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The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 12 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 12 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent, and that tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. The selection and grouping list shows the way in which amendments and new clauses have been arranged for debate. Any Divisions on amendments or new clauses will take place in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper—I remind Members, after Thursday afternoon’s confusion, that new clauses will be voted on at the end of proceedings.
Clause 7
Directions by Secretary of State
Jerome Mayhew (Broadland and Fakenham) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 7, page 4, line 30, after “functions” insert—
“where the Office for Rail and Road, in carrying out its functions under section 69A of the Railways Act 1993 (as inserted by section 74 of this Act), has deemed Great British Railways to be in breach of its statutory functions.”
This amendment would restrict the Secretary of State’s ability to give directions to Great British Railways to circumstances where the Office for Rail and Road has deemed Great British Railways in breach of its statutory functions.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 11, in clause 7, page 4, line 30, at end insert—
“(1A) A direction under this section may only be given as a last resort, and only if the executive head of Great British Railways has had to be removed because Great British Railways is failing to comply with its key performance indicators as set out in section [Great British Railways: Key Performance Indicators].”
This amendment limits the Secretary of State’s power to give directions to Great British Railways to a last resort.
Amendment 13, in clause 7, page 4, line 31, leave out subsection (2).
This amendment would remove the Secretary of State’s ability to say that Great British Railways can only exercise unspecified functions after consulting the Secretary of State or with the Secretary of State’s consent.
Amendment 14, in clause 7, page 5, line 9, after “publish” insert “and lay before Parliament”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay any directions given to Great British Railways before Parliament.
Amendment 16, in clause 7, page 5, line 11, at end insert—
“(5A) If the Secretary of State uses the powers in this section to give a direction to Great British Railways about the general level and structure of fares for travel on railway passengers services designated under section 25 or 26, then the Secretary of State must publish the assumptions, criteria, and objectives underpinning any direction.”
This amendment puts a duty on the Secretary of State to publish the assumptions, criteria and objectives used when giving any direction about the level or structure of fares, so decisions can be assessed against passenger growth and affordability.
Amendment 15, in clause 7, page 5, line 12, leave out subsection (6).
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State enforcing failure to comply with a direction through civil proceedings.
Amendment 17, in clause 8, page 5, line 35, leave out subsection (2).
This amendment would remove Scottish Ministers’ ability to say that Great British Railways can only exercise unspecified functions after consulting them or with their consent.
Amendment 18, in clause 8, page 6, line 4, leave out subsection (6).
This amendment would prevent Scottish Ministers enforcing failure to comply with a direction through civil proceedings.
Amendment 24, in clause 15, page 8, line 21, at end insert—
“(1A) The document set out in subsection (1) must ensure that Great British Railways is focussed on meeting the key performance indicators set out in section [Great British Railways: Key Performance Indicators].”
This amendment would require the rail strategy to be geared to enabling Great British Railways to meet its key performance indicators.
New clause 4—Secretary of State: power to dismiss the executive head of Great British Railways—
“(1) The Secretary of State may dismiss the executive head of Great British Railways.
(2) The Secretary of State shall only exercise the power in subsection (1) if—
(a) Great British Railways is not meeting a key performance indicator set out in this Act,
(b) Great British Railways has failed to act on guidance given by the Secretary of State under section 9 of this Act.”
This new clause gives the Secretary of State the power to dismiss the executive head of Great British Railways if the organisation is failing to perform against its statutory duties.
Jerome Mayhew
It is just as pleasurable to have you in the Chair today as it was last week, Sir Alec.
I remind hon. Members that clause 7 gives the Secretary of State the power to issue and publish directions to Great British Railways relating to its railway activities. It also outlines how the Secretary of State must obtain consent from Welsh and Scottish Ministers before giving directions relating to their devolved services, except where powers are used in relation to the access regime. The clause further outlines how GBR will be required to comply with directions, which are mandatory and binding, and intended to be used as a so-called
“responsive tool for necessary course correction, rather than as a proactive tool to set requirements on GBR,”
or, as further clarified in the explanatory notes, as “a last resort”.
Interestingly, although the explanatory notes state that a direction by the Secretary of State is a mechanism of last resort, the clause itself gives no indication to substantiate that. Instead, it suggests that the Secretary of State can act independently of their Welsh and Scottish counterparts’ views, especially as there is a reliance on non-legislative measures. My first question to the Minister is, therefore: why is this supposed last-resort requirement not on the face of the Bill?
When dealing with matters relating in particular to the interpretation of devolution, the risk is that any decision taken by the Secretary of State may be disputed by the devolved nations and end up as a political football, which only increases lawyers’ profits. Would it not therefore be prudent to set out in the legislation exactly what is meant? Without a clear breakdown of the procedures and directions, surely we run the risk of granting the Secretary of State a large degree of power with very limited oversight.
The clause gives the Secretary of State unrestricted power, other than for operations in Scotland and Wales, to intervene in the running of GBR. That is a step too far. While it is justifiable for the democratically elected Government of the day to set and agree GBR’s strategic objectives, key performance indicators and business plans, after those are set out, the Government’s role should be to hold GBR to account for the delivery of the targets, objectives and strategies, and not to tell it how to do so on a day-to-day basis.
A question arises on clause 8(4), and I would be grateful if the Minister could provide clarity on the oversight system outlined in clauses 7 and 8. Subsection (4) states:
“Before giving, varying or revoking a direction under this section the Scottish Ministers must consult the Secretary of State.”
Presently, GBR must decide whether a decision directly affects devolved services, but the Bill provides no statutory test, which leaves a delivery body making politically sensitive judgments, further increasing the risk of challenge by devolved nations. Clarity for Members, especially those from the devolved nations, will be extremely helpful, so I would be grateful if the Minister would address that directly.
Under subsection (5) of both clauses 7 and 8, directions must be published, but there is no requirement for them to be laid before and scrutinised by Parliament—the old trap of creating transparency without consequence. A reporting or laying requirement, perhaps through the Select Committee, would turn publication into genuine accountability. However, I am interested to hear what rationale the Minister has not to allow greater scrutiny of GBR in Parliament. Again, perhaps he will address that directly in his response. That is the rationale behind our suggested amendments to require the Secretary of State to lay directions before Parliament, in order to allow us to scrutinise the decisions in greater detail.
There is a fundamental question about leadership and who is the key decision maker. We are told repeatedly by the Minister and others that GBR is the directing mind, but will that really be the case if the clause goes through unamended? If GBR really is the directing mind, what is the necessity for the clause? It is a recipe for decision paralysis, with GBR, given the decision-making structures, undermined by guidance—we will come on to that when we discuss clause 9—and by directions from the Department for Transport in the name of the Secretary of State.
Clause 7 really does risk creating the worst of both worlds. We will have the cost of GBR and its oversight structures—we are told in the recently published job application for the part-time chair that GBR will have more than 100,000 employees; it will be an enormous organisation, with its own senior management team—and then we will have the same again, with an overactive Department for Transport second-guessing GBR’s day-to-day working and being able to give guidance and directions as a result of clauses 7 and 8.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
As my hon. Friend describes the growing size of the Department for Transport and Great British Railways, I am slightly reminded of the Department of Health and Social Care, and NHS England. The Government talk of doubling up and so are winding back by abolishing NHS England, but here they are doubling up in the Department for Transport over Great British Railways. I wonder whether he has any reflections on that analogy.
Jerome Mayhew
It is not a perfect analogy, because GBR is at least intended to be more akin to a business—a nationalised business—but my hon. Friend is entirely right that where we have two organisations in competition, each one thinking that it runs the railways, that is a recipe for confusion at the least, and disaster at the worst.
This is not an idle concern, because it has happened before. We all remember the Virgin West Coast franchise debacle in 2012, when the slightly arm’s length process of franchising did not go well, causing a communal panic in the Department for Transport. The phrase, “Something must be done to prevent this from ever happening again,” was no doubt repeated many times. The result was that more and more micromanaging took place by the Department for Transport in the setting of franchises. The Department no longer talked only about outcomes that needed to be achieved, leaving how companies went about that entirely up to them, which is the appropriate way to draft a franchise agreement. Instead, that devolved into mechanisms of how a franchise should be operated.
