Wednesday 11th February 2026
(3 days, 3 hours ago)
Lords ChamberVictims and Courts Bill 2024-26 View all Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 141-II Second marshalled list for Committee - (10 Feb 2026)
Lord Sandhurst
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment broadens the cohort to whom Section 35 (victims’ rights to make representations and receive information) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 applies to include any victims listed in Schedule 6A. It also probes the rationale behind the three part categorisation of crimes in Schedule 6A.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 48 to 54, in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, concern the operation of the victim contact scheme and the new helpline provisions introduced by the Bill, and in particular the Government’s decision to structure eligibility around the three-part categorisation of offences in new Schedule 6A. We welcome the Government’s intention to expand access to information for victims. The extension of the victim contact scheme and the creation of a statutory helpline represent important recognition that the victim should not be left in the dark about the progress, release or supervision of those who have harmed them. But the detail matters, and it is the detail of Schedule 6 that these amendments probe.
Amendments 48 and 49 address the decision to confine the statutory rights under Section 35 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 to victims of offences listed in Parts 1 and 2 of new Schedule 6A and subject, in the case of Part 1, to a specified custodial threshold. Amendment 48 would align Section 35 more broadly with new Schedule 6A as a whole, and Amendment 49 probes why the current drafting draws the line where it does. Noble Lords will have seen that new Schedule 6A divides offences into three parts. Victims of Part 1 offences qualify when the offender receives
“a sentence of imprisonment … for a term of at least the specified … length”.
Victims of Part 2 offences qualify without that same threshold. Other offences are treated differently still.
The question before us today is: what is the principled basis for this threefold division? For example, Part 1 includes crimes such as wounding with intent to cause GBH, rape, aggravated burglary, abduction and child sex offences. Part 2 includes crimes such as stalking, coercive behaviour and putting people in fear of violence. It seems to us wrong that the latter list of offences does not include a custodial threshold for eligibility for the victim contact scheme, but the first list of offences does include such a threshold. The Minister said on Monday that use of the victim contact scheme is available for the “most serious cases”. Why, then, should the victim of, say, child sexual offences or abduction whose offender did not receive a sentence of imprisonment for a term of at least the specified sentence length be ineligible for the victim contact scheme? Following the Sentencing Act and subsequent reforms that were debated in this House, we have seen, and will continue to see, a marked shift in the sentencing landscape. Fewer people will receive immediate sentences of imprisonment, and sentences will be shorter.
First, the automatic presumption for suspended sentences will mean that many offenders guilty of crimes under Part 1 of the new schedule—wounding with intent, rape and so on—may receive suspended sentences. That will make their victims ineligible for the victim contact scheme. This, frankly, is an insult to victims and the public. Part 1 is a shopping list of serious crimes for which there should be no restrictions on victims’ eligibility for the victim contact scheme.
Secondly, under the Sentencing Act, the majority of offenders will be released after just one-third of their sentence. The practical consequence is that far more offenders than now are to be subject to supervision outside custody. That shift makes the victim contact scheme more, not less, important. The scheme is not a mere information line. It allows victims to make representations regarding licence conditions and, where they apply, parole decisions. In a world in which release and supervision decisions affect more and more cases, the ability of victims to engage meaningfully with those processes becomes essential to maintaining confidence in the system.
The noble Lord, Lord Timpson, stated that the Sentencing Act will more or less double the number of people being tagged. That will mean that at least double the number of victims will want to engage with the victim contact scheme. Faced with these facts, it is difficult to see why eligibility should depend so rigidly on whether an offence falls into Part 1 or Part 2, or whether a custodial sentence crosses a certain line.
From the perspective of the victim, the impact of the offence is not measured in statutory parts or sentencing thresholds. If the offender is subject to release conditions or to supervision in the community, the victim may well have legitimate concerns about notification, exclusion zones or contact restrictions. Those concerns do not disappear simply because the sentence imposed fell just a little below the specified sentence length.
Amendment 50 turns to the new helpline. The Government have rightly recognised that some victims fall outside the formal victim contact scheme but nevertheless need access to information. The helpline is intended to fill that gap. However, as the Bill is drafted, it is still limited by reference to the categorisation in new Schedule 6A. If the purpose of the helpline is to provide a route for victims to obtain basic information about the offender’s custodial or supervisory status, why should it not extend to all victims of offences listed in new Schedule 6A? If Parliament has already determined that those offences merit inclusion in new Schedule 6A, what is gained by further subdividing access to information within that list?
Amendments 51 to 53 similarly address the exclusion of victims whose offenders are serving suspended sentences. As matters stand, victims whose offenders are serving suspended sentences or community orders may not fall within the scope of the helpline in the same way as those whose offenders are in custody. Yet, arguably, it is precisely in such cases that victims will have acute and immediate concerns. An offender not in custody but serving a suspended sentence or community order remains in the community; the victim may live nearby. The potential for proximity, breach or renewed contact is real, not nugatory.
I once again point out that it is government policy that the presumption for most of the offenders for whom this clause is relevant will be to receive suspended sentences. This automatically means their victims will not be able to access the helpline. If the Government are going as far as to legislate for a helpline, it should reflect the realities of modern sentencing. The distinction between custody and community supervision is no longer as clear-cut in terms of risk or impact. This is the result of the Government’s own legislation. A victim whose offender is under probation supervision in the community has every bit as much interest in knowing the conditions imposed and the mechanisms for enforcement as one whose offender is in prison.
Finally, Amendment 54 probes the question of accountability. The Bill places duties on providers of probation services to take reasonable steps to provide information to victims about release, licence conditions and other relevant matters. That is welcome, but what is to happen if a victim believes that those reasonable steps have not been taken? It is not clear from the legislation what mechanism exists for review or appeal. Probation officers increasingly exercise functions that have a quasi-judicial character, particularly in relation to the formulation and management of licence conditions. This is once again due to the Sentencing Act.
Where discretion is exercised, there should be some form of oversight. Amendment 54 proposes a modest and practical solution: that where a victim is dissatisfied, there should be a route to seek reconsideration by a senior probation officer. The Government no doubt accept that the existence of an appeals process is important. Indeed, it is a fundamental element of our judicial process. It does not seem right, therefore, that probation officers, who are already subject to fewer checks and balances and less public scrutiny, should be shielded from an appeals process concerning their decisions.
These amendments ask the Government to explain the rationale behind the categorisation in new Schedule 6A, and to consider whether access to the victim contact scheme and helpline should better reflect the contemporary sentencing landscape. If we are serious about placing victims at the heart of the justice system, access to information and participation cannot depend on seemingly arbitrary distinctions. I beg to move.
The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord Gardiner of Kimble)
My Lords, I should inform the House that, if Amendment 48 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 49 by reason of pre-emption. Also, if Amendment 50 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 51 to 53 by reason of pre-emption.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for outlining the detail of the amendments in this group. I was slightly surprised by what he said, because I understood that it was not about whether a prison term was suspended or not, it was the conviction itself that acted as the trigger for the victim’s rights. I see the Minister is nodding. Just to double-check, I went to the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime. This makes it absolutely clear that the moment there is a possible crime against somebody which falls within something that could be considered by the code, the victim is entitled to support and help. For certain particular crimes, they are entitled to enhanced rights and help. I am sorry: I printed it off the web and it does not have a page number, but it states that victims of the most serious crimes are eligible for enhanced rights under this code. There is no question at all of them being reduced or stopped if a conviction is suspended. Once again, I repeat that this is exactly what happened to me. In my particular case, the offender was given a prison sentence and it was suspended, but the victim support continued in spite of that.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity of setting out the Government’s position. Our approach is carefully considered. I regret that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks to make party-political points out of this by using language such as “insult to victims”, particularly when, in relation to the principal part of his argument, he is just plain wrong.
The starting point is that we must prioritise public funds to ensure that they go where they are most needed. We have done this by providing proactive support to those victims where the court has imposed a longer sentence, because a longer sentence reflects the seriousness of the offence. Of course we recognise that all victims of crime will want information about the offender in their case. For that reason, we are introducing a new route for all victims—the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is quite right about this—to request information via a dedicated helpline.
This is why new Schedule 6A is in three parts. Part 1 ensures that the most serious cases, involving victims of violent, sexual, and terrorism offences where the defendant has been sentenced to a custodial sentence of 12 months or more, can receive proactive support through the victim contact scheme.
Part 2 ensures support for victims of stalking and harassment offences, regardless of sentence length. We recognise that, even where there is a short sentence, this cohort of victims needs and will receive proactive support through the victim contact scheme.
I am just trying to ensure that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, can hear the information I am giving him back, because we think that what the noble Lord said is not right, so I thought he might be interested in hearing what I have to say about it.
Part 3 ensures that victims of other sexual and violent offences, and breach offences linked to violence against women and girls, will be able to get information through the helpline should they request it, including for those offences in Part 1 where the sentence for the offence is less than 12 months. We consider that this is the right place to draw the line, but we will keep eligibility under review to make sure that we are reaching the right victims.
The Bill includes regulation-making powers for the Secretary of State to amend the list of offences, and the specified lengths of sentence of such offences, which determine eligibility for either service. The Bill also includes a discretionary power that enables victims of any offence, where the offender is serving a sentence of imprisonment, to be provided with either service, where they request it and probation deem it to be appropriate.
The victim contact scheme and the victim helpline will apply only where there is a custodial sentence. That is not only because of the consideration of public funds but because the information provided via these routes, such as the date of release on licence and conditions of licence, self-evidently does not apply unless there has been a custodial sentence. Where a suspended or community sentence is imposed by the court, under the victims’ code, the police witness care unit will explain the sentence to the victim.
Finally, regarding Amendment 54, I am pleased to reassure the noble Lord that there is already a route for victims to request a senior probation officer review of a decision about what information to provide, so this is already catered for. In the circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I addressed this at some length in opening. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the Minister for correcting my errors. I shall add nothing more. I am also grateful for the Minister’s explanation of how—she hopes, at least—this will work in practice. On that basis, I shall withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sandhurst
“Functions of Commissioner: protecting those assisting victims of crime(1) Section 49 (General functions of Commissioner) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 is amended as follows.(2) After subsection (1)(a) insert—“(aa) take such steps as the Commissioner considers appropriate to support or protect individuals who act in good faith to assist victims of crime, where those doing so promote the interests of victims and witnesses or encourage good practice in the treatment of victims and witnesses.”(3) After subsection (2) insert—“(2A) For the purposes of subsection (1)(aa), steps taken by the Commissioner may include reporting, making recommendations, or consulting with relevant authorities regarding individuals who assist victims to promote good practice and victim protection.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the Victims’ Commissioner may take discretionary steps to support individuals who assist victims of crime, as part of their statutory role promoting the interests of victims and witnesses.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 58, 59 and 60 are intended to strengthen the role of the Victims’ Commissioner. They would ensure that the commissioner can more effectively promote the interests of victims and witnesses and respond to cases that have wider public policy relevance.
Amendment 58 clarifies that
“the Victims’ Commissioner may take discretionary steps to support individuals who assist victims of crime”.
The amendment was brought about following the recent case of Mark Hehir, the bus driver who courageously intervened to prevent one of his passengers being the victim of theft. His actions were nothing short of heroic. He placed himself at real risk to protect passengers and members of the public. His decisiveness in a high-pressure situation should be applauded. Public recognition of his bravery has been strong. A petition in support of him gathered over 140,000 signatures. This demonstrates the widespread view that those who act courageously to protect others should be commended and supported, not left vulnerable to professional or personal consequences. The case highlighted the gaps in protections for citizens who step in to assist victims. Ordinary people who act responsibly should not face penalties or career repercussions for doing the right thing.
Amendment 58 would go some way to addressing that gap. By explicitly allowing the Victims’ Commissioner to support individuals who assist victims, the amendment would ensure that the commissioner can take discretionary action in cases of public significance, such as providing advice, engaging relevant agencies or highlighting best practice. The amendment represents a practical safeguard for citizens such as Mr Hehir and a clear statement that society values and protects bravery and civic responsibility. If individuals such as Mr Hehir do not deserve protection, it is difficult to see who does. This is about recognising heroism and ensuring that those who intervene to protect victims are not left unsupported.
