Monday 2nd March 2026
(7 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberCrime and Policing Act 2026 View all Crime and Policing Act 2026 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 167-II(c) Amendments for Report (Supplementary to the Second Marshalled List) - (2 Mar 2026)
21:41 - Division on Amendment 281A - Ayes: 144 / Noes: 140 - Amendment 281A agreed.
21:56 - Division on Amendment 297AA (to Amendment 297) - Ayes: 144 / Noes: 143 - Amendment 297AA agreed.
22:08 - Division on Amendment 300 - Ayes: 143 / Noes: 140 - Amendment 300 agreed.
22:19 - Division on Amendment 300A - Ayes: 142 / Noes: 140 - Amendment 300A agreed.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her amendment, which would place a duty on the Secretary of State, within 12 months of the Act being passed, to make provisions for the way in which offences of sharing intimate images are reported and the mechanisms by which content is removed by the relevant internet service. I understand that the Government have given my noble friend an undertaking for Third Reading, and I am pleased that they have done so.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I am pleased to put on record that this Government completely accept and agree with the intention that underlies this amendment. That is why, as I said earlier, the Government will introduce a legal duty for tech platforms to take down reported non-consensual intimate image abuse within 48 hours, to ensure that victims get rapid protection. This change, which will be brought forward at Third Reading, will create a strong, enforceable foundation for getting harmful material removed from online circulation, so that victims are no longer left chasing platforms for action. To support swift and effective action to remove this material by internet infrastructure providers, we will also explore any barriers to blocking and how this can be addressed. This will help ensure that rogue sites operating outside the scope of the Online Safety Act will be targeted. I appreciate the noble Baroness’s eagerness to see this change brought about quickly, but as the Government intend to bring forward amendments to this effect at Third Reading, I hope she will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
Can the Minister confirm to the House that not only will the Government be bringing forward amendments but if I am not satisfied with them, I may bring back my own?
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
May I just check that that is an undertaking? We have a nod. Thank you. I am very pleased that we will return to this issue at Third Reading, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Levitt
“1A After section 66A insert—“66AA Sharing semen-defaced image(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—(a) A intentionally shares a semen-defaced image of another person (B),(b) B does not consent to the sharing of the semen-defaced image, and(c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.(2) A “semen-defaced image” of a person (B) is—(a) a photograph or film which—(i) shows, or appears to show, B, and(ii) has, or appears to have, semen on it or in its immediate vicinity, or(b) a photograph or film of a photograph or film within paragraph (a). (3) “Photograph” includes the negative as well as the positive version.(4) “Film” means a moving image.(5) References to a photograph or film also include—(a) an image, whether made or altered by computer graphics or in any other way, which appears to be a photograph or film,(b) a copy of a photograph, film or image within paragraph (a), and(c) data stored by any means which is capable of conversion into a photograph, film or image within paragraph (a).(6) A person “shares” a semen-defaced image if the person, by any means, gives or shows it to another person or makes it available to another person.(7) But a provider of an internet service by means of which a semen-defaced image is shared is not to be regarded as a person who shares it.(8) For the purposes of subsection (1)—(a) “consent” to the sharing of a semen-defaced image includes general consent covering the particular act of sharing as well as specific consent to the particular act of sharing, and(b) whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.(9) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for sharing the semen-defaced image.(10) A person (A) who shares a semen-defaced image of another person (B) does not commit an offence under subsection (1) if—(a) the semen-defaced image had, or A reasonably believes that it had, been previously publicly shared, and(b) B had, or A reasonably believes that A had, consented to the previous sharing.(11) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates a new offence of sharing a photograph or film of a person where the image has, or appears to have, semen on it or in its immediate vicinity, without the person’s consent.
