English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Scott of Needham Market) (LD)]

If I can help the noble Lord, at this point I think that we are expecting the two Opposition Front-Benchers to speak and then the Minister.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak on a number of amendments in this group that relate to health. They illustrate just how far this Bill stretches and the breadth of its potential impact on matters of public interest. Health is now firmly brought to the fore. Clause 44 inserts new provisions into existing legislation to place a duty on all combined authorities and combined county authorities to have regard to the need to improve the health of the people in their areas and to reduce health inequalities when they exercise their functions. The same duty is applied to mayors of mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities.

This represents a welcome shift. It means that health and health inequalities are no longer seen as an issue solely for the NHS or public health bodies, but I hope that the Department of Health and Social Care is aware of these proposals. If it is not and is not fully engaged, we will not get too far. Instead they must be taken into account across the full range of decisions made by combined authorities, whether they relate to transport, housing, planning, skills or economic development. That is an important change, because many of the factors that shape health outcomes sit well beyond the health system itself.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for her Amendment 159, which seeks to broaden the list of health determinants and health outcomes to be considered as part of this new duty. The concerns that she raises are understandable and I am sympathetic to the desire to reflect the full complexity of what really drives health inequality. However, I ask the Minister whether she believes that combined authorities will have both the capacity and the practical power and resources to deliver against such an expanded list. In the Government’s view, is this expansion feasible? While ambition is welcome, we must ensure that any duty placed on local institutions is deliverable and affordable, rather than well intentioned and unrealistic.

In opening this group, the noble Lord, Lord Addington, spoke about public access to fitness, sport and recreational facilities. These issues are clearly important and, as always, he made a compelling case for the role that access to physical activity plays in improving health outcomes. Many noble Lords will agree with the principles that he set out. It will be interesting to hear from the Minister whether she believes that placing such matters in the Bill is either necessary or proportionate.

The amendments to Clause 44 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Freeman of Steventon, seek to align the list of health determinants more closely with academic research. The points that she raises are thoughtful and well made. I would be grateful if the Government could explain how the existing list of health determinants was arrived at. Who decided what should be included and by what process? Was there any consultation and were academic experts involved? Understanding how this list was developed is important so that we have confidence that it is robust and evidence based. In particular, I found the reference to “educational opportunities and attainment” in Amendment 161A especially interesting. Education is widely recognised as a key driver of long-term health outcomes and I will listen carefully to what the noble Baroness has to say on this matter.

I also note the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, particularly those that relate to climate and pollution. These amendments raise issues that are often cited as having implications for public health. However, they also serve to underline a broader issue that runs through this group. The difficulty is not simply whether individual factors can be linked to health outcomes but how far such a list should extend. If climate-related risks and pollution are included, should the same apply to noise pollution, as raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Freeman? What about resilience to heat waves, which was also raised in this group? Each of these can be argued to have relevance but, taken together, they illustrate the challenge of scope. At some point a judgment must be made on where the boundary of general health determinants is drawn. That judgment is important for maintaining clarity and focus within the Bill and ensuring that the resulting duties are workable.

This returns me to the underlying question raised by the group. Who determined which health determinants should be included and on what criteria? What evidence or metrics were used to reach these conclusions? Without greater clarity on this point, it is difficult to assess whether the approach taken is sufficiently defined and proportionate. In that context, will the Government commit today to publishing an explanation as to how these decisions were reached? In particular, will the Minister set out who was consulted in the development of this list, what evidence was relied on and what criteria were used to determine inclusion or exclusion? Providing that clarity would assist the Committee in understanding the rationale behind the approach taken and assessing whether the duty, as framed, is appropriately defined and justified.

Before I sit down, I go back to my plea in the last group. As I have said before, if any of this is going to work, the Department of Health and Social Care will have to be involved. It will also have to work with local government and, by working with it, be willing to devolve power and moneys locally. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (Baroness Taylor of Stevenage) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have submitted amendments on health improvement, which is an important topic. I am pleased that we will have this duty on local authorities at mayoral combined authority and combined county authority level. As other noble Lords have said, it is an important step forward.

The Government are committed to building a fairer Britain. To do that, we must ensure that people can live well for longer and spend less time in ill health. Our response, our reimagined NHS, will be designed to tackle inequalities in both access and outcomes, as well as to give everyone, no matter who they are or where they come from, the means to engage with the NHS on their terms.

With our colleagues in the Department of Health and Social Care, we remain committed to reducing the gap between the richest and poorest in healthy life expectancy—an ambitious commitment that shows that the Government are serious about tackling health inequalities and addressing the social determinants of health. We support NHS England’s Core20PLUS5 approach, which targets action to reduce health inequalities in the most deprived 20% of the population and improve outcomes for the groups that experience the worst access, experience and outcomes in the NHS. As the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, said, tackling health inequalities requires a whole-government effort, as does making sure that the best facilities are available across the country. That is why we are working across departments, from housing and education to employment and welfare, to make sure that health is built into all policies and runs as a golden thread through everything taking place.

I now come to the specific amendments, a number of which would make additions to the list of general health determinants. Before I turn to the individual amendments, I note that the scope and definition of “general health determinants” in the Bill has been intentionally and carefully crafted to be broad and flexible. I will write to noble Lords in answer to the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, about how those determinants have been drawn up and what consultations have been done on them.

The Bill lists some of the broad and interconnected factors that shape health, life expectancy and healthy life expectancy. Combined authorities, combined county authorities and mayors can directly impact these factors, such as standards of housing, employment prospects and environmental factors, through the delivery of their wider functions. Given the importance of these factors as inarguable determinants of health, the Bill strengthens the duty and adds clarity by listing them explicitly. Although some examples are provided, it is not our intention to set out a definitive list—we feel that that would be constraining. We recognise that combined authorities and combined county authorities are experts in their local areas and are therefore best placed to decide how to determine and act on the factors most relevant to improving health and reducing health inequalities in their own areas.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Addington, for tabling Amendment 158 and, as ever, for championing the importance of public access to fitness, sport and recreational facilities. This amendment would require combined authorities to consider the level of public access to fitness, sport and recreational facilities when exercising their functions. The general health determinants already include matters affecting lifestyle, access to services and environmental factors, and explicitly allow for consideration of any other matters that affect life expectancy or the general state of health. I am not being pedantic—nobody loves a clever clogs—but, to be specific and clear, I note that the amendment would apply only to combined authorities and not to combined county authorities, thereby creating inconsistency in how the duty operates. I apologise that I shall have to point that out with a number of these amendments, but it is important to clarify that.

I now turn to Amendments 159 and 167 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. I appreciate that her intention is that the health improvement and health inequalities duty, and the definition of general health determinants within the duty, are broad and impactful. A driving purpose behind the health improvement and health inequalities duty is to support combined authorities and combined county authorities in reducing health inequalities and adopting a “health in all policies” approach. The effect the amendments would have is unclear because of the potential interactions with both “health inequalities” and “general health determinants” in Clause 44.

As I mentioned, the Bill has been drafted to provide a broad and flexible definition of “health inequalities” to ensure that differences in aspects such as life expectancy, general health, mental health and disabilities can all be captured in its scope. This allows combined authorities, combined county authorities and mayors to focus on the broad underlying causes of health inequalities and to tailor their responses to key local issues. Similarly, the framing of “life expectancy” or “general state of health” is intentionally broad and does not exclude mental health, disability or healthy life expectancy, all of which are legitimate dimensions of what one might regard as health and are reflected in mainstream methods for describing health states or health impacts.

I turn now to the large group of amendments: Amendments 159B, 160A, 161A, 163A, 163B, 165ZA, 165B, 167A, 167B, 167C, 167D, 167E, 167F and 167G. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Freeman of Steventon, for her diligence in tabling them and recognise her assured intention to ensure that the definition of general health determinants reflects academic research and is impactful.

As drafted, the list of general health determinants already requires combined authorities and combined county authorities to have regard to environmental factors, employment prospects, earning capacity and access to public services, and explicitly allows for consideration of any other matters that affect life expectancy or the general state of health. Health inequalities are already defined within the duty as inequalities between people of different descriptions living in an area, and it is therefore not necessary to restate this within the general health determinants.

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[Baroness Boycott (CB)]

I thank the Minister, but half of the amendment is not about allotments. Having run this scheme in London, I know that allotments are almost impossible to get. It is also about the right to grow on meanwhile lease bases within communities and councils. Meanwhile leases are available online. It is extremely easy: it just needs the local authority to agree that wasted spaces can be used for growing and then taken away if a builder, developer or council wants them back.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I do not disagree with the noble Baroness. I am saying that this is a local authority duty, and it does not need to go up to the strategic level of a mayoral combined authority. That is why we do not need the amendment for combined authorities, but I accept her point about local authorities. A statutory duty is probably not applicable anyway, but I will give that some further thought, if she is happy for me to do so.

