(4 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am sure that all noble Lords will be pleased to see the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, in her place today. I enjoyed working with her on the passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act in the last Parliament, when I was new in my role and she knew a great deal more about the Act than I did. Now I am new in my role again, and I am quite sure she still knows a great deal more about this Bill than I do; I am sure that I will enjoy working with her just as much. I am also pleased to see and work again with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, who probably knows more about this subject than the rest of us put together.
The Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill will enhance the UK’s resolution regime, providing the Bank of England with a more flexible toolkit to respond to the failure of banks. It ensures that, where failing banking institutions require intervention, in particular smaller banks, certain costs of managing their failure do not fall on taxpayers. It strengthens protections for public funds and promotes financial stability, while supporting economic growth and competitiveness by avoiding new upfront costs on the banking sector.
The resolution regime was introduced in the wake of the global financial crisis and implemented in the UK through the Banking Act 2009. It provides a number of additional tools to the Bank of England to manage the failure of financial institutions safely, helping to limit risks to financial stability, public funds and the economy. The regime was introduced in recognition of a global consensus that reforms were needed to end “too big to fail” and ensure financial institutions could wind up their operations in an orderly way. This regime has been developed and added to steadily over the past decade by a succession of Governments, giving the UK a robust regime and supporting its role as a leader in financial regulation, while also reflecting relevant international standards.
The regime was last used to resolve Silicon Valley Bank UK, the UK subsidiary of the US firm that collapsed in March 2023. The Bank of England used its powers under the Banking Act to facilitate the sale of Silicon Valley Bank UK to HSBC, delivering good outcomes for financial stability, customers and taxpayers. All the bank’s customers were able to continue accessing their bank accounts and other facilities, and all deposits remained safe, secure and accessible. In doing so, the Bank of England ensured the continuity of banking services and maintained public confidence in the stability of the UK financial system.
While the case of Silicon Valley Bank UK demonstrated the effectiveness and robustness of the resolution regime, the Bank of England, the Treasury and international counterparts have carefully considered the implications of this wider period of banking sector volatility. This builds on the proposals set out in consultation by the previous Government, following the work they did with the Bank of England after the Silicon Valley Bank case. This Government believe there is a case for a targeted enhancement to give the Bank of England greater flexibility to manage the failure of small banks effectively. I hope that, given the origin of these proposals, they will be welcomed by noble Lords from across the Chamber.
It is worth noting that small banks that fail are typically expected to be placed into insolvency under the bank insolvency procedure and are currently not expected to meet the conditions that must be satisfied for the Bank of England’s resolution powers to be used. These conditions include whether exercise of the powers is necessary to meet certain objectives of resolving a bank and is in the public interest.
Under the bank insolvency procedure, upon entering insolvency, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme compensates eligible depositors for account balances up to £85,000 per depositor within seven days, with higher limits for temporary high balances. This compensation is funded initially through a levy on industry and then, where possible, recovered from the estate of the failed firm.
Following the case of Silicon Valley Bank UK, the Government’s view is that in some cases of small bank failure, the public interest and resolution objectives may be better served by the use of resolution powers than insolvency. If, in future, a failing small bank were to require resolution, it may require additional capital. This may be needed for a range of reasons: for example, to meet minimum capital requirements for authorisation or to sustain market confidence. At present, these costs may initially have to be borne by taxpayers, as the Treasury would be the only available source of funds to meet these expenses. That is an undesirable status quo.
A key aim of the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill, therefore, is to strengthen the protections for public funds where a small bank is placed into resolution instead of insolvency. Overall, this is a necessary and, I hope, uncontroversial set of reforms in order to ensure the regime effectively continues to limit risks to financial stability and to taxpayers.
It is important to note that the bank insolvency procedure will still have an important role in managing the failure of small banks. Relatedly, the Government do not intend to make widespread changes to a resolution regime that is already working well. Instead, this Bill reflects the view that there is merit in a targeted set of changes which ensure that, if needed, certain existing resolution tools can be applied to small banks in a way that achieves good outcomes for financial stability while also protecting taxpayers.
The Bill achieves this by introducing a new mechanism. This mechanism allows the Bank of England to use funds provided by the banking sector to cover certain costs associated with resolving a failing banking institution and achieving its sale, in whole or in part. The Bill does three things to create the new mechanism. First, it expands the statutory functions of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, which will be required to provide funds to the Bank of England upon request, to be used where necessary to support the resolution of a failing bank.