Baroness Levitt
“66AD Creating a copy of intimate photograph or film shared temporarily(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—(a) another person (B)— (i) shares with A a photograph or film which shows, or appears to show, B in an intimate state, and(ii) does so in such a way that A can view the photograph or film for a limited time, but cannot send it to another person,(b) A intentionally creates a copy of the photograph or film that A can view at other times,(c) A knows that the photograph or film is shared with A by B,(d) B does not consent to the creation of the copy, and(e) A does not reasonably believe that B consents to the creation of the copy.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a)(ii)—(a) the cases in which A can view the photograph or film for a limited time include the case where A can view it for as long as B allows A to do so;(b) sending the photograph or film to another person does not include showing it to another person.(3) References in this section to creating a copy of a photograph or a film include —(a) creating a copy of part of a photograph or film, or(b) creating a copy of a photograph or film with modifications,where the copy shows, or appears to show, B in the intimate state in which B is shown, or appears to be shown, in the photograph or film.(4) Subsection (1) is subject to section 66AE (exemptions).(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for creating the copy.(6) Section 76 applies to an offence under this section.(7) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).66AE Creating a copy of intimate photograph or film shared temporarily: exemptions(1) A person (A) does not commit an offence under section 66AD(1) in relation to a photograph or film shared with A if—(a) the photograph or film was, or A reasonably believes that it was, taken or recorded in a place to which the public or a section of the public had or were permitted to have access (whether on payment or otherwise),(b) the person the photograph or film shows, or appears to show, in an intimate state (B) had no reasonable expectation of privacy from such a photograph or film being taken or recorded, and(c) B was, or A reasonably believes that B was, in the intimate state voluntarily.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy from a photograph or film being taken or recorded is to be determined by reference to the circumstances that A reasonably believes to have existed at the time the photograph or film was taken or recorded.(3) A person (A) does not commit an offence under section 66AD(1) in relation to a photograph or film shared with A if—(a) the photograph or film had, or A reasonably believes that the photograph or film had, been previously publicly shared, and(b) B had, or A reasonably believes that B had, consented to the previous sharing.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates a new offence of creating a copy of a photograph or film showing, or appearing to show, a person in an intimate state, that has been shared with the person creating the copy only temporarily.
Baroness Levitt
“(2A) In subsection (3), at the end insert “, or as a person with whom it is shared”.” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the provider of an internet service by means of which a photograph or film is shared is not regarded as a person with whom it is shared for the purposes of the offence in section 66AD of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13).
Baroness Levitt
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment applies the definition of consent in section 66D(10) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to the new sections inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13.
Baroness Levitt
“(za) section 66AA;”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment extends the time limit for prosecuting the offence in new section 66AA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 321, line 19).
Baroness Levitt
“Online Safety Act 2023 (c. 50)
23 In Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023 (priority offences), in paragraph 28A (Sexual Offences Act 2003), at the end insert—“(c) section 66E (creating purported intimate image of adult);(d) section 66F (requesting the creation of purported intimate image of adult).””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds offences to Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023, requiring service providers to take action to identify and minimise users’ exposure to content created or requested in the commission of those offences and to mitigate the risk of services being used to commit those offences.
Baroness Levitt
“Pornographic images of sex between relatives(1) After section 67D of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert—“67E Possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives(1) It is an offence for a person (P) to be in possession of an image if—(a) the image is pornographic, within the meaning of section 63,(b) the image portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, a person (A) sexually penetrating—(i) the vagina or anus of another person (B) with a part of A’s body or anything else, or(ii) B’s mouth with A’s penis,(c) a reasonable person looking at the image would think that A and B were real, and(d) a reasonable person—(i) looking at the image, and(ii) taking into account any sound or information associated with the image,would think that A and B were related, or pretending to be related, in a way mentioned in subsection (2).(2) That is to say, A being related to B as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece.(3) It is an offence for a person to publish an image of the kind mentioned in subsection (1).(4) Publishing an image includes giving or making it available to another person by any means.(5) For the purpose of subsection (1)(d)—(a) the reference to sound or information associated with the image is—(i) when subsection (1)(d) applies for the purpose of an offence under subsection (1), to sound, or information, associated with the image that is in P’s possession, and(ii) when subsection (1)(d) applies for the purpose of an offence under subsection (3), to sound, or information, associated with the image that the person in subsection (3) publishes with the image, and(b) A and B are not to be taken as pretending to be related if it is fanciful that they are actually related in the way pretended.