(1 day, 21 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI beg to move amendment 7, in clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out “for England and Wales”.
The amendment would secure that Clause 1 applies to a pension scheme for local government workers for Scotland, as well as a scheme for local government workers in England and Wales. Clause 1 does not extend to Northern Ireland (see Clause 100).
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 8, 10 to 12 and 16 to 24.
Before I turn to the amendments, I should briefly outline the reform of the local government pension scheme, for which chapter 1 provides the legislative underpinning. The LGPS is the largest pension scheme in the UK, with £400 billion of assets under management, projected to rise to almost £1 trillion by 2040. However, I think it is a matter of cross-party consensus that the LGPS has not realised its full potential, not least because it is too fragmented.
The first chapter of the Bill sets out the legislative basis for reform to modernise the LGPS’s investment framework and governance arrangements, setting robust new standards that all pools must meet, including Financial Conduct Authority authorisation, the capacity and expertise to manage 100% of their partner authorities’ assets, and the ability to deliver on local investment mandates. As part of the reforms, the LGPS will move from eight pools to six. We have set a deadline for the new pool partnerships to be agreed in principle by the end of this month, with new shareholder arrangements in place by March 2026.
The clauses in chapter 1 would mean that by this time next year we will see a world-class LGPS, made up of large pools of professionally managed capital, held to account by authorities who have confidence in robust and transparent governance structures, and who together are delivering the best value for members. I remind the Committee that LGPS members’ benefits are guaranteed in statute, and nothing that we discuss today will affect any of those benefits.
These amendments will extend the LGPS provisions to Scotland. There is a wide range of amendments, but they all have the same objective: to take the matters relating to England and Wales and ensure that those are provided for in the case of Scotland. The Government are making this provision following a formal request from the Scottish Government, and I have written again to the Scottish Government this morning for the legislative consent motion that they will need to put in train to go alongside it. Amendments will be needed in respect of clauses 1, 2, 4 and 7 to give effect to that objective, and that is what the Government amendments in this group do. I commend them to the Committee.
It is great to be starting what I hope will be quite a quick canter through today’s work, Sir Christopher. The Opposition welcome the broad grain of this entire Bill; it seeks to do a lot of very useful things in the pension industry across the UK. We have some contentious points, but those will not come up today.
Regarding clause 1, we welcome the creation of asset pool companies. These are sensible and pragmatic steps towards modernising the local government pension scheme, and much of the work had already been done under the previous Government. Consolidating funds represents a responsible approach that should deliver more effective management and investment of pension assets. The LGPS, as we have heard, is among the largest pension schemes in the UK, with 6.7 million members and £391 billion of capital. Before pooling, of course, it was 86 separate local authorities, which caused huge inefficiency, inequality of opportunities and, in some cases, poorer outcomes for pension beneficiaries.
I should mention at this point, Sir Christopher, that I am a member of the LGPS and also that, as a councillor on Forest of Dean district council, I was responsible for looking after some of this activity in terms of pension management. It was not an efficient way of doing things, so pooling is an incredibly good idea. We welcome the Government’s continuing our work to make these pension funds work more efficiently and deliver better returns for members, and ultimately we all want to see improved returns and lower employer contributions. Small funds, whether in local government or elsewhere, are rarely fit for purpose in the global investment environment.
We have some concerns. The broad framing of the powers contained in chapter 1, clause 1 could allow for the mandation of certain investments by Government. Pools should be investing in line with the investment approach set out by their underlying asset owners in order to deliver against the fiduciary duties of LGPS funds. Governments should not take powers that would erode fiduciary duty.
There are concerns about the costs of the Government’s decision to reduce the number of asset pools from eight to six. This is an administrative cost. We have heard from one council, Wiltshire, which is one of 21 LGPS funds in England now looking for a new pooling partner. Jennifer Devine, head of the Wiltshire pension fund, has said that the cost of closing its asset pool could come to as much as £100 million. There will be some costs incurred, but, none the less, the general thrust of the whole process is one that we support and we certainly would not stand in the way of these amendments.
As the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, and echoing the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, I broadly welcome the thrust of the Bill. We heard in evidence that a lot of the industry is playing catch-up and is about 15 years behind those who are best in class. As Liberal Democrats, we are keen to make sure that we are supporting particularly those who are more challenged in being able to save or to make the right decisions, and that we use what levers we can to tackle issues such as climate change and cleaning up our environment. We look forward to working with colleagues on this Committee.
On the local government pension schemes and the pots, we welcome the direction of travel. However, for us it is about making sure that we keep local links to communities, and driving positive change through that investment in our local communities is absolutely essential. I look forward to the debates over the next few weeks.
I declare an interest as a holder of deferred membership of a local government pension scheme in Scotland, which will come into scope should the Government amendments go through, as I imagine they will. First, I thank the Government for working with the Scottish Government to make these changes and for taking the decision to agree with the Scottish Government’s request for these changes to be made. It is appreciated.
While I am on thank yous, the people who manage local government pension schemes are managing an incredibly significant amount of money and are ensuring that benefits are provided to many millions of people in those schemes. The hard work they do to steward those funds appropriately cannot be overestimated, so I say thank you to all the trustees who take that action on behalf of so many of us. Those working in the public sector tend to get a lower salary than they would in the private sector, but they often get access to a defined-benefit pension scheme or a career-average pension scheme, which is better than many people in the private sector get. There is a bit of give and take there.
On Tuesday, we heard from the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board and also from one of the pension schemes. There was a commitment that came forward in the evidence to ensuring trustees are appropriately trained—I am not for a second saying that they are not appropriately trained right now, but we must ensure that level of training is provided when they have many other competing demands on their time. It is important that the Government ensure the correct monitoring, evaluation and also support of those organisations, so that if new training is required—for example, if environmental, social and governance provisions change, or decisions about where it is best to invest funds change—the Government commit to ensuring that trustees are given all the training they need. I believe that all pension trustees have a difficult job, but particularly those managing local government pension schemes, who are often local councillors—a task that, I know, is not a part-time job and is incredibly busy.
The other concern raised on Tuesday, and which was just mentioned by my Liberal Democrat colleague, the hon. Member for Torbay, is about the locality of the decisions made. It is important that the pooling of resources means more investment in important and key projects than would result from a smaller organisation. Hopefully, the reduction in administrative costs will ensure that those schemes are significantly more efficient, but I am keen that we do not lose the local voice within the pension schemes that we have now.
The case was made very eloquently on Tuesday that, while pension schemes take into account value for money—what we would have called best value in local government in Scotland—in decision making, they should ensure that they are not supporting projects that the community are absolutely up in arms about, because so many of their members will live in that community. Scheme members need that guaranteed return, but they also need their communities to be nice places for them to live.
I am slightly concerned that, with pooling, the ability for local projects to be put forward could potentially be lost. Although I am not asking for any specific changes, I would ask that the Government keep an eye on that. Should there be significant numbers of smaller projects that are not being supported because of the changes that previously might have been supported, the Government should consider whether they need to take action to ensure that those voices are better heard and that those smaller projects still have the opportunity for investment.
Thank you very much for allowing me to speak on this, Chair. I am assuming that we have also spoken on the clause stand part and are unlikely to debate that again at the end; I have therefore made most of my general comments here rather than particularly specific ones on the amendments.
I thank everyone who has spoken. I am grateful for the welcome for the Bill as a whole, for this chapter and for the amendments that particularly relate to Scotland. As the hon. Member for Wyre Forest pointed out, this Bill builds on progress that was put in train over the last decade, and I am glad to see that. It is only because of that progress that we are now able to accelerate quite significantly.
Questions were raised about mandation. I want to be absolutely clear that questions about asset strategy will sit directly with the administering authorities, as they do today. It is for them to set out those asset allocation decisions, which are, in the end, the biggest driver of returns for members. The investment decisions sit with pools, never with Governments. We will provide clarification, if we come on to one of the amendments later, to make clear that the Government will not be directing individual investment decisions of pools; that was never the intention.
Questions were raised about the administrative costs of transition. Those do exist, as they have in previous moves towards pooling, and will obviously need to be managed sensibly, but I think we all agree that those costs are small relative to the very large savings that will come from a much less fragmented system.
Points about the importance of trustees were powerfully made, and I absolutely agree. Stronger governance reforms have already been put in place for the LGPS trustees in England and Wales, and these reforms build on that through stronger governance more generally.
I also hear the argument about local voice. As I said, the administering authorities are responsible for setting the strategy in relation to local investments. Strategic authorities, because of a Bill that was passed earlier this week, will have a requirement to collaborate with the LGPS on those local investments. I take the points that were made, and I think there is consensus on these amendments.
Amendment 7 agreed to.
Amendment made: 8, in clause 1, page 1, line 12, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “responsible authority”. —(Torsten Bell.)
