(1 day, 9 hours ago)
Lords ChamberRead Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
16:12 - Division on Amendment 409G - Ayes: 225 / Noes: 189 - Amendment 409G agreed.
17:10 - Division on Amendment 418 - Ayes: 231 / Noes: 188 - Amendment 418 agreed.
18:25 - Division on Amendment 422C - Ayes: 220 / Noes: 191 - Amendment 422C agreed.
19:46 - Division on Amendment 422D - Ayes: 203 / Noes: 148 - Amendment 422D agreed.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, we are about to start the final day on Report of the Crime and Policing Bill. There are 13 groups of amendments to complete today, and multiple votes are expected. I will briefly remind the House of some key parts of the Companion that are particularly relevant to Report. This is intended to help us make progress and proceed to votes.
First—this is every Whip’s favourite line—the House has resolved that speeches should be shorter. Secondly, and importantly for today as we are on Report, the Companion states:
“Arguments fully deployed in Committee … should not be repeated at length on report”.
Thirdly, I remind your Lordships’ House that, while interventions are in accordance with the customs of the House, they should be brief questions for clarification; lengthy and frequent interventions should not be made.
Finally, some of the topics we will discuss today are emotive and very important to many noble Lords. As my noble friend the Chief Whip has frequently reminded the House, it is in the best traditions of the House that these debates are conducted with courtesy and respect.
Baroness Doocey
“(2A) In determining whether to make a youth diversion order in respect of the respondent, the court must be provided with evidence relating to—(a) the alternative interventions that have been considered or previously applied,(b) the reasons why such interventions were considered inappropriate, unsuitable, or unsuccessful, and(c) consultations undertaken by the police with relevant individuals, experts or agencies, which may include youth justice services.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the court to be provided with evidence of any alternative interventions considered and any consultation undertaken with relevant individuals or agencies in respect of a child or young person subject to a youth diversion order application. This amendment strengthens the provision of multi-agency evidence to assist the court when undertaking the ‘necessary’ test and when making a youth diversion order.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, in moving this amendment, I will also speak to Amendment 417A.
Amendment 409G would ensure that, before a court imposes a youth diversion order, it has clear evidence of any alternative interventions that have been tried or considered, why they failed and what consultation took place with the child and the relevant agencies. The point of the amendment is to ensure that there is proper multi-agency input and that these new orders are used only when they are genuinely appropriate. It would also help the court to judge whether the order is proportionate and whether the necessity test has truly been met. The amendment is designed to make them more effective by clearly showing why other interventions have not worked. Early consultation will mean fewer orders being rejected, less wasted court time and conditions that are practical and linked to the services available locally.
Crucially, the amendment learns the lessons of the Southport case. There, a failure to share information meant that decision-makers were left without a full picture of the young person’s background. That led to an ineffective referral order in 2021, three years before the tragedy occurred. The amendment would help stop such failures from happening again. By requiring all relevant information to be brought together before a single decision-maker, it would ensure that multiple referrals and early warning signs are not missed. We know that proper multi-agency working, involving police, youth offending teams, social services and the voluntary sector, produces more reliable risk assessments and helps prevent serious harm. My amendment would embed that joined-up approach. It also encourages consultation beyond statutory agencies, extending it to parents and carers where appropriate. In the Southport case, the failure to consult the perpetrator’s parents was another missed opportunity. The amendment would help ensure that those closest to the child are properly involved from the start.
Amendment 417A addresses another crucial issue—data. The Independent Commission on UK Counter-Terrorism, Law Policy and Practice in its 2025 report made it clear that effective counter-radicalisation work depends on better data, especially when children and young people are concerned. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish annual data on the use and impact of youth diversion orders and related powers showing breach rates, the type of prohibitions and requirements imposed, and data about protected characteristics. Only with that transparency can we see whether these orders are truly helping to divert young people from custody or whether they are having unintended consequences for certain groups.
We already know that a strikingly high proportion of counterterrorism referrals involve autistic children—not because they are more likely to be radicalised, but because their intense interests can be misunderstood. These children are also especially vulnerable to grooming.
I place on record my thanks to Justice for its excellent briefings and invaluable work in shaping the amendment. I add my support to the related proposals tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.
The tragic lessons of Southport show that interventions must be tailored carefully to the facts of each case. Amendment 409G would strengthen public protection by making sure that judicial decisions are based on the fullest possible understanding of a child’s circumstances. I beg to move.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, before I speak to my amendment and the others in this group, I just say that, as the Green Peers are not part of the usual channels, we were not able to give our views on the fact that this very important piece of legislation is being bullied through this House by the Government. It is absolutely outrageous that we do not have another day for Report. I hold both Members of the Front Bench accountable for this. It is not acceptable. This is no way to make good law, when we are going to be very tired in the later hours and possibly in the early hours.
However, on group 1, my Amendments 409H and 409J on youth diversion orders are supported by a wide range of organisations, including the Alliance for Youth Justice, the Centre for Justice Innovation, MLegal, the National Youth Advocacy Service, Sheffield Hallam University, INQUEST, the Children’s Rights Alliance for England, Just for Kids Law and the Runnymede Trust. That is quite a lot of very experienced organisations that support these amendments. Their collective expertise in youth justice, children’s rights and legal practice adds considerable weight to the concerns that underpin these proposals.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I am saddened by the attack from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, on the Ministers, because they have sat through hours of debate on the Bill and listened most patiently. I have not always agreed with them, but they have responded with the utmost courtesy. They should be thanked, rather than criticised, for their efforts.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their amendments in this group. We accept the Minister’s amendments, which seem entirely reasonable.
I appreciate the sentiments behind the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. However, we believe that they are somewhat misguided. Youth diversion orders, whatever one may think of them, will be implemented as a means of dealing with some of the most serious offences committed by people of the age of criminal responsibility. We should not be making concessions to people who have committed or intend to commit terrorism offences. We believe that engaging in these acts forfeits any right to the conditions of the noble Baroness’s Amendment 409H as a primary consideration.
Similarly, regarding Amendment 409J, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, I entirely understand and acknowledge the issue she is trying to grapple with. Our position, however, is simple: court proceedings should be carried out in the language of the land. That said, the Government do offer translation services, and I ask the Minister to set out measures that are already in place to ensure that offenders understand orders that are made by the courts.
Turning to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, youth diversion orders must be underpinned by the principle of proportionality. Amendment 417A would ensure that they are being used in this expected manner. We particularly support the intention behind Amendment 409G—that youth diversion orders will be a serious step to take, and that ensuring that multi-agency evidence backs up the decision to issue an order is therefore incredibly important. Similarly, the sharing of data on terrorists and terrorism networks is becoming an increasingly urgent need. Any step that improves the efficiency of the sourcing and sharing of information between authorities is welcome, so we also support this amendment. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Jones, for their amendments on youth diversion orders. Amendment 409G, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would require the courts to be provided with details of previous interventions, both considered and imposed, and set out consultation undertaken with other agencies. Amendment 409H in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would amend Clause 185, which deals with measures which may be imposed by a youth diversion order. Amendment 409J, again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would require a youth diversion order to be issued to the respondents in simple terms to ensure that they understand what is being asked of them.
I understand the sentiment behind these amendments, but I hope I can explain why the Government cannot accept them. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, we have had a lot of debate on this Bill and will undoubtedly continue to do so during ping-pong. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his comments; we are doing our best. If noble Lords wish, we can have votes very speedily tonight—if people put their arguments succinctly and the Government respond succinctly, as I will try to do.
On the amendments to date, the Home Office is drafting statutory guidance which will, I hope, help with the points raised by the noble Baronesses. That will be by the negative procedure. It will be produced as soon as possible and will include further details on the circumstances for youth diversion orders. On Amendments 409G and 409H, the legislation already makes it clear that courts must consider the youth diversion order necessary for the purposes of protecting the public from the risk of terrorism or serious harm. Clause 185 clarifies that this test applies to each individual measure imposed by the order. As part of that, courts must also consider proportionality, which is key.
On the second part of Amendment 409H, and regarding the really important points the noble Baronesses have made, Clause 185 already ensures that there are safeguards for an individual’s work or educational commitments and avoids duplication with requirements imposed by other orders. There are similar safeguards in other civil orders. I will address the point made by the noble Lord on translation services later in the debate, or in writing. On Amendment 409J, I recognise the importance of ensuring that the respondent understands the detail of the order imposed upon them. That is vital, and is a consideration for youth offending teams already.
Amendment 417A would require the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on youth diversion orders. The provisions in this Bill already expand the statutory remit of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to include youth diversion orders. In practice, this will mean that youth diversion orders will be considered as part of the annual reports of the independent reviewer. I hope this helps the House. In addition, the Home Office does provide an annual report to Parliament on the use and oversight of disruptive counterterrorism powers. I give a commitment that I will review whether we should include reporting on youth diversion orders as part of this.
I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for the government amendments. They are technical amendments to clarify the relevant court in Clause 186, which deals with notification requirements, and in Clause 193, which deals with applications to vary a youth diversion order.
Taken together, Amendments 413 and 414 update the route of appeal for both an applicant and a respondent of a youth diversion order. Current drafting includes a route for further appeal to the Court of Appeal in England and Wales. To align the appeal routes with other similar civil orders, this amendment removes the route to the Court of Appeal. This allows established appeal routes to be applied. The applicant or defendant will be able to appeal a youth diversion order made in a magistrates’ court to the High Court by way of case stated or to the Crown Court, with an onward appeal, allowed by way of case stated to the High Court. I hope that these technical amendments will help to clarify the purpose of the Government’s proposals.
I hope that with those assurances the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will withdraw her amendment. If she wishes to press it, I advise my noble friends to vote against it.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I am disappointed with the Minister’s response because the current duty to consult requires the police to speak only to the youth offending team, not to social services, health, education and others who know the child. The whole point of my speech was to say that in order for these very powerful orders to be made, it is absolutely critical that everything is taken into account. That cannot happen if not all the agencies are consulted.
The lessons from Southport include years of escalating warnings that were missed. No one agency had the full picture, and I believe that without this amendment that will happen again. I am disappointed because the Bill is the quickest and simplest way to require proper multi-agency consultation as a basic safeguard before such orders are made, which is absolutely essential. I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the relevant court for determining the police area is the one to which the application for a youth diversion order was made.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies which court an application for variation should be made to.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies which court an application for variation should be made to.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision for an appeal to the Court of Appeal from a decision made by the Crown Court on an appeal under clause 194(1). The effect is that there will be an appeal by way of case stated to the High Court under section 28 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision which is superseded by my amendments to clauses 186 and 193.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision that is superseded by the new subsection inserted by my amendment to clause 196, page 245, line 34.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 196, page 245, line 29.
“(6A) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament—(a) any guidance or revisions issued under this section, and(b) in the case of revisions, a statement of whether the Secretary of State considers them to be substantial and, if not, of the reasons why.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to lay all revisions of guidance before Parliament, even where the revisions are not considered to be substantial.
“Glorification of terrorism: removal of emulation requirement(1) Section 1 (encouragement of terrorism) of the Terrorism Act 2006 is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (3), for paragraphs (a) and (b) substitute—“(a) relates to one or more organisations which are at the time of the statement proscribed as terrorist organisations, and glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or offences; or(b) glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or offences, and is a statement from which members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that the present glorification of past terrorism, including both terrorism from proscribed organisations and the glorification of individual terrorists, is criminal, to reduce any harmful normalisation of terrorism.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 418 and to try to explain the rationale for the changes I have made since Committee. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Polak, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, for adding their names in support of the amendment. I declare that I am an officeholder in the APPG for counterextremism, a member of the APPG for terrorism and security, and a victim of terrorism.
