Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debate13:58 - The House having divided: - Ayes: 288 / Noes: 239 - Question accordingly agreed to.
14:15 - The House having divided: - Ayes: 243 / Noes: 279 - Question accordingly negatived.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point of order. We will cross that bridge when we come to it. We are currently asking Members to keep their contributions to 15 minutes and that, of course, will be reassessed very shortly—I can give him assurances about that.
Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)
Madam Deputy Speaker, since I have been in the Chamber, I have received the truly awful news that three people died last night in a fire in Bicester, including two members of the Oxfordshire Fire and Rescue Service. The hon. Member for Bicester and Woodstock (Calum Miller) has had to leave the Chamber to liaise with those on the ground and we both want to take this opportunity, if we may, to convey our deep sorrow for and solidarity with the families of those who have died, and our fervent and heartfelt best wishes to the two firefighters who remain in a serious condition. We are grateful for their heroism and that of their colleagues when, as ever, they ran towards danger to serve us all. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”]
I rise to speak in favour of new clause 16 and amendment 14, and I am very grateful for the opportunity to speak. When the Bill first came before the House, I was a Minister attending Cabinet and therefore unable to speak on the subject. I genuinely thank my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater) and every single Member who served for so many hours on the Bill Committee for this incredibly important Bill. I also thank the hundreds of my constituents who have contacted me with their views. I genuinely believe that every single one of them was motivated by compassion and a determination to reduce suffering, and in many cases their views were shaped by their experience of death and of suffering in life. I know that that is the case for many of us in the Chamber as well, so I hope that the same spirit of respect that we saw previously will continue throughout the passage of the Bill, whatever our views may be.
New clause 16(1)(a) would exclude from the scope of the Bill those who do not want to be a burden on others or on public services, and paragraph (b) would exclude those experiencing a mental disorder, including depression. On the former, we have discussed this morning whether it is appropriate to mention international analogies. They will, of course, be instrumentalised by those who have different views about this important subject. I have personally found survey evidence from the Oregon example of people expressing that they felt they were a burden to be highly compelling. I do not believe that it indicates that that was the primary reason why they sought assisted dying, but I believe that it is an important piece of evidence that we need to take into account.
I also believe that we need to look at situations where people who are potentially subject to coercion have been evaluated by professionals in our society, and where we might be concerned about the outcomes. I ask for Members’ understanding here.
Tim Farron
On the point that the right hon. Lady has just raised, the Oregon example suggests that in 2023, 47 people who opted for assisted dying gave as one of their primary motivations that they felt they were a burden to others. Is that not a great concern for everybody in the Chamber? Does it not undermine the argument about passing the Bill on the grounds of autonomy? That argument is not accurate, because the provisions affect the autonomy of people who will self-coerce.
Anneliese Dodds
I personally believe that it does. I have heard countless times the phrase, “I do not want to be a burden.” I know Members will come to different conclusions about whether it is sufficiently excluded by the Bill. I believe it needs to be on the face of the Bill, so that we can ensure that it is out of scope.
Sir James Cleverly (Braintree) (Con)
I tabled an amendment to ensure that the self-defined responsibility to go for assisted dying did not become a rationale. What is the right hon. Lady’s view on the impact of intersectionality on this issue? We know that, in practical terms, a number of people do not have full control over their lives. The Mother of the House, the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), made the point that people who are often pushed around by their families and their wider society—particularly women from ethnic minorities—will be at particular risk from the gentle advice or suggestions from authority figures to whom they will be overly deferential, which could lead them into a very dangerous position.
Anneliese Dodds
I agree with the right hon. Gentleman. I believe it is exactly those individuals who would be more likely to be subject to coercion by others, and I am afraid the evidence does indicate that. Sadly, we can see it in the experience of our courts, which have dealt with so-called mercy killings. I appreciate that many Members in this Chamber would not want that example to be used in the context of this discussion—of course, we are talking about something very different from those court cases. None the less, I believe it is instructive that in those cases, highly trained legal professionals have often described the actions, particularly those of former partners, as motivated by compassion, but when the circumstances have been investigated in detail, there has been substantial evidence of coercion and abuse. It is important that we consider that now.