This amendment and Amendments 10 and 11 are consequential on Amendment 7. References in Clause 1 to the Secretary of State are changed to “the responsible authority”. That term is defined by Amendment 24 to refer either to the Secretary of State (as regards England and Wales) or to the Scottish Ministers (as regards Scotland).
I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 1, page 1, line 16, at end insert—
“(ba) enabling the responsible authority, in prescribed circumstances, to give a direction to an asset pool company specified in the direction, or to all or any of its participating scheme managers, requiring the company or scheme managers concerned—
(i) to take any steps specified in the direction with a view to enabling or securing compliance by a scheme manager with a direction requiring it to participate in, or to cease to participate in, the company (see paragraph (b)), and
(ii) to take any other steps necessary to enable or secure compliance with such a direction;”.
The amendment makes clear that scheme regulations can provide for directions to be given to prevent a direction of the kind mentioned in clause 1(2)(b) (requiring a scheme manager to participate in, or to leave, a particular asset pool company) being frustrated by a failure by the company or its participating scheme managers to take steps necessary to enable or secure compliance with its terms.
We turn now to three technical amendments concerning the powers to direct asset pools, which I mentioned in my previous speech.
Amendment 9 ensures that a pool must comply with the use of the power to direct administering authorities to join a particular asset pool, matching powers brought forward in clause 1 of the Pensions Bill. These are powers of last resort. Amendment 13 responds to feedback and removes the power to issue directions to asset pool companies relating to specific investment management decisions. It was never the Government’s intention to intervene in those decisions by pools, so we are removing that sub-paragraph to provide clarity. Amendment 14 adds a duty for Ministers to consult the affected parties before issuing directions more generally. I commend the amendments to the Committee.
In the interest of speed, I will not speak to these amendments, other than to say that we have no objection to them.
I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 1, page 2, line 34, leave out from “company” to end of line 40 and insert
“limited by shares and registered in the United Kingdom which is established for purposes consisting of or including—
(i) managing funds or other assets for which its participating scheme managers are responsible, and
(ii) making and managing investments on behalf of those scheme managers (whether directly or through one or more collective investment vehicles),
and whose shareholders consist only of scheme managers, and”.
The amendment revises the definition of asset pool company to clarify (a) that the company should be limited by shares held by scheme managers only and registered in any part of the UK and (b) that the mandatory main purposes described in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) need not be the only purposes of the company.
The amendment revises the definition of an asset pool company to clarify that they can be established anywhere in the UK and that only LGPS administering authorities can be shareholders of those pools. The amendment also removes limits on the purposes of an asset pool company, making it clear that asset pool companies are free to provide advisory services and perform other functions in addition to their primary purpose of providing management services. The Government do not want to stifle innovation from asset pool companies as they continue to evolve from strength to strength. The amendment makes sure that that is not the case. I commend the amendment to the Committee.
I have just one question for the Minister. How are the shareholdings to be decided? Will they be determined based on the size of the investment, and how will the Government decide between councils having shareholders or contracting with asset pool companies? That is my only comment.
It is for those forming the pooling companies to agree their own arrangements. The hon. Member rightly raises the question whether people are shareholders or clients of a pool. There is only one current administering authority that is a client rather than a shareholder of a pool, so in the overwhelming majority of circumstances we are talking about shareholders. However, the legislative basis for the pooling allows for that in future, if for some reason that was the way forward that some administering authorities and pools chose. Broadly, the same picture applies to most questions in this space: we expect administering authorities and pools to work together to agree their governance arrangements, and that is what they are doing.
Amendment 15 agreed to.
Clause 1, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Asset management
Amendments made: 16, in clause 2, page 3, line 5, leave out “for England and Wales”.
The amendment would secure that Clause 2 applies to scheme regulations relating to pension scheme for local government workers for Scotland, as well as scheme regulations relating to a scheme for local government workers in England and Wales. Clause 1 does not extend to Northern Ireland (see Clause 100).
Amendment 17, in clause 2, page 3, line 23, at beginning insert
“in the case of a scheme for local government workers for England and Wales,”.—(Torsten Bell.)
The amendment would secure that, despite the general extension of the scope of application of Clause 2 to Scotland (see Amendment 16), subsection (2)(c) will remain of relevance only to scheme regulations relating to England and Wales.
I beg to move amendment 246, in clause 2, page 3, line 33, at end insert—
“(4A) Scheme managers must publish a report annually on the local investments within their asset pool company.
(4B) A report published under section (4A) must include—
(a) the extent, and
(b) financial performance,
of these investments.”
This amendment provides for scheme managers to report back on the financial performance of any local investments that they might make.
Clause 2 places important requirements on pension scheme managers regarding how they manage pension funds for local government workers, requiring formulation, publication and review of investment strategies. The Bill encourages investment through asset pool companies and emphasises local investments. However, the Opposition’s key concern is that the primary purpose must remain the delivery of strong financial returns for pension funds. Those returns ultimately belong to the pension fund members, but council tax payers also have a responsibility, as they support these schemes. Investment decisions must prioritise financial performance that ensures sustainable pensions while safeguarding public funds.
Although we acknowledge that local investments can bring benefits to local communities and local economies, they should only be a secondary focus and should not compromise returns. Local investment should be considered as an additional benefit, but the overriding duty of scheme managers is to act prudently and in the best financial interests of the scheme members and taxpayers. We caution against overweighing local investment priorities if that risks undermining the long-term financial health of these pension funds. In short, financial returns must come first; local investments can follow, but must not take precedence.
Pensions UK has questioned the need for these new powers and believes that they are too far-reaching. LGPS reform is already progressing at pace, and pools and funds are collaborating in line with the direction set by the Government. Pensions UK would like to understand what specific risks the Government are seeking to manage through the introduction of these powers, and it is seeking amendments to the Bill to ensure that if these powers remain in the Bill, they will only be exercised after other avenues have been exhausted, to guard against adverse outcomes for the pools, funds and scheme members.
The Pensions Management Institute has highlighted that the administering authorities will be required to take their principal advice on their investment strategies from the pool. Given that an administering authority is required to invest all of its assets via the pool, this is a major conflict of interest and puts a significant burden on the administering authority or scheme manager to ensure that the pool is performing effectively, with no independent checks and balances.
The Bill makes it clear that co-operation with strategic authorities, such as regional combined authorities, on appropriate investments will be required. However, there is a risk of investment decisions being influenced by political and local interests. The fiduciary duty should always prevail when local investments are considered. We do not oppose the clause, but we call on scheme managers to maintain discipline in prioritising sustainable returns, with local investments as a welcome but secondary consideration.
We are considering three amendments with this clause. There is uncertainty about what qualifies as a local investment for LGPS funds, how such investments are defined and what assets or projects will meet the requirements under the new rules. In addition, we do not want to shift the focus away from the fiduciary duty of trustees to local investments that might not deliver the best-value returns on schemes. Amendment 246 provides for scheme managers to report back clearly on the financial performance of any local investments that they might make. Scheme managers at local councils should charge the asset pool companies with finding the best value.
Although we are not opposed to local investment, the focus of trustees must clearly remain on achieving best value, and the better performance of a pension fund means that local councils can already use their powers under regulations 64 and 64A of the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013. Consequently, we can argue that LGPS megafunds with a focus on best returns can lead to more a fully funded council and therefore to employer contribution holidays.
Sir Christopher, would it be helpful for me to speak to the other amendments?
That is fine. It has been a few months since I last participated in a Bill Committee, Sir Christopher, so thank you for your advice.
We are not proposing to press this amendment to a vote, but I would be very grateful if the Minister could respond to my points and undertake to take them away and consider how advice can be given to these pool managers to ensure that the issues I have mentioned are taken into account.
I refer Members to the Chair’s provisional selection and grouping of amendments, which should give them a guide as to which amendments are grouped and which are not.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Christopher. I hope that the Government consider amendment 246, which would require annual reporting by LGPS asset pools on the financial performance of local investments. This is not bureaucratic red tape; it is a necessary safeguard that would help trustees in upholding their fiduciary duties and responsibilities and protect the interests of scheme members and the people whose pensions are at stake. It would be a sensible addition to the Bill, especially when we consider the fact that the Government’s impact assessment offers very little on LGPS consolidation. There is no reference to the impact that the de facto mandation of local investment will have on the trustees’ fiduciary duty or on members’ outcomes. I urge the Government to consider the amendment, not only for those reasons but because it would give consolidated asset pools greater clarity over whether their investments are best placed.
I start by wishing the Minister a happy birthday. [Hon. Members: “Hear, Hear.”] I am sure that for all of his life he has wanted to be sitting on a pensions Bill Committee on his birthday.
More seriously, when we were in desperate measures in my time as a local authority councillor in Torbay, we borrowed to invest and make money for the local authority—that was once upon a time, because it is no longer possible—so I know from experience that authorities often have to invest elsewhere in the country to get the best financial returns. Our experience in Torbay was that a lot of our investments in the south of England got in the money that we needed to keep the local authority ticking over.
