(1 day, 18 hours ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
This Bill aims to deliver fundamental reforms to our pensions landscape, and it is good to see that the prospect of discussing a long, slightly technical pensions Bill has seen so many Members flooding into the Chamber. These are reforms on which there is a broad consensus across the pensions industry. They also build on at least something of a consensus across the House. In its principal focus on higher returns for pension savers, the Bill also responds to specific responsibilities that we hold in the House.
It is because of decisions of Parliament that something significant has happened over the past decade: British workers have got back into the habit of saving for a pension. Today, more than 22 million workers are building up a pension pot. That represents a 10 million increase since 2012, when Parliament introduced the policy of automatically enrolling workers. The rise is largest for women and lower earners. So there is lots to celebrate as more save, but there are no grounds at all for complacency about what they are getting in return.
The private sector final salary pensions that many of today’s pensioners rely on guarantee a particular income in retirement. If those pension schemes do not deliver good investment returns, that is a problem for the employer and not directly for the saver. But most of tomorrow’s retirees with a defined-contribution pension bear all the risk; there is nothing guaranteed. How well the pension scheme that they save into performs matters hugely, and because pensions are a very long game, even small differences in how fast a pension pot grows can make a massive difference over time.
That is the system that the House has chosen, so the onus is on us to ensure that it delivers. But the pension system that we have today is too fragmented, too rarely does it ensure that people’s savings are working hard enough to support them in retirement, and it is too disconnected from the UK economy. That is the case for change and the context for the Bill.
The UK has the second-largest pension system in the world, worth £2 trillion. It is our largest source of domestic capital, underpinning not just the retirement we all look forward—or at least most of us look forward to—but the investment on which our future prosperity depends. But our big pension system has far too few big pension schemes. There are approaching 1,000 defined-contribution schemes and less than 10 providers who currently have £25 billion or more in assets.
A consolidation process is already under way, with the number of DC schemes reducing by about 10% a year. What the Bill does is add wind to the sails of that consolidation. It implements the conclusions of the pensions investment review, creating so-called megafunds. For the DC market, we intend to use the powers provided for in clause 38 to require multi-employer schemes to have at least £25 billion in assets by 2030, or a credible pathway to be there by 2035. Bigger and better pension funds can deliver lower costs, diversified investments and better returns for savers. That supports the work that the industry is already doing to better deliver for savers.
As the House has discussed before, in May, 17 major pension providers managing about 90% of active defined-contribution pensions signed the Mansion House accord. This industry-led initiative saw signatories pledge to invest 10% of their main default funds in private assets such as infrastructure by 2030, with at least 5% in UK assets. That investment could support a better outcome for pension savers and back clean energy developments or fast-growing businesses. To support this industry-led change, the Bill includes a reserve power that would allow the Government to require larger auto-enrolment schemes to invest a set percentage into those wider asset classes. That reflects the reality that the industry has been calling for the shift for some time, but words have been slow to translate into actions.
I draw the House’s attention to the fact that I am a trustee of the parliamentary contributory pension fund. Consolidation is absolutely the right direction of travel so that pension funds have better experts who are better able to advise. I still have a slight concern, though, about mandation. There will have to be schemes to invest in, and they will need to ensure that they are getting returns. How will the Minister ensure that the Bill actively delivers on both sides of the equation?
I thank my hon. Friend for her question and for her oversight of all our pensions, which I think is reassuring. [Laughter.] Sorry; it is reassuring! I will come directly to her point, because I know that is one question that hon. Members on both sides of the House will want to raise. Let me just say that the Bill explicitly recognises the fiduciary duty of trustees towards their members.
In the last Parliament, a number of us raised concerns about the administration of defined-benefit schemes by, among others, BP, Shell and Hewlett-Packard. It was obvious at that stage—I think this view was held by his right hon. Friend the Minister for Social Security and Disability, who was then the Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee—that one of the root causes of the problem was insufficient independence and oversight by defined-benefit pension trustees. What is there in this Bill that will protect the position of pensioners in their retirement under those schemes?
The right hon. Member invites me to skip quite a long way forward in my speech, and it is a long speech.
That was not the support I was hoping for from the Chair—understandable, but harsh. I will come to some of the points that the right hon. Member raises. I think he is referring particularly to pre-1997 indexation, which I shall come to.
As I said, the Bill includes a reserved power that will allow the Government to require larger auto-enrolment schemes to invest a set percentage into wider assets. That reflects the wider calls that have been made for this change but have not led to its taking place. What pension providers are saying is that they face a collective action problem, where employers focus too narrowly on the lowest charges, not what matters most to savers: the highest returns. I do not currently intend to use the power in the Bill, but its existence gives clarity to the industry that, this time, change will actually come.
Some argue—I will come to some of the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Dame Meg Hillier)—that this somehow undermines the duty that pension providers have to savers. That is simply wrong. First, the Bill includes clear safeguards to prioritise savers’ interests and is entirely consistent with the core principle of trustees’ fiduciary duties. Clause 38 includes an explicit mechanism, which I have discussed with Members from the main three parties in this House, to allow providers to opt out if complying risks material detriment to savers. Secondly—this is the key point that motivates a lot of the Bill—savers are being let down by the status quo. There is a reason major pension schemes across the rest of the world are already investing in this more diverse range of assets.
Fragmentation within the pensions industry happens within providers, not just between them. Some insurers have thousands of legacy funds, so clause 41 extends to contract schemes the ability that trust-based schemes already have to address that. Providers will be able to transfer savers to another arrangement without proactive individual consent if, and only if, it is independently certified as being in the member’s best interest.
Another point that I hope is of common ground across the House is that we need to do more to realise the untapped potential of the local government pension scheme in England and Wales. We need scale to get the most out of the LGPS’s £400 billion-worth of assets. Again, the Bill will turn that consensus into concrete action. It provides for LGPS assets spread across 86 administering authorities to be fully consolidated into six pools. That will ensure that the assets used to provide pensions to its more than 6 million members—predominantly low-paid women—are managed effectively and at scale. Each authority will continue to set its investment strategy, including how much local investment it expects to see. In fact, these reforms will build on the LGPS’s strong track record of investing in local economic growth, requiring pension pools to work with the likes of mayoral combined authorities. In time, bigger and more visible LGPS pools will help to crowd private pension funds and other institutional investors into growth assets across the country.
