Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debate15:22 - The House divided: - Ayes: 292 / Noes: 239 - Question accordingly agreed to.
15:36 - The House divided: - Ayes: 297 / Noes: 238 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Minister for Policing, Criminal Justice and Victims (Damian Green)
I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 112.
Madam Deputy Speaker
With this is will be convenient to take Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 112.
Damian Green
I should add that I wish the House to agree to amendment (a).
Clause 151 defines what amounts to a “miscarriage of justice” for the purposes of compensation under section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. There has been much debate about the clause, both here and in the House of Lords, and I am indebted to all who have contributed to examining this important issue. The Government have taken account of all the points that have been made and all the concerns that have been expressed, and our position has changed as a result of the very good debates that have taken place in Committee here as well as in the House of Lords.
I was pleased to note that Members of both Houses and members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights agreed with us that that the current definition set out by the divisional court in the case of Ali was not clear enough, that we needed to legislate for a clear definition of a miscarriage of justice given the ongoing uncertainty and reinterpretation of definitions by the courts, and that our aim was not to seek to restrict compensation, but to provide clarity. The question that remains before us is how it can be determined whether someone has suffered a miscarriage of justice.
This is indeed a complex issue. When a case is properly brought to court—that is, when there is evidence of a crime on which it is right to ask a jury to adjudicate—there is no miscarriage of justice when the result of the trial is an acquittal, or even in very many of the cases in which a guilty verdict is later quashed as unsafe. The Government believe that a miscarriage of justice arises only when there is in existence a fact which entirely exonerates the accused: in other words, a fact which makes it unquestionable that the accused did not commit the crime. In such cases, it is only the ignorance of this fact that allowed the accused to be convicted in the first place. What we are seeking to define is something far more than merely a failure in the investigative or trial processes. We are seeking to define a clear miscarriage of justice which is—and, in our view, can only be—the wrongful conviction of the innocent.
Our aim is to create an unambiguous statutory description of such a situation for the purposes of compensation. The fact that the definition inserted in the Bill by Lords amendment 112 is open to various interpretations is obvious from the significant number of judicial review cases awaiting consideration by the administrative court—13 at present—in which the aim is to challenge the Secretary of State’s application of the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Adams. That number excludes the three cases that are awaiting judgment from the challenge to the divisional court’s decision in respect of Ali and others, which was heard by the Court of Appeal last December. A test similar to the “Adams test”—the definition that is at the heart of all these cases—is the test that is now being proposed in Lords amendment 112.
It is vitally important for us to ensure that the definition that is introduced into statute for the first time is “fit for purpose”. It must be clear and robust enough to avoid the need for further judicial interpretation, and, as far as possible, to limit the scope for argument about what will amount to a miscarriage of justice. The amendment that we propose would leave applicants in no doubt: if the new fact that led to their conviction being quashed showed that they did not commit the offence—for example, if it were shown that they had been somewhere else at the time, if someone else was proved to be the perpetrator, or if the courts acknowledged that no offence had in fact been committed—they would have suffered a miscarriage of justice, and would be likely to be compensated.
Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)
Will the Minister explain to those of us who are not lawyers what the difference is between the Government’s original wording and the wording of the amendment that they are now proposing?
Damian Green
I join my hon. Friend in that state of grace of not being a lawyer. The difference is that we have removed the word “innocent”. There was, I think, a feeling that the original Government proposal required people to prove their innocence, which, of course, would alter the presumptions that lie at the heart of the criminal justice system. That is what could be described as the non-legal significant difference, which is none the less a significant difference.
John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)
Will the Minister therefore explain to us what the difference is between “innocent of” and “did not commit”?
Damian Green
A lot of the debate was about the nomenclature—the thought that we were asking people to prove their innocence. I have just explained the effect of the new clause: if a new fact emerges that on its own shows the person could not have committed the offence or that an offence may not have been committed, that would entitle that person to compensation. Throughout this debate people have recognised that it is not simply a question of being declared innocent that requires a miscarriage of justice to be called.
Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)
Further to that point, will the Minister explain how it would be different for someone to prove they did not commit an offence, as opposed to someone being expected to prove their innocence? What is the difference in terms of the burden of proof?
Damian Green
The point is that nobody has to prove that they are innocent. We are not requiring them to do that. There requires there to be evidence that shows that they could not have committed the offence because they were somewhere else, for example, or because there is new DNA evidence or the offence has not been committed. That is the material difference between the two.