We had that mission creep, and I fear that under the Bill we might get exactly the same approach with GBR. It will be set up with the best of intentions, and perhaps in the first two or three years all will run smoothly and the directing mind in practice might well be GBR, but then something will happen, because something always does happen in the real world, with lots of people doing their best but sometimes making mistakes, and there will be a collective gasp from the Department of Transport, because it will feel like it is on the hook, so “Something must be done to ensure that this doesn’t happen again.” We have designed into this mechanism a structure that allows the removal of GBR’s operational independence, and it does so without any reference to actions of last resort by the Government—the Bill is silent on that.
We talk about the Secretary of State, but we all know that officials in the Department for Transport will be advising the Secretary of State on what he or she should be doing in a particular circumstance, and there will be a power grab. Without amendment, the clause will absolutely allow for that. We should be alive to the real-world experience that we all have and take this opportunity to strengthen its wording in order to design out that issue and ensure that there is proper accountability—with GBR accountable to the Secretary of State and, through the Secretary of State, to Parliament—and that operational independence stays with what will be a nationalised business, rather than creating a railway version of NHS England, as my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East mentioned a moment ago.
I have tabled two amendments to address this issue. Amendment 12 would limit directions to circumstances in which the Office of Rail and Road assesses GBR to be in breach of its statutory functions. It could be argued that the Secretary of State should have an emergency lever; that is fair enough, because bad things happen. One of our great complaints before the election, although I am beginning to hear it from Labour Ministers as well, was, “We pull the levers but they’re not attached to anything—we have no power.” When we form the Government after the next election, we will want to have levers that are attached to something, and I accept that it is necessary to have an emergency lever to pull should a significant unforeseen event occur—another pandemic, perhaps—and an intervention be required.
However, amendment 12 would still allow the Secretary of State to intervene in emergency scenarios, as the ORR would deem that such events make it impossible for GBR to conform to its business plan targets. Clause 74 sets out the ORR’s power to monitor GBR’s performance. Elsewhere in the Bill, we shall argue that the ORR needs more teeth to hold GBR to account, and this provision limiting the potential for the Secretary of State to intervene until such time that an independent regulatory body has recognised that GBR has not been able to fulfil its functions will be an important safeguard.
Amendment 11 would put the words “last resort” on the face of the Bill, and would provide that a direction may be made only after the removal of GBR’s chief executive officer. The intention behind the amendment is to treat GBR as a business, which I think we all agree is what it is intended to be—albeit a nationalised one. Where there is a board of non-executive directors, they can question the executive team, and they can challenge decisions and require the chief executive to explain and defend the direction of the company. However, when push comes to shove, and the decision is made that the organisation is moving in the wrong direction, the weapon available to the chairman is the removal of the chief executive officer.
If GBR is operating on a day-to-day basis with oversight from the Department for Transport—the Secretary of State—and concerns arise as to its direction or performance, the sequence of severity of the response should not start with guidance from the Secretary of State and then mandatory directions. They might be the final requirement, because we all need those levers, but surely they should come only after the chief executive has been challenged and then removed, just as in the private sector with an arm’s length majority investment.
Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)
I certainly see what the hon. Member is trying to do with these amendments, and the Liberal Democrats share some of his concerns about the balance between holding GBR to account and GBR’s autonomy. However, does he not feel that amendment 11 may go a little too far? Laudable though the KPIs that he has set out are, I am not sure that any railway in this country has ever achieved them all at once, and if the amendment were made we may very well go through a revolving door of chief executives before the Secretary of State can give any direction.
Jerome Mayhew
That is a perfectly fair challenge, but amendment 11 would not require the CEO’s removal by the Secretary of State if those KPIs are not met; it would be a necessary first step to demonstrate that the KPIs are not being met, and then there would be a discretion. I suppose the hon. Member is really arguing that my safeguard is not quite as strong as it could be. Nevertheless, it would be a step in the right direction, and it would not require the removal of the chief executive.
New clause 4 would give the Secretary of State the power to dismiss the CEO of GBR on the grounds that a KPI has not been met and—this is an important bit, which the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage might recognise gives the new clause some weight—GBR has failed to act on guidance that has been issued by the Secretary of State under clause 9. It is sequential. First, the chief executive is given guidance from the Secretary of State. Most chief executives worth their salt would take notice of official guidance given by their 100% shareholder, but if for some reason they fail to act on the guidance and they are still missing their KPI, then the power to dismiss would be exercisable. In my submission, that is a good approach.
Clause 7(2)—the “interference clause”—anticipates minor direction changes, which is exactly the kind of direction that should not be issued and is contrary to the explanatory notes. We are told that the powers in the clause will be used only as a last resort, but subsection (2) states:
“A direction under this section may provide, in particular, that a function is only to be exercised—
(a) after consulting the Secretary of State, or
(b) with the Secretary of State’s consent.”
The clause is not an emergency lever. It is quite clear from the drafting that the circumstances in subsection (2) cannot apply to a last-resort emergency lever. It is saying, “You can carry on doing things, but we need to have oversight in the nitty-gritty.” It is truly an interference clause.
Is it the Government’s intention that directions issued under clause 7 will be, as described in the explanatory notes, used as a “last resort” emergency brake, or do they intend—this is the case as the Bill is drafted—that the Secretary of State will give himself or herself the power to intervene in day-to-day management, even down to the level that individual decisions will not be taken until there has been consultation with the Secretary of State or the Secretary of State has consented to them?
Clause 7(5) needs improvement. It requires publication by the Secretary of State, but anticipates no role for Parliament in that oversight. The organisation Rail Forum said:
“We agree that this is desirable to ensure GBR remains arm’s length and is allowed to manage its own affairs.”
That is important. The industry itself is saying that GBR needs to be operationally independent and to manage its own affairs. Amendment 14 would correct that issue. It would require the Secretary of State to lay any decision before Parliament—the right place for primary scrutiny. Rail Forum supports the amendment. It says:
“This is essential to ensure that normal Parliamentary process is not bypassed.”
Amendment 16 would mean that decisions on fares imposed on GBR by the Secretary of State can be assessed against passenger growth and affordability. Such a direction would have a huge impact on the financial position of GBR, because decisions on fares and passenger growth and affordability are central to revenue. It is crucial that decisions are made on proper evidence and in line with the objects of GBR.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
I do not want to stop my hon. Friend’s flow, as I believe he is probably coming to the end of his remarks. On listening to his eloquent speech, it strikes me that these amendments point directly to the fact that if Parliament had more of a role under the Bill, we would not even get to such places. Ultimately, if there is scrutiny throughout the process and an ability for Parliament, once GBR exists, to hold the Secretary of State and GBR to account, we should avoid the need for a civil proceeding, because a lot of the issues could be nipped in the bud before getting to that stage.
Jerome Mayhew
My hon. Friend is entirely right. That will be a theme of our comments on and challenges to the Bill throughout the progress of our scrutiny: accountability without responsibility is no accountability at all. Time and again, we see an unwillingness from those who drafted the Bill to trust the role of parliamentarians as scrutineers.
As a former businessman, I know—I have not made this one up; it is not unique thinking—that, in any organisation, you get what you measure. That will have been the case in any organisation that hon. and right hon. Members may have worked in in the private or public sector: the NHS has targets because it gets what it measures. At the moment, the Bill measures very little on GBR’s performance, and where it does, that disappears off to the Department for Transport and is reported to other civil servants.
As parliamentarians, we know our value in holding not only GBR to account but the Government of the day, which will not always be a Labour one. That is our important role, which is done through the Select Committee process and more widely. As parliamentarians, we should seek to improve the Bill. I recognise that we will have a number of Divisions during this process and I am unlikely to win a single one, but I urge the Government to listen—perhaps to the private comments of its own Committee members; they do not have to tell me about it—because these are genuine areas of improvement that we as parliamentarians should be encouraging the Government to add to the Bill. On that note, I will stop.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)
It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair, Sir Alec. I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham, for this group of amendments, which are primarily about the direction powers in the Bill.
Amendments 11 and 12 would each limit the use of the Secretary of State’s direction power, requiring that the power can be used only as a last resort, after dismissing the head of GBR and if GBR has breached its functions. I understand the intention here, which is to ensure that these direction powers are used proportionately. I assure the hon. Member that the Government agree with that aim—we absolutely must empower GBR to be the directing mind of the railway—and I agree that the railway will not work if Ministers are forced to keep meddling in it in the way that they do today. That said, this power is not the problem that he thinks it is.
The new direction power is common in relationships between the Secretary of State and arm’s length bodies. Other examples in the transport sector that are not limited to last resort use include the power in the Infrastructure Act 2015 for the Transport Secretary to direct National Highways. Hon. Members will note that these types of powers are not frequently used. These amendments would create restrictions that undermine the principle that the Secretary of State should retain the ability to respond to persistent, urgent or unforeseen issues where rapid intervention is required.
