Monday 12th January 2026
(1 day, 11 hours ago)
Lords ChamberDiego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 View all Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 158-I Amendment for Third Reading - (9 Jan 2026)
17:05 - Division on Lord Callanan’s amendment to the Motion - Ayes: 201 / Noes: 169 - Lord Callanan’s amendment to the Motion agreed.
Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)
My Lords, I have it in command from His Majesty the King to acquaint the House that His Majesty, having been informed of the Report of the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill, has consented to place his interests, so far as they are affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.
Clause 6: Commencement and short title
Amendment 1
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would make all orders under clause 6(1) subject to parliamentary control in the form of negative procedure.
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)
My Lords, this government amendment will change the parliamentary procedure applicable to the delegated power in Clause 6. With this amendment, all instruments made using that power would be subject to the negative procedure. Previously, no parliamentary procedure applied unless the power was used to amend, repeal or revoke Acts of Parliament or statutory instruments made under them.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for his contribution to this. I am glad that we were able to agree on a sensible compromise which puts into effect one of the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I hope that this assures the noble Lord and the DPRRC that the Government have listened to the views of noble Lords and are willing to find compromises where they are sensible. I beg to move.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I want to say a big thank you to the Minister for her engagement following Report and for tabling this amendment by way of, as she says, what I hope is very much an agreeable compromise.
While the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee made the good point that Henry VIII powers should only exceptionally be subject to other than the affirmative procedure, in fact, when one looks at the detail of the Bill in the Government’s further response, it is quite clear that it would be excessive for the House to be detained on an affirmative debate on some of this legislation in relation to what are clearly not controversial matters. However, establishing the principle that all statutory orders should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny is, I think, important. I am very glad that the Government have accepted that.
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)
I am grateful to noble Lords for their engagement on this crucial legislation, which secures a vital element of the UK’s national security and the UK’s transatlantic defence partnership. I thank noble Lords across the House for their expertise, which they have used to scrutinise the security of the base, the costs of the treaty, support mechanisms for the Chagossian community and environmental conservation provisions, to name a few.
The UK-Mauritius treaty protects the Diego Garcia military base and ensures that the UK retains full control over this vital asset. This in turn will protect our national security for generations, ensure that the UK keeps unique and vital capabilities to deal with a wide range of threats, and keep the British people safe. The Bill ensures that the treaty can be ratified. As the world grows more dangerous, so too does the importance of the base for our national security. Noble Lords will not need to be told how crucial it is that the treaty is ratified and the base protected in the ever-shifting geopolitical landscape of our age.
We have had extensive debate in this House, and it has been good debate. I thank noble Lords on this side of the Floor, including my noble friend Lord Beamish, for their thoughtful and insightful contributions. I thank noble Lords from across the House for their thoughtful contributions throughout the passage of the Bill, in particular the noble Lords, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, Lord Hannay, Lord Jay and Lord Purvis of Tweed. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Hannan and Lord Lilley, for their exuberant speeches, even if I have not always agreed with them. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Foster and Lady Hoey, and the noble Lords, Lord Morrow and Lord Weir, for their passionate speeches. I thank my noble friend Lord Coaker for his support on leading the Bill. I thank my honourable friends in the other place, the Minister for Overseas Territories and the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, who have spoken at length with Peers about the detail of the Bill.
Finally, I thank the officials who have supported the Bill. I thank those on the Bill team—notably Helena Brice, our indefatigable Bill manager—and the policy teams in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Ministry of Defence. They have worked tirelessly behind the scenes, often working to challenging deadlines. I thank those in my private office, in particular Bola, who have of course been crucial in supporting me. My thanks must be offered to all the parliamentary staff who have ensured the smooth process of this Bill.