Amendment 59 proposes the removal of the statutory restriction that currently prevents the Victims’ Commissioner exercising functions in relation to an individual victim or witness. We welcome the expansion of the Victims’ Commissioner’s powers in Clause 8, but would like to understand why the Government have included a restriction to the expansion. By removing the restriction entirely, the amendment would ensure that the commissioner can intervene in such cases without procedural or statutory impediment.
It is important to stress that this amendment does not seek to replace existing complaints mechanisms; nor does it transform the commissioner into a case-by- case complaints handler. Instead, it would empower the commissioner to identify and address systemic issues revealed through individual cases, providing a crucial bridge between personal experiences and broader improvements in policy or practice. In doing so, it would strengthen the commissioner’s statutory remit to promote the interests of victims and witnesses rather than limit it.
Amendment 60 takes a more targeted approach, should the Minister oppose Amendment 59. It seeks to limit the restriction on the Victims’ Commissioner exercising functions in individual cases to circumstances where there are ongoing criminal proceedings. This would strike a sensible balance, preserving the integrity and independence of live judicial proceedings while allowing greater engagement with victims and witnesses outside the live court processes. By doing so, it would ensure that the commissioner’s statutory role in promoting the interests of victims and witnesses is meaningful and practical rather than being constrained by overly rigid restrictions.
Amendment 60 seeks to allow the Victims’ Commissioner to request information from agencies, to monitor how individual cases are handled and to promote good practice where lessons from a single case could benefit other victims or witnesses. It would maintain the commissioner’s ability to drive improvements and to highlight systemic issues, without creating any conflict with ongoing judicial processes.
These amendments are designed to enhance the Victims’ Commissioner’s role in supporting victims and witnesses, to ensure that individual cases can inform systemic improvements, and to promote best practice. I look forward to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.
The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord Gardiner of Kimble)
My Lords, I inform the Committee that if Amendment 59 is agreed to, I will not be able to call Amendment 60 by reason of pre-emption.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for tabling these amendments and to the Government for the expansion of the Victims’ Commissioner’s powers as set out in the Bill.
However, there are some broader issues that it might be helpful to air here, which are not the subject of amendments, for obvious reasons. It is 22 years since the office of the Victims’ Commissioner was created. I wonder whether, given the legislation that is going through to remove police and crime commissioners, that will change the landscape in which the Victims’ Commissioner’s office works. Therefore, it may be worth reviewing exactly what the roles of the Victims’ Commissioner are. I have some sympathy with the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, in that context.
From these Benches, we have argued that the entirety of the responsibilities of the Victims’ Commissioner should be broader than they were up until the presentation of this Bill. But there is another point that we have raised consistently—not just in legislation but in Questions and at other times—and that is the disparity of resources between the Victims’ Commissioner’s office and the office of the Domestic Abuse Commissioner. I have been told that this is partly because the Victims’ Commissioner’s office looks only at policy, but we know the reality in the complex world of victims is that it sees many more things. If the Government would consider a review of the role in light of the change with police and crime commissioners, it might also be a time to look at whether the Victims’ Commissioner’s office has the resources that it needs to deliver the very important job that it does.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I am very doubtful about Amendment 58. It would expand the role of the Victims’ Commissioner very substantially indeed if the Victims’ Commissioner is going to take action to support or protect individuals who act in good faith to assist victims of crime. That would involve a great deal more work for the Victims’ Commissioner. I am very doubtful, with the resources available, that the role of the Victims’ Commissioner should be diverted from the primary responsibility of considering victims of crime.
Of course, one has every sympathy with the bus driver whom the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, mentioned—his behaviour was heroic and his treatment seems to have been very unjust indeed. I understand he does not actually want his job back, but that really is not the point. The point is that to expand the role of the Victims’ Commissioner to other persons who have assisted the victim seems to me to be unjustified and a diversion of resources.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, the Government firmly believe that the Victims’ Commissioner—I have known the current occupant of the role for many years and have the utmost regard for her—has a crucial strategic role in representing the interests of victims and the witnesses of crime and anti-social behaviour.
Amendment 58 would significantly widen the commissioner’s remit by requiring her to support and protect individuals who assist victims. Of course, we agree that the work of those who dedicate their efforts to supporting victims is crucial, but the proposed widening of the Victims’ Commissioner’s statutory functions would, in the Government’s view, dilute the fundamental purpose of the Victims’ Commissioner; that is, to promote the interests of victims and witnesses themselves. In fact, the commissioner’s statutory function of promoting the interests of victims and witnesses already allows her to work with and support those who themselves support victims, and she does not need an explicit statutory function to continue with that.
Since the definition of “those assisting victims” could be interpreted broadly, this amendment also risks heavily extending the casework burden that would be imposed by the two other amendments, to which I now turn.
The Government have already brought forward Clause 8, which proposes to amend the existing statutory limitation on the exercise of the commissioner’s functions in relation to individual cases to allow her to exercise her functions in relation to cases that indicate a wider systemic issue. But Amendments 59 and 60 would go further—either entirely removing or narrowing the existing limitation. We understand the amendments to be creating an alternative. We do not believe that this is the right approach and consider that our carefully designed Clause 8 achieves the right balance.
The Victims’ Commissioner is not a complaints body, and it is important to maintain this distinction. Her role is to advocate for victims as a group and to address system-wide issues—that is what Clause 8 does. It is up to her to decide which cases she believes create those system-wide issues.
Individual victims already have a clear escalation route through the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman if they are dissatisfied with their experience of the criminal justice system. Expanding the commissioner’s involvement in individual casework to this extent would shift his or her role towards handling complaints rather than overseeing the system as a whole.
It is also vital that decisions of the judiciary and other independent public bodies that support victims of crime remain free from external influence. The current legislative bar, and the amendment to it that we have proposed through Clause 8, safeguards that independence and avoids any uncertainty about the commissioner’s role in such processes. We do not believe that Amendments 59 or 60 achieve that.
The point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which she has raised and discussed with me before on the many occasions on which we have now met—obviously, I look forward to many more—is a good point and one that we need to keep under review. Perhaps the noble Baroness and I can discuss it further the next time we meet. As I say, I very much look forward to that.
I hope the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, agrees that preserving the Victims’ Commissioner’s strategic function is essential to holding the system to account effectively, and I invite him to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I listened with interest to what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, had to say, and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I encourage the Minister to listen with care to what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said and perhaps to move our way on certain aspects.
Dealing with Amendment 58, the law should not leave people such as Mr Hehir exposed to detriment for acting courageously. It may be that the Victims’ Commissioner is not the right person, but we put this forward in the hope that it would allow consideration of what to do in such situations. The amendment sends a clear message that civic responsibility and bravery should not be met with silence or indifference on the part of authority.
Amendment 59 would remove the restriction on individual cases. We appreciate that the commissioner has a strategic role to promote the interests of victims and witnesses generally, but that cannot be done effectively if individual cases are placed beyond reach. We accept that Clause 8 enables the commissioner to act in cases relevant to public policy, and we are grateful for that, but individual cases often reveal systemic failings. Removing the restriction entirely would enable oversight and the identification of patterns that will require reform. If we are serious about learning lessons, we suggest that the commissioner should be able to look at cases from which those lessons arise, but do so with discretion.
If the Minister considers that Amendment 59 is too broad, Amendment 60 would provide a possible balanced alternative. It would preserve the integrity of live criminal proceedings, it would allow engagement in individual cases once proceedings have concluded, and it would ensure that the commissioner can examine outcomes, seek information and promote improvements without interfering with the courts. It reflects a sensible constitutional boundary.
In summary, these amendments would not unduly expand the commissioner’s role but would clarify and strengthen it. They would ensure that individual experiences inform systemic reform and that statutory restrictions do not undermine the purpose of the office itself. A Victims’ Commissioner who cannot meaningfully engage where necessary with individual cases is constrained in fulfilling the commissioner’s core duty.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
The noble Lord seems to be suggesting that the Victims’ Commissioner does not now engage with individual cases. My understanding is that she very much does, but to feed towards her statutory role. That is quite different from getting involved in the minutiae of an individual case, supporting a victim or witness and promoting that individual’s interests.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, there is clearly a balance to be struck. I think we should, as we go forward, because we all have the same interests at heart here, look carefully at whether there will be occasions when the commissioner should look at individual cases, not so much to interfere but to draw on the information that can be gleaned from them and use them in setting policy. With that said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I oppose the Question that Clause 11 stand part of the Bill. This clause seeks to extend the right to prosecute to those with different qualifications from solicitors or barristers.
As my noble friend Lord Gove highlighted at Second Reading, the Crown Prosecution Service faces constraints in whom it can employ, and the criminal Bar is facing a retention crisis. Last year, a national survey by the Criminal Bar Association found that one in three criminal barristers intends to quit. It is obviously crucial that we have enough Crown prosecutors for cases, and we fully appreciate on this side the challenge that the Government face. However, I do not believe that this clause is an appropriate solution. Rather than carefully addressing the causes of those pressures and looking for proper solutions, this clause simply moves the goalposts. It redefines who is qualified to undertake what is highly serious work. That is not good enough.
While it has been argued that allowing CILEX members to prosecute will help to increase diversity, this argument should not be used as a smokescreen for what could potentially dilute standards. I dare say that is not what those truly calling for diversity want either, on their part. Genuine diversity in the legal profession is not achieved by lowering thresholds or by altering qualifications to fill gaps. It is achieved by facilitating pathways and by supporting structures within the profession, so that people from all backgrounds can succeed on an equal footing. To suggest otherwise risks turning diversity into a box-ticking exercise. It does not demonstrate an authentic commitment to broadening access to the profession.
We cannot risk lowering the quality of prosecution. This would not be fair on the defendant, and certainly not on the victim, and it is definitely not in the long- term public interest. Victims and defendants rely on the competence of the prosecutor. A victim must have confidence that their case is being handled by someone who is suitably qualified. Those who prosecute murders today will some years ago have prosecuted in the magistrates’ courts; they start at the lower level and they move up, gaining their experience moving from level to level as proportionate to their skills.
A defendant whose liberty may be at stake is entitled to proper assurance. These are not minor concerns; they go to the heart of our justice system. More widely, any weakening of our standards risks undermining public confidence in the justice system as a whole and weakening the supply, I suggest, of future prosecutors of serious crime. Can the Minister please explain what assessments were undertaken previously of the impact of this proposed change?
If we are to expand the pool of prosecutors, we must be absolutely sure that this shift is backed by sufficient evidence of good quality, and that any necessary safeguards are in place to ensure that standards will not drift or diverge over time. The Committee deserves clear evidence that this reform will enhance, and not diminish, the quality of prosecutions. We have not been shown that evidence. Without it, this clause risks creating more problems than it solves. I urge the Minister please to reflect carefully on these concerns and to ensure that any change to the thresholds is supported by robust, transparent evidence and proper safeguards. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I will make one or two brief observations about this, if I may. First, I must declare an interest, in that about 10 years ago I was made an honorary vice-president of CILEX. In case it is thought that I am speaking with the interests of CILEX in mind, I wanted to make that absolutely clear.
My first observation is this: the transformation of the way in which the legal profession operates and its financial position has been enormous over the last 20 or so years. Sometimes, I think we forget the huge difference there is in remuneration for those who practise in areas such as commercial and administrative law and those who practise in the criminal sphere. This is having a very serious effect on the ability.
