(9 months ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to all who have contributed to this short but focused and important debate on the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, which seek to extend the power for police to restrict protests near places of worship to cover faith schools and faith community centres. The amendments were spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, and supported by the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Marks and Lord Massey of Hampstead, and from the opposition Front Bench by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron.
I acknowledge the wider societal problem that the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, powerfully described in moving the amendment. I think it is fair to say that he acknowledged the need for Clause 124 and hence its inclusion in the Bill. We are as government very aware of the problem. In the discussion on the previous mega group of amendments on public order on Tuesday evening, there were some assertions by noble Lord that synagogues are not impacted by marches or protests. I neglected to say it at that time, but this is an opportunity for me to say from the Dispatch Box that that is clearly not the case. We know that there are synagogues in central London that have been directly impacted by marches. They have had to change their service times and have had their normal pattern of worship disrupted by those marches. It is clear proof that, in respect of the Jewish community over the last couple of years at least, we need the provisions of Clause 124.
Before I move on to the amendments, I hope that, in responding to those in Israel and the US who raised with him whether it is safe for Jews to live in Britain and to be in Britain, the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, provided them reassurance that this is still one of the best places to be Jewish. We have fantastic values of tolerance and a liberal approach to enjoying any lifestyle that you wish and any religion that you wish to follow. As a British Jew, I am certainly very happy still, despite the concerns that we are discussing, to say that Britain is a great place to be a Jewish person. I hope that he responded in a similar manner.
On the amendments, under Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986, the police must have a reasonable belief that a public procession or assembly may result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of the community, or that the purpose of those organising the protest is the intimidation of others. The police must have a similar reasonable belief under Section 14ZA in respect to noise generated by a one-person protest.
Clause 124 will strengthen the police’s ability to manage intimidatory protests near places of worship by allowing them to impose conditions on a public procession, public assembly or one-person protest, specifically if they have a reasonable belief that the protests may result in intimidation and deter those seeking to access places of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities or conducting religious activities there.
Clause 124 does not define places of worship, which means that, where community centres may be used as a place of worship, there is flexibility for the police to consider using this measure and imposing conditions if appropriate. We believe this is a proportionate approach, because it allows the police to exercise their independent operational judgment rather than being constrained by prescriptive lists in legislation. Non-statutory guidance from the College of Policing will assist in clarifying marginal cases without removing the police’s discretion.
I appreciate the point that the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, made—and has made in previous debates—on police discretion. To respond to him directly, I am of course very happy to meet him with department officials to discuss this as we move through Committee and before we get to Report. That offer is open to him and to other noble Lords who would care to discuss the issue.
Regarding faith schools, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, there is particular sensitivity around schools because it involves young people. I declare an interest; I have two daughters who attend a Jewish faith school. It is incredibly concerning that they could be exposed to this in the manner of going to school and that the most normal everyday activity that a child or young person undertakes could be so disrupted. We very much share his concern, and his concern that it is not simply about Jewish faith schools; we are talking about all manner of faith schools, particularly, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, pointed out, Muslim schools—they are very much at the cutting edge as a very visible place in a community where protests could be mounted and could be a focus for local community opposition or aggression, which is why we need to be careful about it. However, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 gave local authorities the power to make expedited public space protection orders which protect those attending schools from intimidation, harassment or impeded access in the course of a protest or demonstration. Combined with the wide range of powers the police already have to address intimidation and harassment, these amendments would, I submit to your Lordship’s Committee, unnecessarily duplicate existing law.
Given that, I hope—although I am realistic—that I might have been able to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, a little. I hope that, taking an account of the offer of a meeting and further discussion on the points that his amendments raise, he would agree that his amendments are not necessary and, at least for the time being, that he will not press them.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his contribution. I was tempted to add restaurants to the amendment, but I had already tabled it. I have instead just made a booking there. Members of the House of Lords are welcome to join me to support the restaurant.
I thank my riparian neighbour, down the river at Henley-on-Thames from Hurley, for his most welcome contribution. Of course, I thank my noble friends Lord Massey and Lord Cameron.
I assure the noble Lord, Lord Katz, that I told everyone who made that comment to me that the UK was a very safe space for Israeli citizens to come and visit. However, it really was a concern that was expressed to me, quite shockingly. I assure him that I am totally in agreement with him on that.
I would argue that community centres could not be defined as places of worship. The JW3 centre specifically, as the noble Lord knows, could not be described as such, so it would not come within that definition. However, I can see that he is sympathetic and understanding, and I am very grateful for that. I am grateful to the Government for putting in Clause 124. Clearly, the 2022 Act was not sufficient, which is why they had to put in Clause 124, so perhaps there is a discussion to be had. I am grateful for his agreement to do that. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments touches on how the police should deal with modern threats and how we balance civil liberties with the clear duty of the state to protect the public.
I listened very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, when she introduced her Amendment 379, which, as she said, would prevent the police using live facial recognition when imposing conditions on public processions or assemblies under the relevant provisions of the Public Order Act, unless and until a new statutory code of practice had been approved. If we accept—as we on these Benches and, I think, others in your Lordships’ House do—that live facial recognition can be a legitimate and valuable policing tool in preventing crime, identifying suspects and protecting the public, it is difficult to justify singling out its use in this specific context for an additional and likely onerous layer of bureaucracy. The police already operate within an extensive framework of legal safeguards, such as data protection law. To require a further code of practice, subject to affirmative approval by both Houses of Parliament, risks delaying or deterring the deployment of technology precisely where it may be most needed. So, regretfully, we cannot support the amendment.
Amendment 471, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, goes further in seeking to affect the Government’s ability to use live facial recognition technology. It would restrict the circumstances in which live facial recognition could be used; it would require prior judicial authorisation in the specific circumstances of its use; and it would create an extensive new enforcement and oversight architecture. Public order situations are often fast-moving and unpredictable. Senior officers must be able to make operational decisions quickly, based on risk and intelligence on the ground. Introducing additional procedural hurdles at the point of use risks undermining that agility. We should focus on rolling out effective technology at pace to combat crime and disorder, while ensuring robust safeguards and scrutiny.
In particular, the requirement for prior judicial authorisation is, in our view, particularly problematic. One of the principal advantages of live facial recognition is its speed and flexibility. It can be deployed rapidly in response to emerging intelligence, acute threats or serious risks to public safety, and requiring prior judicial approval risks rendering the technology ineffective in precisely the circumstances where it could prevent serious harm. In dynamic operational scenarios, such as events of violent disorder, knife crime hot spots or rapidly evolving threats, delay can mean failure.
I was particularly taken by the speech of my noble friend Lord Moynihan, who spoke about the position in New York, where, because of there being fewer police on the streets, the technology had to take over. He was right to say that.
We on these Benches are concerned by the attempt to narrow the scope of live facial recognition to a tightly defined set of purposes, because, if Parliament accepts the use of this technology in principle, it makes little sense to confine it to only a small number of scenarios. Crime does not present itself neatly within statutory categories. Policing requires judgment and discretion. Artificially restricting the use of a tool that has demonstrated value risks depriving the police of one of the most effective capabilities available to them.
We of course recognise the need for appropriate safeguards to be implemented in the use of this technology. This new and expanded use of people’s data, even if to facilitate an objective that we support, must be enacted with transparency and proportionality. But these amendments would constrain the police’s operations and weaken our ability to respond to modern threats. At a time when criminals are increasingly sophisticated and technologically adept, Parliament should be empowering the police to use lawful, proportionate and effective tools rather than tying their hands.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling the amendments and starting this important debate. Facial recognition is an increasingly important tool that helps the police, and I am grateful for the support of the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Hogan-Howe. I was particularly struck by the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, on gait and movement, which point to why this is valuable.
Currently, facial recognition technology is used to identify those suspected of committing crime, those who may be in breach of a court order and, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones said, those who are missing persons and could be found. To put some context to it, for example, there were 127 people arrested following the use of facial technology during the disturbances in the summer of 2024 around asylum protests. According to the Metropolitan Police’s figures, between January 2024 and September 2025, 1,300 people were arrested for offences including rape, robbery and GBH, and, in that period, 100 sex offenders were arrested for breaching their conditions: that is, going to an area where they should not have gone. That is quite a valuable action, tool and resource. But that does not mean—which goes to the heart of the amendment the noble Baroness moved—that the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, the noble Baroness herself and the Liberal Democrat Front Bench are not ones that need to be examined.