Jerome Mayhew
Where is the reference to persistent, urgent and unforeseen incidents in the Bill?
Keir Mather
The Government have made it clear what the provisions within these clauses are designed to implement. I ask the shadow Minister to look at legislation passed under his own Government that contain direction powers that are remarkably consistent with those found in the Bill, and at the directions provided in other pieces of legislation. Does he feel that they represent mission creep when it comes to Secretary of State responsibilities? He will note that these type of powers are not used frequently. We believe that these amendments would create restrictions that undermine the principle that the Secretary of State should retain the ability to respond as required.
Critically, a direction should come before there has been a serious impact. The removal of an executive or the ORR deeming GBR to be in breach of its statutory functions would suggest that a serious failure has already occurred. In the latter case, it is unclear in what situation the hon. Member would consider a breach of a statutory function to have occurred, which would introduce ambiguity into the system.
Restricting the direction powers by limiting their use to only the most serious of instances would mean that any directions were more likely to be more prescriptive and severe. I am sure that the shadow Minister would not wish to see the public or industry seriously impacted before the Secretary of State acted. The new powers also recognise the GBR board as the railway’s directing mind while enabling Ministers to intervene to support GBR to deliver or correct course.
Amendments 13 and 17 would remove the ability for the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers, respectively, to say that GBR can exercise unspecified functions only after consultation or with their consent. I do not think that these amendments are helpful. They would effectively remove the clarity on the directions power, but would not restrict the legal scope of it. They would simply lessen the legal transparency around the use of the direction.
There are circumstances where requiring GBR to consult the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers before taking a specific action would be entirely reasonable, and maybe even desirable for GBR. For example, where GBR needs to address a specific risk or situation as part of a wider national co-ordination or cross-industry response, the Secretary of State may need to ensure that actions are in line with national responses. The ability to revoke a direction allows Ministers to ensure that they operate in a proportionate and rational way in response to time-sensitive issues.
Amendments 15 and 18 would prevent the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers, respectively, from enforcing GBR’s failure to comply with a direction through the civil courts. The Government need to retain the right to independent enforcement with fixed remedies that compel GBR to act across a range of mechanisms, to ensure a pathway to protecting taxpayers’ money and the delivery of the Government’s objectives. I hope the hon. Member would agree that it is completely undesirable to remove any ability for Ministers to hold the executive to account.
I also politely say that the hon. Member cannot have it both ways: either GBR is an organisation that could exercise mission creep and is too independent of scrutiny, whether from Parliament or anywhere else, or the powers in the Bill place too many strictures on it from the perspective of Government. That point of clarity is required in the Opposition’s overall perspective on the Bill.
Jerome Mayhew
As I have set out in my series of amendments, the appropriate oversight and control is to remove the chief executive. The Minister must accept that, if the Secretary of State thinks that the organisation is going in the wrong direction, is not listening to guidance or has gone rogue in some way, they have the unfettered power to remove the chief executive officer at any stage. If he does not think that is the case, he should say so now, because if the Secretary of State has the power to remove the chief executive officer and put in place someone who will do his bidding, then none of this is needed, is it?
Keir Mather
I will turn in a moment to the specific points that the shadow Minister raises around the chief executive, but I think I share his views on the importance of GBR’s compliance with its fundamental functions and with the law. That is why amendments 15 and 18 are peculiar—they do not recognise GBR needing to be able to have enforcement through that particular route.
Amendments 14 and 16 both relate to the transparency of directions. Amendment 14 would require directions to be laid before Parliament, but we believe that is unnecessary as provisions in the Bill already require directions issued under this power to be published, and Parliament has the power to call the Secretary of State to account should it take the view that more information is required.
Baggy Shanker (Derby South) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Alec. The Minister is quite eloquently setting out why some of these amendments are not needed. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham, set out earlier why they were needed, but also referred to problems that may happen in the future. It is difficult to write a Bill while trying to tackle problems that may or may not happen in the future.
The fact remains that rail reform failed to happen during 14 years of Conservative Government. The previous Rail Minister admitted that the Government failed to bring in the necessary reform. We had 10 Rail Ministers, I think—correct me if I am wrong—in 14 years. That was not just a failure to bring in a Bill; it failed passengers, railways and our workers who support the railways. Is it not time that we crack on, pass the Bill and deliver the improvements that this industry so greatly needs?
The Chair
Order. I remind Members that interventions should be short and punchy. If Members would like to make a longer intervention they have the opportunity to catch my eye.
Keir Mather
I agree with my hon. Friend’s sentiment that it is unwise to hypothesise about what potential eventualities could befall GBR in specific instances, as the shadow Minister encourages me to do. What is important—my hon. Friend made an important point around consistency, both in our legislative work and the work of the Government more broadly—is to ensure that the bedrock upon which GBR sits is legally sound, and that all eventualities that may arise are catered for through provisions within the legislation that offer sufficient breadth. That is why amendments 15 and 18 do not serve the legal accountability purposes that the shadow Minister seems to want to stress.
Keir Mather
I will give way one final time and then I want to make some progress.
Jerome Mayhew
I am grateful that the Minister is being very generous. In my opening remarks, I asked him to give me some real-world examples of when injunctive relief might be required. Could he not forget to provide those?
Keir Mather
I had not forgotten the shadow Minister’s request for me to provide specific examples. In a sense, though, I do not believe that it would be wise to do so. I do not think that the purpose of this Committee is to speculate about what GBR may or may not do in future; it is important that we develop a suite of measures that create the accountability that is required.
Keir Mather
I will give way one final time, and then I really do want to make some progress.
Laurence Turner
I will not test the wisdom of speculating about future legal circumstances, but is it not the case that when Railtrack was in a state of advanced collapse, that particular case did end up in court?
Keir Mather
I defer to my hon. Friend’s expertise on that particular matter, but my overall point is that, rather than create events in our heads about when this enforcement power may be required, it is important that we give GBR, and the Secretary of State in exercising accountability in relation to it, a full suite of measures to ensure that it remains compliant with the law. Actually, specific duties outlined in the Bill encourage GBR not only to be compliant with the law but to deliver for passengers, including those with disabilities, and to make sure that we have a long-term infrastructure strategy for the railway and unify it in a way that serves the interests of passengers.
Amendment 16 would require the publication of the assumptions, criteria and objectives used when giving directions about fares. The Government have been clear that GBR will have a greater level of autonomy and flexibility over fare setting than train operating companies do today; however, given the need to balance passenger and taxpayer contributions to funding the railway, that freedom will be within strategic parameters and guardrails set by the Secretary of State.
While it is possible that the directions power could be used to set strategic parameters and guardrails for fares, there are alternative routes, most notably the ability for public service contracts awarded to GBR to contain fare parameters and guardrails. Nevertheless, it is crucial that the Secretary of State retains the powers to direct and give guidance to GBR on fares. It is necessary that the Government and GBR alike can respond to exceptional circumstances. Beyond that, the Government are committed to interacting with GBR clearly and transparently, and the refreshed role of the Secretary of State on fares is no exception.
Finally, I turn to two additional amendments, which relate not to directions but generally to the accountability of GBR. Amendment 24 would require the long-term rail strategy to be geared towards enabling GBR to meet the key performance indicators set out in new clause 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham. New clause 4 would allow the Secretary of State to dismiss the head of GBR were it not meeting the key performance indicators proposed in new clause 2. We have already discussed new clause 2, so I will not repeat my arguments, but in relation to amendment 24, the long-term rail strategy is clearly meant to be just that—long term. The amendment would make the strategy a document focused on short to medium-term performance indicators, which could change much more frequently.
Rebecca Smith
I would argue that my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham has tabled a key amendment, which relates to something that came up in the scrutiny of the Bill in the Transport Committee; indeed, I asked a question of the noble Lord Hendy about it when I quizzed him on how we as MPs are supposed to hold the Government to account for the delivery of the long-term rail strategy. I appreciate that it is long term, but we have to get from the short term to the long term, and if nothing is set out in the Bill about what delivery is supposed to look like on the route to the long-term delivery, we effectively cannot do our job. The Minister in the other place rightly said, “It’s going to be an amazing railway system. It’s going to be perfect,” but he could not answer me on how we hold people to account on getting from A to B. I would be interested in the Minister’s response to that if he is not prepared to accept amendment 24.