We recognise all the benefits of allotments and community gardening, but we do not want to duplicate existing legal responsibilities or place burdens at the wrong tier of government, which would run counter to the Government’s approach to devolution. I am sorry for going on for so long, but there were a lot of amendments in this group. As I have explained the Government’s rationale for resisting these amendments in detail, I request that they are not pressed.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

This is an important group of amendments, particularly if health does decide to devolve down either power or money in the future. But if local areas have specific health needs that the Government identify, and if they are not seen by the Government as dealing with them, do the Government intend to take a power to intervene?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I am not sure about powers of intervention. We have a very specific competence that points our combined authorities towards health issues. The Government have made it very clear that we want to see mayors, in particular, sitting on ICBs; I hope that this will start to address some of the issues raised by noble Lords about not having a voice around the table with health colleagues. I know that Manchester has new powers relating to health issues. We will want to monitor those, have a look at them and watch what is working. We will then decide whether we need to take any further action.

[Baroness Freeman of Steventon (CB)]

At the end of the clause, in the list of health determinants, there is a particular exclusion for genetically inherited characteristics. Is that supposed to exclude people suffering differences in health due to the colour of their skin?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I am sure that that is not what is intended, but I will revert to the noble Baroness with a written reply.

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[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, some time ago in the teens, from 2015 until about 2022, I was a member of the fire services pension fund, which exposed me to a world that I had had no real previous experience of. I learned that there were 40 fire and rescue authorities in the UK and it astonished me that, of the 40 fire and rescue authorities, there were seven different structural constructs within them. I am speaking in violent agreement with the noble Lord who has just spoken.

For example, there were the single county authorities such as Norfolk or Suffolk, and there were the joint county authorities such as Dorset and Wiltshire, working together under a single canvas. There were joint committees, for example, as you might find in the West Midlands—I am not quite sure whether the Yorkshire ones that the noble Lord just referred to are in the same bucket as the West Midlands or indeed whether they form an eighth different variant. There are the mayoral ones in Manchester, the London Fire Brigade stands alone and, of course, within the police and crime commissioners there is the one in Essex, for example, which is different from the one in Hertfordshire. We are now going to add combined county authorities, so I think that makes eight, and now within the mayoralties there will be a case A or a case B, each of which may have in addition a commissioner or a deputy mayor.

This is crazy. For 40 types of authority there are—I have nearly run out of fingers—10 different constructs, I think. The Bill should be bringing order to that complexity. Instead, it is obfuscating and adding a further cat’s cradle of complication. I know that we are in Committee and that we will come back on Report, and I understand the complexity and the interaction with the police, because the police and fire and rescue work together in so many cases, but we have to bring some order to this chaos.

Although I do not necessarily support the entirety of the text of Amendment 170, it has probed the necessity of bringing some sensibility to what is a nonsense in the way in which our brave fire and rescue firefighters deal with not just fires. During my tenure as a trustee of the fire service’s pension scheme, I learned that the average fireman goes to a fire once every 12 days or so; this is about the other important work they do, in prevention and in attending road accidents and other national emergencies. They deserve better than the structures they have today.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 170 would require a mayor who holds fire and rescue authority functions to delegate those functions to a deputy mayor for fire and rescue, creating governance arrangements that mirror those already in place for policing.

The noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, raises a number of interesting and important points, as we have heard from this short debate. I look forward to the Minister’s response, particularly on the issue of democratic accountability, as raised by my noble friend Lord Trenchard, and on my noble friend Lord Fuller’s point about making sure that public services all work from the same geographic area. This is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to ensure that; it might take a little longer, but I am sure it is worth doing.

During our consideration of the Bill, it has become clear that fire and rescue services are not listed as statutory consultees in the devolution framework. For me, that raises a number of important questions for the Government. As we have heard, fire and rescue services play a central role in public safety, resilience, planning and emergency responses, yet when decisions affecting land use, building standards, transport corridors or climate adaptions are taken without any requirement for fire service input, there is a risk of the safety and resilience considerations being added only after decisions have been made, rather than being embedded right from the outset.

In that context, I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why fire and rescue services are not statutory consultees, whether the Government consider this omission appropriate, and whether steps are being considered to strengthen their formal role in devolution and governance arrangements.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, for moving Amendment 170, which would require a mayor with fire and rescue authority functions to delegate those functions to a deputy mayor for fire and rescue.

Mayors are best placed to determine how to use the people and resources at their disposal to deliver for their communities. This amendment would prevent that by mandating the delegation of these functions specifically to a deputy mayor for fire and rescue. It would also, therefore, prevent mayors delegating these functions to a public safety commissioner. The effective delegation of fire and rescue functions to a commissioner can ease capacity constraints, ensuring that there is a dedicated individual with the time and expertise to focus on executing those functions. Fire and rescue functions are already held by deputy mayors for policing and crime in Greater Manchester and York—and in North Yorkshire, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. She seemed to say that she was not quite sure where it sat, so I will definitely write to her to explain how it works.

If they wish, mayors will be able to make an existing deputy mayor for policing and crime the public safety commissioner, meaning that that individual could lead on both policing and fire. However, certain functions should be the sole responsibility of the elected mayor as the head of the fire and rescue authority. Functions with the most significant bearing on the strategic direction of the fire service—such as the budget, the risk plan and the appointment or dismissal of the chief fire officer—are, therefore, retained by the mayor. On statutory requirements, fire and rescue services still have the right to respond to any planning application at the moment, for example, so they play a key role in that area. It is important that decisions in these areas are taken right at the top and that the person taking them is accountable at the ballot box.

To answer the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, every effort is made to make coterminous the public service boundaries when we lay out these plans. The position we have taken provides strong accountability and operational flexibility for the mayors, and I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

The noble Lord’s point about whole-society resilience in the security review is quite right in the circumstances in which we find ourselves. There are resilience plans in all local authorities for such an incident, so these things are taken into consideration and reviewed constantly.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I have two comments on the noble Lord’s response. First, the fire and rescue service is no longer a statutory consultee. Anybody can respond to a planning application, but that is slightly different from being a statutory consultee. Secondly, commissioners are not accountable at the ballot box. Therefore, why would we allow the role to go down to not deputy mayors—I do not think there are such things—but the commissioners responsible, when they are not accountable at the ballot box?

[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

I am not sure whether there were any questions there.

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

172: Schedule 23, page 259, line 7, at end insert—
“Matters outside the scope of Inspections
4A In section 28 (inspectors), after subsection (A8) insert—“(A8A) When carrying out an inspection under subsection (A3) of a mayoral combined authority, or mayoral CCA, in its capacity as a fire and rescue authority by virtue of section 1(2)(f) or (g), an English inspector must not review or scrutinise decisions made, or other action taken, in connection with the discharge of an excluded mayoral FRA function.(A8B) For the purposes of subsection (A8A), the following are excluded mayoral FRA functions in relation to a mayoral combined authority, or mayoral CCA, in its capacity as a fire and rescue authority—(a) the issuing of a community risk management plan;(b) the variation of priorities and objectives set out in a community risk management plan;(c) the allocation of the draft or actual budget for fire and rescue functions in relation to any financial year;(d) the function of appointing, suspending or dismissing the chief fire officer;(e) the function of holding the chief fire officer to account for the exercise of—(i) the functions which are delegated to the chief fire officer; and(ii) the functions of persons under the direction and control of the chief fire officer;(f) the function of approving a pay policy statement prepared for the purposes of section 38 of the Localism Act 2011;(g) the function of approving arrangements to enter into a reinforcement scheme under section 13;(h) the function of approving arrangements with other employers of firefighters under section 15;(i) the function of approving arrangements under section 16;(j) the function of approving plans, modifications to plans and additions to plans for the purpose of ensuring that—(i) so far as is reasonably practicable, the mayoral combined authority, or mayoral CCA, is able to continue to perform its fire and rescue functions if an emergency occurs; and(ii) the mayoral combined authority, or mayoral CCA, is able to perform its functions so far as necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing an emergency, or reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency, or taking other action in connection with it;(k) the function of approving any arrangements for the co-operation of the mayoral combined authority, or mayoral CCA in relation to its fire and rescue functions with other general Category 1 responders and general Category 2 responders in respect of—(i) the performance of the mayoral combined authority’s, or mayoral CCA’s, duty as a fire and rescue authority under section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004; and(ii) any duties under subordinate legislation made in exercise of powers under that Act. (A8C) In subsection (A8B)—“community risk management plan” has the same meaning as in Schedule ZA1;“emergency” has the meaning given in section 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 for Part 1 of that Act;“general Category 1 responder” means a person who falls within Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004;“general Category 2 responder” means a person who falls within Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004;“priorities and objectives” has the same meaning as in Schedule ZA1.””Member’s explanatory statement
This would provide for matters which inspectors of fire and rescue authorities may not review or scrutinise when inspecting mayoral combined authorities or CCAs which are fire and rescue authorities.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, government Amendments 172 and 173 make essential amendments to Schedule 23, ensuring that the law operates as intended with evolving governance arrangements. Amendment 172 aligns the inspection framework for mayoral combined authorities and mayoral county combined authorities with existing exclusions for other fire and rescue authority governance models, ensuring fairness and consistency across England.

