to entry in banking arising from access conditions for the payment schemes, the payment systems regulator will have powers to tackle anti-competitive fees, terms and conditions, and to mandate access to the core systems. If deemed necessary, it will be able to break up the current ownership structures to create a landscape where fair competition can thrive. Secondly, the regulator will examine issues relating to innovation. Payment systems are characterised by strong network effects. Just as owning a telephone brings little benefit if no one else has one, each user gains added value from a payment system with the addition of further users. The shared ownership of the interbank payment systems by the banks reinforces this, because no single bank stands to gain an advantage over the others by investing in and developing the systems. This tendency to underinvest means that, while there have been some important innovations in recent years, they have too often required the Government’s or the OFT’s intervention to drive change, and the industry has taken too long to realise their full benefits.
The Government want to challenge underinvestment and lack of innovation in the co-owned systems. They want a payments industry that rewards entrepreneurial behaviour and develops systems that are innovative, efficient and effective. Therefore, the regulator will have an objective to promote the development of, and innovation in, payment systems.
The third problem identified in the market is the failure of the industry to respond to end-user needs. This, too, stems from the market’s network characteristics and ownership structures, which mean that failing to respond to end-user needs incurs no competitive disadvantage to any of the banks. This makes it possible for the banks to take decisions about the provision of services, even if this is directly against the interests of the wider public, as we saw in 2009 when the industry attempted to abolish cheques. The Government want to see a market where payment systems work for end-users, rather than one that serves only the self-interest of the big established banks.
Successive Governments and UK regulatory authorities have been trying to find a viable solution for these problems for more than a decade, dating back to Sir Don Cruickshank’s report to the Treasury in 2000 recommending that the Government create a utility-style regulator for payment systems. Instead, however, the process resulted in the creation of the industry-dominated Payments Council. In February, the Chancellor announced that the Government would introduce a new regulator to open up payment systems. Over the summer, the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards endorsed the Government’s commitment to bring payment systems into formal regulation. In their response to the final report of the PCBS, the Government confirmed that they will ask the payments regulator, once established, to urgently examine account portability.
I turn to the details of these amendments. They establish the payment systems regulator as a separate legal entity established by the FCA. This provides bespoke objectives and powers to address the distinctive problems in the market for payment systems, and allows for the benefits of close co-ordination with the FCA. The objectives of the regulator will be to promote competition, innovation and the interests of service users. The payment systems regulator will oversee all domestic payment systems brought into scope by being designated by HM Treasury. Initially, it is expected that the main interbank schemes and international card schemes will be designated. Once a system is designated, the regulator will have powers over that system’s operators, infrastructure providers and payment service providers that provide payment services using the system. This new regime will not affect the existing role of the Bank of England under the Banking Act 2009 in overseeing recognised interbank systems for stability purposes. The Bank will be excluded from the scope of regulation in its current capacity as a payments system participant. There will also be a duty for the co-ordinated exercise of functions between the PSR, FCA, Bank and PRA, and a memorandum of understanding setting out how this will happen.
The payment systems regulator will be equipped with a toolkit of regulatory powers enabling it to address the deep, structural issues causing problems in the market for payment systems. To open up access and encourage greater competition, the regulator will be able to intervene and require changes to any anti-competitive fees, or terms and conditions of an agreement for access to a regulated system. It will have powers to require the provision of both direct and indirect access to payment systems. It will also have competition powers to enforce Competition Act 1998 prohibitions against anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance, and to make market investigation references to the Competition and Markets Authority. These competition functions will be exercisable concurrently with the CMA. Ultimately, if the payment systems regulator determines that the current ownership structures need to be broken up to achieve adequate competition, it will have the power to require disposals of interests in operators of regulated systems.
In furthering access and competition, the regulator will also address underinvestment by the industry and the slow pace of innovation. There is no shortage of players who want to be able to innovate in this space, and with greater access to the core systems and infrastructure, inventive, entrepreneurial players will be able to bring propositions to market when they have previously been blocked from doing so. Greater competitive pressure on industry participants can be expected to drive up standards and force payment system owners, operators and payment service providers to deliver improvements in the payment systems space. However, in cases where market forces are still unable to play out, if the big incumbent banks resist, the regulator will have powers to drive through improvements as it sees fit, by issuing directions that require or prohibit action by participants in regulated systems, and this includes requiring specific developments to be pursued.
In advancing its service-user objectives, the regulator will be able to require or prohibit the taking of action in the operation, management and development of payment systems. This means that it can prevent the industry ignoring the legitimate needs of consumers—for instance, by trying to abolish cheques. The payment systems regulator will be able to publish details of a compliance failure and to impose financial penalties; if deemed necessary, it will be able to require owners of payment systems to dispose of their interests in them, subject to Treasury approval.