Our measures will build scale, support investment and deliver for savers, but the Bill does more to ensure that working people get the maximum bang for every buck saved. To reinforce the shift away from an excessively narrow focus on costs, clause 5 provides for a new value-for-money framework. For the first time, we will require pension schemes to prove that they provide value for money, with standardised metrics. That will help savers to compare schemes more easily, and drive schemes themselves to focus on the value that they deliver. For persistently poor performers, regulators will have the power to enforce consolidation. That will protect savers from getting stuck in poorly performing schemes—something that can knock thousands of pounds off their pension pots.
We are also at last addressing the small pension pots issue. I was out door-knocking in Swansea earlier this spring, and a woman in her mid-30s told me that something was really winding her up—and it was not me knocking on the door. [Laughter.] This is a very unsupportive audience. It was trying to keep track of small amounts of pension savings that she had from old jobs; the only thing that was worse was that her husband kept going on about it. There are now 13 million small pension pots that hold £1,000 or less floating around. Another million are being added each year. That increases hassle, which is what she was complaining about, with over £31 billion-worth of pension pots estimated to currently be lost. It costs the pensions industry around £240 million each year to administer. Clause 20 provides powers for those pots to be automatically brought together into one pension scheme that has been certified as delivering good value. Anyone who wants to can of course opt out, but this change alone could boost the pension pot of an average earner by around £1,000.
Of course, once you have a pension pot, the question is: what do you do with it? We often talk about pension freedoms, but there is nothing liberating about the complexity currently involved in turning a pension pot into a retirement income. You have to consolidate those pots, choose between annuities, lump sums, drawdowns or cashing out. You have to analyse different providers and countless products. Choice can be a good thing, but this overwhelming complexity is not—77% of DC savers yet to access their pension have no clear plan about how to do so.
I agree with a lot of what the Minister is saying. Given what was said last week by the Financial Conduct Authority on targeted support, would he look again at what is being resisted by the Money and Pensions Service? It is not prepared to work with the pension schemes to allow automatic appointments so that pension savers can be guided to better outcomes. I realise that MaPS will say that it is too busy, but this is a key moment. If we could get people to engage at age 50, say, we would see vastly different outcomes for them if they invested properly, and in better ways, with their pensions.
I thank the right hon. Member for his question, and for the discussions that we have had on this important topic. He spent years working on this. The priority for MaPS right now is to ensure that we have the system set up to deal with the additional calls that are likely to come when pension dashboards are rolled out, but I will keep in mind the point that he raises. I think he and a number of hon. Members wrote to me about exactly that point. As I promised in my letter, I will keep it under review, but we must not overburden the system, because we need it to be able to deliver when pension dashboards come onstream.
Will the Minister update us on when consumers will see the introduction of the pensions dashboard? [Laughter.]
I think recent progress on the pensions dashboard means that that deserves a little less laughter. What we are seeing at the moment is success, driving the first connections to the dashboards. Obviously, all schemes and providers are due to be connected by the autumn of 2026, but I will provide good notice of when we can give a firm date for that. My hon. Friend and near neighbour has secured himself early warning of exactly that happening.
We need to make the choices clearer for people as they move from building retirement savings to using them. The Bill gives pension schemes a duty to provide default solutions for savers’ retirement income—yes, with clear opt-outs. As well as reducing complexity and risk for savers, that will support higher returns because providers will be able to invest in assets for longer if they do not need to secure the possibility of having to provide full drawdown at retirement.
Each of these measures to drive up returns will have an impact on their own, but it is their cumulative impact that matters most, especially when it is compounded over the decades that we save for a pension. To give the House a sense of scale, someone on average earnings saving over their career could see their retirement pot boosted by £29,000 thanks to the higher returns that the Bill supports. That is a significant increase for something that should matter to us all.
The reforms that I have set out will transform the DC pensions landscape, but with £1.2 trillion-worth of assets supporting around 9 million people, defined-benefit schemes remain vital—they have already been raised by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael). Their improved funding position is hugely welcome. Around 75% are now in surplus, which has enabled far more schemes to reach buy-out with an insurer. Many more intend to do so, welcoming the security that buy-out can offer. Others may not be able to reach buy-out or may value running on their scheme for at least a time. The Bill provides those trustees with a wider range of options. Clauses 8 and 9 give more trustees the option to safely share surplus funds, which is something that many can already do.
I thank the Minister for giving way and the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) for raising this issue. What will the Bill do for my constituent Patricia Kennedy and the members of the Hewlett Packard Pension Association who are asking for more action on their pre-1997 non-index-linked contributions.
My hon. Friend has raised this issue with me on a number of occasions, and he is a powerful advocate for his constituents who have lost out through the discretionary increases that they were hoping to see on their pensions not being delivered. This is the same issue that the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland raised. One of the things that surplus release will allow is that trustees may at that point consider how members can benefit from any release that takes place. One thing I would encourage them to prioritise if they are considering a surplus release is the indexation of those that have not received it on their pre-1997 accrual. I hope that provides some clarity to the right hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend.
I am extremely grateful to the Minister for taking my intervention and for the very helpful letter he sent me on 30 June about schemes of this sort, and in particular the ExxonMobil pension scheme. His letter encouragingly states:
“Following our reforms, trustees will continue to consider the correct balance of interest between members and the sponsoring employer when making decisions about the release of surplus funds. Trustees will be responsible for determining how members may benefit from any release of surplus…and have a suite of options to choose from—for example, through discretionary benefit increases.”
The trouble is that these pensioners have received a letter from the trustees of the ExxonMobil pension fund stating:
“The power to award discretionary increases is held by Esso Petroleum Company Limited (the “Company”). Whether or not any discretionary increase is provided is for the Company to determine: the Trustee has no power to award discretionary increases itself.”
This may be a loophole that the Minister needs to address. If the trustees cannot award the surplus as benefits and the company says no, that is not going to benefit my constituents.
I thank the right hon. Member for raising that specific case. I will look at it in more detail for him as he has kindly raised it here, but he has raised a point that will have more general application, which is that lots of different schemes, particularly DB schemes, will have a wide range of scheme rules. He has raised one of those, which is about discretionary increases. One thing that is consistent across all the schemes, with the legislation we are bringing in today, is that trustees must agree for any surplus to be released. It may be the case that the employer, in the details of those scheme rules, is required to agree to a discretionary increase, but the trustees are perfectly within their rights to request that that is part of an agreement that leads to a surplus release.
In any circumstances, the trustees would need to agree to a surplus release, so they are welcome to say to their employer: we are only going to agree to it on the basis of a change to something that the employer holds the cards over. I am happy to discuss that with the right hon. Member further, and there may be other schemes that are in a similar situation.