Noble Lords will be aware that, currently, the use of facial recognition technology is already subject to safeguards, including the Human Rights Act and Data Protection Act. The Government accept that there is a need to consider whether a bespoke legislative framework is needed. We need to get it right. We need to balance the need to protect communities from crime and disorder with the need to safeguard individual rights.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will know, and as has been referenced in this debate, on 4 December, the Government launched a consultation: I have a copy available for the House. It is a 10-week consultation on a new framework for the enforcement of the use of facial recognition and similar technologies. The consultation explores when and how these technologies should be used, what safeguards are required to protect the issues that noble Lords and Baronesses have raised today and how to ensure that their use is proportionate to the seriousness of the harm being addressed.
I refer the Committee to page 5 of the summary to the consultation:
“The government is therefore committed to developing and introducing a new legal framework that sets out rules for the overt use of facial recognition by law enforcement organisations”.
That is a clear government objective. The consultation is about how we achieve that government objective. It runs until 12 February and I encourage all those who have spoken to submit their views.
I take Amendment 471 as a positive contribution to the consultation. Some aspects would cause difficulties, but it is a fair point to put to the Committee today. I hope noble Lords will accept that I cannot pre-empt the outcome of the consultation, which runs until 12 February. However, the clear objective, which I have read out, is to find the framework that noble Lords are seeking. We will need legislation to put in place the new legal framework, and that will come when parliamentary time allows.
The Minister says that he cannot pre-empt the outcome of the consultation, but surely Clause 125 already pre-empts the outcome of the consultation.
I do not think that it does. We will leave it at that. There is a proper and full consultation document, a copy of which is, I am sure, available in the House for Members to look at.
I revert to my starting point. For the reasons that have been laid out by a number of Members in the Committee today, across the political divide and none, it is a valuable tool. Do the noble Lord and the noble Baroness who raised this have an objection to automatic number plate recognition? Under current regulations, every vehicle that goes past a camera at the side of the road is an “innocent” vehicle but some of those number plates will lead to crime being solved or individuals being caught. The principle is there. If they object to the principle then we will not find common ground on this. We need regulation—I have accepted that. We are bringing forward the consultation, but, ultimately it is a valuable tool to stop and prevent crime and to catch criminals.
The Minister cannot compare cars with people—that is a completely false comparison. I do not know whether the Minister has been in a van with a camera looking at number plates. There is no mistaking number plates; there is a lot of mistaking human faces.
The Minister earlier used the word “proportionately”. There is a significant distinction between proportionately and expediently. The test for lawful interference with ECHR rights is proportionality rather than expediency. We have covered this before, but it has come up again now. Having expediency in the Bill gives police the powers beyond what is reasonable for human rights. We are not sitting here for hours into the night doing this for fun—we can all agree that this is not fun. We are doing this because we believe that the Bill is wrong.
I am doing it because I believe that we need to catch criminals and reduce crime. That is a fair disagreement between us. That is why I am doing this Bill and that is what this Bill is about. We may disagree, but facial recognition technology is an important mechanism to prevent crime and to reduce crime. I can tell the noble Baroness that we have agreed to bring forward regulations and are consulting on what those will include. I hope she will submit some views. I remain convinced that the type of technology that we have is valid and useful.
I do not normally disagree with the Minister, although we might be on different sides of an argument, but I found that last comment very bad. We are all on the same side—we all want to catch criminals and prevent crime. That needs to go on the record. From what he just said, it was almost as though he was suggesting that he is on the side of that but we are not. To make it clear, we are not sitting here for the sake of it; we are here because we genuinely believe in this and we want to catch criminals and prevent crime.
Let us put out the hand of friendship and make common cause on those issues.
To respond to the noble Baroness’s amendment, I simply say that the consultation is there. Amendment 471 would go quite a long way beyond even that which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, brought forward. I believe this to be a potential future crime-fighting tool. It needs regulation around it and that is what the Government are intending to do. We are very clear about that on page 5 of the consultation. How it is regulated and what is regulated, and how this is approached, is what the consultation is about, but I agree with the basic principle of the noble Baroness’s amendment. Therefore, I ask her to withdraw it.
I would like that in writing.
I thank the Minister for his response and thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. The Minister mentioned the consultation, and I am pleased that the Government will legislate, but I hope Parliament will be very much involved, because, like anything, the devil will be in the detail. Whatever comes out of that will be very important.
Can the Minister tell me what happens if, in response to the consultation, the public say that they do not want the police to access particular databases? Will the Government then take those clauses out of the Bill? Perhaps he could just clarify that.
I have a concern that, even before the consultation began, the Home Office was saying that it hoped the process would pave the way for wider rollout. That does not really inspire confidence that Ministers are keeping an open mind. A consultation should not be used as a rubber stamp; it should be the start of a genuine national conversation about the limits that a free society wants to place on mass biometric data surveillance. For that conversation to mean anything, the public need to know the full picture, how accurate the systems are, and where and when they are being used. Right now, that transparency is not there.
We have heard that the Home Office thinks that:
“Any new laws informed by the consultation would take about two years to be passed by Parliament”.
That is far too slow, given the pace of technological change, and that comment was made in December 2025. All we are asking is that Parliament sets the rules before the technology sets them for us. I hope Parliament will be involved in setting those rules. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Before the noble Baroness finishes, I did not want to interrupt what I thought was a very helpful contribution that laid out the kind of dilemmas that we face, but I will just ask for a couple of points of clarification to see where we might agree or disagree. In relation to John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, does she recognise that the concept of harm has now become so broad—in terms of psychological harm, for example—that it has become possible to say that any speech is harmful, and that this has led to the mess that we are in? There is physical harm, as opposed to, “I think that speech is harmful”. Anytime I have been cancelled from speaking, it was on the basis that I would cause harm to the students or pupils. It is a concept of me turning up with a baseball bat, about to do some harm to them, whereas actually they were anticipating, ahead of me speaking on issues usually related to free speech, that I would harm them psychologically and they would be damaged. Is that not a problem for legislators in the context of this amendment? Secondly—
Lord Katz (Lab)
I remind the noble Baroness that while she is able to ask questions for clarification, interventions are meant to be brief and I urge some brevity, given the progress we have made in Committee so far this afternoon.
I will ask this very briefly, then. Is there a problem that young people and the police do not appear to be able to distinguish between microaggressions and genocide? Is it one line?
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, for the way in which he put his arguments. I fully accept his contention that they are not designed to include his belief in racism or discrimination and the fair and open way in which he made his points. The same comments apply to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Young of Acton. I understand their motivation and where they are coming from, but I have to say straightaway to the Committee that I do not agree with the direction of travel. We will resist it and I will explain why in my comments.
Before I do so, let me say that—and I hope this is helpful for the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton—on the issues he raised around non-crime hate incidents, we are going to come to those in a later debate on Amendment 416E. The College of Policing is producing a report and review, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, as the chair of the College of Policing. I commit to the Committee that that review will come forward before Report on this Bill, and we intend to look at it as a Government and respond to it. The points that the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, mentioned are probably more relevant when we have the debate on Amendment 416E, if he accepts my comments. We will revisit that in due course.
Amendment 382F proposes to repeal to the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and make significant changes to the Communications Act 2003 and the Public Order Act 1986. I understand the motivation for the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, to bring them forward, but they include removing key provisions that have been in place for many years, were passed under different Governments of political complexity and have been consistently applied in case law.
The terms the noble Lord seeks to omit from the Public Order Act 1986 are understood by the police and the CPS, and there is case law interpreted by the courts. These provisions provide police with proportionate tools to manage low-level public disorder and protect the public from threatening or abusive behaviour, as well from those who seek to stir up racial hatred. The existing legal framework already ensures that enforcement decisions are made proportionately and in line with human rights obligations, including the right to freedom of expression.