Amendment 173 makes technical alignments with existing legislation. It ensures that, where a mayoral combined authority or a mayoral combined county authority takes on fire and rescue functions, it is treated in the same way as existing fire and rescue authorities. The amendment will also bring mayoral fire and rescue authorities within Part V of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989, covering companies in which local authorities have interests. It will also bring it within Section 155 of the same Act for the purpose of emergency financial assistance.

It also clarifies the handling of Section 114 reports in the case of mayoral fire and rescue authorities, and the fire and rescue authority’s response under Section 115 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988. When a chief finance officer issues a report, the report must be sent to the relevant scrutiny committee, and the authority’s response must be sent to the chief finance officer, the external auditor and the relevant scrutiny committee. I commend these government amendments to the Committee.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, these two amendments are enabling amendments in response to the previous issue that was raised with Amendment 170 about absorbing fire and rescue services into a mayoral authority.

It has long been the objective of previous Governments to combine police services and fire and rescue services into one model by arguing that they were both emergency services and, therefore, would be better combined. That has always been resisted, with support from these Benches, because police and fire and rescue services have very different objectives. This Bill is seeking to absorb policing and fire and rescue into the ambit of the directly elected mayor, without having this discussion about whether it is appropriate.

I accept that four mayoral authorities have already combined policing and fire and rescue. Whether or not that has been a success is yet to be tested. The argument against these two amendments—I will reprise a bit of what I said on Amendment 170—is that it is an erosion of transparency and public accountability for what is, after all, a critical emergency service.

It is always interesting to me when we have government amendments—it points to pressure somewhere that new powers are needed to make this work. Amendment 172 removes the inspection of the fire service from the inspection regime and puts it into a mayoral regime. This means that, for instance—these are within the amendment—an inspector cannot challenge the budget of fire and rescue, challenge the appointment or dismissal of the chief fire officer, hold the chief fire officer to account or approve an emergency performance and reinforcement scheme.

All those are critical to ensure public accountability of the fire and rescue service, but suddenly they will not be available for its inspection regime. That will not do. The fire and rescue service plays a vital role as first responders to serious road traffic accidents. They are always the first there, not the police, and they are often at terrorist incidents. We need to have accountability for the public and the existing inspection regime, to ensure that it works well.

My argument with this amendment, as with Amendment 170, is that this is happening by stealth, by absorbing fire and rescue into the police service. Combining them ensures that the mayor has responsibility for those functions. The inspection regime does not apply to the mayor, therefore public accountability for the fire and rescue service lies in holding the mayor to account. As I have said, the mayor is now the sole Lord High Everything of a huge number of strategic functions, so holding them to account on any one of them will be a challenge. I hope that the Minister will think again on this proposal to change the way that fire and rescue services are democratically accountable and inspected, because I fear that failing to do so could have serious consequences.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, as I understand it from the Minister, the inspectors in question inspect only operational matters and not governance matters. Therefore, to not inspect the governance of mayoral combined authorities and combined county authorities is in keeping with the approach that the inspectors already take to existing fire services. Will the Minister please confirm that I have that right? If I do not, will she please explain why the Government’s arrangements for these new authorities will be subject to less scrutiny than already exists in the fire services? If my understanding is correct, I still have concerns about the need for effective scrutiny of new authorities taking new powers, in this instance over fire and rescue, so will the Minister please tell the Committee how the governance of fire and rescue services will be inspected and scrutinised, if not by this inspectorate? We have to ensure that there is an appropriate approach to scrutiny for all new mayoral combined authorities, which is exactly what the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, said. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Pinnock and Lady Scott, for their comments. We have seen a lot of changes in governance in both policing and the fire service. I worked in policing for a long time and during my time policing went from police committees, which were local authority committees, to police authorities, which were more widely representative of communities, and then to police commissioners. Fire and rescue services have been with local authorities; in some areas they moved to police commissioners and responsibility for fire sat with police commissioners. But the mayor will be the only person elected by the whole of that combined authority area, so there is a democratic mandate there.

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

174: Clause 50, page 55, line 31, after “the” insert “GLA and the”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in my name inserting new provisions into the Licensing Act 2003 to confer powers on the GLA and the Mayor of London.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government are committed to supporting the high street economy, a key part of which is the hospitality sector and the night-time economy. Amendments introduced on Report in the other place established a new strategic licensing role for the Mayor of London. This included a duty on the mayor to publish and set out his licensing priorities in a new London-wide statement of licensing policies.

There was also an amendment that served as a placeholder for a new call-in power, which provided the Secretary of State with the power to make regulations to confer on the Mayor of London the function of determining relevant licence applications in certain circumstances. Government Amendments 174 to 181 replace this placeholder and provide more detail around the types of circumstances in which the mayor may call in or determine relevant licence applications.

The amendments also add the Greater London Authority as a responsible authority in certain circumstances under Part 3 of the Licensing Act 2003. They place a requirement on the GLA to notify interested parties, including the applicant and the relevant licensing authority, of applications that the GLA considers to meet the definition of potential strategic importance to Greater London. This will be set out in regulations by the Secretary of State. If a London licensing authority decides not to grant an application of potential strategic importance as applied for, including, for example, by rejecting the application or applying additional conditions to it, the mayor is required to decide whether or not to call in the decision.

If a decision is called in, the mayor must issue a direction to the relevant licensing authority, having given regard to his licensing policy and the importance of promoting the licensing objectives. New rights of appeal in relation to directions issued by the mayor will also be introduced to help ensure the call-in power is used judiciously. The new call-in power will initially be given effect in London to help unleash the full potential of our capital’s world-renowned cultural venues but could be deployed in mayoralties across the country in the future to help prevent decisions from being blocked by unnecessary red tape or short-term thinking.

Separately, at a national level, the Government launched a joint government and industry licensing taskforce last year and are considering more than 2,000 responses to a call for evidence that sought the public’s views on its proposals. We expect to consider those views before making any future reforms to the national licensing regime, including on aspects such as pavement licensing. For the avoidance of doubt, the amendments being discussed today concern the licensing regime in Greater London, not national licensing reforms. I beg to move.

[Baroness O'Neill of Bexley (Con)]

My Lords, I have a real concern about this group of amendments, which appears to look to tinker around the edges to bring the Mayor of London and the Greater London Authority into line with other strategic authorities. We already established in an earlier session that governance in London was the first established; it has never been repeated and, indeed, this Bill does not seek to repeat it either. Surely the sensible route is the one that we suggested in Amendment 75: to have a full review, consider the future governance of London and deal with issues such as this at that time.

I do not want to revisit the earlier argument, but I remind noble Lords that in London there is not the same relationship between the mayor and the boroughs as is suggested there might be in the new governance relationships, or indeed that exists elsewhere. In practice, that means that the mayor might not appreciate local circumstances—as I have said before, not all of London is the same. The mayor might not appreciate the local policing capacity, or lack of it, and the implications of that on licensing decisions. He might not understand the local economy and what licensing could mean for that. He might not appreciate the impact of the local demographics when decisions are being made to overturn local licensing decisions.

What is more, as we have heard before, the current scrutiny of the mayor is not considered to be effective. Devolution should mean respect for decision-making at its lowest common denominator—in this case, the borough level. If a more strategic decision is needed for a wider area, the decision should include the local decision-making processes or partners. For those reasons, I urge the Minister to consider the proposals put forward previously for a thorough review, at which time the implications of these amendments could be considered.

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[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments in the Minister’s name would insert a new provision into the Licensing Act 2003 for additional powers for the Greater London Authority and the Mayor of London. We are not opposed to a greater strategic role for the GLA and the mayor, particularly where that role helps to identify key applications and promote consistency across London.

However, we harbour significant concerns about Amendment 179A, which would establish a London-wide strategic licensing oversight system. We are not persuaded that the mayor should be granted such extensive powers to intervene in and potentially overrule decisions taken by local licensing authorities. Although applicants will have the right of appeal, these provisions introduce a new layer of bureaucracy and uncertainty into what is already a complex licensing regime. We struggle to see why the mayor should be given such a decisive and potentially determinative role in local licensing decisions, particularly where those decisions are currently taken by local authorities with detailed knowledge of their communities, as my noble friend Lady O’Neill made clear. The mayor will not have that, and we are overriding local accountability. I am concerned by the provision that allows certain applications to be deemed “of potential strategic importance” when the definition of that term is to be set out not by the GLA or the mayor but through regulations by the Secretary of State.

I have similar scepticism to the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, about whether this actually is a devolution Bill. It is supposed to be about local democracy and trusting local people to make the right decisions for their local area. It should not be about transferring powers upward to mayors and Whitehall. Why is London again being put on a pedestal and treated differently to the rest of the UK? I appreciate that the Minister said that this could be extended to the rest of the UK. Again, I very much defer to what my noble friend Lady O’Neill said: it would make a lot of sense for this to be part of a broader review of the governance of London.

Moreover, it is not clear why the Government have chosen to introduce these provisions at such a late stage, or how they interact with existing licensing frameworks. At the very least, the Committee needs more time to consider the implications of these amendments, alongside fuller guidance from the Minister about how these powers would operate in practice.