I would therefore welcome the Minister’s thoughts on how we get the balance right. Clearly, investors would want to invest in the local area to drive economic development, but there is a need to balance that with getting positive outcomes for the pension fund. Some guidance from the Minister on how he sees that balance being struck, as the hon. Members for Wyre Forest and for Mid Leicestershire have alluded to, would be helpful.
I want to ask the Minister about the comments made on Tuesday in relation to the transparency already required of local government pension schemes. My understanding is that local government pension schemes are already pretty transparent, and that they are required to publish significant amounts of information.
On the amendment and the requirement for annual reporting, the case was made on Tuesday—I forget by who—that a particular moment in time may not give a true picture of what is going on. Investments may not provide an immediate return. In fact, pension funds are not necessarily looking for an immediate return; they are looking for a longer-term return so they can pay out to tomorrow’s pensioners as well as today’s. Pension schemes are one of the best vehicles for the patient capital that we need to be invested in the economy for it to grow, so I am little concerned that a requirement for annual reporting on specific investments may encourage short-term thinking. Can the Minister confirm what transparency regulations there are in relation to local government pension schemes and how they compare with those for other pension schemes?
I want to build on what the hon. Member for Torbay asked. As a former local councillor myself—I am not part of the pension scheme, I hasten to add, so I do not have an interest to declare—the bit from the evidence session that came out for me, thinking through this bit of the Bill, relates to the equivalent in treasury management. As a council, we often borrowed from the Public Works Loan Board to invest in, for example, a shopping centre to get the income from rent, business rates and so on. What safeguards or requirements will be put in place to ensure that any money spent from a pension fund goes on capital rather than revenue? I appreciate that council tax revenue increases could be used for that, but are there any safeguards to ensure that the money is not just spent and then does not exist anymore?
I will try to confine my remarks to the amendment and the points made about it; I am not going to encourage us to focus on the grouping provided. I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for the amendment. I agree with him on many points he made, including that the LGPS is a success story for local investment, with authorities and pools already playing a major role in their communities. We are committed to ensuring that continues, but we also need to ensure it is done in the right way, delivering the right returns for each scheme.
As I said, every LGPS authority will be required to set out its approach to local investment in its investment strategy, providing some of the transparency that the hon. Member for Aberdeen North just set out, including their target allocation. They will need to have regard to existing local plans and priorities. I want to offer the hon. Member for Wyre Forest some reassurance—this goes directly to the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North—that via regulations and guidance, we will already require each pool to report annually on local investments made on behalf of their authorities. The intention of the amendment will be delivered via those regulations and that guidance. On that basis, I am glad that he intends to withdraw his amendment, but I recognise his point.
On the wider question of pool advice, and whether there is a risk of pressure from strategic authorities to make investment decisions that are not consistent with their fiduciary duty, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest should see these reforms as supporting in that respect. Remember that these pools will now all be FCA-authorised. There are significantly improved governance arrangements. If anything, this should provide certainty. It should already not be the case legally, anyway, but the stronger governance arrangements will support that.
The hon. Member for Torbay rightly asked about how administering authorities and pools will think about the balance, weighing the impact on their local economy. As he will be aware, the fiduciary duties are clear about what the objective is, and the Bill is clear on the respective roles, both of the administering authorities in setting their strategic asset allocation, including to local investments, and of the pools in making those decisions, taking into account the available returns. I think that provides much of the balance that he rightly pointed out is an inevitable issue within this. I should also be clear that the LGPS will invest not just across the whole of the UK—rather than just in individual areas—as the hon. Member for Torbay talked about, but also around the world. That is what the LGPS does today and will continue to do.
I am reassured by the Minister’s comments. I beg to ask to leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 245, in clause 2, page 3, line 39, leave out from first “in” to end of line 39.
This amendment changes the definition of local investment to remove the reference to the benefit of persons living or working.
This amendment runs closely with amendment 246. Amendment 245 changes the definition of local investment to remove ambiguous reference to the benefit of persons living or working in the area. It is a small, technical amendment, but it is about giving more focus on the key need to members of the fund.
At present, the Bill arguably lacks a clear definition of how the priorities of the asset pools must follow, particularly on what qualifies as local investments. Our amendment seeks to address that gap by simplifying this. Put simply, we believe that local should mean local. These asset pools should prioritise investment in large-scale projects, actively promote local growth or make tangible improvements in local infrastructure—improvements that directly benefit the people in that local area.
Where no such opportunities exist, other investment options should be considered, but we cannot allow a situation where, for example, an LGPS fund raised in the midlands is continuously redirected elsewhere in the country. Unfortunately, the Bill appears to suggest that the other areas included in the consolidated LGPS schemes could benefit disproportionately. My constituents may ask me, “Why aren’t these funds being used locally by investing in local opportunities, rather than being gifted to councils in other areas of the country, assisting in the same way?” I believe the amendment will add clarity on that to the Bill, and I would welcome the Minister’s comments on it.
I was thinking about how the amendment would work in practice in my local area. I live in the Aberdeen city council area. We are landlocked. We are surrounded by the Aberdeenshire council area. If those local authorities were in separate local government pension schemes, the effect of the amendment would be that Aberdeenshire council could not class an investment in Aberdeen as a local investment despite the fact that its local authority headquarters are in Aberdeen. That is the only sensible place for them because Aberdeenshire goes all around Aberdeen, and it is the only place to which someone can reasonably get transport from all the areas in Aberdeenshire.
Although I understand what the hon. Members for Wyre Forest and for Mid Leicestershire are saying about the classification of local investments, I am not uncomfortable with the fact that the clause includes
“for the benefit of persons living or working in”
the area. If, for example, people in Aberdeenshire invested in a new swimming pool in Aberdeen city, I imagine that it would be used by a significant number of people in Aberdeenshire, and would absolutely be for their benefit.
We should remember that the local government pension schemes will have to prove that the thing they are investing in is for the benefit of local people living or working within the scheme area, although it may be slightly outside it. For example, if they invested in a small renewable energy project providing renewable energy to local people across a border, they would fall foul of this. It would not be classed as a local investment despite the fact that it would be very much for the benefit of people living or working within the scheme area.
The level of flexibility in the clause, and the fact that the schemes will have to justify their investments anyway, is more sensible than what the amendment suggests. I understand the drive to ensure that provision is made for local investment in local areas, but because of the nature of some of those boundaries, it makes more sense to keep the clause the way that the Government have written it.
I will give a very short speech because the hon. Member for Aberdeen North has just made every single point that I was going to make. I understand the motivation behind the amendment, but we do not support it because it would prevent investments that straddle boundaries—for example, investments in transport and infrastructure that would benefit people living in both Wales and neighbouring English counties. We have heard other examples as well. It would be wrong to limit authorities in where they could invest in this way. I ask the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to withdraw the amendment as it unnecessarily limits the remit of local investment.
I thank the Minister and wish him many happy returns. I hope that he has a happy birthday. We are satisfied with the Minister’s comments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 31— Guidance on utilising surpluses—
“(1) The Secretary of State must publish guidance on the utilisation of surpluses within the Local Government Pension Scheme.
(2) Guidance must include—
(a) information about maintaining scheme members’ financial security;
(b) how the surplus can best support local fiscal needs.”.
This new clause requires Secretary of State to publish guidance on how surpluses can be deployed to balance member security with local fiscal needs.
Clause 2 sets out how assets will be managed in the LGPS under the reformed system of asset pooling. It requires that asset-pooling regulations introduced under clause 1 include requirements for all LGPS assets to be managed by pool companies. The clause would therefore introduce a statutory requirement to consolidate all LGPS assets into those pools, delivering the significant benefits that I know all hon. Members present agree on.
The clause also sets out that the regulations must require administering authorities to formulate, publish and keep under review an investment strategy for their authority’s assets. It also stipulates that regulations may set out from whom administering authorities can take advice on their investment strategy, a point raised by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest. The Government intend to use regulations to require that the pool be the primary source of advice. That will ensure that advice is provided on a consistent basis and free from competing interests, given that pools exist solely to serve their administering authorities. That is an important wider point to remember: the administering authorities are the shareholders of pools and are working together to deliver for members; they are not competing interests.
Regulations must also require administering authorities to co-operate with strategic authorities to identify and develop appropriate investment opportunities. This requirement will soon see the LGPS involved at an earlier stage on local investment opportunities. For the purposes of this provision, for England the definition of strategic authorities matches that in the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill, while for Wales it includes corporate joint committees. Members may wish to note that there is a reciprocal duty on strategic authorities in the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill.
In summary, the Government are introducing the provisions to finalise the consolidation of assets into pools, and to codify the role of the administering authorities in setting investment strategies and how that engagement with strategic authorities will happen.
I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for tabling new clause 31, which would require the Government to publish guidance on how LGPS surpluses—of which there are now more, which is welcome—can be deployed to address financial needs in local authorities. I recognise that the hon. Member seeks to support local authorities in considering their financial positions against potential funding surpluses.
