Crime and Policing Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

I do not think that we take interventions on Report, if I may refer to the Companion—but perhaps the Whip could assist us.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

I can clarify for your Lordships’ House that the noble Baroness is able to take interventions, or not, as she wishes.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

I would like to proceed and conclude my argument. I will be happy to listen to the noble Baroness once I have finished.

Because the police do not know when they find a lifeless body which of the situations they are confronted with, even with decriminalisation of abortion offences for the women acting in relation to her pregnancy, she may still be investigated. If it was a case of stillbirth, for example, for that woman the investigation will inevitably be a cause of stress. She might be worried that the evidence will not support her or she will not be believed. However, what else are the police supposed to do in these cases, other than try to establish the facts?

Therefore, it is not possible to remove women acting in relation to their pregnancy from any criminal process, even if you decriminalise abortion offences for them. What is possible is to introduce further guarantees, as we are attempting to do with this amendment, that would add an additional layer of personal assurance from the DPP that the facts in context of terminations are taken into account, and that after 12 months, in any event, proceedings will not be brought against the pregnant woman. It ensures that the decision to prosecute in relation to the woman is taken at the highest level—the DPP—and applies the certainty of a limitation period.

No solution in this area will ever be flawless, but when the evidence before us is so limited and the broader picture so uncertain, wholesale decriminalisation would be a disproportionate response to a problem which, in any event, needs careful and thoughtful steps for resolution. This amendment offers a more balanced and workable path to the problem that we all want to resolve satisfactorily. It provides meaningful safeguards for women, ensuring that any decision to prosecute is taken at the highest level, as well as the certainty of a limitation period, while not upending the balancing of principles and values underlying the Abortion Act 1967. I hope that both those who oppose criminalisation and those who are rightly troubled by the distressing cases we have discussed will see that this approach represents a principled and proportionate compromise, and will feel able to support it.

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[Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)]

I am very sorry—I have to carry on or I am going to run out of time. This is Report and I am going to continue.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

The noble Baroness is perfectly entitled not to take any interventions. We will make better progress if people just agree to take interventions or not, and then we will be able to hear from everyone.

[Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)]

One letter I received pointed out that 22 week-plus babies aborted in a medical setting are clinically euthanised prior to surgery with a lethal injection into the heart. What would happen, she asked in her letter, to babies aborted at home and born alive? Would the baby be left to die? How would the baby be disposed of? Would the mother be charged with infanticide?

Clause 208, as confirmed by a legal opinion obtained by the Father of the House, Sir Edward Leigh, in the other place, would also make it legal for a woman to perform her own abortion on sex-selective grounds at any time. Data from NHS England shows that there is already an imbalance in the sex of children among certain communities that cannot be explained by pure chance. Do the proposers of this clause want to further facilitate what has been called femicide?

Let me be clear about what Clause 208 does not do. It does not, despite the claims of its promoters, leave the current law intact. If the 24-week limit can no longer be defended when women induce their own abortions, and they can obtain pills through the post via a phone call, the limit set by Parliament in 1990 is rendered meaningless. The reason why it was then lowered from 28 weeks was precisely because of concerns about the termination of viable children.

The most basic justification for all abortions is that the unborn child in question is unwanted. The slogan is that every child should be a wanted child, but we all know that there are so many couples who for medical reasons cannot have families themselves yet desperately want a family. When you think of the fate of a viable baby being aborted as unwanted when there are so many families yearning to provide that love and support via adoption, this clause is morally questionable, even on the purely utilitarian grounds of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

The preamble to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states that

“the child … needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth”.

Removing the offence of a woman terminating her own pregnancy, even at full term, would remove the few remaining legal protections for unborn children.

I am sure that the proposers of Clause 208 genuinely believe that they will thereby create a kinder and more civilised society, but I fear that the consequences, if this is passed, will be precisely the opposite.

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[Baroness Blackstone (Lab)]

Let me just finish, I am just about to complete what I was going to say. I am happy to take the question.

The evidence is clear that telemedicine has reduced waiting times; enabled earlier treatment, which is a huge advantage; maintained high safety and effectiveness rates; improved privacy, which is something that most women in these circumstances really appreciate; and increased safeguarding disclosures. It expands choice and keeps women within a regulated clinical framework. That in itself is exceedingly important too.

To weaken or remove telemedical abortion would not improve safety; it would instead reduce access, delay care and create barriers for the most vulnerable women. The system works. It is safe, effective and must be maintained.

[Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, views on both sides of the debate are sincerely held. We should all respect each other for that. We had a long debate in Committee. This is Report. Members should make their points. Repeated interventions do not help us at this stage. We need to take the temperature down. The House can make its decision known in the Division Lobbies later on.

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly support abortion on demand but, as we have heard, the danger continues to exist that an almost full-term foetus could be aborted by means of a pill ordered by telephone and delivered by post. I am struck by the extraordinary efforts that this House has gone to in order to provide safeguards for those who are terminally ill and who demand assisted dying, yet we do not afford the unborn foetus or near-term foetus any kind of safeguard at all. The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, would introduce some kind of safeguard, which perhaps we all owe to that unborn child.

The experience of other countries suggests that late-term abortions are uncommon, and an in-person consultation to determine the stage of pregnancy would ensure that they remain so. We know, too, that women who abort at later stages of pregnancy are more likely to have birthing complications. This, surely, is a further reason for some medical oversight.

As I said, I strongly support abortion on demand. I think that introducing a safeguard such as this to avoid the actual death of a near-term foetus is acceptable, and I hope very much that the noble Baroness will put this to the House.

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[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords—

[Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, can we please take the temperature down and respect the Clock? There are 10 minutes for Back-Bench contributions. Of course, many people want to get in, but please take the temperature down—there is no need to constantly interrupt others. Everyone can speak. We will come to the Cross Benches first and then go to the noble Baroness opposite.

[Baroness Gerada (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to pick up some of the safeguarding issues around telemedicine that have been mentioned in the House. To put things in context briefly, I have been a GP now for nearly 40 years, and over the past five years I have been conducting many remote consultations.

First, you can assess safeguarding issues remotely. A paper was published in 2025—very recently—on young girls under 16. More than 600 young girls were involved in the study. It found that 100% of the safeguarding issues—some of these girls then had to be seen face to face—were identified remotely. The conclusion, which is very short, states:

“Requiring in-person adolescent consultation is associated with reduced access to medication abortion without enhancing safeguarding”.


We do want to work with evidence. You might think it is safer to consult face to face, but the evidence shows that it is not safer: it can actually make it more harmful.

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That is why, as someone who broadly supports current abortion law, I am none the less appalled by this clause. If it stands, I believe that the mitigations offered by Amendments 422E, 425, 426, 426C and 426D would represent the bare minimum of a framework of sensible control. I would add that decriminalisation and telemedicine simply should not coexist. As the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf, explained so clearly, the case for Clause 208 simply has not been made, and by far the best solution today will be to leave it out entirely.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, I say to my noble friends who will try to come in shortly that we have had a reasonably long debate on this group and we had a very long debate in Committee. I have begun to hear calls for the Front Benches. I offer the House a reminder that this is Report: the stage when we vote to make decisions. I hope that we can quickly begin to move on to hear from the Front Benches.

[Lord Winston (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful that the Chief Whip will offer me the chance to speak for a couple of minutes. We have always agreed that this is an expert House, and it helps to make sure that legislation is best addressed by expertise where it can be. One of the things we might want to consider in this debate is that there are at least two Members of this House who have given at least 100 years in total to the management of people having terminations of pregnancy —so we do know quite a lot about it. There is also a large number of people who have not spoken who are fellows of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, who I think have been rather insulted by some of the things they have heard today because they do not represent the views of most members.

Having said that, I just want to say two things very simply. I firmly believe in decriminalisation. There is a great deal of misapprehension, as was just shown by the noble Baroness, Lady Spielman. The fact of the matter is that you cannot induce a pregnancy close to term. In fact, I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Patel, will agree with me that it is virtually impossible to induce labour in a woman who does not have ruptured membranes at term with drugs. It just does not work. In fact, both he and I—numerous times, if I am not wrong—have been faced with caesarean sections that we did not want to do as the only way we could get a baby out of the womb when it was in danger. We could not use drugs to induce labour, because they do not work. That certainly applies to pills but even to drugs given intravenously. It is therefore important to understand that a termination of a pregnancy conducted by a woman herself will be an extremely rare event. It would be very difficult, and the idea that pills will work is nonsensical.

Moreover, we have heard a lot about pills, but nobody has told us yet what pills they are talking about. That is very important. The hormones that are usually used in early pregnancy would not work in late pregnancy. The other thing I have already mentioned is that pretty well all late terminations of pregnancy are done for very serious medical conditions. One of the commonest ones is where there is an extremely deformed baby in the womb. I described this during the earlier stages of the Bill, and I will not go through it again. The indications of these late pregnancies are always very carefully and scrupulously observed. They are not done lightly.