I emphasise to the Committee that the personal example cited by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, shows that these laws are here for a purpose. Her comments have highlighted the question: how would each of us like to be on the receiving end of an abusive or insulting comment or phrase about a personal characteristic of our lives that we cannot change? Attack me for my politics by all means, because that is the view I have taken, but attacking individuals, or showing insulting or offensive behaviour towards individuals for characteristics they cannot change, is a step that we need to consider very carefully.
Let us look at what Amendment 382F from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, seeks to remove. The amendment would repeal the Malicious Communications Act 1988, including the offence of sending a
“letter, electronic communication or article”
to someone
“which is indecent or grossly offensive”,
if the purpose of sending it is to
“cause distress or anxiety to the recipient”.
That is quite a heavy protection for people that the noble Lord is seeking to remove.
The amendment also seeks to remove Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, including the offence of sending, or causing to be sent,
“by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other matter that is grossly offensive … indecent, obscene or menacing”.
Again, those protections are included in the 2003 Act to protect individuals from grossly offensive, obscene, indecent or menacing communication, yet the noble Lord seeks to remove that today, for the reasons he outlined to the Committee.
The amendment also seeks to repeal Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, including the offences of causing:
“Intentional harassment, alarm, or distress”,
or harassment, alarm or distress without intent. The amendment would remove, from the same Act, “abusive or insulting” from the following offences:
“Fear or provocation of violence … Use of words or behaviour … written … to stir up racial hatred … Publishing or distributing written material … to stir up racial hatred”,
and public performances of a play intended to stir up racial hatred. I want to protect free speech—protecting free speech is absolutely right—but we also have to protect the rights of individuals to enjoy a life free from “grossly offensive” insults, “intentional harassment”, and “abusive or insulting” material.
The noble Lord seeks to repeal “abusive or insulting” from Section 21 of the Public Order Act:
“Distributing … or playing a recording … to stir up racial hatred”.
The amendment, it appears, intends to strengthen protections for free speech. I understand where the noble Lord wishes to come from on that—that is a fair and open debate between us—but it does so by decriminalising behaviour that is, in the law and under all those Acts, “abusive and insulting”. I am sorry, in this Committee I am not going to accept that approach on behalf of the Government.
As we know, we will have the review from the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, who will look at the wider issues of hate crime legislation and the independent review of public order. I take the strictures of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that we cannot stick everything into the review, but we also have the review from the College of Policing—which I will refer to again; I have already done so in response to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton—which is looking at those issues.
I still think, given what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, that there is a basic floor from which society needs to protect individuals from abuse and insulting behaviour. The existing offences are not just used to put that floor in place; they are also used—this is a really important point which I hope the noble Lord will accept—to ensure that the police have the ability to intervene early in public order situations where they could support the protection of vulnerable people, who may be alarmed by abusive or insulting conduct, which has a disproportionate impact. The existing offences are used to manage public order and racial hatred and provide the police with proportionate tools to respond to a range of behaviours.
The offence thresholds should not and do not interfere with free speech. The review is going to conclude very shortly and the Government will consider and respond to those recommendations afterwards.
I simply say to the noble Lord that I hope that he thinks very carefully—as I know he has already; I do not want to be patronising—about the content of the debate we have had today, the comments that I have put to him about why those legislation aspects have been passed by a Thatcher Government and a Blair Government, and why there is a need to protect individuals, along the lines of the experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which she mentioned. They are there for a purpose and I believe that the Committee should ask the noble Lord, having heard the debate, to withdraw his amendment and, I hope, not visit it on Report.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
I thank noble Lords for what I hope everybody felt was a stimulating and useful debate, with a great number of differing views expressed by different noble Lords. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for her eloquent support of the amendment. It was so depressing to hear her point out that we, the original home of free speech, are now seen around the world as one of the worst countries in suppressing it.
My noble friend Lord Blencathra presented the case for the amendment rather more eloquently than I was able to and, equally, with eloquent personal experience, which I felt was interesting, as indeed—I will talk about this in a minute—did the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. My noble friend Lord Young, again in far more eloquent terms than I, gave stark evidence of the dysfunctionality of the law, with the huge numbers of interventions by the police. Some 12,183 arrests was one statistic he quoted, in one year alone for just one act.
I add to the various mentions of where the police were forced to pay £10,000 or £20,000 in compensation that we should remember that that is not police money; it is our money. I would rather like to see that money spent in better ways and police time to be spent in better ways.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, for his brief intervention and move on to the very affecting speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. She was talking about how hate material should be legislated against. I will address that in the next amendment, which comes immediately after this. By the way, I can assure her that I played no part in the degrouping of my amendments from those of my noble friend Lord Young. I was deeply sorry to hear of that awful and appalling incident that the noble Baroness had to suffer at the railway station. I entirely agree that the people there should have intervened and supported her. It must have been just dreadful to have been sitting there with no support—until, of course, after the event, when there was plenty of it.
The noble Baroness may want to look at Hansard tomorrow, but my amendment would leave in place the ability of the police to go after that dreadful person who abused her because she was threatening imminent violence with that kick. Whether it was accurately placed or not, that was violence. I agree with that law, which should have gone after her. Facial recognition might have helped.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for that explanation. She clearly demarcated our difference in view as to where the line should be drawn. I suggest to noble Lords that it is important to draw the line at the threat of imminent violence. That has been a principle in the past, but it has been breached by recent laws and actions by the police.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, kindly supported this amendment—
Lord Katz (Lab)
I hate to interrupt the noble Lord’s flow, but I thought this an apposite time to point out that Members should normally be brief when pressing or withdrawing an amendment. The Companion is clear that you do not have to respond to all points raised in the debate. We are now over five minutes. I urge the noble Lord to conclude his remarks.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
I remember the noble Lord, Lord Katz, taking almost 30 minutes the night before last when he had a time limit of 20 minutes. His remarks were so interesting that I did not feel like repining. I certainly would have finished by now had there not been interventions.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for kindly and eloquently supporting my views and turn finally to the Minister who, although speaking as always in the kindliest way, gave a most disappointing reply. I hope that, after the debate on the next amendment, he might reconsider. I was surprised that he still supported criminalisation of offending feelings after such a comprehensive listing by many speakers of the problems created by that in the various laws. I will talk more on this on the next amendment. In the meantime, and for now, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
Before my noble friend the Minister stands up, I will briefly intervene to say that at Second Reading, I counted 44 previous statutes that were being amended by the Bill. I just counted five in Amendment 382G. I do not know whether they join the 44 statutes in the Bill itself or whether they stand alone, but the Bill is extremely complex. In the word I used at Second Reading, it is, in this sense, a “monster” of a Bill, not because of the many provisions in it and the other provisions that noble Lords have brought out in it: that is not my point. My point is just on the complexity of the Bill. I beg that there may be a change of mind by Governments and parliamentary draftsmen and that they do not inflict Bills like this on the House.
Follow that, my Lords.
I appreciate the measured approach of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, to the significant measures that he proposes in his amendments, and I appreciate the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, from the Front Bench, and the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, in support of the measured way in which he brought forward his amendments. Having said that, I stand with the noble Baronesses, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green and Lady Brinton, in saying that I cannot and would not wish to accept those amendments. Hate crime legislation exists because offences motivated by prejudice inflict deep harm on victims and on entire communities. These crimes target people for who they are, undermining social cohesion and spreading fear. It is my view that repeal would not just send a wrong signal but say that identity-based hostility is no more serious an offence than any other offence, and I am afraid that it is. Our laws rightly recognise its heightened impact and ensure that justice outcomes reflect that gravity.
Despite the fact that the noble Lord and others have mentioned and prayed in aid figures that have risen, hate crime laws deter abuse. They uphold the shared values of society. The noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, made the very good point that they provide a measure of awareness and of the potential for those offences. Ultimately, they protect victims with protected characteristics that they cannot change. It is really important to remember that they are being attacked, or preyed on in many ways, for characteristics that they cannot change.
Let us be clear, because the noble Lord has been measured and clear, that this amendment would remove offences of stirring up racial hatred. It would abolish—
My Lords, it took me a few seconds to react to and think about what the Minister said. For the information of the House, I think it would be fair to recognise that several of the nine protected characteristics are not immutable and are capable of change. Gender identity is one; marriage and civil partnership is another. Let us be clear: some are immutable, but others are capable of change. I am not expressing an opinion on this proposed new clause, but in general it is fair to say that protected characteristics socially evolve and develop over time.