The way in which the Minister is talking about insurance buy-out suggests that, in the Government’s mind, insurance buy-out is still in some way a gold standard. Can he reassure the House that he is seeking to flatten the playing field, such that the increased choice available to defined-benefit pension schemes will mean that for perpetuals who run on—such as OMERS, which started off as the Ontario municipal employees retirement system and is now worth 140 billion Canadian dollars—there is as much safety in superfunds as there is in insurance buy-out?
I shall come on directly to the question of superfunds, which I know the hon. Member has a long-standing interest in. There is obviously a distinction between closed and open defined-benefit schemes, which I think is relevant to the point he is raising. It is also important for trustees to have a range of options.
Obviously that can happen only where there are surplus funds, and there may not be surplus funds in all circumstances. I just want to give the Minister a heads-up in relation to the questions about employee benefits. It would be useful in Committee to have more information about the Government’s analysis of how many of these surplus releases will directly benefit the employees rather than the employers. I understand that the Government, with their mission for growth, want investment in growing the company as well, but what kind of split does he expect to see? I do not expect an answer to that today.
It is nice to sometimes be able to surprise on the upside. I would expect employees to benefit in most cases, because trustees are in the driving seat and I am sure they will want to consider how employers and employees will benefit from any surplus release. Obviously, the exact split between the two will be a matter for the individual cases, but I am sure we will discuss that further in Committee.
I want to reassure the House that this is not about a return to the 1990s free-for-all. DB regulation has been transformed since then, and schemes will have to remain well funded and trustees will remain in the driving seat. They will agree to a release only where it is in members’ interests and, as I said, not all schemes are able to afford to buy out members’ pensions with insurers.
The Bill also introduces the long-awaited permanent legislative regime for DB superfunds, which is an alternative means to consolidate legacy DB liabilities. This supports employers who want to focus on their core business, and, as the superfunds grow, they will have the potential to use their scale to invest in more productive ways. Crucially, trustees will be able to agree to a transfer into a superfund only where buy-out is not available and where it increases savers’ security.
The Pension Protection Fund is, of course, the security backstop for DB members. It celebrates its 20th anniversary this year, and it now secures the pensions of over 290,000 people. The Bill updates its work in three important ways: first, by lifting restrictions on the PPF board so that it can reduce its levy where appropriate, freeing schemes and employers to invest; secondly, by ensuring that PPF and financial assistance scheme information will be displayed on the pensions dashboard as it comes onstream, which my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent and Rhymney (Nick Smith), who is now not in his place, is keen to see; and thirdly and most importantly, by making a change to support people going through the toughest of times. As several hon. Members have called for, we are extending the definition of terminal illness from a 6-month to a 12-month prognosis, providing earlier access to compensation for those who need it most.
Pensions are complex beasts, and so are the laws that surround them. That complexity is inevitable, but not to the extent that some recent court cases risk creating. The Bill also legislates to provide clarity that decisions of the Pensions Ombudsman in overpayment cases may be enforced without going to a further court. I have been clear that the Government will also look to introduce legislation to give affected pension schemes the ability to retrospectively obtain written actuarial confirmation that historical benefit changes met the necessary standards at the time.
Governments are like people in one important respect: they can easily put off thinking about pensions until it is too late. I am determined not to do that. We are ramping up the pace of pension reform. The past two decades have delivered a big win, with more people saving for their retirement, but that was only ever half the job. Today, too many are on course for an income in retirement that is less than they deserve and less than they expect. The Bill focuses on securing higher returns for savers and supporting higher income in retirement without asking any more than is necessary of workers’ living standards in the here and now.
The Bill sits within wider pension reforms as we seek to build not just savings pots but a pensions system that delivers comfortable retirements and underpins the country’s future prosperity. Legislation for multi-employer collective defined-contribution schemes will be introduced as soon as possible after the summer recess, and we will shortly launch the next phase of our pensions review to complete the job of building a pensions system that is strong, fair and sustainable. It is time to make sure that pension savings work as hard for all our constituents as our constituents worked to earn them. I commend the Bill to the House.
I congratulate the hon. Member for Tamworth (Sarah Edwards) on her speech. I am afraid, however, that you, Madam Deputy Speaker, will have to forgive me for puncturing the air of bonhomie and positivity about the Bill, because I am really not content with it.
Frankly, I feel it is my duty as an Opposition Back Bencher to be suspicious of consensus, particularly when the City of London is conspiring with a Labour Government to muck about with our pensions. We have seen that before. I am old enough to remember Gordon Brown’s so-called reforms in 1997, which struck a hammer blow to the British people’s pension funds. You will remember, Madam Deputy Speaker, that the late, great Frank Field—who was then the Pensions Minister—later called those changes a spectacular mistake that struck a hammer blow to the solvency of British pension funds and drove a dagger deep into the heart of the defined-benefit landscape, resulting in its extinction.
As such, I am afraid that must rise to raise some very significant reservations about this bit of legislation—and not just its technical execution, but the political instinct that it betrays. While the Bill is wrapped in the warm words of reform and modernisation, what it actually does is centralise control, unsettle previously settled rights, and risk disenfranchising precisely those people whom it purports to help.
To begin with the Bill’s technical aspects, I reiterate my point of order. I am a member of the local government pension scheme through my membership of the London Pension Funds Authority, and I am uniquely affected by this legislation, as are 6.5 million other former and current public sector workers. My view is that, under this Bill, those people’s rights are being denied, and that through the hybrid legislation process, they or their representatives should have the right to petition the Bill Committee and explain why they feel they are affected by investment pooling, the changes to fiduciary delegation and the asset consolidation. They are uniquely affected by this Bill, which strikes profoundly at the governance of the pension funds they have paid into in a way that it does not for other pension funds in this country. That is the definition of hybridity—if that is a word—so if we are going to stick to the rules in this House, we really should stick to them. I look forward to getting the letter that you promised me, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I know that you have asked me not to refer to procedure in the other place, but this is not the only Chamber that will be looking at this legislation.
The hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams), who is just about to leave—I am sorry to detain her but will be brief—asked the Minister what the problem is. I repeat her question, but in relation to the local government pension scheme, I also ask what it has to do with him. It is my money, not his, and it is for scheme members to make decisions about how they wish their money to be used. It is not taxpayers’ money; it is my money. It is a defined-contribution and benefit scheme, and we have all paid into it. He is the second Minister in the space of 18 months to try to interfere with the local government pension scheme, and I stood in this Chamber and opposed Michael Gove, now Lord Gove in the other place, when he attempted to manipulate the local government pension scheme for political reasons. I urge the Minister to think twice before he does so.