Secondly, the Bill allows the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to recover the funds provided by charging levies on the banking sector. This is similar to the current arrangements for funding depositor payouts in insolvency, with the exception of the treatment of credit unions. In response to feedback from industry, the Government have decided to carve out credit unions from levy contributions in recognition of the fact that they cannot be put into resolution, and so the new mechanism cannot be used on them. It is important to note that this means the banking sector is levied only after the event of failure, not before, thereby avoiding new upfront costs on the sector.
Thirdly, the Bill gives the Bank of England an express ability to require a bank in resolution to issue new shares, facilitating the use of industry funds to meet a failing bank’s recapitalisation costs. Taken together, these measures give the Bank of England a more flexible toolkit to respond to small bank failures in a way that promotes financial and economic stability. Critically, they strengthen protections for taxpayers’ money, while avoiding new upfront costs on the banking sector.
The Bill consists of five clauses and is narrow in scope. I will now set out how each of them operates and the effect they produce. The first clause inserts into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 a new section which introduces the new mechanism. It allows the Bank of England to require the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to provide the Bank of England with funds when using its resolution powers to transfer a failing firm to a private sector purchaser or bridge bank. It sets out what these funds can be used for: namely, to cover the costs of recapitalising the firm and the expenses of the Bank of England and others in taking the resolution action. It also allows the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to recover the funds provided through levies.
The second clause sets out that the Bank of England must reimburse the Financial Services Compensation Scheme for any funds it provides that were not needed. The third clause primarily ensures that existing provisions relating to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme apply to the new mechanism in the same way. The most substantive change specifies that the Financial Services Compensation Scheme cannot levy credit unions to recoup funds provided under this mechanism. The most substantive change in the fourth clause gives the Bank of England the power to require a failing firm to issue new shares. This will make it easier for the Bank of England to use the funds provided by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to recapitalise the firm by using the funds to buy the new shares. The fourth clause also makes several consequential changes to reflect the introduction of the new mechanism. The fifth and final clause sets out procedural matters, including that the Treasury may make regulations to commence the provisions in the Bill.
The key proposals in this Bill have been subject to consultation with industry, and the Government appreciate the feedback they have received and have reflected on it carefully. The Government note the concerns about the appropriateness of credit unions being liable to pay levies under the mechanism. The Government have taken this feedback on board, and the Bill therefore carves credit unions out of the scope of levies where the new mechanism is used. The Government also acknowledge the questions raised by industry about whether additional safeguards should be included to ensure the Bank of England calls on the Financial Services Compensation Scheme only where this is less costly than putting a bank into insolvency instead. The Government have reflected on this feedback carefully and consider that the safeguards in the existing resolution regime remain appropriate.
However, the Government do intend to update the special resolution regime code of practice in due course, in order to set out how we will ensure clarity on how the Bank of England will consider relative costs to industry in different scenarios. As part of this, the Government intend to set out in the code of practice their expectations around what the Bank of England would need to report on publicly following the exercise of its new powers. Finally, the Government stress that the banking sector as a whole stands to benefit from use of the mechanism set out in the Bill, in particular in its ability to reduce the potential risk of contagion arising from small bank failures where resolution is in the public interest.
I recognise that noble Lords have in the past raised concerns about the exemptions applied when SVB UK was transferred to HSBC and, although these are not within scope of the Bill, may wish to raise such concerns today. It is important to note that the resolution of SVB UK presented an exceptional set of circumstances which required an exceptional response, recognised by noble Lords across the House at the time. The House also supported the conditions that were applied to the exemption, in particular to limit the type of business that SVB UK—now HSBC Innovation Banking—is able to carry out. I am assured that the regulator is in a position to ensure these conditions are met.
I would also like to reassure noble Lords that there is no expectation that ring-fencing provisions would be disapplied in the event of resolution in future; as with many aspects of resolution, they would need to be considered on a case-by-case basis, based on the balance of risks and the public interest at the time. The Government would, though, caution against steps that would create significant new procedural barriers to the use of the transfer tools, given unpredictable situations and the need to act quickly and decisively.
Stability is at the heart of the Government’s agenda for economic growth, because when we do not have economic and financial stability, it is working people who pay the price. The resolution regime is a critical source of stability when banks fail, by ensuring that public funds and taxpayer money are protected. This Bill delivers a proportionate and targeted enhancement to the resolution regime to ensure it best continues to provide that important stability. I look forward to hearing your Lordships’ views on it during this debate. I beg to move.