Keir Mather
It puzzles me that with all the other transport bodies that have been set up—National Highways is an interesting example—I do not recall a series of concerns having been outlined that one of the most robust systems of parliamentary democracy in the world was in some way, shape or form incapable of—
Jerome Mayhew
I am grateful to the Minister, though I remind him that we do have 14 sessions; we are not cantering to the last fence. He prays in aid National Highways. We are all constituency MPs. We all know how frustrating it is trying to deal with National Highways. I do not want to make a headline unnecessarily, but my personal view, as a constituency MP, is that trying to deal with National Highways in the interests of my constituents is almost impossible. Why would he choose that as the example to follow when designing accountability for GBR?
Keir Mather
In a spirit of cross-party contrition, I agree with the shadow Minister’s point; it is a fair one, and perhaps that was a poor example.
In the setting out of the long-term rail strategy, through the Secretary of State, there are myriad means of Parliamentary accountability to ensure that process is done in a way that reflects the long-term interests of the railway and of passengers. There are robust means of scrutiny through this House and other means of which Parliamentarians can avail themselves of, and of which the hon. Member for South West Devon has availed herself multiple times through the passage of this Bill.
I would like to conclude on this grouping and so I want to speak to new clause 4. As the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham will be aware, with bodies of this nature the Government’s long-standing policy is that the Secretary of State of the sponsoring Department has responsibility for appointing the non-executive chair of the board. The executive team is then accountable in the first instance to the organisation’s non-executive board, and it is right that trust is given to the expertise and experience of the executive and that there is appropriate distance between the Secretary of States and those tasked with the day-to-day operational management of the organisation. That is one of the benefits of the GBR model.
Legislating to dictate a process whereby the chief executive is dismissed directly by the Secretary of State for failure to meet a single KPI is not appropriate and it cuts across all guidance and understanding of effective partnership between Government Departments and their arm’s length bodies. For those reasons, I cannot accept these amendments and urge the hon. Members to withdraw them.
Jerome Mayhew
I am wholly unconvinced by the explanation the Minister has given. On many of the clauses and amendments I have put forward, and those put forward in the names of other Members, one can see both sides of the argument; on this one, I think the Government are entirely wrong. They are setting up a structure using another arm’s length non-governmental body, National Highways, that is a byword among us constituency MPs for a lack of accountability and for being a frustrating body to deal with. That is not the right direction for the Government to be going in and I will push the amendments to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Keir Mather
I beg to move amendment 166, in clause 7, page 5, line 4, leave out
“operation of a GBR-provided Scottish service”
and insert
“exercise by Great British Railways of functions—
(i) on behalf of the Scottish Ministers in accordance with arrangements made under section 4, or
(ii) under a contract awarded under section 31(3)(b)”.
This amendment broadens the circumstances in which the Secretary of State must obtain the consent of the Scottish Ministers, where giving directions to GBR.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 167 and 168.
Clause stand part.
Clause 8 stand part.
Keir Mather
The amendments will improve clarity and ensure that the Railways Bill works as intended. Clauses 7 and 9, as drafted, set out that the Secretary of State must obtain consent from Scottish or Welsh Ministers when issuing a direction and guidance to GBR
“in a manner that directly affects the operation of”
a GBR-provided Scottish or Welsh service. That definition could unintentionally exclude scenarios where Great British Railways is exercising functions delegated by Scottish or Welsh Ministers that do not directly affect operation of railway passenger service functions, such as in relation to branding. The amendments provide a clearer and more precise approach. Consent will now be required whenever GBR is acting on behalf of Scottish or Welsh Ministers under formal arrangements enabled by clause 4, or contracts awarded under clause 31. That is a better way of defining where consent is needed as it reflects the responsibilities devolved to Scottish and Welsh Ministers under the Bill.
The amendments remove ambiguity from the Bill without changing its core purpose. They ensure that devolved Governments have a clear and consistent role in decisions affecting services devolved to them, while maintaining the Secretary of State’s ability to protect the network as a whole. That approach has the support of both Scottish and Welsh Ministers because it provides certainty and transparency. I therefore urge the Committee to support the amendments.
Clause 7, to which the amendments apply, provides the Secretary of State with the power to issue legally binding directions to Great British Railways. Clause 8 replicates that power for Scottish Ministers when GBR is exercising functions relating to Scottish railway services in Scotland. Such powers are common in relationships between Government and arm’s length bodies and used only when absolutely justified and in a proportionate way. For example, the Oil and Gas Authority has received only one ministerial direction in its 10-year history.
Clause 7 is a normal, standard accountability provision that follows established precedent. It is a type of power that is always used sparingly. It is not a new and extraordinary means of interfering with the railway that the Government are trying to decentralise to GBR. The powers are necessary to reflect the overall democratic accountability of the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers for the performance of GBR within the areas of the country that they are responsible for and fund.
To protect GBR’s day-to-day operational independence as the directing mind, the powers will be used only where there is strong justification, in consultation with the ORR and after agreed processes have been followed. For Scotland, those processes include following a series of procedures and controls that will be set out in the memorandum of understanding between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers that is required under clause 23 of the Bill. They also include consulting the Secretary of State before using the power.
To ensure appropriate transparency, the clauses require that the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers must publish any issued directions, including when they are amended or revoked. As GBR may also provide services on behalf of Scottish or Welsh Ministers, clause 7 requires the Secretary of State to secure the consent of Scottish or Welsh Ministers to issue directions to GBR relating to areas that fall under the devolved responsibilities of Scotland or Wales.
Finally, to avoid a scenario where GBR receives contradictory directions from Ministers or where directions issued by Scottish Ministers appear to go beyond their responsibilities, clause 8 provides the power for the Secretary of State to revoke Scottish Ministers’ directions. We have agreed with Scottish Ministers that that provision is necessary to protect the overall network as a whole.
The clauses are essential to provide a clear and proportionate route for intervention while still enabling GBR to deliver as the directing mind in the interests of its customers, taxpayers and the public. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Jerome Mayhew
The Committee will be pleased to hear that I am not going to reheat my arguments on clause 7, but we have not yet discussed clause 8. The arguments inevitably mirror each other to a degree, because clause 8 in the main seeks to extend the provisions of clause 7 to Scottish Ministers.
Clause 8 will grant Ministers in Scotland the power to issue and publish directions to GBR—so far, so similar—and GBR will be required to comply with those directions. However, the Secretary of State has ensured that they will have the ability to remove a direction of Scottish Ministers where it is inconsistent with her directions. The clause requires the Secretary of State to consult Ministers in Scotland before revoking and must publish any revocations.
The clause suffers from the same issues as clause 7, as I have already intimated: granting the Secretary of State, and then by extension Scottish Ministers, the ability to direct GBR, which is meant to be operationally independent. That is the first confusion. I will not rehash the arguments, but hon. Members should take it as read that I repeat them here.
As the Minister just mentioned, clause 8(7) will allow the Secretary of State to revoke a direction given by Scottish Ministers under that clause. That is confusion No. 2. We anticipate circumstances in which GBR has a direction of travel—that is not meant to be a rail pun—with which the Scottish Minister disagrees; the Scottish Minister issues a direction for GBR to go in a different direction, and then the Secretary of State disagrees with that direction and issues a revocation. What a recipe for confusion, delay and poor governance that creates!
Who is really in charge of the railways in Britain? It is certainly does not sound as though it is GBR, which is being second-guessed on the one hand by the Scottish Ministers and on the other by the Secretary of State. It does not sound as though Scottish Ministers are in charge even in Scotland, because they can suffer a revocation from the Secretary of State. Yet the consultation document tells us, as the Government have told us time and again, that
“GBR will be operationally independent, staffed by experts and professionals from the rail sector…who will be empowered to deliver for passengers and freight customers without government interference in day-to-day decision-making.”
When did that change? Perhaps the Minister can let us in to the secret. Clause 8 not only prevents GBR from being independent—as clause 7 does—but prevents devolved Ministers from acting within their own devolved settlements without being second-guessed by the Secretary of State.
I accept that the Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Transport, Fiona Hyslop MSP, when speaking about clause 8 during the Transport Committee evidence session, seemed not to oppose that oversight, as she recognised that certain aspects, such as access and freight, remain reserved. It seems that Scottish Ministers are content to accept the clause as drafted because a further memorandum of understanding will create firebreaks between non-devolved powers, in which the Secretary of State may intervene, and devolved powers. That could be okay, but we as a Committee do not know, because we have not seen the memorandum of understanding, even in draft.