Secondly, I believe that this Bill is conceptually flawed. If we are being generous—[Interruption.] By all means, the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth is free to go—I will not be mentioning her again. She was hesitantly rising to leave. If I am being generous, the ambition behind this Bill is to unlock capital that can be invested for the purposes of growth, but the methods it proposes are chillingly dirigiste and make the dangerous assumption that Whitehall knows best and that central direction by the Government can outperform the dispersed judgment of hundreds of experienced trustees managing diverse funds in varied contexts. Essentially, with this Bill the Minister is turning the pension fund industry into an element of Government procurement by the back door.
There are three further points that I want to put on the radar on Second Reading. I understand that the Bill will go through, but I hope the Minister will take them into account. First, it is simply not true that megafunds perform better. There is plenty of academic and empirical evidence that the picture is much more mixed. Often, smaller funds with better governance and a more focused investment strategy can perform better. These supertanker monopoly funds lose agility, lack accountability and become distant from pensioners and members of the fund. Their investment discretion and their ability to move quickly on investment decisions becomes sclerotic and bureaucratic. In particular, it is true that these megafunds specifically underperform when they invest in exactly the kind of illiquid assets that the Government are hoping to push them into: infrastructure and private equity. I urge the Government and the Minister please to examine carefully the evidence from the United States and elsewhere that shows that these very large funds do not necessarily produce better returns for investors. They may well be able to reduce costs because of scale, but I am afraid that the evidence is just not there on fundamental investment returns.
My second point is on the danger of politicisation. We have seen elsewhere in the world where pension funds have been pushed into the Government’s priorities to their own detriment. In Canada, large pension funds have come under significant Government pressure to invest in state infrastructure. In France, pension fund surpluses have been directed into Government bond-buying programmes effectively against their will. Once those assets become controlled and directed into state-favoured investment vehicles, which is what the Government are proposing through this Bill, the temptation for Ministers—not necessarily this Minister, but future Ministers—is to go further and push funds into politically convenient infrastructure projects that may prove to be financially disastrous. If that power had been available to the political team that decided to instigate the frankly financially disastrous HS2, and my pension fund had been put in it, where would I be now? I urge the Minister to think carefully about the responsibility for my retirement and my future. By me, I am referring to myself as a member of the local government pension fund. I am everyman for these purposes.
I am afraid that essentially what has happened in France and in Canada, and what may happen under this legislation in the UK, is that the pension fund system effectively becomes a tool of Government fiscal policy. Effectively, absent capital spending available directly from the taxpayer, the Government direct capital spending from pension funds—from private money—and plug holes that they create by writing cheques that they cannot fulfil. I would be interested in the Minister’s response to that.
I was just googling “dirigiste” and my right hon. Friend’s everyman quote. Will he comment on the fact that OMERS, which he would probably agree is one of these megafunds that he thinks are slow and unwieldy and invest in infrastructure and illiquids, returned a 7.1% net return over the last 10 years and the London Pensions Fund Authority returned a 7% return over the last 10 years?
As I said, the evidence about performance across the population of funds is mixed. Some smaller funds do extremely well, because they have strong governance and a focused and nimble investment strategy. Some megafunds do reasonably well, because they can spread their risk across a variety of asset classes, but it is not a given that a big fund will perform better than a smaller fund. In fact, in certain circumstances smaller funds, because they have better accountability and can have a more focused investment strategy, may well perform better.
Frankly, and this speaks to my hon. Friend’s point, it is for me as a member of the pension fund to decide what I want to do, performance or otherwise, because it is my money. Given that I have contracted with this pension fund under circumstances made clear to me when I contracted with it as part of my employment or otherwise, it is not necessarily for the Government to steam in and tell me what I should or should not do with my own money. That means I carry a certain element of risk—absolutely—but unless we are going full-throated for the total financial infantilisation of the British people, I cannot see that we have any other way to preserve our financial freedom and autonomy.
Does the right hon. Member accept that he might be atypical among scheme members?
That may well be true, but that is a different question. There is a question about financial education and the ability of large numbers of our fellow citizens to understand these financial complexities. We have a large and professional independent financial adviser community, and all pension funds are required to have pension advisers who can speak to members, tell them what is going on and explain the decisions before them. I do think that over the years, such steps have disenfranchised the British people from their financial decisions, yet we hold them responsible for their debts, their mortgages and their future. There is a larger question for us in this House about how much we have subtracted from the autonomy of the British people, and therefore how much blame attaches to us as politicians when their financial circumstances are not what they expect.
The right hon. Member is giving a lucid speech, as he always does—he speaks very well—but I am failing to understand exactly the point he is making. He is talking about a local government pension scheme, which is guaranteeing him an income in retirement, as if it is a defined-contribution scheme where he is the one at risk from changes in the investment performance. It is local taxpayers with their employer contribution who ultimately bear the risk in the scheme he is talking about. It is our job to make sure that those taxpayers have the best possible chance of not having bad returns, leading to bad outcomes for them. He is not at risk in the way he is talking about.
Yes, I have. I paid contributions through my employment at City Hall, as did my employer. Admittedly, it was a scheme based on a defined benefit, rather than a defined contribution, but that was the deal done with me on a settled contract, saying that this was what I would be provided for from my contribution. Every year, I review my pension benefit forecast. I am consulted by the fund about how it should conduct its affairs. I am asked to turn up to my pensioners’ conference to discuss with trustees how they are looking after my future. The point is that the Government are steaming in with absolutely no consultation with me as a pensioner and I have no right to be represented, although I am uniquely affected, beyond other pension schemes. I consider that to be high-handed and, as the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth said, to be solving a problem that does not exist.
My third point was also raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier): who carries the can? What happens when the Minister tells my private pension scheme or the parliamentary pension scheme that it must invest in, for instance, HS2 and it turns out to be a disaster? What happens when whichever ministerial pet project rises to the top of the priority list for pension allocation—what rough beast, its hour come round at last, slouches towards Whitehall to get its finance—and it all goes horribly wrong? I am sorry to quote Yeats to the Minister, but who will pay when that happens? When there is a deficit in defined-contribution pension funds that have been so directed by the Minister, who will pay for that deficit?
I have already given way to the Minister. He said that the Bill contained an opt-out for pension funds, but that is not strictly accurate. It does not create an opt-out for trustees; it creates an opportunity for them to request the ability to opt out from the regulator, with whom the discretion to opt out lies. It also reverses the burden of proof. Even if it is on their own judgment, the trustees must prove, empirically, that investing as the Minister so directs will be to the detriment of their fund. That is not a true opt-out. It is not at the discretion of the trustees. All they can do is request, and all they can do is try to offer whatever evidence they may have. We must reflect on the fact that an awful lot of investment decisions are made by trustees on their judgment—yes, on advice, but on their judgment—and that is a very hard thing to disprove.