How that problem is solved is a matter for Her Majesty’s Government, not for me, but it seems to me that, in looking at what the state can afford, it is necessary to look at the way in which an organisation such as CILEX has transformed itself, the qualifications that are given and the reality of many cases. As a judge, one sometimes feels that the best experience for being a good prosecutor is having done a lot of prosecutions, not necessarily where they had a first-class degree from a great university or whether she had done extremely well in the solicitor’s or Bar finals; experience is important.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I entirely agree with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas has said. I shall add some observations. It is self-evident, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, says, that only those who are qualified and competent should be responsible for prosecutions, and no one would dispute that. However, it seems to me equally self-evident that not every criminal prosecution requires presentation by a barrister or a solicitor. There are many criminal prosecutions that others are perfectly competent to present. What matters is to ensure that whoever prosecutes in any particular case has the qualifications and experience that are necessary, and that will depend upon the nature of the case, whether it be a murder case at one extreme or a driving case at the other. I hope the Minister will be able to assure us that those factors will be, and are being, taken into account in deciding, once this reform is introduced, who prosecutes in any particular case.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
The noble and learned Lord has said what I wanted to say much more sensitively and tactfully, but I will say what I was going to say.
There is a danger that lawyers of my generation— I shall just apply it to my generation and not suggest which generation other Members of the House belong to—are prejudiced against lawyers who do not have standard qualifications, if you like, or the backgrounds that many of us come from. I understand from CILEX that there are 133 members working as associate prosecutors who cannot progress or get promotion. That is a real shame. It is a much wider issue than just prosecution.
I think the noble Lord answered his own point because he was talking about members of the Bar progressing. The Minister will tell us—I cannot believe it is not the case—that no one joins the CPS and prosecutes a murder the next day. Every profession has its hierarchy, and one progresses in the hierarchy dependent on both skill and experience. The current position is out of date, so, even if it were not to solve an immediate problem, what is proposed in the Bill is a good idea. I am afraid that we cannot support the opposition to the clause.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, it is vital to ensure that the Crown Prosecution Service can recruit and retain a sufficient number of qualified Crown prosecutors. We suggest that Clause 11 supports this aim by increasing the CPS’s recruitment flexibility through the removal of an unnecessary legislative barrier. In turn, this will help increase the pool of eligible candidates for appointment as Crown prosecutors. It is axiomatic that a shortage of Crown prosecutors adds to the backlog because it cannot make decisions quite as quickly about prosecutions as it could if there were more of them.
Currently, the Crown Prosecution Service is restricted in who it can appoint as Crown prosecutors due to an unnecessary legal requirement. This is set out in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which provides that Crown prosecutors and those who prosecute cases on behalf of the CPS must hold what is known as the general qualification. The general qualification is a term of art, having a very specific meaning in this context. It means that a prospective Crown prosecutor must have
“a right of audience in relation to any class of proceedings in any part of the Senior Courts, or all proceedings in county courts or magistrates’ courts”,
even though most of those rights of audience—for example, before the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court—are never going to be exercised by a Crown prosecutor in a million years.
This requirement can exclude certain qualified legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners—from the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives—who have relevant criminal practice rights but are prohibited from becoming Crown prosecutors. These legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners, often hold the right skills and specialist qualifications required to perform the Crown prosecutor role, including having rights of audience for the courts in which they will actually appear, as opposed to rights of audience for the courts in which they will not, but they do not meet the general qualification criteria. This restriction limits the DPP’s ability to consider a wider pool of legal talent and reduces the CPS’s flexibility in managing existing and future recruitment challenges.
The purpose of this clause is to remove the requirement for the general qualification and, in doing so, give the DPP the discretion to appoint appropriately qualified legal professionals, such as CILEX practitioners, as Crown prosecutors for the CPS. I can reassure the Committee that the removal of the general qualification requirement will not in any way dilute professional standards; there are appropriate safeguards to preserve standards.
Prospective professionals eligible to be a Crown prosecutor who do not at the moment hold the general qualification must still meet the authorisation requirements of the Legal Services Act 2007—they have to be appropriately qualified, authorised and regulated, and be able to exercise rights of audience and conduct litigation, both of which are reserved legal activities under the Act. It is a criminal offence under the Act to carry out reserved legal activities unless entitled to do so.
In addition, it is important to note that the measure does not require the CPS to appoint any specific type of legal professional. Instead, it gives it the flexibility to do so where appropriate and ensures that recruitment decisions remain firmly within the DPP’s control. The DPP will retain full discretion over appointments, ensuring that only suitably qualified and experienced individuals become Crown prosecutors. Newly eligible professionals must meet the same Crown prosecutor competency standards as those who qualify through more traditional routes. I also emphasise that those appointed following this change will, like all Crown prosecutors, be subject to performance monitoring by the CPS, including case strategy quality assessments focused on the application of the Code for Crown Prosecutors.
This change reflects the modern legal services landscape, spoken to powerfully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. Alternative routes to qualification are increasingly common, where professionals from non-traditional backgrounds play a growing role in the justice system. By removing this unnecessary legislative barrier, the clause may also support the recruitment of a diverse and representative cohort of Crown prosecutors.
I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has ever met any CILEX practitioners; I certainly have, and they are an amazing cohort of people. I am sure he absolutely did not intend to suggest that somehow those who have qualified through an alternative route are, by very definition, less competent than those who have gone through the traditional route. If that is the suggestion, then it is not one this Government can support. I therefore hope that the Committee will join me in supporting Clause 11 to stand part of the Bill and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his opposition to it.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. At the heart of it lies the underfunded state of our criminal justice system—something which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has highlighted. Looking forward, the criminal justice system needs more money and the prosecution service needs proper funding, as of course do those who defend in the criminal courts; but Clause 11 does propose a significant shift, extending the right to prosecute to individuals who do not hold the long-standing qualifications of solicitors and barristers. I cast no aspersions on CILEX, but I make that observation. There is a difference in their training and educational background. This clause will expand capacity, there is no doubt about it—and there is no doubt that the system requires it, for the reasons that others have outlined in this debate—but it will not address the underlying cause of problems faced in the criminal courts. We must not go down a route which results in weakening of standards, undermining of public confidence, and unfairness to victims and witnesses involved in the criminal courts.
A central issue remains the absence of clear evidence in support of Clause 11. We have sought clarity from the Minister on what assessments were undertaken on the impact of this change, whether risks to standards were considered, and whether safeguards are in fact in place to maintain standards over time. Without clear evidence, Parliament cannot truly judge whether the proposed reform protects the quality of prosecutions. We must not embark on a position where there are unclear professional boundaries and variations in training and oversight.
We recognise the pressures facing the criminal justice system and the need for more good people to embark on careers in the criminal courts, whether in defence or in prosecution; in this case, we are talking about prosecutors. We share the desire for a stronger, more resilient system, but Clause 11 does not, we suggest, properly address the causes of these pressures. We urge the Minister to reflect carefully on the concerns which I have raised and to consider whether Clause 11 provides the assurance and evidence that this House, our justice system and, indeed, victims deserve. That said, I will not pursue my opposition.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, Clause 12 is an exception to the many provisions of the Bill that we support. It concerns the recovery of costs in private prosecutions. On its face, it may seem a minor and rather technical amendment, but in substance Clause 12 represents a significant shift in long-established policy and practice. It has serious implications for access to justice, particularly for victims of fraud and economic crime.
Private prosecutions should be regarded as a safeguard, rather than an anomaly, in our criminal justice system. Such prosecutions exist precisely to ensure that, where the state cannot or does not act, victims are not left without recourse. Private prosecutions are conducted in the criminal courts and are subject to the same judicial oversight, obligations of disclosure and prosecutorial duties as any other prosecution. Judges retain full control throughout, and the Crown Prosecution Service retains its power to take over cases where it considers that to be appropriate. For many years, Parliament, Ministers and the courts have recognised that private prosecutions serve a public interest. That is why the current costs regime allows courts to order payment from central funds for reasonable sums properly incurred by private prosecutors. This payment is not a windfall. It is simply reasonable compensation for costs already borne, and even then recovery is typically partial and not complete.
It is our strong belief that Clause 12 would change that settlement fundamentally. It gives the Government power through regulations to cap the recoverable costs of private prosecutors. In so doing, it risks making many legitimate prosecutions financially unviable. That is particularly so for charities and other public interest bodies which pursue cases only after other routes have failed. This would represent a sharp departure from previous ministerial policy.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, the issue of costs in private prosecutions is an extraordinarily serious one. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has spoken of the position of charities, the RSPCA being one example. One can well understand the position of a charity conducting a prosecution through a small solicitor where costs are modest. On the other hand, one must recall that for good reasons of public interest, there are private prosecutions by large corporations to protect intellectual property. The consequence of the change in the market for solicitors and barristers has produced a problem, because what the CPS pays prosecutors to prosecute is completely out of line with what a large, industrial conglomerate that wants to enforce its intellectual property rights can pay. This is a problem that has to be grappled with.
One of the reasons why the CPS cannot prosecute more than it does is the Government’s constraint; both the last Government and this one are responsible for that. There is not enough money in the system to enable the CPS to prosecute where it should be doing so. More than 10 years ago, the change in the market and the constraint on the finances of the CPS, arising out of the 2008 financial crisis, began to manifest themselves in the contrast between what happened in private prosecutions by large conglomerates, or associations of those interested to protect their economic position, and in the CPS. The courts have tried to do something about it through a number of cases, but it is an extraordinarily difficult area.
For example, in a commercial case—many of these cases go to solicitors—there did not used to be the idea that you would have to get a tender before you prosecuted, but the courts now require it. The courts have made a number of very important changes to try to bring this cost under control, because, although it cannot be shown that if you pay a large sum—several hundred thousand pounds—to defer the costs of a private prosecution it will directly come out of any bit of the overall justice budget, anyone who has had to deal with the Treasury knows that that is the case. The Treasury looks at a pot for justice and, if you take large sums out of it by paying for private prosecutions, the other part of the justice system suffers.
This is a matter that has to be grappled with, and the right people to grapple with it are the Government. It is not a very good position for judges to be in to be making these very difficult decisions because of the gross inequality between what you pay private lawyers, which many may think is far too much but that is not for me to judge, and what you pay the Crown Prosecution Service, which may not be enough—again, that is not for me to judge. The problem of what I might call public penury and private affluence is absolutely illustrated by the problem of paying for private prosecutions. It is for the Government to grapple with, and setting rates is one of the ways to do it. I think it is probably the right way, but all I am saying is we that cannot run away from this problem that has arisen because of changes in the market and the constraints on public expenditure.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has inevitably given us a very brief tour d’horizon of the problems of the costs and charges of the legal profession getting out of hand. Looking at the Bill over the weekend, I had to turn up the 1985 Act and write into it the changes that would be made by the Bill. It seems that the one to focus on is making the provisions subject to regulations, which boils down to the Lord Chancellor setting rates—at least that is how I read it. It is not much of a stretch to think that those are going to be linked to legal aid rates, and one can see the problem.
The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, who explained some of the problems very clearly, mentioned consultation and rather dismissed it as being helpful, but it is important that the Committee should know what is planned by way of consultation. I hope the Minister can help us on that, because so much turns on its outcome.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, in the view of the Government, Clause 12 provides a modest enabling power for the Lord Chancellor to set through regulations the rates at which private prosecutors may recover expenses from central funds where a court has ordered that such costs be paid. To be clear at the outset, this clause does not set any rates, and it does not affect the long-established right to bring a private prosecution, which remains protected under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.
I should say at this stage that I have a great deal of experience in the area of private prosecutions, both as a state prosecutor working for the Crown Prosecution Service, where I oversaw all the private prosecutions that came to the CPS for consideration, and in private practice, where I brought a number of private prosecutions on behalf of clients and advised on many more.
The Justice Select Committee, in its 2020 report, Private Prosecutions: Safeguards, invited the Government to take a closer look at the private prosecution landscape, particularly where public funds are engaged. Taking an enabling power of this kind allows us to do precisely that in a careful and evidence-based way. The committee highlighted three key principles, which this Government agree should underpin reform: first, addressing the disparity between defence resources and those of private prosecutors; secondly, safeguarding the right of individuals to bring a private prosecution; and, thirdly, ensuring the proportionate and responsible use of public funds.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I listened with interest to the Minister. I remain of the view that private prosecutions are a constitutional safeguard for when the CPS is unable or unwilling to act. There remains the position of charities and there remains the position of corporations and other organisations trying to protect their intellectual property by exercising perfectly lawful prosecutions. The example given of the costs in a particular case is not really helpful, as we do not know the details. It is the sort of things that we would have had detail of had there been a proper consultation first, and we would not have one cherry-picked example given to us.