Amendment to the Motion
Lord Callanan
At end insert “but that this House regrets that the UK-Mauritius Agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia does not secure the long-term future of the Diego Garcia Military Base, creates uncertainty over the continuing unrestricted use of the Military Base and imposes £35 billion of costs on UK taxpayers for which the Government has no mandate, and that the Government failed to consult the Chagossian people before signing the Treaty”.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, throughout our debates on the Bill, we have had, as the Minister said, many robust exchanges, and the Bill will go to the other place with four amendments passed by your Lordships’ House. However, it has become increasingly clear throughout those debates that this deal fails even on the terms set out for it by its ministerial proponents.
They have told us repeatedly that we need this deal to provide legal certainty—“Look at the advisory opinion by the ICJ”, they tell us. We are told that if we do not give away the islands then all sorts of unpleasant judgments might follow in various unspecified fora. My noble friend Lord Lilley has been forensic in questioning the Government on exactly where these adverse rulings might emanate, given that the ICJ itself would surely be excluded from any such decisions and that disputes involving the UK and Commonwealth countries were specifically excluded from its mandate when we first acceded to it. We have heard various mutterings about the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and even the International Telecommunication Union, but no definitive response. Therefore, we have an advisory ICJ opinion, from a panel containing Russian and Chinese judge—those doughty campaigners for the concept of international law, seemingly applying to everyone except themselves—and, with great seriousness, Ministers tell us that this opinion must be respected.
However, we now have an additional opinion from another UN body: the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which, ironically, contains Mauritius as a member. A few weeks ago, this committee published a formal decision calling for the suspension of treaty ratification. As far as I am aware, the Foreign Office has ignored it and is yet to even comment on the ruling. So we have two diametrically opposed opinions from different UN bodies, one of which is to be obeyed without hesitation while the other, apparently, is to be completely ignored.
Ministers then tell us that they have fully secured the future of the Diego Garcia base, which will be able to continue operations exactly as before. However, they have manifestly failed to explain how that can possibly be the case when Mauritius is a signatory to the Pelindaba treaty which prohibits the placing of any nuclear weapons on any African territory, which Diego Garcia would become under this deal. Nobody has been asking Ministers to disclose secret defence information, but we know from openly published sources that the base has been utilised for the transportation of nuclear weapons on planes and submarines. How can that possibly be compatible with Mauritius’s obligations under the Pelindaba treaty?
The agreement is completely silent on this matter. Even in the face of robust questioning from my noble friend Lady Goldie, a former Defence Minister, we have received no ministerial answers. If base operation is to continue unhindered, as Ministers tell us it will, we can only assume there exists some kind of secret agreement along the lines of the old disgraced US policy on gays in the military: don’t ask and don’t tell.
The current Mauritian Government might play along with this fiction, but what about any future Mauritian Governments? What about all the other African signatories to the treaty? Any one of them could also take action in the international courts to force Mauritius to abide by its treaty obligations. For an agreement supposedly predicated on providing both military and legal certainty, it seems destined to do the exact opposite.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, I first of all associate myself with the remarks of my noble friend Lord Callanan. I preface my further remarks by saying there was a very useful debate on Report, which brought out a number of important points which command attention. In that context, I spoke then exclusively on the defence and security implications of this treaty. I thank the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for both listening to my concerns and undertaking to write to me, which he has indeed done. That attentive and helpful approach bears all the hallmarks of a responsible and helpful persona which a Defence Minister should be, and of which the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is the embodiment; the content of the response bears all the hallmarks of a letter drafted by someone blind to the basic precepts of defence and security but who finds much more comfortable the languorous corridors of the FCDO and the limiting confines of the minutiae of the text of this treaty.
It is the other treaty, the Pelindaba treaty, about which I sought clarification. Instead, I received a letter about how this treaty guarantees this, stops that and binds Mauritius to the other. The letter is silent on how, once Mauritius gains sovereignty of the Diego Garcia base under this botched treaty, Mauritius can stop the co-signatories of the Pelindaba treaty, either on their own account or egged on by others, from challenging Mauritius on alleged misuse of the base under the terms of the Pelindaba treaty. I suspect the reason for the silence is because you cannot stop that third-party interference.