Hywel Williams (Arfon) (PC)
Will the Minister concede that that puts the burden of proof squarely on the defendant, however? They will have to do what is virtually impossible: prove a negative, and perhaps many years after the alleged offence took place.
Damian Green
No, I do not accept that because what would trigger the compensation claim would be the new evidence showing they could not have committed the offence. Something has to happen. Some new evidence has to be brought forward, so it is not simply a situation of the case being redefined.
Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)
If an innocent bystander is watching this debate today and the Minister is saying they have to prove they did not commit an offence, it sounds awfully like they have to prove their own innocence, which of course is anathema to our legal system. Why is he so keen on this new version?
Damian Green
I am keen on this new version and consider it to be an improvement on the original version precisely because it does not require anyone to prove they are innocent, and it provides as unambiguous a wording as we can find to ensure we do not have years of judicial interpretation to come.
Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)
I assure the Minister I have not risen to intervene to ensure he takes an intervention from every other Member in the Chamber. Can he give me an example of a case that would not pass one filter but would pass the other filter, because I cannot think of one?
Damian Green
It would not be helpful to go into individual cases. I have given some examples of what requirements need to be shown for an applicant to receive compensation. What is required is that there must be a new fact that demonstrates that the applicant did not commit the crime. A Court of Appeal judgment that led to the quashing of an applicant’s conviction would have to show what the reasons were. Although I cannot give individual examples, I can tell my right hon. Friend that the reason could be new DNA evidence or compelling new medical evidence, or compelling new alibi evidence that shows the applicant was somewhere else at the time.
To address what lies behind a lot of the unease, let me say that it is fundamentally important to remember that we are legislating here for a compensation scheme that is based on specific eligibility requirements. These are designed to meet our international obligations which only require payment in exceptional cases. The Government believe this clause achieves that.
Everyone has been asking, “What’s the difference between the original clause and this clause?” Of course the substance is not different. However, we recognise that in this area language is very important, and precisely because of the emotion that surrounds the word “innocent”, there is a case for reviewing the reference to that word which has been so controversial, and that is what we have done. We have removed that word, which I hope adds to the clarity and lack of ambiguity.
John McDonnell
I think I understand where the Minister is coming from, but I just think we are getting ourselves into a bit of a mess here. Let me give him a concrete example. I chaired the Guildford Four campaign for a large number of years. What happened there was the discovery that the confessions were completely wrong. They were wrong for all sorts of different reasons—the circumstances in which they were taken, the way they were taken. They were just false. At that stage it is then demonstrated that the prosecution—and the original decision of the courts—is unsound and it is then dismissed. Those people are then released. They will then have to seek to prove their innocence to gain any compensation, so practically I think we are digging ourselves into a hole here and are creating a system that will cause more problems than those we are seeking to solve.
Damian Green
I disagree. The hon. Gentleman seems to be saying the system will in some ways be more difficult because people will have to apply for compensation. That in itself is not a huge change.
John McDonnell
May I explain my point again? Let us take the Birmingham Six as our example. As soon as the confessions were seen to be completely false, they were released on the basis that their prosecution was unsound. However, to gain compensation they will now have to go out and prove they “did not commit” or they were “innocent”, whichever terminology is decided on.
Damian Green
I think this is just a genuine misunderstanding. Someone will be eligible for compensation if the new fact—the hon. Gentleman is talking about new facts emerging in respect of confessions and so on—which led to the quashing of their conviction shows they did not commit the offence for which they were convicted. I think the particular objection he is giving rise to now would not apply, therefore.
Mr Burrowes
I must declare an interest as a lawyer. Returning to the amendment, these matters must be dealt with on a proper evidential basis. It has never been the remit of a court or Minister to pronounce on innocence. The issue is dealing with the question of whether an offence has been committed. That is what any jury or tribunal considers on the basis of the evidence. It is therefore important to look at the test for compensation on an evidential basis, which plainly is whether an offence has been committed. If we get into the territory of pronouncing on innocence, the situation becomes harder and more ambiguous. The amendment in lieu makes it much more concrete. This is a fair and just test and that is why the amendment in lieu is welcome.
Damian Green
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for bringing his legal mind to bear on this, and explaining the difference.
Damian Green
The hon. Gentleman may disagree, but he will have his chance to contribute to the debate.