Kim Leadbeater
Is my right hon. Friend reassured by the fact that the Bill creates a criminal offence of coercion and pressure, which does not exist at the moment? No one is checking for coercion when victims of domestic abuse or others take their own lives under desperate circumstances.
Anneliese Dodds
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point. I believe the Bill has been substantially improved through the many amendments that she and others have tabled. I know that these issues were discussed in detail in Committee, but I have to be honest: sadly, the prospect of a prosecution has often not been sufficient to prevent abuse. I note that in the discussions in Committee, a number of medical professionals mentioned that they often have to assess whether coercion has taken place and that they are confident in that assessment, but there is a huge amount of contestation around whether that confidence is rightly placed or otherwise.
Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)
Does my right hon. Friend share my concern that there will only be three hours for a panel, and that the first and second doctors might not actually know the patient or have met them? Their ability to spot coercion will be very limited.
Anneliese Dodds
Yes, I do share my hon. Friend’s concern in that regard. Sadly, we all know how perpetrators of coercion operate. They will often school the subject of their coercion in how to respond to questioning, to try to hide what they are doing from others. That is a concern.
Dr Opher
Does my right hon. Friend not see that, in Committee, we were very aware of coercion? That is one of the reasons why we have a social worker on the panel of experts. Additionally, clause 1(2)(b) says it will be necessary to establish that a person
“has made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person”.
It is very clear in the Bill.
Anneliese Dodds
I very much appreciate my hon. Friend’s efforts, and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, to ensure that these matters were covered in Committee. Sadly, because of the patterns of behaviour that we see time and again with those who have been subject to coercion, I do not believe that the safeguards go far enough. That is my assessment, and I know that other Members will come to a different view.
Anneliese Dodds
I will make some progress, because I know others wish to speak.
I want to speak briefly about subsection (1)(b) of new clause 16, which relates to mental disorder. Colleagues will dispute whether analogies are appropriate, but it is important that the House is aware—this was covered in Committee—that in the Netherlands, which of course has a different regime from the one proposed in the Bill, two cases involving psychiatric suffering were subject to assisted dying in 2010; in 2023, that figure was 138. That is a very substantial increase. I understand that, as was said earlier, it is a completely different set of circumstances in the Dutch case, but I am concerned that there is some confusion about the scope of the mental capacity provisions in the Bill.
Daisy Cooper
I supported the Bill on Second Reading on condition that it would be strengthened to tackle the issue of capacity. Does the right hon. Lady accept that the Bill that we see today is very different from the one that we saw on Second Reading? There is a requirement for capacity. If there is any doubt at all, a doctor is compelled to report that person for additional assessment, and independent advocates have been introduced for people with learning disabilities, autism or mental disorders. Social workers are now included in the panel of experts, specific training on mental capacity is required, and there is a disability advisory board too. Does the right hon. Lady—
Anneliese Dodds
I agree that the Bill has been improved, but there is a difference between mental capacity, at least as assessed by medical professionals, and the presence of mental disorder. I know the Committee examined that subject at length. It was very clear from the discussion in Committee that it anticipated that elements such as being able to assess information and make judgments between alternatives would be covered by the mental capacity provisions—but the evaluation of those alternatives, which can be impacted by mental disorder, is not part of that process. The reality is that those subject to a number of mental disorders—including, sadly, eating disorders—may be highly intelligent and may well be able to carry out many logical procedures to assess information, but their evaluation of the value of their future life and their assessment of the value of bodily control, in relation to other factors, are different from those of someone who is not ill. I believe that issue has not been fully understood.
Anneliese Dodds
I will not give way at the moment.
That is why it is important that that exclusion is put very clearly on the face of the Bill.
Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)
Does my right hon. Friend agree that clause 2(3) makes it very clear that no one can qualify for assistance under the Bill by reason only of either disability or mental disorder unless they also have six months’ terminality and capacity?