We are going to come back to this issue again and again. There are a plethora of documents designed to support the operation of GBR—to support this skeleton Bill—and yet we have not seen them. How can this Committee do our job of scrutinising this Bill line by line, seeking to improve it and to ensure that it achieves the objectives that the Government say it does, when 19 documents and counting—documents that are crucial to the actual running of the railway both in Scotland and in the United Kingdom as a whole—are absent, even in draft?
Bill Reeve, the director of rail reform for Transport Scotland, when invited to add further to the remarks from the Cabinet Secretary, said:
“An awful lot will rely on the memorandum of understanding to flesh that out and give examples.”
There is a question for the Minister surrounding this memorandum of understanding for Scottish and Welsh Ministers. A lot of the powers in the Bill seemingly rely on a document that is not part of the Bill. Will the Minister provide details of the memorandum of understanding prior to the passage of this Bill? If not, why does he refuse to let us know what the memorandum of understanding is likely to stay? Why does he believe that Parliament should approve a working arrangement between the devolved Governments on which no consultation has been undertaken?
I will speak further in detail on the memorandum of understanding when we reach clauses 23 and 24, but it is important that Ministers note that the current framework of the Bill relies on a document that has little oversight or clearly defined objectives, and which we have not seen.
Keir Mather
On memorandums of understanding, I point the shadow Minister to the fact that the heads of terms for the memorandum of understanding with the Welsh Government have already been published. On the overall principle on the development of memorandums of understanding, the stakeholders who gave evidence to the Committee were very clear that the process is being carried out in close consultation with devolved Governments and that it is very common for such operational documents to be developed in consultation in this way.
We are creating an operational framework by which GBR can function as an organisation. It is very important that that platform exists before the devolved settlements that will dictate the operational reality of how the railway works are layered on top.
On the shadow Minister’s point about direction powers, these are the same direction powers that exist, almost like for like, with Great British Energy, Great British Nuclear and the North Sea Transition Authority. They are there to respond to urgent and pressing matters. His points on overreach should have applied to the creation of those organisations as much as to the creation of GBR.
The factual reality of how the direction power has been used in the case of oil is that only one direction has been issued in 10 years. It is the Government’s intent—we have been very clear in saying so—that this direction power must operate in a similar way and only respond to urgent, pressing and persistent matters.
On the issue of direction from Scottish Ministers, the Secretary of State cannot revoke a direction if it pertains purely to a devolved matter, but Scottish Ministers did agree that revocation powers are necessary when there are conflicts in directions. Speaking from my perspective on how this Bill puts the devolved settlement at the centre of how the railway functions, there are sufficient methods to create accountability, mutual working and shared recognition of priorities and ambitions across devolved Governments, the UK Government and GBR, so that I do not envisage a revocation of a direction being used regularly. It is only there to ensure the smooth function of the railway.
Amendment 166 agreed to.
Amendment made: 167, in clause 7, page 5, line 8, leave out
“operation of a GBR-provided Welsh service”
and insert—
“exercise by Great British Railways of functions—
(i) on behalf of the Welsh Ministers in accordance with arrangements made under section 4, or
(ii) under a contract awarded under section 31(4)(b).”.—(Keir Mather.)
This amendment broadens the circumstances in which the Secretary of State must obtain the consent of the Welsh Ministers, where giving directions to GBR.
Amendment proposed: 14, in clause 7, page 5, line 9, after “publish” insert “and lay before Parliament”.—(Jerome Mayhew.)
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay any directions given to Great British Railways before Parliament.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Olly Glover
I beg to move amendment 143, in clause 9, page 6, line 30, after “statutory functions” insert
“, but only in respect of strategic or financial matters where such guidance is necessary and does not interfere with the operational exercise of those functions.”
This amendment limits the guidance that the Secretary of State can give to Great British Railways.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 19, in clause 9, page 6, line 30, at end insert—
“(1A) The Secretary of State may only give guidance under this section if—
(a) the Secretary of State has drawn to Great British Railway’s attention that Great British Railways is not meeting a key performance indicator set out in section [Great British Railways: Key Performance Indicators], and
(b) Great British Railways has not, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, taken action to remedy this failing within the period of two months.”
This amendment would restrict the Secretary of State’s ability to issue guidance to GBR to circumstances where GBR was failing to meet a key performance indicator as specified in NC2.
Amendment 20, in clause 9, page 6, line 37, at end insert—
“(5A) If the Secretary of State uses the powers in this section to give guidance to Great British Railways about the general level and structure of fares for travel on railway passengers services designated under section 25 or 26, then the Secretary of State must publish the assumptions, criteria, and objectives underpinning any guidance.”
This amendment puts a duty on the Secretary of State to publish the assumptions, criteria and objectives used when giving any guidance about the level or structure of fares, so decisions can be assessed against passenger growth and affordability.
Amendment 21, in clause 10, page 7, line 4, at end insert—
“(1A) The Secretary of State may only give guidance under this section if—
(a) Scottish Ministers have drawn to Great British Railways’ attention that Great British Railways is not meeting a key performance indicator set out in section [Great British Railways: Key Performance Indicators], and
(b) Great British Railways has not taken action to remedy this failing within the period of two months.”
This amendment would restrict Scottish Ministers’ ability to issue guidance to Great British Railways to circumstances where Great British Railways was failing to meet a key performance indicator as specified in NC2.
Olly Glover
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Alec. This amendment relates to some of the clauses in the Bill that will enable the Secretary of State to give guidance, as opposed to direction, to GBR. Amendment 143 is, in my humble opinion, a very modest and reasonable attempt to simply clarify some of the clear intentions that the Minister has expressed for the Bill. Our amendment would mean that the Secretary of State could only provide guidance to GBR on its statutory functions in respect of strategic or financial matters, where such guidance is necessary and does not interfere with the operational exercise of those functions.
The reason for tabling this amendment alludes to things I have said previously in this Committee room, and in other locations—there have been many examples in the past of the Secretary of State as proxy for the Department for Transport, getting involved in far too much of the fine detail of the running of our railways, whether that is the intricacies of timetable specification, whether certain types of rolling stock are upgraded or not, and whether they are equipped with wi-fi and tables, or not. There are many other examples that I could give and I have given before. The amendment is intended to strengthen the Government’s clear intent that the direction and guidance given by the Secretary of State should be strategic and high level. The guidance should be about providing a clear overview of what the Government of the day wishes the railway to achieve and deliver, and about empowering GBR—with appropriate regulation to hold it to account, as we have been debating—to get on with it.
I hope the Minister will view the amendment rather more favourably than he has others, although my powers of clairvoyance feel particularly strong this morning, and I suspect that will not be the case, in which case we will wish to press it to a vote.
Jerome Mayhew
I will deal briefly with amendment 143 and develop some arguments on the other amendments. I congratulate the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage on tabling amendment 143, which pushes in exactly the same direction that I have been pushing today, and also last Thursday, in developing the concern about increasing micromanagement by Department for Transport officials in the name of the Secretary of State, which will undermine the independence of GBR as a tactical organisation.
The culture is already there: the Department has been micromanaging the railways to an increasing extent since 2012 at the latest. This Bill needs to change culture. It is not a steady-state Bill; it is a once in a generation opportunity to change the culture not just of GBR, moving it away from Network Rail, but of the Department for Transport, which is as necessary as the other cultural change. If this Bill is to achieve what it is meant to, the Department’s relationship with the railways should properly be changing. Amendment 143 is a modest but important proposal that would go some way to facilitating that.
Dealing with the group as a whole, and continuing the theme of the exercise of functions and guidance by the Department, the Opposition once again note the contrast between the supposed independence of GBR and the various mechanisms that the Department and the Secretary of State have managed to wheedle into the Bill to grant themselves extra powers, whether as a last resort or, as I fear, to create a micromanaging charter, and where that last resort, as it has been described, has no qualifying criteria—although as we have heard from the Minister, that is seemingly of little consequence.
The clause enables the Secretary of State to “issue and publish guidance”, with notable devolved exceptions, which will allow the Secretary of State to
“clarify policy intentions to GBR.”
The explanatory notes acknowledge that
“in most cases requiring course correction, guidance would be used before directions,”
although I note that it is not required. The Government anticipate that they could move straight to directions if they wish to. However, subsections (1) and (2) are very clear:
“The Secretary of State may give guidance…or revoke guidance”
without any qualifying criteria at all.