I should also add that, sadly, babies born much after 24 weeks still are very likely to be highly abnormal. Even though people often miscarry them when they do not want to, sometimes it can be the very best thing that can happen because these babies will eventually die early with very severe abnormalities.

Recently, the noble Lord, Lord Patel, chaired a committee on this very issue to see how we could reduce the number of premature births. It is a big problem in medicine because of the risks to the babies when they are born after 28 weeks. I shall say no more except that I firmly believe we should really try to understand this from the woman’s point of view. No woman tries to interrupt her pregnancy except with the deepest grief and the deepest unhappiness.

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[Noble Lords]

Front Bench!

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

We will have a short intervention, but we need to move on shortly to the Front Benches. That is what the House wants, I believe.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, throughout this debate Northern Ireland has been mentioned, yet not one Member from Northern Ireland has been allowed to speak until now. We have had to force the issue to be allowed to speak in this debate. When the new abortion laws, the most liberal and extreme laws in the United Kingdom, were forced on Northern Ireland, few across this House really cared. The lobby for abortion in Northern Ireland was on the basis that women there had fewer rights than in England and Wales. Now that same lobby is using the same arguments for a change in the law in England and Wales. In the previous debate, it was suggested that this would bring England and Wales into line with Northern Ireland, but that is misleading as, crucially, Northern Ireland does not have pills by post.

I genuinely believe that even many of those who support abortion know in their hearts that this is not the way to go about things. This hurried parliamentary process, the rewriting of one of the most sensitive and serious areas of criminal law, is surely unworthy of our democracy. A clause passed in the other House last summer was passed after 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate. Is that what our democracy has come to? If noble Lords think that this is a good idea, why are they not prepared to allow public consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny, instead of rushing it through?

Clause 208 means no justice for the death of a full-term unborn child, even in the most grotesque circumstances. I ask supporters of Clause 208: what would you do if a woman told you that she was taking abortion pills, perhaps obtained from an NHS provider via telemedicine, in the 39th week of pregnancy because she had changed her mind about having a child? What would your conscience say to you, knowing that you made that possible through the support of this legislation?

We heard a great deal about unwelcome investigations, but what do supporters of Clause 208 think the police should do if they discover the dead body of a 39 week-old baby in a rubbish bin? The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, explained in Committee that investigations would often still be required even if Clause 208 passes, as police would need to investigate the circumstances if a deceased full-term baby body is found away from a clinical setting. Is that the option that supporters of Clause 208 really believe in?

To conclude, I could give many reasons why I support Amendments 425 and 426 but, because of time, I am not able to do so. Let us remember that when we are talking about the life of an unborn child, we are talking about not an it but a real, living person with the expectation of being born, being protected by a caring and loving society, and being held in loving arms. I do not think that is too much for a child to ask or expect.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

We need to move on to the Front Benches.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I am the first speaker from these Benches. For us, this is a matter of conscience. My noble friend Lady Smith of Newnham has not had the opportunity to speak. She disagrees with me. She is supportive of the other side. She wished for me to mention that she has been contacted by a young student called Lily, who has contacted a number of other Peers to say that they share her point of view. I hope that Lily and my noble friend will hear that we have acknowledged their sincerely held views, which are very different from mine.

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[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, once again we have had a full and passionate debate on a matter of the utmost significance. It is apparent, from both deliberations in Committee and from today, that views on this matter are deeply and sincerely held across your Lordships’ House.

A wide range of points have been raised by noble Lords. Let us consider a variety of them. We have heard about issues around how the police investigate cases, about the interaction of telemedicine and criminal investigation, about the potential for women to face coercion, about issues of safeguarding of younger women and about issues of domestic abuse—to name but a few mentioned tonight. A lot of ground has not yet been covered. Other noble Lords have not yet spoken or have wanted to speak but have not been able to. What this tells us is that the matter is very far from settled. Some noble Lords’ concerns have plainly not been allayed.

This brings me back to the point I made in Committee. This clause has not received anything like adequate scrutiny. It is true that we have now had several hours of debate on this matter in your Lordships’ House. The point I made before, however, still stands: it is a matter of procedure, not substance. In the other place, however, this clause was considered for only 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate. No parliamentary committee has been able to seek views and take evidence, and if ever there was the need for a parliamentary committee to take evidence on a policy, this is it. We need to hear from and test the views of the police, of the CPS, of doctors, of obstetricians, of safeguarders and, if possible and most importantly, of women or their representatives and advocates. This policy was not in the Government’s election manifesto. It has not been subject to pre-legislative scrutiny, public consultation, or an impact assessment. The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, put it very well in Committee. She said that the clause was passed

“in the other place following a very brief and truncated debate, entirely incommensurate with the gravity of its impact”.—[Official Report, 2/2/26; col. 1336.]