Let what the noble Baroness has said stand. I am making the point that disability, transgender identity—in my view—sexual orientation and race are things that you have and that are part of you. If the offences proposed for removal are removed by this House, that would send a signal to society that we are happy for people to stir up hatred on the grounds of those characteristics. That is not acceptable to me and I hope the noble Lord recognises that I cannot accept those amendments today, although I accept the way they have been put.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
Surely the signal that scrapping hate crime from British law would send is not that we do not care about vulnerable groups but that we think they should enjoy the same legal protections as everyone else, and that everyone should be equal in the eyes of the law.
That is a view, but not one that I share. There are protections in the Public Order Act 1986 against stirring up hatred on racial or religious grounds because, yes, I am equal under the law if I have that hatred against me, but that hatred may be generated because I happen to have a racial or religious characteristic that is subject to attack. So, we are not equal under the law, because if I did not have that racial or religious characteristic I would not have been attacked. For me, that is therefore an aggravating factor and a reason why we should maintain those offences.
I go back to what I was saying a moment ago. This would remove offences of stirring up hatred under the Racial and Religious Hatred Act. It would abolish racial and religiously aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act and delete aggravating factors of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity from the Sentencing Code. At the very time when Jewish people are being attacked for being Jewish and transgender people are being attacked for being transgender, that is not acceptable. I am not saying that either noble Lord wishes to encourage or support that type of activity—I recognise from the measured way in which they put their arguments that they do not. They have an honestly held opinion that removing that legislation would be of benefit to society. I happen to disagree and I am trying to put the reason why. If there is clear water between us, that is the nature of political life. I am not imputing any characteristics to the noble Lord for bringing this measure forward.
However, the effect of this would be to compromise the ability of the courts to reflect the greater harm—as the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green, said—to undermine deterrence and clarity for police and prosecutors and to signal that those crimes are no more serious when they are motivated by hostility toward protected characteristics, contrary to long-standing principle. It would also risk eroding public confidence, particularly among people with those protected characteristics. The underreporting that the noble Baroness mentioned would absolutely nosedive if these provisions were taken away, because people would think that society had not put that down as a benchmark by which people should be judged. I am therefore afraid that I cannot accept the amendment.
I must also give notice to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, who made a very helpful plea that we should not bring forward further protected characteristics. I regret to inform him that, on Report, I will be very proud to stand here and move an amendment which puts transgender and disability as protected characteristics, in line with the manifesto on which my party stood and won an election in July 2024. We will be bringing forward amendments in the Crime and Policing Bill on Report to give effect to this change. We can have that debate openly and honestly, but I say to the Committee that society has some basic principles of respect that it should enshrine in law. The legislation that the noble Lord is seeking to remove would undermine that principle and I will not support it.
I have listened carefully to this debate and the previous one without intervening. I have a lot of sympathy with the Minister, as he knows, on many of the measures in the Bill, but I am a little surprised at his unequivocal rejection of several of these kinds of amendments, only because we have the Macdonald review going on. Will he accept that, if it comes up with recommendations while the Bill is not yet an Act, he will accept amendments to take on board those recommendations?
Let me say two things in response to that. We have commissioned the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, to look at a review of protests and a range of matters to do with that legislation. However—and this is where I accept what the noble Baroness said—we will have to look at what the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, brings forward and the Government will have to take political decisions on whether we accept it.
I am defending a principle here today. The noble Lord will be looking at potential issues around implementation, tweaks, et cetera, but the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, has made a well-measured assault on legislative tenets. I cannot ever see this Government accepting the removal of those legislative tenets, but we will always accept the recommendations being looked at. Going back to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green, on how we can improve the monitoring, policing and understanding of these issues, it is a complex area, as the noble Baroness knows through her experience and recent appointments.
We will also be bringing forward on Report offences relating to transgender and disability, which was in our manifesto commitment. That is another complex area, which is why it has taken time for us to get to the stage of bringing forward the amendment. When we do so, we will have to look at it in the context of the whole package that the noble Baroness has worked on, that this Committee is looking at now and on which the noble Lord made his comments.
From this Dispatch Box today, I simply say that I cannot accept his amendments. I think he knew that before he introduced them. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, hinted as much in his contribution, but I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment. If he revisits this on Report, we will have that discussion again in a fair, open and measured way, as we have today.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
Perhaps I might ask one important question. I understand that the report from the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, is going to be produced before Report. Does my noble friend the Minister agree that it should be made available to us before we settle into Report?
The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, is expected to produce a report at some point during the next couple of months. I cannot give a definitive time for that, but I can tell the Committee that we will obviously make sure that it is published. There are likely to be Statements or an Urgent Question in this House on the report. We will first look at how we as a Government consider the recommendations and, secondly, if we need legislation, what mechanism that would be and when it would be brought forward. I can tell my noble friend that there will be a full discussion on the report when it comes. I cannot, as yet, constrain the discussion from the perspective of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, by answering the question my noble friend posed.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
My Lords, I thought that too was a great debate and that the Minister managed to articulate very clearly that there is clear water between two opposing groups of thought on these matters. I am gagging to launch into a half-hour speech to attempt to respond to what he and others said, but I am mindful of the earlier admonitions from the noble Lord, Lord Katz. I merely thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox, Lady Hunt and Lady Brinton, my noble friends Lord Young and Lord Davies, and the Minister for their contributions.
I believe that it is time to call an end to this hate crime law experiment. The criminalisation of hate speech and hate crime was overambitious. It punishes ideas and motives, as opposed to actions. As I have shown, I believe it is choking up the justice system and shutting down free speech. I will close by slightly misquoting Samuel Johnson:
“How small, of all that human hearts endure,
That part which laws ”—
or Lords—“can cause or cure”. Having said that, for now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, this group addresses the extension of warrantless search powers for electronically tracked stolen goods to the service police, in Clause 129, alongside civilian police, in Clause 128. While we recognise the need for police to tackle high-tech crime, such sweeping powers, particularly warrantless searches, must be meticulously governed to avoid abuse and uphold civil liberties. I have tabled Amendments 386 to 389, which would ensure that robust governance and accountability mechanisms are embedded in these provisions.
Amendment 386 would require the Secretary of State to produce a code of practice for the operation of Clause 129, specifically mandating consultation with civil liberties and human rights organisations and relevant service police bodies. This would ensure due process regarding the authorisation, seizure, retention and disposal of evidence.
Amendment 388 would require the Secretary of State to provide appropriate training for service police personnel on how to exercise these powers proportionately and lawfully.
Amendment 387 would mandate the establishment of an independent mechanism for handling, investigating and reviewing public complaints arising from the exercise of these powers, giving complainants similar statutory rights to victims reporting to the Independent Office for Police Conduct.
Amendment 389 would mandate that the Secretary of State produces an annual report detailing the exercise of these warrantless search powers under Clause 128, ensuring transparency and accountability to Parliament. Further, these new obligations would require the affirmative procedure for their governing regulations, ensuring full parliamentary debate before they are enacted, as sought in Amendments 499 to 501.
We on these Benches are opposed to Amendments 383 to 385 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, which seek to remove the requirement, as we have heard from the noble Lord, for an officer to even possess electronic tracking data before conducting a warrantless search. By stripping away this technologically justified threshold, these amendments would transform a specific investigative tool into an arbitrary power of entry, undermining the core principle that a person’s home is his castle.
In contrast, Amendments 386 to 389 provide the necessary basis for these intrusive powers to be overseen. Specifically, Amendment 386 mandates a statutory code of practice for the Armed Forces to ensure that their exercise of these powers is necessary, proportionate and strictly compliant with the Human Rights Act. Furthermore, Amendment 387 would establish an independent mechanism for handling public complaints, ensuring that any misuse of power is investigated by a body demonstrably independent of the service police.
Finally, my amendments would require post-implementation reporting to Parliament every 12 months. We must see the data on the demographic profile of those targeted and the subsequent criminal justice outcomes to guard against disproportionate application or mission creep. Without these safeguards, we risk creating a shortcut—as other provisions might do—to a surveillance state, where convenience is prioritised over constitutional protection.