Anneliese Dodds
I am aware of what my hon. Friend quite rightly refers to. Of course, any such condition would have to be coterminous with a terminal illness, but we know—the Committee thrashed this out for a long period—that depression is often present at the same time as a diagnosis of terminal illness. We also know that concepts such as “terminal anorexia” have started to be used in certain contexts. That unfortunately suggests that, despite the many protestations of those who understandably support the Bill, there is the possibility that those subject to eating disorders will be pulled within its scope. I am very pleased that amendment 14 would rule that out—it is important that it does so. It is critical that this Chamber sends that message too, given the potential confusion about scope.
I am very grateful for the opportunity to speak to new clause 16 and amendment 14. Above all, I hope we can continue this important discussion, which is critical for so many of our constituents.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. Members will be aware that there are still many who wish to contribute to the debate. May I ask that contributions are kept to five minutes?
Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
I am grateful to you for that guidance, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am also grateful to the promoter of the Bill, the hon. Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater), for putting me on the Bill Committee where, in my view, we did some excellent work. Although we have heard an awful lot of claims about the process, I think anybody objective who reads the Bill that is now being reported to the House will recognise that it is a strong piece of work that is measured and seeks to strike a balance in a difficult area of complexity, humanity, compassion and morality.
Before I discuss some of the amendments, I want to bring the House back to what we are trying to deal with: a set of people who have been told that their struggle with disease is over, that they are heading towards an inevitable death and that there is nothing more that medical science can do for them. What we are trying to do is to give them the chance to face death on their own terms. That is the simple mission that the House has been set.
The second thing I want Members to contemplate as they look at this slew of amendments is that although it is easy to look at each amendment individually and see its merits or demerits, we must bear in mind the machine we are building as a whole, and the fact that we are putting those people through this process at a time when they are facing the end of that struggle. They are thinking about what the nature of their death will be like and they are talking to their friends and family, putting their affairs in order, and being concerned about when that awful day is going to come. We have to have some compassion in the process as well as compassion in the purpose.
When Members consider some of the amendments I will highlight, I ask them please to keep in mind that we will have to put these people through a possible two-month process at a moment when their time is severely limited, very often to less than six months. For example, new clause 7 and amendment 50, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden and Solihull East (Saqib Bhatti), would restrict the number of patients that doctors can deal with in any 12-month period. That will severely restrict access and may mean that patients who are partway through the process have to change suddenly because their doctor is time limited, pushing them out, notwithstanding the multiple safeguards we already have in the process.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) gave an interesting speech about amendment 47. Again, in that amendment, he would be creating another step, another delay and another set of problems for the dying person to overcome or issues for them to address. In his amendment—I am sure he is a much better lawyer than me—I found it odd that he would effectively be creating an inexhaustive list of individuals who could be called upon in any circumstances who might be “properly interested” in the welfare of that individual. To me, the person who should be the most interested in their future is the person themselves. Any step we take that cuts across their privacy, their autonomy and the alacrity with which they can seek this solution to their impending or perceived agony seems a step too far. I do not understand how, practically, the commission is supposed to ascertain who those individuals are—are they neighbours, friends or just family? What is the definition of family? We need to put that contemplation and how they want to handle their death squarely in the hands of the dying person.
Jess Asato
The right hon. Member mentioned that the person is autonomous and should be protected from inquiries about them, but what if they are not autonomous because they are being coercively controlled by a partner? What if that partner has prevented them from reaching out to their family to let them know that they are going to take an assisted death? Would it not be a great safeguard to ensure that the panel and all the doctors around them had ascertained that the family had been told?
Kit Malthouse
The hon. Lady makes a good point, and it was a compelling point made in Committee and is certainly one that we recognise. That is why the amendments on training that she tabled in Committee were adopted—specifically to ensure that everybody involved in the process is sensitised to detecting those issues and to make clear that any doctor in the process, and indeed the panel, might want to know why family are not being informed. That is specifically why a social worker was put on the panel: to understand the psychosocial environment in which the person is taking that decision. Fundamentally, in the end, if I am facing my death in a matter of weeks and decide in my capacity that I do not want to inform my family, that is my choice. That is my decision. I may have to explain my reasons to the doctors, but—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. On that point, I remind Members that we are very short of time.