That strikes at the heart of why we currently have sovereignty over the base, how we use it, how the United States uses it and how our allies may need to use it. That unfettered, unchallengeable usage and access is possible only because we have sovereignty. While we can have bilateral discussions with Mauritius and enter into bilateral agreements and treaties with Mauritius, they are only as good as Mauritius has competence to give the protections, undertakings and reassurances. If the hands of Mauritius are tied by a preceding undertaking such as the Pelindaba treaty, then these protections, undertakings and reassurances are not worth the paper they are written on—just a load of flummery.
I did not put down an amendment at Report, because this flaw is irremediable. I was prepared to allow the Government a final opportunity to provide clarification and reassurance, but, unsurprisingly, they have been unable to do that. The question then is: what should a responsible Opposition do? My naturally bellicose nature inclined towards voting against this Bill, but I am not indifferent to the constitutional status of this House and the respective conventions which regulate our proceedings in relation to government Bills. Fortunately, my leader, my noble friend Lord True, and my Chief Whip, my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford, are far less hot-headed than I am and infinitely more thoughtful and strategic in outlook. It is their view, which I accept, that, however wrong-headed and naive we think this treaty to be, voting down the Bill on Third Reading is not an appropriate way, in this instance, to proceed.
Our regret Motion places on the record all our misgivings and apprehensions. If this precarious, ill-starred government adventure comes to grief, it will give me no pleasure to say, “We told you so”, but at least His Majesty’s Opposition can hold their head up and say, “We did our job”; what a pity the Government cannot make the same claim. I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Callanan.
Lord Altrincham (Con)
I thank the Minister for her courtesy and patience throughout this very unusual Bill and its passage through this House. I will make a few remarks on the financial costs.
The treaty makes provision for a financial agreement that requires the UK to make payments to the Republic of Mauritius for the next 99 years. The agreement is very unusual, and that is because the payments are not known. The payments are not known from year 14 for the next 85 years because the payments are linked not to events in the Indian Ocean but to UK domestic inflation. It is an extraordinarily long contract for the taxpayer to be exposed like this to UK domestic inflation.
Inflation in the future is unknown, unknowable and uncapped. That means the payments under this contract are unknown, unknowable and uncapped. Maybe the Foreign Office, in looking at the projections, imagined a very benign opportunity for UK inflation and maybe it hoped that the numbers would stay very low, but if we had inflation as high as it was in this country two years ago, at any point in the 85 years of this contract the payments would get completely out of hand and be completely unaffordable to the UK.
This is why Ministers and Parliament have been poorly briefed on the contents of the treaty and why there is this extraordinary difference between the £3.4 billion accounting valuation, which was done under the Treasury Green Book procedure for UK domestic infrastructure spending, and what this is actually going to cost. As my noble friend Lord Callanan mentioned, the Government’s own internal estimate of the cost is around £34 billion to £35 billion, which is a very substantial amount to be paying.
We might hope, at this stage of the Bill, to have some good advice from the OBR, but the OBR has been quite unhelpful to the Government—and, possibly, to Parliament—and said that it has nothing to do with this. We might hope for clarification from His Majesty’s Treasury. Of course, the treaty was not negotiated by the Treasury; it was negotiated by another department. But, in the middle of the holidays, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury slipped out an announcement on 16 December—it is on GOV.UK—to say that the Treasury would be changing its Green Book methodology. So, we can be sure that the Treasury does not even agree with the accounting valuation, let alone the actuarial true cost of this agreement.
When the Minister said to us during the passage of the Bill that the total cost was £3.4 billion—she said it to us in this Chamber—it was not correct, because the total cost is not known. That needs to be corrected in the treaty, because it is quite clear that that is the intention of the Government. The Government wish, for their own reasons, not well understood by the Opposition, to pay the Republic of Mauritius £3.4 billion. It is their intention and it appears to be their understanding—but it is not what is in the treaty.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Leong) (Lab)
My Lords, this is Third Reading. Arguments made at previous—
Lord Leong (Lab)
This is Third Reading and the noble Lord is repeating what has been debated before.
Lord Altrincham (Con)
I will speak briefly to the rest of the amendment.