Decisions on employer contribution rates in the LGPS are rightly taken locally, not by central Government. Contribution rates for employers are set every three years as part of a valuation process—which hon. Members will know is approaching shortly—in which administering authorities will work with their actuaries and employers, including local authorities, to determine a contribution rate that is sustainable for employers and will allow the fund to pay out pensions in the future. As part of that process, a local authority is able to utilise a surplus in its funding position by reducing employer contribution rates. The LGPS is currently in a healthy funding position, as I said, and it is expected that some employers will follow that path. But crucially, again, that is a decision to be made locally on the basis of each employer’s needs.
The existing statutory guidance says that funds should set out in their funding strategy their approach to employer contributions, including a reduction of contributions where appropriate, and should carefully identify and manage conflicts of interest, including conflicts between the role of the particular administering authority and other local authorities that are participants.
This is a genuine question that I do not know the answer to. Is reducing the contribution made by employers the only way that the funds can currently utilise a surplus, or are there other methods by which they can spend it?
That is the only way that I have seen taken up by local authorities, and it is the main one that local authorities are discussing, although, as I have said, that is a decision for them. I hope that at least partially answers the hon. Lady’s question. I commend clause 2 to the Committee, and ask the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to withdraw his new clause.
On new clause 31, as we have heard, the local government pension scheme in England and Wales has reached a record surplus of some £45 billion, which is 112% of funding levels, as of June 2024, with some estimating that it will rise to more than 125% by the end of 2025. Despite that strong funding position, no measures have been introduced to make it easier to allow councils or employers to reduce contributions or take contribution holidays. The surplus could be used to create contribution holidays for local authorities, as we have heard, or potentially to reduce council tax or increase the money available for spending on local services.
The current Government focus remains on asset pooling and local investment strategies, rather than enabling the more immediate and flexible use of surplus funds. Councils can already reduce employer contributions under regulations 64 and 64A of the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013. The problem is that, in practice, actuaries and administering authorities hold the cards, and the guidance has been used to shut down reviews even when funding levels are strong.
The Minister needs to consider issuing better guidance to councils to make the process more transparent, to rebalance the power between councils and funds, and to ensure that actuaries properly consider reductions when the funding position justifies it. The mechanisms that are currently in place mean that the assumptions are overly prudent, reviews come only in cycles, and councils have no leverage in disputes.
New clause 31 seeks to introduce provisions to allow employers within the local government pension scheme to take contribution holidays or reduce employer contributions when surplus funding is confirmed, with actuarial valuations, subject to maintaining the security of member benefits. It would also require the Secretary of State to issue guidance on how surpluses could be prudently deployed to balance member security with local fiscal needs. That would enable councils to better manage budgets, support local services and stimulate local economies without compromising pension schemes.
However, the Minister seems to be working with the Opposition on trying to find ways to move all this forward, so for the sake of brevity we will seek to withdraw new clause 31.
The Minister spoke of a couple of opportunities for regulation in this area, and we heard oral evidence about how an awful lot of this Bill is to be drawn out in secondary legislation. Will he give us timelines for when he plans to share the regulations, or at least begin the consultation on them, and say what he sees as the key elements of those regulations that will break cover in due course?
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
For the avoidance of doubt, new clause 31 will be put to the vote much later on. At that stage, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest will be able to withdraw it if he so chooses.
Clause 3
Exemption from public procurement rules
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 21—Exemption from public procurement rules.
Clause 3 concerns how procurement law relates to the LGPS. New clause 21 is intended to replace clause 3, and I will endeavour to explain why it is a technical but valuable amendment. The existing clause and the replacing new clause are identical in their purpose and desired outcome. The reason for the change is technical: rather than stating in the Bill how procurement law affects the LGPS, new clause 21 will instead move the LGPS exemption directly into schedule 2 to the Procurement Act 2023, thereby future-proofing it against changes to the Procurement Act itself.
The amended clause has two aims. First, to broaden the scope of cross-pool collaboration, and secondly, to put client authorities, of the kind mentioned by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, on the same footing as share- holders. That is necessary because the Procurement Act effectively caps the potential for collaboration through joint ventures between pools, as the vertical exemption in schedule 2 to that Act requires demonstration that no more than 20% of a pool’s turnover can be generated on behalf of anyone other than that pool’s shareholders. That may limit the collaboration between pools that we expect to see more of.
Legislation should not act as a barrier to collaboration. The clause addresses that by exempting LGPS pools from the 20% limit, such that the relevant procurement rules are satisfied so long as a pool is acting in the interests of any LGPS authority. Furthermore, given that LGPS authorities can choose to participate in their pool as a contracting client or as a shareholder, the clause also enables all LGPS authorities to benefit from the exemption, regardless of whether they are a client only or a shareholder. This means that LGPS pools will be able to specialise as centres of excellence for particular asset classes and for other pools to access those services, thereby reducing duplication and enabling the investments at scale that we heard so much about in the evidence session.
I ask that clause 3 does not stand part of the Bill, but commend to the Committee new clause 21, which replaces clause 3.
The Government have requested to withdraw clause 3 and replace it with new clause 21. I am slightly confused as to how we got to the point where the Government did not make this decision in the first place, and how the Bill we discussed on Second Reading did not include the change being made to the Procurement Act, instead of the change being made directly in the Bill. Have the Government done significant consultation over the summer, or received input from various organisations that has made it clear that the new way they are now proposing is better than the original?
I can understand that there are two different ways and that there may be a toss-up about which one is best, but why have the Government come down on the side of changing the Procurement Act rather than making the change in primary legislation in the Bill? The Minister has made a little bit of that case, but if he could expand on why the Government have chosen to change their approach, it would be incredibly helpful.
I will be very straight with the hon. Lady, in answer to her fair question. It would obviously be preferable if the clause were not changing between Second Reading and Report, so it is a completely reasonable question to ask. The straight answer is that it is both because of consultation responses, or people’s feedback, and because the legal advice is that this is a more foolproof way to make sure that the intent of the Bill on Second Reading is put into effect.
As I set out earlier, the key change is that other changes to the Procurement Act will not have unintended consequences for the LGPS in future. I hope the hon. Lady understands that that is the motivation. There is nothing else going on here. The change has happened over that period because that is when comments came in and when legal advice was received.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
I put the Question that clause 3 stand part of the Bill and some people shouted aye and nobody shouted no—so that is it. I suggest that Members will have to deal with this on Report. The only way we learn how to conduct procedure in this House is through experience, and I am sure the Minister and the Government Whip will not forget this experience.
Clause 4
Scheme manager governance reviews
Amendments made: 18, in clause 4, page 4, line 35, leave out “for England and Wales”.
The amendment would secure that Clause 4 applies to scheme regulations relating to a pension scheme for local government workers for Scotland, as well as scheme regulations relating to a scheme for local government workers in England and Wales. Clause 1 does not extend to Northern Ireland (see Clause 100).
Amendment 19, in clause 4, page 4, line 40, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “responsible authority”.
The amendment and Amendments 20, 21, 22 and 23 are consequential on Amendment 18. References in Clause 4 to the Secretary of State are changed to “the responsible authority”. That term is defined by Amendment 24 to refer either to the Secretary of State (as regards England and Wales) or to the Scottish Ministers (as regards Scotland).
Amendment 20, in clause 4, page 5, line 1, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “responsible authority”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 19.
Amendment 21, in clause 4, page 5, line 19, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “responsible authority”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 19.
Amendment 22, in clause 4, page 5, line 33, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “responsible authority”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 19.
Amendment 23, in clause 4, page 5, line 38, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “responsible authority”.—(Torsten Bell.)
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 19.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 22—Additional powers for certain scheme managers.
Thank you for the learning, Sir Christopher.
Clause 4 enables the Government to make regulations that require LGPS administering authorities to undertake and publish an independent review of their governance arrangements at least once every three years. I am sure that Committee members will agree that good governance is critical to the healthy functioning of a pensions scheme. The clause will ensure that authorities face external scrutiny of their governance processes. Many authorities already carry out governance reviews of this form and this measure will merely ensure consistent high standards.
The clause also enables the Secretary of State to direct an authority to undertake an ad hoc governance review if they are concerned by significant weaknesses in an authority’s governance or suspect that an authority is not complying with regulations. As a result of the amendments we have already discussed, the power can also be exercised by Scottish Ministers in relation to the LGPS in Scotland.
New clause 22 enables the Secretary of State to give specified LGPS administering authorities certain additional powers, which most administering authorities will already have by virtue of being local authorities. The new clause allows the powers to be extended to administering authorities that are not local authorities, such as the Environment Agency. The new clause will simply create a level playing field for all administering authorities in England and Wales.