The safeguards that I have proposed in Amendments 386 to 389 regarding service police are only as strong as the parliamentary scrutiny that would underpin them. We must ensure that these powers are exercised with not just efficiency but a regular check of parliamentary accountability.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses Clauses 128 and 129 granting new powers to the police to enter premises to search for and seize stolen items that can be electronically tracked there, without the need to first apply to a court for a warrant. I welcome the welcome given to these new clauses by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on behalf of the Opposition.
These new powers are intended, as he said, to be exercised where a stolen item is electronically tracked to a specific location. This is in direct response to public concern that the police are not able to act swiftly in response to crimes such as mobile phone theft, even when victims have clear, real-time electronic evidence of the phone’s location. It will reduce the risk that stolen goods are quickly moved on or used to facilitate other crime. I suggest to the Committee that the main benefit of these clauses is ensuring that mobile phone theft is addressed and combated.
The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, is no longer in his place, but when speaking to an earlier group he suggested that there is an impression that the police do not prioritise criminal behaviour such as mobile phone theft but instead concentrate on other issues, which I will not go into. I suggest that the police being able to more quickly and effectively tackle very common criminal behaviour such as mobile phone theft would also very much enhance the reputation of the police. As the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, said, it is sometimes at risk of being downplayed.
I will first address the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. Amendments 383 to 385 would remove the requirement in Clause 128 that the power may be exercised by police only in relation to stolen goods electronically tracked to specified premises. They would also remove the condition that before the use of power is authorised by a senior police officer, he or she must be satisfied that there is electronic tracking data linking the stolen item and a specific premises. These amendments would significantly broaden the scope of the proposed powers and remove important safeguards.
Powers of entry are inherently intrusive, and there is a balance to be struck between ensuring that the police can act quickly and decisively against thieves, and retrieve victims’ stolen property, and safeguarding the right to a private and family life. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, put it very well when he referred to it as a technically justified threshold. I contend to the Committee that people generally accept the need for warrants to be used in detecting stolen goods, but some devices can be tracked electronically in real time. The police turn around and say, “We can’t do anything about this because we have to go and get a warrant”, but you can point to the address where you know that phone is and you know that, if the police do not act quickly, there is a good chance that phone will be moved out of the country. It is only right that we use that as an apposite threshold to introduce these powers, rather than saying that they should be used for any stolen good of whatever nature, where there is no electronic tracking data involved. It will do much to improve confidence in the police in catching up with the 21st century and current technology, but we do not see the need to go further.
The requirement for electronic tracking data linking at least one stolen item to the premises before powers can be exercised provides a further layer of reliability in their use, while ensuring, as I said, that the police can act swiftly when they need to. I say again that removing these requirements would dilute the safeguards intended to ensure that police officers use these powers lawfully, proportionately and only in specific circumstances.
That brings me neatly to Amendments 386 to 389 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I commend his intent to ensure that there is strong accountability, independent oversight and scrutiny of the use of these powers. As I have said, the Government recognise that these new powers are intrusive by their nature, particularly as they can be exercised by officers without them first needing to seek authorisation from a court by obtaining a search warrant. We have, accordingly, built in appropriate safeguards to ensure that the new powers are used appropriately and within well-established independent oversight and scrutiny mechanisms.
Amendment 386 would require the Secretary of State to issue a statutory code of practice to which the service police must have regard when exercising the new powers. I stress to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that these new powers will be subject to the relevant provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and its codes of practice. The Government will amend PACE Code B, and Code B of the service police codes of practice, to reflect the new powers, providing clear and detailed guidance around their use for both territorial and service police. These revisions to the codes will be completed before the powers are commenced. This will provide robust statutory guidance to police and will be complemented by the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice.
Amendment 387 would require the creation of an independent oversight mechanism to investigate public complaints about the use of these powers by service police. Any complaints about their use by territorial police would be addressed in the normal way through internal police complaints procedures and referrals to the Independent Office for Police Conduct, where required.
The service police are the focus of the noble Lord’s amendment, and any complaints would be dealt with under the complaints system for service police. As set out in the Service Police (Complaints etc.) Regulations 2023, this is overseen by the Service Police Complaints Commissioner, whose role is similar to that of the IOPC. The commissioner is independent of the service police and the MoD, and has a statutory duty to secure, maintain and review arrangements for procedures that deal with complaints and conduct. They deal with the most serious complaints and set the standard by which service police should handle complaints. The Service Police Complaints Commissioner has the same powers as the service police where it has been determined that they will carry out an investigation, and they can also determine that a complaint can be reinvestigated, if they are satisfied that there are compelling reasons to do so.
Amendment 388 would require service police to undertake training before they could exercise the new powers. All members of the service police undergo training that addresses each element set out in the noble Lord’s amendment, including on the legal requirements and limitations of search and seizure powers, proportionality, maintenance of clear records and compliance with Article 8 of the ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998. Service police trainees are tested on arrest, entry, search and seizure before they can exercise these powers. Training is updated in response to any change in legislation that would affect service police officers’ exercise of their powers. Specifically, training will be updated in light of the new powers in this Bill.
My Lords, the bad news is that not all service personnel are absolute angels: it could be one junior soldier stealing a mobile phone from another junior serviceman. These arrangements are very sensible, and I agree with everything that the Minister has had to say. My only question for him, while I am on my feet, is this: is there any evidence that the service police make mistakes on the procedures when they are exercising their powers? I am not aware of any problem.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I will take the last one first. I am not sure there is any evidence; I would have to look into that. To answer the more substantive intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as to why service police need the powers to deal with electronically tracked stolen goods, while service police deal with crime in the defence context, it is important that they are equipped to respond effectively to current and future trends in criminal behaviour. Obviously, the provisions in the Bill help to ensure that service police can respond with lawful, fair and proportionate action, now and in the future, to the full spectrum of criminality that threatens the cohesion and operational effectiveness of our Armed Forces. These new powers will give officers more chance of quickly finding and retrieving stolen items that are electronically tracked at premises, and reduce the risk they are lost or moved on. Maybe put it down to an overabundance of caution but also an acknowledgement that crimes that affect and have to be investigated by civilian forces can also affect and be investigated by the Armed Forces.
My Lords, all I will say is that, faced with an abundance of caution—that is to say, if in doubt— “give the police powers” is not an approach that is particularly favoured on these Benches.
Lord Katz (Lab)
That is a point well made and well taken. I add that the powers would, of course, be exercised only within the jurisdiction of the service police, so service police would not suddenly be moving into areas of activity that you would expect the territorial police to be pursuing.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, anticipated that I was winding up. I hope that my comments have reassured the noble Lord that the spirit and intention behind his amendments have been incorporated within the proposals in the Bill. In the light of my remarks, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I give thanks to noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I will reiterate my opening speech by saying that I know we all have the same end goal of arresting criminals and preventing thefts. We may have different roads that we believe to be the best way of arriving at that goal, but I am confident that this debate has taken place in a productive and open-minded manner.
At the risk of repeating myself, phone theft and shoplifting, frequently targeted at electronic stores, are not just epidemics but growing ones. Crime is thriving, businesses are closing, and the public are becoming increasingly anxious. A phone is stolen every seven and a half minutes in our capital city. We cannot simply look on at the situation with the hope that it gets better.
The Government must resolve to adopt the framework from our 2023 Bill, and they must now go further. Amendments 383, 384 and 385 in my name would achieve this. They would remove the requirement that a stolen good be electronically traceable and would permit senior officers to use discretion to search premises without a warrant. These amendments answer a problem that requires immediate action. The Government must get a grip on the theft epidemic. Our measures provide them with one of many necessary solutions, and I hope the Minister takes them away for consideration.
Moving on to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I largely agree with his principle that the new clause that introduces new powers should be accompanied by checks and balances. Establishing a code of practice, having an independent mechanism for investigating complaints, providing mandatory training for senior officers and requiring an annual report on the use of the powers in question would act to safeguard the heightened powers officers will gain. This especially holds should the Government incorporate our amendments. We trust the judgment of our officers and believe that they will always make the judgment they think best, but I am conscious that we are entrusting them with more intrusive powers. Mechanisms must exist that counteract any tendencies for this power to be misused, and I believe that the noble Lord’s amendments would achieve that. However, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, these amendments build on Clauses 130 to 137, which confer powers on law enforcement agencies to extract information from online accounts as part of their investigations into immigration crime and sexual abuse cases, and to protect national security and our borders. Taken together, Amendments 441 to 444, 452, 393 and 394 ensure that the police can access information held in the online accounts of individuals subject to national security-related civil orders. These include terrorism and state threat prevention and investigation measures, as well as youth diversion orders, which are being introduced by clauses earlier in this Bill.