Changes to the law of abortion are and remain issues of conscience. The Opposition do not and will not take an official position on the substance of the clause. There is a multitude of views in my own party, and the issue is in the hands of your Lordships’ House as a matter of conscience. But that does not mean that we are released from our duty to undertake due diligence and rigorous interrogation of the consequences of changing the social law of this country. Whatever one thinks of the substance of the issue itself, the truth is that this clause has been tacked on to the side of a Crime and Policing Bill when it should not have been. That is no way to make law.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be as brief as I can. I shall start, as I did in Committee, by reiterating that the Government maintain a neutral stance on abortion in England and Wales. Many of the amendments in this group are similar or identical to those tabled in Committee. So, save in a very few cases, I shall not repeat the Government’s assessment of their workability. This means that if I do not explicitly mention an amendment, it is either because there are no workability issues or because I set them out fully in Committee. As a shorthand, I will refer to conduct that comes under Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, and under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, collectively as “abortion offences”.

I begin with Amendment 423ZA tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor. It is unclear how this amendment is intended to work in practice—in particular, which party would bear the burden of establishing a lack of mental capacity and what the standard of proof would be. Thus, it is possible that it would create confusion for practitioners. Your Lordships may wish to note that the law already takes account of defendants’ understanding of their actions in various ways. It is unclear how this amendment is intended to interact with well-established criminal law principles.

Amendment 422E, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, is similar to that tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, in Committee, but it contains an additional requirement that a prosecution could not be brought any later than 12 months from the date of the alleged offence. Your Lordships will be aware that, other than for summary-only offences, there is, almost without exception, no statutory time limit for prosecuting criminal offences in England and Wales. The reason for that is that evidence may emerge over several years, so a limitation period would remove the ability to prosecute in cases where evidence of guilt came to light much later on. The introduction of a limitation period could lead to differences in outcomes depending on when evidence becomes available, the complexity of the case and the resources of investigating and prosecuting authorities.

Amendment 423, in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, is similar to the one he tabled in Committee, but it differs in three respects: it would broaden the scope of the specified defences; it would make provision for who must bear burden of proof in relation to those defences; and it would introduce additional provisions relating to police investigations. In relation to the workability concerns I raised in Committee, for the second and third of these differences there are some further issues. In relation to the burden of proof, the drafting is ambiguous. If the intention is that the defendant should bear the evidential burden, clarification would be needed. In relation to the proposed new provisions for police investigations, your Lordships may wish to note that decisions on whether to initiate, and the scope of such an investigation, are currently operational matters for the police.

Amendment 423A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is also similar to one tabled in Committee. While the Government remain neutral on changing the criminal law, it is important that investigations into other offences, such as murder, manslaughter or infanticide under the Infanticide Act, are still carried out. Those offences would continue to be investigated and prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution Service if the test for prosecution is met. Your Lordships may wish to note that this amendment would be likely to trigger a review of any live investigations and prosecutions. However, we would not expect this to carry any significant resourcing implications.

Amendment 426C, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf of Dulwich, is again similar to an amendment tabled in Committee. It might be helpful to remind your Lordships of the point that I made then, namely that the proposed new offence is not limited to obtaining abortifacient drugs for use in the termination of a pregnancy. Abortifacient drugs are not defined in legislation and are also used for non-abortion-related purposes. In addition, further amendments would be needed to clarify whether the offence was one that is to be triable either way, whether the maximum penalty on conviction on indictment should be the same as that on summary conviction and whether the maximum penalty in the magistrates’ court should align with its general powers, which update automatically should the limits on its sentencing powers change in the future.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

I would be grateful for clarification as to whether the Government have considered their own current inquiries into the grooming gangs. There was evidence there that:

“Victims and survivors were also critical about how easy it can be to obtain emergency contraception or abortion services without appropriate questions being asked”.


This evidence has been relied on consistently in Committee and on Report, yet there are concerns. Have the Government looked at that?

Secondly, in relation to the case that I mentioned in Committee, which contradicts much of what has been said, the comments of His Honour Mr Justice Cooke in Leeds Crown Court, in the case of Sarah Catt, very clearly state that this was a “cold calculated” decision that she took for her own convenience and self-interest. She took pills at 39 weeks and gave birth, and it seems she never revealed where the body was. She had a history of deceit and concealment—that is in the judgment of Leeds Crown Court. So have the Government considered, also in relation to other amendments about pardons, that this was conduct not of a victim but of a woman who perpetrated a crime?