Kit Malthouse
I am grateful, Madam Deputy Speaker; I will be swift.
That is my choice, and this Bill is rooted in the need to give autonomy to those facing death who have capacity. We should take care to tread carefully upon that right.
On the two amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Rebecca Paul), new clause 16 says that somebody cannot be “substantially motivated” by certain considerations. I do not really understand what “substantially motivated” is meant to mean. To me, this misunderstands the complexity of what it must be like to be told that you are dying. The things that might run through your head—the affairs you might have to deal with, the news you have to break to your family, the impact it will have on your small children—form a cocktail of motivations. But the one thing I have learned over the last 10 years from campaigning for and spending lots of time with dying and bereaved people is that towards the end of their life, they have absolute clarity about what they want, because it becomes clear to them towards the end what their death will be like. At the very least, they want to have this card in their back pocket to play if they require it. Remember: these are people who are facing death, who are struggling with death, and we have to give them the power to advance over it.
Kit Malthouse
Sorry, but I am conscious of time.
Finally, amendment (a) to new clause 10, which we might divide on this afternoon, is difficult. We debated a similar amendment in Committee. As sponsors of the Bill, we are clear that there should be a conscientious objection clause to allow individuals to opt out, and that is strengthened by new clause 10. But allowing an employer—any employer—to say that any employee in their employment cannot participate if that is what they decide seems to me a step too far, and it could prove to have unintended consequences. First, the board of every healthcare trust in the country will become a battle for control between those who oppose and those who do not. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) said, people may suddenly find that they have to uproot themselves, after years of living in a care home, and relocate to get the kind of death that they want. In effect, the amendment prioritises the rights of somebody who is providing accommodation over the rights of the dying. As I said on Second Reading, in my view, as they face their end, we should prioritise the rights of the dying.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
It would be unprecedented to put a formal time limit on speeches. Please can Members listen to the stricture that we are very short on time? I call Lizzi Collinge.
Mr Speaker
To be quite honest with you, the amendments that we have discussed are the ones that we have got through. On the amount of time allocated, in fairness, we are presuming what will come next. I am going to call the Minister; if a closure motion is moved, I will decide at that moment whether to accept it. The fact that many amendments may not have been spoken to is not unusual, which is why consideration will not last for one day, as per the normal procedure; it will continue over further days, on which further amendments will be discussed, and of course there will be Third Reading at a later date. I call the Minister.
The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)
Thank you, Mr Speaker, and I thank Members across the House for their excellent contributions to the debate. As Members will know, the Government remain neutral on the passage of the Bill, promoted by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater), and on the principle of assisted dying, which we have always been clear is a decision for Parliament. I therefore begin by clarifying that I am speaking in today’s debate as the Minister responsible, jointly with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green (Sarah Sackman), for ensuring that the Bill, if passed, is effective, legally robust and workable. She and I were pleased to be members of the Bill Committee, again to provide advice on the workability and technical effectiveness of the Bill as it went through detailed line-by-line scrutiny.
I will not, therefore, give a Government view on the merits of any individual amendments in terms of their policy intent, as defined by the Member who tabled them, as that is rightly a matter for the House to decide. I will instead focus my remarks on amendments that the Government deem to give rise to significant workability concerns, and those amendments that have been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley with technical drafting support from the Government, which have been developed to ensure that the Bill is technically and legally workable.
While I will not give an assessment of all the amendments tabled by other Members, I ask the House to note that they have not been drafted on the basis of advice or with technical drafting support from officials. Therefore, the Government are unable to confirm that those amendments are fully workable, effective or enforceable, though I acknowledge the point made by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan).
I will begin with obligations, duties and protections for medical practitioners. New clause 10 and amendment 52, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, replace clause 28 and expand the safeguards to ensure that no person is under any duty to participate. The new clause also clarifies several functions where certain professions or persons are under no duty to participate, including social care workers, pharmacists or persons acting as a proxy or witness. Finally, it provides that certain functions cannot be opted out of—for example, the recording of matters in a personal medical record.