That said, I remind the Committee that what we are looking at here is £3.9 million—not a lot. It is not a small sum, of course, but it is not a large sum in the context of the criminal justice budget. My concerns have not been put to rest but, in the circumstances, I shall not occupy any more of the Committee’s time. I beg leave to withdraw.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“Removal of presumption of computer reliability(1) Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is reinstated.(2) Section 60 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is repealed.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause removes the statutory rebuttable presumption that a computer system is working correctly for the purposes of criminal evidence produced by it. Instead, prosecutors would have to offer a reasonable demonstration of the reliability of any relevant hardware and software on which it proposes to rely, thus giving the defence an opportunity to scrutinise and challenge the same.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, this group contains two amendments that seek to address dangerous practices relating to criminal evidence. While the Bill does much to protect victims of crime, our justice system must also protect people from becoming victims of miscarriages of justice. Both of the problems we identify have already led to serious wrongful convictions and risk many more in the future.
Amendment 61 is in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom and Lord Beamish, who fought so hard in the other place for the sub-postmasters, and of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who has been such a distinguished campaigner for the rule of law to apply as much to big tech as anyone else. I share Amendment 62 with my old and dear noble friend Lady Lawrence of Clarendon. If honour by association was as easy as guilt by association, I would be honoured indeed.
Amendment 61 is a simple amendment that would reinstate Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. It was repealed by the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 on a recommendation of the Law Commission, but long before contemporary understanding of both the capabilities and fallibilities of digital technology.
Under the old Section 69, a party seeking to rely on computer evidence had to show that there was no improper use of the computer, that it was operating properly at all material times and that any faults did not affect output. It allowed for court rules to scrutinise computer evidence. Since the repeal of that vital protection, a common-law presumption of computer reliability and accuracy has applied, in effect reversing the criminal burden of proof in some cases and leading to serious harm, most recently in the Post Office Horizon scandal. Several Justice Ministers have acknowledged this since 2018. The Ministry of Justice released a call for evidence in January 2025. I hope my noble friend the Minister will tell us what has come as a result, because that is too long, I suggest.
The presumption is inaccurate, unsafe and far from future-proof. Technology is not infallible, as we saw so graphically in the end with the Fujitsu Horizon scandal. Perhaps my noble friend can also tell us what attempts that corporation has made to recompense the UK taxpayer and the victims of the abuse and scandal. Flaws can be hidden and very difficult for a lone defendant, or even a group of defendants, to detect. They cannot take on the corporation, let alone look in the black box. Developments in artificial intelligence, including the capabilities for deepfakes, make the risks of presuming computer evidence reliability even more dangerous. I hope that the Government will either accept our amendment or offer an alternative in this Bill. The clock is ticking.
As for Amendment 62, I ask Members of the Committee to consider whether they have ever indulged in crime procedurals as a guilty pleasure, whether reading them or watching them on their favourite streamer after a long night in Committee in your Lordships’ House. Middle England is addicted to those dramas, whether on TV or in books, and the creativity behind them is big business. But what if those who participated in the creation of that art, or even just enjoyed it, found themselves prosecuted on the basis that that interest was somehow probative of criminal intention or propensity?
If noble Lords find that a ridiculous proposition, they should spare a thought for the young Black men and boys who have increasingly been prosecuted with reliance on their enjoyment of rap and drill music. It is disgraceful and has been allowed to go on for some years now. Even more outrageous, there are groups and units of mostly middle-aged white police officers who hold themselves out as expert witnesses to translate this music, these lyrics and the patois for juries. Learned friends at the Bar, including my learned friend Keir Monteith KC, who is currently in the Chamber, have had to take this on in court and have dealt with miscarriages of justice in the Court of Appeal because of this kind of prejudicial and racially prejudiced practice.
The figures are not good. The Crown Prosecution Service does not keep records of music evidence being used in this way in court, but studies at the University of Manchester in particular show that there have been many cases: 68 cases involving 252 defendants between 2020 and 2023. That is probably an underestimate, because these are first instance trials and are not always reported. Two-thirds of the defendants in the Manchester study were Black, 12% were mixed race, 82% were under 25 years old, and 15% were aged 17 or younger. Over half the cases were of course joint enterprise prosecutions, because there is a particularly toxic cocktail when you combine the use of this prejudicial material with casting the net so wide as in joint enterprise.
In the case of the Manchester 10, Black teenagers were collectively sentenced to 131 years in prison for conspiracy to murder and to cause grievous bodily harm. During the trial, a nine-second video clip of someone identified as one of the defendants, with drill music playing in the background, was used as evidence of his gang membership. In closing, the prosecution Silk told the jury that some of the defendants had become involved in gang culture
“because they had an interest in drill … with its themes of violence, drugs and criminality”.
“The Night Manager”, anyone?
The Court of Appeal found that the young man had been misidentified. There was not even rapping in the video. This is how bad this practice is. He was of good character: head boy and captain of the rugby team, with an unconditional offer to study law—forgive me for being particularly attached to the study of law as a noble pursuit, but I hope noble Lords take my point. His conviction was quashed, but only after serving three years in prison.
We talk about equality before the law. That requires that no one is above the law’s reach, nor anyone below its protection. The shameful events currently rocking our politics only highlight the dangers of entitlement, hypocrisy, and the obvious destruction of trust in our vital institutions when there is “one law for some” and no fair hearing for others.
This is a modest but vital reform. It would create a presumption that any creative expression on the part of a defendant—not just rap and drill music—should be inadmissible unless four tests are met. First, the expression must have a literal, rather than figurative or fictional, meaning. Secondly, it must refer to the specific facts of the case. Thirdly, it must be relevant to an issue of dispute. Finally, that issue cannot be decided by other evidence.
Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom (Con)
My Lords, I will speak on Amendment 61. I did not speak at Second Reading, for which I apologise to your Lordships’ House. I lacked the ingenuity of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in moving an amendment to the Bill. I pay tribute to her for doing so. Everything she said about Amendment 61 was right. I also pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for pursuing this issue with her usual persistence and eloquence. I am grateful to her for having involved me in some of the meetings that she organised.
My first point is that evidence derived from a computer is hearsay. There are very good reasons why we treat hearsay evidence with caution. To admit hearsay evidence is a step in itself, but to presume that it is reliable is a giant stride beyond that.
Secondly, we are all aware of how frequently we have to redo the programming on our Apple iPhones or whatever, partly because of bugs in the programming of the computer technology on which we rely so much. Bugs are inevitable in computer programmes. That was why Fujitsu—I hope the Minister will answer the point about whether Fujitsu has paid, or might pay, any money to the taxpayer or to the sub-postmasters— had an office dedicated not just to altering the sub- postmasters’ balances, shocking as that was, but to altering and amending a programme that was never going to be perfect, because no computer programme is. If computer programmes are inherently unreliable, to have a presumption in law that they are reliable is unsustainable.
Thirdly, the consequences of the repeal of Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—which, I remind your Lordships, happened partly because the Post Office asked for it to happen to make its prosecutions easier for it—were that Seema Misra was sent to prison when she was eight weeks pregnant and on her son’s 10th birthday. She collapsed when she was sentenced. This is an urgent matter. If we leave it in place, further injustices may happen as soon as tomorrow.
That is the first point about why it is urgent. The second point about why it is urgent is that any defence lawyer, in any event, will point to the Horizon case and say that it is perfectly obvious that this presumption is wrong. It is perfectly obvious. We cannot, in all good conscience, permit to continue in law a presumption which we know to be incorrect, and I hope that the Minister will at least set out a path to changing it.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
My Lords, I too support Amendment 61 in the name of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti.
When I left my home in Durham on Monday morning, I had a phone call. It was from an individual I had met five years earlier. He was the husband of a postmistress in Northumberland who had been prosecuted by the Post Office. She was prosecuted in 1998. He was ringing me to tell me that on the Saturday morning, she had received the letter overturning her conviction under the Horizon Post Office scandal.
I met the couple five years ago. They had a thriving business and were well respected in the community—a small village in Northumberland. They now live in a small council house in the same village. As they explained to me when I sat in their living room, everyone still thinks, “That is the woman who stole the money from the Post Office”.
That woman was traumatised. That is the only word I can use. She had blanks in her mind. It was very difficult for me to get the information from her, so traumatised she was. That woman has suffered for nearly 30 years. She has now got that letter saying that she did nothing wrong and can now hold her head up high in her community. As I said to her husband, that must be an unbelievable feeling.
That couple are going to get compensation—quite rightly—but, as the husband said, that is not important. The important thing was that woman’s and their family’s good name. That was ruined, because computer evidence, as the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, just said, was used to persecute a decent, hard-working woman.
Over the last 15 or 16 years that the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, and I have been campaigning on this, I have met many victims of this scandal. They are decent, ordinary people whom you pass in the street. If you were their friend, you would consider it a privilege. Their lives have been completely ruined. That is because the presumption was that the computer had to be right. It was classed as a mechanical machine and that this could not be infallible.
The judiciary needs to take some blame in the Post Office scandal, because I have read many court transcripts of the cases. I think of one. There was a postmistress from County Durham called June Tooby, who was not involved in the Horizon case but the pre-Horizon scheme—Capture. She was an absolutely marvellous woman and she defended herself in court. She said to the judge that her argument was that the computer was wrong and gave the reasons why. He dismissed her completely out of hand and would not listen to her that somehow this was a possibility.
That is not the only case that I have seen where judges have taken the approach of completely dismissing that. I am not one for attacking our judiciary, but I get annoyed when judges get on their high horse and say that somehow they cannot be criticised. The judiciary played a part in this scandal and must take responsibility for that.
The noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, said that this is urgent. It is urgent. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti said that the consultation started on 21 January 2025. Sarah Sackman, the then Minister, said at the opening of that consultation:
“We must learn the lessons of the Post Office scandal … Ensuring people are protected from miscarriages of justice is … one part of the government’s Plan for Change”.
That was over a year ago. I know that things move very slowly in this Government and that things sometimes have gestation periods longer than that of an African elephant, but this cannot wait. I urge the Minister. We do not want any more reviews or need any more consultations. That seems to be the in word these days—if you do not want to make a decision, have a consultation or say, “We are considering it”. This is now urgent.
I congratulate my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti on tabling this amendment. It must be done in this Bill. It cannot wait. Speaking for myself—and, I think, on behalf of my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot —we will not let this rest. This is the opportunity for the Government to put this right. I would love to know what the Ministry of Justice has been doing for the last year because it is a very simple thing; nor is it controversial. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, has just said, people will still be found guilty. There will be more victims if we do not change this. This would also send a clear signal to those victims of the Post Office Horizon scandal that this Government are taking this seriously.
I say, very gently, to the Minister, not to come back with, “We’re going to review it” or that there is some next stage to go through. Frankly, I am getting sick of this. My heart drops when I hear of another review or consultation. It seems to be a great “Yes Minister” way of kicking things into the long grass. This cannot be kicked into the long grass. I am determined that it will not be.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, I support Amendment 61, to which I have added my name, and associate myself with the noble Baroness’s words on Amendment 62. I was sitting here thinking that if I was guilty of the total creative expression that I have consumed, I would have to be locked up for life. It was moving to hear how one small fraction of the population is being discriminated against on this count, so I add my support on that issue.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lords, Lord Beamish and Lord Arbuthnot, have laid out the case comprehensively and persuasively. There is indeed a great deal of history to it. I thought it might be useful for me to concentrate on the justification of successive Governments for resisting it. This centres primarily around the idea that computers now permeate every aspect of life and that altering the presumption in law, in the words of the former Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, would bring into scope
“evidence presented in every type of court proceeding and would have a detrimental effect on the courts and prosecution—potentially leading to unnecessary delays”.—[Official Report, 18/12/24; col. GC 160.]