Taken together, these amendments create a strong, competition-focused regulator, which will have the right objectives, functions and powers to ensure that conditions in the payment systems market are such that challenger banks and innovative non-bank players are given a level playing field to challenge the big incumbent banks; innovation takes place to facilitate useful new services for businesses and consumers; and decisions on the provision of payment options are taken in the interests of all users of payment systems, not just the interests of the big banks. I commend these amendments to the Committee.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I have a number of queries about another set of amendments that are longer than the original Bill. First, I support entirely the notion of establishing a payments regulator, but why is it being established as yet another independent regulator? Surely, covering the activities that it refers to—the nature of markets and settlement systems, which are akin to clearing and settlement in business and financial services in general—is the clear role of the FCA. Why are we establishing an extra organisation? After all, one thing that we have learnt through the financial crisis is that communication between organisations is less than perfect, even in the best of all possible worlds. Surely it would be better if this was simply a division of the FCA rather than an organisation having, as the schedule makes clear, an entirely separate board and chairman. This seems to be a proliferation of institutions with no purpose when we already have the FCA there to do the job.
Secondly, I want to explore the competition objective a little more. It is very clear that enhancing competition by giving access to payment systems is highly desirable. It is also clear that users might benefit from competition. What is not terribly clear is whether we want to have very diverse structures in the fundamental architecture of the payments system, which is absolutely core to the banking system. It recalls to me the early days of the railways when there were more than a dozen railways from London to Brighton, as they all competed with one another. This was not conducive either to the effective development of the railway companies or the provision eventually of a proper service to passengers. Therefore, I am a little puzzled, given the essential role of the payments architecture as being absolutely fundamental to the operation of the banking system, as to whether we want to see diverse structures and how they might be related to one another. I wonder what the Government’s thoughts are on this.
My third point also refers to the nature of fundamental market infrastructure. Within these new clauses it is the responsibility of the regulator to assure maintenance of service. However, another part of the Bill, which we will look at next, is labelled “fundamental market infrastructure” and is also devoted to the maintenance of market service more generally. The responsible authority for maintaining market service is different in the two cases. In one it is the Treasury; in the other it is the Bank of England. Why do we have two different authorities responsible for the maintenance of fundamental market infrastructure when the payments system is undoubtedly part of fundamental market infrastructure? It seems to me that, in inserting this desirable measure into the Bill, the fact that it has created some ambiguities and inconsistencies has not been noticed.
Lord Sharkey
Government Amendment 60U is headed, “Power to require disposal of interest in payment system”. New subsection (2) states:
“The power conferred … may be exercised only if the Payment Systems Regulator is satisfied that, if the power is not exercised, there is likely to be a restriction or distortion of competition in—
(a) the market for payment systems, or
(b) a market for services provided by payment systems”.
How is that a remedy for anything? When it comes to divestment or disposal, is it the Government’s notion that someone will pick up the shares that have been disposed of; and, if so, who will it be? What would be the incentive for anyone to pick them up?
Lord Newby
My Lords, I am grateful for the wide welcome given to these provisions.
Lord Newby
A number of noble Lords raised the same question and have come down on different sides. Should we have a separate regulator or should it be just a division in the FCA? In the end, it was a question about how important we thought the issue was. A division in the FCA would be a division among a lot of divisions. The staff of a division in the FCA would probably be at a somewhat more junior level than that of a chief executive of an important regulator. The priority that the overall body, namely the FCA, would give to this would obviously be somewhat less than a body on its own could give, because the sole concern of the people working for it would be to make the scheme work.
It would have been possible to do it in the FCA. In a sense, you literally pays your money and takes your choice. Our view is that this is a fundamental element of the system that needs shaking up and the best way to do it is to have a group of people whose sole interest—and whose career interest—is associated with making this thing work. That is why the body is being established on its own.
The second question of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, was about the definition of competition. As he said, competition in terms of access and users is clearly desirable. Will it be desirable or possible to have diverse structures for all elements of the system? Almost certainly not; some parts of it are a natural monopoly. That is one reason why a regulator is needed. At the moment, you have a natural monopoly controlled by a small group of banks. What we want to do is open up that access but give more scope for looking at options, which at the moment are closed down by the structure. My personal view is that it is highly unlikely that the basic plumbing of the system will replicate the situation in the railways; it would make no sense. However, there may be elements of the payments system, including new forms of payment, which may be susceptible to competition, and we want the regulator to have that in its purview and look at it. There is no suggestion that we are seeking to break up those elements of the system that form a natural monopoly.
The noble Lord also asked about maintenance of service. There is a difference between what the regulator will be doing on a day-to-day basis in making sure that the whole system works effectively and what happens if the whole thing is failing. That is the difference in the second provision, which we will come on to later, about resolution. The people to look after resolution when something has failed are not necessarily the best people to be doing the day-to-day management of it.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I beg the noble Lord’s pardon, but the question related to a possibility of interruption of service. Amendment 62 states:
“The Treasury may by order designate a company”,
and so on, to maintain the service. We then move on to the next section relating to fundamental market infrastructure, which states that the maintenance of service is the responsibility of the Bank of England. There is an inconsistency here. As regards the issue of the infrastructure as a payments system and the issue of all other aspects of back-office infrastructure, the Treasury is responsible for one and the Bank of England is responsible for the other. However, they are so interrelated and interdependent that it does not really make sense. You have either one or the other. I do not mind which. I would prefer the Bank of England to be responsible because it is closer to the payments system, but you do not have both.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I will have another look at that. The noble Lord has a problem which I do not have to the same extent, but he makes a perfectly reasonable point and we will look at it.