The amounts referenced in the Chamber and during the passage of the Bill have not been correct. We need to make sure that the treaty is amended to reflect what the Government’s intention is: that it should be a payment of £3.4 billion and not an open-ended economic exposure. Given the extremely unusual and long-dated nature of this contract, we need to make sure the treaty is amended to protect UK taxpayers and, indeed, to maintain confidence in the sovereign credit of the UK.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, I join with others in welcoming the robust yet civilised and courteous way in which this legislation has been debated. Obviously, at Third Reading, it is not appropriate to regurgitate all the arguments. However, given the significance of the Bill, it is also the case that it merits some level of, albeit brief, comment. While we have gone through this process, and I welcome the amendments that have been tabled to the Bill, they cannot render acceptable what is totally unacceptable.
We are still left with a Bill that is bad for the United Kingdom. We are not simply handing over sovereignty to Mauritius; we are paying it an expensive dowry to take over what has been British sovereign territory for 200 years.
From a defence point of view, we are left with a flawed situation. Rather than perhaps the jewel in the crown, we are left with a situation where, despite the assurances that have been given, we know, from a practical point of view, that we will see Mauritius in effect leasing out, in either official or unofficial form, to foreign powers—particularly the Chinese Government—surrounding islands. So, instead of a jewel in the crown, we will be left with a military base with a noose around it, ever tightening as time moves on.
In particular, even with the amendments, we have not dealt with the situation as regards our debt and duty to the Chagossians themselves. We have been left in a situation in which they have been denied complete access to the islands. They have no right of full self-return. More importantly, they have also been left without the right of self-determination.
This House has been united, as we saw a few moments ago, in rightly condemning what has been happening in Iran and supporting the Iranian people in their right of self-determination. This House, on a number of occasions, has utterly condemned the invasion of Ukraine and supported the right of Ukrainians to decide their own future. Similarly, I suspect that this House would be united in saying that the Greenlanders have the right to determine their own future and that it should not be imposed from the United States or anywhere else. The thread that runs through all three of these situations is the right of self-determination and democracy. That is the golden thread to which should be standing.
Yet, we are in a situation, as regards the Chagossians, that this can apply elsewhere in the world but, shamefully, not to the people who have actually looked to us to deliver for them. If we simply let this go through and the Government let this go through unaltered, we will lack the moral or political authority to dictate elsewhere in the world on the issue of self-determination. So I support the regret amendment in the perhaps vain hope that, by sending a signal today, we can at least say to the Government, “Think again before it is entirely too late”.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I very much support the amendment of regret and I am pleased it has been tabled. I find the word “regret” not nearly strong enough, because for me this will be a very sad day if the Bill goes through from the House of Lords to the other place.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, has just said that this was not part of a Labour manifesto, but it was part of the last Government’s determination to get a deal on the issue of Diego Garcia. I accept that there are genuine arguments in this debate around environmental issues, and issues around the Chagossian people. I have to say that, from certain quarters, that has come a bit late. We have had quietness, certainly during the last Government, about the rights of Chagossians. I accept that there are noble exceptions in this House and in the other place who have campaigned for many years for their rights, but that was never an issue at the forefront of the last Government’s negotiations with regard to the Bill. What the last Government did was very sensible. They wanted to enter into a long-term agreement to ensure the security and long-term use of Diego Garcia, which was under threat, obviously because of the unusual nature of that island territory.
In terms of Diego Garcia, the agreement is vital not only to our national interests but to our international allies, including the United States. Much has been said about the United States being against this deal. It is not; it sees the long-term benefits. I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said about the investment, but that pales into insignificance compared to the amount of investment that the US and other allies will be putting in to secure not only the long-term interests of that base but its capabilities. It is not something we can play party politics with. Alas, I accept that some people are playing party politics with this.
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Lords, apart from thanking the Minister and her noble colleague for the courteous way in which they have responded the points I made—which she found exuberant and my noble colleague found forensic—I can limit my remarks to four sentences, two of which are questions.