We are seeking to provide greater clarity, which is why we are unwilling to accept the Lords amendment. We have listened to those who consider that the express reference to the concept of innocence is problematic. That is what lies at the heart of this change. Our amendment in lieu is intended to take this concern into account by removing what has been until now the controversial aspect of this clause: the use of the word “innocent”. I hope that removing the express reference to innocence will make our respect for the presumption of innocence clear, and I hope I can allay the concerns expressed by hon. Members.
We remain strongly committed to ensuring that compensation is paid only to those who genuinely warrant it, however. In our view compensation should be paid only to applicants where it is shown beyond reasonable doubt that they did not commit the offence. We believe that this change takes into account the points made in the House of Lords, which we have carefully considered. As Lord Phillips said in that debate, the primary objective of section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which this clause would amend, is to provide redress to an applicant who has been convicted when he or she was in fact innocent. He also considered that its second and subsidiary objective was to ensure that an applicant whose conviction had been quashed but who had in fact committed the offence charged should not be compensated. Our proposed test goes a long way towards achieving both of those objectives. We consider that, while the definition of a miscarriage of justice for which we are seeking to legislate is drawn narrowly, it nevertheless provides for a range of circumstances in which compensation should rightly be paid to help people who need to rebuild their lives after suffering great injustices.
Throughout our debates, much has been said about the views of the European Court of Human Rights on compensation for a miscarriage of justice, and I am again grateful to Lord Phillips, who commented on this so succinctly during the debate on Report in the Lords. He stated:
“In substance, whatever interpretation is given to miscarriage of justice, something more than quashing a conviction is properly required”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 22 January 2014; Vol. 751, c. 680.]
This much can be gleaned from the four most recent decisions of the European Court on this issue. Today, our business is to determine precisely what that “something more” is. We believe that the definition we are now providing in our amendment will make it easier for applicants to assess whether they should apply for compensation, and will make decisions on eligibility easier for the applicant to understand and less likely to be the subject of legal challenge, as my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) made clear a moment ago.
Mark Durkan
Surely the Government’s amendment would not make it easier for the applicant to decide. Would not the Lords amendment make it easier to decide?
Damian Green
No; my difference with the Lords amendment is that it would leave applicants less clear about what to do. This would result in a large number of cases backing up in the courts waiting for judges to interpret what Parliament meant by the legislation, just as there are at the moment. The purpose of my proposal today is twofold: first, to meet the reasonable objections that have been raised about the original Government proposal; secondly, to provide greater clarity so that the House can speak with as clear a voice as possible in these difficult areas and not leave the field open to judicial interpretation, which can take a long time and which provides uncertainty for applicants.
I am aware that, in both Houses, there has been a misconception that applicants would somehow be required to prove that they did not commit the offence before compensation could be considered. I can categorically say that that is not the case. Applicants do not have to prove anything under the existing criteria, and nor would they have to do so in future under this proposal. Applicants need only rely on information that is already available to them as a result of their appeal process.
The test provided for in the Bill on its introduction was one that Labour was perfectly content to operate while it was in office. I hope that the new definition, which attempts to address the concerns that have been raised, will therefore have the support of the Opposition. I hope that they will now reconsider their position so that the Bill, and the many important measures it contains, can swiftly secure Royal Assent.
Jack Dromey (Birmingham, Erdington) (Lab)
Justice demands that those who are guilty of serious offences should be held to account and brought before the courts, especially in the case of heinous offences such as the murder of a child or a terrorist outrage of the kind that the city I am proud to represent suffered in 1974, with the appalling Birmingham pub bombings by the Provisional IRA, in which 21 innocent civilians were murdered. The victims of such crimes deserve no less than having the perpetrators brought to justice. Justice also demands that the innocent should not be found guilty, however. When serious miscarriages of justice occur, it is right that the innocent have access to justice and are able to be compensated for them.
I am proud of the system of jury trial in this country. I fought for many years to defend it, as a member of the executive council of the then National Council for Civil Liberties, now known as Liberty. Trial by jury is one of our great British institutions. In the words of the jurist Lord Devlin, each jury is a “mini Parliament”, and trial by jury is
“the lamp that shows that freedom lives”.