I am afraid I feel that the Bill is bulldozing into an area of highly sensitive financial structure, and is not taking care of the interests of those whom it purports to protect. It is reclassifying risk, it is recentralising power, and it is rewriting contracts that have hitherto been extant for many years. It is too important to my future, and the future of millions of pensioners, for us to rush into this consensus-driven Bill without proper examination in Committee, with pensioners and pension funds themselves able to petition, as they should be, under a hybrid Bill structure.
I am probably a parliamentary oddity, given that I have been looking forward hugely to rising to support the Bill—and what luck to follow such a colourful and interesting speech from the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse).
I believe that this landmark piece of legislation, which builds on the progress made by the last Administration, has the potential to fundamentally reshape the trajectory of British capitalism by addressing one of the most important long-term challenges facing our country, namely how we can unlock and unleash the full potential of British savings to support growth and prosperity here at home. It is a challenge that we must overcome if we are to tackle a number of deep-rooted structural weaknesses in our economy: low productivity, low business investment and regional inequalities, as well as the financial insecurity that pervades the lives of too many of our older citizens, especially those who do not own their homes.
Before I go any further, I must pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Minister—the Bill bears the hallmarks of his serious and determined leadership—and also commend my hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth (Sarah Edwards) for her very interesting speech.
The Bill seeks to address the lack of alignment between our nation’s vast pool of domestic savings and the long-term investment needs of our economy. Over recent decades, that growing misalignment has become all too evident in communities across the United Kingdom. During that time, our domestic pension funds, which now amount to about £.3 trillion, have steadily retreated from investment in the UK, although the trend has not been replicated in other comparable developed economies. Despite taxpayer support amounting to more than £60 billion a year—or £70 billion, according to the right hon. Member for Salisbury (John Glen)—too little capital is finding its way into British companies, infrastructure and innovation.
Data from the Capital Markets Industry Taskforce—I must disclose the fact that I once worked for one of its member firms before entering this place—lays bare the scale of the problem. The data focuses primarily on public equity markets, but when we look at the largest pension schemes and funds in other countries and compare the size of their total equity allocations relative to their domestic equity markets, we see that Canada’s pensions are 2.5 times overweighting their home market, while France’s are nine times overweight, Italy’s 10 times overweight, Australia’s 27 times overweight, and South Korea’s are 30 times overweight. The UK is, massively, an international anomaly. Our domestic pension funds are underweighting our equity market by about 40%. That, I think, represents a structural weakness, with direct consequences for the global competitiveness of our economy, the vitality of our industries and, ultimately, our national economic resilience. If we are unwilling to invest in ourselves, we hold back our growth prospects.
The UK has long needed catalysts for a modern economic renaissance. The Government have taken important first steps through their industrial and infrastructure strategies, the artificial intelligence opportunities action plan and the reforms of our planning system, but the common ingredient that is required to ensure their success is a reliable source of long-term capital. Even a modest rebalancing of that £3 trillion could unlock billions in investment for domestic growth. In real currency that our constituents can understand, that means investment in digital, physical and social infrastructure, and it means greater opportunities for entrepreneurs to not only start up businesses but scale them into something globally consequential, providing better jobs and higher incomes for families throughout the country.
These investments are not just good for local economies. If we get the broader fundamentals right, they can also deliver stronger returns for tomorrow’s growing cohort of retirees, so the Government are right to propose tackling fragmentation across the UK pensions system. In particular, the private defined-contribution market and the local government pension scheme remain too fragmented. I must gently disagree with the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire: I think that there are too many small, sub-scale schemes that have not only driven up costs and created market inefficiencies, but resulted overall in suboptimal investment outcomes. I think that larger funds can manage risk better, and can invest in opportunities that can deliver higher returns for savers.
I do not dispute the fact that there are too many small funds that are suboptimal; my question is whether it should be the Government who correct that. If, for example, I am a member of a small suboptimal pension fund and the Government, through the Bill, consolidate it with another pension fund, and it turns out that this reduces my return, who carries the can?
As I have said, I think that larger funds can manage risk better and deliver better outcomes for savers, which means that they can take greater ownership of how they spend their retirement years. I also think that the £25 billion threshold for megafunds in the defined-contribution market is the right level to deliver the objective. Other jurisdictions, especially Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands, have demonstrated that scale drives better governance, lower fees and stronger returns.
I welcome consolidation and the path towards the professionalisation of the local government pension scheme. I disclose that before I entered this place, I chaired a local authority pension fund, so I know at first hand the potential of pooling, and share many experiences of pension fund meetings with the shadow Minister. I fully acknowledge that there will be resistance to pooling in some quarters.
I start with an apology to the Minister, because I had a bit of a giggle when the timeline for pensions dashboards was mentioned. I have been here quite a long time, and I feel like we have been talking about pensions dashboards for that entire time. It has been suggested that they are just around the corner for most of the last 10 years. It feels like this is something that we rehash on a regular basis. It would be great if they really were just around the corner; I look forward to seeing them.
The right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) will not be surprised to hear that our political ideologies are slightly different when it comes to interventionism and what the Government should or should not do. It is completely acceptable for the Government to give some direction on the largest assets, but I am specifically not talking about the LGPS, because it does not exist in Scotland. That part of the Bill does not apply to my constituents, so I will not touch too much on that.
I understand where the hon. Lady is coming from. She is keen on Government intervention in our pensions, but does she recognise that that represents a fairly significant transfer of investment risk, and that the Government should underwrite that risk in all fairness to pensioners, who may lose money as a result?
Auto-enrolment was a fairly substantial intervention by the Government in pensions. Since 1997, pensions have had to increase in line with inflation, and that was an intervention by the Government. There has been a long trail of interventions by the Government in how assets are managed and where they are held, but pension trustees are still required to get a return. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman about specific projects, and I would be particularly concerned if we were looking at specific projects, but the mandation relates to UK assets, and the funds in which they could be invested.
I would love to see much more investment of pension funds in social housing, for example, where the trustees can get a pretty great return, but they will still have a fiduciary duty and responsibility. For defined-benefit schemes, the member will always get what they have been promised they will get. No matter how the fund is managed, they have a defined benefit from the scheme, unlike in a defined-contribution scheme, where it depends on the size of the pot as it grows—but I am going to carry on, because I have a lot to cover that is not to do with mandation, and as I say, the LGPS does not apply in Scotland.