It is important to hear that, because it was almost identical to the words spoken by the previous Minister, the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, who said:
“Almost all criminal cases rely on computer evidence to some extent, so any change to the burden of proof would or could impede the work of the Crown Prosecution Service and other prosecutors”,—[Official Report, 24/4/24; col. GC 580.]
leading to great delays. In other words, they had exactly the same rebuttal to a suggestion that we made, as the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, explained, in not one but two previous Bills. My worry is that the argument appears to be that computer evidence is so pervasive that we cannot change the law. But the reverse must also be true: if it is going to be so pervasive, how can we allow it to remain above the law?
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I support the principle behind Amendment 61. The real question is: how quickly can this be done?
I want to give an illustration of a problem that has arisen in civil courts across the world: the ability of artificial intelligence to hallucinate—to create cases and precedents for lawyers to use that do not exist. All civil courts across the world, including those in this country, have realised that this is an immense problem. It is being dealt with by practice direction—in some cases, very quickly indeed—because it is corrosive to the proper conduct of litigation, and it seems to me that there is no reason why, when this comes back on Report, it cannot be dealt with. It is not a difficult problem, and if it has been around for two years, that is 18 months too long.
The other point I want to address, in a slightly different manner, is Amendment 62. This is a much more difficult problem and has arisen because of the way in which drill music, and similar music, has been used in the prosecution of cases. The admissibility of such evidence is quite complicated.
What is very worrying—as can be seen by the attendance here today of one of the counsels involved in these cases—is that the way in which this evidence has been used in some cases has caused a lot of deep misunderstanding and suspicion about the way our criminal justice system operates for certain minorities. The thought that you will be found guilty because of the music you listen to is deeply troubling.
However, it seems to me that what we need to do first is look at the cases where this has been used. I looked at the case of the Manchester 10 and, coincidentally, in that case, the evidence had been admitted by agreement, and the Court of Appeal upheld the way in which it had been used for certain purposes.
It seems to me that this is a more complicated problem, and it would be helpful if the Minister was able, between now and Report, to put before the House a short letter explaining what the problem is. I think it would be easier to look at the amendment in the light of a better understanding. The last thing I want to do is to bore the Committee by explaining the ways in which evidence can and cannot be used legitimately. It is much better that members of the Committee have the benefit of reading that on a piece of paper.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I have two brief points on Amendment 61, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for tabling it. It is really wrong that computers or systems have ever been deemed to be reliable, let alone infallible. My husband is a research and design engineer who has worked in Cambridge Science Park for well over 40 years. He and his friends have a phrase that they use among themselves and about themselves: “Garbage in, garbage out”. When we started hearing about the Post Office Horizon scandal and Fujitsu, the first thing he said to me was, “Garbage in, garbage out”. The problem we have is that too many people, the courts and the court of public opinion believe that computer systems are infallible.
I also want to touch very briefly on AI because we are seeing cases in the courts now. Facial recognition cases are coming up. Big Brother Watch reported on one last June. I notice that not quite weekly, but quite frequently, an individual is arrested as they go into a store and are accused of taking something very small and then evidence is produced of them on a facial recognition watch list. It then transpires some time later that they are not that individual. One particular firm’s name keeps coming up—I will not go into that —but the reaction of the shop is exactly that: it is infallible. I support the amendment, and I urge the Minister and the Government not to pause on this at all. It is needed, not just for the legacy of Post Office Horizon, but for cases in our courts right now.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
I rise in support of Amendment 62, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Perhaps I can help the Minister with some of the intricacies of this. We have heard from Members who have a legal background. I have a youth work background, and I would like to say this: much of the music that is being talked about—drill music, rap music—is horrific. The content of the music is horrific and it is horrible, but, unfortunately, it is also very entertaining. Many young people will listen to it just by association. The music is entertaining, people party and you have no other choice. So for someone to view your output as an individual through your membership of that genre is a very slippery slope. Many years ago, I dealt with a group of young men who made a video that pointed to some serious criminality, and the police dealt with it in the right manner. They used it to understand who they might further investigate. They did not use the evidence, except one part that was quite blatant, as a reason to prosecute individuals.
When someone tells you that they are an expert in interpreting the music, I am afraid they are wrong. I was born in that community, I come from that community, many members of my family make that music, but because young people make the music and technology allows them to make it so quickly, the words they use, the meanings they use and the characters they build change almost on a daily basis. If you were to say to my son, “the man dem”, he would understand. Would noble Lords? When I grew up, “the man dem” existed as a concept, but the words did not, so he and I can have a conversation about the same thing and not know that we are talking about the same thing.
Very rarely will you hear me stand up, talk about race and accuse the police of being racist, but this cuts very close to that because when a lovely, well-meaning, educated, middle-class man or woman listens to the music, they have no understanding of the cultural background of that music or of the fact that that music might have been produced in the way it was to display a character. Much of the bragging and the boasting is simply that: bragging and boasting about fictitious situations that they hope they will never be in and that we also hope they will never be in. To present that in court as some kind of evidence of their associations and their behaviour is a slippery slope. If you want to destroy the relationship between young people, particularly young Black people, and our system, this would be the way to go.
Baroness Lawrence of Clarendon (Lab)
My Lords, I declare my interest as an anti-racism adviser to the Labour leadership. I added my name to Amendment 62 tabled by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I hope noble Lords understand why I have done this, given my years of campaigning for race equality, in the criminal justice space in particular. Our amendment is essential but also modest and proportionate. We do not say that creative expression can never be admissible in criminal trials. We just say that there must be a strict rule against racial prejudice in particular. It is not new in our system to try to ensure that prejudice associated with criminal evidence should not outweigh its probative value, nor, unfortunately, is it new to find the police and the prosecution system working against people of colour when they should be protecting everyone from all our diverse communities equally. As my noble friend said, we would not dream of prosecuting a middle-class, middle-aged, white person for crimes on the basis of them writing or enjoying crime fiction. Why then are we happily prosecuting young Black men and boys on the basis of rap and drill music? I think we all know why. We talk about equality before the law, but 28 years after the Lawrence inquiry, we know the principle is still not a reality.
My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti mentioned a young Mancunian man, a model student, a head boy aspiring to be a law student who had an unconditional offer to study law at the University of Birmingham—until the police and the prosecutors wrongly mistook him for a youngster in a nine-second video in which drill music was playing in the background. Through reliance on this ridiculous evidence, he was convicted of violent conspiracy. His conviction was overturned, but only after he served three years in prison. I urge the Committee to support our amendment and my noble friends in the Government to accept it.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I rise briefly to speak to Amendment 61. In doing a little background on this, I looked at the Law Society’s response to the MoJ call for evidence, which it produced last April. I wish to read two brief excerpts, because I think they are both particularly pertinent to what we are talking about. The first says:
“But given the increasing complexity of computational systems, computers should not be assumed to be operating correctly. Instead”—
this is important, because this is what other jurisdictions outside the UK systematically do—
“it should be evidenced and demonstrated through assurance, regular review, and disclosure of the technical standards applied by the system”.
That is what happens in Germany. That is what happens in France. That is what mostly happens in the United States.
Secondly, returning to the issue of artificial intelligence, the Law Society has been thinking about this and is clearly very worried about it. I quote again:
“Careful consideration needs to be given to emerging AI technologies that overlap with but go beyond the scope of this call for evidence. For AI, an additional layer of certification for meeting internationally recognised standards is important to ensure accountability and transparency, especially if they were designed and developed”—
which they mostly are—
“outside of the jurisdiction … Attention must be given to the ability for domestic regulation and requirements to be adhered to for computer systems and AI tools that are built outside of the jurisdiction”.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, it is six years since the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and I were among the members of a newly formed committee that looked at—I do not think I have got the title quite right—advanced technology in the justice system. We were concerned, among other things, about the need for a human in the loop and whether it was possible to have a human in the loop. We were given very firm assurances by two Home Secretaries, which I do not think convinced the committee at all.
We were also concerned about the attitude, “X must be right because the computer says so”. Have we actually moved on from that? I do not think so. On that basis —and was it my noble friend who added facial recognition into the mix?—we support the amendment.
I am deliberately going fairly fast because I do not need to add a whole lot to what has already been said. On Amendment 62, there have been a number of occasions when I have heard a rapper and realised how very clever the work was. I really admired what I heard. Then I thought back to the occasion decades ago when my father started criticising my musical taste and calling it Simon and Godawful. Tastes change; generations move on and develop. I cannot speak to the detailed content of all rap and drill, but I think we are in danger of dismissing the importance of this music to the generation that produces it.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and her eminent supporters for bringing forward these amendments, and to all noble Lords for their contributions in respect of Amendments 61 and 62. I think I can deal with Amendment 61 quite shortly. We have had powerful and compelling speeches on the amendment from its proposers. It seeks to remove a presumption that a computer and software system on which a prosecution relies is working and reliable. We all know what has prompted this: the terrible Post Office scandal.
It is absolutely plain that prosecutors must no longer be able to rely on the systems being necessarily in working order as evidence for the purpose of criminal cases. The Government have had long enough now—and officials even longer than this Government—to look at this problem. If they have not, they have been prodded with a sharp stick by these amendments, and I am confident that, prodded with that sharp stick, they will come up with a solution. They will have to do so by Report, because otherwise I think this amendment will be carried then. I need not say any more.
Amendment 62 proposes a new clause to prevent an overreliance on a person’s musical taste as probative of criminal proclivity or intent. On this side we agree that a person’s creative or artistic taste should not result in them being treated prejudicially by the judicial system. We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, the noble Baronesses, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon and Lady Chakrabarti, and others in support of this amendment.
We have some reservations about this amendment as it is currently drafted. We accept the good intentions behind it. We understand the danger it is designed to meet, namely that people are treated prejudicially for their creative and artistic tastes, and it is undoubtedly the case that those from particular backgrounds are vulnerable to this and may in effect suffer, or risk suffering, mistreatment in our courts. Against that, we fear also that the amendment might create other difficulties, creating genre-specific shields for certain evidence and thereby treating some expressions differently from others—in other words, shifting the balance too far and creating another class that is not protected. While we are sympathetic to this amendment, for those reasons we cannot support it.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I get to my feet with some diffidence, given the range of eminent speakers, many of whom I have the most utmost respect for, who have spoken in favour of this group of amendments. I start with Amendment 61 in the names of my noble friends Lady Chakrabarti and Lord Beamish, my other friend, who is in fact also noble—the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot—and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. This is a powerful group, and I entirely accept what they say about the difficulties created when there is a presumption that a computer is working properly unless the defendant is able to produce evidence that it is not. That can create an enormous obstacle for defendants. It is extremely difficult to prove that something is not working in those circumstances, so I accept that. I also understand that what is sought here is to reverse that position and to take it back to the position of Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act.
I have already discussed this briefly with my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. The difficulty I have with this amendment is that it is extremely broad, and the problem with that is that, since Section 69 was introduced, what constitutes digital material has evolved significantly. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, says that it is no answer to say that computers are everywhere, but I am afraid we have to be realistic about this. The computer evidence that is adduced in the criminal courts is, for example, the extremely complicated accounting software that is relied on by banks. That is at one extreme. But there is also the routine evidence that comes into criminal courts every single day, which can include text messages from mobile telephones, email chains, social media posts, DVLA printouts, medical records from GP surgeries and even criminal records themselves from the police national computer.
There is a real risk that if the amendment in this broad form were introduced, it could bring the criminal courts to a standstill. I know that is obviously not the intention, but I am concerned about whether there is a way of finding that we can limit it so that it excludes the routine use of computers—often things that people would not even think of as computers at all; the law recognises that a mobile phone is a computer, but most people would not think of it that way—and is limited to the cases that have caused real concern to those in your Lordships’ House, where a conviction is often based solely or mainly on the evidence of a computer. I can see a very different case to be made for that kind of evidence as well.