Finally—

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her points, which I am sure your Lordships’ House will want to take into account when deciding whether, as a matter of policy, to vote for or against the various amendments. I remind the noble Baroness that these are not government amendments—the Government are neutral—but I am sure that everyone in your Lordships’ House has heard them and will take them into account in various ways.

Amendment 425 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, is identical to one tabled in Committee. I raised at that stage the Government’s concerns about workability and operational difficulties, and they remain. In short, the effect of Amendment 425 might be to reduce access to early medical abortion due to resource constraints on the ability of abortion providers to hold in-person consultations.

Amendment 426D, tabled by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester, is new, but it carries similar possible operational effects to those I set out in Committee in relation to Amendment 425, about which I spoke a moment ago. The proposed new clause in Amendment 426D may have a detrimental impact on abortion provision and access for under-18s, including those who live in remote areas or who have difficulties in attending a clinic. It should also be noted that it is unclear whether this amendment would require under-18s to have all consultations face to face, including any initial contact with the service. If so, this would further increase the workability concerns, including resourcing constraints on providers and access to abortion provision for young people.

Amendment 426B, in the name of my noble friend Lady Thornton, is once again very similar to an amendment tabled in Committee. The duty on the Secretary of State, as drafted, poses substantial operational and resourcing implications. There is no centrally held record of women who have been convicted of, cautioned for, arrested for or investigated on suspicion of abortion offences. Therefore, the Secretary of State would be unable to comply with the duty to direct the specified bodies to delete such details from records. If this is the will of Parliament, consideration will need to be given to how to deliver the objectives of this amendment in a way that is operationally workable.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, I appreciate that the hour is late and very charged emotions have been expressed, so I do not intend to delay the House with a long response. I simply point out to those Members who are not familiar with the Companion and were surprised that so many of us did not take interventions that this was not due to any lack of respect for their positions. The Companion says at 4.29 that a Member

“may justifiably refuse to give way, for instance … in time-limited proceedings”.

I wanted to make that clear.

I have heard what the Minister has said about Amendment 422E. I will go away and consider that. This was meant to be a compromise. I know that Members want to get to other substantive amendments. I therefore do not wish to test the opinion of the House and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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23:05

Division 5

Amendment 424 disagreed.

Ayes: 148

Noes: 185

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23:17

Division 6

Amendment 425 disagreed.

Ayes: 119

Noes: 191

Amendment 426 not moved.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, let me assist the House by saying that we should now be moving on to Amendment 426A on assisted dying, in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton. I understand my noble and learned friend tabled the amendment only to get a particular response from the Government and he has no intention of dividing the House tonight. I suggest that we allow his contribution but do not have a prolonged debate on assisted dying tonight—we have had a number of days on that. Then, when we have had the Minister’s response, we can get back to the other amendments because potentially there are three more votes in this group. I think the House will want to vote on those and this is a way forward for everybody.

Amendment 426A

Moved by

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[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

With the House’s permission, it might be helpful if I set out the Government’s position, and then perhaps we can take it from there, if the noble Baroness is prepared to give way to me at this stage. The Government have some workability and drafting concerns about the noble and learned Lord’s amendment, but I will focus on the central issue so that the House knows what the Government’s position is.

Although the Government remain neutral on the overall issue, we recognise that assisted dying regimes being implemented in different parts of the UK and the Crown dependencies could create practical issues for those in one jurisdiction who are involved, in some way, in the lawful assisted death of a person in another jurisdiction. However, I support what my noble and learned friend said: the Government consider it premature to legislate on this issue. We do not yet know whether assisted dying will become lawful in the various jurisdictions, what the final form of any such regimes may be, or how and when they would be implemented. Legislating now in this unique way to amend the criminal law in England and Wales without clarity about these frameworks risks unintended consequences. The Government do not rule out that, in due course, processes may be agreed between the jurisdictions—or, if necessary, future legislation placed before this House and, potentially, other Parliaments—to achieve these aims.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for that indication. On the basis of that, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.

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23:35

Division 7

Amendment 426B agreed.

Ayes: 180

Noes: 58

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23:47

Division 8

Amendment 426C disagreed.

Ayes: 70

Noes: 166

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23:58

Division 9

Amendment 426D disagreed.

Ayes: 68

Noes: 163

The remainder of today’s proceedings will be published tomorrow.