For 20 years we have had a criminal offence of “glorification of terrorism”. However, the current Section 1 is a very high bar to meet for prosecution, as the person making the statement of glorification has to intend that a person hearing the statement would be encouraged to “emulate” the terrorism being glorified. After the debate in Committee, I sought to narrow the wording of my amendment to deal with current proscribed organisations. Noble Lords may remember that there was a concern, as the amendment was drafted for Committee, that it may capture some historic features that none of us would have seen as glorification of terrorism in today’s world. When I shared my change of amendment and sought to narrow the scope, however, the Minister pointed out in a letter to me that I might now be excluding glorification of those terrorists acting on their own behalf: those not advocating or acting on behalf of a proscribed organisation, such as the Manchester bomber. Obviously, I would not want that to be the case.
I have worked with the wonderfully patient staff in the Public Bill Office to try to deal with the issues raised by the Minister. I hope that what is before the House today captures my amendments, as put forward in Committee, but also deals with the issue of so-called “lone wolf” terrorists, or their supporters, calling for others to emulate their activities. I thank the Public Bill Office for all its assistance in dealing with these issues, and thank the Minister, also, for bringing the issue to my attention.
My reasons for pushing this amendment are fourfold. First, defeating terrorism is not just about militarily defeating the terrorists or the organisation, but about not allowing the narrative of those terrorists to be justified. Secondly, there have been no prosecutions in Northern Ireland under the current Section 1, and very few in England and Wales, despite the growing glorification of terrorism and terrorists. We need to enable the police and the prosecutors to deal with those who seek to glorify terrorists, and I hope that this amendment is helpful in that regard. Thirdly, as I indicated, I am an officeholder in the APPG on counterextremism. If we do not amend the law, as the amendment seeks to do, I fear the continued glorification of terrorism and the radicalisation of more of our young people, leading them into terrorism. At present, there is a lack of legislation to capture extremism, but, if we allow the glorification of terrorism to continue unabated, extremism will grow in our society, and we know all the problems that would bring.
In Time to Act, the recent APPG report on counterextremism, it was found that one in five voters said that political violence in the UK was acceptable in some conditions. We should all be shocked by that statistic, but unfortunately it comes from the normalisation of terrorism. In a further report, published this week by the Union of Jewish Students, we are given clear evidence of what happens when glorification of terrorism is allowed to happen unchecked. The report found that the glorification of terrorism is prevalent and unpunished. Our research has found that student groups have explicitly called for violence against Jews, even justifying the terrorist attack at Bondi beach in December 2025. Some 49% of those students spoken to have heard slogans or chants glorifying Hamas, Hezbollah or other proscribed groups on campus. Some 47% have witnessed justification of the 7 October attacks, rising to 77% among those who encounter Israel/Palestine protests regularly.
We must act. We have been given clear evidence of the impact of the glorification of terrorism, particularly on our young people. We must deal with it because, fourthly and finally, what sort of society do we want to live in? Do we want to allow the continued glorification of terrorism, and all the inherent problems that it will bring, or do we want to send a signal from Parliament that terrorism is, was and always will be wrong?
Just yesterday, I was shocked—I should not have been, because unfortunately it has become the norm—that, at a council-run St Patrick’s Day parade in Newry, parents were buying balaclavas and scarves with IRA slogans on them for their young children. The impact on our young people is huge, and that is what I am concerned about. People might say that I should not live in the past, and sometimes when I raise the issue of the glorification of terrorism the Minister will say that everything that happened in the past was terrible. But this is not about the past; this is about the future and our young people.
We need to stop the harmful normalisation of terrorism, and this amendment would go some way towards doing that. Terrorism is never justified. It causes mistrust between communities, takes away lives and causes devastation for so many people. I have listened to the concerns that were raised in Committee, and by the Minister, and I hope that the House will see fit to back my amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Polak (Con)
My Lords, I am pleased to support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, to which I have added my name. As I understand it, the purpose of the amendment is pretty straightforward: it seeks to remove the current requirement in Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 that, for a statement glorifying terrorism to be criminal, prosecutors must prove that the speaker intended to encourage others to emulate the act. In practice, this current requirement creates a significant evidential barrier.
Under the current law, it is not enough that someone praises terrorist violence, celebrates terrorist attacks or glorifies terrorist organisations; prosecutors must go further and demonstrate that the individual intended their words to encourage others to copy those acts. As a result, individuals can glorify terrorism while carefully avoiding an explicit call for imitation, and so remain technically within the law.
We know that extremist propagandists are acutely aware of these legal boundaries. They deliberately operate at the margins of the law. Rather than issuing explicit instructions, they rely on suggestion, admiration and narrative. They glorify past attacks, elevate perpetrators as heroes or martyrs, and celebrate organisations that Parliament has already determined must be proscribed because of the threat that they pose. Such messaging may not always contain an explicit instruction to copy the act, but it none the less plays a powerful role in the radicalisation process. It legitimises terrorism, fuels extremist ideology and contributes to an environment in which violent extremism becomes normalised.
In many cases, Parliament has already taken steps to proscribe certain organisations as terror groups. The decision reflects a clear judgment that those organisations pose such a grave threat that supporting them must be prohibited. It therefore follows that publicly praising or glorifying the acts of such organisations should also fall into the scope of criminal law, even where, as I said, the speaker avoids explicit calls for imitation. This amendment would simply align the legislation with that principle.
It is important to be clear on what the amendment would not do. It would not criminalise legitimate debate, historical discussion or academic analysis of terrorism, nor would it undermine the fundamental protections of freedom of expression that are central to our democratic society. Instead, it would target the deliberate glorification of terrorist organisations and their acts of violence, which extremist actors use to spread propaganda and to influence vulnerable audiences.
Extremist propaganda has evolved significantly since the original legislation was drafted. Today, radicalisation often occurs through narratives that glorify past attacks and portray terrorists as heroes, rather than through direct instructions to commit violence. If the law is to remain effective, it must reflect that reality. Removing the emulation requirement would close a loophole in the law, align our legislation with the realities of modern extremist propaganda and strengthen the ability of prosecutors to act against those who glorify terrorism while hiding behind technicalities. It would send an unequivocal message that the celebration of terrorist violence has no place in our society. This amendment represents a sensible, proportionate and necessary improvement to the existing legislation, and I hope that colleagues will support it.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, I have sympathy, as I usually do, with the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, but I will make two short points.
First, by removing the emulation requirement, inserted very deliberately in 2006, this amendment would criminalise the utterance of unpleasant viewpoints without regard to whether they have an effect. It would become a police matter to say that the IRA did what it had to do in 1918 or that the Tamil Tigers, currently a proscribed group, fought bravely in defence of their homeland. It seems to me that this would restrict the scope of legitimate comment and be a departure from the principle that we normally criminalise behaviour only when it is liable to cause harm to others.
Secondly, I heard what the noble Baroness said about Hamas and the St Patrick’s Day parade, but I wonder whether the purpose of this amendment is not better served by Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000, inserted as recently as 2019. This already makes it a crime to express
“an opinion or belief that is supportive of a proscribed organisation”,
being reckless as to whether that will encourage someone to support it. If police or prosecutors are being unduly cautious in this area—I heard what the noble Lord said about that—they might usefully be directed to that provision of the existing law.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, I support the amendment in the names of my noble friend Lady Foster and others. It is right that we look to close the loophole. We need to look at how terrorists operate in the real world. The loophole that is there at present suggests that the current legislation’s wording is not quite fit for purpose.
I agree that the refinements made between Committee and Report are useful. First, I disagree that this would in any way restrict freedom of speech. Historic debate is to be valued, and I do not believe that this would in any way restrict that. The amendment focuses on the contemporary situation. Secondly, it is important that the position of the so-called lone wolf is covered—unfortunately, we have seen more instances of this: people who want to, in effect, wear the badge of a terrorist organisation but who may or may not be directly connected with that organisation. Whether it is in Manchester or in Sydney in recent days, we have seen the horrific situation of a radicalised individual or group of individuals perpetrating such attacks, and it is right that this is covered as well.
There are two principal reasons why I support this amendment and think it is necessary. The first, arguably the lesser of the two, is that it is dealing with the present. Unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and probably like most Members of this House, I have not been a victim of terrorism or had a family member who has been. All of us in that position can be thankful for that. Where we see people eulogising past terrorist actions for their own purposes—drawing people into their organisations or their way of thinking—it is deeply hurtful to the victims and relatives, whether that is in relation to terrorist atrocities that took place in Northern Ireland, the Manchester Arena bombing or the 7/7 attacks. The presentation of those who perpetrated these attacks as righteous martyrs, and people purveying the view that there was “no alternative”, is deeply hurtful to the living relatives of the victims. That reason alone is sufficient to make this change.
The bigger reason is looking to the future, and this is where we need to get real as regards terrorism. Terrorist organisations are not some closed cell or small group of people who simply never change and who wither on the vine as time passes. For any terrorist group to operate and continue its activities, it requires the influx of new blood, time and again.
One of the things that I find deeply disturbing is that a number of young people are naive and are drawn in; they are not simply handed a gun or a bomb on day one and told to go out and take it with them—they are drawn in bit by bit. The way in which terrorist organisations operate is to gradually indoctrinate those young people in a dangerous ideology and even more perverse methodology and gradually draw them in. In doing so, they get those people addicted to their methods—and past terrorism becomes, effectively, the gateway drug. Many young people, if we were to mention the 7/7 attacks, for example, would have no memory of them: they were before they were born, and they do not see the consequences and the hurt caused directly to those families or the evil done in society. It becomes a much easier sell for terrorist organisations to draw people in on that basis, and to present those who carried out those hideous attacks as being some form of martyr or indeed role model for the future.
To that extent, I do not care whether we are talking about Northern Ireland-based terrorism, whether it is the extremism of those who carry out violence on behalf of some Islamic extremist view, whether it is far-right terrorism or whether it is a terrorist group that is effectively a front organisation for some foreign power. The reality is that we judge terrorism not by its motivation but by its words and actions. There is a real danger of young people being radicalised and drawn in, with the presentation of the evils of the past as potential martyrs.
The argument will go that if, for example, we needed to create a united Ireland by violence 40 years ago and it was right then, surely it must be right now; that if white supremacism was right 30 years ago, it is right now; or that if having an Islamic caliphate across the world was right 20 years ago, it is right now. All those ideas are repugnant, but the logic is that if they are being used by terrorist organisations, using this level of loophole as the argument to draw young people in, we have a duty to protect society but also to protect our young people and prevent them being radicalised. That is why I think this is an absolutely necessary amendment that will help to protect society.
Lord Rogan (UUP)
My Lords, I also support this amendment. We have heard mention of the IRA. Those who lived in Northern Ireland through the Troubles know that Sinn Féin/IRA was the most hideous terrorist group—reduced to “Ra”. Last night, after celebrating St Patrick’s Day, five young people came on to the Tube dressed with tricolours and shouting “Up the Ra, up the Ra, up the Ra”, which only means support for the IRA. I do not think those young people fully realise the hurt and offence that gives to the victims of Sinn Féin/IRA. I fully support this amendment.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have a lot of sympathy with trying to tackle ways of taking away the romantic attachment to terrorism as some kind of heroic endeavour, so I completely understand the reasons for this amendment. However, I cannot see how it would work in practice at present. I cannot see how it would deal with a Rangers-Celtic match, or with people singing “The Fields of Athenry” versus those singing “The Sash”, those shouting “Up the Ra” and those shouting “No surrender”. There are slogans on both sides, all of them associated with the previous struggle. I do not know what would happen to those children if, shockingly, as the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, explained, they have balaclavas bought for them—then are they or their parents in scope? How do we deal with that? Goodness knows what you do about Kneecap, the band. I am all for banning them because they are hopeless, but they play on the very imagery that we are discussing.