It is increasingly common for individuals to store data in the cloud for various reasons, such as to free up space on devices and, increasingly, because of the way devices or applications are designed, but also, regrettably, in some cases deliberately to make it less accessible to law enforcement. This is particularly the case with young people: police operational experience has shown that this cohort will regularly store data in online accounts. This data can be critical in supporting law enforcement to manage terrorist and broader national security risks. The increasing reliance on cloud data means that the police are likely to have an increased need to access cloud data as part of compliance checks where an individual—this is the important thing for the Committee—is subject to online restrictions as part of a civil order, such as the youth diversion order. These amendments will provide a clear statutory basis for officers to access cloud data when conducting a compliance check for an individual—again, this is the important point—who is subject to either a youth diversion order or a terrorism, state threat prevention or investigation measures order.
The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 contains a provision allowing for the extraction of information from electronic devices in cases where the user has died. Amendment 392 will clarify that this power also now applies to online information, as long as the authorised person is satisfied that the power is proportionate and there is no other practical way of obtaining the information.
Lastly, Amendments 389A to 389F are small but important drafting changes to Clause 132. The clause before the Committee identifies which senior officers may authorise the use of a power in Clause 130, which provides for a general extraction power for law enforcement agencies to obtain online information. Currently, the table refers to “Navy”, “Military” and “Force” but does not explicitly mention the police. I think noble Lords would wish the police to be mentioned, and therefore the amendments insert the term “Police” after each of those references to correct the omission. I hope that is clear to the Committee. This is in the specific circumstances that I have outlined in my speech, and I hope that noble Lords can accept the amendments at the appropriate time.
My Lords, this grouping deals with the complex landscape of remotely stored electronic data, or what is commonly known as cloud access. Government amendments in this group, such as Amendments 393, 394 and 441, significantly expand the ability of the state to inspect online accounts through seized devices, including the interception of authentication codes. We acknowledge that, as evidence shifts from hardware to the cloud, the law must evolve. However, we remain deeply concerned by the widened scope for investigation, which carries an inherent risk of excessive prying.
These powers go beyond merely searching a phone. They allow law enforcement to walk through the digital doors of a person’s entire life—their private communications, financial history and medical records. As the Minister said, under Clause 169 these intrusive inspections can now be included as conditions of a youth diversion order. While the Government maintain that these are necessary to identify harmful online activity early, we must ensure that they are used only when strictly necessary and proportionate to protect the public from serious harm.
I ask the Minister to clarify the oversight mechanisms for these powers. We cannot allow the inspection of a child’s entire digital history to rest on a subjective belief, rather than a rigorous, objective assessment of risk. The digital ecosystem must not be a safe haven for perpetrators, but neither can it become a borderless opportunity for state surveillance.
I hope I can answer the questions from the noble Lords on the Liberal Democrat Benches and the Opposition Front Bench. I can say to them, on the amendments we have brought forward today, that the measures in them apply only to the terrorism and state threats prevention and investigation measures, as well as the new youth diversion orders. There are safeguards on what type of data the police are allowed to access. For example, there are limitations on accessing information which might include legally privileged material.
In a similar way to accessing local data on a device, nothing in this legislation changes the existing duties on the police imposed by the Data Protection Act 2018. UK legislation offers important safeguards for law enforcement in processing that personal data. That includes the requirement not to retain personal data longer than necessary. It also includes that the police may come across information that is not directly relevant to their investigation and, in such circumstances, the police aim to mitigate the risks of collateral intrusion on people’s privacy, by focusing on the information. There will be a similar approach adopted for the measures that I put down in the amendment today.
We are also working with the police on plans to implement those new youth diversion orders. As part of that, the police will have their own operational procedures and data protection impact assessments. As I said already, the legislation does not affect any existing duty on police forces that is a fundamental part of the Data Protection Act 2018. I hope that will help the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Davies of Gower. Again, I just remind the Committee that it is only in the specific cases of the two types of order—youth diversion and, effectively, the TPIM-type order that we have under existing legislation—so it is a relatively small number. I hope that, with those protections, the noble Lords can allow the Committee to agree the amendments today.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for attempting keyhole surgery at this late stage. I suspect that some noble Lords want to go a little further in the surgery than keyhole, but I will try to assuage those fears as part of the response to the debate that we have had.
In answer initially to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 are important national security powers available at the UK border. They already allow a counterterrorism police officer to stop, question, search and detain a person travelling through a port or the border area in Northern Ireland to determine whether the person is or has been involved in terrorism or hostile activity. These powers do not require an examining officer to have any degree of suspicion to use them. They are already in place and have been since 2000, so they are not new powers.
This clause introduces a power for law enforcement agencies to extract information from online accounts—the cloud, wherever that cloud currently exists—that are accessible via a device examined under existing powers that allow suspicionless stop and search at ports for national security purposes. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has rightly said, this responds directly to a long-standing concern raised by the independent reviewer, who noted that current legislation does not adequately address cloud access. I hope that, to some extent, this assuages the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, on these matters. I accept and understand that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and, in moving his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, are concerned about these issues and ensuring that we have enhanced safeguards around these powers; notably, that the retention of this cloud data for counterterrorism purposes must be reviewed after three months and that it can be retained only where a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is involved in terrorism.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 391 builds on this. In respect of the information retained, it looks to put in an objective test for assessing necessity of retention. Let me just say, including to the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, that the Government fully recognise the need for robust safeguards. I accept the points that have been made around the Committee on that. We need to have robust safeguards when exercising powers to extract or retain information from electronic devices under Schedules 7 and 3. However—this is normal practice, and I hope it will assuage the Committee’s concern—normally, and, I strongly believe, in this case, the statutory codes of practice for examining officers are the appropriate place to set out the detailed operational safeguards. If it helps the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and other noble Lords who have spoken, we are seeking to address the concerns raised by updating the code of practice that already exists to include the measures in the Bill to provide the safeguards of the requirements that have been mentioned by noble Lords in their contributions today.
Codes of practice are a long-standing approach that allows the Government to update protections flexibly and promptly and ensures that they can remain fit for purpose as operational needs and legal standards evolve. I hope I can help all those who have spoken on this and who have requested keyhole surgery on the legislation. The codes of practice are subject to parliamentary approval, so in order to take this matter forward, in the event that the Bill and these clauses become law, the clauses themselves are not brought into effect until such time as the codes of practice have received parliamentary scrutiny of an affirmative nature. We would not seek to implement the clause until the codes of practice were approved by both Houses of Parliament. It is the normal practice that, following Royal Assent, there would be consultation on what the code of practice could potentially involve before it was passed by both Houses.
Why should something as significant as this, raised by the Supreme Court and by the very man the Government speak to about how counterterrorism should be dealt with, not be in the Bill, rather than in statutory guidance?
Because there is already statutory guidance in relation to the operation of the 2000 legislation. The purpose of the revised codes of practice is that it is normal practice to have a code of practice approved by Parliament for how the Act is implemented by officers on the ground at the port of entry. The code of practice is approved or not approved by both Houses, it is subject to consultation, and I have given a commitment from this Dispatch Box that that code of practice and this clause, if the Bill is enacted, will not be introduced until the code of practice has achieved the assent of both Houses.
The noble Lord explained that I should be happy because this had been requested by those who knew. Those who knew also requested that in the document itself, in the actual Act, there should be these changes. I do not understand why it is reasonable to accept their advice to put this in, but not reasonable to accept equally sensible advice to have the restrictions proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.