(6) In subsection (2)—“(a) “parent” includes an adoptive parent;“(b) “child” includes an adopted person within the meaning of Chapter 4 of Part 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002;“(c) “uncle” means the brother of a person’s parent, and “aunt” has a corresponding meaning;“(d) “nephew” means the child of a person’s brother or sister, and “niece” has a corresponding meaning.(7) For the purpose of this section—“(a) “image” has the same meaning as in section 63;(b) penetration is a continuing act from entry to withdrawal;“(c) “vagina” includes vulva; (d) references to a part of the body include references to a part surgically constructed (in particular through gender reassignment surgery).(8) Subsections (1) and (3) do not apply to excluded images, within the meaning of section 64.(9) Nothing in—(a) section 47 of the Adoption Act 1976 (which disapplies the status provisions in section 39 of that Act for the purposes of this section in relation to adoptions before 30 December 2005), or(b) section 74 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (which disapplies the status provisions in section 67 of that Act for those purposes in relation to adoptions on or after that date),is to be read as preventing the application of section 39 of the Adoption Act 1976 or section 67 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 for the purposes of subsection (6)(a) or (b).(10) Proceedings for an offence under this section may not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.67F Defences to offence under section 67E(1) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67E(1), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2).(2) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for being in possession of the image concerned;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67E(1);(c) that the person—(i) was sent the image concerned without any prior request having been made by or on behalf of the person, and(ii) did not keep it for an unreasonable time;(d) that—(i) the person directly participated in the act portrayed as person A or B mentioned in section 67E(1)(b),(ii) the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person, and(iii) the person is not related to person B or A (as the case may be) in a way mentioned in section 67E(2).(3) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67E(3), it is a defence for a person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (4).(4) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for publishing the image concerned to the persons to whom they published it;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67E(1);(c) that—(i) the person directly participated in the act portrayed as person A or B mentioned in section 67E(1)(b),(ii) the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person,(iii) the person is not related to person B or A (as the case may be) in a way mentioned in section 67E(2), and(iv) the person only published the image to person B or A (as the case may be).(5) In this section, “non-consensual harm” has the same meaning as in section 66. 67G Penalties for offences under section 67E(1) A person who commits an offence under section 67E(1) is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).(2) A person who commits an offence under section 67E(3) is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).”(2) In section 68 of that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services), after “67A” (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert “and 67E”.(3) In Schedule 14 to that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services), in paragraphs 3(1), 4(2) and 5(1) after “67A” (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert “or 67E”.(4) In section 47(1) of the Adoption Act 1976, for “or sections 64 and 65 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sex with an adult relative)” substitute “sections 64 and 65 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sex with an adult relative), or section 67E of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives)”.(5) In section 74(1) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002—(a) omit the “or” after paragraph (a);(b) after paragraph (b) insert “, or(c) section 67E of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives).”(6) In Schedule 34A to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (child sex offences for the purposes of section 327A), after paragraph 13ZA (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert—“13ZB An offence under section 67E of that Act (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives).”(7) In Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023 (priority offences), in paragraph 29, after paragraph (b) (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert “;(c) section 67E (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives)”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment makes it an offence to possess or publish pornographic images of sex between relatives (that is to say, incest).
Baroness Levitt
“Sexual activity with an animal(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (5).(2) For section 69 (intercourse with an animal) substitute—“69 Sexual activity with an animal(1) A person commits an offence if—(a) the person intentionally touches an animal (whether living or dead),(b) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, that is what is touched, and(c) the touching is sexual.(2) For the purposes of this section, touching is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that—(a) because of its nature it may be sexual, and(b) because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual.(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years.” (3) In section 78 (meaning of “sexual”), after “66D” insert“, 69”.(4) In section 79 (Part 1: general interpretation) omit subsection (10).(5) In paragraphs 35 and 92 of Schedule 3 (sexual offences that make offender subject to notification requirements), for “intercourse” substitute “sexual activity”.(6) In the following provisions, for “intercourse” substitute “sexual activity”—(a) paragraph 151 of Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003;(b) paragraph 38(az) of Schedule 18 to the Sentencing Code.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment replaces the existing offence of intercourse with an animal with a wider offence of sexual activity with an animal.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, we have dealt with some unattractive topics already this evening, and we are about to embark on another one. Government Amendments 301, 302, 451 and 465 in my name deal with the unpalatable but very serious question of animal sexual abuse.