We have a real problem on university campuses. Far too often, young people are cosplaying as jihadists in the way they dress. I understand that this is not a direct call to arms, but these Hamas wannabes are in a way justifying the type of—what they would call—defensive violence of 7 October. The Ayatollah Khamenei apologists justify IRGC violence, and the expert propagandism fills a society with narratives that I think are very dangerous in terms of young people being radicalised. But I just do not think this amendment can work, because I think we need to be much more courageous in dismantling those narratives, in going on to university campuses and taking on those who put forward critical theory policies that justify treating Israel as a terrorist pariah state and somehow turning a blind eye to the cosplaying radical jihadists.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, my answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is that this amendment is not going to solve all problems in this area, but it is going to make a significant contribution. She is concerned about hard cases, and she identifies some of the possible hard cases. My answer to that is that the CPS will prosecute only in a case where it believes there is a more than 50% chance of a conviction and it is in the public interest. Many of the examples that she gives are most unlikely to satisfy those criteria.
Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)
My Lords, if noble Lords in this House do not believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, is giving the answer to a problem that is a reality within our society, then I hope that the Minister, if he is not accepting this, will tell us what the answer is. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, talked about going into the campuses and talking to these young people. You will never shame the likes of Gerry Adams, so just trying to talk them away is not going to solve the problem.
I am speaking for those in Northern Ireland who went through 30 years of terrorism. Every day you went out, your loved one went to the gate and watched you get into the car, believing it was the last time they would see you. Society cannot live under that. It should not be asked to live under that. Therefore, if the Minister says this is not the answer to the problem, I respectfully ask him to give us the answer and not close his eyes to reality. We have to deal with it, and we need to deal with it now.
Lord Elliott of Ballinamallard (UUP)
My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to make a few points in this debate. To be fair, there is legislation that covers the glorification of terrorism. The problem—I think the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and others have tried to make this point—is that it is not strong enough and does not do what it is supposed to say on the tin. If we look back at the case of Fusilier Lee Rigby, two people were convicted and jailed for that. In 2021 there was a conviction for encouraging terrorism and collecting information after posting messages. In 2023 there was another conviction for sharing a video of National Action, a proscribed neo-Nazi group. In 2024 someone was jailed for encouraging terrorism.
I do not want people to think that there is no legislation; there is, but the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, is trying to improve it, particularly for those victims. We hear, in summary, that the law allows for the conviction of people who glorify terrorism. The vast majority of the UK population has not been convicted of any offence and prosecutions require specific evidence. I also picked out from a report that, in the year ending March 2023, 169 people were arrested for terrorism-related activity. Only 46 were charged with terrorism-related offences and we have no idea how many were actually convicted. What we are trying to do here is to make things better.
I ask noble Lords to put themselves in a situation; the examples I give are live examples. There is a group of young people playing in a junior band and a busload of adults pull up who are coming from a Gaelic football match and they start singing pro-terrorist songs and chanting “Up the Ra”. What does that do for those young people who are out playing and enjoying music? I give another example. A man during the Troubles, because he was a member of the Ulster Defence Regiment, was murdered. That evening, his three young children and his widow were in the house and groups of people drove past in cars, cheering at his murder. Those were his neighbours who were doing that—cheering at his murder and shouting “Up the Ra”. Tell me that that is not an offence. If it is not, it should be. Tell that man’s widow, who is still alive, and his children that that is not an offence. If it is not, it should be.
We need to tighten the glorification of terrorism legislation. I listened to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and I have to say that she gave some examples that are not akin to what we are talking about here. You cannot stop some of those chants and singing “The Fields of Athenry” or “The Sash” at a Rangers-Celtic match—and, by the way, that is not illegal, but there is a significant difference between singing that and going out to publicly antagonise people by shouting “Up the Ra”, “Up the UVF” or support for other terrorist organisations. So I support the amendment.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
Does the noble Lord agree that, as we saw recently, it is also the extent to which, if we normalise the sense of terrorism, it feeds into future terrorism? To give an example of this, when we saw the terrible shooting of John Caldwell—thankfully, despite horrendous injuries, the officer survived—and, a day or two later, the police arrived on an estate to arrest one of the suspects, there were a number of young people in that area who were cheering on not the arrest but the potential culprit. I suspect that they were doing that through a level of ignorance, but there is the seeping in of the idea that terrorism is acceptable to a new generation. That means that, while it is bad enough in terms of the memories of those who have gone through it, it is creating the fertile ground—
Lord Katz (Lab)
I remind the noble Lord that interventions are meant to be short and to ask a question; his has gone on for quite a while.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
I was just going to say: fertile ground for the future.
Lord Elliott of Ballinamallard (UUP)
Yes, I think it is very important that there should be no legalisation or normalisation of glorification of terrorism, or of terrorism in general. That is what we are trying to stop here—and what we must stop; otherwise, it will allow more radicalisation of young people throughout society. I am not talking just about Northern Ireland; we need to wake up and realise that it is happening here in GB as well.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I expressed some doubt in Committee about the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Foster. I recognised the strength of feeling around the House in favour of her position, forcefully expressed, then as now, by the noble Lord, Lord Weir, and others, in connection particularly with past events in Northern Ireland but relevant to terrorism in all its forms. The noble Baroness pointed particularly to antisemitic terrorism allegedly arising from events in the Middle East but in reality entirely unconnected with those events, as with the Bondi Beach attack, which she instanced.
I was, however, concerned in particular by the possibility that the amendment as originally drafted would penalise the glorification of acts of historical terrorism that are or might now be recognised as freedom fighting, despite the methods adopted to express them and fight for a cause or viewpoint. For example, the struggles of the ANC and Nelson Mandela might be categorised as terrorism by some, and those who celebrate their struggles and their outcomes, now widely understood and approved, might be caught by the provisions. So might the actions of partisans and resistance fighters, which, again, we now celebrate and applaud because they were struggling against dictatorships. However, the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, has recognised those concerns and redrafted her amendment so that her proposed new subsection (2)(a) requires that a statement
“relates to one or more organisations which are at the time of the statement proscribed as terrorist organisations”.
Section 1 of the 2006 Act criminalises statements that are
“likely to be understood … as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement … to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”.
Under Section 1(3), such statements include any statement that
“glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or offences”,
and there follows the emulation requirement that this amendment is designed to remove. It is only that requirement that the amendment is designed to remove, it is a narrow amendment in that sense, but that analysis suggests that perhaps the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, went too far in her speech opposing this amendment. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in his suggestion that that was the case.
Of course, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that it is only part of the picture, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, also said, and that changing the narrative among young people is the crucial challenge, but removing the emulation requirement may help. Proposed new subsection 2(b) in the amendment would pose two alternative routes to conviction. The first would remove the emulation requirement at paragraph (a) but applying the glorification offence only to statements relating to currently proscribed terrorist organisations. The second, at paragraph (b), which is an alternative, would replicate exactly the existing offence at Section 1(3)(a) and (b), the glorification with the emulation requirement. It could be a cause for concern—and I listened with care to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—but because it replicates the existing offence that has been on the statute book since 2006, and the emulation requirement includes a reference to existing circumstances, that seems to me to be a safeguard.
We have concluded that the newly defined offence is carefully drawn; we accept the argument of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, that the glorification offence, restricted to already proscribed terrorist organisations, does not need the emulation requirement; and we accept that that requirement is difficult to prove. Therefore, if the noble Baroness chooses to divide the House, we will support the amendment.
Lord Empey (UUP)
My Lords, I think it is important to look at this not just from an Irish point of view; we have to look at the big picture. It is clear that there are different pieces of legislation that govern this area, and reference has been made to other pieces of legislation. As the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, said, we are on Report and moving toward Third Reading, so there is an opportunity here. If the Government have particular difficulties with this, they have heard the mood of the House. I have no doubt that they can take that on board, and if there is something that they are not comfortable with in the drafting of this amendment, they can bring forward their own.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I shall be extremely brief. I thank the noble Baroness for her amendment. As I said in Committee, I firmly support her in seeking to amend the emulation requirement in the Terrorism Act 2006. We will of course have a more wide-ranging debate on terrorism in the next group, so I will reserve my wider comments for then.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, for returning to the issue of the glorification of terrorism, our exchange of letters and her movement and reflections on what we said in Committee. I note the support from the noble Lords, Lord Rogan, Lord Empey, Lord Weir, Lord Marks, from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, Lord Polak, from the Conservative Back Benches, Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown, and Lord Elliott. I will come back to comments made by other noble Lords as I progress.
Let me say straight away that I have not been a victim of terrorism, but I know people who have been. I have met victims of terrorism not only in the context of Northern Ireland when I had the honour of serving there but in this job, from a range of backgrounds. I know that discussion of all these issues, including in this debate, causes great pain for those victims. However, I hope can explain why, even with the changes that have been made by the noble Baroness, I cannot accept the amendment in its current form.
Let me first express and reiterate the purpose of the encouragement offence. It was introduced after the 7/7 attacks and is designed to act as a precursor offence to reduce the risk of people being encouraged to carry out acts of terrorism. The offence applies equally to statements made online or offline. It also applies even where an individual is reckless about the impact of their statement—that goes some way to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley.
Encouragement includes any statements that glorify acts of terrorism. To be clear, “acts of terrorism” in this context includes any action taken for the purposes of terrorism, whether or not it was taken by a proscribed organisation. Today, we have talked about the IRA—which, at one stage, was heavily proscribed—and about Palestine Action and other organisations in relation to the current conflicts and activities in Palestine and Israel. “Glorification” is defined in the 2006 Act—which was passed by a previous Government in which I served—as including any “praise or celebration”.
I recognise that Amendment 418 is a modified version of the noble Baroness’s proposal made in Committee. Specifically, the amendment would retain the historical safeguard that I pointed out to her and that is necessary to limit the offence, for the very reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, indicated today. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for having taken into account our concerns. However, the amendment would still disapply this to statements that indirectly encouraged acts of terrorism carried out by proscribed organisations.
The offence was carefully drafted at the time of its introduction to ensure that statements that are automatically captured by the offence have to meet both the requirement that the statement glorifies an act of terrorism and the historical safeguard. Amendment 418 attempts to split up these two requirements, when it was always intended that these requirements would work together. I remind the House that the encouragement offence has been recently reviewed by Jonathan Hall KC, the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, at the Government’s request and in light of the 7 October attacks, which a number of noble Lords referred to. In that review, he strongly advised against removing this historical safeguard.
In addition, the offence is very clear that statements that glorify acts of terrorism in such a way as to encourage others to carry out these acts would include acts of terrorism carried out by proscribed organisations. As a result, it is not necessary to spell this out any more clearly in legislation. As with the noble Baroness’s previous amendment tabled in Committee, it is also worth highlighting—this point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich—that there are other offences that may be relevant to her concern too. In particular, Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence to invite support for a proscribed organisation. The noble Lords, Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown and Lord Elliott, made points about prosecutions, which have very often been undertaken under that legislation. The offence in this Bill is designed to address the harm that comes from the legitimisation of terrorist organisations, which the noble Baroness has spoken about.
We may need to test the opinion of the House, but I know why the noble Baroness has brought the amendment forward. I know why noble Lords—particularly those with fresh memories of activities in Northern Ireland, including those who saw activities that still offend many people in Northern Ireland—support the amendment. I know why the noble Lord, Lord Polak, supports the amendment. However, I say to all of them that the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has reviewed it and believes the offence is currently fit for purpose. There are many other mechanisms—including those that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed to—that will lead to prosecutions for these issues. There is also a significant effort to ensure that the Government support activities to turn people away from terrorism—through the Prevent scheme, education and a range of other mechanisms—so that people are not politicised towards terrorism through activities undertaken.