What is guidance? It is a steer short of direction, and an application for an injunction against GBR—which we have just voted in favour of—destroys the myth of GBR operational independence. It will be taking orders from the Department for Transport, because that is the status quo ante. Without strengthening this clause and some others, we will confine the relationship between the Department for Transport and the newly created GBR to “more of the same”. That is the fear that we should collectively be fighting against.
The guidance will be not just on the strategic direction or the business case, but on delivery decisions, at the whim of the Department. We can say, “Well, it’s the Secretary of State. This will be done under advisement,” but we all know that in practice it will mean officials micromanaging GBR in the name of the Secretary of State, who will provide the rubber stamp. I fully expect the Minister to reassure me that that would never happen, and that the provision is only for course corrections. Now, if I was in the passenger seat of a vehicle and kept telling someone how to drive, I suppose I would call that a course correction, but they might call it backseat driving. That is the problem: the Bill is designed for backseat driving by the Department for Transport. Will the Minister explain how the clause is nothing short of backseat driving?
I obviously wish GBR the best of luck, and I hope the Minister’s enthusiasm and optimism is fully justified, but I fear that the disastrous consequence of forcing it to walk on eggshells will be constant second-guessing. I have been involved in an organisation in which there was second-guessing—no one was sure who had the decision-making power—and it was a disaster. If there is second-guessing, the organisation as a whole does not know when a decision has been taken. Does the power lie with the board? Does the board have to get clearance from a second board in a wholly different organisation, which might have a different view? Should people in GBR wait for the nod from the Department for Transport before taking action within the organisation, particularly if it is a decision with which its sub-department may not agree?
Rebecca Smith
My hon. Friend’s argument highlights the challenge that a lot of the independent retailers, open access users and, potentially, freight users will face if the Bill remains as drafted. Ultimately, they are the people outside the walls of the castle who will struggle to understand who is making what decision and which decision is final. It is a bit like a child going to one parent, getting an answer they do not like, and going to the other parent to get a different answer. Should there be more clarity in the Bill specifically for that reason?
Jerome Mayhew
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. When one’s children come and ask for something, the wise answer is always to ask first, “What did your mother say?” If we were able to apply that common sense to this situation, I would not be so concerned. What we have instead is stakeholder management culture seeping into the core aspects of GBR functions.
Laurence Turner
Will the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that progress has been made on the cultural issues and the micro-management that he describes? I note in passing that he dates that culture from 2012 onwards, which was, of course, entirely under the Government of which he was part. In the Transport Committee, we heard that until the election, Network Rail had to seek Treasury permission to do as much as put up a passenger footbridge. Is it not welcome that that has now come to an end?
Jerome Mayhew
It is certainly welcome, but we are still in the position in which an improvement to a line—something as small as the Haughley junction improvement, which costs roughly £15 million to £20 million—still needs ministerial sign-off from the Treasury before it can be authorised. The Government have some way to go to improve the situation.
This will leave us with a stakeholder management culture. My hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon is entirely right that many organisations in the 60% of the railway that is not being nationalised as part of GBR will be intimately and hugely impacted by GBR’s decisions—or will they? Will they, too, have to wait for the all clear from the Department for Transport? If GBR gets on the wrong side of Ministers or the Department, its course is going to be corrected to all manner of different ports.
The combination of clauses 7 and 9 removes almost any semblance of operational independence from GBR. Clause 9(5) states that GBR
“must have regard to guidance given under this section.”
That sounds soft, but in practice it creates a standing expectation of compliance and makes it impossible for GBR to make dynamic tactical decisions that are free from day-to-day second guessing by departmental and ministerial intervention.
That brings me to amendments 19 and 21, which would help defend the operational independence of GBR. If the Secretary of State is concerned about an aspect of GBR’s performance, they may instead issue guidance to inform GBR of its failure to meet the key performance indicators. Additionally, under clause 10, the Secretary of State may give guidance only if
“Scottish Ministers have drawn to Great British Railways’ attention that Great British Railways is not meeting a key performance indicator…and…Great British Railways has not taken action to remedy this failing within the period of two months.”
As a result, the amendments would apply to GBR in both England and Scotland.
Finally, amendment 20 repeats the argument made about directions or guidance given by the Secretary of State on the general level and structure of fares, and it would introduce new subsection (5A), which states:
“If the Secretary of State uses the powers in this section to give guidance to Great British Railways about the general level and structure of fares for travel on railway passengers services designated under section 25 or 26, then the Secretary of State must publish the assumptions, criteria, and objectives underpinning any guidance.”
That is self-evidently sensible, and I look forward to the Minister agreeing with me.
Keir Mather
May I begin by addressing the point about backseat driving? Following the shadow Minister’s remarks, I identified that this is something that we want to avoid not only in future but because it is the existing scenario that we inherited. Right now, under the old system, the Secretary of State is the only person who is really accountable for driving the system forward, and private operators spent more time employing people to decide who was to blame for failures on the railway than ensuring that the railway actually ran in the interest of passengers.
Interference in access and timetabling is another issue that has been raised. The reason why we have diffuse responsibility and muddled accountability in that space is because Network Rail and the ORR, which are two separate organisations, both have responsibility there but they cannot do it in a unified way, and therefore they cannot serve the interests of passengers. That is exactly what the creation of GBR as a directing mind for the railway seeks to avoid, and guidance within that system plays a very important role in removing one of the shadow Minister’s key concerns: an overbearing Secretary of State issuing direction to GBR. Guidance has been designed to create an iterative process by which GBR can enter into a dialogue with the Secretary of State to talk through and deal with common challenges.
The amendments seek to limit the ability of the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers to issue guidance to GBR under clauses 9 and 10. I am clear that the new system established by the Bill does not intend to involve the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers in ongoing or individual operational decisions. That is for GBR’s board and the thousands of employees working on the railway. Instead, the guidance power provides a mechanism through which Ministers can respond to overarching issues that might emerge. For example, if the ORR identified persistent failures in GBR’s performance against its business plan, it may suggest guidance from the Secretary of State that could help to support GBR to course correct, and to clarify the desired outcome without requiring more stringent action, such as a direction.
Further, it is not all one-directional guidance. Guidance will be a flexible tool designed to support Great British Railways. For example, there may be instances where guidance is requested by GBR and is issued in a collaborative manner to provide clarity on the policy direction or shared objectives. I also remind members of the Committee that GBR must have regard to the guidance—in other words, it must consider the guidance and weigh it against its other duties and obligations. It is not required to blindly follow the guidance in all cases.
Let me turn to the specifics of each amendment. Amendment 143 would limit the issuing of guidance to solely financial or strategic matters. In seeking to establish a hard line between types of decision making, the amendment would create a false dichotomy. Strategic and financial decisions are likely to have operational implications. The amendment could therefore inadvertently prevent the Secretary of State from being able to issue guidance where there is any operational impact at all, which is clearly disproportionate, given the potentially collaborative and helpful nature of the guidance.
Similarly, amendments 19 and 21 seek to prevent the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers from issuing guidance unless GBR is not meeting a key performance indicator under the Opposition’s proposed new clause 2. I have already explained why that proposed new clause is nonsensical. I reiterate that KPIs would be better designed and included as part of GBR’s business plan.
Jerome Mayhew
You are kind to call me to speak again, Sir Alec; I realise that I did not speak to clause 10 earlier. Briefly, I recognise that clause 10 mirrors clause 9, which we have debated substantially, but it is important to note that Scottish Ministers are given a guidance function, whereas Welsh Ministers are not. That reflects the devolution settlement, whereby Scotland funds and controls its rail system in its entirety, whereas Welsh responsibilities are substantially limited to the core valley lines. I repeat our previous arguments about the express need for operational independence for GBR, without constant second-guessing by Department for Transport officials, which my amendment 21 addresses, and about fares, which I discussed in relation to amendment 20. I will press a selection of the amendments to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Keir Mather
Clause 9 provides a power for the Secretary of State to issue non-binding guidance to Great British Railways, which GBR must have regard to. Clause 10 provides Scottish Ministers, as funders of the railways, with the same power.
Guidance provides the Secretary of State with a proactive lever to hold GBR to account, while preserving its operational independence as the directing mind. Scottish Ministers will be able to issue guidance to GBR on the exercise of its statutory functions in Scotland, in so far as they relate to Scottish railway activities.
These powers will be used by the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers to help to develop a better common understanding of an area or to encourage a strategic focus on a specific issue to support GBR in carrying out its functions in the interests of its customers, taxpayers and the public.