I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. As noted in my opening speech, this is intended to be a targeted and proportionate enhancement to the resolution regime. It will provide the Bank of England with additional flexibility to manage bank failures in a way that strengthens protections for financial stability and taxpayers. Therefore, it supports the Government’s ambitions to promote economic stability and growth.
Without the Bill, a gap would remain in the resolution framework, meaning there would be a potentially significant risk to public funds in the event of a small bank requiring intervention. In certain circumstances, there could also be a greater risk of contagion from the failure of one small bank spreading to others. The bank insolvency procedure and other forms of modified insolvency remain an important part of the toolkit for dealing with the failure of small banks.
A key principle underlying the Prudential Regulation Authority’s approach to banking supervision is that it does not operate a zero-failure regime. Rather, it works with the Bank of England, as the UK’s resolution authority, to ensure that any firms that fail do so in an orderly manner. Any resolution action, including action involving the new mechanism, would continue to be subject to all four resolution conditions being met. The Bank of England must also have regard to a number of resolution objectives to ensure that the action taken is in the public interest. Not every small bank failure would meet those conditions to justify taking resolution action. However, in the event that a small bank failure does meet these conditions, it is right that the Bank of England has the appropriate flexibility to manage the failure effectively.
To address the key point made by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, since the global financial crisis there have been international efforts to address the risks that crystallised during the crisis and to reform and strengthen financial supervision and regulation, making the financial system stronger and more stable. Financial stability is a priority for this Government, at the heart of our vision to support economic stability and growth. The Bill supports that priority by ensuring that there continues to be a robust regime for managing the failures of banks in a way that limits risks to financial stability and taxpayers.
The noble Lord also asked about the funding for the FSCS. The Financial Services Compensation Scheme is funded by levies on the financial services industry, as he knows. For deposit-taking firms, if a bank or a building society were to enter insolvency, the FSCS would have to pay out compensation and then raise its levy on the banking sector to recover the funds. To cover the gap between paying out compensation and recovering the funds through the levy, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme would use its overdraft as well as its commercial credit facility. Combined, these can provide up to £1.5 billion.
The noble Lord asked about the speed of providing the money. The Financial Services Compensation Scheme will provide the money as soon as it is able. Given that resolutions generally happen very quickly, in a matter of days, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme may be required to provide the money very quickly.
The noble Lord asked about the vehicle for the funds. Under the Bill, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme would provide the funds at the Bank of England’s request and recoup them from the banking sector. The Financial Services Compensation Scheme is well placed to perform both functions, as it already has the infra- structure and expertise to source funds at short notice, handle large sums of money appropriately and levy the banking sector.
The noble Lord also asked about the bank levy. The Government believe that their proposal to fund costs through the Financial Services Compensation Scheme is a targeted and proportionate approach, ensuring that the banking sector pays only when it needs to. Meanwhile, the bank levy continues to ensure that banks make a fair and sustainable tax contribution that reflects their importance to the financial system and wider economy. However, the Government believe that the mechanism provided for under the Bill should be funded by the wider banking sector. The bank levy would therefore not be an appropriate funding mechanism and is not paid by small banks, for which the new mechanism is primarily intended.
The noble Lord asked too about the regime being insufficiently robust and not yet tested. The resolution regime is designed to ensure that the Bank of England has the full suite of powers needed. The Bank of England and the Treasury regularly contingency plan to test the regime.
Coming to the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I am very grateful to her for her support for the Bill. She asked about WealthTek and MREL in substance and raised concerns about the recent failure of WealthTek and the implications of that failure for consumers. It will not be possible for me to comment in detail on the case of an individual firm failure. However, I will respond to her on her general concern that costs due to an administrator can be deducted from compensation that is due to consumers when their firm fails. In the case of depositors of banks, I reassure the noble Baroness that PRA rules are clear that no insolvency or administration costs can be deducted from payouts due to covered depositors when their bank enters insolvency.
The investment bank special administration regime is a bespoke insolvency regime for investment firms that hold client assets. It is designed to offer better outcomes for customers by ensuring that the special administrators prioritise the return of client assets.
The noble Baroness also asked about requesting money more than once in a single resolution. The Bank of England is not limited in the number of times it can request money from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. This provides appropriate flexibility in case further unanticipated costs arise following the initial intervention, for example in relation to subsequent litigation or compensation. This in turn reduces the risk to public funds.