First, the Government have acknowledged that neither the International Court of Justice nor the tribunal of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea could produce a ruling that was binding on us as to the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands. The Government none the less assert that other countries might respond, even to rulings which were non-binding on us, by withholding goods, services or facilities which could render the base inoperable.
My two questions are: what goods and what services, and supplied by which countries? Secondly, if the base could be rendered inoperable by foreign states withholding goods and services, is it not vulnerable to such action even in the absence of legal rulings and even if we surrender sovereignty if other countries object to our possession or use of the base? Why have the Government not replied to these questions?
Lord Deben (Con)
My Lords, I will just come back to the issue of the environment, which is crucial here. I have a direct question to the Minister, whom I particularly respect in this area. Why on earth was there not a clear connection between our payments and the upkeep of this, the most important marine environment area in the world? We have a very proud record on this, yet we are now giving this into the hands of a country which, however good its words, has one of the worst records on marine protection in the entire world. We are giving it power over the most important marine protection area in the entire world, and we have not connected the money we are paying with its ability to pay for the protection of this area. My question to the Minister is very simple: why not? Why on earth have we not done that?
I do not like this agreement at all; I am opposed to it for all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, has so rightly put forward. But at the heart of my concern is that we are letting down the whole of the international community by giving out something which we have protected and which has set the example for marine preservation throughout the world. Without the Chagos agreement, we would never have had all the others which have followed, and which have been crucial to the environmental health of this planet. I ask the Minister again: can she explain how this arrangement has been made when there is no connection between what we pay and what we expect in terms of protection?
Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)
My Lords, I have one final question to the Minister, while confessing, quite frankly, that I have taken zero part in the earlier Committee stage—but Third Reading, contrary to what was suggested earlier, is an opportunity to look at the overall aim and underlying strategy of a measure. Some earlier remarks, which were fascinating, about the financial side should have been ones we were allowed to hear a bit more of.
My question is quite simple. Why does the Minister think that, in looking at this issue, we have not heard a single mention of the Commonwealth system, the largest—although not very centralised—organisation in the world? Why does there appear to have been no discussion between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—its relevant office—and the new and very lively Commonwealth Secretary-General? Why does she think we have not seen any understanding that the Commonwealth, although it has been described as “friends with a purpose”, is of course deeply concerned with the rights of islanders, and the rights of countries as to their status—whether they should be protected and be free and open members of the Commonwealth or associated with the Commonwealth? Such engagement would be in the knowledge that we have many friends and that they could discuss matters with Mauritius, and indeed with India, as well as their own status in an age of delegated and digitalised activity in which very small countries can assume a very important role, as no doubt the Chagos Islands and Diego Garcia will be doing for some years. Given that new and changing pattern of organisations as a new world emerges, as everyone admits, and that entire makeover and difference in our international relations for years ahead, why does she think we have not applied the sensible duty that we should have applied as an active member—not a hub—of the Commonwealth network and left the decisions that we are now being asked to make for much further discussion in a changing world?
Lord Kempsell (Con)
My Lords, what a privilege it is to follow the incisive questions of my noble friends who spoke before me and to add my support to the regret amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Callanan, whose speech crystallised the litany of reasons that there are to oppose the Bill and to continue opposing it. The speeches already made in this debate have been a mirror of the way in which your Lordships’ House has conducted the difficult work of scrutinising the Bill—forensic, effective and in depth.
I will restrict myself only to a point, which occurred to me just now as the Minister was speaking, and which we have not heard so much of in previous stages. As the Minister was delivering her paean to all those who have been involved in working on the Bill, and no doubt they have worked very hard to achieve this outcome, I felt some disquiet at the Government indulging themselves in the way in which they have handled this policy. That is for one reason—the consultation of the Chagossians themselves. We know that only a handful, despite the huge machinery at the Government’s disposal, have been asked for their thoughts and views. Moreover, there is the way in which Ministers have adumbrated reasons, explanations and theories for the deal—first, that it was designed to push back on hostile states, and then we learn that only a week later, representatives of hostile states have visited the Government of Mauritius and openly praised the deal. There was also the argument that the deal was necessary for the policing of the electromagnetic spectrum over Diego Garcia, an argument that we heard so much about and that then fell away when it emerged that the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination—not the International Telecommunication Union this time—criticised the Bill in the sternest possible terms.