I entirely understand the intention behind this amendment, and I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Beamish and the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, for the work that they have done in relation to Horizon. It is humbling to stand here and talk about the Horizon victims and survivors and what happened to them, and I would not want anyone to think that the Government are not listening in relation to this.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
I am not opposed to consultation, but, I am sorry, this Government are hiding behind consultation. Once the consultation is finished, we then need action, but that is not happening, not just in this area but in a whole host of other areas.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I do not accept that. My noble friend should think carefully about making accusations such as that.
The point is that we are looking at the evidence that we have received in order to evaluate it to ensure that we make evidence-based and informed changes. The Government are considering this matter carefully. I am not announcing another review or another consultation; I am simply saying that we are looking at the evidence that we have.
I hope that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti will hear the words that I am using. She knows that I understand the problem and that I am not unsympathetic, but we need to find a way that does not create a lot of unintended consequences.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The noble Baroness is competing with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
I would never compete with the noble and learned Lord.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
The Government have had nine months. Normally, if you went to a competent lawyer and said, “This is the evidence. We need a solution”, you would be horrified if you had to wait nine months. Why is there not an answer? Can we have one when this comes back on Report? There is no excuse for delay.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I will answer the noble and learned Lord and then I will give way to the noble Baroness, because, as she knows, we do not permit interventions on interventions.
The answer to his question is that this is not the only thing we are doing. Your Lordships know how much legislation is passing through this House. It is a question of bandwidth and having time to do things. I am trying to assure the Committee that our intentions are good ones and that we are listening.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
The words that the Minister used, which I believe her to believe, are exactly the same words that we have heard from several other Ministers. The only words that would give succour to members of the Committee are, “We will have something on Report”. While I take her point about broad and narrow, that is not an excuse that can last for years. That consultation was not the first consultation, so we have been waiting for years.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I entirely understand the point that the noble Baroness is making, and I pay great tribute to her expertise. She can imagine just how popular I would be if I gave that undertaking from the Dispatch Box right now. All I can say is: leave it with me.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
Having been a Minister myself, I know that the Minister can do that tonight. She knows what will happen if she does not bring it forward: an amendment will be tabled, and it will get passed.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I think I have already said that I am listening carefully.
Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom (Con)
Before the Minister moves on to Amendment 62, would she please comment on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, about the Law Society’s contribution to the consultation about a system of assurances? That may be a way forward that might allow her to bring forward her own amendment on Report.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
That is exactly what the Government are evaluating. I cannot go any further than that today, but those are all the things that are being considered. I cannot go any further than to say that I am listening.
I turn to Amendment 62, in the names of my noble friends Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Lawrence. I am very aware of these issues, particularly in relation to rap and drill. I knew about this amendment, but in the course of my practice and when I was a judge I have been to a number of lectures on the subject and read a number of articles, including some by Keir Monteith, King’s Counsel, who I see is sitting below the Bar today.
The question here, on the use of this material, is one of relevance. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, I do not want to go into a boring exegesis of when evidence is admissible and when it is not. The real concern here is to make sure that if—and it is a big if—this evidence is to be used then it has proper probative value, on the basis that it goes further than either that this defendant is a bad person because they like rap and drill music or, even worse, some spurious and crude racial stereotypes. Judges have a duty to ensure that only evidence meeting these standards is adduced and they should exclude any evidence that does not meet the required threshold—that is not a matter of discretion. However, I understand the concerns about the fact that that has not happened in all cases.
It is axiomatic to say that creative and artistic expression is of itself not a crime, and it is rare that it would feature in the evidence of a prosecution unless it inherently involved criminal activity, such as damaging another person’s property with graffiti or drawing sexual images of children. As for musical expression, the Crown Prosecution Service is clear that creating or listening to music is not a crime, but it says that, on occasion, it has encountered cases where, upon investigation into a violent offence, it became clear that drill and rap music had been used in the build-up to encourage or incite violence or to reveal information about a crime that only the attackers would know. These instances are rare and, importantly, are already subject to rigorous scrutiny under existing evidential rules. However, I am aware of the disquiet, and we understand the community concerns.
I take the point made by my noble friend Lady Lawrence. I am a lover of crime fiction but I do not think anyone is ever going to use that in a prosecution against me—well, I hope they do not. She makes a valid point.
The Crown Prosecution Service is actively consulting on this matter through a public consultation, seeking views on whether formal prosecution guidance should be issued regarding the use of musical expression evidence. We want to ensure that any future approach is clear and informed by a wide range of perspectives.
It is the Government’s view that, as currently drafted, the amendment would be unduly restrictive and would, in effect, frustrate the ability of the Crown to adduce relevant and probative evidence before the court, with the potential consequences of frustrating justice for victims in some serious cases. The Government intend to await the outcome of the CPS consultation and announce next steps in due course. I invite all noble Lords not to press their amendments.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I did not speak to Amendment 62 when I briefly got up but I did some research on it. I think it is usually the case in a particular area of law that, where you have a body of experts in particular areas of evidence, it is not uncommon for those experts to be used by both the prosecution and the defence. In doing my research on Amendment 62, I found that that is not the case. The so-called experts who are used by the prosecution are solely used by the prosecution, while the experts who are used by the defence—who would be able to talk knowledgably in the sort of detail that the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, was able to give us—are used only by the defence. That in itself tells you that there is something wrong.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I do not disagree with the noble Lord. I have already made it clear that I understand the disquiet, the concerns about it and the very real possibility for something that is in fact crude racial stereotyping to look as though it is evidence. That is why we need to await the outcome of the CPS consultation.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in what was a very important debate that did credit to the whole Committee. I am most grateful to my noble friend the Minister, who is a distinguished criminal lawyer and a distinguished former member of the CPS, but, with all due respect, no one should mark their own homework. It is not for the Crown Prosecution Service to mark its own homework, nor any other lawyers even.
In relation to Amendment 62, to go in reverse order, I urge my noble friend to consider what the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and others have said about what is happening in practice—the University of Manchester study and so on—because just reading out the official statement from the CPS is hope-sapping—I know that my noble friend would not want to sap my hope in difficult times. In relation to Amendments 62 and 61, she suggested that she is listening and said it with some personal input. She is not AI. She is not a projection from the Government. She will forgive me for saying that she is one of our best advocates on these Benches and the Government are very lucky to have her. However, as I know our noble friend Lord Timpson has said, publicly and privately, many times, we are not all here for ever; we are not on this earth for ever; we are not in this Chamber for ever; we are not in positions of power and influence for ever. We must make the most of our opportunities to make change, as was promised, and make it for good. Race equality surely must be one of the foundations of any Labour Government, specifically one that has promised so much.
In relation to both amendments, I heard no proper pushback from any side of the Committee. On Amendment 61, I have to defer to the noble Lords, Lord Beamish and Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. The time is now; the vehicle is this Bill. Finally, I say gently to my noble friend that when she walks into rooms in the Ministry of Justice with officials or even Commons Ministers, I hope she realises that she is the cleverest person in the room or at least the one with the most direct experience of practising criminal law in the courts. If anyone can find a way through, I trust that that is my noble friend.
Amendment 62 could theoretically be dealt with by rules of court—but it must be dealt with—but with Amendment 61 we need an urgent legislative amendment in this Bill. My noble friend foreshadowed the possibility of a way through, partly on her concerns about sole and determinative evidence and partly responding to the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. I urge her to deliver for the Committee and for the people of this country, for the past victims of miscarriages and for all those who might come. I say that as respectfully and positively as I can to my noble friend. I hope she knows how much respect I have for her, but we are looking for something on Report in respect of both Amendments 61 and 62. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Russell of Liverpool
“Discontinuance of proceedings: victims' right to review(1) The Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 is amended as follows.(2) In section 23A (Discontinuance of proceedings after accused has been sent for trial), subsection (2), omit “indictment is preferred” and insert “start of the trial on indictment, as defined in section 22(11A) of this Act.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would extend the period a case can be discontinued in the Crown Court, to bring it in line with the Magistrates Court. This would mean that the CPS could discontinue a case at the Crown Court with the option to reopen it following a successful VRR, if it concludes that it made an error stopping the prosecution.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I start by addressing the Minister and saying, “No pressure”. I think this amendment is particularly pertinent to her because it talks directly about the Crown Prosecution Service and some of the things it does and does not do. She will know more, I suspect, than anybody else in the Committee about the detail of what I am about to address.
The purpose of the amendment is to enable the Crown Prosecution Service to discontinue proceedings in the Crown Court up until the trial, bringing it in line with its opportunity to do so in the magistrates’ court. Importantly, this change would mean that proceedings could be ended at a later point and still reinstated where it was determined that the prosecution was ended in error. For victims of crime, this is an important safeguard which would enable them to meaningfully exercise their right to challenge Crown Prosecution Service decision-making.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I signed Amendment 63, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Russell. I will not go into any of the detail that he has just given so comprehensively, but I did want to give your Lordships’ Committee the chance to hear two voices of victims who have found that VRR really worked for them.
In September 2021, “Daria”, an anonymous survivor, reported offences of harassment, stalking and image-based abuse to the police. The perpetrator was arrested in November 2021; however, confusion between police forces and errors in case handling resulted in delays and lapses in time limits for some offences. By December 2022, the CPS issued a decision of no further action for the most serious charges of disclosing and threatening to disclose private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress. This was despite Daria providing detailed evidence that the intent threshold was met.
Daria immediately requested a review under the victims’ right to review scheme. Over the following months, the CPS kept her updated and requested further statements, and in May 2023, a district Crown prosecutor overturned the original decision. The CPS authorised two counts of disclosing or threatening to disclose private sexual images with intent to cause distress. In December 2023, the perpetrator was convicted on both counts and sentenced in the Crown Court in March 2024. The CPS formally apologised for the distress caused by the initial wrongful decision.
Daria has said:
“Without the Right to Review, my case would have ended in silence. The CPS originally decided not to prosecute—despite everything I’d reported and the evidence I’d provided. It was only through the VRR process that my voice was finally heard, and justice was served. The man who targeted and humiliated me online was ultimately convicted. Survivors deserve this second chance. The right to review gave me mine”.
Victoria was groomed and sexually abused from the age of 14. When she reported the crime years later, the CPS initially decided on no further action, wrongly re-aging her as 16 and dismissing the evidence that she had been below the age of consent. Victoria requested a VRR. The first review upheld the decision, but she escalated it further. In 2021, after a second interview, the CPS overturned its decision and charged her abuser with seven counts of indecent assault. A further charge was added at trial. Her abuser was unanimously convicted on all eight counts and sentenced to 23 years in prison. He was also placed on the sex offenders register indefinitely. Despite this, Victoria had endured nearly six years of delays before her trial, which left her with PTSD, agoraphobia and severe anxiety. She said:
“After the CPS refused to charge my abuser, I requested a VRR. This led them to overturn that decision, and my abuser was later convicted. He would not have faced justice without the VRR process. My case highlights the need for VRRs to be permanently accessible to complainants so mistakes can be addressed”.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I can be brief. I support Amendment 63 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. We have already spoken about the need for consistency across our justice system. That includes extending the powers to compel offenders to attend their sentencing in the Crown Court to magistrates’ courts. This amendment would also bring the periods in which a case can be discontinued into alignment; indeed, I am interested to see what justification exists for the difference between the two. We have heard a compelling speech also from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, with a particular example. I know that one should be wary of individual examples, but it is a compelling example and we should listen to it carefully.