On value for money, I think the Bill is good, because comparing pension schemes is difficult. Comparing any financial schemes is difficult because they are all laid out in different ways and the fees are calculated in different ways, so it does not make sense to most people. Some of stuff on requiring the publication of information on value for money in certain ways is important, and the surveys are also important. I have slight concerns about the chapter on value for money because, in comparison with the small pots consolidation section, there is no requirement to publish the regulations in draft before they actually become regulations. There is a requirement for consultation, as there is in both those chapters, but not a requirement for publication in draft. I think it is important for those to be published, so the widest possible range of views can come forward, because value for money is so important for such a wide range of people, whereas some of the other stuff in the Bill is much more technical and will have an impact on far fewer people. The point about publishing the regulations in draft is important.
I am disappointed that the Government have not made more moves on adequacy, but given where we are in the cost of living crisis, I can understand why it may be difficult to get cross-party political consensus on the creation of adequacy provisions. This Bill could have taken more of a look at pensions in general, rather than being about pensions specifically, because in a lot of ways the Bill is seeking to do is improve every individual’s pension pot’s potential for growth. That is an admirable aim, but some of the larger picture could have been included—for example, in relation to auto-enrolment, the under-22s and people earning small amounts of money who do not qualify.
The right hon. Member for Salisbury (John Glen) alluded to the mid-life MOT, which I have previously shouted about. I agree that people should be sent an appointment for a mid-life MOT, in the same way as they are asked to get their bowel cancer screening sent through the post. It should be exactly the same with a mid-life MOT, which is so important, but so many people duck and dive about it. Millennials are coming up to reaching this point, but millennials are a generation particularly averse to thinking about retirement, because we do not think it will happen to us. We think we will die before we get there, because there is an incredible amount of cynicism among millennials. We tend to avoid thinking about it because we are not going to reach that point, so forcing millennials—in the nicest possible way—by giving them such an appointment and making it for them means they are much more likely to undertake it.
On guided retirement, again I think the Bill tackles the issue pretty well by ensuring that people have more information. I am particularly concerned about the people who draw down the 25% tax-free sum of money, and then do not have a plan for the rest of it. How many of them have just thought about the 25%, and have not thought about the rest of it, or about how complicated and unpredictable annuities can be depending on the year? I am thinking about somebody I know who does not smoke or drink and runs 10 km a couple of times a week, but they will get a smaller annuity than somebody who does the opposite. Do people know how unpredictable it is—how much they will get and the fact that they cannot tell from what the pot looks like the actual outcome to cover their living expenses? Any kind of understanding people can be given about that is really important. I do still have concerns about some of the issues with freedoms and how financially disadvantageous it can be for a significant number of people.
I agree with some of the stuff on the consolidation of small pots. I have a concern about the fact that the Secretary of State or the Minister can make changes to the definition of small pots by looking at some consultation and then bringing a statutory instrument to the House. I would appreciate some clarification, and agreement that the Minister will consult pretty widely before taking a decision about changing the definition of small pots in secondary legislation.
On surplus release, I would disagree with a chunk of the Conservative Members who would use it for slightly different things. I press the Minister on the balance between the economic growth mission and what employees will get as a result of surplus release. I am pleased to hear that trustees will have some flexibility, but I am concerned that that creates a system with a number of tiers, because it depends on how passionate the trustees are about helping the employees or helping the Government’s growth mission. I would ask for some guidance from the Government about what they expect. When they are making that deal with employers, they have to agree with the employer where that money will go—how much of the money will go to increasing the pension pots and how much into people’s salaries. There will need to be a significant amount of guidance for trustees on where the Government expect money to go. It would be appreciated if we could be involved in the creation of that guidance, or at least be consulted on what it is supposed to look like.
On megafunds, there is a bit of a “wait and see” on what megafunds, both master trusts and the superfunds, will look like and how they will pan out. I can understand looking at other places the Government consider to be successful in how pension funds are managed and the very large investments that could be created as a result of huge funds. I appreciate that overheads can be reduced and that funds can be run more efficiently as a result, and that investments can be made into very large, long-term patient capital projects if the fund is significant.
My specific question on superfunds is about new entrants to the market. The Bill states that there is an ability for transitions. Organisations likely to meet superfund status at some point, given a certain amount of time, will be given slack until they can reach that status, which is utterly sensible. But then it talks about new entrants coming in to become a superfund. There is a pathway and the ability to get approval to do that, but only if they are innovative. I am slightly concerned about what innovative means, because it is not defined—I think it will be defined in secondary legislation. Why should they be innovative? Surely, if a new entrant is excellent, that should be enough? Innovative concerns me. I do not really understand what it means, or why it is in the rules for new entrants. Anything the Government can say to explain what they think that is supposed to mean, and what they intend it to mean in the secondary legislation, would be helpful.
On the whole, the SNP is cautiously optimistic about the Bill. We believe there need to be some changes and we have specific questions in various areas, such as: on the rationale in relation to mandating; on the rules on value for money and how they will impact individuals; and on the consolidation of small pots and how they will ensure individuals have better outcomes. It is not in the Bill, but ensuring the pension dashboard happens so that people can see the consolidation of small pots happening in real time would be incredibly helpful. The best outcome we can get is for everybody to have an adequate pension when they reach retirement. We will not get that if people cannot see and cannot understand what they have in their pensions and if those small pots are not consolidated.
I rise to speak in favour of the Bill. On a policy basis, the Bill addresses a number of very important challenges.
The first is ensuring that the pension system delivers good outcomes for the millions of pension savers in Britain. That is absolutely critical. In my lifetime, the risk of pension savings has shifted from the employer to the employee—in other words, to our constituents. At the heart of the reforms is one essential fact: investment in a diverse set of assets leads to better returns and better outcomes than investment in a narrow set of assets. We need to move away from a focus on cost in the industry and on to a focus on overall value and the outcomes that savers get, so they have comfortable retirements. I am determined that the working people in Glasgow East have comfortable retirements and are properly rewarded for their hard work. Therefore, the Bill’s objective of ensuring that savers in Glasgow East and across the United Kingdom ultimately have access to a wider pool of investments, which have historically been restricted, is a good outcome and a good policy.
The second challenge the Bill seeks to address is growth. People in Glasgow East are very ambitious, as I know they are in Aberdeen North and in Hampshire. As I knocked on doors ahead of last year’s election, people would say to me, “Britain has lost its way.” And many people said that they felt their children would be better off working abroad, or that there were more opportunities for their children abroad. That is the challenge the Bill plays a part in addressing. We do not invest enough in our productive capacity so we have lower, sclerotic economic growth.