Some Governments blunder into historic foreign policy disasters; some have their hand forced by world events; but never have a Government in modern British administration walked so voluntarily into a strategic bear trap, as this Government are doing with this Bill. Can I ask the Minister to clarify, as the Bill returns to the other place, what plans are in place now to make good the deficit in consultation of Chagossians? Even at this very late hour, what plans do the Government have for that?
I say to the Minister that the Bill remains so confusing, including the pace at which the Government brought it forward and the way they handled questions and scrutiny, not least my own Written Question in September 2024, in which I asked the Government to explain their intentions for the Chagos deal. The Minister answered, saying that it was too early to say. Only nine days later, the Government announced the entire plan. These are deficits in consultation and scrutiny. How does the Minister plan to make them good?
There is, of course, a suspicion that behind every great fortune—a fortune in taxpayers’ money is being spent on this deal, as my noble friend Lord Altrincham explained—there is a crime. There are many of us who consider this deal to be a historical crime. I think we will see the final answers that we seek with the implementation of the Bill, as the truth about this deal emerges.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, when I first started to ask questions about the treaty in this place, I asked about the trust fund. I am sure the Minister will remember that question because, in her answer, she accused me of not respecting national security, which was quite a thing for me, having spent all my political life standing up for self-determination and, indeed, security in its widest possible sense.
To echo what the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, said, the greatest problem with this treaty is the idea that we cannot have national security alongside respecting the rights of the Chagossian people. I do not accept that that is the case. We could have respected the Chagossians’ very clear desire. I know there are some here who will say there are different views among the Chagossian communities, but, given the recent report by the International Relations and Defence Committee of this House, which we heard about on Report, it is clear that those who communicated volunteered the fact that they wanted the Chagos Islands to remain British.
There are many reasons, which we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, why the treaty is a bad treaty, and the Bill is a bad Bill. There are fiscal reasons, which were made by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in Committee and echoed again today by the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham. There are environmental issues on a monumental scale, which we heard about from the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, and the noble Lords, Lord Deben and Lord Goldsmith. There are, of course, defence issues, which the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, rightly mentioned again today. This is all in the context of a live judicial review, which has still not given a judgment, and, of course, the report by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in December. Yet, the Government are determined to push ahead.
This is a bad Bill. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, for tabling his amendment to this Third Reading Motion, because reasonable questions about the Bill were put to the Government in Committee and on Report, and were met with a wall of denial. Now, the Chagossian people have set up a Government in exile. What does it say about the United Kingdom that the Chagossian people have to do that? Many of them are here again today in the Gallery.
Even if Third Reading goes ahead, the denial of rights will not disappear and the Chagossian people will not disappear—that is very clear. I plead with the Government, even at this late stage, to think again.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lords, what are we here for if not to think again? We are wriggling painfully on a hook. In the early days, a lot of people, hearing that the Chagos Islands were to be handed over, understood it to be some kind of restitution to the indigenous Chagossians, whom we all agree were very badly treated in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But, with every week that has passed since that initial announcement was made, the arguments have crumbled.
It has become clear that the Chagossians do not want to be handed to a foreign power that has never governed them and whose interest in the archipelago is financial. The Chagossians are here, as always, watching in the Gallery—their silence a neat symbol of how they have been overlooked in this entire debate. It has become clear that Mauritius does not have the capacity to maintain, as my noble friend Lord Deben says, the world’s greatest marine conservation area. It has become clear that the price tag is vastly higher than we were initially led to believe. It has become clear that foreign powers and unfriendly foreign powers are in favour of this deal. It has become clear that we are steamrolling over democracy.
