English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Baroness Pinnock Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Pinnock]

170: Clause 45, page 49, line 37, at end insert—
“(c) arrange for the deputy mayor for fire and rescue to exercise one or more of the Mayor’s fire and rescue authority functions.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires a Mayor with Fire and Rescue Authority functions to delegate those functions to a Deputy Mayor for Fire and Rescue, ensuring governance arrangements parallel to those for policing.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, this amendment was tabled by my noble friend Lord Goddard of Stockport, who is unfortunately not able to be here today. It seeks to insert a vital safeguard into Clause 45, ensuring that the specialised governance of our fire and rescue services is not diluted as the powers of regional mayors are expanded. As the Bill currently stands, it enables the transfer of fire and rescue authority functions to elected mayors, yet it does not mandate the same dedicated oversight and accountability that is necessary for this important emergency service. Amendment 170 would rectify this by requiring a mayor with these functions to arrange for a deputy mayor for fire and rescue, specifically to exercise those responsibilities.

The prime strength of this amendment is that would ensure governance arrangements for fire and rescue services, which would then run parallel with those already established for the police service. As the Government have rightly sought to abolish police and crime commissioners, they have abjectly failed to ensure that governance and accountability to the public are paramount. A reflection as to how potentially fragile our governance arrangements are can perhaps be informed by events in the United States of America, where the governance arrangements of policing have apparently been overturned with ease.

Can the Minister explain how replacing an elected police and crime commissioner by an unelected appointment, accountable to no one but the mayor, is an improvement in terms of public accountability? By extension, how will governance work if, as proposed, the fire and rescue service loses its direct governance and becomes the responsibility of an unnamed mayoral appointee? Further, there is a real risk that, as this Bill establishes a new tier of “strategic authorities” with broad “areas of competence”, the elected mayors will become “Lord High Everything”, as was the arrogant Pooh Bah in the “Mikado”.

Amendment 170 would ensure that fire and rescue functions receive the dedicated attention they require rather than being treated as a secondary concern within a massive strategic portfolio. This role would provide a clear point of contact for local public service partners and ensure that the strategic direction of emergency services is managed by an individual with a specific, focused mandate—albeit not a specific and focused democratic mandate.

Proper accountability is also lacking within the Government’s plans. The idea that a scrutiny panel, as with the police service, can be effective when only able to consider decisions post hoc is for the birds. I hope the Minister can agree to think about the challenge that Amendment 170 provides in the interests of public accountability. What we need is structural consistency between policing and the fire and rescue services and the dedicated and democratic accountability necessary to protect both our fire services and the communities they serve. I beg to move.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I hope I am not causing any confusion by having moved to these Benches. It was simply because the other Benches are very congested; I continue to support the same party that I supported when I came into this House as a Conservative Peer.

I would like to use Amendment 170—I congratulate the noble Baroness for speaking so eloquently to it—to probe the Government on an issue that is causing great concern, not dissimilar to that expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock. I think from memory we were the only two Peers in this very Room who spoke against the orders for the combined authority of North Yorkshire.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

It was thee and me.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

It was thee and me, yes—that was the sum total who voted against. I think that we were right and history has proven that to be the case. I am still trying to get my head around where the fire and rescue service sits in the combined authority of North Yorkshire. I am concerned that now it is going to be even more complicated if, having elected a mayor for York and North Yorkshire, as the noble Baroness has highlighted, this will now pass to the mayor.

This is causing me concern because I raised the point elsewhere about the number of BESS projects—basically clean energy projects, particularly battery storage projects and solar farms—across North Yorkshire and the lack of consulting with fire and rescue authorities, because they are not statutory consultees. I believe that that has highlighted a gap in the structure at the moment. I use this opportunity to ask the Minister—I see that we have switched places; sliding doors and switching places is a theme for today—how that will impact on a county such as North Yorkshire, or York and North Yorkshire, if there is going to be no democratic oversight and no accountability, if that is the current understanding in the Bill.

The noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, is on to something here and I would like to listen carefully to how the Government plan to monitor this. I do not believe that rural counties have really been considered in the mix of things. Clearly, it is an oversight if fire and rescue authorities are not being consulted as statutory consultees to such major projects. For all the reasons that she gave, I think that another lacuna has been identified by Amendment 170 in the great scheme of things and I look very much to hearing the Minister’s reply.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, I thank everybody who has contributed to this debate on the future of the governance of fire and rescue services. It has exposed a fundamental flaw in the pattern of governance that the Government are pursuing with some haste: enabling a single elected person to become the sole democratically accountable authority for strategic planning, skills, strategic highways, policing, fire services and possibly health. This reflects what the Minister has said: a person, as a directly elected mayor, will hold all the accountability for those important public services.