Pension savings are an essential source of finance for British industry and infrastructure. In that regard, the Bill includes, in chapter 3 of part 2, something that seems to be causing anxiety: the backstop mandation of investment by defined-contribution pension funds into private asset classes linked to the United Kingdom. Private non-listed shares and debt are now central to investment in a way that they were not when I started off as a junior lawyer many years ago. Growth companies in areas such as medicine, AI, technology and, of course, space remain in private hands for much longer, and list on public markets much later, if at all. The mandation power must be viewed in that context. If UK pension funds do not invest in those classes of domestic assets, working people may miss out on significant returns, and we risk losing the opportunity of growth and of developing the great innovations from our fantastic universities, including the University of Strathclyde.
The hon. Gentleman is making a good point, but does he accept that illiquid investments, by their very nature, tend to be more volatile, and that from a risk-adjusted point of view they therefore represent much higher risk for investors? He mentioned investment in life sciences companies; he will be aware of the collapse a couple of years ago of the fund led by Neil Woodford, which was a significant investor in illiquid private sector life sciences companies and, because of that illiquidity, collapsed. The point is that if we are mandated to do that stuff—I ask the same question as I asked the Minister—who will pay? Who carries the can?
I hope the right hon. Gentleman would accept that diversification is critical here. Of course, illiquid private assets are not something that one holds for a couple of years and then sells, but the funds are designed to be large enough to bear the risk from diversification. That is the critical point.
Pension funds are a statutory arrangement, with significant taxation and other legal benefits. That creates a business opportunity for pension providers—and quite right, too. Against that background, it is right that the Government review whether, under the existing arrangements, savers are getting a fair return from that special statutory and legal arrangement. Given the tax breaks, it is not unreasonable to address the question of whether there is sufficient investment in the United Kingdom.
Let me turn to our attitude to risk in the UK, on which the success of pension arrangements turns, as does our desire for more economic growth. We will not get more economic growth unless we take more reasonable risks, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer and others have made clear. It is essential for banks and fund managers to consider whether they take enough risk.
The chief executive of the National Wealth Fund, John Flint, made the point last Tuesday at the Treasury Committee, when he said,
“I would encourage the stewards of private capital to go back and challenge themselves on their risk appetite…the country’s growth outcomes are, for me, largely consistent with the country’s risk appetite generally.”
I venture to say that our great fund managers and banks need to turn their minds to whether they are taking enough risk, because that drives economic growth and drives successful outcomes for savers.
Another aspect of pensions reform and risk taking is the individual savers, as was brought home to me in a quite different context, when I was on a football history tour organised by Football’s Square Mile, which promotes the history of football in Glasgow East. As we stood mainly in Glasgow East—I must admit that some of it was in Glasgow South—the guides explained to us that when Queen’s Park decided to organise the first international football match between Scotland and England in 1872, the club had just over £7. It had a choice: the low risk was to hold the match at a rugby club, free of charge; the higher risk was to hold the match at the West of Scotland cricket club at Partick, an old, closed ground where tickets could be sold and there was potential revenue. The problem was that the West of Scotland cricket club wanted more by way of rent than the Queen’s Park had—much more than £7. The guides put the choice to us all as we stood just in Glasgow South constituency, and just outside my constituency. The vast majority of people on the tour picked the low-risk option: an indication, at the end of the week, of how risk-averse we have become in Britain.
Encouraging sensible risk taking is critical to pension saving and if we want more economic growth. In fact, Queen’s Park took the higher-risk option: it rented the cricket ground and made a huge profit. The game transformed the profile of football and was the foundation for Queen’s Park’s building the first international football stadium in the world, which opened a year later in 1873 in my constituency. Queen’s Park took a risk that was pivotal to the development of modern football, and modern football contributes billions to the Exchequer. My point is that risk is essential to economic activity, as Mr Flint explained and as was illustrated later in the week.
The Bill is critical for economic growth. It takes active steps to ensure that money flows to the entrepreneurs and risk takers who will create wealth across Britain. It ensures that working people have access to better pensions. On that basis, I support the Bill.
My hon. Friend is making a strong speech and some strong points. Does he agree that the alarm bells he is ringing about financial education, the under-provision of pensions and longevity are even more stark and alarming next to the demographic change that means that over the next 30 years, we will see the number of workers per pensioner plummet? We will go from about 3.6 workers per pensioner at the moment to well under three by 2070, which means that even if pensions are not enough, the country will not be able to afford to plug the gap as it does at the moment?
My right hon. Friend makes a compelling case. As I said in my speech, this goes back to financial education and ensuring that we all understand the implications of pensions adequacy.
My concern about adequacy does not mean that the Bill does not have its merits. The continuation of Conservative policy, the small pots consolidation and the creation of megafunds are sensible reforms that will increase individuals’ pension pots by reducing dormant pots and increasing economies of scale. However, this is a missed opportunity for a Government with a large majority. They could have acted more boldly, moved faster and improved pension adequacy throughout the United Kingdom.
I would like a clear commitment from the Government that they are actively looking at improving pensions adequacy. The Labour party has long professed to be the party of workers, yet some who look at the Bill will sense that it does not go far enough in preventing the UK from declining into being a society funded by welfare in retirement. Let us encourage people to strive, work hard and save more for a better future. I very much hope that the Government will work collegiately and cross party with His Majesty’s Opposition in Committee to ensure that our constituents do not sleepwalk into a retirement crisis.
At the outset, I take the opportunity to declare my own interest. Unlike the hon. Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith), I was elected prior to Lord Cameron ejecting councillors from the local government pension scheme. As a former member of Trafford metropolitan borough council, I also have savings in the local government pension scheme. I am therefore set to benefit from the improved governance of the LGPS initiated by the Bill.
These measures are testament to our dedication to building a resilient, efficient and fair pension system, galvanising and creating the potential to boost our economy at every opportunity. It is our aim to build a future in which every saver can look forward to a secure and prosperous retirement.
I welcome the broad, if not entirely universal, support for the Bill. The open discussion in which we have engaged today is important because, as a responsible Government, we want the House to be assured that the new powers in the Bill come with appropriate mitigations. We understand that Members will have questions, and I have listened carefully to those that have been raised. I remind everyone that the highly fragmented pensions framework has not served savers well, and there is a need for improvement as both the industry and savers demand a better service. The Bill goes to the core of what is needed, providing big solutions to the big problems that are undermining so much potential for savers and the economy.
Let me now turn to some of the comments and queries that have arisen throughout the debate. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Tamworth (Sarah Edwards), for Luton South and South Bedfordshire (Rachel Hopkins), for Buckingham and Bletchley (Callum Anderson), for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan), for Truro and Falmouth (Jayne Kirkham) and for Glasgow East (John Grady) for speaking in favour of some elements in the Bill, and for their recognition of the investment and growth opportunities that it can unleash.