If, as the upper House and the revising Chamber, we are not prepared to take a stand on something of this magnitude and as permanent in its impact in changing the size of the United Kingdom and changing the maps—this is going to be remembered long after people have forgotten what the inflation rate was in 2026 or whether we banned X—then what on earth are we here for?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, I wish to address just one point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish. He said that the previous Government would inevitably have done a deal. Plainly, this is not so. As my right honourable friend Tom Tugendhat made clear in the debates on this Bill in the other place, both he and I, when he was Minister for Security, made clear our opposition to adopting this course of negotiations. Furthermore, when my noble friend Lord Cameron was Foreign Secretary, he was offered a similar deal to the present one and we know that he stopped the process. The current treaty is and remains an act of wanton strategic self-harm.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, this has been an important debate on an important Bill and a considerable treaty that impacts on people’s lives and on international law, and which has direct relevance to UK national security. But this regret amendment has a bit of a Cambodia year zero feel to it, as if it all started last summer.
A casual observer would not be aware from this debate—notwithstanding the point that the noble Lord, Lord Murray, just indicated—that the previous Government chose to open negotiations to cede sovereignty in November 2022, without a mandate or consulting the Chagossian people. That decision by the previous Government, which we now know was opposed by the noble Lord, Lord Murray, and considered a mistake by the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, was done without consultation and was not predicated on guaranteeing Chagossian rights. Furthermore, we now know that it was actively ongoing in April 2024. It was at that point that the then Foreign Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, wrote to the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee to confirm the continuation of the negotiations, but also, regrettably, the ongoing denial of the resettlement and consultation rights of the community. So if we are to have regrets, perhaps there is quite a lot that can be shared around the Chamber.
I have previously said, and I do not want to repeat it, that we have a deep regret with the current Government. They have chosen not to change the path of the previous Government in coming to office, and they chose not to conclude the process differently. That has been the essence of the votes on the amendments in this House. At each step of the way, I have sought to raise the concern about a lack of consultation, consent and rights. I am very pleased that the House backed my amendments to seek to address this, and I hope very much that the Commons will now back this too. Putting the permissive elements of Chagossian rights in the treaty on a Mauritian and UK statutory footing should now be the priority. I hope this will get cross-party support.
From the outset, I have raised concerns over the lack of transparency in the financial arrangements and value for money. I was also very pleased that the House backed my amendments to give Parliament, and through it the wider Chagossian community, a much greater say—indeed, a final say—on ceasing making payments if Mauritius does not honour its commitments as part of the treaty. As the House knows, there are mechanisms in place only if the UK renege on commitments, not Mauritius. I am not saying that it will and I am sure both parties have entered into the agreement in good faith, but if, for whatever reason, they fail to honour commitments, Parliament must have the ability to cease the financial elements of the agreement. I hope that the Government will move on these areas as they are the view expressed by this House.
I turn to some of the wider political arguments that we have heard—and we have heard quite a lot. Notwithstanding the “year zero” feel of this amendment, anyone listening to the debate or reading it in Hansard should understand the basic numbers of this House, because some external messaging about stopping the Bill, and the last-ditch efforts of people who have not stopped it, need to be put into context. There are—and I like many of them—281 Conservative Members of this House, while my Benches have 75. There is a separate argument as to the numbers, of course, but the number of Conservative Peers alone could sway the decision today if the Motion is voted on, and I understand that it will be. It is basically a regret Motion. The Conservatives have chosen, with the fire and fury that we have heard in opposition, not to oppose the Bill today but to complain about it. The whole public should be aware that that is the reality of what will be happening today, and we will see how many of those 281 will at least complain about it, even though they are not seeking to stop it.
As we reach the end of this Bill, I thank most particularly the Chagossian community, many members of which have watched our debates. I have regretted some of the language that they have had to listen to, but I hope many of them feel that there are many people in this House who believe sincerely in their rights.
I thank Ministers who have been willing to listen, engage and—on certain occasions, as we have heard today from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley—agree. I want to chat with the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about how persuasive he was, because I hope the Minister will now act on the other amendments that we have heard, but presumably that will have to be for ping-pong.