What is the Government’s rationale for not including Scotland in new clause 22? Is it because the Scottish Government looked at the original Bill and had not seen the amendments? Or is it because the differential structures between Scotland and the rest of the UK mean that it would not help in the Scottish situation? If the Minister is not clear on the answer, will he please commit to ask the Scottish Government whether they want to be included in the new clause and the relevant changes to be made so that it applies in Scotland? If the regulatory systems are the same, it seems sensible that a level playing field apply. It would be incredibly helpful if the Minister could make the commitment to check whether the Scottish Government want to be included.
I am happy to give that commitment. I am not aware of any administering authorities in Scotland that would be affected, but I am happy to take that point away.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Mergers of funds
I beg to move amendment 244, in clause 5, page 6, line 6, at end insert—
“(2) In the case of merger of schemes for local government workers, the Secretary of State must consider the geography of scheme areas and ensure these areas align with strategic authority boundaries before implementing the merger.”
This amendment requires the Government to explicitly consider the geography of new LGPS areas in any reorganisation.
The amendment would amend the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 to explicitly empower the Secretary of State to make regulations if there was a merger, including a compulsory merger, of two or more LGPS-funded schemes. The change in clause 5 would support flexibility for structural consolidation to enhance fund management and efficiencies; however, there is uncertainty about how the Government will confirm geographical boundaries for the local government pension scheme asset pools amid local government reorganisation.
Currently, LGPS reform aims to consolidate assets and strengthen local investment, but concerns remain about the implementation timescales and risks of disruption. Stakeholders highlight the need for clarity on new geographical boundary definitions and on alignment with new or existing local authority boundaries. Potential challenges exist in meeting asset-pooling and Government deadlines if changes coincide with wider local government changes.
Amendment 244 would require the Secretary of State to explicitly consider, for any LGPS scheme merger, the geography of scheme areas, and ensure alignment with strategic authority boundaries. This would help to provide clarity, promote smoother transitions and reduce disruption from concurrent local government reorganisations. The amendment emphasises the importance of integrating pension scheme boundaries with local government structures to support effective government and investment strategies. We hope the Government will reflect on this issue as the Bill progresses through the House.
As the Lib Dem spokesman for this part of the Bill, I welcome the direction of travel.
If the hon. Member for Wyre Forest can confirm that he does not intend the change to apply in Scotland, because we do not have strategic authorities, I am quite happy not to vote for or against it and to leave it to those who do have strategic authorities.
I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for the amendment and for the points he raised. Amendment 244 would amend clause 5 to allow fund mergers only if the two funds are in the same strategic authority, so it would be a highly constraining power. I recognise the logic, but our view is that it is far too constraining.
I emphasise to Members that the Government do not have any plans to require the mergers of LGPS funds, and that our strong preference is that when mergers take place, that happens by agreement between the administering authorities. The Government would use the power to require a merger of pension funds only as a last resort, if local decision making failed to deliver satisfactory arrangements.
I reassure Members that during the reform process Ministers and officials have looked carefully at how local government reorganisation, which is ongoing and very important, as the hon. Member for Wyre Forest rightly pointed out, maps on to the existing LGPS geography, and we will continue to do so. There should not be any friction between the emerging unitary structures and the LGPS. I reassure the Opposition that the administering authorities that were in the Brunel and Access pools are already carefully considering their choice of a new pool in the light of local government reorganisation.
In summary, it is important that local government pension funds and Ministers retain flexibility in their decision making so that decisions can be taken in the best interests of the relevant scheme. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw amendment 244.
I am reassured by the Minister’s comments and appreciate that he wishes to make the measure work in the interests, geographically, of local government or local authorities as they undergo a transition through the reorganisation of local authorities. Obviously, this provision needs to work concurrently with that process, but I appreciate that it is up to the authorities in the first instance. We wanted to be reassured, and the Minister has made the point that there will be no or little Government interference unless they really do disagree with themselves. I am reassured.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3 to the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 has already conferred powers on the Secretary of State to make regulations about the administration, management and winding up of any pension funds. Clause 5 amends the 2013 Act to clarify and provide certainty that, in the case of the LGPS, the Secretary of State already has existing powers to make regulations about the merger of two or more LGPS pension funds. That includes compulsory merger. The purpose of the clause is simply to ensure that it is put beyond doubt that sufficient powers are in place to facilitate the merger of pension funds if needed—for example, as a consequence of local government reorganisation.
The power could also be used in the unlikely event that an independent governance review finds particularly grave issues with an administering authority’s governance of its pension fund. Members will note that, as I have just pointed out, the Government do not have any plans to require the merger of funds at present, and our strong preference is that when mergers happen, that is done on the basis of agreement between the administering authorities. These powers can also be exercised by Scottish Ministers in relation to the LGPS in Scotland. I urge that clause 5 stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Amendments of 2013 Act relating to scheme regulations
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The powers and duties to make local government pension scheme regulations under this chapter of the Bill are exercisable under the 2013 Act. Clause 6 sets out the amendments required to that Act to ensure that these powers operate effectively. Subsection (2) clarifies that the power to make scheme regulations under the Act is subject to the Bill’s provisions, and it ensures that scheme regulations can include any consequential, supplementary, incidental or transitional provision that is necessary as a result of the Bill. Subsection (3) further clarifies that the requirement to consult on scheme regulations made under provisions in the Bill, which must be satisfied before the regulations can be made under section 21 of the 2013 Act, can be satisfied by consultation carried out before or after the Bill comes into force. Just to spell this out, that is to say that consultation taking place before Royal Assent could contribute to the consultation required.
I hope that clause 7 provides a useful interpretation of the terms and definitions in chapter 1 as they relate to local government pension schemes. I urge that clauses 6 and 7 stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Interpretation of Chapter 1
Amendment made: 24, in clause 7, page 7, line 7, at end insert—
“‘the responsible authority’ means (in relation to a scheme for local government workers in England and Wales or Scotland)—
(a) the Secretary of State, in or as regards England and Wales, or
(b) the Scottish Ministers, in or as regards Scotland.”—(Torsten Bell.)
The amendment defines the term “responsible authority” for the purposes of clauses in Chapter 1 of Part 1.
Clause 7, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Power to modify scheme to allow for payment of surplus to employer
I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 8, page 8, line 2, leave out paragraph (b).
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 27. It removes the power to disapply the section in prescribed cases, as this is now contained in new subsection (5A).
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 26 and 27.
Clause stand part.
Thank you, Sir Christopher, for the progress through the local government pension schemes part of the Bill. We now move on to the defined-benefit clauses. Clause 8, which amends the Pensions Act 1995, enables trustees of private sector defined-benefit schemes to modify their schemes to safely share surplus funds with the sponsoring employer. Through that change, trustees will also be better placed to negotiate with sponsoring employers to get additional benefits from surplus for scheme members.
I know that Members here—that is, hon. Members rather than scheme members—are keen to ensure that the security of pensions is not impacted by these changes. We have consulted on this point and several restrictions are in place that are outlined in clause 9. I will outline the core protections.
First, trustees will remain in the driver’s seat, deciding whether to modify scheme rules to allow surplus release from their individual schemes in line with their duty to the interests of the beneficiaries. Secondly, a prudent funding threshold for surplus release will be set out in regulations, on which we will consult. Surplus will be released only where a scheme is fully funded at a low dependency, which means that the scheme funding is sufficiently high to allow trustees to meet future liabilities with a very low risk of future employer contributions. Thirdly, trustees must obtain actuarial certification to demonstrate that the scheme meets these funding requirements and members must be notified before surplus funds are released.
The amendments clarify two points. First, the treatment of particular cases, such as sectionalised schemes—schemes that have multiple parts to them—is usually set out in regulations. Amendment 27 enables regulations to specify how the new powers to modify by resolution will apply in such cases—for example, to ensure that each section in a sectionalised scheme is treated as a scheme in its own right for the purposes of this power specifically.
Secondly, the power in the clause is not intended to affect schemes in wind up where the majority of schemes will have existing rules about how surplus should be distributed at the point of wind up. The amendment clarifies that when trustees consider the exercise of the power to modify, any separate power to repay surplus on winding up is disregarded. Equally, the new power in clause 8 cannot be used to introduce a power or to modify an existing power to release surplus on winding up.
I thank the Minister for his comments. We agree that the law needs to be updated to reflect current circumstances, and it makes sense to ensure that companies that have not made pre-2016 resolutions are not unfairly penalised. We broadly support the update to the law because it corrects an important imbalance. However, it is crucial, as we move forward, that we maintain the necessary guardrails and uphold the independence of trustees to protect scheme members’ interests. These important aspects will be further discussed in relation to clause 9.
I will raise a couple of points made by people we have been engaging with while looking at the Bill. First, the Pensions Management Institute highlighted its disappointment that the Government did not take the opportunity of this legislation, which broadly talks about defined-benefit funds, to make it easier and more tax efficient for employers and schemes to use scheme surpluses to fund contributions under defined-contribution arrangements, including those not held in the same trust. That would have opened up possibilities for many entities that have long since moved their ongoing DC provisions to a master trust or contract-based arrangement.