Juries can get it wrong in certain circumstances, however: when evidence is withheld from or not disclosed to the defence, as in the case of Sally Clark; when new forensic evidence shows that the person charged and convicted was in fact innocent, as in the case of Mary Druhan; or when evidence is extorted as a consequence of outrageous and unacceptable pressure in a police station, or when it is manufactured, as in the cases of the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four. When we debate the importance of compensation for the victims of miscarriages of justice, it is worth reflecting on each of those sets of circumstances.
Sally Clark was a practising solicitor. She was traumatised by the sudden death of her child. She was wrongly accused of murdering her child, and went to prison. When she came out, she was a crushed woman, and she died not long afterwards. Mary Druhan was convicted of arson. In a powerful speech in the other place, Baroness Kennedy of the Shaws described how Mary Druhan had served 11 years in prison, and how she had become so institutionalised that when she came out, she was unable to negotiate public transport. She was also traumatised by the tragic suicide of her daughter while she was in prison.
At a time in our history when the country was reeling from the horror of terrorist violence, what happened to the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four was absolutely wrong. The Birmingham Six were beaten, brutalised and wrongly convicted. They served 16 years in prison. In the case of the Guildford Four, I will never forget when they walked to freedom and Gerry Conlon stood on the steps of the Old Bailey and said that his dad had died in prison. Such serious miscarriages of justice are mercifully rare—there are typically only a couple a year—but it is absolutely right that compensation should be available for the innocent victims who have suffered as a result of them.
At the very heart of our legal system lies the principle that a person is innocent until proved guilty, and rightly so. It is for that reason that Labour tabled an amendment on Report to ensure that that age-old principle was upheld. I said then, as I do now, that I agreed that the Government were right in principle to include in the Bill a statutory definition of the cases in which compensation should be paid for a miscarriage of justice, in order to secure greater certainty in this area of the law. However, the Government’s proposed changes today seek to redefine the compensation test, limiting it to circumstances in which a
“new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that the person was innocent of the offence”
of which he or she was convicted. That seems to fly in the face of the age-old principle. Worse still, the Government’s proposal will lead to the Secretary of State passing judgment on whether or not a person is innocent. Requiring the Secretary of State to perform that role when no court has done so would be to impose a complex and contentious role on Ministers, in cases that are among the most sensitive.
Damian Green
With the leave of the House, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will respond briefly to some of the important points that have been made during this debate.
Taking this back to first principles, the domestic courts have always made it clear that compensation should be paid when the new facts that form the basis on which a person’s conviction was quashed clearly show that the applicant did not commit the offence. However, the courts have never been able to define without ambiguity a stable and robust test. Given the courts’ difficulty in this area, we decided to create a clear and definitive statutory test, the requirement for which is supported by Parliament and others, including the Joint Committee on Human Right, although I appreciate not by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and conceivably the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan), although he did not address the point.
With regard to the test, we have sought to provide an amendment that recognises that compensation should be paid only to those who genuinely warrant it. What we require to achieve that is for the new fact to demonstrate that the applicant did not commit the crime—I addressed the various situations in which that could be shown—and that this should be evident from the reasons outlined in the Court of Appeal’s judgment that led to the quashing of an applicant’s conviction. The applicant does not have to prove their innocence—in other words, the reversal of the burden of proof, which Members have mentioned. That is simply not the case. The reasons why the applicant could not have committed the crime will be evident from what is outlined in a successful appeal.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey) talked about the Sally Clark case. Obviously it is difficult to say how we would consider any applications where compensation would be payable under the new test in the abstract. We have heard much mention of their lordships’ discussion of this. On Report in the Lords, there was disagreement between two eminent lawyers as to the facts of the case that would be fundamental in consideration of an application for compensation. Great lawyers can disagree about that, but what we do know, and what therefore cannot be in dispute, is that the Secretary of State did grant compensation in that case.
Jack Dromey
Just for the record, Lord Saville of Newdigate, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Scott of Foscote, who are members of the Supreme Court, all supported amendment 112. Why is the Minister pitching this at the level of beyond reasonable doubt?
Damian Green
I should point out that Lord Brown disagreed and that the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Adams case was five to four. It genuinely is the case that our most distinguished lawyers were very close to disagreeing.
On the question of beyond reasonable doubt, the ambiguity we seek to resolve with our amendment (a) is illustrated not just by the 13 cases currently awaiting consideration by the administrative court, but by the disagreement between the lawyers in the House of Lords about whether Sally Clark would not have qualified for compensation under that test. The fact that the hon. Gentleman could not tell my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) whether the test he supports—the conclusive test—is one of beyond reasonable doubt or of the balance of probabilities reflects that test’s inherent ambiguity.