These amendments respond directly to concerns raised in both Houses. I am grateful to many noble Lords, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Black, Lord Blencathra and Lord Pannick, and Danny Chambers MP, all of whom argued persuasively that the current offence does not reflect the full range of abhorrent behaviour that we believe should be prohibited. I pay particular tribute to David Martin and Paula Boyden from the Links Group, who met me and provided the Government with further evidence.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken to the amendments in this group and I echo the thanks of my noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood to the Minister for her remarks and for listening and acting on the concerns raised in Committee. I acknowledge the work of my noble friends Lord Black and Lord Blencathra, who are tireless champions of animal welfare and have worked effectively with the Government on the Bill.
We welcome the introduction of Amendment 301 and its consequential amendments, which build on the debate in Committee and update the offence of “intercourse with an animal” with a wider provision that covers all sexual activity, as we have heard. This area of law has long needed updating, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, and I am glad that the Government are doing it now. My noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood raised a couple of concerns that were worth highlighting. He said that to deprive an individual of animals that they own after they have been convicted is a logical next step. If the primary goal is to promote the welfare of animals, as I believe it is, it seems to me that the best way to achieve that would be to ensure that those who have been convicted are prevented from owning or having access to animals.
Similarly, he spoke about the discrepancy in sentences and that does not seem to make complete sense, as it stands. I look forward to hearing what the noble Baroness has to say in reply.
My noble friend also mentioned the possession and sharing of animal pornography. I am sure that there is not much appetite for further discussion of pornography today, but this is an important issue, and I would be grateful if the Minister could commit to considering measures to curbing animal pornography in the future.
Finally, these Benches wholly support the intention behind the amendment in the names of my noble friends. In the interest of brevity, I will not repeat the statistics or arguments raised by my noble friend Lord Black in his speech, but the evidence base is clear and irrefutable. It seems there is a causal link between animal abuse and domestic abuse and sexual violence. As he highlighted, pets are often used to coerce and control victims of domestic abuse. There seems to be institutional knowledge within relevant authorities that this is happening and yet we lack the safeguards to address it. My noble friend also mentioned the tragic case of Holly Bramley.
The cost/benefit of this measure is hard to argue against. The child sex offender register, a current practice that uses the same principle, costs just £1.92 million per year. I suggest that we would be in similar sums for this. I understand that the Minister may not be able to offer her support to this measure at this point, but I hope that it is something that the Government will return to in the future.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Black, Lord Blencathra, Lord Pannick and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for welcoming the Government amendments today and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for the flattering remarks that he made which were very welcome after a long day in your Lordships’ House. I am pleased to hear that the amendments have this support and, once again, I thank those who raised this with us in Committee.
This new offence is focused solely on strengthening the criminal offence relating to sexual abuse of animals, given the scope of this Bill. To establish this offence, the new offence that the Government are bringing today, the prosecution does not have to prove that the animal actually suffered, because this was sometimes an obstacle to prosecutions in the past. This was something that we were persuaded of during the meetings with the noble Lord and those who came with him. Where the conduct has caused the animal to suffer, the defendant can be charged with an offence under the Animal Welfare Act 2006, for which orders such as removing the animal from the offender’s ownership, rehoming or destroying the animal, or disqualifying the offender from keeping animals are available. It is not either or—they can both be charged at the same time. It is quite common with criminal behaviour.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
The Minister says that the accused could be charged. Charged and prosecuted by whom?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
Although the RSPCA conventionally prosecutes, there is nothing to stop the Crown Prosecution Service from prosecuting. If you had conduct that fell within both, you would not have two separate prosecutors bringing two separate sets of proceedings; it would be the Crown Prosecution Service for both. However, I understand the concerns. I am committing to continuing to engage with parliamentarians and key stakeholders on this issue. We will keep it under consideration.