I have made the case and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others can accept that case or not. If he believes that keyhole surgery is still required, he has a mechanism to begin the operation. I hope the Committee can accept the assurances I have given, based on the fact that this is an amendment to the 2000 Act. The normal practice already in place is to have codes of practice, and I am proposing, via the discussion, to have revised codes of practice, subject to parliamentary affirmative scrutiny, and that the clauses will not be implemented until such a time as both Houses give their assent to those measures. I hope that assuages the noble Lord; if it does not, he knows what to do.
I am sorry, I must be missing something here. There is a provision to conduct a really draconian intervention on a traveller as they pass through an airport, but it is not on the basis of suspicion. On what basis does the constable, or whatever he or she is, choose that traveller rather than another traveller, if there is no suspicion involved?
I hope I can help the noble Lord. The Schedule 7 and Schedule 3 powers are exercised at pace. Some investigations, particularly those involving complex or sensitive matters, could well extend beyond three months. Evidence often emerges gradually and may be fragmented.
Statutory codes of practice provide a flexible and responsive mechanism for setting out detailed safeguards and allow for timely updates on operational and legal contexts. If we embed such details in primary legislation, with due respect to the noble and learned Baroness, that would create inflexibility and mean that we may not keep pace with changing threats or operational realities. The codes are subject to parliamentary scrutiny; they can be revised as needed and ensure robust protection. That is why I have put that argument before the Committee. If it feels that that argument is not acceptable, we will have to have that discussion later on. That is my defence against having keyhole surgery at this time.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will respond shortly, but I am sure the Minister realises that he cannot sit down quite yet. He talked about the process, the statutory guidance and so on, but does he accept the substance of the amendments and has he given an assurance to the Committee that, if it were agreed hypothetically that the statutory code guidance was an acceptable way forward, the substance of these amendments would be incorporated into it? Does he accept the case made so eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson?
I think I have said that the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, are worthy of reflection, but we will put the discussion ultimately into the code of practice. The final settlement will be a consultation on the code of practice. I have heard what has been said today. There will be a consultation and an opportunity for the noble Lord, with his former hat on and his position in this House, and others to comment on it. That is the case I am making and I hope I have convinced the Committee. If not, methods are available. Given the late hour and the amendment target we are trying to reach, I will rest my case.
I thank the Minister and all noble Lords who have contributed to this excellent debate. Frankly, I am overwhelmed by the quality and quantity of the interventions. With the exception of the noble Lord who signed the amendment, I have not approached any noble Lords who spoke or even notified them that this debate was coming up. It is remarkable that so many spoke so strongly in support. I single out the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for whom we all have enormous respect as a former police officer. I hope that his approval in principle for these amendments will be heard on the Government Front Bench.
These amendments are operationally perfectly simple. Nobody has suggested that this would be a great burden on the police or any bureaucratic impediment to them doing their job. If they had been, I would have been very reluctant to propose them. Although they are operationally simple, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, they are of constitutional importance. They may look technical, but they are important.
On that theme, I will address the Minister’s remarks on the code of practice and the consultation on it. That really is not enough. If the law says it is enough for a constable to have a subjective belief that the economic well-being of the United Kingdom is being harmed, it will avail nobody to complain that there was no objective evidence or reasonable suspicion. The Minister perhaps heard an indication from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, of what the reaction of the courts might be to an argument of that kind. I thank him for his offer, but I am afraid it is simply a deflection. This issue pre-eminently needs to be addressed in the Bill.
I end with two further thoughts for the Minister to consider. First, for most of the last decade, Schedule 7 was the most controversial aspect of our counterterrorism laws. One reason is that it potentially affects a lot of people; a lot of people used to be stopped and questioned at airports. It took over from the old “no suspicion stop and search power”, which was repealed when Theresa May was Home Secretary in 2011 or 2012 and defused as an issue of major public concern because of some sensible but quite minor changes made to it. For example, nine hours of detention were taken down to six, alongside several other technical changes. People who were upset by Schedule 7 and saw it as targeted at them and their community were reassured that Parliament was looking at it and prepared to respond to some of their concerns.
Although this may look very technical on the pages of the Bill, I ask the Minister to remember that we have reached a sort of equilibrium on Schedule 7, but it is a very delicate one. If you are going to increase the powers in this manner, it is really important to think about safeguards as well.
I ask the Minister to reflect on a second point. He may not accept my arguments, but I put the pragmatic case to him that these arguments have been put not only by me and previous independent reviewers—the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was also a great reformer of Schedule 7—but by the Supreme Court, which felt strongly enough about this issue to single it out for comment in a case in which the issue did not arise. As a lawyer and a member of the brotherhood of the law, I am delighted by anything that could produce more excuses for litigation. However, at such little cost, administratively or otherwise, the Minister has it in his power to do what the Supreme Court suggested and neutralise a lengthy, and one might almost say pointless, bout of litigation.
I know the Minister has a lot on his plate, but in view of the way this debate has gone and the points that have been made right around the House, I hope the Minister will find time to meet with me and perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and others if they want to come, and discuss this properly. I was sorry to hear him say he had a defence against keyhole surgery. Keyhole surgery is designed to help; it is not the sort of thing one should have to defend against. He should count himself lucky he is meeting surgeons and not butchers. However, we are very keen to meet him and I hope he might agree. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I hope I can be brief with these amendments because they are relatively straightforward. Clause 138 enables the Secretary of State to make driver information regulations about access to the driver licensing information held by the DVLA, the police and other law enforcement agencies. The provision applies UK-wide and, in so far as it applies to Northern Ireland, relates to a mix of reserved and transferred matters.
We have had discussions with the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, and Amendment 394A provides that the Secretary of State may only make the driver information regulations, in so far as they relate to devolved policing agencies in Northern Ireland, in particular the Police Service of Northern Ireland, with the consent of the Department of Justice. The Northern Ireland Executive are taking forward a legislative consent motion in the Northern Ireland Assembly on this basis, and I hope the Committee can support that proposal.
Amendments 397A and 397B are technical amendments that simply clarify the period covered by the first annual report on the use of driver licensing information. Under Clause 138 as drafted, that period begins with the commencement day, which is the day on which Clause 138 comes into force. However, there will be not a single day for Clause 138 coming into force, as Clause 210 partially brings Clause 138 into force on Royal Assent for the purpose of making regulations.
With these amendments, the first annual report will cover the period beginning with the date that Clause 138 comes into force and ending on 31 December of the year in question. That is relatively straightforward. We have had discussions with the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, which respects the devolution settlement as it applies to Northern Ireland; I commend to the Committee the amendments that tidy that up.
I will make two points about Amendment 396 from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to help inform her contribution. First, Clause 138 is intended only to tidy up existing legislation to ensure that all those who need access to DVLA driving licence data have clear legal powers to do so. Secondly, as she is aware—we have discussed it before—a new legal framework is being developed for law enforcement use of facial recognition and similar technologies. I will not repeat what I said earlier, but I encourage her and other noble Lords to submit their views to the consultation by 12 February. I hope that that has been helpful, but I am happy to hear what the noble Baroness has to say.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her explanation on the comments and I am grateful for the general acceptance of the government amendments, which just tidy up where we are to date.
I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness on the concerns that she expressed in Amendment 396. First, I am clear that Clause 138 is intended only to tidy up existing legislation to ensure that all those who need access to DVLA driving licence data have a clear legal basis to do so. The police currently use automatically accessed DVLA data for Road Traffic Act enforcement, but are unable to use such data when investigating serious crime. The Bill, together with future regulations and a code of practice, will allow wider use of data obtained automatically.
I want to be absolutely clear for the noble Baroness that the aim is to allow the DVLA to provide information to the police. It is not designed to allow the police to send an image to the DVLA and for the DVLA to search its database for the identity of an unknown person. I hope that that gives some clarity.
I say to all three noble Lords from the Liberal Democrat Benches who have spoken that the code of practice and future regulations that we are producing under Clause 138 will be tabled under the affirmative procedure in both Houses of Parliament. I say to the noble Baroness that this is only tidying up and the revised legislation will be under the affirmative procedure.
I hope that I gave a considerable amount of detail on facial recognition in our previous discussions. We have a consultation, which closes on 12 February. We want to provide strong regulation of facial recognition and, as I said previously in Committee, I hope to have a useful, constructive dialogue on that going forward. Based on those comments, I hope that the noble Baroness will not press her amendment and I commend the amendments in my name on the Marshalled List.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Attlee for his long-standing commitment to this very important issue. I would venture to say that there is not another noble Lord in the Committee who cares as deeply as my noble friend does about the topic of abnormal loads.