There is nothing new in the “beyond reasonable doubt” test. The existing provision in section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 already requires a miscarriage of justice to be shown to have occurred beyond reasonable doubt. The Government, therefore, are not introducing a new test. The aspect on which the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Foyle have laid such great weight is already in the 1988 Act, which we are seeking to improve.
The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington made a reasonable point. He does not think that Parliament should get involved at all and that we should just leave it to the lawyers. I disagree with that argument and so do most people who have addressed the issue. I think we should try to set out a clear, unambiguous basis for the payment of compensation.
I return to the basic point that where the new fact which underpins the quashing of the conviction clearly shows that the offence did not happen, that the applicant could not have carried out the offence or that someone else carried out the offence, that would qualify as a miscarriage of justice. That seems to me to be clearer and less ambiguous than what we have at the moment. It will not deny anyone who genuinely deserves compensation from getting it.
Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 112.
The Minister for Crime Prevention (Norman Baker)
I beg to move, That this House agrees with Lords amendments 1 to 68, 138 and 168.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. The House is agreeing with Lords amendment 1 only, with which we will consider Lords amendments 2 to 111.
Norman Baker
Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker, I am so keen to agree that I got carried away.
The amendments deal with the new antisocial behaviour powers in parts 1 to 6 of the Bill, and I will deal briefly with each one in turn. Members will, I am sure, have watched with interest the proceedings in the House of Lords on the test for issuing an injunction in part 1 of the Bill. Because of the clear vote in the Lords, where there seems to be a majority, and in the light of that debate, the Government has accepted that the test for an injunction should be amended. Lords amendments 1 and 5 will provide for a two-tier test, and the nuisance or annoyance test will continue to be used to deal with housing-related antisocial behaviour. In all other circumstances, the test of harassment, alarm or distress will apply.
The Government believes that the fears raised in the Lords and by campaign groups were unfounded, and our view is shared by the Law Society and housing providers who have been using the nuisance or annoyance test responsibly and proportionately for more than a decade. The suggestion was made that we somehow wanted to curtail the activities of carol singers. It is slightly difficult to believe that any Government would want to do that, and that we would mis-write legislation to enable that to occur. We are then expected to believe that a local council or police officer would want to use the legislation to ban carol singers. We are then expected to believe that any court in the land would deem it proportionate, just and convenient to ban carol singers. Of course, by the time a court had so decided, several weeks on, the carol singers would have left the place where they were singing and it would not be possible to capture them. I think that that example shows some of the exaggeration and scaremongering that have occurred on this proposal. The Lords have spoken, however, and we have listened carefully. It is a democratic Parliament and we have therefore accepted, largely, the substance of Lord Dear’s amendments.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
I do not take exception to the Minister’s comments, but those of religious persuasion who are concerned about the proposed changes support the view that the Lords have put forward. Will the Minister confirm that the position of those of religious persuasion and religious beliefs will not be in any way changed?
Norman Baker
Yes, I am happy to deal with the issue of religious beliefs. Lords amendments 2 and 19 respond to concerns by the Joint Committee on Human Rights relating to the provision in clauses 1 and 21 that requires a court to avoid, so far as practicable, imposing prohibitions or requirements in an injunction or a criminal behaviour order that would conflict with a respondent’s religious beliefs. The amendments remove this wording, as the right to hold a religious belief is absolute. It was simply the manifestation of a person’s religious beliefs that we intended the provision to capture, but a court would be obliged to consider this in any case to comply with its obligations under the Human Rights Act. That being the case, the neatest solution is simply to remove the provision. That is what has happened, and I hope that that deals with the hon. Gentleman’s point.
Mark Field
While I agree with the Minister that we should agree with what the Lords have had to say on this matter, I do not necessarily think that it is the result of the workings of democracy—it is anything but. He slightly trivialised the issue of carol singers, but there is a bigger nuisance concern. For example, there might be a sense that if trick or treating was being clamped down on, it would be unfair not to clamp down on other activities, such as carol singing. I think that that is what might have been behind the Lords thoughts on this matter.