At present, I do not believe that the justification for these amendments has been made, so I look forward to the Minister’s response and to further explanation of the rationale behind the operation of these amendments. However, we cannot support any of these amendments being made at this stage.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their comments on these amendments. I will be very happy to meet noble Lords to discuss the proposals further and in more detail. I will give a little more information now and, I hope, answer some of the questions that noble Lords have asked.

On why we feel that the new call-in power is needed, there is evidence of unmet potential for London’s night-time economy. A YouGov survey found that 45% of Londoners stated that they had ended a night out before midnight in 2023-24, despite wanting to stay out later—I never do but, obviously, there are people who do. Night-time spending in the capital fell by 3% from 2022-25. London also has a lower premises licence approval rate than the rest of England and Wales. Of course, the reasons for that are multifaceted but, through the establishment of a new mayoral call-in power, intended to be used only in specific circumstances, as a measure of last resort, we would hope to encourage a more enabling and joined-up approach to premises licensing that unleashes the full potential of London’s cultural hospitality and night-time economy sectors. I know we have talked many times in your Lordships’ House about the restaurant and pubs business, and so on. We particularly want to encourage that sector in London—and everywhere else, but it is important to do that for the capital’s tourism and other trades.

In answer to the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, the Government support the principle of localism in licensing decisions, but we are committed to putting the right powers at the right levels to drive economic growth that we want to see. Local licensing authorities are often, or in fact nearly always, best placed to make licensing decisions based on their local knowledge and in consultation with other responsible authorities, including the police and enforcement authorities. But where the licensing system affects sectors with a strategic economic role—the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, mentioned that aspect—it is important that city-wide considerations can be taken into account. The new strategic licensing role of the Mayor of London would enable this and provide an opportunity to adopt a similar approach to those that have worked effectively in New York, Amsterdam and Sydney.

To pick up on some specific points about how this is going to work—the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, asked a couple of questions about this—the mayor will draw his strategic licensing policy by consultation on it before it is published. The mayor will be required to consult each London licensing authority, which will be able to make representations about its local circumstances. The Government intend to consider this and may seek to engage with key licensing stakeholders before setting out thresholds of what that

“potential strategic importance to Greater London”

actually means in regulations. That will provide further detail on the types of licence applications that will potentially fall within the scope of the mayor’s call-in power.

In answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, about why this issue has not come forward before, that is a fair point. Further time is required to develop the new mayoral call-in process, including how it would interact with existing licensing legislation. In thinking about bringing this forward, the Government have considered that sometimes the best way in which to deliver devolution across the country is to test out new powers or approaches in one or two places first. As a globally renowned centre for culture and nightlife, London represents an ideal location to test new strategic licensing powers and duties. Nevertheless, it is very much our intention to ensure that it will be possible to roll these out to other mayors across the country, subject to the provision of appropriate evidence via provisions in the Bill. Piloting things is a very good way in which to see how effective they are, and whether they get the balance right between the local decision-making to which the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, referred and what we might think of as a strategic call-in power—so it is very important to do that.

I thank my noble friend Lady Dacres for her comments about licensing. She and I had an informal meeting with some London leaders on Saturday. They were not all London leaders, so I will not use that as evidence because that would not be fair, but, broadly, their view was similar to that of my noble friend Lady Dacres: although you would not want this to be used all the time, it is an important power to have in a key city such as London. However, a call for evidence is out and is currently being reviewed.

[Baroness O’Neill of Bexley (Con)]

Were all those whom the Minister consulted inner London authorities, or did they include outer London boroughs as well? My frustration is with the fact that everyone assumes that London is all the same, yet Westminster is certainly not like Bexley; and Lewisham, where the noble Baroness, Lady Dacres, comes from, is not like Bexley. Bexley has a night-time economy, yet the Mayor of London is considering closing our police front counter but will not close Lewisham’s because it is that much closer. The police in Bexley are closing down and not working past 10 pm, yet obviously the nightclubs are open till 2 am. Those sorts of things have to be considered for the benefit of all local people, but the mayor will not be aware of them. I apologise, but I felt I needed to say that.

[Baroness Dacres of Lewisham (Lab)]

Just to correct some of what the noble Baroness alluded to, I see Lewisham as a mix of inner and outer London because we have the south circular and diverse aspects to our borough. She mentioned the police station. All our police station fronts, bar one, have been closed. Lewisham has the largest police station in London—in fact, in Europe—and I am sure that is the sole reason why it has not been closed. It includes horses, as well as other back-office support for the police. I wanted to correct that for the record, because the noble Baroness made it seem as though we are open because of our distance from central London, and that is not the case.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness and my noble friend for those helpful comments. I want to be absolutely clear that it was not a formal consultation I had on Saturday; it was an informal meeting, but a number of London leaders were there. It was not representative, so I will not pretend it was, but it is clear to me that there is more work to do before moving forward with this. Between now and Report I am happy to meet all those who have spoken in this debate but, for now, I will withdraw Amendment 174.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

It is perfectly reasonable that the Minister has suggested that there should be a more joined-up set of regulations, but I tabled an amendment that would have achieved this through the agent of change. Will she reconsider her views on how we can balance the late-opening nightclubs with the new residences next door to them?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

We have had extensive discussions of the agent of change; it is a slightly different proposal. I know it could potentially be linked to this, so if the noble Baroness wants to get involved in the discussions on this, I am happy to include her.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

I appreciate the Minister’s very positive response to our comments. She said that this is a pilot. You would normally have a review at the end of a pilot to work out whether it has worked and the consequences thereof. I appreciate that she intends to withdraw her amendment, but it would be helpful, if these amendments were to come back on Report, to be clear about what the pilot means and what the review process is.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

That is a very fair point. I was indicating that we will have some further discussions about it. If I bring further amendments back on Report, we will need to be clear about putting some flexible powers into the Bill so that we can extend it if we need to. If we look at the London project and it has not worked, clearly that does not mean that it will be extended. But we need the powers because, as all noble Lords will be aware, getting primary legislation on to the statute book is quite a process. We would rather have a permissive power that enables it, if it is needed, and then we are able to do that if necessary.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

Or it could be withdrawn.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

Yes, it could be withdrawn.

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[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I will not seek to repeat what has been said so eloquently by my noble friend Lord Lansley and the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville.

The issue is quite simple. This is supposed to be a devolution Bill about local empowerment; it is not supposed to be about giving the Secretary of State huge powers, in particular to amend things that have not even been thought of yet. On restricting things in the way that has been suggested, there are some flexibilities in this Bill, historical Bills and Bills for the current Session, but having the power to amend something that is not even a twinkle in the eye of a new Minister— whoever they may be—is just going too far. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has also said this.

This matter needs very deep thought on the part of the Government. We will come back to it if the Government do not seek to address this issue of a Secretary of State having the ability to amend something that has not been thought of yet. Frankly, I find it difficult to understand why you would want to amend a law you have not written yet, because you could always bring in powers that are relevant to that law as part of any legislation you then bring forward.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, for their proposed amendments to the delegated powers in the Bill. I also thank the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for its report and its recommendations regarding the delegated powers in the Bill, to which these amendments relate. I will consider its report ahead of Report and will make sure that all noble Lords who have joined this debate on delegated powers have sight of that response.

I turn to Amendment 180A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, which seeks to limit the ability to make consequential, supplementary or incidental provisions that would follow a decision to repeal the strategic licensing regime. This amendment would prevent such provisions being made to future legislation. Our intention behind introducing the new strategic licensing pilot in London is clear: to trial a more strategic approach to licensing in London.

However, we recognise that any significant change to long-established arrangements may, in practice, give rise to operational or policy difficulties that could not have been fully foreseen at the point of legislating—I referred to that on an earlier group. It is for that reason that we have provided a power for the Secretary of State to amend the new strategic licensing measures within the first five years of them coming into effect. This will ensure that the Government can act swiftly and proportionately to protect the effectiveness of the wider licensing framework if necessary. The Secretary of State must be able to make consequential, supplementary or incidental provision that repeals or revokes legislation made at a later date, if necessary, in the event that the strategic licensing measures are repealed.

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Debate on whether Schedule 25 should be agreed.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, by opposing Schedule 25, we seek to probe and clarify what functions may be delegated to mayors under future regulations. Prior to the changes proposed by this Bill, the principal mechanisms for conferring local authority and public authority functions on combined authorities were set out in the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009. More recently, equivalent provisions for combined county authorities were established through the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023.

Under both frameworks, functions have generally been conferred on individual combined authorities or combined county authorities through bespoke statutory instruments, subject to the affirmative procedure. In other words, Parliament has been asked to scrutinise each discrete transfer of power on a case-by-case basis, authority by authority. However, in our reading, paragraph 2 of Schedule 25 marks a significant shift. It enables the Secretary of State to make regulations conferring functions not on individual authorities but on categories of mayors of combined authorities and combined county authorities, or to modify such functions once conferred. Clause 17 provides that those functions will then be exercisable by the mayor on behalf of the combined authority or combined county authority.