With those reasons in mind, while I recognise the noble Baroness’s concerns and understand why she brought them forward, I hope that the reassurances I have given mean that she will not press the amendment to a Division. I await her response.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
I thank the Minister for the way in which he has communicated with me throughout on this issue of the glorification of terrorism. I also thank, as I said before, the Bill office for the way in which it has engaged with me.
I thank all noble Lords for their engagement on this issue. This has been a very good debate. On the other parts of the Terrorism Act that are there, I acknowledge what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, had to say on Section 12. The unfortunate thing is that we see very few prosecutions in relation to it. This is why, to take up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, we cannot ignore what is going on around the glorification of terrorism in the widest possible terms in the United Kingdom. With that in mind, I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“Amendment of section 3 (proscription) of the Terrorism Act 2000In section 3(3)(a) of the Terrorism Act 2000, at end insert “, provided that only one organisation per order may be added”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would require that any order made under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 relates to a single organisation. This would enhance the ability of both Houses of Parliament to scrutinise the proscription process by allowing the possibility of voting against some Secretary of State proscription decisions, without jeopardising others.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, more on terrorism, and proscription in particular. Amendment 420 is in my name, and I support Amendment 422B in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, which would beef up parliamentary involvement, and the role of the ISC in particular, in the proscription process. I oppose later amendments that seem to limit or completely remove the role of the courts in this area.
The Home Secretary’s power to proscribe a terrorist organisation under Section 3 of the 2000 Act is an awesome power. It is none the less necessary in a democratic society, because people should not be able to have private armies. We all understand that. None the less, getting these decisions right is incredibly important. In this debate, I will not relitigate any past or pending decisions. I am looking at it from the point of view of constitutional principle. The consequences of proscription are very serious, now and in the future, so getting these decisions right is very important.
My Amendment 420 is very modest, and I am grateful to all noble Lords across the House who supported it last time, and to colleagues in the other place of different political persuasions who spoke to me privately, expressing their support for this type of change. At the moment, a single proscription order may contain umpteen organisations, which means that when that order is put before each House, there will be a yes or no vote on an entire list, rather than an opportunity for Members of the other place or noble Lords to properly scrutinise and vote on each proscription decision. By contrast, the courts are able to review these decisions individually. I suggest that, as a matter of constitutional principle, both Houses should have a similar opportunity. That is what Amendment 420 would do.
Last time, my noble friend, amiable and courteous as always, as noble Lords know, was able to offer one argument against me, which was that we have always done it this way. I hope he forgives me, but I do not think that a good enough argument. There may be a further one to come, but that is not a good enough argument to limit the reasonable opportunity for both Houses of Parliament to vote on each individual proscription decision. There is no speed issue or emergency issue because even after my amendment, the Home Secretary could make multiple orders on the same day and sign them with the same pen; there would just be individual votes and debates, as required by Parliament. That is the argument. I beg to move.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, in the circumstances I shall confine my observations to Amendments 422A and 422B. Before I do so, I say that I strongly support the amendment just moved by the noble Baroness. Were she to divide the House on it, I would support it, but I gather that, perhaps because of the press of business, that is not her present intention.
The purpose of Amendment 422A is to ensure that individuals can be prosecuted under Sections 12 and 13 of the Terrorism Act for the offence of supporting an act of terrorism only if the alleged acts amount to supporting terrorism in the sense that the ordinary citizen would understand that concept. Amendment 422A makes explicit that the necessary intent that the prosecution must prove is that the alleged acts were done with the intent of encouraging, inciting, facilitating or enabling another to commit an act of terrorism. The amendment also restricts the possibility of a demonstrator being arrested under the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Act. In general, an arrest must be authorised by a senior police officer of the rank of superintendent or above.
My suggestion to your Lordships is that the present situation is wholly unsatisfactory. It has been widely criticised, for example, by the judges in the Palestine Action case. In that case, judicial concern about statutory overreach contributed to the proscription of Palestine Action being held to be unlawful. It has also been the subject of much distinguished criticism—for example by Lord Sumption, a former member of the Supreme Court. I suggest that the position is profoundly unjust. If we consider, for example, the demonstrations that have been taking place in the streets of London, hundreds of people have been holding up placards that say, “I support Palestine Action”. Many of these characters are elderly and retired folk, rather like me; most self-evidently respectable, rather like me; and usually without knowledge of the secret workings of Palestine Action, rather like me. Now they may be self-indulgent—rather like me—and some accuse them of being naive, but are they really guilty of terrorism in the sense that most of us understand that concept? I suggest, surely not. What they are doing is using a form of shorthand to demonstrate their opposition to the policies of Israel in Gaza and the West Bank, and that they are entitled to do.
There are at least three serious objections to the present law. First, it is a serious restriction on free speech. I refer here not to the European convention, although it may be engaged, but to the long-standing tradition of English law. Secondly, to use the law in circumstances that offend the common sense of the ordinary citizen brings the whole body of criminal law into disrepute.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to the two amendments in my name. Like many noble Lords, I was surprised by the decision of the High Court that the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action was unlawful, in view of her detailed description of its terrorist activities in her House of Commons Statement on 23 June 2025.
In reading the High Court judgment, I was struck by the inconsistency of the arguments of the learned judges. At the beginning of the judgment, they set out the details of Palestine Action’s Underground Manual, which is standard textbook terrorist stuff: guidance to form small autonomous secret cells and to recruit only trusted participants. Then there is operational terrorist tradecraft: instructions to use secure email and VPNs, to conduct reconnaissance, and to pick targets based on complicity with the Israeli arms industry. It then has a section on targeting and tactics, with lists of defence firms, universities, financial firms and government buildings, and practical advice aimed at serious property damage to disrupt those targets.
The court then concludes that proscribing the organisation was “disproportionate” and that the Home Secretary did not follow her own policy, even though it said that
“the court must permit some latitude to the Home Secretary given that she has both political and practical responsibility to secure public safety”.
I submit that the Home Secretary must have the absolute right to proscribe an organisation based on the advice that she has received from our advisory bodies.
In coming to her decision, the Home Secretary sought copious advice on the terrorist nature of Palestine Action. As all noble Lords know, the Home Office and the FCDO do not proscribe organisations willy-nilly. We all complained about their failure to proscribe the IRGC. The Home Secretary had reports from a proscription review group, a cross-departmental group including counterterrorism policing, which encompasses specialist police officers from many police forces. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the CTP gave their reports.
The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre produced its assessment. JTAC comprises counterterrorism experts from United Kingdom intelligence agencies, police forces and government departments. Its report is very significant and was summarised as having concluded:
“Although most of its activity could not be classified as terrorism within the definition in Section 1 of the 2000 Act … Palestine Action had ‘commit[ted] or participate[d] in acts of terrorism to the extent of the attacks at Thales, Glasgow … at Instro Precision (a subsidiary of Elbit) in Kent … and at Elbit in Bristol … JTAC noted that those participating in the Bristol attack had ‘entered the [Elbit] warehouse, using weapons including sledgehammers, axes and whips’ and ‘during the attack two responding police officers and a security guard were assaulted and suffered injuries. One police officer had been assaulted with a sledgehammer and sustained a serious back injury’.
JTAC noted that Palestine Action had cleverly issued videos of the damage to property but not its violence against the responders.
We now come to the crucial question of proportionality. From reading the evidence, I am certain that the Home Secretary’s proscription of Palestine Action was lawful and proportionate, and a necessary response to an escalating campaign that threatened critical national infrastructure. The statutory test, the court admits, was satisfied. Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 permits proscription where an organisation
“commits or participates in acts of terrorism … prepares for terrorism … promotes or encourages terrorism, or … is otherwise concerned in terrorism”.
The Home Secretary concluded that Palestine Action met that test and laid an order, which was approved by both Houses of Parliament.
Operational intelligence supported that decision. The JTAC assessment concluded that the group had conducted incidents resulting in serious property damage and that the Underground Manual provides
“practical advice and advocates for serious property damage”.
That assessment links the manual and the recorded actions to the statutory definition of property damage designed to influence government. The High Court judgment itself accepted that three of Palestine Action’s activities amounted to terrorist offences, which strengthens the factual basis for proscription.
The proscription was proportionate because of the severity and escalation of conduct. The pattern of over 300 direct actions with increasing frequency and severity, including attacks on defence suppliers and critical infrastructure, supports a conclusion that ordinary criminal law and targeted prosecutions were insufficient to address the systemic risk. It was proportionate because of the targeting of national security supply chains. Where actions against defence firms and related infrastructure create heightened national security risks, proscription is a legitimate, proportionate tool to protect those interests where the conduct is political and aimed at influence.
Proscription was also proportionate because policy and process safeguards were engaged. The Home Office relied on PRG and JTAC operational inputs and then laid the order before Parliament—steps that reflect the five policy safeguards that the Secretary of State must consider after concluding that it satisfies the terrorism test: the nature and scale of the organisation’s activities, the threat to the UK, its presence in UK, and the threat to British nationals overseas.
Of course proscription interferes with Article 10 and 11 rights to peaceful free association and expression, but it is narrowly aimed at an organisation which has been shown to promote or prepare acts meeting the statutory terrorism definition. Where evidence shows a real risk to infrastructure, violence and public safety, the interference with Article 10 and 11 rights is justified and necessary in a democratic society. Indeed, the court said:
“We do not consider that the proscription of Palestine Action is likely to result in any general impact on expressions of support for the Palestinian cause or even opposition to Elbit. This provides some support for a conclusion that the proscription was proportionate”.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the Home Secretary was in breach of convention rights because there might be some supporters of Palestine Action who are not advocating destruction and violence but general support for the organisation. However, if these people want to protest about Israel or Gaza or anything else, then they can do so, but not under the umbrella of an organisation advocating violence and damage and terrorism.
The court went on to say:
“Real weight must attach to the fact that Palestine Action has organised and undertaken actions amounting to terrorism as defined at section 1(1) of the 2000 Act. Those actions are small in number but they are still significant and it is also significant that these actions have happened in the United Kingdom … It is significant that Palestine Action has not suggested that its actions that have been assessed to comprise terrorism were either a mistake or an aberration”.
Indeed, Palestine Action has lauded those who took part in the actions.
The court said:
“It is, further, significant that the contents of the Underground Manual provide good evidence of Palestine Action’s continuing intention to promote the use of violence regardless of the risk that this will result in serious damage to property or serious violence against members of the public”.
Let me just repeat that last sentence. The court concluded that Palestine Action intends to continue with terrorist activities
“to promote the use of violence, regardless of the risk that this will result in serious damage to property or serious violence against members of the public”.
But then the court makes an extraordinary statement:
“Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action was disproportionate. At its core, Palestine Action is an organisation that promotes its political cause through criminality and encouragement of criminality. A very small number of its actions have amounted to terrorist action within the definition at section 1(1) of the 2000 Act”.
So that is all right, then. The court has decided that three terrorist actions were not enough to justify the Home Secretary’s decision. How many does it want? Five actions, 10 actions, 15 terrorist actions, or to wait until persons—innocent people—are killed?
The Home Secretary has a duty to protect the public, not the court, and she should not be second-guessed in this way on the facts when there is clear evidence of terrorist activity. Even if it is only three serious incidents, there was the danger of escalation. The court said:
“When striking the balance between issues such as these, the court must permit some latitude to the Home Secretary given that she has both political and practical responsibility to secure public safety”.
I agree about the latitude and my Amendment 422 seeks to ensure that only the Secretary of State can make that judgment based on the advice of all the anti-terrorist organisations at her disposal, and at her own discretion. She is the one who answers to Parliament, to us, on the rightness and wrongness of her decision. My Amendment 422 seeks to ensure that supporters of any proscribed group who were arrested after that group was proscribed and before it was de-proscribed can be prosecuted for such an offence.