Norman Baker
I am not quite sure what was in the Lords thoughts. Other examples were given—bellringers and so on—and nobody in this country would want, in any way, to limit the activities of bellringers. I fear that the Government’s honest attempt to deal with genuine antisocial behaviour has been misconstrued, either inadvertently or otherwise, but we are where we are. We have accepted the form of words—“harassment, alarm or distress”—which was wanted by their lordships.
The next set of amendments in this group relate to under-18s. Lords amendments 3, 4 and 12 enable an applicant for an injunction to apply to the youth court for permission to have cases involving respondents, who are both over and under 18 years of age, to be heard together in the youth court if it is in the interests of justice to do so. If the youth court does not grant the application, the hearings will be separated, with the adults in the county court and the under-18s in the youth court. By linking these hearings, we will help to put victims first.
Lords amendment 10 brings us to the prohibitions that can be included in an injunction where the respondent is under 18. As originally drafted, clause 12 meant that the injunction could be used to exclude a respondent of any age from his or her home in cases of violence or risk to others. However, in the Lords, concerns were expressed, by my Liberal Democrat colleague Baroness Hamwee, on whether it would ever be appropriate to exclude under-18s from their own home on the grounds of antisocial behaviour. Lords amendment 10 limits the exclusion provisions to injunctions where the respondent is over 18. Where it is in the best interests of the child to be removed from the family home, there are sufficient powers in other safeguarding legislation to ensure that that is possible without the need to resort to an injunction.
Other amendments and provisions in this group relate to tenancy injunctions, the criminal behaviour order, dispersal powers, the public spaces protection order, the recovery of possession of dwelling houses and the issuing of statutory guidance. I will be very happy to pick up on any questions that Members have on any of those particular matters.
Helen Jones (Warrington North) (Lab)
I am grateful to the Minister for outlining how the Government do not intend to oppose the Lords amendments, although it is interesting that he bows to the wisdom of the Lords on this issue, but not on miscarriages of justice. The Lords amendments, particularly on the threshold for injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance, improve the Bill, taking the threshold from “nuisance and annoyance” to “harassment, alarm or distress”, but overall we feel that the Bill still weakens the powers against antisocial behaviour, which is of growing concern to people. It is a badly worded Bill thrown together on the usual principle of, “We must do something. This is something. Therefore, we must do it”, which the Government seem to operate under. Large parts of the Bill will not offer people the protection they need.
Richard Fuller
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Richard Drax), because I am always better informed after listening to his speeches. I wish to speak to Lords amendment 69, which deals with changes to the penalties relating to attacks by dogs, and I, too, hope that the Minister will respond directly to the points that my hon. Friend and I are raising today.
This amendment originated in the Bill Committee in this House. I, too, thank my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips) and my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Tracey Crouch) for supporting the pressure that was put on the Government in Committee to increase the maximum sentence permissible for these offences. We were all appalled by the evidence that the police gave in our evidence sessions, so I am very pleased that Lord de Mauley took forward the Committee’s recommendations, produced this amendment, and obtained the Government’s support and, I hope, that of the whole House.
There have been a number of victims of dangerous dogs. The hon. Member for Bolton West (Julie Hilling) has made a powerful case on behalf of her constituents who were affected by a dangerous dog, and other hon. Members have done the same on behalf of victims of upsetting cases that resulted in only a minimum sentence. The police told us how difficult it was for them to prosecute under the existing legislation, and Lords amendment 69 gives them the tools they need to deal with the small minority of people that my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset was talking about who breed or keep dogs that go out of control, attacking and maiming people. The police will now have the measures to provide the proper prosecution and sentencing through the courts for those people.
The amendment is also an indication of the good work of the trade unions. The Communication Workers Union has run an excellent campaign in support of its members who face the daily risk of attack by a dog. Such attacks can end in injury and be quite severe: they may have a negative psychological effect on postal workers. It is fair to put on the record my support for the CWU and its campaign to bring this legislation to the House.
Although this took place before my time here, I understand that legislating on dangerous dogs is treacherous territory for Governments of whatever party or origin. I hope that this amendment will prove to be an exception to that rule, and I commend the Minister for bringing it to the House today.
Norman Baker
With the leave of the House, Mr Deputy Speaker, I will respond to some of the points that have been raised in a very wide-ranging debate. As you will appreciate, we are considering a huge range of disparate measures, so I will do my best to make sense of them. I welcome the Opposition spokesperson’s general support, even if, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) says, we are not clear whether they are accusing us of being too draconian or too weak in our response to antisocial behaviour. As they are accusing us of both, perhaps we have got it about right.