To ensure appropriate transparency, the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers will be required to publish any issued guidance, as well as any amendments or revocations. Further, where the guidance relates to functions that Scottish or Welsh Ministers have delegated to GBR or to services that they have contracted GBR to provide, the Secretary of State must secure their consent before the guidance is issued, reflecting devolved accountability for those services.
This is a sensible and proportionate provision that allows for direct and unambiguous communication between Ministers and GBR, and is intended to support the proper management of the railway.
Jerome Mayhew
We have debated these two clauses. We have made clear our concerns about the current drafting and have tried our best to improve the Bill through a number of very sensible amendments, the majority of which were supported by the Liberal Democrats. We in our turn have supported some sensible amendments proposed by the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage. I recognise that to vote against the clauses would potentially put a difficult hole in the armoury of the Secretary of State for GBR, so it is with a heavy heart that I do not oppose these two clauses.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Licensing
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Keir Mather
On a point of order, Sir Alec. Before turning to the clause, I would like to correct the record. My Department’s commitment has always been to publish the draft GBR licence during the Bill’s passage, rather than before the Bill leaves the Commons, as I had said in oral evidence on 20 January. Before publication in draft, my Department will undertake engagement with stakeholders to inform the draft. That engagement will start before the Bill leaves the Commons, and I will ensure that hon. Members are involved in it if they would find that beneficial.––[Official Report, Railways Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2026; c. 97, Q180.]
Keir Mather
Clause 11 introduces schedule 1, which will amend part I of the Railways Act 1993 to set out GBR’s licensing regime in a way that broadly mirrors the existing licence provisions in the 1993 Act. I will deal with schedule 1 in more detail later, but for now I commend the clause to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
I do not think I said this earlier, because I was merely intervening, but it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Alec.
I appreciate what the Minister just set out in correcting the record from last week, because a lot of what I was going to say had to do with the lack of the licence. In spite of what he said, I still think that it is a problem for us to be debating clause 11, and later schedule 1, without that detail in front of us. It is very generous of him to say that we can be part of the consultation process, but given that we are encumbered with being here for 10 hours a week, I am not quite sure when would be able to do that. With all due respect, I still want to put on record how disappointing it is that we do not yet have the licence. Ultimately, Great British Railways is entirely premised on that licence: it does not operate without it, cannot deliver its functions without it, and will not create this supposedly amazing utopia of perfection for passengers and infrastructure deliverers alike without it.
Debating the clause without that context feels like a completely wasted opportunity—indeed, I fear that this debate will be incredibly short. This is something that I have seen happen with other Bills. The Minister will say that this is what the Opposition would also have done, but we were not in the position to set up Great British Railways, which—next to the NHS—will be the biggest Government-funded and backed body in this country. Without the scrutiny of hon. Members this morning, we cannot do our job properly.
Such scrutiny is in the interest of all the stakeholders—the public, the staff who work for all the railway companies that are to be brought into Great British Railways, and all the other stakeholders that provide services through open access or freight. Whether it is the coffee shop in a station or the trolley service on the train, all these people need this information, and I am disappointed that we cannot provide that scrutiny at this stage in the debate. I would welcome the opportunity to see the draft as soon as it is out, but it is disappointing that has not come in time for debate in Committee. No doubt similar comments will be made on Report and, hopefully, in the other place.
Edward Argar (Melton and Syston) (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister for his clarification. When I asked the question and he, with alacrity, answered, I did catch the expression on one of his official’s faces; I have to say that I have, on occasion, found myself in that position in the past, so I sensed what might have been coming.
I have to say that I am deeply disappointed. Although it is important that stakeholders are engaged, this legislation has been some time in the making. The licence is at the heart of how GBR will operate, so the fact that not even a skeleton draft will be made available to hon. and right hon. Members as the Bill continues its passage through this House is deeply concerning. I will speak at greater length when we get to schedule 1, but we are effectively being asked to give the Government a blank cheque, based on assurances of intent, without actually seeing the detail of the legislation.
Joe Robertson
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Alec. My right hon. and hon. Friends have already spoken at length and I agree with them, but I will add just a couple of short points to place my disappointment on the record that not even a draft of the licence has been presented.
It is good that the Minister has clarified that it will be coming forward sooner than he suggested previously, but the reality is that it is already too late, as we heard from stakeholders last week during evidence. I urge him not to delay any further. Even an outline draft of the licence as soon as possible, rather than a more detailed one, would be clearly better than nothing. He should also bring forward the other 19 documents identified by my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon—again, in draft form as appropriate—as soon as possible. As I say, it is already too late for this Committee today, as we debate this very clause and schedule. I wish to place that on the record.
Jerome Mayhew
I echo all the comments made by my right hon. and hon. Friends. I also thank the Minister for facing up to it with a point of order. It was obvious last week that a point of order was on its way. None of us on the Opposition Benches will hold him to his initial, rather quick, response—no doubt I will do something similar during the passage of the Bill—but that does not let the Government off the hook.
This is not business as usual for a Department bringing through a Bill of this nature. My right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston, an experienced former Minister, gave two examples of primary legislation that also relied on secondary documentation. In those circumstances, the departmental teams did provide skeleton outlines for Parliament, which is what we are, to consider and do our job properly. I do not want the Minister to rush out a quick affirmative like last week, so I ask him to take time to consider, perhaps discuss with his officials, and reply later today on whether he and his officials are able to commit to some form of briefing—some skeleton outline—on the nature of the licence, at a time when we can collectively discuss and debate it, and see whether it points in the right direction.
Clause 11 simply enables GBR’s licensing to be set out in schedule 1, which we will come on to in a moment. That schedule amends part 1 of the Railways Act 1993 and sets out the detailed process by which the GBR licence will be issued and maintained. Both the Secretary of State and the Office of Rail and Road will retain the ability to grant licences to railway bodies other than GBR—for example, open access operators, freight operators and other infrastructure managers such as the core valley lines in Wales. I know we will discuss the contents of schedule 1 and the detail of the licence extensively.
Keir Mather
Although we have had an opportunity to discuss some of the provisions regarding the creation of the licence—it being enforced by the ORR with powers that include giving GBR directions to escalate issues to its board, requiring GBR to create and publish improvement plans and issuing enforcement orders— I have heard Opposition Members’ points that they would like an opportunity to discuss those matters more closely and in further detail.
We believe that developing the licence in this way will ensure that what is published for statutory consultation is informed by the development of a stable legislative framework in which to scrutinise the licence—as we are doing now—and can be meaningfully refined and enhanced by a wide range of views. However, I take the point that the shadow Minister and other right hon. and hon. Members have made, and I am sure that we can have further discussions today. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1
Licensing of Great British Railways
Jerome Mayhew
I beg to move amendment 109, in schedule 1, page 55, line 10, leave out from “may,” to “grant” and insert—
“at the recommendation of the Office of the Rail and Road in relation to matters related to safety and standards and, after consultation with the Passengers’ Council,”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to get a formal recommendation from the Office of the Rail and Road that the GBR licence adequately ensures that licence obligations related to safety and standards are not compromised or undermined.
Schedule 1 contains the meat of what we have been talking about. It amends part 1 of the Railways Act 1993 to set out how GBR will be licensed. Paragraph 2 confirms that GBR should never be exempt from holding a licence, and paragraph 3 inserts new section 7B, which will enable the Secretary of State, following consultation, to grant GBR a written licence to operate specified railway assets. The licence must be in writing and will remain in force unless revoked or surrendered. Surrendering the licence will require the Secretary of State’s consent.
Paragraph 3 also sets out the process for granting licences to persons other than GBR. The Secretary of State and the Office of Rail and Road will continue to be able to grant licences to persons other than GBR to operate railway assets. The ORR may grant such licences only with the Secretary of State’s consent or under a general authority issued by the Secretary of State. Licences must be in writing and will remain in force unless revoked or surrendered. Surrendering the licence will require the ORR’s consent, much in the same way as it previously required the Secretary of State’s consent.
Proposed new section 8A sets out the requirements for the granting of licences by the Secretary of State or the ORR. It provides that a notice must be published outlining the intention to grant a licence, the reasons for doing so, and allowing at least 28 days from the date of publication for interested parties to make representations or objections. There is a duty to consider representations or objections made within the period specified in the notice.