On the question of small banks holding MREL, the Bank of England is ultimately responsible for MREL policy. The Government note that setting MREL for small banks would be very expensive for this cohort of firms.
The noble Baroness also asked about raising new taxes on the banking sector. The Bill avoids imposing any new upfront costs on the banking sector. Crucially, all costs are contingent and would crystallise only in the event of a firm failure. The counterfactual to using resolution powers alongside industry funds would be insolvency, in which scenario the banking sector would in any case be liable to pay levies to fund depositor compensation.
I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Macpherson for his very kind words. The noble Lord asked about the banking insolvency procedure, as did the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. A key principle underlying the Prudential Regulation Authority’s approach to banking supervision is that it does not operate a zero-failure regime. Rather, it works with the Bank of England as the UK’s resolution authority to ensure that any firms that fail do so in an orderly manner. It is important to note that any resolution action, including action involving the new mechanism, will continue to be subject to all four resolution conditions, including the public interest test being met, just as it is now. Not every small bank failure would meet those conditions to justify taking resolution action.
My noble friend Lord Macpherson also asked about the Treasury’s ongoing role in authorising the new mechanism. As now, the Treasury will be consulted on any use of resolution powers. However, its consent is required only if the use of those powers would have implications for public funds.
My noble friend also asked about the Bank of England not being incentivised to keep costs down. It is right that Bank of England expenses can be recovered by levies. The alternative, of course, would be to use public funds.
My noble friend Lord Eatwell and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, also asked about the scope of the Bill not being limited to small banks. The expectation is that the mechanism would generally be used to support the resolution of small banks. However, the Government consider it appropriate for the mechanism, in principle, to be applicable to any banking institution within scope of the resolution regime. This would give the Bank of England, in consultation with the relevant authorities, the flexibility to respond as circumstances required.
My noble friend also suggested that the regime does not protect against systemic risk and is dependent on a buyer to work. It is worth noting that the resolution regime includes an expansive set of powers designed to equip the Bank of England with the tools to manage systemic risks and to limit contagion across the financial system. As well as the powers to transfer a failing firm to a buyer, this toolkit also includes the bail-in power. As part of this power, the largest and most systemic banks are required to hold additional equity and debt to absorb losses and self-insure against their own failure.
In the event that these banks fail, the Bank of England can use these additional resources to recapitalise the firm, including by converting the additional debt into equity and turning those creditors into shareholders. This would allow the failed bank to continue as a going concern without necessarily relying on a buyer, thereby stabilising it sufficiently to give it time to restructure and address the issues that led to its failure.
Equally, the Bill will ensure the Bank of England’s toolkit to manage systemic risk is robust by ensuring that the Bank of England is able to mitigate risks of contagion that may arise from the failure of a smaller bank, including in situations where a buyer is not forthcoming.
My noble friend also queried the point of comparison in the cost-benefit analysis published by the Government on 19 July. One principle of the resolution regime, as it has operated to date, is a presumption that shareholders and creditors will be required to meet the costs of bank failure. This is why the largest and most systemic banks are now required to hold additional equity in debt: to absorb losses and self-insure against their own failure. For banks that are not required to hold additional equity and debt, the Bank of England’s preferred strategy for managing their failure is insolvency. The Bill would make an alternative source of funds available, such that resolution powers may be considered for small banks that would otherwise be expected to be placed into insolvency. I will look further into the points that he raises, but the Government therefore maintain that insolvency is the correct counterfactual and the right point of comparison with the new mechanism, and they stand behind the analysis that they have published.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, asked about costs of the industry being taken into account. There are a number of important safeguards in the regime. The Bank of England must consult with the PRA when considering resolution action. The PRA, in turn, sets a cap on what is considered affordable for the sector to be levied per year. The PRA will continue to have this role under the new mechanism. In addition, the Government intend to update the special resolution regime code of practice to provide greater clarity about how the Bank of England will take account of the costs to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme when considering whether to use the new mechanism in its assessment of the resolution, conditions and objectives.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, asked about the deal for buyers coming on the back of industry. The Bank of England will be responsible for determining whether resolution is in the public interest, including transfer to another firm. The new mechanism introduced by the Bill ensures that where there is no willing buyer, absent recapitalisation the taxpayer is not responsible for meeting the costs of recapitalisation. As now, the expectation is that usually any sale will be achieved by an auction process.