Apart from making the system more consistent in its procedures, this amendment would allow prosecutors in the Crown Court to discontinue a case at a late stage, preventing unnecessary, costly and time-consuming trials. In the context of a court backlog and the need for efficiency, allowing this more flexible mechanism for bringing prosecutions to an end appears to us to be a measured and sensible improvement. To be clear, Amendment 63 still allows the option to reopen a case following a successful victim’s right to review request, if it is concluded that the CPS has made an error in stopping the prosecution. This amendment would not do away with this important scheme which is available to victims. We thank the noble Lord for his efforts and look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I will start with a little trip down memory lane. In either 2010 or 2011, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, when sitting in the Court of Appeal, heard a case called Killick. That was a case where prosecution had been restarted and, as part of his judgment in relation to it, the noble and learned Lord said that the Crown Prosecution Service needed to come up with a system that would allow victims to challenge a decision not to prosecute, without them having to bring judicial review proceedings. As he may remember, I was the prosecutor who remade the decision to charge in that case and, as a result, the Crown Prosecution Service—under a certain Director of Public Prosecutions, who may be known to your Lordships in another context at the moment, and I, working as his principal legal adviser—devised the victims’ right to review scheme.
I wrote much of the legal guidance, so the noble Lord, Lord Russell, is correct when he says I know quite a lot about it. I am a huge fan of the victims’ right to review scheme, because although the Crown Prosecution Service is in many ways a completely wonderful organisation, everybody is human and sometimes people get things wrong—and when we get it wrong, we want to put it right. Obviously, a right is not a right unless it has a remedy attached to it, and that is a real problem in some of these cases. The noble Lord knows, because I discussed this with him when we met, that my practice when I was dealing with reviews of cases was always that if I took the decision to offer no evidence, I would write to the victim and say, “In 14 days I am proposing to do this, unless you want to make representations to me as to why I should not, or seek judicial review proceedings”. I completely get the issue here.
The only note of caution I will sound is this. It would be a substantial change, with wide-ranging implications for both victims and defendants. For that reason, it needs to be considered carefully, because discontinuing a case is not simply putting a pause into proceedings. Restitution requires fresh proceedings, starting back in the magistrates’ court, which risks delay and uncertainty for both victims and defendants. It does not go straight back into the Crown Court as a restart. That is why robust safeguards and controls, which are not in this amendment, are essential when making these decisions.
For example, in the magistrates’ court procedure, which this amendment seeks to replicate, the defence can refuse to accept a discontinuance and insist on no evidence being offered, or insist that the Crown Prosecution Service makes a decision as to what it is going to do. We are anxious to ensure that discontinuance is not, for example, used in the Crown Court as a way of getting an adjournment that would not be got under other circumstances, as in saying: “We don’t have enough evidence here. We need another three months to get it, so we’re going to discontinue and then restart”. That could create awful uncertainty, both for victims and defendants, as to what is going on. There are, for example, cases where somebody is a youth at the time they are charged and, if the case is then discontinued, they may then be tried as an adult later on.
I am not saying that I do not understand the problem or that this may not be part of the solution, but it needs to be considered carefully. What we plan to do is to consider this proposal further in the context of the wider court reforms and Sir Brian Leveson’s most recent report, with his recommendations for improving efficiency. I also welcome the expansion of the CPS pilot, strengthening victims’ voices before final decisions to offer no evidence are made. The outcome of that pilot will also inform our thinking. For the time being, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
I thank the Minister very much for her response. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for adding her name and for the examples she put forward. As I surmised, the Minister does indeed know what she is talking about—on a 24 hours a day, seven days a week basis, from what we have heard—and she is looking remarkably well on it.
I thank the Minister very much for the broadly positive way in which she has responded. I think she acknowledged, as we have all acknowledged, that there is an issue and an inconsistency here. But putting it right is not a matter of just snapping one’s fingers and changing one thing, because that has knock-on effects. I am hoping that the Minister will agree to have some follow-up discussions between now and Report, to see either what it will be possible to do by Report or what changes one can start instituting or committing to look at carefully, which can then be enacted later. But on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)
My Lords, I do not want to jump the gun, but I have just spoken to my fellow Whips, and our plan is to try to get to target before the dinner break. I thought it would be useful to let everybody know.
Clause 13: Reviews of sentencing: time limits
Amendment 64
Lord Sandhurst
“(aa) in that sub-paragraph for “28” substitute “56”;”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment increases the window for applying to the Unduly Lenient Sentences Scheme from 28 days to 56 days.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments concerns the terms of the unduly lenient sentence scheme, which we consider has too narrow a window to effectively allow for victims to reflect upon and review the sentences given to their offenders. Amendments 64, 65 and 66 aim to increase the existing 28-day window for applying to the unduly lenient sentence scheme to one of 56 days.
Similarly, Amendment 69, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to allow the 28-day time limit to be extended in exceptional circumstances. We thank the noble Baroness for this amendment. We on these Benches are very receptive to the idea of including an “exceptional circumstances” clause in the unduly lenient sentence framework. It is a safeguard that recognises that victims may, for one reason or another, not always be able to act within the current timeframe. Currently, there exists an asymmetry between offenders and victims. Offenders might be able to seek extensions or have certain deadlines adjusted, whereas victims are rigidly bound by the 28-day window. This amendment helps to address that imbalance.
The process of applying for review of a sentence is not one that can always be readily undertaken within four weeks. It requires a knowledge of the law that often requires the instruction and subsequent direction of a lawyer, which in and of itself is a process that can often take up to, if not beyond, the 28-day window that victims are given in which to appeal. Crucial to this process is the availability of the sentencing remarks, a problem which we have partially solved in the Sentencing Act by requiring their release within 14 days, but that occupies, none the less, half the time the Government currently offer to appeal a lenient sentence.
Perhaps the most effective case for change is a human one. Victims must face and relive the most traumatic events of their lives in court. They have to re-encounter their offender in some cases—not due to the current drafting of Clause 1, I accept—and in the cases we are concerned with, they have to deal with what they believe to be an unjust sentence.
An increase to 56 days is not a drastic one; it simply increases the window to two months, and it allows slightly more time for the process to be completed. We on these Benches are also open to the idea of a longer window to apply specifically for victims and, where they are murdered in cases of extremely serious crime, their next of kin. That may be for another day.
I turn to Amendment 72, which seeks to place a clear statutory duty on the Crown Prosecution Service to notify victims or, in the case of a deceased victim, their next of kin, of their right to request a review under the unduly lenient sentence scheme. At present, whether a victim is informed of the scheme can depend upon practice rather than principle. In some cases, of course, victims are advised promptly and clearly. In others, awareness depends rather upon chance, whether it is mentioned to them by their legal advocate or at some other time during the court process, or whether they independently discover its existence. That is not a satisfactory basis on which to safeguard a right of such importance, and particularly one that is time limited within a strict statutory window.
A right that expires after 28 days, or indeed 56 if our earlier amendments are accepted, is meaningful only if the person entitled to exercise it is made aware of it in good time, and before time starts to run. Without notification, the right is illusory at best. Amendment 72 therefore proposes a straightforward and practical safeguard; namely, the CPS must write to the victim, or their next of kin, within 10 working days of a sentence being delivered, informing them of their ability to seek a review. This is not burdensome. The CPS is already engaged with victims throughout the prosecution process. Contact details are held; communication channels should exist. This amendment simply makes notification consistent and mandatory. Amendment 75, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has the same aim as our amendment, albeit with a marginally different mechanism. I hope that we can work together to achieve this reform.
If we are to maintain a short and strict time limit for challenging unduly lenient sentences, the least that we can do is to ensure that victims are properly informed of that right. Without such a duty, access to the scheme may depend less on justice and more on happenstance. We trust our judges, but we know that even they are not infallible. Some will be more sparing with their sentences; some will be more certain in their own judgment and not feel the need to alert victims to the scheme. Others will simply forget on occasions. This should not be the case. The Government are very well equipped to create a system in which a letter is sent out, within 10 days, alerting victims of their right to apply for a review of the sentencing. They do it endlessly in other departments; it should be a seamlessly transferable process. All are equal before the law. I beg to move.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, my two amendments in this group, Amendments 69 and 75, also make proposals for unduly lenient sentences, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has mentioned. From these Benches, we have been keen to improve the access that victims have to challenge what they believe is an unduly lenient sentence. I had amendments to try to achieve this in the Victims and Prisoners Bill in 2023-24.
It is worth pausing to review what has happened since 1988, when the ULS scheme started and victims were given the right to ask the Attorney-General to reconsider the sentence of their offender. One of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, concerns guaranteeing that victims are informed. Currently, the victims’ code places responsibility for informing victims about the ULS scheme on witness care units. For bereaved families entitled to the Crown Prosecution Service bereaved families scheme, the CPS should where possible, through the prosecutor and the trial advocate, meet the family at court following sentencing—if they attend the hearing—and inform them about the ULS scheme where appropriate. However, evidence from victims and bereaved families shows that this often does not happen, with many learning about the scheme only when it is too late to apply. By contrast, the offender and their legal representatives are present at sentencing and able to start planning any appeal against the sentence. In extenuating circumstances, the offender can also be given more than 28 days to launch their appeal. The offender also has post-sentence meetings with their legal representatives. It was clear then, and it remains so now, that the offender had and has more rights and support than the victim. This is not a level playing field.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I rise with a degree of caution. I entirely understand the motives behind the amendments moved by my noble friend Lord Sandhurst, and that moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. Shall we begin by trying to remember what an unduly lenient sentence is? It is one that falls outside the range of sentences that a judge, taking into consideration all the relevant factors and having regard to the sentencing guidance, could reasonably consider appropriate. In other words, the sentence must be not just lenient, but unduly lenient. One of the things the Court of Appeal must consider when it is looking at an application to review a sentence is that the offender has been put through the sentencing process, or will be put through the sentencing process, for a second time, and that it will not intervene unless the sentence is significantly below the one the judge should have passed.
Law officers often receive applications—I say this with some experience, as I was a law officer from 2010 to 2012, and in England and Wales it is the law officers who have the ability to make these applications to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division—on the basis that the person complaining about the sentence just thinks it is not adequately severe, but that is not the test. One therefore needs to not encourage an expectation—this is what may follow from the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton—that, by getting a government department or the Crown Prosecution Service to write to a disappointed victim or family member, it must follow that the CPS, or whichever government department is required to do this, agrees, or that it will lead to a successful appeal before the Court of Appeal.
I remember that all sorts of people used to read newspaper articles about a particular sentence that often bore very little resemblance to the sentencing remarks or the details of the case. Sometimes, in some newspapers, you would get an editorial saying that it was a disgrace that this lenient judge has done this, that or the other, and that something must be done, and all sorts of people would then write to the law officer’s department demanding that something be done. Very often the sentence was passed in relation to an offence that did not come under the scheme, or, if it did, on proper examination it did not fall within the ambit of what the Court of Appeal was likely to disturb. So I suspect that all sorts of expectations could be built into the public mind, which could lead only to disappointment.
Secondly, there is something to be said about finality. Although one does not always have any sympathy for a criminal defendant, they are entitled to justice and finality. Having sentenced people, I assure noble Lords that sentencing can be difficult, certainly for a judge who is dealing with, shall we say—I do not mean this in a silly way—the less serious types of criminal offence that none the less come within this scheme. I always found sentencing to be the most difficult part of the judicial function. This is a generalisation, but if you are a High Court judge dealing with criminal cases, the chances are that you will probably have to decide the tariff only on life sentences. But if you are sitting in the Crown Court as a recorder or circuit judge, you may very well have to deal with all sorts of quite complicated considerations when working out the just sentence for a particular defendant based on the facts of a particular offence. It is not always easy.
In my experience of having to seek the advice of the Treasury counsel and making up my own mind about whether an application should go to the Court of Appeal, I found that, by and large, the overwhelming majority of judges passed a just and correct sentence—when I say “correct”, it is not a binary exercise—that was entirely defensible and not the sort of thing that the Court of Appeal would have disturbed. To encourage people to make applications would be a mistake when it is going to lead only to disappointment.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
The amendment would not encourage the CPS, or whatever the notifying body is, to encourage the victim to appeal; it would merely be notifying them of the right. Does the noble and learned Lord accept that?
Lord Garnier (Con)
I can see what the printed words say, but if the Crown Prosecution Service was to write to the victim saying, “Do you realise that you can apply to the law officers to have this sentence reviewed by the Court of Appeal?”, it would give an imprimatur and an indication. That is the implication, and we should resist it.