The noble Lord, Lord Higgins, asked a couple of questions—one about cost and the other about international payments. The cost of the activities comes from the FCA budget and is therefore borne by the regulated population. It is not known at this stage what the level of fees or the detailed budget will be. These will be determined by the FCA. The regulator will be concerned with UK payments systems only.
Lord Higgins
I am not quite clear about who is paying this cost. Am I right in thinking that it is the people using the chequing system? My second question was: is this regulatory system compatible with a change in the underlying system from, say, cheques to the system used in the Netherlands? Thirdly, am I right in understanding that the noble Lord said that this arrangement will cover only domestic, not international, transactions? Should we not be covering both?
Lord Newby
It will cover the UK end of international transactions. The counterparty in another country is regulated by that country’s operations, not by the UK end of it. Obviously, close working between both countries is required but we are dealing with the pipes that leave the UK. Once they have left the UK, the pipes are regulated by someone else. As far as cheques are concerned, if there were to be a decision or view expressed that cheques had come to the end of their useful life, it will not fall under the purview of the regulator to effect that change. I think that I am right in saying that the budget forms part of the FCA’s overall budget, as set out in the legislation. Therefore, the overall financial services sector pays into the FCA for a whole raft of specialist functions. This is no different from anything else that is funded by the FCA.
Lord Eatwell
Perhaps I may follow that. The overall financial services industry, or that bit of it which is regulated by the FCA, some of which has nothing to do with banking and payments systems, has to pay for this regulator. On top of that, let us remember that he who pays the piper calls the tune. All this stuff about separate careers and career paths is subsumed by the fact that the financial controller of the FCA will control the funds going into this organisation. I take the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, about the focus on this role, but I really do not understand why you cannot have a division with a senior figure in charge of it, and therefore some clarity within the FCA.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I am extremely sorry that the noble Lord does not understand. We just have a difference of view about that. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked about the kind of action that the regulator could take and whether it could, in effect, behave unreasonably. The answer is—
Baroness Noakes
I did not question whether or not it could behave reasonably because all regulators are supposed to behave reasonably, and can be challenged if they do not. I asked the Minister to address specific points. There are amendments here about granting access and varying the terms of existing agreements. I asked where in the 40, which I am told is now 52, pages of amendments that we are asked to consider in this group are the financial principles that will guide this new regulator in imposing terms for this new access or in varying existing access rights. I was trying to tease out, for example, whether the regulator will have the power to impose subsidies on existing payments regulators or whether he will be required to ensure that the payment system operators can cover their costs. Therefore, I asked: where are the financial principles which the regulator has to use in exercising the powers that are granted by two of the amendments in this group?
Lord Newby
I am extremely sorry; I misunderstood the noble Baroness. I think that I shall have to write to her on that point.
My noble friend Lord Sharkey asked whether this was the only case in which a regulator had innovation as part of his remit. I simply do not know but I think that the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, pointed out that, if it were, that might indeed be an innovation. If it is an innovation, we think that it is a good one.
In terms of divestment and who picks up the shares, we are saying that this is something that the regulator should have the power to look at as one possibility. There is no blueprint in Treasury minds as to how he will do it or whether he will do it and, if so, who the beneficiaries will be. It is something that we want to have as an option for the regulator to look at. We want to give the regulator the greatest possible scope to come up with alternative ways of developing the system and possibly of generating new sources of funding for the innovation, which we are also keen on.
I am sure that I have omitted a number of points. My noble friend Lord Phillips raised a question concerning subsection (3) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 60B and I have now forgotten what he asked. Perhaps he would like to ask it again. He is indicating that he would not—that is good.
Lord Martin of Springburn (CB)
I have been very interested in what has been said about the regulator. Obviously the regulator has to work at arm’s length from those he is regulating. If any hospitality is offered to the regulator, is that put in a register that can be seen by the public? In other words, will we have transparency in this matter?
Lord Newby
I will write to the noble Lord as I do not have the faintest clue, except to say that I am sure that this regulator will follow the same rules as other regulators, but I simply do not know what their rules are in respect of hospitality. I suspect that, like Ministers, there will be some de minimis figure below which they will not need to make such a declaration and beyond which they will. However, I will check that.
Lord Newby
“The Payment Systems Regulator
(1) The FCA must establish a body corporate to exercise the functions conferred on the body by or under this Part.
(2) The body established under subsection (1) is referred to in this Part as the Payment Systems Regulator.
(3) The FCA must take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the Payment Systems Regulator is, at all times, capable of exercising the functions referred to in subsection (1).
(4) In complying with the duty imposed by subsection (3) the FCA may, in particular—
(a) provide staff to the Payment Systems Regulator, and(b) provide services to the Payment Systems Regulator which the FCA considers would facilitate the exercise of any of those functions.(5) Schedule (The Payment Systems Regulator) (which contains further provision about the Payment Systems Regulator) has effect.”