New clause 11 and consequential amendments 64 and 65, also tabled by my hon. Friend, provide for the replacement of the co-ordinating or independent doctor where that doctor is unable or unwilling to continue to carry out their functions under the Bill, other than through illness or death. A number of amendments have been tabled in this area by other Members, and I shall briefly set out the Government’s analysis of them.
Several hon. Members rose—
Stephen Kinnock
I will just make a little progress.
Amendment 60 may similarly prevent access to an assisted death for those residing within a care home or hospice, if that care home or hospice decided it would not allow such assistance on its premises.
Sir Edward Leigh
The Minister is making a very important point, and this is what I dealt with in my few short remarks. If, according to the Minister, care homes run by religious orders will have to provide this service, those orders will have to get out of care homes altogether.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention. As I say, the Government do not take a position on the policy intent that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has set out. I would simply observe that if somebody has been in a home for a considerable period of time, that home is then considered to be their home. As such, any action to take them out of that home could engage article 8 of the ECHR, on the right to family life.
I now turn to the procedure for receiving assistance under the Bill, including safeguards and protections. First, I will speak to the amendments that have been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley with technical workability and drafting advice from the Government.
Amendment 58 clarifies the duty on the Secretary of State to make through regulations provisions for training about reasonable adjustments and safeguards for autistic people and those with a learning disability. That remedies previously unclear wording in the Bill. Amendment 60 is required to make provision for circumstances where the independent doctor dies or, through illness, is unable or unwilling to act as the independent doctor. Amendments 67 and 68, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, clarify that an approved substance can be self-administered using a device should the individual be unable to self-administer without one. Amendment 91 gives effect to amendment 273, which was accepted in Committee, by ensuring that data will be recorded in the final statement to ensure coherence within the Bill.
I turn now to the amendments tabled by other Members on the subject of procedure, safeguards and protections that the Government have assessed may create workability issues if voted into the Bill. New clause 7 would limit the number of times two doctors can be jointly involved in the assessment of a person seeking assisted dying to three times within a 12-month period. In situations where there is a limited pool of doctors in any geographical location or area of medicine, that could limit access to assisted dying and create inequalities in access. New clause 9 would require the co-ordinating doctor, independent doctor and assisted dying review panels to apply the criminal standard of proof that requires them to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. Cases considered by the panel are civil matters, and as such it would not be usual practice for the criminal standard of proof to be applied to their decision making—and it is a very high bar. The provision would also impose additional standards on the assessing doctor that fall outside the usual framework for medical decision making.
Gregory Stafford
Is the Minister saying that, in his view, it is better that someone who should not die does die, than that someone who should die does not?
Stephen Kinnock
As a Minister at the Dispatch Box, with the Government being neutral, I am not commenting on the policy intent of the Bill. What I am saying is that the new clause could create significant uncertainty. For example, it is not clear how the standard it introduces would interact with the definition of “terminal illness” set out in clause 2, which requires that a person’s death
“can reasonably be expected within six months”,
as it is not clear whether “reasonably be expected” fits within the balance of probabilities threshold or is beyond reasonable doubt.
Amendment 101 would exclude any person with a learning disability, including people with Down syndrome, from a preliminary discussion about assisted dying unless they raise the subject themselves, irrespective of whether they would otherwise be eligible. That may be subject to challenge under various international agreements, including the United Nations convention on the rights of persons with disabilities and article 14 of the European convention on human rights, which prohibits disability discrimination.
Amendment 102 would introduce a requirement that
“the registered medical practitioner must ensure that the person has no remediable suicide risk factors which pose a significant risk to their life”
before holding a preliminary discussion under clause 5. The terms “remediable suicide risk factors” and
“a significant risk to their life”
have not been defined, so the amendment may be difficult to operationalise.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
I tabled amendment 102 in good faith, as I thought it might be workable.
I want to reflect on what the Minister said at the beginning of his speech. I do not recall ever being offered an opportunity to pass my amendments to Government officials to ensure that they would be workable. Given the scope of what we are debating this afternoon, it sounds very much like any amendments that have not been tabled by the hon. Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater) had no chance of being taken forward unless she accepted them.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. She may have noted the comment from the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle: approximately 500 amendments were tabled in Committee, and approximately one third of them were accepted. There was a pretty robust process for looking at whether amendments were acceptable, and the Government were involved in commenting and advising on all of them.