I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could explain in practical terms how this new approach differs from the position under the 2023 Act. In particular, how does conferring functions on a category of mayors differ, both operationally and constitutionally, from the authority-specific approach taken under the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act? What are the implications of this shift for democratic accountability, parliamentary scrutiny and local consent? Simply, will Parliament have more or less say and will decisions of this kind be subject to clearer democratic oversight than under the previous framework? My fear is that they will not. Additionally, is the Minister willing to illustrate this with a concrete example, perhaps in relation to transport, skills or planning, so that the Committee can better understand how Parliament’s role in scrutinising these transfers of power will change in practice?

The provision in paragraph 12 of Schedule 25 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations applying differing voting arrangements from those set out as the default in Clause 6 in relation to particular functions for one or more categories of combined authorities or combined county authorities. I have a number of questions for the Minister. First, in what circumstances do the Government envisage departing from the default voting arrangements and what criteria will guide those decisions? Secondly, how will local consent be secured where voting arrangements are altered by regulation, particularly if those changes materially affect the balance of power between constituent authorities and the mayor? Finally, what safeguards exist to ensure that such variations do not undermine transparency or local democratic accountability?

Part 6 of the schedule introduces yet another significant power: the ability of the Secretary of State to confer additional public authority or local authority functions on specific strategic authorities as part of a time-limited pilot programme. It also allows for the governance arrangements of existing functions to be modified on a similarly time-limited basis. Again, I seek assurances from the Minister. How will pilot authorities be selected and on what objective basis? What evaluation criteria will be applied before, during and after a pilot programme? Crucially, what guarantees are there that the time-limited pilots will not default and become permanent through inertia rather than explicit parliamentary approval?

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[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I, too, support what my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook was saying. I recall that she was responsible for Sections 18, 19 and 20 of LURA, on the conferral of functions on county combined authorities—as they were at that time—so she has been down this track.

I have three quick points. First, and I think my noble friend touched on this, the existing legislation, by which the Secretary of State can confer functions on combined authorities or combined county authorities, operates on the basis of a proposal from those authorities to the Secretary of State for the functions to be conferred. After consultation, the Secretary of State requires the consent of those authorities for the functions to be conferred. I cannot find that in Schedule 25, so the conclusion that one reaches is that, in this devolution Bill, the authorities do not even have the power to decide whether the functions are theirs or not. They will just be given to them or modified without anything beyond consultation; it does not require a proposal or consent. That is a very odd way of proceeding.

Secondly, we had a discussion in an earlier group about the structure of the voting arrangements in Clause 6, but we suddenly find in Schedule 25 that the Government want a power to change them on potentially quite important issues. I cannot for the life of me understand why that is necessary here, because the individual strategic authorities can change their constitutional arrangements anyway, if they really wanted to. I think that we established that in the earlier group. So why do the Government want to be able to change the voting arrangements?

Thirdly, on the pilots, there is a requirement in paragraph 21 for the pilot schemes to produce an impact report but, as far as I can see, it has to be given to the Secretary of State. It does not appear to have to be given to anybody else and it certainly does not have to be published. The Government should come back and make it clear that, when produced and given to the Secretary of State, the impact report should then be published.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for probing whether Schedule 25 should stand part of the Bill. Schedule 25 is central to the objectives of the Bill and the Government’s ambitions for devolution in England. We have been clear that the devolution framework delivered by this Bill is the floor not the ceiling of our ambitions for devolving powers to our communities. Schedule 25 provides the Secretary of State with the power to confer new functions on strategic authorities and to modify these functions. This will ensure that strategic authorities and mayors have the powers that they need to deliver for local people.

I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, wanted to question which functions could be conferred using these powers. As outlined in paragraph 4 of Schedule 25, a function can be conferred if it

“is a function of a public authority, and … relates to any aspect of any area of competence”.

It might help if I go into a little more detail on that. The current list reflects the areas under which the Government believe strategic authorities should hold powers and functions. Functions and powers held under these areas will best empower mayors to act strategically, to drive growth and to help shape public services for their local communities. The current list of thematic policy areas is deliberately broad and allows for a wide range of activities to fall within the areas of competence. The Government remain open to considering whether the list could be expanded in future.

Questions were asked about the conferring of functions on to a strategic authority and how that will work.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I am sorry to interrupt but I have a question. When the Minister talks about extending the list in future, is that the list of functions within areas of competence, or is she talking about the ability to extend the list of areas of competence?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I am talking about the functions within the competence.

The Secretary of State will be required to consult relevant parties, including the strategic authority, the constituent councils and any body that currently holds the function. The Secretary of State will then need to determine whether to confer the function, paying regard to the need for the effective exercise of the function concerned. Regulations made under Schedule 25 will be subject to the affirmative procedure, ensuring that appropriate parliamentary scrutiny takes place.

In some instances, it will make sense to pilot functions with a smaller number of strategic authorities for a time-limited period. I will try to answer the questions about piloting, but I will look at Hansard later and come back in writing if I have not answered them all. Where we are piloting, strategic authorities will be required to provide an impact report on the pilot, which the Secretary of State will take into consideration before deciding whether to confer the functions permanently; I will consider whether those reports should be public.

As an example—the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, asked for an example of this—development corporation functions are held by mayors. If we wanted to move those functions to foundation authorities, for example, we could use these powers. What will happen with a pilot is that an area will make a request for a function. Pilots will need to be consented to by both the Secretary of State and the relevant local authorities. When a pilot has been completed, there will be an impact assessment of that pilot.

I will come back to the noble Baroness in writing on her questions about default voting arrangements, balance of power and the safeguards.

The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, asked about a grid setting out the different powers between different layers of local authorities. We have already produced one; it is on GOV.UK. Perhaps the noble Lord might like to have a look at it and, if he has any further questions, to come back to me.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

In view of the points made in the debate on this group of amendments, is it going to change?

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

The competencies are there, so the powers will stay the same as in the grid that we have set out. I ask the noble Lord to have a look at it and, by all means, to come back to me if he has any questions on it.

The Government will be able to confer functions across all areas on which we expect strategic authorities to act. Also, if the Government wish to create a completely new function and confer it on a strategic authority, primary legislation would be required. This strikes the balance between delivering further devolution and ensuring that appropriate parliamentary scrutiny of more novel measures takes place.

I hope this answer is helpful to the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, and ask her not to oppose the schedule.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her response; however, I think we will need to go back to Hansard. My example, for instance, was not on the pilots. It was an example on the changes that have been made in this Bill to, in particular, the levelling-up Act. I will of course go through Hansard carefully and, if necessary, we will return to these matters.

The issue of oversight goes to the heart of how this House discharges its responsibilities, particularly in view of reorganisation and changes to how we are all governed. Processes in this place matter and, when we confer powers, particularly those that will shape local systems and local decision-making, we must do so with proper regard to localism and accountability, not just what the Secretary of State at the time would like.

Much of our consideration of this Bill has necessarily focused on the schedules. Schedules are rarely debated line by line in the same way as clauses. When powers are dispersed across multiple schedules, as they are in this Bill, it becomes more difficult for your Lordships to track precisely what authority is being granted, to whom and subject to what limits. That is not a criticism of this House, nor of the Government, but it does mean that we must consciously take the time to examine these provisions with care. Schedules also frequently rely on delegated powers, allowing Ministers to add, remove or modify functions through regulations with limited parliamentary oversight. Over time, this risks creating a ratchet effect, whereby more and more policy is shaped by executive action rather than by primary legislation. That is precisely why the questions raised in this debate deserve clear and substantive answers. When the Minister reads Hansard, maybe a letter would be sensible.

For those reasons, while I am grateful for the short debate that we have had today, I remain concerned that important issues of scrutiny and accountability have yet to be fully addressed. I hope the Government will reflect on these points as the Bill progresses. At this point, I will not press my opposition to the schedule standing part.

Schedule 25 agreed.

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[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, before we complete this group, I just want to say that what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, said by way of moving his probing amendment asks not only important questions but questions to which we will have to come back, if not in this Bill then on the NHS reform Bill. As I know the noble Lord will completely understand, in so far as that forthcoming legislation will transfer responsibilities back into the Department of Health and Social Care and, potentially, give specific statutory responsibilities to integrated care boards, neither of those will allow this legislation and the 2016 legislation to operate in the way he intends. We will, therefore, have to come back to that and how it will happen at the time.

As things stand, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care does not devolve any of his functions to local government. In effect, he devolves the functions that would otherwise be exercised by NHS England in Manchester to the mayoral strategic authority. If we are going to do that in other mayoral strategic authorities when NHS England has disappeared, there will need to be a new structure to see how this works.

In some ways, it is entirely dependent on how the Government intend, in the NHS reform procedures, to re-establish the relationship between the NHS and local government. Nobody—I heard the noble Lord say this quite recently—has satisfactorily created that relationship. In the coalition Government, it was a very complicated process, and it did not work. There have been positive outcomes in relation to public health, but, for local government, there have not been satisfactory outcomes in relation to the management of health services—particularly in so far as they can be combined satisfactorily with social care services. This is something that we will have to return to in the NHS reform Bill.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, turning first to Clause 53, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, for his probing stand part notice. As we have said more than once, the devolution of health is a complex matter that raises many important questions—particularly, as we have heard, around the relationship between local authorities and the NHS. I listened to the passion of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, on this issue. I assure him that I felt as passionate as him 15 years ago; I hope that, at the end of all this, he is not as disappointed as I was.