Proposed new section 8B gives the Secretary of State the power to set rules for how licence applications must be made. Among other things, that includes the format of the application, the fee payable—different fees may apply—and the requirements for publishing the application. Before making any regulations, the Secretary of State must consult the ORR. Any fees collected by either the Secretary of State or the ORR in connection with licence applications must be paid to the consolidated fund.
Paragraph 4 clarifies that a licence granted to GBR may specify when the authorisation it provides takes effect. It allows the licence to include a start date or a mechanism for determining it. Paragraph 5 provides that the licence granted to GBR may include a condition requiring it to comply with the provisions set out in separate document that is prepared by the ORR and approved by the Secretary of State. It might be something such as a code of practice—one of these operating documents that we have been talking about so much—and it may relate to the sale of tickets by GBR or third parties, or to services that GBR provides to the rail industry to facilitate railway operations that are of particular interest to the independent retail sector. The paragraph makes it clear that an approved document may be used to regulate GBR’s behaviour in relation to the sale of tickets by parties other than GBR, in the independent retail sector.
Paragraph 6 provides that, before making modifications to a GBR licence, the Secretary of State must publish a notice explaining the proposed modifications and the reasons for them, and must allow the usual period of 28 days for interested parties to make representations. There is a duty on the Secretary of State to consider representations or objections to the notice made within the period specified.
Paragraph 7 clarifies that the ORR must consult the passengers’ council before making any amendments to passenger or station licences that relate to functions of the council. The ORR must also send a copy of the modifications to the council as soon as practicable. Paragraph 9 clarifies that any licence under section 8 of the Railways Act 1993 that was in force immediately before the changes made by the schedule come into force will remain so, per the conditions and periods set out in the licence, unless it is revoked or surrendered.
Here is the mystery of the missing licence: where is it? We have explored this at some length, and the Minister is going to go away and see what he can rustle up in the Department’s cupboard to point us in the right direction, or at least to give us the direction of travel of the missing licence. In oral evidence to the Transport Committee, Ben Plowden, chief executive officer of the Campaign for Better Transport, said:
“I think the licence will be critical. There are various references in the documents that the Government published to a ‘streamlined licence’, so I would be quite interested to see what that means relative to the current licence that applies to Network Rail. I think the Government are going to consult on the draft licence, so we will all have a chance to look at it.
The other point I would make is one I made earlier, which is that the licence will be one of many documents the Government will produce in the next year to 18 months. There is the long-term rail strategy and GBR will produce its business plan. There will be the access and use policy; the new periodic review process; and MOUs with Ministers in Scotland and Wales. There will be guidance on partnerships with mayoral combined authorities, and guidance on the right to request full rail devolution. There is a huge amount still to come.
Understanding how the licence intersects with those other documents and processes is going to be critical, because between them they will add up to the set of arrangements that determine whether GBR is successful or not for passengers. We have to see the licence in the context of all the other things that will be guiding, directing and shaping what GBR does, how it invests, and what it does operationally.”
That is the experts in the industry repeating what the Opposition have been arguing repeatedly today and last week. More accurately, it is the other way around: we have been listening to the industry in a way that the Government have not, and have been expressing the deep concerns in the sector that the current proposals are half cocked. Huge chunks of the direction, guidance and memorandums are simply missing, including the licence that the schedule is designed to address.
Rebecca Smith
The Minister spoke earlier about the consultation. It is worth restating that it is not the final draft but a consultation on the draft that is going to happen. We will have sight of the final version of the licence way down the road of the Bill’s progress, and ultimately the final licence may not be ready before scrutiny of the Bill is complete. Does my hon. Friend agree with me that that is something that we need to address? Hopefully the Minister will reassure us.
Jerome Mayhew
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We have made that point as forcefully as we can. I trust the Minister when he says that he will take it away and do his best with his ministerial and departmental colleagues, but it is not just a matter of saying, “We kind of understand that licences already exist. Licences have been issued by the Office of Rail and Road. It will not be some kind of copy and paste, but taken from what already exists and we are going to get something similar here.” As Ben Plowden said, there are various references in the documents that the Government have published to something very different: a streamlined licence. That begs all sorts of questions about what is anticipated to be removed from the licence. The Department for Transport has got as far as saying it is going to be smaller, perhaps significantly smaller because it is streamlined, but this is critical.
The licence of ORR is a mission-critical document that anyone who works in the industry would acknowledge, yet we are told it is streamlined, and therefore elements of what is traditionally considered to be a licence under the current system are anticipated to be removed. Is the Minister able to tell us what parts are likely to be removed? What is it? Because the Government documents refer to a streamlined licence, he can tell the Committee what that means. The Department says it is going to be streamlined, but what does it intend to remove to justify that description? It must be somewhere within the Department; otherwise those words would not have been used in the supporting documentation. There is no excuse for the Minister not to describe the definition of a streamlined licence and what is anticipated.
My hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon made the point that the Minister has corrected the record on when the draft licence will be provided during the passage of the Bill through both Houses, but in the next breath he said there will be consultation on that document, which has not yet started. How can that consultation be anything other than a paper exercise? The Minister seems confident that he can go through a consultation process that has not yet started, that the Department can then properly consider the contributions and come to a considered view and redraft the licence, taking into account all the comments, good, bad and ugly, that the consultation came up with, and then produce the draft licence in the two or three months that the Bill has to run through both Houses. That is an extraordinary position. It suggests either that the Minister will have to come and make a second point of order in a couple of months’ time, or that the consultation to which he refers is an absolute farce, because the Government have already decided what they want to do. They are going through the performance of a consultation, but they have already made up their mind. Perhaps the Minister will tell us which one it is.
Amendment 109 would constrain the Secretary of State’s ability to modify GBR’s licence without first seeking consent from the ORR and the passengers’ council. It is part of a series of amendments including amendments 110, 112 to 116 and 233, to which I will speak later. The Government strategy is that the Bill will be the legislative shell for the creation of GBR. Crucial matters of detail, such as the licence under which GBR will operate and important long-term strategies, business plans, targets and so on are separate and, at this stage, missing. Such details matter and deserve proper scrutiny.
We know that other plans and targets are unlikely to be set until after the Bill is enacted, so it is important to include strong checks and balances. That is the purpose of amendment 109. At present, the Bill merely requires the Secretary of State to consult the Office of Rail and Road. Legally, that is weak; after consultation, the Secretary of State may simply ignore whatever the ORR comes up with. The amendment and those linked to it would require the Secretary of State to obtain the Office of Rail and Road’s agreement for the licence to be issued. Subsequent amendments would require the Office of Rail and Road’s agreement for the licence to be modified.
Modification of the licence requires consent from the new passenger watchdog. If the passenger watchdog is to be as powerful in championing the interests of passengers as the Government claim they want it to be, it requires proper powers that go beyond an invitation to be consulted. For that reason, I propose that we put amendment 109 to the vote.
The Chair
I note that debate on amendment 109 has included discussion of schedule 1 more generally. In order to use the Committee’s time more efficiently and if the Committee is content, we could debate schedule 1 more broadly now. That would mean that group 20 is not debated; there would just be a formal decision on schedule 1 and debate on group 19 would be unchanged. As that is the will of the Committee, we will take that approach.
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Gentleman for the amendment, which is intended to prevent the Secretary of State from granting a licence to GBR unless the ORR gives a formal recommendation that licence obligations related to safety and standards are not compromised or undermined. The amendment does not specify what the ORR’s recommendations would need to contain or how it would operate in practice. The Government recognise the importance of effective regulation in the rail sector, particularly in relation to safety. The safety of our railways is a priority, and we will ensure that it is central to GBR, so that our railways continue to rank among the safest globally. The Bill makes no changes to the existing safety regime, which has proved to be exemplary.
In practice, amendment 109 would give an approval role to the ORR on matters relating to safety and standards ahead of the GBR licence being granted by the Secretary of State. It would confuse the clear accountabilities that the Bill establishes, which place responsibility for drafting, consulting on and granting the GBR licence with the Secretary of State, with the ORR then enforcing against its provisions. That aligns with the Government’s approach to regulation: Ministers set policy and strategy, and regulators provide validation and reassurance to the industry.
The Bill already requires a consultation on the contents of the GBR licence and specifies that the ORR and the passenger watchdog must be consulted as part of that. That will ensure that any concerns about safety and standards can be raised and considered appropriately ahead of the GBR licence being granted. The amendment would confuse accountabilities and add additional processes where they are not needed. I therefore urge the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
Jerome Mayhew
I am grateful for Minister’s explanation, but I am not persuaded by it and seek to put amendment 109 to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.