Stephen Kinnock
I will make some progress, if I may.
Amendment 87 would require the co-ordinating doctor to “take all reasonable steps” to establish whether a first declaration had previously been made, so it may slow down the process for accessing assisting dying.
Amendment 45 would significantly impact the operability of the Bill. It would duplicate the role of the assisted dying review panel, and place an additional burden on the co-ordinating doctor to convene the clinical panel. It would also require additional NHS and social care resources, particularly palliative care consultants. That could slow down a person’s access to an assisted death, because there is no requirement on when the panel must be convened, and it could take some time to set up, given the demands on health and social care professionals. The amendment does not specify who is to be on the clinical panel in situations where the co-ordinating doctor is neither a GP nor a consultant. Similarly, there is no provision for whether the clinical panel is to make its decisions unanimously or by majority.
Amendment 48 would require significant changes to the functions and focus of the bodies that are proposed to present arguments to the panel as to why a certificate of eligibility could not be granted. Where an official solicitor acts as an advocate to the court, their purpose is to assist the court on a difficult or novel point of law, not to perform an adversarial function. Similarly, there is no precedent for the Attorney General, His Majesty’s Procurator General or the Treasury Solicitor to intervene in a case in the way that is envisaged, as their roles are to act on behalf of, or provide advice to, the Government, and not to represent a specific argument. In the Government’s view, there are no existing public bodies that are well suited to undertaking this adversarial role.
Graham Stuart
Has the Minister any sympathy with the point made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright)? The panel might struggle to get the evidence it needs to make a decision, and there is no mechanism to address a situation in which, in the absence of that evidence, the panel makes a decision, but evidence then comes forward that suggests that its decision was incorrect. Does the Minister have any workable ideas for addressing that issue?
Stephen Kinnock
Clause 15 sets out the process that the panel must go through. It includes a right for the panel to request information and input from a range of potentially interested people. Clause 15(4)(d) appears already to cater for the intended effect of the amendment in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright).
Several hon. Members rose—
Sir Jeremy Wright
I am conscious of the confines of the Minister’s role in the process, but what assessment have the Government made of the capacity of a panel to investigate for itself anything that is not brought before it either by one of the relevant doctors or by the person seeking a certificate? The panel’s capacity to do so is surely important, if any issue that is not raised by either group is relevant to its consideration.
Stephen Kinnock
The Government’s position on the relevant clause is that the panel has to be satisfied that the correct steps have been taken, and there is not evidence of the points that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has made. Our view is that the intended effect is already catered for in clause 15.
Amendment 38 would exclude from being provided with assistance a person who is not already terminally ill, as defined under the Bill. The reference to “standard medical treatment” is unclear. This could cause further uncertainty around eligibility, given that treatment could be individually tailored to each patient and their needs.
Amendment 81 would remove the requirement that any references to capacity in the Bill are to be read in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005. That would effectively remove the definition of capacity in the Bill. In the absence of a new definition, the Mental Capacity Act may continue to apply by default. That would, of course, diverge from the familiar concepts in the Mental Capacity Act, which could create confusion for practitioners.
The stated intention of amendment 14 is to exclude a person who would not otherwise meet the definition of “terminally ill” if the person meets that definition solely as a result of voluntarily stopping eating or drinking. Our assessment is that the amendment risks introducing uncertainty over a person’s eligibility for assistance under the Bill. However, the substantive question is a policy choice for Parliament. Recognising the intent of the amendment, we do not believe that it would render the Bill unworkable.
Once again, I thank all hon. Members for their contributions. I hope that these observations have helped them in their consideration of the amendments that have been tabled.
Kit Malthouse
claimed to move the closure (Standing Order No. 36).
Question put forthwith, That the Question be now put.
The House proceeded to a Division.
Mr Speaker
There is a delay in the No Lobby. Will the Serjeant at Arms please go and inspect?