I do not want to go on too long. Anybody can write to the law officers to say, “Will you review this sentence?” It does have to be a victim, or the family or next of kin of a deceased victim. There are plenty of avenues available to the public and to victims if they wish to explore this. To come back to my first point, we need to exercise a degree of caution before opening the floodgates to lots of disappointment.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, briefly, I support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, to which I have added my name. I have listened carefully to what the noble and learned Lord has said, but this is not an attempt to encourage lots of challenges to unduly lenient sentences. It is, above all, an attempt to achieve a degree of parity between the way offenders and defendants are treated.
The intent of the amendment it to suggest that a government department nominated by the Secretary of State should do the informing. It would need to be a body that was viewed as genuinely neutral, but it would be perfectly possible to inform the victim of their right and make quite clear the orbit within which an appeal against an unduly lenient sentence is likely to be successful and the parameters beyond which it would be highly unlikely to be considered, so as to make very clear to the victim, from the very beginning, the possibility of their having a case that might be over the threshold as opposed to being clearly below the threshold. It is entirely possible to imagine that one could create that.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, when I say that I will be brief, I will be very brief. I have listened carefully to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. He is quite right in his observations, and particularly about the ultimate test of whether a sentence is set aside because it is unduly lenient. However, I think the answers have already been made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell: this is a notification. The CPS is not taking a position on the merits of making the application; it is just setting up a timetable.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I will deal first with the existing time limit. We are listening—I am making a “we are listening” speech—not just to the strength of views in this Committee and in the other place on the time limit for the unduly lenient sentencing scheme but to the victims themselves. We are consistently hearing that this time limit is simply not long enough when victims are processing the outcome of the case, and I am extremely sympathetic to their representations. A ticking clock is the last thing that they need at a difficult time. The Government have been persuaded by arguments that something needs to be done, but we want to make sure that we get this right. Currently, we have been given a number of conflicting views on the best way to go about this. I would like to meet all noble Lords who have tabled amendments, and indeed any other interested Members of your Lordships’ House, to discuss the best way forward.
Turning to the question of notification, it goes without saying how important it is that victims are made aware of the ULS scheme. It is another subject that comes up over and again; it is not much of a right if you do not know that you have it. I am afraid that I am not persuaded by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, saying that we should not tell people that they have this right in case they want to use it—if that is not what he meant to say, I apologise and withdraw the remark. The way it is supposed to work is this. Under the victims’ code, police-run witness care units are required to inform victims about the unduly lenient sentencing scheme within five working days. However, we are hearing that this is not happening, so we need to ensure that it does. The question is how best to go about it.
At present, I am not persuaded that putting the obligation into primary legislation is the best way. The first reason is that, usually, if you create an obligation, you have to create a penalty for the breach. The second is that if you want to change it, you have to amend primary legislation in order to do so. The victims’ code is a statutory code of practice. Last week, we launched a consultation to ensure that we get it right and that the code is fit for purpose. Again, we would welcome your Lordships’ engagement with that consultation before it closes on 30 April, and any other ideas before we reach our final conclusion. For now, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. I am delighted that the Minister is in listening mode—I might win one at last.
Dealing with my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier’s points, I think the point is simply this: we certainly do not want to encourage victims down the road of hopeless applications which actually make things worse for them and make them more disappointed. Extending the time limit of itself does not do that; that is simply extending the time limit. Informing them properly does not do that, and the CPS could, I am quite sure, design a standard form letter which states the time limit for doing this but that the parameters —it would not use that word, obviously, but plain English —for an application are limited, so people should not raise their hopes. That would be the way forward.
I would be very happy to meet the Minister after the recess to discuss this. There is merit in the idea of guidance or guidelines—that seems attractive. We seem to be moving in the right direction, so that there might be an extension of time to 56 days and that the 28-day time limit on any basis might be extended where exceptional circumstances arise, and that on any basis there should be some mandatory obligation on the Crown Prosecution Service to notify victims of their right, and I hope that that would include next of kin in appropriate cases. I think that addresses everything. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw.
Baroness Sater
“Dealing with offenders for crimes committed as childrenWhere a court is dealing with an offender for a crime committed before the age of 18 but at the time of the first court appearance the offender is older than 17 but younger than 21, the offender must be dealt with by a youth court and sentenced according to the sentencing guidelines which apply in a youth court.”
Baroness Sater (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 68 is in my name and those of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier and my friend the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and I thank them for their ongoing support.
This amendment revisits an issue I previously raised during the passage of the Sentencing Bill. I return to it because I feel so strongly that this anomaly in our criminal justice system is one that must be resolved and merits further and careful consideration by this Committee. It concerns children who commit offences while under the age of 18 but who, through delay in proceedings entirely outside their control, are first brought before the court only after their 18th birthday. Under the current system, they will be sentenced as adults, losing access to youth-specific disposals, including referral orders, youth rehabilitation orders and the support of youth justice services, even though their offending behaviour occurred during childhood.
As I previously said, this can only be described as a postcode lottery in sentencing outcomes. If two young people commit the exact same offence at the exact same age in similar circumstances, and one happens to live in an area where their case reaches court before their 18th birthday and the other does not, the first will get all the support from the youth court process, while the second defendant, not because of the seriousness of the offence or their maturity, will end up in the adult court. The consequences of not being part of the youth justice process and the subsequent treatment of criminal record disclosures can affect a young person well into adulthood, including their future employment prospects. The Bill provides an opportunity to look at this issue, correct an unfair anomaly and ensure consistency in sentencing.
As I have said previously, the youth justice system exists for a reason. Those of us who have worked in youth justice know how the youth court has specifically trained magistrates who emphasise welfare, education and rehabilitation and can turn young lives around and reduce reoffending. Without this support, their future could be bleak. In the passage of the Sentencing Bill, my friend the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier spoke in support of addressing this anomaly, and I am grateful once again for their support today. I was encouraged by the support of the Minister. While he stated that youth sentencing lay largely outside the scope of the Sentencing Bill, he made it clear that the Government had a great deal of sympathy with the issue. He also indicated that there may be merit in looking at this issue further, while understandably pointing to the need to consider the wider implications across the justice system. I took that as a constructive response. It is in the same spirit that I bring the matter back today.
This amendment simply seeks to ensure that, where offending behaviour took place during childhood, it is assessed and addressed through the correct lens—one that reflects age, maturity and culpability at the time of the offence, rather than being determined by administrative delay entirely outside an offender’s control. I return to this issue today because I feel so strongly that we must address this clear anomaly. I hope that the Government will be willing to take a second look at this and consider how it might be resolved. I beg to move.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I am delighted to be able to support my noble friend Lady Sater’s amendment. I have heard her express these views before, I heard her express them just now, and there is nothing more to be said. I urge this Committee to get on and agree with her.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Sater, my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for tabling Amendment 68. We agree with the principle that children who commit crimes should thus be charged as children, even if by the time of their court appearance they are above the age of 18. What matters is the mental state of the offender at the time the offence was committed, not the lottery of when he or she comes to court. The amendment seeks to ensure that there is no loophole preventing this being the case, and we therefore hope that the Government will agree with that aim.
Amendment 70 in my name concerns the collection and publication of data relating to offenders’ immigration history and status. This is a sensitive issue. Illegal immigration has long been a core political issue for voters and has become even more salient in recent years. There continues to be widespread misinformation and unfounded assertions, both in person and online. That is because empirical evidence concerning immigration has not always been readily available. People perceive changes occurring as a result of policy, but often operate under the assumption that the Government are shielding themselves from transparency. That is not the case, of course, but it must be dealt with.
Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than with crime rates. The public feel less safe, they see the demographic change and they link the two. This is problematic. It can lead to misguided opinions about certain parts of society. There is no available data to inform opinions of what the true position is. Non-governmental studies and disjointed data releases have repeatedly justified this connection, but the lack of clarification from the Government still leaves room for the general public to be decried as fearmongering or bigoted. It is not just policy: people deserve to know the impact that government policies are having on their everyday lives, especially when they can have immediate impacts on their safety.
We say that there is a clear case to publish crime data by immigration status. Accurate and comprehensive data allows for informed debate and evidence-based policy. At present the information is scarce, it is fragmented and it leaves the public, and indeed policymakers, reliant on conjecture. If transparency and open justice are priorities, to release offender data by foreign national status and immigration history would provide clarity, support public confidence and allow all sides to address the facts without speculation.
The Minister will be aware of the time we have previously spent on the topics in Amendments 71 and 74. Amendment 71 would exempt sex offenders and domestic abusers from being eligible for early release at the one-third point of their sentence, while Amendment 74 would reaffirm the Government’s policy of favouring suspended sentences but once again seeks to exclude sexual offences and domestic abuse from the presumption. Custodial sentences should of course by judged by the extent to which they deter reoffending. We accept the Government’s belief that short custodial sentences often do not serve this end, but reoffending cannot be the sole metric by which the nature of a punishment is decided. The prison system at least prevents individuals from offending while they are incarcerated.
For sexual offences and domestic abuse, these considerations are not abstract, certainly for the victims. Victims’ lives, safety, sense of security, the opportunity to reorganise their lives and perhaps move or otherwise change their way of living, are directly affected by whether an offender is at liberty or in custody. In 2019, the first year for which comparable data is available, there were 214,000 arrests for domestic abuse and 60,000 convictions, a conviction proportion of 28%. In 2025—six years later and under this Government—there were 360,000 arrests for domestic abuse but only 41,000 convictions, a drop from 60,000 and a conviction rate of just 11%. Something must be done.
The Government have highlighted the scale and seriousness of sexual offences and domestic abuse. They have described violence against women and girls as a “national emergency”. They have committed to strategies including specialist investigative teams and enhanced training for officers, and demonstrated recognition that these crimes demand careful handling. It would be inconsistent to promote such measures while making it easier for offenders of these crimes to avoid immediate custody.
This principle also extends to early release. It becomes a moral question rather than a purely empirical one when an offender has drastically altered the life of a victim by means of their crime. I do not think it reflects who we are as a society if we say that those who commit as invasive and exploitative a crime as sexual assault or domestic abuse should not serve the full extent of their sentences.
I end by saying I hope the Liberal Democrats will support these amendments. They have made it a point of principle, as have we, that victims of domestic violence deserve targeted measures to prevent them suffering further harm. Their justice spokesman in the other place, Josh Barbarinde, tabled a Bill last year to prevent domestic abusers from being released early under the Government’s SDS40 scheme. They now have a chance to put their principle into practice, as Amendment 71 would have exactly the same effect. I hope they will be able to offer their support.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I start with Amendment 68 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sater. She spoke passionately about this issue during the passage of the Sentencing Act and I pay tribute to her wealth of experience on this topic. As a former youth magistrate and a member of the Youth Justice Board, I have a lot of sympathy for the issues raised.
However, this amendment would radically change the youth justice landscape. As the noble Baroness knows, sentencing guidelines already make it clear that, when an individual is dealt with as an adult for crimes that were committed when they were a youth, they are to be sentenced as though they were being sentenced at the time that they committed the offence and not when they appear before the court. They also state that the courts have got to consider not only the chronological age of the offenders but their maturity and other relevant factors that remind the court they are not just mini-adults and need to be treated differently. Our position is that we remain concerned about the operational and legal complexity associated with a proposal like this. We are worried that we may not be able to achieve this during the passage of the Bill. However, I would like to speak to the noble Baroness, if she is willing to meet with me, and let us see what we can do.
Amendment 70, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, aims to place statutory duties on the Crown Court, HMCTS and the Secretary of State in relation to collecting and publishing data on sentencing. This Government remain committed to developing the data we publish on foreign national offenders. The Ministry of Justice has already taken action to increase transparency on the data published and, notably, in July, for the first time the offender management statistics included a breakdown of foreign national offenders in prison by sex and offence group.
Baroness Sater (Con)
I thank the Minister for her very positive response. I welcome and appreciate her offer to meet. I know it is difficult and complex, but I appreciate the further conversation with her. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.