That will not happen; no one person can hold all that accountability successfully. It will be dispersed, as it is now. In West Yorkshire, we have a directly elected mayor who has appointed a deputy mayor—it could be a commissioner, but in West Yorkshire the position is deputy mayor—who is a political appointee, not directly accountable to the residents of West Yorkshire, for policing.

We know from earlier parts of the Bill that the directly elected mayor can appoint up to seven commissioners, as we are now calling them, who will take responsibility for some of these functions but who are not directly accountable to the public whom they serve and for whom they are making decisions. That format of governance will crumble away when the first big incident of significance occurs, because who is responsible and who calls the shots? That fundamental problem is at the heart of this.

Apart from that, the second fundamental problem is the method of accountability through scrutiny. In earlier amendments, we on these Benches called for a scrutiny panel for each political appointee as a commissioner, which would go some way to alleviating the discrepancy in democratic accountability. But at the moment those scrutiny panels will scrutinise decisions post hoc, which is unacceptable. If they are to be effective, they need to look at pre-decision scrutiny as well.

I am sorry that the Minister has recited the mantra that all will be well and that creating a “Lord High Everything” will be fine. I fear that it will not, and I shall continue to point out the fault-lines in this model. I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 170 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, government Amendments 172 and 173 make essential amendments to Schedule 23, ensuring that the law operates as intended with evolving governance arrangements. Amendment 172 aligns the inspection framework for mayoral combined authorities and mayoral county combined authorities with existing exclusions for other fire and rescue authority governance models, ensuring fairness and consistency across England.

Amendment 173 makes technical alignments with existing legislation. It ensures that, where a mayoral combined authority or a mayoral combined county authority takes on fire and rescue functions, it is treated in the same way as existing fire and rescue authorities. The amendment will also bring mayoral fire and rescue authorities within Part V of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989, covering companies in which local authorities have interests. It will also bring it within Section 155 of the same Act for the purpose of emergency financial assistance.

It also clarifies the handling of Section 114 reports in the case of mayoral fire and rescue authorities, and the fire and rescue authority’s response under Section 115 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988. When a chief finance officer issues a report, the report must be sent to the relevant scrutiny committee, and the authority’s response must be sent to the chief finance officer, the external auditor and the relevant scrutiny committee. I commend these government amendments to the Committee.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, these two amendments are enabling amendments in response to the previous issue that was raised with Amendment 170 about absorbing fire and rescue services into a mayoral authority.

It has long been the objective of previous Governments to combine police services and fire and rescue services into one model by arguing that they were both emergency services and, therefore, would be better combined. That has always been resisted, with support from these Benches, because police and fire and rescue services have very different objectives. This Bill is seeking to absorb policing and fire and rescue into the ambit of the directly elected mayor, without having this discussion about whether it is appropriate.

I accept that four mayoral authorities have already combined policing and fire and rescue. Whether or not that has been a success is yet to be tested. The argument against these two amendments—I will reprise a bit of what I said on Amendment 170—is that it is an erosion of transparency and public accountability for what is, after all, a critical emergency service.

It is always interesting to me when we have government amendments—it points to pressure somewhere that new powers are needed to make this work. Amendment 172 removes the inspection of the fire service from the inspection regime and puts it into a mayoral regime. This means that, for instance—these are within the amendment—an inspector cannot challenge the budget of fire and rescue, challenge the appointment or dismissal of the chief fire officer, hold the chief fire officer to account or approve an emergency performance and reinforcement scheme.

All those are critical to ensure public accountability of the fire and rescue service, but suddenly they will not be available for its inspection regime. That will not do. The fire and rescue service plays a vital role as first responders to serious road traffic accidents. They are always the first there, not the police, and they are often at terrorist incidents. We need to have accountability for the public and the existing inspection regime, to ensure that it works well.

My argument with this amendment, as with Amendment 170, is that this is happening by stealth, by absorbing fire and rescue into the police service. Combining them ensures that the mayor has responsibility for those functions. The inspection regime does not apply to the mayor, therefore public accountability for the fire and rescue service lies in holding the mayor to account. As I have said, the mayor is now the sole Lord High Everything of a huge number of strategic functions, so holding them to account on any one of them will be a challenge. I hope that the Minister will think again on this proposal to change the way that fire and rescue services are democratically accountable and inspected, because I fear that failing to do so could have serious consequences.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, as I understand it from the Minister, the inspectors in question inspect only operational matters and not governance matters. Therefore, to not inspect the governance of mayoral combined authorities and combined county authorities is in keeping with the approach that the inspectors already take to existing fire services. Will the Minister please confirm that I have that right? If I do not, will she please explain why the Government’s arrangements for these new authorities will be subject to less scrutiny than already exists in the fire services? If my understanding is correct, I still have concerns about the need for effective scrutiny of new authorities taking new powers, in this instance over fire and rescue, so will the Minister please tell the Committee how the governance of fire and rescue services will be inspected and scrutinised, if not by this inspectorate? We have to ensure that there is an appropriate approach to scrutiny for all new mayoral combined authorities, which is exactly what the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, said. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness O'Neill of Bexley (Con)]

My Lords, I have a real concern about this group of amendments, which appears to look to tinker around the edges to bring the Mayor of London and the Greater London Authority into line with other strategic authorities. We already established in an earlier session that governance in London was the first established; it has never been repeated and, indeed, this Bill does not seek to repeat it either. Surely the sensible route is the one that we suggested in Amendment 75: to have a full review, consider the future governance of London and deal with issues such as this at that time.