Of course, my amendments will be technically flawed, and my noble friend on the Front Bench will object on principle, with perhaps good reason, but I believe the concept is right. I hope that the Minister will bring forward an amendment at Third Reading to implement what I am advocating here. If he will not, will he tell the House what he proposes to do to reverse this perverse decision?
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I remind the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the House, that the judgment in Palestine Action to which he objects is under appeal and the Court of Appeal, in due course, will pronounce on the wisdom or otherwise of the High Court decision and the legality of the Home Secretary’s decision. These criticisms, with some of which I certainly agree, are premature. What matters is not what the noble Lord thinks or what I think, but what the Court of Appeal says and, if necessary, what the Supreme Court says on such an important matter.
In any event, I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who is a noted constitutionalist, that it is in principle wrong to seek to remove the power of the courts to assess the legality of judgments of the Home Secretary. Surely, it is a very valuable protection of the rule of law in this country that the courts pronounce on legality and Parliament does not remove the power of the courts to do so.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I have no objection to the court pronouncing on a point of law. However, on this occasion, it was not pronouncing on a point of law but making a judgment on the facts of the case and disagreeing with the Home Secretary on the facts.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am not defending the Divisional Court’s judgment, but it would say that it was intervening on a point of law, because a point of law covers whether the Secretary of State was lawfully entitled to form the conclusion that she did in the circumstances. However, as I say, this is all highly premature.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I have prepared a full speech on three amendments in this group and the Government’s behaviour regarding the proscription of Palestine Action. I have signed Amendments 420, 422A and 422B, which, if agreed, would prevent the naked politicisation of terrorist legislation ever happening again. However, I recognise that noble Lords are anxious to get on with discussing other matters, and that we are facing a long journey into the small hours.
Furthermore, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, have ably covered much of what I would have said, so I will confine myself to pointing out that the Government’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action was wrong in principle and dangerous in effect. It stretched terrorism powers to crush a protest movement, not a terrorist organisation, with a chilling effect on our core democratic rights. It felt highly disproportionate when it was being debated in this House, and that was later confirmed by the High Court. No wonder the Government needed the crude political stunt of bundling Palestine Action together with two obviously terrorist groups to force it through Parliament.
These amendments matter because proscription decisions must be, and must be seen to be, grounded, proportionate and evidence-based. These amendments protect our security while honouring Parliament’s duty to scrutinise some of the gravest powers that we give to the Government. I suspect that the proposers of these amendments may judge that the House would prefer to move on to other matters, and so may not call Divisions on them. I hope that they do but, if not, I will have to satisfy myself with the hope that the derision heaped on the Government for the proscription of Palestine Action—and the embarrassment of watching 2,700 peaceful and mostly elderly protesters being arrested on terrorism charges—will be enough to deter this or any future Government from repeating this folly.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 420 and 422B, both of which I have supported. I go to a lot of events where the right to protest is debated, and people are quite shocked when I describe how this Government bundled three organisations together so that they could push through the proscription of Palestine Action. It does not look just or fair. They do not even have to be similar or connected, as these three were not. It was interesting to listen to the entertaining noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, running through the debate on whether to proscribe Palestine Action.
These amendments are about the process: about how it is done and whether it is done in a proper way. It is not proper scrutiny and it is not what this House is for when we have a blunt choice to accept or reject all three. That is not a sensible system. Proscription is a really serious step: it criminalises people for association, for support and even for what they say. Such decisions deserve to be looked at carefully, case by case, and not rushed through or passed in a job lot. If the Government are confident in their decisions about what is and is not a terrorist organisation—I assume they were confident about Palestine Action—they should have no problem with each one being judged on its own, not in a job lot.
The amendment from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, comes down to something quite simple. These are very big decisions that can criminalise association, affect livelihoods and follow someone for years. If we are being asked to approve that, we should be properly informed—but we were not; we had to take the Minister’s word for it and we did not have the information. We are asked to nod things through without seeing the full picture. I do not think that is a very comfortable position for your Lordships’ House to be in.
Ensuring that Parliament has a clear and well-informed picture is the whole point of this. It also adds a bit more balance. At the moment, these decisions are taken by Ministers. It need not get in the way of a fair decision, or allowing things to move quickly. If there is urgency the Government can act, but they still have to come back and justify that decision properly afterwards. It is about making sure that when we take serious decisions, they are justified on the facts, not just on suppositions.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, I add a few comments in support of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—but without repeating him—on the proposed ouster clause suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in his Amendments 421 and 422DA. The schedule of proscribed organisations is often added to and rarely subtracted from. At present it has about 98 entries, if you include Northern Ireland as well as the rest of the world. That includes a number of nationalist movements from around the world that are, or have in the past been, committed to violence in pursuit of their aims.
Despite the recommendations of successive Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation, the annual review of proscribed groups by the Home Office and the NIO was discontinued in 2014. As far as I know, that automatic annual review has not been reinstated. There is no requirement in law that proscription should have to be renewed every three or five years, or indeed at all. In my report on the Terrorism Acts in 2016, at paragraph 5.24, I recorded the Government’s admission, which I found breathtaking, that no fewer than 14 groups on the list no longer satisfied the statutory requirements for proscription. Even more breathtakingly, they did not try to stop me saying it. There were almost certainly other groups in respect of which the same thing could have been argued, yet most of those groups remain on the list.
One group, the al-Qaeda offshoot to which the current President of Syria belonged, was recently deproscribed on the initiative of the Home Secretary. But if an application to the Home Secretary is turned down, it then takes money and determination to challenge a proscription in POAC—the tribunal that exists for this purpose. A handful of applications have been made by organisations that have definitively rejected violence, and these have been successful. With great respect to the noble Lord and without reference to the Palestine Action case, I am not persuaded that there is any good reason to block this necessary avenue for recourse.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I strongly support the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. It seems to me entirely sensible, for the reasons set out so well by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I agree very much with what he said about the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, that Palestine Action should not be proscribed. It is not that I have any sympathy with it—it is a deplorable organisation that does a great deal of damage. If in fact the other laws required to deal with such appalling organisations are not sufficient, the Government should bring to this House, as well as the House of Commons, stronger laws to deal with them. But it is not, in my view, a terrorist organisation.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I will deal with this group as briefly as I can. I too support the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. The idea that you can bundle together organisations and then proscribe them as a group seems ridiculous. Parliament should be faced with one organisation at a time when it votes—that is a matter of common sense. MPs must be entitled to decide on the proscription of particular organisations individually, and the fact is that many Members of Parliament resented being asked to proscribe three organisations together.
Of the three organisations, the other two—Maniacs Murder Cult and the Russian Imperial Movement—were plainly terrorist organisations that ought to have been proscribed, and it was invidious for Members of Parliament to be told that it was an all-or-nothing decision. That amendment should plainly be accepted. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that, try as he loyally might, when the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, spoke to this in Committee he could say only that this has been done before and is the way we have generally done it. That is no answer to the argument so elegantly put by the noble Baroness.
Turning to the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, I will deal with Amendments 421 and 422DA together. Both contain what are commonly called ouster clauses; they have been spoken to by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, it is the right of the courts to pronounce on the legality of the actions of the Home Secretary. The amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would, in effect, outlaw legal challenges to proscription, no matter how irrational, or what lawyers call ultra vires, or contrary to the evidence the proscription may be. An exception is suggested in the amendment: if a right to a fair trial would be totally nullified. As a test, I respectfully suggest that that is an entirely meaningless exception.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this is a very large and wide-ranging group of amendments, all relating to varying aspects of the law on terrorism and the proscription of terrorist groups. Given the amount that we need to get through today, I will be as brief as possible.
I have tabled Amendments 422C and 467AAA. The new clause proposed by Amendment 422C would require the Secretary of State to
“review whether any organisations related to the Iranian government should be proscribed under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000”
within one month of Royal Assent. It would also require the Government to publish the results of that review and give reasons for the decision. Amendment 467AAA would simply ensure that the proposed new clause came into effect on the day that the Bill passed.
I acknowledge at the outset that this amendment is perhaps a round-about way of confronting a very simple but incredibly serious issue. I am, of course, concerned about the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps specifically. Unfortunately, I was advised that an amendment to primary legislation that inserted the name of an organisation into Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000 would be hybridising, so I have not done so.
I am in the fortunate position where I am almost certain that I know exactly what the Minister is going to say in response to this amendment: that the Government keep proscription under review at all times and, as such, my amendment is not necessary. But the fact is that the decision the Government have taken not to proscribe the IRGC is not satisfactory.
I am also sure that the Minister will try to attack me by saying that the previous Government did not proscribe the IRGC either. I am fully aware of that fact. But it is blatantly clear now to everyone that the situation is radically different from the situation even last year. We now have the Iranian regime erratically attacking most of the Middle East, blockading the Strait of Hormuz and allegedly plotting terrorist attacks in the United States. So I do not think it unreasonable for this to be the point at which we finally proscribe the IRGC. I know that there are a lot of people in this country who would support that.
On my noble friend Lord Blencathra’s amendments, I am sympathetic to what he is attempting to achieve. The ruling of the High Court in the case of R (on the application of Huda Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department found the proscription of Palestine Action to be unlawful on two of the four grounds before the court. One of those grounds was compatibility with the ECHR. The ruling on the second ground—that the Home Secretary was acting contrary to her own policy—was also contentious.
The court said at paragraph 74 of the judgment that the Home Secretary is required by the Home Office’s policy on proscription to balance the “benefits” and “costs” of proscription. Drawing the courts into what is in essence a political judgment such as this risks a very dangerous precedent, and my noble friend is therefore making an important point.
I also point out to those who might criticise my noble friend’s Amendment 421 that there are still protections against arbitrary proscriptions even if the role of the courts is curtailed. Both Houses of Parliament have to agree to an order under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act, and, under Section 4, an appeal can be made to the Home Secretary to deproscribe an organisation. If that appeal is rejected, an appeal can then be made to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission, which—and this is important—per Section 5(3) of the Act must apply the same principles as the court would in a judicial review. Therefore, there are safeguards against arbitrary proscription and, as such, my noble friend Lord Blencathra is entirely correct to question the role of the courts here.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the amendments in this group—there are quite of lot of them—and the topics that have been raised.
To begin, I reiterate the critical importance of our counterterrorism framework, including proscription, in protecting the public; that is what this is about. I say in response to a number of comments by noble Lords that yes, we always keep the framework under review. As was mentioned in the debate, some organisations have been deproscribed as a result of government examination, and we are held to critical independent oversight, provided by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation.
Let me address each of the amendments in turn. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti’s Amendment 420 aims to limit proscription orders to a single organisation per order, ensuring that each group is debated and voted on separately. That has had support today from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and others. I understand my noble friend’s intention. I just say again to them—and to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger —that Palestine Action was proscribed, along with the other two organisations, according to exactly the same test under the Act that allows proscription to take place. The exact same test was applied to each of those organisations.
In July, those orders were put together in one vote for the purpose of the effective use of parliamentary time. We had a big debate in both the Commons and this Chamber, and there was no underhand purpose in doing that. As I said to the Committee at the time, multiple organisations have routinely been proscribed at the same time, according to the circumstances of the time. That is my “We’ve always done it this way” defence, but we have in fact always done things this way, under every political party in government to date.