The noble Lord also asked about subsidiaries. It is possible that the parent company may be able to recapitalise its subsidiary outside of resolution, but there may be circumstances in which this is not possible, as was the case with SVB UK. It is important that the Bank of England has the necessary tools to deal with a failing firm, regardless of its home jurisdiction.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, also asked about levy affordability. In line with its safety and soundness objective, the PRA carefully considers the affordability of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme levy for firms. The Government are therefore confident that any levies imposed as a result of this mechanism will be set at a level that is affordable for firms.
On the noble Lord’s point about letting shareholders and creditors of the failed bank off the hook vis-à-vis other, larger banks that have to meet these rules in resolution, Sections 6A and 6B of the Banking Act 2009 require the Bank of England to ensure that shareholders and creditors bear losses when a banking institution fails. This is an important principle that will continue to apply when the new mechanism is used. This involves cancelling, diluting or transferring common shares so that shareholders are the first to bear losses.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, also asked about the flowback to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Any money requested by the Bank of England but not expended would be returned to the FSCS. Any money that the Bank of England recovers through the sale of the firm in resolution, or through its winding up, would also be returned to the FSCS up to the amount of the original payment.
Finally, the noble Lord asked whether taxpayers should pay. It is not right to presume that government should pay for resolution. The Bill rightly follows the approach taken in insolvency: the costs fall to industry. I hope I have covered all his points. If not, I shall write to him.
The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, asked about letting firms fail to impose market discipline. The failure of Silicon Valley Bank UK showed there may be some cases where it is in the public interest for the Bank of England to intervene in a small bank failure if doing so mitigates the risk of systemic impacts. However, insolvency remains an important part of the toolkit. It is important to know that any use of the transfer tools in their resolution regime would entail the writedown of regulatory capital. This would impose losses on shareholders and creditors of the firm and is an important means of maintaining market discipline.
The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, also asked about interaction with the corporation tax cap. This Government have been clear about their mission to boost growth; it is vital that the tax system support this. The Chancellor’s commitment on tax was set out in the manifesto. We keep all tax under review, and the Chancellor makes tax policy announcements only at fiscal events in the context of the public finances.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for her support for the Bill. She raised a number of questions about the ring-fencing exemptions. She specifically raised points about the circumstances surrounding the failure of SVB UK and the decision to provide HSBC with an exemption to the ring-fencing rules. As I alluded to in my opening remarks, this exemption was deemed crucial to ensuring that the sale of SVB UK could proceed. The success of the transaction was necessary to protect SVB UK depositors and the taxpayers, but it did not set a precedent. As I stated earlier, the resolution of SVB UK presented an exceptional set of circumstances that required an exceptional response, recognised by noble Lords across this House at the time.
I recognise the noble Baroness’s important point about ensuring that any resolution action is subject to appropriate scrutiny. That is why the Government have committed in their consultation response to updating their code of practice regarding reports. The Bank of England is already required to submit to the Chancellor to lay before Parliament in the event that this new mechanism is used. We will develop those amendments to the code of practice in due course and consult with the Treasury’s banking liaison panel, which advises on the resolution regime on the precise scope of its content. The noble Baroness invited me to write to her, so if I have not covered all her questions here, I absolutely will in a letter.
The noble Baroness also asked whether the Government are committed to the bail-in procedure. Bail-in is a crucial part of the toolkit for resolving the largest, most systemic banks. There is international consensus behind this.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Penn, asked about the impact on medium-sized MREL banks and what consideration the Government have given to the impact on medium-sized banks, which are required to meet their own requirements to hold equity and for debt to be bailed in, known otherwise as MREL, as well as to contribute to the costs of this new mechanism.
The Government recognise the important contribution made by challenger banks and note concerns raised during consultation about the broader policy surrounding MREL. MREL policy is set by the Bank of England, as set out in the Government’s consultation response. The Bank of England will reflect on the feedback raised during consultation and consider whether changes are warranted to its approach to setting MREL policy.