When I was going through this in Wiltshire, the interesting thing was that the staff on the front line—those in the NHS and in local authorities—really understood this issue. They understood the importance of devolution and how they could deliver much more efficient, better services for the people whom they wanted to serve. That pushed me to do this more and more. However, as I have noted previously, many of the determinants of public health sit outside the health system. We must be clear on who is responsible for what. As we have said many times, where additional duties and responsibilities are placed on local authorities, they must be matched with sufficient resources to deliver them properly. In addition, the Government’s approach must be evidence-based and must demonstrate value for money for taxpayers.

On previous groups, the Minister mentioned the mayor’s involvement in integrated care boards, and we all welcome that. But it has to go further than that. In my opinion, being a member of an integrated care board will not deliver what we need to be delivered on the ground with health and local authorities.

This brings me to Amendment 185 in the name of my noble friend Lord Gascoigne. I thank him for making the case so compellingly. This amendment would prevent the duplication of powers between local authorities and central government. In the realm of health, for instance, we cannot risk the lines of accountability being blurred, whereby functions and responsibilities are devolved down to local authorities, yet Whitehall does not equip them to deliver effectively or continues to do the same jobs itself, leading to duplication.

This is precisely the difference between the Government’s current approach to devolution and what genuine community empowerment ought to look like. This amendment aims to correct that by ensuring that, when a function is devolved, it is also relinquished by central government, while still permitting the appropriate oversight where needed.

If the Government truly believe in local community empowerment, there can be no greater vote of confidence than supporting the principles set out here, trusting local authorities to do the jobs devolved to them fully, and giving local people clear, transparent lines of accountability. This is a matter not of meaningful devolution but of efficiencies and effective government. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on both these important amendments.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, for their amendments. I turn first to my noble friend Lord Hunt probing whether Clause 53 should stand part of the Bill.

Clause 53 places limits on the devolution of health functions to strategic authorities to ensure that the health service remains truly national. I know the noble Lord understands that. For instance, it prevents the transfer of the Secretary of State for Health’s core functions in relation to health. Where health functions are devolved to a strategic authority, it requires that provision is made to ensure that they adhere to national service standards.

Protections against devolving these functions are not new; as the noble Lord indicated, they have probably been going since the health service was first set up. They have certainly been in place since central government first began the process of devolving functions to combined authorities. The Bill merely retains those protections. I know my noble friend wishes to probe the Government’s intentions on devolving health functions in the future, and he is right to do so.

Health, well-being and public service reform is an area of competence for strategic authorities, as set out in Clause 2. The Bill also confers a new health improvement and inequalities duty on combined authorities and combined county authorities. As health is covered within the areas of competence, the Government could use the powers in this Bill to devolve health functions to strategic authorities in the future, if they believed it appropriate to do so. Mayors of established mayoral strategic authorities would also be able to request the devolution of health functions and get a response from government.

This demonstrates that the Government see a clear role for strategic authorities and mayors in health, both now and going forward. The example of Manchester is a very good one, and we will continue to look at what is happening there to make sure that lessons can be learned and that, if we get requests from other mayors to devolve health functions to them, we pick up on any lessons from Manchester. At the moment, the process is looking positive. But it will always be right, I fear, that limitations remain to make sure that the health service remains truly national. Whether that is in targeting or some of the processes, we will see.

I turn to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, which seeks to prevent the doubling up of powers and responsibilities in strategic authorities and Whitehall. I heard the Secretary of State speak over the weekend and his view is definitely that devolution by default is the way he wants to move this forward. He was very clear on that, and on the advocation of subsidiarity that sees powers and funding always held at the most appropriate level for delivering any service. The funding settlement will be announced this week; it may be out today. It is out—I thank the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill. I had not kept up on that, although I have talked of nothing else all weekend.

Through the integrated settlement, we have instituted the principle that, where central government funding falls within the scope of an established mayoral strategic authorities’ functional responsibilities, that funding will be devolved. The Government are also committed to providing new strategic authorities with capacity funding to kick-start their organisations, so all areas on the devolution priority programme will receive mayoral capacity funding to help establish their new institutions once the legislation has been laid before Parliament. They will receive capacity funding in future years as well, so they are ready and prepared to deliver the benefits of devolution.

I agree with the noble Lord that, unless you have the funding to deliver these new functions, there is not much point in devolving them. We very much agree with the spirit of the noble Lord’s amendment. When responsibilities are devolved, they have to be devolved as thoroughly as possible to enable the true innovation and place-based approaches that we all want to see and that are the whole purpose of devolution in the first place. That is the position the Government have taken in the devolution framework in this Bill. The majority of powers will be exercised solely by the strategic authority or concurrently with the constituent authorities.

However, there are rare circumstances where the relevant Secretary of State and the strategic authority need to share powers. To give an example, the Secretary of State will retain the ability to provide funding in relation to adult education in addition to funding provided by the strategic authority. This will ensure that those areas in strategic authorities do not miss out on nationwide schemes. For example, I think there have been some announced today.

The amendment in itself is too restrictive and would prevent instances where it makes sense for powers to be held concurrently with government. I understand the noble Lord’s concern that, while functions may be devolved, funding may remain in Whitehall. However, the Government are committed to providing strategic authorities with the funding to deliver their functions.

We have committed to providing new strategic authorities with capacity funding, as I have said, and the integrated settlement institutes the principle that government funding will be devolved where the responsibilities fall within established mayoral authorities’ functional responsibilities. I hope that, with those explanations, noble Lords are able to support the clause standing part of the Bill.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend. It has been a really interesting and encouraging debate. I share the view, concern and thrust of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, and I thought my noble friend was pretty positive in response.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, made a very pertinent point about the difference between delegation and devolvement. As the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, pointed out, although we talk about devo Manchester in relation to health, it was actually delegation, with the Secretary of State retaining responsibility.

I do not think that in the short term we will be able to move off the Secretary of State’s responsibility. That goes back to 1948. However, I think a lot more could be delegated, and there are issues where we could start to look at real devolvement. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, reminded me that we have the joys of another NHS reform Bill coming to us in the next few months, and we will have an opportunity to discuss and debate this further. I will be looking particularly to see whether the Bill tries to nibble away at what is already contained in Clause 53.

One has to say that, at the time of the agreement over Greater Manchester, it is well known that NHS England was not in the loop in the original decision-making. I am afraid that, because of that, it has not been keen to see progress such as has occurred in Manchester. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, said that Manchester was essentially a pilot and we should have a proper assessment; I agree with that.

My noble friend was very encouraging. I understand this whole question about the Secretary of State’s accountability to Parliament for the running of the National Health Service and how that squares with giving more authority to local authorities to have a role in it. We can find a way through. For instance, this always struck me: if we are going to have pilots, why on earth can we not have one mayoral authority taking on responsibility for an ICB—not having one place on it but actually doing it? Albeit it might be under delegated powers from the Secretary of State, at least let us dip in the water of freeing up the system. Looking at how the NHS is run at the moment, how many restructurings do we need to show that central command control simply does not work? Having said that, I withdraw my opposition to Clause 53.

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[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I am glad that I am following the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, because I could not disagree more with his Amendment 196C. When I was the leader of a district authority, we had control over the business rates, and we were able to get full reliefs to the last pub, shop or community sporting club in a village with a population of less than 3,000. That was the source of a huge community empowerment. The effect of the noble Lord’s amendment would be another nail in the coffin for rural pubs and small businesses, and I reject it on that basis. I will also speak to my own Amendment 256A, which is a rag bag. We are talking about Clause 56 at the moment, but this would go right at the end, beyond Clause 85; perhaps I should have asked for it to be de-grouped, but here we are.

My amendment is consistent with the Government’s Clause 11, which relates to constraining the council tax-raising ability of the larger, newly created mayoral combined authorities. But I am looking at the other end of the spectrum, because I am concerned that, following local government reorganisation, the former district councils, which are currently defined as “billing authorities” under the Local Government Finance Act 1992, will disappear. In Section 39(2), they will become local precepting authorities. In other words, the district council, once abolished, will be converted to a third-tier parish or town council. This will affect places like King’s Lynn, a historic county borough; cathedral cities like Norwich or Oxford; county towns like Ipswich and Chelmsford; and coastal communities like Hastings, Eastbourne and Great Yarmouth.

Some of these places have large populations—for example, Norwich City Council, when it is abolished, will have a population of more than 150,000—and there will be lots of new large locals formed. The problem is that the majors are constrained in their ability to put up council tax—5%—but the locals are not. This amendment would change the definition of “local precepting authority” to include authorities with a population below 49,999. Where a local precepting authority exceeds 50,000, it would become a major precepting authority for the purposes of raising council tax and be subject to the same rules as other larger councils.