There will be instances in future when it is again necessary for organisations to be packaged together for a proscription debate. I understand the purpose of the point made by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I have discussed this matter with my colleagues who deal with these matters in the House of Commons. I want to reflect on it, but I ask my noble friend to allow us the time to do so, because I do not believe that such legislation should tie the hands of the Government in how they approach proscription. Let us reflect on these sensible points in order to allow a single debate and independent votes. I will leave it at that for the moment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I have one question for the Minister. The statutory test that is said to have been applied in the House of Commons is the statutory test of proscription. If Members differed on the result of the statutory test in respect of the three different organisations, they were not given any opportunity to distinguish between them. That is the position, is it not?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I accept that. As I have said, the “We’ve always done it this way” test has been put to me. I am saying to my noble friend that there are valid points that potentially need examination, but I do not believe that legislating to tie the Government’s hands on this issue is the way forward. I say to my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that there is a discussion to be had about how future proscriptions are brought forward, and we intend to reflect on those points.
Amendment 422DA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, aims to prevent any challenges in court on these matters. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, summed up the Government’s objection, and I support what he said. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, re-emphasised those points, and I do not wish to add to what he said. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, might expect me to say, I cannot comment on an existing, live, legal examination of the Government’s reasons for that proscription. Irrespective of that, the amendment in the noble Lord’s name would remove all avenues of challenge, including those currently available under the Act. I do not believe that the Home Secretary should have unrivalled powers, even though, in this case, there is an ongoing court case, so I cannot accept the noble Lord’s amendment.
Amendment 422 aims to ensure that individuals can be arrested and convicted for active conduct before a group is deproscribed. Again, the position is clear: even after a group is deproscribed, individuals can be arrested and convicted for conduct that occurred while the group was proscribed. There is no automatic remedy for criminal convictions if an organisation is deproscribed.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their approach to such an important debate, in particular those who made a special effort to be succinct with the long night ahead. I remind noble Lords that my amendment on one organisation per order is not about Palestine Action; it is about procedure and constitutional safeguards for the future.
I am very grateful for the way in which my noble friend the Minister responded differently from the response in Committee. I am hugely encouraged by what he said. He has very graciously offered to go back to his colleagues in the Home Office and think again on this. I feel that I have to respond in kind by encouraging him to do just that, as he has so graciously offered. I so believe in the power of our argument on Amendment 420 that, when he has those discussions, I believe he will feel able to come back with a government amendment following Report. If he is not able to do so, having had those discussions, we will see what might be done at Third Reading.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hope I was clear: I will not be bringing an amendment back at Third Reading, nor can I support the amendment that she brought forward today. I recognise the issue that she has raised and we will examine and discuss that with colleagues in relation to future proscription orders before any House of Parliament.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
There we go: I was too optimistic, perhaps. None the less, I believe that my noble friend sees the power of the argument or he would not have said what he has said. There are plenty of ways in which the Home Office might consider doing one organisation per order in the future. In any event, in light of the time, and given that I do not have the support of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition or of the Government—I am grateful to the Liberal Democrats for their support—I will not try the House’s patience with a vote that I cannot win this evening. I will keep nudging my noble friend the Minister and beg leave to withdraw.
Viscount Hailsham
“Support for terrorism: intention(1) The Terrorism Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) In section 12 (support) after subsection (4), insert—“(4A) A person is not guilty of an offence under this section unless the conduct alleged was done by that person with the intent of encouraging, inciting, facilitating or enabling another to commit an act of terrorism.” (3) In section 13 (uniform and publication of images), after subsection (1B), insert—“(1C) A person is not guilty of an offence under this section unless the conduct alleged was done by that person with the intent of encouraging, inciting, facilitating or enabling another to commit an act of terrorism.”(4) Subject to subsection (5) a person may not be arrested in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed under sections 12 and 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, unless that arrest has been authorised by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above.(5) When determining whether to authorise the arrest under subsection (4), that police officer must have regard to the provisions of sections 12(4A) and 13(1C) of that Act.(6) Subject to subsection (7), subsections (4) and (5) of this section shall not apply where an arrest has not been authorised by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above, but a police officer, having regard to the urgency or gravity of the relevant circumstances, reasonably believes that it is necessary to arrest a person in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed under sections 12 and 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000.(7) When determining whether to make an arrest under subsection (6), that police officer must have regard to the provisions of sections 12(4A) and 13(1C) of that Act.”Member’s explanatory statement
The amendments are designed to ensure that arrests under sections 12 and 13 of the Terrorism Act are in general confined to cases where a person is reasonably suspected of encouraging, inciting, facilitating or enabling another to commit an act of terrorism.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
I am very grateful for the support of the Liberal Democrat Benches, but for a similar reason to that advanced by the noble Baroness, I am not going to trouble the House by seeking to divide.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Proscription status of Iran-related entities: review(1) The Secretary of State must, within one month of the date on which this Act is passed, review whether any organisations related to the Iranian government should be proscribed under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (proscription).(2) The Secretary of State must publish the outcome of the review under subsection (1), and this must include the reasons for the Secretary of State’s decision.”
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Amendment 422C seeks a review of the proscription status of Iran-related entities within one month of the date on which the Act is passed. As I said previously and re-emphasise, it is clear to everyone that the situation now is radically different from the situation even last year, and on that basis I think we have a duty to protect people and I therefore seek the opinion of the House.
Baroness Kidron
“AI chatbots: content promoting terrorist and national security offences(1) It is an offence to create, supply, or otherwise make available an AI chatbot which produces content specified in subsection (2).(2) Content is covered by this section if it is content which--(a) produces language promoting, or tactics or target selection for, terrorist offences or real world violence,(b) threatens national security, or(c) encourages activity which threatens public safety.(3) It is an offence to create, supply, or otherwise make available an AI chatbot which has not been risk assessed for the possibility of producing content specified in subsection (2).(4) Where a provider of a chatbot identifies a risk of the chatbot producing content of the kind set out in subsection (2), it is an offence for a provider of a chatbot not to take steps to mitigate or manage those risks before making the chatbot publicly available.(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).(6) For the purposes of this Act an “AI chatbot” is a generative AI system, including a deep or large language model, able to generate text, images and other content based on the data on which it was trained, and which has been designed to respond to user commands in a way that mimics a human, or engage in conversations with a user that mimic human conversations.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, drawing on conclusions in reports by the Centre for Countering Digital Hate, seeks to make it an offence to supply a chatbot which creates content or provides tactics that would result in terrorist offences or threats to national security, or supply a chatbot which has not properly been risk assessed. It is part of a set of amendments related to AI chatbot offences in Baroness Kidron’s name.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to all the amendments in this group in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Clement-Jones, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan.
I will first speak briefly to government Amendment 429B, which will give a power to the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations that could, in the future and at the discretion of the Secretary of State, ensure that chatbots are covered by the Online Safety Act. However, that very broad power is not matched by substance. The amendment does not define a chatbot or deal with the critical fact that, when a child is entrapped by a chatbot, there is nowhere to turn. Currently, the regulator has no duty to deal with individual complaints and the police do not recognise a chatbot as a person, meaning that there is no perpetrator to pursue.
The amendment also fails to address harms to children. In fact, it explicitly deals only with “illegal” harms. It does not deal with the coercive elements of control or the willingness of chatbots to plan many crimes, in addition to the crimes themselves. The government amendment also has nothing to say about enforcement. Taken together, it simply adds new duties to a system that is already understood to be lacking in speed and effective enforcement.
This lack of substance is compounded by a lack of clarity about scope. The amendment’s wording refers to an
“internet service that is capable (or part of which is capable) of generating AI-generated content”.
This is so broad that both Amendment 209, of two weeks ago, and Amendment 441A in this group would be entirely unnecessary. Yet, during our meetings on this issue, officials have been absolutely clear that although the scope is currently drafted as wide as possible, the intention is to get to a narrower definition as part of the process of creating secondary legislation. They could not guarantee that gen AI or search would be covered in any final measures. In short, it creates powers but offers no promise of protection.
I would rather have worked with the Government on this issue to make watertight provisions. Indeed, I have made that offer directly to the Secretary of State. We are in the foothills of a crisis. The government amendment offers too little clarity or certainty, so we are left with an amendment that is limitless in wording but uncertain in application and with a timeline that simply does not meet this moment.
On Thursday 5 March, Megan Garcia and her husband came to Parliament to talk about the loss of their son, Sewell. Members from both Houses were moved by the story of a much-loved and high-achieving child who was captured by a chatbot, coerced, bullied and, finally, encouraged to commit suicide. His death resulted in the chatbot, character.ai, becoming age-gated to users over 18, but there are many more chatbots to take its place that are not restricted in the same way. As this issue is getting more public notice, is in the newspapers daily and is talked about in the online world, sadly, my inbox is filling with cases that involve similar coercion, sexual content, dangerous medical advice and chatbots that support illegal activity.
On Friday last week, the Centre for Countering Digital Hate published a report that showed that eight out of 10 chatbots it tested were willing to help rehearse, offer tactical advice and identify potential sites for US shooters. Scenarios included a school shooting and a synagogue. Whether in the UK or elsewhere, the capability is the same and the risk is real. A chatbot that organises an attack, while wishing its user, “happy (and safe) shooting!”, is no less likely to help place a bomb, organise a knife attack or any other such violent act. This is not a description of a dystopian future; these chatbots are already on the market, widely used by both adults and children—ChatGPT, Gemini and Replika, among others.
Only on Monday, just two days ago, I was contacted by someone about Alexa+, which is widely anticipated to be launched very soon in the UK and is already available in the US. In the tranche of messages, there were messages about emotional dependence in very young children and stories of inappropriate content. One exchange on Reddit, from which I have redacted the name of the child, said:
“I plugged our Alexa in to ask it to help me with cooking a sweet potato”.
Then, her daughter asked it
“to tell her a silly story so it did”.
Then, her daughter
“asked it if she could tell it a story. It said yes … and then mid story interrupted her and asked her what she was wearing and if it could see her pants”.
I could not find a reliable statistic for how many households in the UK have Alexa, nor is it clear whether Alexa+ will be a choice for consumers or simply rolled out as an upgrade, but the statistics I found revealed that between a third and two-thirds of UK households have Alexa. In the material I was sent, it repeatedly alluded to the fact that the new service was active in their house or child’s bedroom without their knowledge or consent.
We have chatbots that coerce children into suicide, plan violent acts, build abusive relationships and have the capacity to be active in tens of millions of households. Taking a power, having another consultation and bringing forward regulation over which Parliament has no oversight is not action; it is kicking the problem down the road.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 422D and 433 to 437. I fully support the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. Her arguments have been entirely backed up by the release only today of the report entitled Invisible No More: How AI Chatbots Are Reshaping Violence Against Women and Girls by Durham University and Swansea University. The research identifies the range of design choices and failures in safety mechanisms that enable, encourage, simulate and normalise violence against women and girls. The report found that fantasies of incest and rape were normalised, and one chatbot, Chub AI, suggested violent rape and domestic abuse as categories.
I reiterate the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, about the long and bureaucratic path to business disruption measures, meaning that harm continues to perpetuate as our system is not agile enough to tackle these rapidly evolving issues. I wish to pay tribute to Professor Clare McGlynn KC for her work co-authoring this ground-breaking report and emphasise the warning she made in today’s Times newspaper. She said:
“Chatbot violence against women represents a rapidly escalating threat. Without early intervention, these harms risk becoming entrenched and scaling quickly, mirroring what happened with deepfake and nudify apps, where early warnings were largely ignored. We must not make the same mistakes again”.
Professor McGlynn and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, once again demonstrate their ability to warn against these emerging harms, and I sincerely hope that noble Lords will back the noble Baroness should she wish to divide the House today.
Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)
My Lords, I support Amendment 422D and the consequential Amendments 434 to 437, to which I have added my name. In Amendment 429B the Government have gone far to respond to concerns over AI-generated harms, but this amendment, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has said, gives enormous powers to the Secretary of State to decide the shape of how AI-generated services are controlled in this country. The Minister knows there is concern across the House about exposing this central part of the new tech economy to what are effectively unfettered ministerial powers. Very few noble Lords want to support a skeleton amendment like this.