I know that the Opposition are wedded to the ASBO, but the simple fact is that, although it may have been useful on occasions, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) has said—I am not saying it has not—it has generally been a failure. In 2012, the 1,329 ASBOs issued represented a decrease of 68% since 2005. Up to the end of 2012, 58% of ASBOs were breached at least once and 43% were breached more than once. Where ASBOs were breached, they were breached five times on average, and the breach rate for under-18s was 69%. Defending a continuation of that arrangement is not a sensible approach for anyone in this House who is as sensible and concerned as everybody should be, and is, about tackling antisocial behaviour.
The hon. Member for Warrington North (Helen Jones) also referred to the use of hotels and other such premises for child sexual exploitation and, in particular, for grooming. She wanted to know how the law stood on that matter. If she looks at Lords amendment 77, she will see that subsection 1(b) of the new clause we propose refers to
“conduct that is preparatory to, or otherwise connected with, child sexual exploitation.”
I believe that provision is sufficiently wide as to provide reasonable grounds for the police to take action.
Helen Jones
That was precisely my concern; I fear that it is difficult to prove a grooming offence, because of the nature of the offence. I asked the Minister this earlier, but will he keep this under review and, if necessary, come back to the House with further proposals?
Norman Baker
I am happy to keep anything like that under review. Everyone in this House shares a dislike of and distaste for the reprehensible child exploitation activities that some people engage in. Of course there are other evidential trails that the police can use. Grooming often takes place online, and so sometimes evidence can be accrued and then added to the use of a hotel, which then gives the police reasonable grounds for taking action. Of course we will keep matters under review, because we want to ensure that we eliminate all such cases as far as it is possible to do so. We share that objective across the House.
Richard Drax
I am most grateful to the Minister for answering my question. If the Crown Prosecution Service decides not to take any action, would someone still be in a position to decide, in the case that I cited, to put down that West Highland terrier because a view had been taken that it was indeed dangerous? What would the situation be there? If the case does not go to court, who has the power to decide on the future of that dog, which has caused an offence on private property?
Norman Baker
On the face of it, if no offence has been committed or pursued, there is no case to answer. However, I imagine that responsible owners would want to take into account the activity that has taken place or the attack on the individual that has occurred. Of course it is always open to people to take civil action if they believe that that is the appropriate course of action. If I find out any further details, I will drop my hon. Friend a line on that particular matter.
The hon. Member for Warrington North referred to the issue of firearms ownership and guidance, particularly in relation to domestic violence. I assure her that we take both issues extremely seriously. Indeed I am spending a great deal of time on those two issues in my ministerial role. I want to make it plain that the law sets out that the police must consider whether a firearms or shotgun applicant can possess a gun without danger to public safety or the peace. The detailed criteria are set out in the firearms guidance, which can be amended when we believe it to be necessary. On 31 July last year, we took action to strengthen the guidance for the police on domestic violence specifically, and published new, more detailed guidance. For the avoidance of doubt, if there is an expectation or an understanding that someone has been involved in domestic violence, I would expect in most if not all circumstances the police to refuse to issue a licence to that particular individual.
Helen Jones
I am grateful to the Minister, who is being generous in giving way. If the Government accept that that should happen, can he explain why they are so opposed to having it written into law?
Norman Baker
The Opposition, as we saw during their time in government, appear to believe that the only solution to anything is to create a law about it. If laws and statutory guidance already exist and it is common practice for certain processes to be followed, it might not be necessary to create a law to achieve the aim that she wants. The question that she should be asking me is whether we have put in place a mechanism to achieve the aim that she rightly identifies, and the answer to that is yes. We do not need to create further legislation to deal with something that has already been dealt with satisfactorily under present arrangements.
Mr David Hamilton (Midlothian) (Lab)
Will we have continuity? What discussions has the Minister had with the devolved Parliaments to ensure that we have a similar approach across the country?
Norman Baker
We and my officials have regular discussions with the devolved Administrations on this and other areas, and irrespective of political control the relationships between central Government here in London and the Administrations in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are sensible and good. If the hon. Gentleman has any particular concerns and believes that there is a scenario in which the approach has not worked and is willing to drop me a line, I would happily look into it for him and take it further.
My hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) referred to schedule 7, which, unless I have got this wrong, appears in the next string of amendments, but as he raised the matter I will deal with it now. He quite properly asked about our response to the changes to the schedule recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. In coming to a final view on that and other matters relating to the schedule, we want to take into account the judgment of the judicial review into the David Miranda case and the report of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation into Mr Miranda's examination. Once they are available, we will naturally study them carefully and decide how best to proceed. Should we conclude that further amendments to schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 are appropriate, we will seek to bring them forward as soon as parliamentary time allows.
My hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) rightly drew attention to the peculiar powers—peculiar in the sense that they are unique—of the City of London. For example, it is the only authority to be designated a secondary authority for the control of dogs. Let me be clear on this point: we are, of course, deleting the reference to private Acts. Much of the land operated by the City of London corporation, as he mentioned, is done so under a private Act. As worded, the measure would have resulted in that land not being designated as a public space for the purposes of chapter 2 of part 4. That would have the perverse result of restricting the corporation’s ability to manage land that it is entitled to manage under a private Act, and that is why we have taken the steps that we have in that regard.
I hope that that deals satisfactorily with the amendments and points raised by hon. Members.
Lords amendment 1 agreed to.
Lords amendments 2 to 88 agreed to.
Lords amendment 89 agreed to, with Commons financial privileges waived.
Lords amendments 90 to 111 agreed to.
After Clause 152
Abolition of defence of marital coercion
Norman Baker
I beg to move, That this House agrees with Lords amendment 113.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendments 114 to 180.
Norman Baker
I will not repeat the numbers, in case I get that wrong, but these are the main amendments to the policing provisions in the Bill. The first relates to schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, which we have already touched on and which is a part of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy. Lords amendments were made in line with our ongoing commitment to ensure respect for individual freedoms and the need to balance that against reducing the threat of terrorism to the public in the UK and to British interests overseas. Other amendments clarify how the right to consult a solicitor as soon as is reasonably practicable and privately at any time may be exercised under schedule 7.
The amendments make it clear that a detained person who exercises the right to consult a solicitor may not be questioned until they have consulted a solicitor or no longer wish to do so unless the examining officer reasonably believes that postponing the questioning would prejudice the determination of whether the detained person appears to be a person who is or has been concerned with the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. I would expect that exception to be used very sparingly.
The amendments also clarify that a detained person is entitled to consult a solicitor in person, where it is practicable to do so, without prejudice to the purpose of the examination. Other amendments respond to a commitment given in Committee in the Lords to consider building on one of the key changes we are already making in the Bill: namely, the introduction of statutory provision for the review of detention under schedule 7 to the 2000 Act. On reflection, we agree that the maximum periods between reviews should be specified in primary legislation, rather than in a code of practice. The amendments provide for a first review of detention by a review officer no later than one hour after the start of detention, and for subsequent reviews at intervals of no more than two hours.
I ought also to refer to marital coercion. I will deal briefly with a final substantive amendment, Lords amendment 113, tabled by Lord Pannick, which would abolish the defence of marital coercion. It is currently a defence for all criminal offences, other than treason and murder, for a wife to show that she committed the offence in the presence of, and under the coercion of, her husband. The defence is an historical one and reflects the particular dynamics of marriage at the time when it was introduced, which was by section 47 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925, which in turn abolished the previously existing presumption that a wife who committed any offence, except treason or murder, in the presence of her husband did so under his coercion and should therefore be acquitted. For those historical reasons, the defence applies only for the benefit of a woman married to a man. I am happy to say that time has moved on, as indeed will I in a moment. That one-sided defence is now clearly an anachronism, and we accordingly agree that it can be consigned to history. Lords amendment 113 achieves just that.
These amendments, and the one in the previous string, reaffirm the value of effective scrutiny and demonstrate, yet again, that the Government is receptive to sensible proposals from hon. Members on both sides of the House and from noble Lords to help address the many issues of public policy we face on a daily basis.
Lords amendment 113 agreed to.
Lords amendments 114 to 180 agreed to.
Business of the House
Ordered,
That, at the sitting on Wednesday 5 February, paragraph (2) of Standing Order No. 31 (Questions on amendments) shall apply to the Motions in the name of Edward Miliband as if the day were an Opposition Day.—(Claire Perry.)