Amendment 403 seeks to allow the police to authorise an abnormal load driver to break normal traffic rules in order to negotiate the chosen route for the load. Amendment 404 seeks to repeal the power of the police to grant certain police powers to a person escorting an abnormal load. It seems that the original intention of Schedule 5 to the Police Reform Act 2002 was that the police have the powers to direct traffic and permit regulations to be broken where necessary. However, few accreditations have made it, as it would effectively allow a self-escorter not to comply with the rules of the road.
Amendment 403 and 404, taken together, would repeal this problem and offer a more flexible solution. Instead of accreditation, Amendment 403 enables the chief constable to grant a traffic regulation dispensation order to a person escorting an abnormal load. It seems common sense to provide the Secretary of State with the flexibility needed to decide which regulations should be dispensed with. Moreover, the chief constable would have the authority to outline any conditions they consider necessary, such as the number of escort vehicles to be allowed. These amendments are well thought out, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Amendment 413 would require the Secretary of State to establish a regulatory framework to manage the fees charged to hauliers by police forces for escorting a vehicle or trailer carrying a load of exceptional dimensions. This amendment has industry support. A regulatory framework will ensure that the fees charged by police forces are consistent among forces across the country. I know that my noble friend has spent much time engaging with industry stakeholders, so I hope the Minister takes his remarks and amendments seriously. I look forward to the Government’s response.
On Amendment 414, I declare myself as an owner of a shotgun. I associate myself completely with the words of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. I will leave it there.
I support the principle behind my noble friend’s Amendments 416D and 416M. They are, in essence, clarifying amendments that ensure that the scope of the original measure in question is not used for the abuse of police services for personal gain. The provision of special services is a helpful law that chief officers should be able to draw on with discretion, but the compensation for the use of those services should not come at the expense of the police force’s integrity.
Compensation should ideally be monetary, with, if necessary, the short-term loan of items for specific use, as my noble friend’s amendment lays out, but it should not be equipment for personal use. Similarly, as my noble friend said, it should not be the officers making the decision on the use of special police services who gain financially from overtime payments; it should be those actually working overtime. My noble friend has laid out cases where both these incidents have happened and, once again, we hear of malpractice in the West Midlands Police.
My noble friend is infinitely wiser in his knowledge on this subject than I am, so I will defer to him, but I hope the Minister can address his undoubtedly well-informed points in depth, especially given the questions certain police forces currently face. I once again thank my noble friend for bringing these amendments forward, and I look forward to hearing both his and the Minister’s closing remarks.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I welcome the amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and his engagement with me and officials from the Home Office and the Department for Transport on abnormal loads. He brings huge—abnormally large, perhaps I should say—expertise to your Lordships’ House on these matters, and certainly expertise that is unique for this House. I thank him for raising his concerns.
It is good to hear from my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester on this, bringing his experience, particularly as it pertains to the operation of heritage railways. Committee on a Bill is not complete, as far as I am concerned, if I have not talked to my noble friend Lord Faulkner about heritage railways. I have done so a few times—at least on the Employment Rights Act, I remember. Obviously, I note with added respect the new status of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, as a social media influencer, so we should freight his words with even greater import.
On the broader issues raised by these amendments, I am aware that the noble Earl has previously written to the DfT with a report that highlighted specific concerns about the interactions between the West Midlands Police and the heavy haulage industry. He made comments about the chief constable, which are obviously relevant and topical. I think we know what he is talking about, and I will just leave it there; it does not really pertain to the issues in these amendments. That report was appreciated, but it will come as no surprise to the noble Earl—although it may sadden him—that I remind noble Lords that the police are operationally independent from government. Therefore, individual police forces are responsible for making decisions on vehicle escorts based on an assessment of risks to infrastructure and the safety of all road users.
As the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, acknowledged, the majority of police forces are making those decisions using their operational independence in a way that he is very satisfied with. The final decision in each case is for the relevant chief officer in discussion with interested local parties. That is set out in public guidance produced by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency, National Highways and the College of Policing. However, I fully recognise the importance of constructive dialogue on these operational matters. In that spirit, the policing Minister and I are pleased to have arranged a further meeting with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, which I believe is going to happen next week, as he said, along with the national policing lead for abnormal loads, so that these concerns can be discussed in more detail. This would provide an opportunity to ensure that the guidance issued by the National Police Chiefs’ Council is being applied consistently and that any unintended consequences for the heavy haulage industry are perfectly understood.
As a further general observation on these amendments, I reassure the noble Earl that the Government keep the special types general order 2003 under regular review to ensure that it remains fit for purpose and reflects operational needs and legal requirements. Where improvements are necessary, these can be made via an amending order, using existing powers under Section 44 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. This approach ensures that any changes are subject to the established processes for regulatory scrutiny, including impact assessments and public consultation. I hope that that provides the reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, sought in her remarks.
In addition, I acknowledge the representations made by the Heavy Transport Association on this matter in support of the noble Earl’s amendments. The Government recognise the importance of the abnormal load and heavy haulage industry to the UK economy and its critical role in delivering major infrastructure projects across the country, be they in transport, civil engineering or housebuilding. We as a Government are committed to growth, and this is an important part of delivering that commitment. In recognition of this, the Government have supported the efforts made by the NPCC to standardise policing practices for abnormal loads. We strongly encourage police forces across the country to make full use of the new guidance on abnormal loads that was published by the NPCC in May 2025, to ensure that abnormal load hauliers receive a consistent service from the police, no matter where they are operating from. Given this ongoing work to support the industry by the NPCC, I contend that we should allow sufficient time for the new guidance to bed in before considering whether changes to the 2003 order are needed. The guidance is due to be reviewed in May 2027.
As to the specifics of these amendments, as the noble Earl explained, Amendment 403 seeks to confer on the police a power to make traffic regulation dispensation orders. This would allow abnormal load drivers to break normal traffic rules to negotiate their chosen route. While I understand the intention behind this proposal, the Government are not persuaded that it is necessary. Traffic authorities already have the power to make traffic regulation orders under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, and these can provide for precisely the situations described. The Government’s view is that traffic management should remain the responsibility of traffic authorities, which are best placed to consider the wider implications for road safety and network efficiency. Giving this power to the police would blur responsibilities and could lead to inconsistent decision-making.
The Government are also unpersuaded of the case for repealing the provision in the Police Reform Act 2002 that allows the police to accredit certain persons with limited powers to control traffic for the purpose of escorting abnormal loads. Removing this power would mean that only police officers could direct traffic during these movements. The noble Earl has suggested that few accreditations have been made by chief officers utilising these powers. That may be the case, but where such designations have been made, it is inevitably the case that the repeal of these provisions would shift the burden back on to warranted police officers, reduce flexibility in managing abnormal load movements, and lead to delays and higher costs for the haulage industry. These movements often support major infrastructure projects and time-sensitive logistics, so any additional delays could have serious economic consequences. The current system strikes a sensible balance by allowing accredited persons to assist under police oversight, ensuring safety while avoiding unnecessary demands on police time.
I turn to the amendments relating to charges levied by the police for escorting abnormal loads. Amendments 413 and 502 seek to require the Secretary of State to establish a regulatory framework for fees charged by police forces, while Amendment 416D details how payments should be made and received, and Amendment 416M seeks to prevent individuals who could be financially impacted by a decision concerning escorting an abnormal load from being involved in that decision. While I recognise that the aim of these amendments is to improve consistency and predictability for operators moving such loads, we do not believe such a statutory framework is necessary.
Further, a national framework for charging for escorting these loads also already exists. Section 25 of the Police Act 1996 contains a power for the police to recharge the costs of policing that has been requested by an individual or organisation. Fee levels are set out in NPCC guidance on special police services and updated annually. Introducing a standardised regulatory framework as envisaged in Amendment 413 would also risk undermining the ability of forces to respond flexibly and proportionately to local needs. The operational demands placed on police forces by abnormal load movements can differ across the country, influenced by a range of local factors, including geography, road infrastructure, traffic conditions and the availability of police resources.