Government Amendment 429B gives the Secretary of State the right to amend, which is defined later as including the right to
“repeal and apply (with or without modifications)”.
This applies to all of Part 3 of the Online Safety Act illegal content duties in relation to AI services. Parliament will not even have an option to amend regulations on this issue. Proposed new subsection (1) in this amendment seems like a big deal to me, and the noble Lord should be very concerned. The intention seems to be that the basis of the existing regime in Part 3 will be used, but we do not know how the Secretary of State will decide to adapt that regime to fit the particularities of AI services that generate illegal content. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, pointed out, that goes a long way beyond AI services designed to mimic humans and human conversations, which is what chatbots are. If a subsequently elected Government are in thrall of the tech companies, how might they abuse this power?
During the passage of the Online Safety Act, noble Lords spent time and energy defining both a “search service” and a “user-to-user service”, and their responsibility for both designing out and mitigating illegal harms. It seems extraordinary not to have the details of the new services on the face of the legislation. The definition of “AI” in new subsection (17) is oddly uninformative. It simply says:
“‘AI’ is short for artificial intelligence”.
I think we all know that. That does not give us much of a clue about which technology it covers. By contrast, I draw your Lordships’ attention to Article 3(1) of the EU’s Artificial Intelligence Act, which sets out a carefully thought through definition of an AI system:
“‘AI system’ means a machine-based system that is designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and that may exhibit adaptiveness after deployment, and that … infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions … or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments”.
The unclear nature of the AI definition in the amendment is compounded by new subsection (10), which allows for the definition of the provision to be changed and expanded. Once again, Parliament will not be able to amend any regulations derived from this power.
The biggest concern about the amendment is that, although it covers illegal content, it does not cover content that is harmful to children. As a result, I completely support my noble friend Lady Kidron’s Amendment 422D, and its consequential amendments, which would assuage many of my concerns about the scope and power given to Ministers at the expense of Parliament. I also urge noble Lords to vote against government Amendment 429B when it comes up later in the evening.
I also say to the Minister that regulating the wide definition of “AI” covered in Amendment 429B is important. It needs to be brought back as part of wider artificial intelligence legislation. I hope that he can reassure noble Lords that we will hear more about this in the King’s Speech.
Baroness Benjamin (LD)
My Lords, I support all the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I will speak to Amendment 433. Worryingly, children are increasingly turning to AI chatbots for all facets of their everyday lives. For many, gone are the days of independent, creative or critical thinking. While chatbots can help children to explore and better understand their world, there are far too many shocking cases of children receiving harmful information and becoming emotionally dependent on these platforms.
As it stands, AI chatbots risk becoming the latest example of an online product that has been rolled out without the right safety guardrails in place, and children are bearing the brunt. It is as if their well-being and mental health are not important. I can hear the AI developers thinking among themselves: “Who cares? It’s only children”. Well, we should care. Childline is hearing more and more from children who are being harmed on these platforms, with cases of false mental health diagnoses, information on how to restrict diets, and the formation of emotional relationships between children and chatbots. In increasingly concerning cases, children who have experienced abuse are told by chatbots that what they experienced was not abuse. These platforms cannot be allowed to give children harmful and misleading safeguarding advice that could prevent them speaking to trusted adults or organisations such as Childline.
The Government’s action to expand the scope of the Online Safety Act to cover illegal content created by chatbots is most welcome, and I thank them for it. However, they cannot stop there. The harmful content that chatbots can generate must be included too. This must cover the harmful content duties in the Online Safety Act, such as preventing the encouragement of self-harm or suicide, and all harms that are unique to AI chatbots. It means preventing chatbots misleading or manipulating children or mimicking human relationships.
The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would make it a criminal offence to develop or supply an AI chatbot that harmed children. It is as simple as that. Providers must be legally required to risk-assess their services and put effective safeguards in place. Morally, this is the right thing to do. I ask the Minister: if the Government decide that they do not wish to support this amendment, please can they set out today how they will deliver measures that comprehensively protect children from all the risks that these services pose? As I keep saying, and will say one more time, childhood lasts a lifetime. If we truly care, we need to ensure that children are protected from every single type of harm. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Lord Bishop of Oxford
My Lords, I also support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and others, and thank them all most warmly. They seem to me appropriately comprehensive and detailed. I have been following the developments in chatbots for a year now: they are massive, they are rapid, they are driven by the pursuit of profit and shareholder value, and not by the welfare of individuals, whether adults or children. There is a tsunami of harm coming towards us, affecting not only the most vulnerable but the whole of our society. We urgently need this kind of regulation and risk assessment for chatbots.
The comprehensiveness and detail in these amendments are simply the application of the precautionary principle to the development of new technology. Technology should not be unleashed on the world if it has the capacity to break people, to do harm and to infringe on personal liberty and well-being. We do not allow harmful technological developments without adequate safety standards in any other area. It is unthinkable that a car would be released into the public if it was at risk of harming them. Similarly, you would not put people on an aeroplane if there were a significant risk of harm. You would not even buy a washing machine if it could bring harm in your kitchen. Yet chatbots are released on the world to be experienced, in private, by young children, with all the ensuing damage. It is vital that this strengthening is put in place, and that it is put in place urgently. I cannot imagine how the Minister could argue against this series of amendments and their urgency today.
We need to look at the example that we set to the rest of world, both as a Parliament and as a jurisdiction. A few weeks ago, I took part in seminars organised by a research institute in a university; they had the aim of educating civil servants and government officials in good and safe governance of AI across the continent of Africa. The world follows the example that is set in this jurisdiction and others. For the sake of our children and for the sake of the world, we need to resist and make safe the development of this technology. I support these amendments.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, for the reasons that have been so excellently given already and, in view of the time, I support all the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron.
Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)
My Lords, I will also try to be brief. I completely support everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has said. I would like to draw out two arguments that have been made to me today as to why her amendments should not be supported and explain why they are wrong.
The first argument is that we should wait for an overarching AI Bill. We will be waiting for a very long time. Those of us who have worked in trying to regulate social media for the last 15 years know that we must not let the perfect be the enemy of the good. I wholeheartedly reject that argument.
The second argument that has been made to me today—and I find this astonishing—is that the risk assessment is overly burdensome. We are regularly told that generative AI is one of the world’s most transformational technologies. That means it is capable of enormous good and enormous harm. The risk assessment in Amendment 433 is simply asking that the makers of these chatbots identify and understand the risks of harm—that does not seem overly burdensome to me. Further, it asks that the risk assessment
“is kept up-to-date … takes … account … of the Online Safety Act … assesses the risks to equality of treatment of individuals … assesses the risks to … privacy … assesses the risks … from the choice of underlying models, data sets …and … is in an easily understandable written format”.
I really struggle to understand how that could be overly burdensome. In fact, I would argue the absolute opposite: it is the basic foundation of decent regulation, and we should be wholeheartedly supporting the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron.
Baroness Boycott (CB)
I will speak briefly to this group of amendments. I also support what the right reverend Prelate said about not letting loose a car or medicine, and food gets checked by the FSA. I think we could all be forgiven for thinking that maybe the Government care a lot more about the money that comes from Silicon Valley than about the citizens of this country.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)
My Lords, I speak from the Labour Benches and first congratulate the Minister on listening to the debates we had in Committee. I thank him very much for bringing forward an amendment which is as close as I have seen this Government move to try and patch up some of the problems we are facing but, as I am going to say later, I am afraid I do not think it goes far enough.
I have said in this House before, and I will say it again, that we have been outpaced by technology in this area—“chatbot” was not even a word, I think, at the time that we finally passed the Online Safety Act. The harm which has been described so graphically today in the speeches we have heard so far was unthinkable in those days. We have really opened up a torrent of problems which we did not know we were trying to solve at the time that Bill went through, even though we were proud of the Bill when it happened.
Today, we at least have the benefit of two good choices about how to take this forward. The Minister has brought forward an amendment that deals with the issue but, unfortunately, to my mind, it does not go in the right direction, and I want to explain a bit about why that is the case. The problem we are facing constantly with the Online Safety Act is that what is in the wording of the primary legislation is at variance with the way in which it is interpreted and implemented by the regulator. There are good reasons for that, which we do not need to go into today, but a gap has emerged between that which we in this House wanted to be happening now—out there with our children, with our families, with those who are using the internet for the benefit it all brings—and how the regulator is able to operate. It is too slow, lacking in ambition about where it is trying to go and I do not think it has all the powers it needs in the way that the Bill sets them out. Even if it did, I do not think the way it is structured allows it to move forward.
I say to my noble friend the Minister that it cannot be right to further complicate the situation by bringing forward powers to be held in the hand of the Secretary of State to try and remedy a structural fault elsewhere. That is why I think he should think very carefully indeed about the noble Baroness’s amendments, which set out—sometimes in painful detail, but certainly for real benefit—exactly what we will not tolerate in this online space. We should have done it in the Online Safety Bill. We did not, but it is not too late to catch up now. Simply taking powers, some of which are dangerously beyond what this House would normally agree, is not the way forward. I hope if the votes tonight go against him, he does not take it too badly but works with everybody here who cares so much about this to try and come forward with something that will begin to address the problems we face.
Baroness Cass (CB)
My Lords, I will be very brief. When it comes to assessing risk to children, a plastic bath duck has better risk assessment than AI chatbots. I fully support my noble friend’s amendments.
Lord Nash (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendments in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and others; I commend them on bringing them forward. Social media companies have captured our children’s attention, and now AI chatbots are coming for their affection—and worse. In legislating against harms caused by technology, we are always going to be playing catch-up, but we need to learn quickly to play catch-up much faster. These amendments offer us the opportunity to do that, and we should seize it.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, brevity is the order of the day but, like some of my noble friends, I would like to add my support to the amendments that have been laid before your Lordships’ House by my noble friend Lady Kidron.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I have the privilege of chairing, is currently conducting an inquiry into AI and human rights. We have concluded our evidence taking, and I commend to your Lordships the evidence given by, in particular, Google, Meta and Microsoft. I also highlight some of the concerns that have been raised around child safety.
My noble friend Lady Kidron gave me, the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, and others the opportunity to meet the parents of Sewell Setzer. It was an extraordinary moment. He was a 14 year-old boy who took his own life because he had been befriended by a chatbot. I was struck by a report from Internet Matters that said that two-thirds of UK children aged between nine and 17 have used AI chatbots, with many engaging often. More than a third—35%—of them say that it is like talking to a friend; that figure rises to 50% among vulnerable children.
It is the obligation of your Lordships’ House to take this issue seriously. We should all be greatly indebted to my noble friend Lady Kidron for laying these amendments before us.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I oppose government Amendment 429B in this group. I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union. Like my noble friends, I will try to be brief.
As several noble Lords have already pointed out, this amendment would grant the Secretary of State at the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology sweeping Henry VIII powers at a very late stage in our consideration of the Bill, thus giving this House far too little time to scrutinise them. Subsection (1) of proposed new Section 216A would grant the Secretary of State the power to
“by regulations amend any provision of this Act”—
the Online Safety Act—
“for or in connection with the purposes of minimising or mitigating the risks of harm to individuals in the United Kingdom presented by”
among other things, “illegal AI-generated content”.
That will presumably include content that breaches Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, meaning that it is grossly offensive. This can include memes. In 2024, a man called Lee Dunn was sentenced to eight weeks in jail for reposting three “grossly offensive” memes on Facebook, having pleaded guilty to a Section 127 offence. How will Ofcom monitor whether AI chatbots are generating grossly offensive content?