I support those who have helped me in the debate, including Adam Bull in our whips’ office, and many other people who have been in touch. I hope we can make progress and focus now on the priorities, which are Chagossian legal rights of resettlement, active consultation and participation, value for money and finance. We should return to these issues after the Commons has considered our sensible amendments.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My Lords, this Government are doing the tough and vital work necessary to protect our national security. We were in opposition for a long time, 14 years, so I understand the temptation to play political games whenever you get the chance—I completely get that. However, one thing that we never did was put our national security at risk.
I do not aim these remarks at all the noble Lords and Baronesses opposite; I know for a fact that the noble Baronesses, Lady Foster and Lady Hoey, whose aim is true, have genuine, long-standing support for the Chagossian community, and they apply that to this debate. However, I have not seen that same integrity and care expressed by some others. Over the years, I often shadowed the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, but I do not think I have ever heard him mention the way that the Chagossian community has been treated or their rights or needs. I am the first to say that they have been badly treated, and have said so many times throughout the passage of the Bill.
I disagree with everything in the Motion. The deal secures the long-term future of the critically important military base on Diego Garcia. If we had not done a deal then that would have left the future of the base, as well as current operations, in jeopardy, with likely further wide-ranging litigation, which would have undermined base operations. Waiting for that risk to crystallise, as some noble Lords opposite encouraged us to do, would have placed us in a much weaker position from which to negotiate. Either there was legal jeopardy, which is presumably why the previous Government embarked upon round after round of negotiation, or, as they now ask us to believe, there was never any legal jeopardy, in which case what on earth were they doing with their time and that of officials undertaking negotiation in bad faith?
Unlike the previous Conservative Government’s strategy with the Rwanda deal, we have been upfront about the costs. We have set them out clearly in our Explanatory Memorandum and in the finance exchange of letters, which were published on the same day as the treaty and have been debated many times since.
Lord Lilley (Con)
I am sorry that the Minister has chosen to end this debate adopting a totally different tone from that which she pursued during Committee and Report. I asked a clear question: which goods, services and facilities will be withheld by which countries if we do not do this deal? She has not answered. She has said that there must be an answer to that question because the previous Government negotiated. She is the Minister and they are the Government; she must give us the answer and not say that there must be an answer from someone else.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I have clearly annoyed the noble Lord, given the finger-pointing this afternoon. My tone comes because this is the conclusion to these considerations. I would invite noble Lords to consider, when we talk about legal jeopardy and our reliance on third states, the remoteness of these islands and the complexity of sustaining a base of this nature. We rely on other states for supplies, for refuelling and for communications purposes. That is why we rest part of our argument on the need to resolve the legal jeopardy that the previous Government, as well as this Government and other states, could see existed here. We were determined to resolve this because, left unresolved, our position becomes weaker and weaker over time. This needed to be settled.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her replies. I do not think she said anything different from the points she made earlier. We had a lot of party-political insults but, yet again, no dealing with the actual issues that we raised. The one concession that I thought I heard from her—I will check Hansard—was an admission of what we have been saying all along: Mauritius does not in fact have the capabilities to resource the protection of the marine protected area. She has never said that in any previous assertions. Anyway, there are lots of points that I could take up more of the House’s time with, but I will not do that. I will just say that I would like to test the opinion of the House on my Motion.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Pitkeathley) (Lab)
The Question is that the original Motion, as amended, be agreed to.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Pitkeathley) (Lab)
I am informed that I should take the voices again. The Question is that the original Motion, as amended, be agreed to.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Pitkeathley) (Lab)
I called the original Motion, as amended, as a result of the vote that your Lordships have just taken part in. I will take the voices again. The Question is that the original Motion, as amended, be agreed to.
Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)
The Opposition have put their amendment to the House and it has been carried. They are now going to vote against the Motion that they have just won on. I do not understand that at all. It seems to me that the normal thing is that, when a regret amendment is won, the Motion is amended and then the House approves the Motion as amended. We have tried to do that three times.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Pitkeathley) (Lab)
My Lords, I will try putting the Question once again. The Question is that the original Motion, as amended, be agreed to.