Notwithstanding that, I emphasise the Government’s belief that the funding approach set out in the Bill is targeted and proportionate, ensuring that the banking sector pays only when it needs to, avoiding a new set of upfront costs. The Government have concluded that the entire banking sector, including medium-sized banks, stands to benefit from the new mechanism through the protection of financial stability and the reduced risk of contagion. It will also contribute to ensuring that the UK retains a robust and world-leading resolution regime.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked about the new mechanism applying only to small banks without MREL. I think I covered that in my previous answer.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, for her support for the Bill. As she says, its origins were cross-party, and I am grateful for her continued support. She raised the issue of using resolution procedure versus insolvency, which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, also asked about. Both noble Baronesses asked about the extent to which resolution will be used instead of insolvency, and for an example of where insolvency will be preferred over the new mechanism. I should reiterate that the bank insolvency procedure will remain a vital part of the toolkit and a preferred strategy in the event of many firm failures, and I stress that the Bill is not designed to replace the bank insolvency procedure; it is designed instead to expand the Bank of England’s options when faced with a small bank failure.
Whether to put a failing firm into a resolution is ultimately a decision for the Bank of England in its capacity as resolution authority. It will decide this based on an assessment of the resolution conditions, and in particular on the basis of whether it is in the public interest at the time. It will make this judgment in advancement of the statutory resolution objectives, including to protect financial stability and public funds. Therefore, if the Bank of England judges that the resolution conditions and public interest test for resolution would not be met for a specific bank, it would seek to place that bank into insolvency. That might be for a range of reasons but could include, as an example, a judgment by the Bank of England that the bank’s failure would not have systemic implications for the financial system or create significant disruption for customers.
The noble Baroness, Lady Penn, also asked about the accountability and for an update to the code of practice, and she asked to see the proposed updates to the special resolution regime code of practice alongside this legislation. I am happy to share a draft of the proposed updates with your Lordships at the earliest opportunity, and I can write to the noble Baroness once they are available. I note that the final wording of any proposed updates would be subject to review by a cross-section of representatives from the authorities and industry on the statutory Banking Liaison Panel, which advises the Treasury on the resolution regime, and of course on the final content of the Bill.
The Government’s consultation response noted that the Government anticipate that any reports required under the Banking Act to ensure ex-post scrutiny of the Bank of England’s actions when using the new mechanism would be made public and laid before Parliament as required. I am happy to state that the strong expectation is that such reports required under the Banking Act would be made public and laid before Parliament, and in many cases this is already required by statute.
The noble Baroness asked me to elaborate on where the Banking Act requires such reports to be laid before Parliament and where it does not. Section 80 of the Banking Act requires the Bank of England to report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the activities of a bridge bank as soon as reasonably practicable after each year of its existence, and for any such reports to be laid before Parliament. That reflects the fact that use of the bridge bank tool can have a wide range of implications that will likely be of interest and of concern to Parliament, notably the risks that using the tool could carry to public funds.
Section 80A imposes the same requirement to report to Parliament when the Bank of England exercises the bail-in tool. Section 79A of the Banking Act imposes a similar requirement on the Bank of England in relation to the use of the private sector purchaser tool, although there is no requirement for a report under this section to be laid before Parliament.
As I said in my earlier remarks, I can reassure your Lordships that in any event where the new mechanism was used the Treasury would intend to ensure that any such reports were made available to Parliament and the public unless there were clear public interest grounds for not doing so, such as issues of commercial confidentiality.
Since the global financial crisis, resolution policy has been developed as a key means of managing the risks that arise when banks fail. Although that regime has worked well in practice, it is important to learn the lessons from last year’s period of banking sector volatility. This targeted set of enhancements is a key part of the policy response and provides the Bank of England with a more flexible toolkit to respond to the failure of small banks. The Bill recognises that there should be protections for public funds and taxpayers’ money when a banking institution fails. It is a narrow and uncontroversial Bill and has been drafted with the aim of achieving its primary objectives while minimising financial and regulatory burdens on the sector.
The Government have listened to feedback from industry and designed their policy accordingly, ensuring that there is a carve-out for credit unions from the requirement to contribute towards levies for these purposes. The Bill is an important component in ensuring the economic and financial stability that will deliver economic growth.
Bank failures are highly unpredictable and can come about at short notice without warning, so it is right that the Government introduce this Bill now to enhance the resolution toolkit and protect public funds. I hope that your Lordships will recognise the merits of this Bill and are able to support it.
Before the noble Lord sits down, unless I missed it, I did not hear him give an answer to my question about whether the Bank of England will be able to recoup legal costs from the funds charged to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme or merely the reimbursement of the recapitalisation costs that would of course go into the bank. If he is not able to answer today, he may wish to write.
I did endeavour to answer quite a lot of the noble Lord’s questions. On that one, I will write to him.