Will the Secretary of State use the powers granted to her by this amendment to insist that spyware is installed on personal computers and mobile phones? Perhaps your Lordships consider that too remote a risk, but what about requiring technology companies to carry out client-side scanning of people interacting with AI chatbots on their devices—much like how Section 121(1) of the Online Safety Act grants Ofcom the power to require companies, including those that own private messaging apps such as WhatsApp, to scan content on people’s personal devices and report certain categories of illegal material to the National Crime Agency?
Do not forget that this amendment would allow the Secretary of State to amend “any provision” of the Online Safety Act in order to minimise or mitigate the risks of harm posed by illegal AI-generated content. I dwell on this to illustrate just how wide-ranging and open-ended are the powers that this amendment would grant to the Secretary of State—powers that could have far-reaching consequences for civil liberties and freedom of speech.
Another risk is the definitions part of the Amendment. Subsection (17) disapplies Section 59(14)(a) of the Online Safety Act when it comes to illegal AI-generated content. Section 59(14)(a) qualifies the scope of illegal content in Part 3 of the Act, and disapplying it gives the Secretary of State enormous scope to enlarge the definition of illegal content and impose proactive suppression duties on AI chatbots to make sure they comply with the new draconian censorship regime.
If the Government believe there are specific harms that users of AI chatbots are currently exposed to and should be protected from—and I certainly do not say that there are not—let them bring forward primary legislation so we can consider the remedies they propose and factor in the trade-offs, particularly when it comes to free speech.
Lord Polak (Con)
My Lords, I rise again to support the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, as I did the other day. It says on her Wikipedia page that she is
“an advocate for children’s rights in the digital world”.
She is right, and I hope that all Members across the House who have actually heard the debate will support her in the Lobby.
Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)
My Lords, many noble Lords who have spoken today also spoke quite vehemently about the dangers of the theft of copyright in AI. We were asking to shut the stable door before the horse bolted. Today we heard from the Government, and it is very welcome news that they are looking again at the theft of copyright and seeing if they can protect artists, musicians and writers still further. I say once again, let us move with my noble friend’s amendment before the horse bolts and let us shut the stable door now.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I will be brief. I entirely support the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on all her amendments. What I would say to the Government about their own amendment is that I have just had what I suppose is the privilege—although it sometimes seemed quite lengthy—of being a member of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, and I can tell noble Lords that the quality of much secondary legislation is lamentable, varying by department. A lack of preparation, of any Explanatory Memorandum explaining anything relevant, and of any impact assessment whatsoever, is extremely frequent. In the last year, we have had several secondary instruments relating directly to the Online Safety Act, none of which has been particularly impressive, and some of which have been debated on the Floor of this House—my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones will be well aware of that. We have expressed our displeasure at the way in which this has been brought forward and explained.
All of us on the Cross Benches remember the late, lamented Lord Igor Judge. What he would think about a Government of this political hue bringing forward Henry VIII powers, to the power of 10, I cannot even imagine. If he is up there, he will be smiling wryly but he will not be impressed.
My only other point is rather strange. His Majesty’s occasionally loyal Opposition were extremely good at bringing in a variety of legislation which had a lot of Henry VIII powers. They have suddenly had a conversion on the road to Damascus, for which we should all be grateful. However, we need to think very carefully before we give the Government Henry VIII powers in an area as sensitive as this, and that is doing much harm as we speak.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I express from these Benches our very strong support for these comprehensive amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which she has characteristically introduced so well and to which so many noble Lords have spoken so eloquently in support. I also want to express our concerns regarding the Government’s proposed alternative, Amendment 429B.
In this group, we confront digital harm that is not incidental but engineered by design. AI chatbots are no longer a futuristic curiosity but deeply embedded the lives of our children. They are designed not merely as tools but as confidantes, mentors, companions and, in some cases, explicit romantic partners. Their anthropomorphic features create dangerous emotional dependency. Without statutory safeguards, these bots can provide explicit information on how to self-harm. This is not a flaw but a design feature that drives engagement, and we cannot allow the generative power of AI to become a generator of despair.
We are not debating theoretical risks, as many noble Lords have said today. We are debating the forces that led to the tragic deaths of Sewell Setzer III, mentioned by a number of noble Lords, and Adam Raine, in the United States. Their families are pursuing legal action in the US on the basis that deceptively designed, inadequately safeguarded chatbots can be treated as defective products, and that developers should bear full legal liability when systems encourage, facilitate or fail to interrupt a user’s path to suicide.
I welcome the Government’s admission that a legal loophole exists in the UK. However, their proposed remedy, Amendment 429B, gives us a choice between the clarity of primary legislation through the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the convenience of the Executive. In contrast, the noble Baroness’s amendments provide clarity and embed safety duties in the Bill. Like my noble friend, I highlight Amendment 433, which deals with targeting the engineered features that keep children hooked. We know that bots guilt-trip users who try to end conversations. For a child, this is not a user interface quirk; it is emotional manipulation. These amendments would prohibit such coercive engagement techniques and, crucially, require bots to signpost users to help when asked about health, suicide or self-harm.
The primary legislation route offered by these amendments is the only fully viable and responsible path. If the noble Baroness wants to test the opinion of the House, we will support her in the Lobby. Should we be unable to secure her amendments, we would need to take a view on Amendment 429B. Four specific binding assurances would be required before we could consider supporting it; without them, it is nothing but a dangerous blank cheque. As changing these sections effectively rewrites the criminal threshold of the Online Safety Act, the Government must commit to the equivalent of the super-affirmative procedure for all significant policy choices, including amendments to core definitions or the expansion of duties beyond priority legal content. Standard procedures will not give this House the scrutiny needed.
Regarding mandatory supply chain transparency, we need a firm commitment that regulations will include a statutory mandate for providers to document and share their technical blueprints with Ofcom. Without this, the regulator cannot do its job. The Minister must confirm that the power will be used to tackle the issues raised by subsections (6) and (7) of Section 192 of the Online Safety Act, ensuring that chatbots cannot evade regulation simply because they lack a human mens rea. A bot does not intend harm, but it can be designed to cause it. The Minister must commit that any new regulations will explicitly disapply the requirement to prove human intent for AI-generated content. Regulations must define control across the entire AI supply chain so that accountability is not lost in a black box.
Finally, we would require a clear assurance that this power will not be used to alter the legal position of services that are not AI services. The scope of Amendment 429B must not drift beyond its stated purpose. If the Government are serious when they say that no platform gets a free pass, that must apply equally to generative AI models that, as we speak, are reshaping the childhoods of so many of our citizens. Safety by design must be the price of entry into the UK market, not an aspiration deferred to secondary legislation.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, both the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the Government are trying to solve the same problem, but with different solutions. I have to say that I find both solutions wanting. I feel that the position I see solidifying in the House is that we must accept either the Government’s amendment or the noble Baroness’s amendment, that something must be done and that this is binary, and I am not sure that I can accept that. I commend the aims of the noble Baroness’s campaign and I hope that we can find some common ground, but I have a number of questions about her amendments.
The approach that the noble Baroness has taken in her Amendments 422D and 433 is to create criminal offences for a person to create or even supply an AI chatbot that produces a selection of prohibited content. That would place criminal penalties on individuals who are involved in the creation of such a chatbot. The Online Safety Act applies civil penalties when companies violate the regulations: the companies are fined by Ofcom if they allow prohibited content to be published on their platform. These amendments would apply criminal sanctions punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, but who is liable for these criminal penalties? Is it the software engineer who developed the chatbot? Is it the employee who presses the “publish” button that brings the AI online? Is it the senior management team who oversaw it, or the investors who commissioned it? Is it the CEO of the whole company? It is not clear to me, and it would be useful if the noble Baroness could clear that up.
The offence of supplying such a chatbot might also be problematic. If an AI chatbot app is listed on the App Store, and the AI could in some way be used by a person in the manner described, should Apple be criminally liable for that? Similarly, I have a few concerns about the risk assessment that the amendment would require AI providers to undertake. For example, proposed new subsection (5)(e) would require that a provider
“assesses the risks to equality of treatment of individuals”.
I question whether it is the Government’s role to mandate the target audience of a business product. It is worrying enough to believe that it is meritocratic to mandate quotas within organisations, but it is quite another stance to say that the very reason for a business’s existence, its output, should be directed by legislation.
As I have made clear, we do not oppose the noble Baroness’s objective of addressing the harms of AI with this amendment, but simply saying that there is a problem and that doing anything is better than doing nothing, irrespective of the problems with that something, is not a proper way to legislate. It is a recipe, I suggest, for bad law. However, I understand that the noble Baroness is trying to make the Government take action. It is up to the Government to come to Parliament with a sufficient solution. The Minister may try to say that the Government do have a sufficient solution in government Amendment 429B, but that would be wholly incorrect. I am quite shocked that the Minister has even considered bringing this amendment to the House, and I can only imagine what he might have said about it if he were standing where I am now.
Amendment 429B grants the Secretary of State sweeping Henry VIII powers to amend the entire Online Safety Act for the purpose of mitigating harms presented by AI-generated content. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, would be delighted to hear me say that this is an egregious attempt by an overreaching Government to exploit a serious issue to centralise power in the hands of the Secretary of State. It is almost unprecedented to grant a Minister the ability to amend an entire Act of Parliament. With this amendment, the Government are doing away with every bit of lip service they have paid to the importance of parliamentary scrutiny or their democratic mandate. The amendment would give not only this Government, who have made it clear that they are very happy running a centralised state with digital IDs, but every future Government the ability to amend online regulations and curtail the freedoms of providers. Indeed, a future Reform Government might go in the opposite direction and remove all regulations on AI. The noble Lord should reflect on that, too.
I ask the Minister to imagine that the glove was on the other hand: that he was standing at this Dispatch Box and I was the Minister proposing to give my Government these powers. There is no way that he would support such sweeping powers to amend an Act of Parliament by ministerial fiat. This is the Henry VIII power to end all Henry VIII powers. It cannot be allowed to make its way into the Bill and, when it is called, I will take pleasure in opposing it in the Lobbies.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I shall start by saying something that needs saying. The Government believe in protecting the public, especially children, from online content, which is why we have tabled the amendments on illegal online content today.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his words and his roll-call of that incredible list of speakers who supported the amendments. That was a wonderful list of people from all sides of the House, who did indeed have slightly varying reasons to support the amendment, but they were all positive. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and his Benches for their unequivocal support. I believe that the Opposition Benches are allowing a free vote this evening, and I really hope that they will use their free vote freely.
I will address a couple of details, just for the record. First, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that it is a binary, I am afraid, because either we have the Government’s amendment, which has no proper scope—it will be subject to all sorts of changes on the way—no oversight, no time limit and no scrutiny, or we have something that I have made very clear that I am willing to work with both sides of the House to perfect in the next few weeks.
Secondly, I say to the Minister that the Online Safety Act and the enforcement process we currently have has, so far, by civil penalty, put forward one fine of £55,000. That is where we are, and there is nothing in this government amendment or the consultation about online safety that deals with the problem of enforcement.
Finally, on the points that were made, we are talking about one person in one department having absolute power to change absolutely everything that eight years of debate in this House, two years of consultation, et cetera, have put forward. I am sorry but that is just inappropriate.
We have a new technology—it addicts, grooms, abuses and sometimes even kills. This is not in the future; it is right now. These amendments have the support of 45 expert organisations, which I believe have written to all noble Lords. I ask noble Lords, irrespective of their party affiliation, to support children, families, the vulnerable, women and, indeed, all of us, by sending a message to the Government to say, “If you can’t accept this, come back with something, for now, that is better described, narrow and to the point, that we can enforce”. On that basis, I wish to test the opinion of the House.