The Phoenix Group also highlighted an issue. To protect funding levels after surplus release, schemes may adopt more cautious investment strategies, reducing allocations to private and productive assets. That could undermine the Government’s growth objectives. Aside from those points, we are happy with the clause.
I very much echo what the hon. Member for Wyre Forest said. Clearly, surpluses have built up over a number of years since the last crash. There has been a level of overcaution. It is important for our economy that those surpluses are appropriately released, which could drive economic growth. I am sure that all of us in the room want to see that.
Perhaps it reflects my ideological position that I am much more comfortable seeing this happen with local authorities than I am here, and I am looking for more guardrails. In fact, there are more guardrails around how local government pension schemes do this. It can be done pretty much only if it is to reduce employer contributions, which increases the amount of money that local authorities have for either reducing council tax, as the hon. Member for Wyre Forest said, or for spending on whatever it is that they want to spend money on a day-to-day basis.
I would like to see more power go to trustees. I am concerned—this was raised previously—about the level of employer pressure that could come to bear on trustees about releasing surplus, when it may not be in the best interests of all the scheme members but the employer might be really keen to use the money. I am also concerned that we have had quite a lot of different ideas about what the surpluses could be used for. The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Torbay, made the same point as the Government about ensuring that employers could invest more to grow the economy, whether that is in bits of tech that make the company more productive or workplace benefits for those who are scheme members.
Why did the Government decide not to strengthen the powers of trustees in relation to the surplus release? Could the Government look in future at tightening what surplus release could be used for? Trustees have a fiduciary duty to ensure that members’ pensions grow as promised, and that they get the benefits that they were promised or that their defined-contribution scheme in other circumstances grows at the right level. However, if the fiduciary duty applies, why is there not a similar application in terms of surplus release? Why is there not a similar requirement on trustees to ensure that that surplus release goes the way that we think it should go?
On Second Reading, I said that there had not been enough clarity from the Government about how they want that surplus to be released. Are they encouraging or instructing trustees to release surplus to employers if it will be invested in the business, or if it is being done to invest in workplace training schemes? I am not convinced that there is enough clarity on this issue.
Given the Government’s drive to ensure that more people are working and that there is a reduction in the amount of economic inactivity, they could say, “Actually, if you are going to use this to improve access to work, to ensure that you can employ more disabled people, we will absolutely sign off a surplus release, provided that you have met all the other criteria.” The Government could encourage trustees to do that. I feel as though there are more levers that the Government could use and that they are not taking this opportunity.
I have not tabled any amendments on this issue, but I raised it on Second Reading. It would be great if the Government gave me some comfort that they are considering whether—in the future with the Bill or, down the line, in the guidance that is given to trustees—to strengthen the hand of trustees, so that they can direct employers better and so they do not come under pressure from employers; or whether the Government will take policy decisions or directions, and point them out to trustees so that they are encouraged to go in a certain direction to ensure that there is growth in the economy, which is apparently the Government’s first mission.
I welcome the broad consensus about the direction of travel from everyone who has spoken. I will come first to the remarks from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, who made some key points. She understandably makes the direct comparison with the LGPS. To a large respect, that reflects the fact that the LGPS is an open scheme where the ongoing contributions are much more of a live question, but I take her point.
I will make a few remarks on her more controversial points about the role of trustees and what funds are used for. The powers of trustees are very strong. Trustees have an absolute veto on any surplus release under the clause, as they do currently, and they have fiduciary duties about how they should use their powers. That is stronger than was implied in some of the remarks that we have heard.
As for the wider point about pressure on trustees from employers, that can affect lots of issues and is not specific to the one we are discussing today. That is what the fiduciary duties of the trust system exist to protect against and what the regulatory work of the Pensions Regulator ensures does not happen. If there was inappropriate pressure on trustees, it would be a very serious issue. That is not specific to the surplus question—that applies to trustees just doing their job. My strong impression with every trustee I talk to is that they take that duty very seriously indeed. I agree that we should always keep that under review.
There is an absolute veto power—a yes or no—but it is also about the power for trustees to be able to say to employers, “This is how we would like you to use the money.” There is less flexibility for trustees there. Once the money is handed over to the employers, there is no comeback for trustees if employers do not use it as suggested.
That is a factually accurate description of the situation. The hon. Lady is not the first person to have raised that point with me, and I understand the wish for greater certainty about how funds will be used. My view is that looking for that certainty through legislation is wishful thinking. Funding sitting within companies is fungible. The monitoring and enforcement of those things would not be practical in any sense. I am sure that part of the discussion between trustees and firms will be about exactly the kind of points that the hon. Lady is raising, particularly for open schemes, where there is a large overlap between employees and scheme. Members will be part of the discussion, but I do not think that that is practical for legislation. I am liberal enough, although I am certainly not a Liberal Democrat, to think that that is quite hard for legislation to manage, and that it is the role of trustees and employers to work through that.
On the hon. Lady’s wider point, I offer her some reassurance that the Pensions Regulator is taking very seriously its job of providing guidance for trustees about how they think about the questions of surpluses. I think that will offer her quite a lot of reassurance, particularly about how members benefit—she has focused on how employers benefit—from release.
Amendment 25 agreed to.
Amendments made: 26, in clause 8, page 8, line 2, at end insert—
“(4A) Any power to distribute assets to the employer on a winding up is to be disregarded for the purposes of subsections (2) and (3); and a resolution under subsection (2) may not confer such a power.”.
This amendment ensures that the scope of section 36B is confined to powers to pay surplus otherwise than on the winding up of the scheme.
Amendment 27, in clause 8, page 8, line 6, at end insert—
“(5A) Regulations may provide that this section does not apply, or applies with prescribed modifications, in prescribed circumstances or to schemes of a prescribed description.”—(Torsten Bell.)
This amendment, which inserts provision corresponding to section 37(8), allows for the application of section 36B to be modified in particular cases (for example, in the case of sectionalised schemes).
Clause 8, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Restrictions on exercise of power to pay surplus
I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 9, page 8, line 18, at end insert—
“(2AA) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (2A), regulations made under that subsection must include provision that takes into account the particular circumstances of occupational pension schemes established before the coming into force of the Pensions Act 1995 which, prior to that Act, possessed or were understood to possess a power to pay surplus to an employer.”.
This amendment would allow schemes where people are affected by pre-97 to offer discretionary indexation where funding allows, with appropriate regulatory oversight.
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 6, in clause 9, page 8, line 23, at end insert—
“(aa) prohibiting the making of a payment until annual increases to payments in line with Consumer Prices Index inflation have been awarded to members,”.
This amendment requires that payments in line with CPI inflation are awarded to members before all other considerations.
The purpose of amendment 5 is to ensure that regulations take account of the particular circumstances of occupational pension schemes that were established before the Pensions Act 1995. There is effective discrimination against certain pre-1997 pension holders. That is a long-standing grievance and has remained unresolved for far too long. This has been reflected considerably in my postbag, as I am sure it has been for pretty much every MP.
In the evidence session on Tuesday, we heard moving testimony from Roger Sainsbury of the Deprived Pensioners Association and Terry Monk of the Pensions Action Group. As they told us, many of those affected are, literally, dying without ever seeing satisfaction. Many of these pensioners are receiving a fraction of what they are entitled to and what somebody who paid the exact same sums is currently receiving. It is causing genuine hardship.
Members of the pre-’97 schemes are often in a different position to those in later schemes. These schemes were designed under a different legal and regulatory framework. Current legislation does not always reflect those historical realities, which creates unintended inequities.
The amendment would require regulations under clause 9 to explicitly consider these older schemes. It would allow such schemes, with appropriate regulatory oversight, to offer discretionary indexation where funding allows. The key impacts would be to provide flexibility while ensuring safeguards are in place, give trustees the ability to improve outcomes for members in a fair and responsible way, and help to address the long-standing issue of members who miss out on indexation simply because of the scheme’s pre-’97 status. It also ensures that members can share in scheme strength where resources permit.
Clearly, safeguards are needed, and the amendment makes it clear that discretionary increases would be possible only where schemes are well funded. Oversight by regulators ensures that employer interests and member protections remain balanced. The intention behind the amendment is to bring fairness and flexibility into the treatment of pre-’97 scheme members and to modernise the system so that it works for today’s savers without undermining scheme stability.
I will not take up too much of the Committee’s time, but suffice it to say that we all heard the evidence that was presented on Tuesday, and we in the Conservative party agree with the Liberal Democrats’ amendment. We will support it.
I will not say much just now. I would like to hear what the Minister says, and I might bob again after that, Sir Christopher.
I thank the hon. Members for Torbay and for Horsham for their amendments and for giving us the opportunity to discuss the matter of defined-benefit members and pre-1997 accruals. I should be clear that clause 9 and the related amendments refer to defined-benefit schemes, not to the questions of the Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme compensation, which were discussed at such length—and, as several hon. Members have said, powerfully—at the evidence session on Tuesday.