I do not want to revisit the earlier argument, but I remind noble Lords that in London there is not the same relationship between the mayor and the boroughs as is suggested there might be in the new governance relationships, or indeed that exists elsewhere. In practice, that means that the mayor might not appreciate local circumstances—as I have said before, not all of London is the same. The mayor might not appreciate the local policing capacity, or lack of it, and the implications of that on licensing decisions. He might not understand the local economy and what licensing could mean for that. He might not appreciate the impact of the local demographics when decisions are being made to overturn local licensing decisions.

What is more, as we have heard before, the current scrutiny of the mayor is not considered to be effective. Devolution should mean respect for decision-making at its lowest common denominator—in this case, the borough level. If a more strategic decision is needed for a wider area, the decision should include the local decision-making processes or partners. For those reasons, I urge the Minister to consider the proposals put forward previously for a thorough review, at which time the implications of these amendments could be considered.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, I heard what the Minister said in her introduction to this group of amendments about it following a proposed change to the Bill in the Commons. Like the previous speaker, I understand the need, in a global city such as London, to reverse—for justifiable reasons—the direction of devolution and enable a power grab from the local boroughs in some circumstances. However, the circumstances are not defined, apart from saying that they have to be of “strategic importance” across Greater London. Yet the definition of “strategic importance” is left to regulations.

It is not at all clear how the mayor will make such decisions when they have been defined as being of strategic importance. Will they be based on the licensing priorities, which is a requirement for local borough licensing committees? How will local concerns be heard and considered? This appears to be a profound and unnecessary centralisation of power that threatens to strip local democratically elected committees of their voice in matters that affect their communities’ daily lives.

Under this proposal, which is set out in Amendment 179A—it contains a proposed new section headed “Licence applications of potential strategic importance”—local London licensing authorities, such as borough councils, would legally be required to notify the GLA of applications for the sale of alcohol, regulated entertainment or late-night refreshment. A further proposal grants the Mayor of London the power, in effect, to veto or override the decisions of these local authorities. So if a borough council decides to grant or reject a licence, that decision is suspended and has no effect until the mayor decides whether to intervene. This is allegedly the devolution Bill, but I am yet to be convinced that it has any relationship to devolution; this is the imposition of top-down command structure over local democracy.

The additional problem is that, if there is a veto and it is called in by the mayor, how quickly will the mayor decide? What is the democratic way in which that will be decided? Is it just the mayor in his or her office making a decision, or will it go to a scrutiny committee for discussion first? Will there be an open and transparent hearing where the local borough council—or several local borough councils, if it is something that affects several of them—can come and explain its decision? Will the mayor have to explain why it has been called in? A lot here is unsatisfactory, to say the least. I ask myself: who is best placed to make a judgment about licence applications, which can have significant effects on people’s daily lives? Is it those who live there and their elected representatives, or is it the mayor of 7 million or 8 million people who says, “Actually, I know best. This is important for business, so hard luck if it affects your daily life”? That is the risk in this.

In the end, this group of amendments is unsatisfactory until we know the definition of “strategic importance” and the methods that will be used for decision-making. For those reasons, I hope the Minister will think again and reconsider. I understand why, if it is a significant application that will affect large parts of London, you would want a mayoral authority to take that decision. But I would want to know how that is defined and how that decision will be taken in a public setting, with the ability for people to have their voices heard and an appeal process.

[Baroness Dacres of Lewisham (Lab)]

My Lords, I am a directly elected mayor of a London borough with a licensing authority and responsibility. I want to speak in favour of and welcome this amendment. The key word is “strategic”. It is important that we recognise that London’s nightlife and hospitality industries are essential to Britain’s economy. We need to support them; they bring more than 1.4 million jobs to the capital and generate £46 billion in economic activity.

Giving the mayor new powers over strategic licences, including the power to call in and decide strategically on those applications, could be important for the future. Different authorities will vary in how they approach their licensing. Of course, there needs to be that relationship between the local authorities and the Mayor of London—whoever that may be, now or in the future—to be able to listen and recognise, and to have that overarching strategic view of what the licensing is being applied for. We do not live within administrative boundaries, so if something is across different authorities and one side believes that a licence should be granted and another does not, there needs to be some sort of arbitrator to see the overall benefit of bringing that position forward and to say either, “Yes, it is strategically important for London” or, “No, it is not”.