As far as animal pornography is concerned—obviously a great worry to everybody—the offence of possession of extreme pornographic images under Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 already criminalises possession of pornographic images depicting extreme acts, which includes intercourse or oral sex with an animal, whether living or dead. We do not believe that further legislation is necessary.
Turning to the question of sentence, the current offence of intercourse with an animal carries a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment, which we will retain for the new offence. We do not have evidence at the moment that this is insufficient to enable the courts to deal appropriately with offending of this nature, but we know that, when animal suffering occurs, there are higher penalties available under the animal cruelty legislation, which—as has already been said by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—provides sentences of up to five years’ imprisonment. Once again, we will engage with parliamentarians and key stakeholders as to how the existing animal cruelty offences operate alongside the new offence. With that in mind, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Black, to withdraw—
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am sorry for holding the House back this late at night. The Minister says that there is nothing to stop the CPS prosecuting for animal cruelty if it is prosecuting a case of sex with an animal and discovers cruelty. In that case, will she guarantee that the CPS will issue guidance to all its prosecutors that, where a prosecutor is prosecuting for animal sexual abuse and discovers animal cruelty, he or she will automatically prosecute it and not wait for the RPSCA to do it God knows when?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The difficulty is that the Crown Prosecution Service, as a matter of constitutional convention, is independent of the Government and does not take well to being told what to do by them. However, we can raise this with it and ask whether it will look at it again. I beg to move.
Baroness Levitt
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment updates the wording of a reference to the offence of sexual activity with a corpse in paragraph 92 of Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak very briefly. As was the case in Committee, we wholly support the intention behind my noble friend’s amendment. It would serve to prevent those who commit a sexual offence obtaining a gender recognition certificate and is a necessary step that would stop criminals retroactively exploiting gender recognition laws. Our view is that we should not put inmates at risk by placing other criminals of a different sex in prison with them, for instance. I have direct experience of this in Scotland, where a few years ago there was the celebrated case of Isla Bryson, who was a double rapist initially housed in the female prison estate having decided to transition while standing trial, and I would not want to see those mistakes repeated in the rest of the UK. I hope that the Minister can offer his support for this amendment and I look forward to hearing his reply.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, for setting out Amendment 307. As she knows, we have discussed this in Committee, we have corresponded and I am grateful for her acknowledgement of that. Amendment 307 seeks to prevent anyone with a conviction for an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 being eligible to obtain a gender recognition certificate.
As I said in Committee, individuals with sexual offence convictions are already subject to a comprehensive set of post-conviction measures, including the notification requirements, sexual harm prevention orders and oversight through multi-agency public protection arrangements. These ensure that offenders are monitored and managed according to the level of risk they present and not their gender. In answer to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, obviously we believe that the measures in place are supportive and preventive and will manage offenders. We can never guarantee that offenders do not reoffend, but there is very close supervision and oversight through those multi-agency protection arrangements.
The noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, mentioned the number of gender recognition certificates issued and the potentially small number of people with a gender recognition certificate who commit an offence. Most of those who have one are living their lives legally, honestly and decently and will not come within the remit of this legislation. Given the strength of the post-conviction risk management systems that I have just mentioned, together with the very small number of gender recognition certificates issued each year, the Government do not consider a statutory prohibition of this kind to be necessary. To return to the point mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, the notification regime exists to support risk management, and we remain unconvinced that a blanket restriction on access to a gender recognition certificate will provide any meaningful additional protection.
Where a registered sex offender seeks to change their name following a change in gender—which goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, with the Scottish example that he gave—whether or not a gender recognition certificate is involved, in England and Wales, the measures as outlined in Clause 98 will apply.
I think that the measures in Clause 98—I know she has read them—are quite important. The notification requirements state:
“A relevant offender must notify a new name to the police … no less than 7 days before using it”.
The measures are there to ensure that reasonable, practical steps are taken. The clause provides the recognition that we are putting in place, which the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned: a registered offender must notify a new name to the police before a name change is put in place. In the small number of cases where somebody wishes to have a gender recognition certificate involved in a name change, Clause 98 covers the points clearly. It becomes clear that requiring offenders to notify the police of the acquisition of a gender recognition certificate will aid the police in the risk management of sex offenders. The Government can exercise existing regulation-making powers to introduce such a requirement.
Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)
I thank the Minister for his comments. Just to be very clear and direct, it would be one less individual for the MAPPA arrangements to worry about, because that individual would not have changed their gender. They would still be living in their previous gender and there would be a very straightforward process there. There would be no risk of loopholes and that person falling outside the MAPPA arrangements.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I again draw the noble Baroness’s attention to Clause 98, which says:
“A relevant offender must notify a new name to the police … no less than 7 days before using it”.
Again, criminal or not, if people wish to identify in the way in which they identify, I think they are entitled to be allowed to do so. I give way again.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I apologise for intervening at this time of night. Surely the key point is that, once someone has been convicted of a sex offence, being on the register, either indefinitely or for a particular period, is the trigger for the monitoring of that offender. Whether they have a gender recognition certificate or not is almost irrelevant. It is not irrelevant to the noble Baroness, and I absolutely accept that, but all the monitoring of that individual will happen regardless of whether they have a gender recognition certificate.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I said this in my opening remarks, but I will repeat myself to enforce what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said: the arrangements in place ensure that offenders are monitored and managed according to the level of risk they present, not according to their gender. That is the key point that I put to the noble Baroness. The gender issue is covered by Clause 98. The management of risk is covered whatever their gender happens to be at any time. People still have the right to change their gender and identify as they feel right, according to their own circumstances.
I say again to the noble Baroness that the vast majority of people who apply for a gender recognition certificate are not going to be sex offenders. They are going to be ordinary people walking round the streets and living in communities and never even thinking of being sex offenders. I do not wish to tarnish those individuals who have a full right to live their life as they choose, so I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)
I will not detain the House. I have heard what the Minister said and I am unsatisfied, but I will withdraw my amendment.
Lord Katz
“(b) in subsection (1), after “satisfied” insert “on the balance of probabilities”;(c) in subsection (2), after “satisfied” insert “on the balance of probabilities”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the standard of proof which applies when a court is deciding whether to make a stalking protection order, or whether to include a particular prohibition or requirement, is the civil standard.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, following consideration of amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Royall and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, in Committee, the Government have brought forward amendments to the stalking provisions in Part 6.
Amendments 308 to 313, 314 and 315 explicitly provide for the civil standard of proof to apply when a court is deciding whether to make a stalking protection order, or whether to include a particular prohibition or requirement to an order in England, Wales or Northern Ireland. This includes when the courts are deciding whether to impose an additional prohibition or requirement on the variation or renewal of a stalking protection order. This will promote consistency and improve clarity in understanding of the standard of proof applicable in cases of stalking protection orders.
In addition, I am very happy to accept Amendment 316 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which will convert the power conferred on the Secretary of State to issue guidance about stalking into a duty to do so. This will align the provision on guidance in the Stalking Protection Act 2019 with that in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, promoting consistency in the legislative provisions which aim to tackle violence against women and girls.
My noble friend Lady Royall also has Amendment 313A in this group. I will respond to it once she and other noble Lords have contributed to the debate, but in the meantime, I beg to move.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
My Lords, before speaking to Amendment 313A, I thank my noble friend for bringing forward amendments in response to my amendment in Committee. These amendments clarify the evidential threshold for obtaining an SPO, bringing this in line with the domestic abuse protection orders, so ensuring swifter and less onerous access to these protective orders, and it will make a real difference to the protection and safety of victims.
I am grateful to the Minister and the Bill team for meeting me, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and to the Victims’ Commissioner and the Suzy Lamplugh Trust for their support.
Amendment 313A is very similar to the one I moved in Committee, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. It would introduce stalking protection notices—SPNs—to provide an immediate safeguard to prevent unwanted contact or communication from a perpetrator until a full SPO is granted, thus mirroring domestic abuse protection notices. In response to the debate on that amendment, my noble friend the Minister suggested that the amendment as drafted would be disproportionate, since it would criminalise the breach of a police-issued notice without court oversight. I have therefore updated the amendment so that a breach of an SPN would not be a criminal offence, ensuring that it reflects the framework for DAPOs.