I am grateful for the constructive support and consensus that we heard from both the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), who opened the debate for the Opposition, and the hon. Member for South West Devon, who closed it. They were right to mention the specular success of automatic enrolment, but that was half the job, as pointed out by the Pensions Minister, and I think the hon. Member for South West Devon acknowledged that we now need to move on to the pressing task of dealing with pension adequacy, which will be taken forward by the pensions review. They were also right to refer to the complexity and fragmentation of pension pots.
I welcomed the support from the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for the long-awaited pensions dashboard, and was particularly pleased to hear of his support for changes in the local government pension scheme, although he expressed concern about certain parts of the Bill and the potential for propping up a failing scheme that arises from those changes. Let me reassure him that no cross-subsidising between administering authorities would be caused by any changes made by the Bill. As for the question of safeguards in respect of surplus release, we cannot stop share buy-backs and the like, but we have confidence in the ability of trustees to adhere to their fiduciary duties.
I understand that mandation has given rise to the fundamental objection of not just the hon. Gentleman but a number of other speakers, but I do not believe that it undermines fiduciary duties, and I do not agree with that analysis. The Bill contains clear safeguards that are consistent with those duties, not least in clause 38, which refers to an opt-out in the event of material detriment to members of a fund. The hon. Gentleman also raised questions relating to gilts; we believe that nothing in the Bill would undermine a well-functioning gilt market. However, as I have said, I welcome the broad support for the Bill, particularly with regard to value for money, small pots, guided retirement products and terminal illness changes.
I want to be clear—so that the House is clear—about the opt-out to which both Ministers have referred. Is it a correct interpretation to say that it is not an opt-out at the discretion of the trustees of the fund, and that the Bill requires them to apply to the regulator with evidence for the regulator to make a decision to grant them the ability to opt out? The idea that trustees are somehow free to make a decision in the interests of the fund is not actually correct, is it?
The right hon. Gentleman is correct in his interpretation, although I do not entirely agree with his characterisation. It is, I think, perfectly reasonable that we would ask trustees to explain how they feel that what is proposed would be to the detriment of their scheme members.
I welcomed the support of the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Torbay (Steve Darling), for many of the general proposals in the Bill. I entirely agreed with his comments about the need to give savers the best possible advice and protections. I also agreed with what he said about the opportunities to deliver further investment in our economy. As for social housing, which others also raised, he will know that many pension schemes already make such investments, and I certainly support their continuing to do so.
We then heard an excellent speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth. I particularly welcome her comments on the value-for-money changes, and she is absolutely correct to highlight the importance of looking at schemes in the round, not just on cost. On the pipeline of investments that she set out, I hope she is reassured by some of the steps that the Government are taking—for instance, through the Planning and Infrastructure Bill—to ensure that there are a range of exciting major projects, such a reservoirs and houses, that people will be able to invest in.
The right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) is certainly correct to say that he punctured the air of consensus in outlining his reservations. I know that my hon. Friend the Pensions Minister has agreed to have a conversation with the right hon. Member next week, and I hope that he will find that incredibly helpful. Clearly, it is not for me to comment on whether this should be a hybrid Bill. On the question of megafunds, he is right that not all large schemes provide a better return, but the evidence shows that while that is not always the case, they do see better returns on average. That is an important point.
The hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) was correct to raise how long we have been waiting for the pensions dashboard, and I am similarly excited and anticipate its arrival. I promise that it will be worth the wait when it finally arrives. On her point about the scope of the Bill, the pensions review will take forward a number of the issues on which she and other Members said the Bill could have gone further. The pensions review is under way, and we will say more about that incredibly soon.
On the pensions review, there is a massive cross-party consensus that there is an issue with its adequacy, and we want to see it tackled. Will Ministers agree to take this forward in as cross-party a way as possible? We all care strongly about it.
This matter is important to everybody in this House, because it is important to the constituents of everybody in this House. I would be very open to ensuring that Members of this House are able to feed as much as possible into the pensions review. It is an incredibly important piece of work.
I return to the question of my age. As a millennial, I am terrified of admitting that I have now reached an age when I should be thinking about my pension, having just turned 40. In any event, some of the work around the consolidation of small pots and so forth will help people.
A number of Members have asked about the balance of the distribution of any surplus release, and it is ultimately for trustees to decide on that balance. On the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North about potential guidance coming forward—the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire (Blake Stephenson) touched on this as well—that is something that I will discuss with the Minister for Pensions. It may well be teased out in Committee.
I hope that the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp) will be a member of the Bill Committee and continue the dialogue with the Minister for Pensions. I am always keen to find volunteers, and I hope that he will put himself forward. On the question of regulatory decision making, I hope that the Pensions Regulator has heard what he said about pace.
On the issue of divestment from funds that invest in fossil fuels and so forth, it is a matter for trustees. Individual flexibility on investments is a cornerstone of the system, but we are consulting on UK sustainability reporting standards and on transition plans.
Finally, we heard from the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon)—we always save the best for last. I am very grateful for his support for the Bill. If he was not 18 yesterday, I am sure it was the day before. None the less, I wish that everybody had a mum like his. We may not have had some of the challenges with the adequacy of people’s pensions had they all received such superb advice from their parents at the age of 18.
Today we embark on a transformative journey with this Pension Schemes Bill. This legislation underscores our readiness to deliver fundamental changes to the pensions landscape, an endeavour that is not only urgent, but essential for driving a future in which savers and, indeed, our economy can derive the benefits of a better organised, less fragmented and easier to navigate pension system, and I am pleased by the widespread support for the Bill across the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Pension Schemes Bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Pension Schemes Bill:
Committal
(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Thursday 23 October 2025.
(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Consideration and Third Reading
(4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Andrew Western.)
Question agreed to.
Pension Schemes Bill (Money)
King’s recommendation signified.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Pension Schemes Bill, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of—
(a) any expenditure incurred under or by virtue of the Act by the Secretary of State, and
(b) any increase attributable to the Act in the sums payable under or by virtue of any other Act out of money so provided.—(Andrew Western.)
Question agreed to.
Pension Schemes Bill (Ways and Means)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Pension Schemes Bill, it is expedient to authorise—
(a) the levying of charges under the Pension Schemes Act 1993 for the purpose of meeting any increase in the expenditure of the Pensions Regulator attributable to the Act;
(b) the amendment of section 177(5) of the Pensions Act 2004 so as to increase the limit in that provision on the amount that may be raised by pension protection levies imposed by the Board of the Pension Protection Fund.—(Andrew Western.)
Question agreed to.