The Government understand the intent behind the amendments. It is crucial that the new surplus flexibilities work for both sponsoring employers and members, for example through discretionary benefit increases where appropriate. That point was raised several times on Second Reading before the summer recess.
On pre-1997 indexation, it is important to be clear that most schemes—as I said, these schemes are not in the PPF or receiving FAS compensation—pay some pre-1997 indexation. Analysis published last year by the Pensions Regulator shows that only 17% of members of private sector defined-benefit pension schemes do not receive any pre-1997 indexation on their benefits, because different scheme rules specify whether someone receives that indexation.
Under the Bill, decisions to enable the scheme to release a surplus will always rest with trustees, who have a duty to act in the interests of scheme beneficiaries. Trustees, working with the sponsoring employer, will be responsible for determining how members should benefit from any surplus release, which may include discretionary indexation. My personal view is that, in lots of cases, it should, but that is where the discussion takes place. The Government are clear that trustees’ discretion is key to this policy. Trustees are best placed to determine the correct use of the surplus for their members, not least because that will involve making some trade-offs between different groups, particularly of members, and it is trustees who are in the position to do so.
It would not be appropriate for the Government to mandate that schemes provide uncapped indexation, in line with the consumer prices index, to all members prior to the making of a surplus payment. Where trustees plan to award discretionary increases, they are best placed to identify what increase is affordable and proportionate for the scheme and its members.
Although scheme rules may require an employer to agree to a discretionary increase—this point was made by several Members who were anxious about it on Second Reading—the trustees will have the final say when deciding to release surplus, and they are perfectly within their rights to request such an increase as part of any agreement that leads to a surplus release. That is a powerful power for trustees to hold on to.
The Pensions Regulator will publish guidance for trustees, as I previously mentioned, and for their advisers, noting factors to consider when releasing surplus and ways in which trustees can ensure that members and employees can benefit. That will happen following the passage of the Bill. These measures already give trustees the opportunity to secure the best outcomes for their members, which could include discretionary increases. I am grateful for the contribution from the hon. Member for Horsham, but on those grounds, I ask him to withdraw the amendment.
As I said, I wanted to hear from the Minister. I agree that trustees should be the ones making the decision on how to spend any surplus and whether to make an uprating. However, as some schemes are barred by their scheme rules from making such an uprating, my concern is about allowing them the flexibility to make it in any circumstances if they decide that that is the best thing to do. It is not about tying their hands and saying that they have to make an uprating; it is about allowing every single scheme the flexibility to make it if they decide that that is the best thing to do.
Where there are employer blockers or other issues in the scheme rules, can anything be done, in the Bill or anywhere else, to remove those blockers so that we can ensure that trustees have an element of choice and remove some of the unfairness that we heard about on Tuesday?
I think I can offer the hon. Lady some reassurance. It is true that within some scheme rules it will be clear that discretionary increases of the kind that we are debating would require employer agreement. I know that that has worried some hon. Members who think that that could be a veto against such releases in a surplus release situation.
My view—and the guidance to be released by the TPR will make this very clear—is as follows. It may formally be for the employer to agree to those discretionary increases. The scheme rules may apply to that, although in some schemes the trustees may be able to make that decision on their own—that will be a distinction that will depend on the scheme rules. However, even when the scheme rules say that the employers must agree, they will have a strong incentive to agree with the trustees if they are asking the trustees to release. That is why I say that the process of surplus release will change the dynamic of those discussions, which I recognise are currently not proceeding in some cases because employers are saying a blanket no to discretionary increases. We do not need legislative change to make that happen.
Would the Minister encourage those schemes that find that they want to release the surplus in relation to the uplift, but are struggling to get that process across the line, to go to the TPR, look at the guidance that is coming out and ask for assistance with making those discretionary uplifts?
I absolutely would. I have been making exactly those points to anyone who will listen.
I thank the Minister for his comments. Over the coming weeks, as he will be aware, we will be discussing several amendments that relate to the same issue. It will be interesting to see whether we can reach a satisfactory solution. In the meantime, we will press our amendment to a vote, because we feel that the issue has remained unresolved for such a long time that it needs everything we can give it to get it across the line, but we hope that in the next couple of weeks of debate we can find the best possible solution.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 247, in clause 9, page 8, line 23, at end insert—
“(aa) prohibiting the making of a payment unless the scheme’s assets have exceeded a buyout valuation,”.
This amendment requires that surplus extraction is only permitted once buyout funding levels are achieved.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 260, in clause 9, page 8, line 30, at end insert—
“(e) requiring the trustees to provide a prescribed notification, as set out in (f) below, with the members of the scheme (or their representatives) not less than 60 days before making any payment under this section;
(f) the prescribed notification should include—
(i) the proposed amount of surplus to be paid to the employer,
(ii) the reasons for the proposed payment,
(iii) the impact on member benefits,
(iv) the scheme's funding position after the proposed payment, and
(v) how members may make representations regarding the proposal;
(g) requiring the trustees to have regard to any representations made by members or their representatives having received the prescribed notification.”
This amendment would require trustees to notify members at least 60 days before making surplus payments to employers. It ensures members receive full information about proposed surplus payments, enabling informed participation.
Amendment 265, in clause 9, page 8, line 30, at end insert——
“(e) requiring the trustees to provide a prescribed notification to members of the scheme, or members’ representatives, not less than 60 days before making any payment under this section,
(f) requiring the prescribed notification under subsection (e) include—
(i) the proposed amount of surplus to be paid to the employer,
(ii) the reasons for the proposed payment,
(iii) the impact on member benefits,
(iv) the scheme's funding position after the proposed payment,
(v) how members may make representations regarding the proposal, and
(g) requiring the trustees to have regard to any representations made by members or their representatives having received the prescribed notification under subsection (e).”
This amendment would require trustees to notify members at least 60 days before making surplus payments to employers.
Amendment 267, in clause 9, page 8, line 30, at end insert—
“(e) requiring that, where the scheme actuary certifies under subsection (a) that the scheme’s assets exceed the cost of securing each member’s accrued rights with an authorised insurer for a continuous period of at least six months, the trustees must first secure a full buy-out of those rights before any payment of surplus may be made to the employer or any other person, and
(f) requiring that subsection (e) does not apply if the scheme actuary certifies that any surplus extraction would, after the extraction, still leave the scheme’s assets exceeding the cost of securing each member’s accrued rights with an authorised insurer.”
This amendment inserts a requirement to ensure that surplus extraction prior to a buyout does not adversely impact the scheme’s ability to reach buyout.
Amendment 261, in clause 9, page 8, line 36, at end insert
“and including confirmation that the proposed payment (surplus access) will not adversely impact members' benefits and that the prescribed notification has been completed in accordance with regulations made under subsection (2A).”
This amendment would aim to strengthen an actuary's role and oversight of schemes accessing surplus, by requiring confirmation that member notification has occurred before certifying surplus payments.
Any decision to release surplus funds from defined-benefit pension schemes should rest firmly, as we have discussed, with the trustees. It is important to emphasise that trustees bear the ultimate responsibility for such decisions. We believe that surplus repayments to employers should be permitted only when members’ benefits are fully protected and robust safeguards are in place to maintain the security and sustainability of the scheme.
The Bill notes that the detailed criteria for surplus payments will be set out in forthcoming regulations, and those regulations must be subject to close scrutiny with a primary focus on safeguarding members’ benefits before any funds can be released. There remain important unanswered questions regarding what appropriate guardrails for surplus release should look like. One firm belief is that defined-benefit pension funds should be funded to buy-out levels, to the extent that they are capable of securing members’ benefits with an insurer. Additionally, any surplus extraction should demonstrably provide clear benefits to scheme members, rather than simply serving the employer’s interest—although we heard evidence on Tuesday that did not necessarily agree with that.
We acknowledge that there are broader issues facing defined-benefit pension schemes that we intend to explore further when the Committee considers the new clauses. In particular, the post-Maxwell accounting framework is a significant constraint on defined-benefit pension funds. The requirement to show deficits on company balance sheets suppresses growth potential. The Bill should not miss an opportunity to address those structural hurdles.
One of the behavioural outcomes we have seen is that defined-benefit pension funds have been investing large amounts of money into bonds, including Government bonds, and not into equities where there is the greatest growth potential in the economy. That throws up a couple of problems in this area. First, the money is not going into equities, which are much more volatile than bonds. Secondly, if we see surplus extraction from some of those funds, that money will come from the Government bond market—the gilt market—and there may be an impact on the Government’s ability to borrow funds, which is something we will hear more about on 26 November. Crucially, the Minister will now be part of that, and I suspect he will be taking into account the bond market’s ability to meet Government borrowing requirements when he gets close to that date.
Moreover, there is nothing in the current legislation to prevent surpluses from being used for purposes that do not support economic growth, such as share buybacks or dividend payments by the host employer. Neither of those outcomes necessarily aligns with the Government’s growth agenda, although it could be argued that the money is going back into the wider economy and finding its way back. None the less, we would like to see more guidance on how that money is to be spent. Simply repaying—potentially—private equity funds a large dividend will not necessarily help the greater good.