Why is this amendment necessary? Because, as highlighted in the Suzy Lamplugh Trust super-complaint and its report on experiences of the CPS and the courts, the use of full and interim SPOs is currently inadequate, including lack of applications by the police and the time that it takes to obtain one, given that both the full and interim orders have to be granted by a court. Victims say that when police do apply for SPOs, the judiciary do not recognise the need for an SPO, particularly if other orders are already in place.
In response to the super-complaint, HMICFRS highlighted the arduous application process for the police and their frustrations over their inability to issue orders themselves. It called for the Government to use the DAPN framework as a template to legislate for a new stalking protection notice, which, like the DAPN, would not require an application to the court and could be issued by the police to offer protection in stalking cases.
The length of delays in cases varies from months to years. For victims of stalking, a delay in taking their case to trial means a continuation of the stalking behaviours, especially if no protective orders are put in place. The failure to put in place an interim or full SPO at the earliest opportunity puts victims at risk of further acts of stalking, which increases the potential psychological and physical harm that they are likely to suffer. Data on SPOs is also limited and outdated, making it hard to establish how many are refused by the courts.
It is both right and logical that SPNs should be enabled and put in place following a similar approach to DAPNs. They would offer immediate police-applied protection in stalking cases and set a timeframe for the courts to consider a full order. It cannot be right that, at the moment, a woman who is at risk of violence from a stalker has less protection than a woman at risk of violence at the hands of her domestic abuser, so steps must be taken to bring this into line.
The hour is late, but I will cite one case study from the Suzy Lamplugh Trust relating to delays in SPOs and the harm caused. This case opened in January 2025. The client was subjected to criminal damage, vexatious complaints to her employer and an online campaign aimed at discrediting her. The offender also moved house to be closer to the client. This has had a significant impact on her quality of life. The case has had four different OICs and different teams from the outset, which has caused considerable delay—to the detriment of the client. An SPO has been considered throughout the investigation, but there has been little progress or ownership of responsibility across the police force.
The advocate has pointed this out on numerous occasions. Several complaints have been made to the police and the local MP but, as far as the advocate knows, no response has been received. Legal services within the force had been contacted about an SPO in February 2025. Multiple witness statements had been obtained to support the application. The police stated that the SPO application was submitted in March 2025, but this turned out to be incorrect. The judge, in a separate non-molestation order request hearing, asked why after six months the force had not secured an SPO. At the time of writing, the SPO application was sitting with the force’s legal services awaiting a court date. Due to the time that has elapsed, the perpetrator has now been on bail for so long that it has required a magistrate’s application to secure a bail extension.
This and hundreds of similar cases demonstrate the need for swift action and the introduction of stalking protection notices. I beg to move.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, as a preliminary point, when we debated this part of the Bill in Committee, my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower made the point that the Government are not taking a strong enough line on sentencing for those convicted of stalking offences. That remains the case. I hope that Ministers will heed that warning. Violence against women and girls is unacceptable. We can all agree that and we must have a zero-tolerance approach. Strengthening stalking protection orders is just one step, but we need to take a tougher approach on sentencing and enforcement.
Amendment 313A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, is a reasonable proposal which Ministers should consider. It sets out the structure of the SPN procedure. The noble Baroness also spoke to existing flaws in the current SPO system. I have a couple of questions that I would be grateful if the Minister could consider. Do the Government feel that the existing stalking protection order system is dealing with orders sufficiently quickly? What steps are Ministers taking to speed up the process when issues arise?
Given the hour, I do not intend to detain the House further. We accept the government amendments in this group on the civil standard of proof, which respond to concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall. They have the effect of clarifying the position on the standard of proof used when imposing SPOs. Clarity of the law and its application are essential parts of any just legal system and we welcome them.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank everyone who has taken part in this short but important debate. As my noble friend Lady Royall of Blaisdon set out, Amendment 313A would introduce a stalking protection notice, which could be imposed by an officer of at least the rank of superintendent. I am grateful to my noble friend for continuing to raise the operational issues impacting how well stalking protection orders work in practice and the differences between existing protective order frameworks for addressing violence against women and girls.