Of course, it is not just the former billing authorities that will flip into parishes; the former boundaries that flowed from the hundreds, the poor law unions, the urban and rural district councils, and the predecessors of the county boroughs in the Reform Act 1832 will disappear. This is why my amendment proposes a size scale, rather than being limited solely to the former district councils. These places will be joining that benighted club: Salisbury, Shrewsbury and Scarborough, which have all fallen out of previous rounds of LGR and must now stand on their own two feet in the sense that, unlike their predecessor billing authority constructions, they will get no formula grant in the future; they will need to earn what they spend.

We already know already that over 100 councils, existing principal authorities, want exceptional financial support this year as the Government shamelessly tilt the formula away from being population based. That is a denial of the simple truth that people consume services that need to be paid for and that it is more expensive to deliver them in the countryside, but that is a debate for another time.

But, under LGR, there will be a powerful incentive for authorities to cost-shunt the most expensive things to these newly created third-level authorities to get the liabilities off their books and on to the small fry. I am thinking of leisure centres, municipal theatres, parks and open spaces, youth groups, civic activity, and community pride events such as carnivals and festivals.

My wife was a parish clerk for over 10 years in a small parish with 500 souls, spending about £3,000 a year, so I know the value of what these unsung volunteers—real community champions—in parish councils can achieve. But I am focusing on the new large class of parish, town or even small city authority, with plenty of staff, plant and equipment, miles away from that “Vicar of Dibley” stereotype.

These residents need protecting from unconstrained tax rises, cost shunts from principal authorities and the smaller populations being made to afford the costs of facilities that have been previously amortised over a much larger canvas—that hinterland of surrounding parishes where people are able to chip in. This is not an idle concern. The noble Baroness has certainly mentioned Salisbury before, which has let rip. Its precept is up 44% in just four years. Its own website tells long-suffering residents that their council tax is the highest in Wiltshire. At £383 for band D, it is over twice the level of my own district council. I have looked at Shrewsbury. Following LGR, its parishioners’ band D is up 218% in 10 years—although I will concede that, at £87, it appears to be offering slightly better value for money. To those against my amendment, I say: look to Shrewsbury, because limiting council tax in these third-tier authorities can be done.

I have also looked at Stevenage, which is likely to be consumed and subsumed into the larger construct—taking power further away from residents and damaging the distinct identity that came from it being the first post-war new town, alongside all the other accoutrements. It is funny how all my examples begin with an S. In Stevenage, the band D was raised by just 3% to £246.41. If it carries on like Salisbury, a band D in Stevenage would pay £354 by 2030—a raise of nearly 50% or over £100.

We must be clear that these are burdens in addition to the new mayoralties that will be created—the huge new bureaucracies with the ability to raise precepts for things they are not even responsible for. There will be new mayoral CIL on top of existing CIL and new authorities where the effects of council tax equalisation within the canvas have not even been ventilated yet, and the costs of LGR have not been determined. We know it is going be subject to at least a £1 billion black hole from the accelerated pension strain costs.

Do not let the Government tell you there will be fewer layers; there will be more and at more cost. The public will be rinsed by LGR. People will pay more for less—that much is certain—but my amendment would at least seek to constrain those billing authorities that are already principal authorities and are constrained in their ability to raise council tax. That will still apply to them when they are transmogrified into third-tier councils, to make sure they cannot do a Salisbury too. That is right not only by residents but by the authorities, because as they approach this forced reorganisation, which will see a transfer of assets, they will know by this amendment that there is not a blank cheque. It will sharpen the minds.

This is not a dig at parish councils or the third tier. They do a lot of valuable work at a level that is closest to the people, but I have got their back, because it will stop those councils with the broadest shoulders from imposing liabilities and cast-offs on to those with the most limited means. That is an essential safeguard if the community empowerment part of this Bill is not to be undermined. I would be creating equity between the cathedral cities, the market towns, the new towns and so forth, so that council tax after LGR does not become an intolerable burden for those who live within the cities and provide perverse incentives for those just outside to become free riders.

I know the Minister is concerned about this and we have spoken for some time about it. I have suggested a £50,000 threshold in Committee, but as we move to Report I would be open to saying that perhaps there should be a £1 million precept or some other measure. But we have to have a measure between the small and the major authorities to protect parishes from having their leg lifted and, in turn, protect their residents from being rinsed.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

Before my noble friend sits down, I would like to clarify something. You cannot compare Salisbury as it is now to Salisbury as it was before as a district council. It was a far larger area; it was Sailsbury and south Wiltshire, not just Salisbury city.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

I am staggered at the thought of a parish council with a population over 50,000; it does not make sense to me. I am also staggered at the thought that, if we are talking about getting back to place-based communities, we are denying to places the size of Scarborough or Harrogate, both of which I know well and which have or used to have important assets, in conference centres and major hotels, the sense of local community or parish, thus increasing the sense for most of our public of total alienation from the politics that we are providing them with.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

Can I just explain to the noble Lord that a parish council is a name given to parishes, towns and cities? It all comes under the same legislation as parishes.

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[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has spoken on this group of amendments. We keep coming back to the same sorts of issues as in the previous group. We were talking about devolution in relation to health, and fiscal devolution and trying to extract money out of the NHS.

Now we come to a different level of fiscal devolution, and my noble friend Lord Gascoigne raised the point that a lot of people outside the London bubble are frustrated. I emphasise that it is not just in the north; I was on the south coast in Southampton this weekend, where there are lots of frustrated people. I can assure you that if you drove along the pothole-encrusted roads of Bedfordshire, there are lots of frustrated people there as well.

This is important because people care about their communities and they want their communities to be better. They care about place, and you cannot create great places by diktat from Whitehall. I recall saying that two or three times earlier in this Committee. That means you need real devolution and real powers. It also means real fiscal devolution; we have a number of suggestions on fiscal devolution here.

The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, and my noble friend Lady Scott made the point that parish councils, particularly small parish councils, are very close to their communities. People can easily see what that extra £10 or £20 or £50 is being spent on—such as extra grass cutting or improvements to the village hall—and they are quite amenable to it. As you start moving away from that and you start breaking that relationship, it becomes much more difficult.

One of the great dangers with fiscal devolution, much as I believe in it, is that central government—I am not making a political point here, but I am blaming Whitehall and the Treasury—see that as an opportunity to raise tax by the back door. We have seen government regularly passing additional responsibilities to local government with a short-term grant and then expecting the council tax payer to fund that burden.

One of the big issues that we have in local government at the moment is that a lot of responsibilities have been passed down; responsibilities are then growing quicker than the tax base, which means many of these issues of place are facing a fiscal squeeze. We have this dichotomy or dilemma: we may want fiscal devolution, but how do we avoid central government cost shunting?

My noble friend Lord Fuller was implying the same thing. It is great to have fiscal freedoms for parish and town councils, but we do not want cost shunting from overpressed district, unitary and county authorities. How do we protect against that cost shunting, where people see higher tax bills but no benefits? Place is important. I am desperately keen for genuine fiscal devolution, but how do we protect our residents from, in effect, cost shunting from Whitehall down the line?

I will talk briefly about some of these amendments. My noble friend Lord Gascoigne’s amendment is really important, because it is not just about the Secretary of State making a judgment—that is what the Secretary of State would do anyway, if he were to devolve powers—but placing a burden on him to say that he genuinely believes that a council has the financial resources, financial capacity and management resources to do what is being entrusted upon it. It is not just a case of going, “Get on with it. Bye. It is not my fault; it is your fault”, then, a year later, not giving it the money that it needs to deliver those things.

Forgive me, because I cannot remember whether it was from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, or the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, but I accept his point. However, the contra argument is that it places a burden on the Secretary of State to make sure that it is feasible. We need to think about that very important distinction.

The other point to make is that we are going through reorganisation here and we need to ensure that this is not shuffling the deckchairs on the “Titanic”. It has to be about meaningfully improving services for our residents and about better value for money. We should not have reorganisation for reorganisation’s sake, which is why I think this amendment is the right approach.

We have had a number of amendments on fiscal devolution, but I will not go through them all. I have a concern about cost shunting and we have to protect against that. We need to give people real fiscal powers in order to deliver better services for their residents. What we do not need—some of the announcements that have been made today are like this and our Government were the same—is to have to appeal to the Government to get funding to do something. That means the Secretary of State is still in charge and that you are not determining your local priorities but, by the way, all the councils will do it because they want as much money as they can for their residents to deliver as best they can.

This must be underpinned by a real understanding that there are both costs and benefits from devolution, and that the funding arrangements are fair and transparent to local government. One of the biggest fears I have in local government is that the resident and local taxpayer does not see what their funding goes on, because far too much of it is dictated by the Government. These are responsibilities and duties with no funding and no powers, which is something that I might come back to on the next group of amendments. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Gascoigne, Lord Wallace and Lord Bassam, and the noble Baroness, Lady Janke, for their amendments in this group.