The Bill proposes new flexibilities for defined-benefit schemes in surplus. Currently, the Bill is unclear on the level at which employers can extract that surplus and there is concern that, once a scheme is fully funded on a low-dependency basis, buy-out could happen. That is a lower threshold than for a gold standard buy-out and, while it may free up capital for employers and support investment, there are concerns that the change could risk members’ security, as buy-out remains the safest way to guarantee benefits. Amendment 247 would provide strong protection against a change of environment where DB funds start to slip back into deficit positions.
Our amendments 260 and 261 are linked. Just Group plc wrote to the Committee to highlight that members of pension schemes that undertake employer surplus extractions should receive proper notification. Engagement with members should be undertaken before extraction, because ultimately any decisions on surplus extraction could be impactful on them. Setting out clearly in legislation what effective engagement would look like, including the role of the actuary in the process, would help trustees to understand their obligations and Parliament’s intent.
Amendment 260 requires trustees to notify members at least 60 days before making surplus payments to employers, and ensures that members receive full information about proposed surplus payments, enabling informed participation. Amendment 261 aims to strengthen an actuary’s role in oversight of schemes accessing surplus, by requiring confirmation that member notification has occurred before certifying surplus payments. Both amendments strengthen the guardrails around DB surplus extraction, as part of our overall strategy of putting member interest first and protecting trustees. We will be pressing these amendments.
I rise to speak in respect of amendments 265 and 267, which echo the issues already covered by the shadow Minister. Allowing 60 days’ notice to scheme members is extremely important to the Liberal Democrats—and, to be fair, I am sure it is also important to the Government—and the central intention is to protect outcomes for members of schemes and ensure that there is enough flexibility. That 60 days’ notice is really important to us.
Ensuring that there is enough money in the scheme for any buy-out is the second element, which the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has already alluded to. We think it is very important that the finances are there and that we put scheme members at the centre of the proposals before us. I look forward to hearing from the Minister what reassurance he is able to give us on those points.
I will speak specifically to amendments 260 and 265. Any communication with scheme members is a good thing, particularly if there are to be changes such as those we have been discussing. Sometimes, surplus extraction may not be for the benefit of scheme members; sometimes it may be for other reasons, and trustees have a duty to make clear what they think it is for and to release a surplus only if they think it is a reasonable thing to do. However, they may not have a full understanding of how members feel about what the surplus could be used for. For example, scheme members who are active members might feel that they would love their company to invest in something to make their lives and their jobs easier, and might be keener on that extraction than the trustees might think, so it would be great to have that input.
Amendments 260 and 265 are incredibly similar—surprisingly similar, in fact—and I am happy to support both, were they put to a vote. Amendment 261 is consequential; on amendments 247 and 267, I do not feel I have enough information on what trustees think to make a reasonable judgment on whether either amendment would be a sensible way forward for trustees to meet their fiduciary duty, which is to provide the best guaranteed return for scheme members. I will step out of votes on amendments 247 or 267, but I will support the amendment that requires members to be consulted in advance.
I rise to speak to amendment 260. I thank my hon. Friend the shadow Minister for outlining our rationale for the amendments. My comments regard informing members. I support the right to pay surplus to employers—I think that is the right thing to do, so long as the correct safeguards are in place—but it is right to inform members of that decision. Not only is it the right thing to do, but it will improve member engagement in the whole pensions process. I made a point in Tuesday’s evidence session on the importance of financial education, and a number of witnesses supported that position. By more actively engaging with members, we will ensure that they take part in their own pension provision and ensure that the right decisions are made in their own interests.
My overall reflection on the amendments is that in most cases what is being requested is already happening, or risks reducing flexibility for trustees. I will set that out in a bit more detail, but I am grateful to hon. Members for their contributions and for the amendments targeting important areas of concern.
Amendments 247 and 261 aim to maintain the buy-out funding threshold for surplus release from DB schemes. Member security is at the heart of our changes, as I have already set out. We are clear that the new surplus flexibilities must both work for employers and maintain a very high level of security for members, as we all agree. Under these proposals, surplus sharing will remain subject to strict safeguards, including the actuarial certification and the prudent funding threshold, which is the same threshold that the TPR under the previous Government had put in place for defined-benefit schemes to aim for more generally. The defined-benefit funding code and underpinning legislation require that trustees aim to maintain a strong funding position more generally, leaving aside the question of surplus release. They do that so that we have very high confidence that members’ future pensions will be paid.
However, the Government are minded to amend the funding threshold at which surplus can be released from the current buy-out threshold to the full funding on a low dependency basis, as I mentioned earlier. That is still a robust and prudent threshold that aligns with the existing rules, as I have just said. The goal here is to give more options to DB scheme trustees. Again, that is true across the Bill: we are aiming to provide trustees with more options about how they proceed.
Many schemes are planning to buy out members’ benefits with an insurer. In many cases that is the right thing for them to do, but other schemes might want to continue to run on their scheme for some time without expecting future contributions to be required from an employer. The low-dependency threshold will give flexibility to trustees to do so. It is right that they have a variety of options to choose from when selecting the endgame for their scheme.
The Government will set out the details of the revised funding threshold in draft regulations, on which we will consult. More broadly, we think it right that that is done via secondary legislation, not primary legislation.
Can the Minister give us some timescales? I asked previously about timescales, regulations and secondary legislation. I would be grateful if the Minister could address that.
The hon. Member rightly returns to an important question. As I set out at the evidence session on Tuesday, our pension policy road map, published at the same time as the Bill, details exactly when we are planning to bring forward regulations. My understanding is that these particular regulations should be consulted on in the spring of next year—if that is not right, I will make sure we come back to him with further details. As I say, the road map provides the details of that timeline. It is a very important question for people to be clear on. In that consultation, I am sure the evidence we have heard will be taken into account.
Amendments 260 and 265 correctly aim to ensure that members are well informed and represented when it comes to their pension schemes and retirement. The new paragraphs would be inserted into clause 9 of the Bill, which amends section 37 of the Pensions Act 1995. Section 37 already provides that regulations must require members to be notified in relation to a surplus payment before it is made.
This is therefore not about the flexibility of trustees; it is redundant, given the requirements already in the Bill. It is similar to the existing requirement under section 37 of the Pensions Act 1995, and we will again consult on these draft regulations following Royal Assent. Furthermore, trustees already have a clear duty to act in all matters in the best interests of the beneficiaries of their scheme, and they are best placed to decide, in consultation with the sponsoring employer, what actions are best for members—I will not keep repeating that point as we go through the rest of this Bill.
Finally, I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for proposing amendment 261, with its requirement for actuarial confirmation that proposed payments from a DB surplus to employers will not adversely affect members’ benefits, and that members have been notified ahead of that release. Those are valuable objectives, but they are already achieved by the robust safeguards in place, including trustee discretion, the prudent funding threshold —on which we will consult—and the actuarial certification that a scheme is well funded.
In addition, the defined-benefit funding code and the underpinning legislation already require trustees to aim to maintain a strong funding position, and that is actively overseen by the Pensions Regulator. I believe the safeguards we have put in place put members at the heart of the policy, which is a point of cross-party agreement, and will allow trustees to continue to be the people who strike the correct balance between the benefits for employers and members. I hope this offers some reassurance to the Committee that, for the reasons I have outlined, these amendments are unnecessary; I urge hon. Members not to press them.
The Minister has said that trustees are required to act in the interests of and to the benefit of scheme members. However, they are required to act so that members will get the benefits that they are promised under the pension. They are not required to act to the benefit of scheme members. As I said earlier, there is a distinct possibility—particularly with surplus, which is not going into the pension scheme and which can only be paid if those benefits are already guaranteed—that the surplus is only a surplus in the case where members are definitely going to get those benefits anyway.
It is the case that trustees might not know what is to the benefit of members. Requiring them, or asking them, to consult members on what they would like, or to provide members with information about how money is going to be spent, could get better results for those members. It is not going to change the amount of pension they will get, which is the trustees’ requirement; however, it may change their lives in a more positive way. Whether or not they are people currently paying into the scheme and actively employed, there are ways that the surplus could be spent that would benefit or disbenefit their lives.
In making that case, I think there should be a consultation with members. The hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire made the point very well that we should encourage people to take more interest in and have more input into their pensions, so that they have a better idea of what is going on, of the possibility of surpluses and of how they are spent. I would appreciate it if the Minister, when he is considering the regulations and the changes being made, could think about how best to consult scheme members. Given that trustees have a duty to act not in the best interests of members, but in the best interests of members’ pensions, I would love to see, around the surplus, arrangements that benefit scheme members—whether they are currently paying, future or deferred members, or those already getting their pensions—rather than solely the employer and the employer’s intentions.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Gerald Jones.)