I am also grateful to my noble friend, together with the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for meeting with the Minister, my noble friend Lord Hanson of Flint, to discuss their amendment. I understand and sympathise with the intention of noble Lords to address this issue. In our violence against women and girls strategy, published in December, we committed to launch stalking protection order intensification sites into select police force areas. These will aim to drive up the use of stalking protection orders and provide opportunities to test innovative approaches to enforcing conditions and monitoring breaches which could be adopted nationwide.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I have just had a look to see whether I can find any data on the number of stalking protection orders issued to those under 18, and the answer is that they are not disaggregated. The Minister is drawing this great distinction about those aged between 10 and 17. We have just had a debate on another matter where we think there is a very small number involved. It would be useful to know if we could have some help from the Minister on the likelihood of numbers.
Lord Katz (Lab)
It may not entirely surprise the noble Baroness that I do not have that data or the awareness of what we can do with the data to hand, but I am certainly happy to undertake to write to her with as much detail as we can summon.
I hope that my noble friend will be content not to move her Amendment 313A and, with other noble Lords, will support the government amendments in this group.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the standard of proof which applies when a court is deciding whether to make a stalking protection order is the civil standard.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the standard of proof which applies when a court is deciding whether to make a stalking protection order is the civil standard.
“(ii) after “satisfied” insert “on the balance of probabilities”;(c) in subsection (3), after “satisfied” insert “on the balance of probabilities”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the standard of proof which applies when a court is deciding whether to make a stalking protection order, or whether to include a particular prohibition or requirement, is the civil standard.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I had written “I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones”, which I crossed out, and then “the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey”, which I also crossed out. I will now say that I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Addington, for bringing forward this amendment and for the careful way in which he outlined the basis for it.
We support the intention behind Clauses 115 and 116. These are serious offences, designed to capture those who deliberately encourage or assist serious self-harm. Precisely because the subject matter is so grave and so bound up with vulnerability, it is essential that the law is applied with clarity and care.
The amendment’s focus on consultation and guidance is pragmatic and proportionate, because policy in this area must be rooted in the lived experience of mental health professionals and legal practitioners, so guidance that distinguishes criminal intent from legitimate activity will be vital to avoid unintended consequences. For those reasons, we lend our support to the principle behind this amendment and look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I too had a speech that started off thanking the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I too crossed that out and wrote in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I also now thank the noble Lord, Lord Addington, for moving this amendment.
I am, however, grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who is not in his place now, for meeting me to discuss his amendment. I think I was able to persuade him and to reassure him that guidance on the application of Clauses 115 and 116 is not necessary. I also wrote to him—I know I cleared the letter, and it may even have been the day before yesterday; I think I have just received a message saying that it may not have been sent until this afternoon, but it has definitely gone. We have placed a copy in the House Library. The letter was written with the intention that it could be sent to the various charities so that they could see exactly what I was saying.
As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and I discussed, the existing offence that these amendments seek to broaden, which is under Section 184 of the Online Safety Act, is already in active use by the CPS and law enforcement. We are not aware of any cases involving therapeutic support where prosecutors have struggled to determine whether a prosecution was appropriate. The CPS guidance is clear about the requirement of intention, which must be present to meet the threshold of the offence, and the CPS legal guidance will be updated to reflect the widened scope of the offence, which now covers conduct both online and in person.
The offence also contains two important safeguards. First, the defendant must intend to encourage or assist the serious self-harm. Secondly, their act must be capable of doing so. These safeguards ensure that vulnerable individuals and those providing mental health support are not also inadvertently captured.
I should make it clear that it is absolutely not the Government’s intention to target either vulnerable people or the therapeutic services that support them. The Government believe the offence as it operates now and as it will be expanded in the Bill is proportionate and targets only the most serious and culpable offending. I hope that the noble Lord is content with these reassurances and will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Addington (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for giving that assurance. Having it repeated again at the Dispatch Box makes it easier for people to feel secure about this. That, along with the letter, which I am sure is a work of great wisdom, will add to the fact that we will have a defence in place, just in case there are misunderstandings. With that, I am prepared to withdraw the amendment.