I will comment briefly on the general points that the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, made. It does not happen as rarely as one might expect, but I do agree with some of what he said. Nobody much cares about the architecture of local government; when I knock on people’s doors, they do not say, “Can you change the structure of local government, Sharon?” That does not happen. They do care, however, about their public services being delivered effectively. They want to see new homes built, their streets cleaned, their potholes fixed—as the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, pointed out—fly-tipping sorted and work being done to tackle the decline of our high streets. The current system was just not sustainable. It was not working in terms of either finance or efficiency, so we have to make some changes to tackle that issue. Both making the structures work better and devolving power to local authorities are needed to make sure that they can tackle the things that are important at the local level.

Amendment 186, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, seeks to place barriers on conferring new functions on strategic authorities. As per paragraph 1(4) of Schedule 25, the Secretary of State cannot confer a new function on a strategic authority unless they are

“satisfied that it is appropriate to do so having regard to the need to secure the effective exercise of the function concerned”.

That provides an adequate test to ensure that, when functions are conferred, it is with the effective delivery of that function in mind. It also enables the Government to pilot new functions with strategic authorities. We talked about some of that earlier. In these instances, strategic authorities will be required to provide an impact report on the pilot, which the Secretary of State will use to help decide whether to confer the function on a permanent basis.

The pilot process provides an adequate opportunity to test devolution before rolling it out more widely. We believe that requiring each strategic authority to have a specific plan for each function effectively signed off by the Secretary of State runs counter to the principles of devolution that underpin the Bill. It risks micromanagement of strategic authorities from Whitehall and slowing down the progress of devolution. I do not say “micromanagement” with any political side because, the last time that my party was in power, we ended up with about 160 performance indicators for local authorities. I am not in favour of that either.

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[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

As the noble Baroness rightly says, they are legally binding targets that people need to take into account. We do not necessarily need to do it again. But I come back to my central point: do not place a duty on somebody if you do not provide the capacity for them to deliver it.

My second point is on devolution. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, made some interesting points about local wealth building and it probably is a very good model, but it may not be the only model. There may be other models and there may be other models that work locally, so why are we doing a one size fits all? We should trust people to deliver for their residents; that is why they get elected and re-elected. Sometimes we will make mistakes, and we do it differently the next time because we made a mistake the first time.

Those are my two key concerns that we need to focus on. First, if you provide a duty to somebody, you need to provide the means and capacity to do it. Secondly, on the issue of democracy, if we are genuine about devolution, we should be very careful about providing a centralised diktat about what we should do. That has nothing to do with the proposed areas of concern, which I have a huge amount of sympathy with.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Willis, for Amendments 192, 193, 194 and 241B. I will respond to Amendments 192 and 241B together, as their aims are somewhat shared.

During the Bill’s passage, the Government have consistently made the point that many local authorities have a high level of ambition to tackle climate change, restore nature and address wider environmental issues, including air quality. It is not clear what additional benefits, if any, a new statutory duty would bring.

The Government offer net-zero support for local government. That includes through Great British Energy, which will work with local government to help to increase the rollout of renewable energy projects. Furthermore, the Government will also partner with strategic authorities and local authorities to roll out the ambitious warm homes plan, which will upgrade 5 million homes over this Parliament to help them to save money on their bills and benefit from cleaner, cheaper heating. To strengthen our engagement with local government on net-zero strategy, policy and delivery, and to support local government to drive forward net-zero action at the local level, the Government also run the Local Net Zero Delivery Group, which last met on 9 December last year.

Local authorities already have statutory duties to improve air quality in their areas. Thanks to the combined efforts of local and central government, air quality in the UK has improved. The Government will continue to work with local authorities to reduce air pollution and its harmful effects. It is worth noting that in London, as the noble Baroness will know, the air quality target, which it was estimated would take 193 years to achieve, was accomplished in nine years. Concerted effort and clear decision-making can make a real difference.

Existing tools and duties also support efforts to contribute to targets for nature, such as local nature recovery strategies and the biodiversity duty under the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, strengthened under the Environment Act 2021. The latter requires all public authorities to consider and take action to conserve and enhance biodiversity, which must have regard to any relevant local nature recovery strategy and to any relevant species conservation strategy or protected site strategy prepared by Natural England.

On climate adaptation, the Government already work closely with local authorities, strategic authorities and mayors, a number of whom are developing dedicated climate risk assessments. In October last year, the Government launched a local authority climate service, which provides tailored data on climate change impacts. The Government also ran the first adaptation reporting power trial for local authorities last year, providing guidance and support on how to assess climate risks to their functions and services.   

I will respond to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Willis, about the mayor not abiding the climate change duty. There is a specific competency on environmental climate change in the Bill. A mayor of a strategic authority, as well as having the overview and scrutiny powers that the body has, could be subject to a challenge by way of a judicial review for failure to meet an existing duty. There is significant power there already. The issues around local democracy and the prioritisation given to an issue is and must be subject to democratic accountability. It is difficult; we have to get that balance right. But as there is an existing legal duty, there is enough power for local citizens to be able to push their locally elected representatives. Given such existing support, and the fact that many local authorities are already taking great strides in tackling environmental decline and climate change, we do not think that this particular duty is needed.

Amendment 193 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, seeks to require strategic authorities to collect and publish annual poverty data for their authority. We recognise that the policies and interventions that strategic authorities deliver have an impact on reducing poverty and alleviating its impacts. As set out in the Government’s strategy, Our Children, Our Future: Tackling Child Poverty, a broad and dedicated range of partners play a role in reducing poverty, and we will continue to do this work in partnership with local, regional, national, private and third sector partners.

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[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, for his amendment. I was initially a little confused, having read the amendment and then listened to his speech, but after his final comment I understand that this is a probing amendment to get the Minister and the Government to be clear about how they see the structure of the Mayoral Council, the regional devolved Governments and, potentially, councils. It is about how to create some kind of structure or how it will be structured. In that sense, I am a lot clearer and happier.

I had more concerns about an English local government council, because that would be largely duplicating the role of the LGA. As an ex-chairman of the LGA, I would be deeply unhappy and my colleague the noble Baroness would also be deeply unhappy as a fellow ex-chair. We would both agree that enhancing the LGA would be a good idea, but I am not sure that we would want an English local government council. As a probing amendment, I understand the purpose of it. The noble Lord raises some valid points about what the role of the Mayoral Council is, how it will all fit in and where the pieces of the jigsaw are. That is a good question, and I look forward to the Minister’s answer.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, for Amendment 195, and hope that he will take my regards back to John Denham, for whom I have the greatest respect. I have often worked with John on English devolution, so I respect what he says.

This amendment seeks to create an obligation to establish a national body called the English local government council. Membership of the council would comprise a person appointed by constituent members of each strategic authority and the Mayor of London. Members of the council would also be required to pay a membership fee, placing a new financial burden on authorities. Functions of the council would include working with the Government to agree a framework for the further devolution of powers; to agree funding for local and strategic authorities; and to identify a representative to participate in the Council of the Nations and Regions.

I appreciate the spirit of the amendment, as I believe that proper representation of local government into central government is incredibly important. We have worked very hard on that as a Government since we came into power in July 2024. When local leaders work together with the Government, it benefits our whole country. That is why the English devolution White Paper sets out three forums for engagement: the Council of the Nations and Regions, the Mayoral Council and the Leaders Council. Across these councils, all levels of devolved government are represented, from First Ministers to mayors to the leaders of local authorities. These forums have all met a number of times—I have been to the Leaders Council three times, I think. I can assure noble Lords that funding and furthering devolution is rarely not on the agenda for discussion, but they also discuss thematic issues as well.

It is therefore not necessary for a new council to create a framework for further devolution. The Bill is already establishing a process to extend devolution in a more streamlined way and to deepen devolution through the mayoral right to request process. While funding is discussed at all these councils, it is right and proper that local government funding is provided through the finance settlement process, which carefully allocates needs-based funding across the country. The current council structures we have in place are working well, and the flexibility afforded to them as non-statutory bodies allows us to work with the sector to adapt the forums as the needs of local leaders change. The current structures place no new burdens on authorities, with no membership fees required, as this amendment would create. For these reasons, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

I am of course entirely willing to withdraw my amendment, but I wish to stress that this is a very important point. We are about to enter another difficult period in which we have no idea how this year’s elections will come out and which parties will be in control in different parts of the United Kingdom, and in which the relationship between the devolved authorities and what is intended to be the stronger combined authorities within England will come under some strain.

What happened between 2015 and 2024 is that these things did not work well and, in many cases, they ceased to meet. We do not want that to happen again. If this proposal for stronger mayoral authorities is to work, we need to make sure that it fits into the governance of the United Kingdom. If it is to work, the institutions, not just the Council of the Nations and Regions but also the Mayoral Council for England, need to have a good deal more power than the LGA has in standing up to central government—and, as in most other democracies, they need to have some sense of how one bargains over fiscal redistribution. One of the central aspects of the German federal system is the bargaining over how money is distributed between the centre and the richer and poorer regions. That is something that we need to do in England as well—it is done a certain amount between the devolved authorities and the United Kingdom. I speak as someone from northern England, and we are always deeply conscious of the fact that we do not manage to bargain with central government about that.

I would be very grateful if the Minister would have further conversations off the floor before Report, because otherwise we will want to push the issue that the Mayoral Council in some shape or other must be given statutory authority. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw.