Immigration and Asylum Bill (Third sitting)
Tuesday 13th October 2026
(2 days, 9 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesImmigration and Asylum Bill 2026-27 View all Immigration and Asylum Bill 2026-27 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 13 October 2026 - (13 Oct 2026)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 13 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 13 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 13 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 12 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 14 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 13 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 14 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 13 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Chair
Good morning, everyone, and welcome. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent, please, and that teas and coffees are not allowed.
We will now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for the sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Any Division on amendments and new clauses takes place in the order that they appear in the amendment paper. The Member who has put their name to the lead amendment of the group is called to speak first. For debates on clause stand part, the Minister will be called first. Other Members are then free to indicate whether they wish to speak in that debate by bobbing. Please bob on each occasion on which you wish to speak during proceedings.
At the end of a debate on a group of amendments and new clauses, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or new clause, or to seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press any other amendment, which includes grouped new clauses, in a group to a vote, that is at the Chair’s discretion. The order of decisions follows the order in which amendments appear in the amendment paper.
Clause 1
The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I beg to move amendment 64, in clause 1, page 2, leave out lines 1 to 5 and insert—
“(5) In the exercise of its functions, the IIAA must—
(a) be accessible, fair and independent,
(b) handle its cases quickly and efficiently.”
This amendment would remove the requirement for the IIAA to “aim to” operate fairly and independently and handle cases quickly and efficiently, so that the IIAA instead has a duty to so act. It would also remove the requirement for the IIAA to have regard to the public interest.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 48, in clause 1, page 2, line 2, leave out “aim to”.
Amendment 49, in clause 1, page 2, leave out lines 4 and 5.
Amendment 87, in clause 1, page 2, line 4, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—
“(c) give effect to the public interest in the effective enforcement of immigration control, including the prompt removal from the United Kingdom of persons who have no right to remain, having regard to the fact that the IIAA operates as a key part of the immigration and asylum system.”
This amendment would require the IIAA to give effect to the public interest in effective immigration control, including the prompt removal of those with no right to remain, rather than merely to have regard to the public interest.
New clause 12—Independent Immigration Appeals Authority: commencement—
“(1) The Secretary of State may not make regulations under section 52(1) for the purposes of bringing Part 1 of this Act into force unless—
(a) the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a report into the establishment of the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority (IIAA), and
(b) a statutory instrument containing regulations for the commencement of sections 1 to 7 of this Act has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(2) A report under subsection (1)(a) must contain—
(a) the full cost of establishing and operating the IIAA, including transition and set-up costs, adjudicator recruitment and training costs, and ongoing annual administrative costs for at least the first five years of operation, with a comparison to the equivalent cost of operating the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the Tribunal’);
(b) the date, or expected range of dates, on which each stage of commencement is expected to take effect, including the length of any period in which the IIAA and the Tribunal will operate in parallel and the date by which the full transfer of jurisdiction from the Tribunal to the IIAA is expected to be complete;
(c) the expected capacity of the IIAA, including the number of adjudicators expected to be appointed at each stage of commencement and the number of appeals the IIAA is expected to be capable of determining per year at each such stage.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a report on the full costs of the IIAA, its expected commencement timetable and its expected capacity before the implementation of Part 1 of this Act.
Siân Berry
It is a pleasure to have you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. I am moving amendment 64, to make fairness and efficiency duties of the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority. I should add that in this group I also support amendments 48 and 49, tabled by my Lib Dem colleagues, I oppose amendment 87 tabled by my Conservative colleagues and I support the Lib Dems’ new clause 12.
My amendment would impose on the IIAA a duty to operate fairly and independently and to handle cases quickly and efficiently. The Bill only imposes an obligation on the IIAA to aim to do those things. The amendment also removes the requirement for the IIAA to operate as part of the immigration system.
The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority will be a body that is independent in name; the reality, however, will be much murkier and more ambiguous. The Home Secretary will personally appoint senior figures in the IIAA, including its chair, and a Home Secretary appointee will be responsible for appointing adjudicators who make appeals decisions. The effect of the Bill is to make asylum decision making less independent, less fair and less expert. It brings asylum appeals under greater political control, putting at risk people’s basic human right not to be persecuted for who they are.
The major driver of the appeals backlog is the poor quality of Home Office asylum decisions, not tribunal judges. The Refugee Council has shown that about two thirds of Home Office asylum decisions that are challenged are overturned, either by the tribunals or by the Home Office itself. My preference, therefore, is for the Government to scrap all of part 1 of the Bill and get back to the day job of making good asylum decisions. If part 1 does go ahead, however—I will debate later whether that should happen—it should contain safeguards for basic standards of independence and fairness.
The amendment deals with two ways in which the Bill tries unfairly to align the IIAA with the Home Office’s policy priorities, rather than the requirements of justice and fairness. First, clause 1(5) states only that
“the IIAA must…aim to be accessible, fair and independent”—
not that it must be independent, fair and accessible in practice, but merely that it must aim to be so. By contrast, under existing rules for tribunals, there is a duty, an overriding objective on tribunals, to deal with cases fairly and justly. That is not an aim, but a requirement. As such, subsection (5) is a watering down, a weakening and an undermining of the independence of asylum appeals. My amendment would make it a legal duty for the IIAA to be independent, fair and accessible, as it is for tribunals, and not merely an aim.
Secondly, the attempt to draw asylum appeals into the Home Office’s sphere of influence is seen even more clearly in the fact that subsection (5) requires the IIAA to prioritise
“in particular…the fact that the IIAA operates as a key part of the immigration…system.”
That, I think, is an unambiguous push to align the IIAA not with the requirements of justice and fairness, but with Home Office policy priorities. My amendment would therefore remove any risk that the IIAA will be pressured into aligning with the Home Office’s immigration policy priorities, and let the IIAA be what it is meant to be: a quasi-judicial body for deciding appeals fairly and independently.
Ultimately, without my amendment, the IIAA will be a body with a conflict of interest at its heart: a requirement to aim to be independent and fair, but also a priority to view itself as part of immigration control. If the Government are sincere about creating a body that can deal with cases independently and fairly, without interference from the Home Office, the IIAA’s duty to operate independently and fairly should be more than an aim; it should be a requirement, just as it is for tribunals. Moreover, there should be no pressure on the IIAA to align with the Home Office’s political vision of immigration control, whoever is in charge of the Home Office. The amendment would create that safety against the priorities of future Governments, as well as this one, being able to put political pressure on the IIAA. The amendment would put all that beyond doubt. It gives the IIAA the best chance of being truly independent and fair. I will seek a Division on this amendment.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I will speak to Opposition amendment 87 and to two other amendments in the group.
As this is the Committee’s first debate on part 1 of the Bill, let me set out the test that the Opposition will apply to it. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary told the House that more than 150,000 people are waiting for an appeal decision and the average wait is well over a year. Every one of those months is a month in which someone whose claim may well fail remains in this country, very often at the taxpayer’s expense. The public have been promised for years that that would be fixed, and we need to see it happen now. Our test for every clause in this part is a simple one: will appeals be decided faster, and will those who lose be removed?
Clause 1(5) is where the Bill tells the new authority what it is for: the authority must aim to be accessible, fair and independent; it must aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently; and it must have regard to the public interest. Amendment 48, in the name of the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, would remove the words “aim to” from the first paragraph only, so that the authority would be under a firm duty to be “accessible, fair and independent”. I understand the instinct, but that hardens the wrong limb of the measure. If any duty in this subsection needs to be firmer, it is the duty to handle cases “quickly and efficiently”. That is the duty that the authority is being created to discharge, and it is the one that the public will judge it on.
Amendment 64 would remove “aim to” from both limbs, subsection (5)(a) and (b), but it would also remove the public interest duty in paragraph (c) to which I now turn. Amendments 49 and 64 in its second paragraph would go further than amendment 48. They would remove the duty to have regard to the public interest altogether. I respect the concern for independence that lies behind amendments 49 and 64, but I cannot agree. It would be remarkable for Parliament to tell the body that decides who may stay in this country that it need have no regard to the public interest or to public confidence in the system it is part of. An immigration system that does not have the confidence of the British public is a system that will not work.
Amendment 87 takes the opposite approach. It strengthens the public interest duty instead of removing it. In the Bill as drafted, the authority must merely “have regard to” the public interest, and the only content that the Bill gives to that interest is the fact that the authority is part of the immigration and asylum system. That tells an adjudicator nothing. The amendment states what the public interest is:
“the effective enforcement of immigration control, including the prompt removal from the United Kingdom of persons who have no right to remain.”
It would require the authority to give effect to that interest, not simply to have regard to it. The difference between “have regard to” and “give effect to” is not a lawyer’s nicety. A duty to have regard to something can be satisfied by thinking about it and then setting it aside; a duty to give effect to something cannot.
Clause 1(5) reaches well beyond the final decision in each case: it governs the authority in the “exercise of its functions”, which means how it lists cases, handles requests to adjourn and manages its caseload. Under clause 4(5), the Procedure Rules Board must also have regard to those objectives when it writes the rules. Amendment 87 would therefore shape every deadline, every adjournment rule and every listing decision the authority makes. It would put the effective enforcement of immigration control into the DNA of the institution from the start.
The Committee heard in evidence why that matters. Professor Ekins of Oxford University told us that one of the potential advantages of the new authority is that it could make
“the public interest in the enforcement of migration law a more pressing consideration.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 22.]
Amendment 87 would make sure that that advantage is actually realised, rather than left to chance. This is not new ground for Parliament. Section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 already states that
“the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest.”
The Minister may say that amendment 87 would compromise independence, but it would not. Clause 1(4) will still require the authority to
“exercise its primary function with a view to ensuring that justice is done.”
Clause 1(6) will still require every Minister to uphold the IIAA’s independence. Each case will still be decided on its evidence and on the law. What changes is that the institution is told plainly what it exists to achieve. We are clear that the public interest includes the swift removal of those who have no right to be in the country. That is one of the public’s most pressing concerns, and the new authority should be in no doubt that it is there to serve it.
New clause 12 asks for a report on the cost, timetable and capacity of the authority before part 1 can be commenced. Whatever view the Committee takes of a statutory lock on commencement, the questions are fair, and I will put them directly: what is the full cost of setting up and running the authority over its first five years, and how does that compare with the tribunal it replaces? How many adjudicators will be in post on the first day, and how many appeals will they decide each year? On what date does the Minister expect the authority to hear its first appeal?
We will press amendment 87 to a Division when it is reached.
The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I thank all Members for the constructive debate we have had on the amendments to clause 1 of this Bill, particularly the hon. Members for Brighton Pavilion and for Stockton West, and the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, who tabled amendment 87.
I would like to say up front that it is very clear that consent for our asylum system in the public domain is fraying. The important part of this Bill is to seek to restore control, restore fairness and rebuild the public’s confidence. We have made huge progress on initial decision making; we have cut the backlog in initial decisions by 72% from the 2023 peak. However, as we have done so, the appeals backlog has grown substantially, now with waiting times of more than two years. Some appeals are absolutely genuine, and they of course must be heard fairly. However, it is clear that some claimants are lodging appeals to frustrate their legitimate removal from this country.
As of June 2026, the open caseload in the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber was about 156,000. The average time taken to clear appeals across all categories is currently at 65 weeks: 72 weeks for asylum protection, 74 weeks for human rights and 48 weeks for European economic area free movement. The Government have substantially increased both capacity and productivity in the FTT IAC, but demand has risen considerably faster. Receipts increased from around 58,000 in 2023-24 to almost 118,000 in 2025-26, while the outstanding caseload rose from around 50,000 to more than 150,000. We have done our best to try to support the workforce within that existing system. We increased the judicial workforce by 21% to 311 judges, including 61 new fee-paid judges and 25 salaried judges who began sitting between January and March this year, and we are continuing further recruitment.
The structural constraint is just how quickly judicial capacity can scale. Judicial recruitment draws on a relatively limited pool of experienced lawyers, and it currently takes around 12 to 18 months from launching an exercise to a judge being able to sit, so that is not feasible. The IIAA therefore broadens the recruitment pool, providing greater flexibility and allowing us to increase capacity while maintaining robust safeguards around training, legal support, quality assurance and professional standards.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
Is it not the case that the long backlog of cases for judges is largely driven by the poor quality of original decision making by Home Officials, as shown by the number of successful appeals? I was slightly concerned that senior officials at the evidence session seemed not to be willing to acknowledge that. Will the Minister acknowledge that the quality of some of those first Home Office decisions is not particularly good?
Anna Turley
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, and all of us, as Members of Parliament, will have had our own cases that challenged some of the standards. However, what we have seen is that, while the number has increased, the decision making quality has not gone up or down. I would also say that, at the moment, the delays in the current system mean that decision making becomes poorer, because evidence is produced later in the system and some of it is not sustainable, and more and more different routes are being attempted to string out appeals. The longer the process goes on, the more complex and difficult the decision making becomes. This is about having swift and fair decision making, but we will always keep the quality of decision making in this process under review in the Department.
To create the swift and fair appeals system that we need, we are scrapping the judge-led asylum and immigration tribunal, which just cannot keep pace with demand, and we are replacing it with a new independent appeals authority to deliver swift and fair decision making. This authority will be staffed by independent adjudicators, who will be ordinary citizens trained like magistrates. To reduce abuse of the system, claimants will be allowed just a single route for appeal, which must be lodged as early as possible. That will remove the scope for bringing multiple appeals, as some claimants do, that are often vexatious and at the very last minute before removal. Late claims will be heard under an expedited process, ensuring that they cannot be used to frustrate a removal. There will be a right for a further appeal to a judge-led tribunal only on a point of law.
The new authority will be independent of Government, with a chair and chief executive officer who are accountable to the Home Secretary and Parliament for delivering an effective and efficient system. All appointments will be based on merit and subject to fair and open appointments principles. All Ministers, including the Home Secretary, will be under a statutory duty to uphold the IIAA’s independence and not to influence its decisions.
Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)
It is undeniable that there is an appetite in the country for an asylum system that is robust but fair, and it seems to be the case that people are abusing the system. With the extended period for appeals in the current process, despite the good will in the intentions behind it. This IIAA process will not only speed up the decisions, which is compassionate for people, rather than leaving them lingering in a system for months or years on end, but provide the British public with the necessary confidence and security of knowledge that the system we have employed in this country is fair and robust.
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are really keen to ensure that public confidence is at the heart of this process; it cannot be allowed to operate in a vacuum. The public rightly expect us to have an immigration system that has regard to the public interest, and that is what these amendments and the Bill seek to reinforce.
Clause 1 establishes the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority as a body corporate: a public body that is independent of Government. It is the first step in the Bill to overhaul the immigration and asylum appeals system, which has seen unacceptable caseloads and waiting times for determinations to be reached. Amendments 64, 48, 49 and 87 concern subsection (5), which sets out the objectives the authority must meet when exercising its functions, namely
“(a) the aim to be accessible, fair and independent,
(b) the aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and”—
crucially, as the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned—to
“(c) have regard to the public interest”.
Melanie Onn
The Minister talks about the public interest test. Could she explain how public interest is considered under the current judicial system?
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend makes an important point. I do not think many members of the public understand how our appeals process works. They see, particularly in the public domain, many cases that have been strung out with tentative evidence and means to do so, and that has led to a huge crisis of confidence. The Home Secretary set out very clearly that she is keen to restore order and control in our immigration service. That is crucial to the public confidence that we need in this country and for us to have a system that protects people from genuine war and persecution. It is vital that we maintain public confidence. Having regard to public interest is a key part of the system; the public would expect nothing less.
Today, asylum and protection appeals take 72 weeks to be determined on average. As we set out in the “Restoring Order and Control” announcement, that extended period can lead to people bouncing around the systems for years—that is neither fair on them nor, given its cost, acceptable to the public—and, in turn, accruing new, additional reasons for delay. The objectives make it clear not only that justice will be done, but that to have an effective immigration and asylum system, the end-to-end decision making and the enforcement regime must be aligned. Importantly, the decision making is still independent, but it cannot operate in a vacuum. The body must be a key part of the country’s immigration and asylum system; as I say, the public would expect nothing less.
New clause 12 seeks to require the Secretary of State to provide a report on the authority’s operations prior to commencement under clause 52(1). In our view, producing such a report prior to commencement is both unnecessary and, given the requirement on the IIAA to operate independently, inappropriate. Decisions on recruitment and training, which will ultimately inform capacity, timeframes and productivity, are for the authority alone; the Home Office should not pre-empt them in a parliamentary report. The Bill contains plenty of parliamentary reporting and accounting measures, which I am sure we will come to—
Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
The Minister mentions other scrutiny measures, but the Bill in its entirety relies heavily on Henry VIII powers. Additionally, the impact assessment repeatedly admits uncertainty, and we do not know the deterrent impact. How does she make the case that there will be better scrutiny and accountability? Does she not agree that having a full understanding of the implementation of the Bill up front would be a good thing?
Anna Turley
I hope the hon. Gentleman has seen the revised impact assessment, which now has a green flag.
Let me set out some of the reporting avenues that are already in the Bill. At the end of each financial year, the authority must produce an annual report on the exercise of its functions and any other information as directed by the Secretary of State. The chief inspector of UK Border Agency will also produce a report once a year, and at other times if requested by the Secretary of State. The chief executive of the authority has a statutory duty to respond to that report and to send that response to the Secretary of State, who must lay it before Parliament alongside the report. The chief executive may also lay written representations on matters they consider to be of importance through the Secretary of State. There is a wide range of provisions in the Bill to ensure proper accountability to Parliament.
Let me pick up the questions asked by the hon. Member for Stockton West about the costs of the IIAA. Detailed plans are currently being developed, and full costs and affordability will be developed through the business case; I undertake to keep Parliament completely updated throughout the process. As I say, we will be developing that, and I will make sure that Parliament is able to scrutinise it in the fullness of time, but in terms of operational capacity and productivity, we should not be pre-empting this. A report prior to commencement is not appropriate; it is for the IIAA, once established, to undertake its reporting duties.
Amendment 87 seeks to narrow the scope of the public interest considerations to those that concern just effective immigration control and the “prompt removal” of those with no right to remain in the United Kingdom. While I have some sympathy with the objectives of the amendment, I am afraid that it cannot be accepted because it is far too narrow in its definition. The authority is an independent body—we have established that very clearly in the Bill—and one crucial part of the immigration and asylum system, not just an extended branch of immigration enforcement. The public interest spans the entire spectrum, and could include things that are not included in the amendment, such as public safety, operational impact and value for money. We do not want to lose those other factors by limiting the definition to effective immigration control and removal. It is important that we keep the scope broad.
Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)
It is important to consider this—and this is why we must reject the Opposition’s approach—in the same way that we consider the police. We must ensure that the public interest covers a wide range of things; if we said it only concerned crime, we would end up in a situation where our police were not protecting individuals or running an effective constabulary in their area and were, in effect, letting down the rest of the country. Does the Minister agree?
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend is absolutely right and makes a really good comparison with the police. The police are to some extent accountable to the Home Secretary, but she does not get involved in operational decision making. Our approach to the IIAA is similar: it is vital that we ensure that we have the wider public interest at the heart of it, because it will be a key part of the country’s nationality, immigration and asylum process.
Tom Gordon
One of my concerns is that the public interest is quite subjective; we are, in effect, giving a statutory steer on what any Government at any given point decide is in the public interest. Does the Minister not have concerns about how that could be applied by future Governments?
Anna Turley
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, but we live in a democracy. The Home Secretary of the day will be the Home Secretary of the day, and it is for them to define, legislate and direct the broader immigration system. To me, that is a key feature. It is really important that we have the flexibility to respond to the challenges and changes that our system faces, and that we ensure that we maintain public confidence in this process. At the moment, we have an abstract body that operates in a vacuum, purely with lawyers, and does not become part of the broader immigration process. It is important that public interest is part of this.
Melanie Onn
My right hon. Friend makes an excellent point about flexibility. Over recent years, we have seen such an increase in the number of applications and appeals. A system that pays no regard to that finds itself falling behind the times, does it not?
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. As I said, we know that things ebb and flow in the immigration system, and it is important that the Home Secretary has a system that commands the confidence of the general public, does not operate in a vacuum and considers the wider public interest.
For the reasons that I have outlined, the Government cannot accept the amendments, and I invite hon. Members to withdraw them.
Tom Gordon
I want to press the point that I made to the Minister a moment ago about how one defines public interest. It concerns me that the appeals body that will be deciding on these cases of law will end up with a challenge when different Ministers of the day provide a different steer as to what is in the public interest. Stemming from that, how does Parliament hold the relevant Ministers to account when we are introducing subjective terms and concepts around public interest? For that reason, we will be pressing amendments 48 and 49.
Amendment 48 would make the provision about the IIAA’s exercise of its functions affirmative: as amended, the clause would say that the IIAA must be accessible, fair and independent, not just “aim” to be. What really concerns me and my colleagues is that the element of flexibility, as the Minister calls it, might lead to unfair application and due process throughout the entirety of the process. I would like to know more about what is meant by “aim to”, as opposed to it being actually accessible, fair and independent.
I will oppose amendment 87, because the IIAA should be independent. The amendment would require the authority to give effect to prompt removals and turn an independent adjudicator into an arm of enforcement, and I am concerned that the public and courts would have no confidence in its decisions.
I welcome the fact that the impact assessments have been updated, but there are lingering questions about the scale and timing of the benefits, and the costs are unclear. We are being asked in effect to abolish a working tribunal jurisdiction without a price tag at this point. I would appreciate clarity on those issues as we move forward.
Anna Turley
A lot of these issues will be addressed during the course of the day’s discussion, so I look forward to responding to the hon. Gentleman further on those points.
Siân Berry
I am not convinced by anything I have heard from the Minister. She talked about my amendments not allowing flexibility, but let us be clear what she has said: she is asking for flexibility in fairness, but not flexibility in the political definition of public interest. The risk to human rights here is huge. Let us not forget that these are life and death decisions for people who are among the most vulnerable in the world. It is clear from the data that the backlog is being driven by the fact the Home Office is deciding to refuse more cases, and the risk that those decisions are bad ones is also pretty clear; we see the frequency with which they are overturned, or the Home Office’s objections are withdrawn, when they go to the current tribunal.
We know that bad decisions can be driven by a target-based culture. We saw that in the Windrush lessons learned review, which said that there was a target-dominated work environment and low-quality decision making. Those things go hand in hand, and we will create a hugely dangerous risk by putting the IIAA together with these objectives right at the heart of what it does. We risk doing Windrush again; we risk huge injustice; we risk huge costs for the Government in compensating people who have been subject to enormous detriment. This would be a really simple thing to fix at this stage. I will not withdraw my amendment, but will press it to a Division.
Question proposed, That the amendment be made.
Siân Berry
I beg to move amendment 65, in clause 1, page 2, leave out lines 11 to 14.
This amendment would remove the provision which prevents individuals from being able to initiate judicial review proceedings against decisions made by the IIAA.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 85, in clause 1, page 2, line 13, leave out from “decisions)” to the end of line 14.
This amendment would mean that IIAA decisions could not be appealed to the upper tribunal.
Siân Berry
Amendment 65 to clause 1 would allow judicial review of decisions. It would remove the provision in the Bill that excludes all judicial review of IIAA appeal decisions. Clause 1(8) is a so-called ouster clause, as the explanatory notes confirm. It is designed to immunise the IIAA’s appeal decisions from judicial review in the High Court. The purpose of the amendment is to remove the Government’s attempt to undermine the rule of law.
There will be two ways to challenge an IIAA appeal decision in the Bill as it stands. The first is that the IIAA can review its own decisions, under clause 6, and the second is that the upper tribunal can hear an appeal based only on a point of law, under clause 7. I hope we can agree that judicial review is a mechanism of fundamental constitutional importance and therefore should be restricted in only very limited circumstances. The Ministry of Justice has referred to judicial review as
“the rule of law in action”.
It ensures that public bodies act only in accordance with their legal powers and with respect for our human rights. The Home Office’s wish for faster and cheaper appeals does not come above the rule of law.
Ousting judicial review is unnecessary and disproportionate. Where there is a suitable alternative remedy, such as an appeal to the upper tribunal like the one for which the Bill provides, the High Court will normally refuse permission for a judicial review anyway. That is because the High Court considers that the alternative remedy will protect the rule of law. If the High Court considers that the upper tribunal appeal in clause 7 is sufficient, there will rarely be judicial review cases. Retaining the claimant’s ability to apply for judicial review would simply mean that the High Court could grant permission in residual cases where it believed that an upper tribunal appeal would not be an effective alternative remedy.
Clause 1(8) attempts to remove that residual right entirely. It is a rare absolute ouster clause, which does not permit judicial review of an IIAA appeal’s decision in any circumstances. Even the previous Conservative Government, when creating an ouster clause in section 1 of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, retained access to judicial review in some circumstances. Clause 1 of this Bill is constitutionally exceptional, and I would like the Minister to explain why this absolute exclusion from justice is deemed to be okay for those seeking asylum, when even the previous Government would not apply it to unnaturalised citizens.
David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)
The core point of the hon. Lady’s speech is the rule of law, which all members of the Committee support, but does she accept that, first, we are talking about the appeals process? At this point, they have already appealed—that is one opportunity that someone seeking asylum has already taken to question the decision. Secondly, there are two other ways in the Bill through which a person seeking asylum can have a decision reviewed. Some of the hon. Lady’s rhetoric does not do justice to the Bill.
Siân Berry
I appreciate that, and I have laid out the possible alternative remedies, but judicial review is an essential backstop. I do not see why the Government are trying to remove it. This is constitutionally exceptional and I want the Minister to explain why it is okay.
This measure will not only undermine the rule of law; it will inevitably provoke litigation in the courts about how this ouster clause should be interpreted and effected. It is concerning that the Government want the IIAA, which is a novel—experimental, even—non-expert body institutionally close to the Home Office, making life or death appeal decisions, to be made completely immune from judicial review at the outset. It demonstrates the Government’s continuing and concerning prioritisation of speed over the rule of law and justice, which we have seen in other Bills. In those circumstances, my amendment is completely necessary. It would ensure that judicial review remained available in those cases where the High Court believed it was necessary. I hope that all Members will support it.
Matt Vickers
I want to speak about amendments 85 and 65. Clause 1(8) provides that a decision of the authority may be questioned in legal proceedings in only two ways: through the authority’s own review power under clause 6, or through an appeal to the upper tribunal under clause 7. Amendment 85 would remove the latter, ending the onward appeal to the upper tribunal.
One of the public’s deepest frustrations with the immigration system is appeal after appeal after appeal. The Home Secretary herself described it on Second Reading. She told the House about a convicted rapist whom it took more than four years to remove from this country after he had served his sentence because of a succession of late claims and legal challenges. We agree with her diagnosis, but we do not understand why the Bill preserves the structure that makes that possible.
Let us consider the journey this Bill still allows. A claim is refused by the Home Office, so the person appeals to the authority and loses. They can then ask the authority to review its decision or for permission to appeal. If that is refused, they can ask the upper tribunal. If permission is granted, there is a hearing, and if that succeeds, the case may be sent to be decided all over again. Each step is measured in months and, at every one, the person remains here—usually at public expense. That expense is considerable—the National Audit Office estimates that the immigration and asylum chamber cost around £79.5 million to run in 2024-25, and that is before the cost of legal aid.
Siân Berry
I appreciate the hon. Member’s laying out the process, but can he honestly say that, if he were subjected to any area of justice, he would accept those arguments and the process for taking away his right to appeal twice, which the amendment would effect? Does he believe that that genuinely represents justice without fear or favour?
Matt Vickers
The hon. Member for North Northumberland made a valid point—this is an appeals process. The case has been considered once but can go to appeal for reconsideration and even that decision can be reviewed again—that is a lengthy process. The entire objective of this Bill is to speed up the process so that it is fair to the taxpayers, as well as to those subject to it. Removing a whole tier of appeal would reduce the burden on the taxpayer, as would other amendments the Opposition have tabled. The time limits in clause 8 will not help, because they bind the authority rather than the upper tribunal. The Bill does not shorten the queue; it moves part of it upstairs.
The Government’s case for part 1 is that the new authority will make robust and defensible decisions with trained adjudicators, a chief appeals officer overseeing quality, and a professional standards officer setting standards. If that is right, its decision should be capable of being final. Where a genuine error is made, clause 6 allows it to be corrected and that review should be carried out by a legally qualified senior adjudicator. That is a fair hearing—a check for error and then an end.
Let me be clear about what amendment 85 would leave in place, because the Minister will say it removes any check on the authority. It does not. Every appellant would still have a full hearing before the authority on the facts and the law. Every decision could still be reviewed for an error of law under clause 6. Government amendment 36 will mean that that review is confined to exactly the kind of point the upper tribunal would consider. Amendment 85 would remove the second external tier, and its two separate applications for permission—the listing queue and the power to send a case back to the start. The Government accept that the onward appeal is only on a point of law and not a rehearing. The question is simply who checks the law and how long it takes. Our answer is a legally qualified senior adjudicator, with the authority, and quickly.
There is a further problem with subsection (8) as drafted. Professor Ekins told the Committee that this is not an effective ouster clause, that the courts would read it narrowly and that the Committee should not rest content with it. He pointed to the more precise model that Parliament used in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. If the Government agree that the authority’s decisions should be final, they should draft subsection (8) so that it works, and we would welcome their help in doing so on Report.
Amendment 65, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would take the Bill in the opposite direction. It would delete subsection (8) altogether and reopen the possibility of judicially reviewing every decision the authority makes, adding a third route of challenge to the two already in the Bill. I understand the hon. Lady’s concern for safeguards, but they are already there. Parliament legislated in 2022 to end judicial review of the upper tribunal’s refusals of permission, precisely because that route had become a means of delay. Clause 7(3) rightly carries that rule across. Amendment 65 would reopen at the first tier what Parliament closed at the second. Our position is clear; enough is enough. Years of delay and expense must come to an end, and the legal merry-go-round has to stop. We will seek to divide the Committee on amendment 85 and we will oppose clause 7.
Anna Turley
Amendments 65 and 85 concern the routes through which decisions of the authority may be challenged. I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion and the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who tabled the amendments.
Amendment 65 would allow individuals to bring judicial review proceedings against the decisions made by the authority. As we have heard, the Bill already provides clear routes for correcting errors and for onward appeals. The authority can review its own decisions under clause 6 and decisions can be appealed to the upper tribunal on a point of law under clause 7 where permission is granted.
Siân Berry
On a point of clarification, is it not correct that under clause 7 the upper tribunal can hear an appeal only based on a point of law? Will the Minister comment on the way that challenging the processes or the administration of someone’s claim could therefore not be taken to the upper tribunal? Is she removing that safeguard? I remain concerned that the complexity of the law and the lack, often, of legal representation, as well as the difficulties that we all see in our casework of people claiming asylum, dealing with the Home Office’s processes and making their way through all this, mean that quite often there are process problems that ought to be challenged, and that this has been denied to people at the upper tribunal.
Anna Turley
The process mirrors the existing first-tier tribunal, which reviews errors of law, so it is important to clarify that this remains the same and retains the same definition. It is only on errors of law that a process can be appealed; this does not narrow that process any further.
Amendment 85 takes a very different approach. It would prevent decisions of the authority from being appealed to the upper tribunal at all. I am afraid we do not consider that acceptable. We do not believe that the authority’s decisions should be entirely prevented from onward appeal. That goes too far in the other direction and denies the right of justice where there has been an error of law.
Removing the statutory right of appeal could potentially open us up to even more litigation, as appeals where there has been an error of law would end up going straight to that process without this important safety valve. The authority will make important first-instance decisions, and it is right that there should be a means of correcting a decision when an authority has made, as we have said, an error of law.
Ben Goldsborough
One of the main arguments that the Opposition spokesperson put forward was that the system would be too slow under the Bill. However, one key thing that was not mentioned was clause 9(4), which gives the Secretary of State the ability to expedite individual cases. Is it not the case that the Bill as drafted protects the individual’s legal right while also making sure that, when there are grotesque crimes against this country, we can expedite to give people the certainty they need that the system is fair and swift?
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend makes an important point. The hon. Member for Stockton West suggests that any unsuccessful appellant could appeal to the upper tribunal and that it will just create another tier, but that is not the case. An appeal may be brought only on a point of law and permission must be granted first, so those safeguards are in place. Permission acts as an appropriate filter so that only cases raising an arguable legal error can proceed. The upper tribunal’s role is not to rehear the appeal simply because a party disagrees with the outcome. It is important to determine whether the law was applied correctly.
Another point about an error of law has been flagged, and I would like to clarify what that means. An error of law is a mistake about the law or its application, rather than a simple disagreement with the outcome or an administrative error. It may arise, for example, where the wrong legal test has been applied, relevant matters have not been considered, the process has been unfair or the reasons given are legally inadequate. The purpose of the review and appeal framework is to ensure that those legal errors can be identified and corrected. It is important that we allow the process to be clear, legally fair and balanced so that, where there is an error of law, that can be referred onwards.
Taken together, the provisions in the Bill strike the right balance. They support the finality and efficient disposal of cases while ensuring that errors can be corrected through clear and appropriate routes. The Government cannot accept these amendments, and I invite the hon. Members not to press them.
Question proposed, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 22 to 24.
Schedule 1.
Anna Turley
I would like to speak to clause 1 in more detail. As we have discussed, clause 1 will establish the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority as a body corporate: a public body that is independent of Government. It is the first step in the Bill towards overhauling the current immigration and asylum appeals system, which has seen unacceptable caseloads and waiting times for a determination to be reached. The clause details the primary function of the authority, which will be to determine immigration and asylum appeals as well as applications for immigration bail. It will give the IIAA the authority to determine the same case types determined by judges in the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber today.
Access to justice is a fundamental common-law principle and a core requirement of the rule of law. Clause 1 will place a statutory duty on the IIAA to uphold that through a statutory objective to be accessible, fair and independent. As set out in the clause, the authority must also aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and have regard to the public interest in the performance of its functions. The clause makes robustly clear that Ministers must uphold the independence of the authority and not influence decisions through any special access to its adjudicators. The clause also states that a decision of the authority in relation to its primary function may be challenged in legal proceedings only in line with the review and appeal framework. Such challenges will be directed to the authority’s review process and onward appeal route to the upper tribunal.
Schedule 1 makes a number of consequential amendments needed to transfer specified immigration and asylum appeal and immigration bail functions from the first-tier tribunal to the authority. Government amendments 22 and 24 make further consequential amendments to the schedule, which I will be detailing in due course. The schedule updates the relevant legislation so that references to the first-tier tribunal, the tribunal and tribunal procedure rules are replaced, where appropriate, with references to the IIAA and its procedure rules. Those amendments apply across the categories of cases that will form the IIAA’s primary function, as set out in clause 1. They are necessary and largely technical amendments, required so that the wider legislative framework operates coherently once the authority begins determining those cases. I commend Government amendments 22 and 24, clause 1 and schedule 1 to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Government amendments 22, 23 and 24 make further consequential changes to schedule 1 and appear to be technical. We do not oppose them. Is the Minister confident that the list is now complete? On clause 1 itself, the Opposition and the British public have one main question: how will this new appeals body get decisions made more quickly? What will the authority be able to do that the existing tribunal cannot? What reduction in waiting times do Ministers expect it to deliver, and by when?
Let me put the question plainly. The Government are taking immigration appeals away from the first-tier tribunal and giving them to a new body, but let us look at what stays the same: the same appeals brought by the same people against the same Home Office decisions, with a right of appeal to the same upper tribunal. Unless something fundamental changes in how quickly cases are decided and in how many people are removed at the end of them, this is rearranging the deckchairs. A new name on the door and a new chief executive will not clear a single case. The public will rightly ask what all that upheaval is for.
The Committee has been given very little to go on, and it has not been told what the Government heard before they wrote the Bill. In March, the Home Office opened a call for evidence on how the body should be designed, covering the recruitment and training of adjudicators, timeframes and oversight. It closed on 6 May. The Home Office said the responses would “inform the legislation”. The Bill was introduced seven weeks later and, so far as I can find, no response to that call for evidence has been published, then or since. Why not? What did the respondents say? Where did the Government disagree with them, and why? Will the Minister commit to publishing the response before Report stage?
Next, the backlog. More than 150,000 people are waiting for an appeal. Do those cases move to the new authority? Do they stay with the first-tier tribunal until they are finished? The authority is to take over gradually, so both systems will be running side by side for some time. How will the Government stop that creating more delay, or cases being lost between the two? The Government will be aware, from the difficulties of folding NHS England back into the Department of Health and Social Care, how hard it is to move functions, staff and buildings from one body to another while keeping a service running. What lessons have been learned, and when will any of this actually happen? The Bill does not say.
Part 1 comes into force when Ministers decide. The authority opens its doors when Ministers decide. Under clause 15, the first-tier tribunal carries on hearing immigration appeals for as long as Ministers decide. The Committee is being asked to approve the replacement of the tribunal without being told when it will be replaced. I ask the Minister for three dates. When will the first case be transferred to the authority? When will the last? On what date will the first-tier tribunal hear its final immigration appeal? If the Government do not know, they should say so.
Turning to the breadth of what the authority will decide, subsection (2) goes well beyond asylum. The authority will decide applications for immigration bail, appeals against deprivation of British citizenship and appeals under the EEA citizens’ rights regulations. Those are serious decisions about liberty and nationality. Under clause 2, many of them could be taken by adjudicators with no legal qualification. Will deprivation of citizenship appeals and deportation appeals brought by foreign criminals be reserved for senior adjudicators? Also, how will clause 1(8) operate where the complaint is about a procedural decision taken during a case, rather than about the final outcome?
Finally, on the practicalities, when will the authority start hearing cases? How many cases will it handle in its first year? Are the staff and money in place? Will the Minister publish the staffing, funding and transition plans, including the arrangements for appeals that are already listed for hearing?
The Opposition’s own borders plan would go further than the Bill. It would abolish the immigration tribunal altogether, with decisions instead being made in the Home Office through a quick, internal appeal. However, whichever model is chosen, the test is the same: decisions made quickly, and decisions acted on.
Siân Berry
I will speak to why clause 1 and schedule 1 should not form part of the Bill. Although I will not speak to every clause, all these reasons equally apply to the rest of part 1, which deals with the creation and implementation of the IIAA.
It is a real shame that this policy has not yet become another U-turn from this Administration. I compare this Bill with the Courts and Tribunals Bill, particularly how adjustments were made following feedback from the legal profession and human rights experts on the establishment of truncated legal process and rights, which was one of the Bill’s most misconceived parts. After the Government pressed on with those plans during the Bill Committee, on which I also sat, today it is being debated on Report without several of the clauses that would have put jury trials out of reach for far too many offences. Although they were quite rightly not selected, I tabled amendments to this Bill that would have removed part 1, which creates the independent immigration appeals authority and all its workings, and I look forward to seeing such proposals also being removed before its Report stage.
The Government said that clause 1 and the rest of part 1 are needed to clear a backlog of more than 150,000 appeals, which currently take an average of over 60 weeks to decide. That backlog is real, and it is important that actions are taken to clear it, but part 1 misconceives the issues. Evidence shows that delays are driven by poor initial Home Office decisions and a severe shortage of legal aid, but part 1 addresses neither.
Instead, the Bill would replace a working, independent judicial tribunal with a costly body that risks being ineffective and lacks independence and fairness. Above all, creating unfair processes and further adding to a hostile environment for asylum will not help stop the boats. In its written evidence, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees called for
“a comprehensive strategy addressing the drivers of irregular movement, expanding safe, regular pathways, strengthening international responsibility-sharing, and enhancing practical cooperation with European and other partner States.”
In oral evidence, the Government’s own National Crime Agency had no analysis or explanation about the real drivers of small boat crossings, being concerned only with the Government’s approach of layering an even harsher deterrence and enforcement regime on to the real causes. It is those real causes that need attention.
I want the Government to listen on this issue, and that depends on Ministers hearing the arguments—that is what this Committee is for. I will be here throughout the Committee to highlight the points made by experts on the needs and real lives of those seeking asylum. They are talking about the difficulties they face in gaining a hearing for their case or in dealing with Home Office processes. In particular—this is something we all know as MPs, because we try to help constituents navigate this system in our casework—they talk about how poor the decision making in the Home Office is, and how the Bill does nothing to improve it.
I want to bring some evidence from Brighton, given by one of a large number of charities that are providing direct support to refugees, as befits a city of sanctuary. The organisation One Church, which does a lot of work in this area, told me:
“The impact of UK immigration policies for the past 15 years has at times crippled our ability to do business and operate a charity focussed (ironically) on marginalised people across Sussex. The escalating cost of filing for visas, the precarity and punitive nature of asylum claims and other proceedings, and the emotional devastation when facing all-too-common Home Office errors have all contributed to outcomes including business costs we can’t afford, charitable work that we’ve had to stop or rein in, and full-on mental health breakdowns that rupture communities and cost incalculably more in long-term complications.”
One Church gave me several examples, but here is one:
“An asylum seeker from Zimbabwe…was unable to earn income or work a job for more than eight years—even as he also was barred from public funds—while his own appeals went through the Home Office system, requiring the community to house him for free and support his basic living needs for many years. He ultimately won his case as well, including a public apology from a judge, but struggled to cope with the effects of such a long stint in a precarious and dependent position. This entire cascade of events was due to an unclear Home Office deadline that meant his paperwork was alleged to have been filed less than 24 hours late.”
David Smith
I thank the hon. Lady for the powerful story that she has just shared. I ran a homelessness charity before becoming an MP, which housed people who were refugees or seeking asylum. Is not expediting the process—stopping appeal after appeal—as much about supporting those who seek asylum, doing justice to them, as it is about wider society?
Siân Berry
I disagree. I think that the Government are focusing on the wrong part of the system here. As MPs, we are all aware of the processes involved in the initial decision making of the Home Office. The number of similar messes that my caseworkers have had to try to clear up—we often succeed—is absolutely huge, so not to focus on getting that initial decision making right the first time, and instead for the Bill simply to take away people’s rights of appeal, is absolutely the wrong approach.
With all such problems, the people who need asylum also need real knowledge of their rights and real access to people who can support their claims, but all that is really hard to get. Late claims and appeals with new information, when people finally get the right support and legal guidance about the grounds on which they should be making their claim, are all necessary to protect asylum rights. Therefore, judicial processes should not be downgraded and truncated, and people who are not legally qualified should not be hearing those cases.
Dr Zubir Ahmed (Glasgow South West) (Lab)
I share a lot of the hon. Lady’s concerns about the initial quality of assessment. I have one of the highest burdens of asylum seekers in my constituency in Scotland. Will she concede that the emphasis that the current Home Secretary has put on upgrading the quality of the assessment of those initial appeals since she has been in post is starting to work? I certainly feel that in my casework. Moreover, on the number of people who appeal to the first-tier tribunal at the moment and the current trajectory of the numbers coming in versus the numbers being processed, does the hon. Lady concede at least that the status quo is completely and utterly unsustainable? How we manage that system needs a fresh look.
Siân Berry
As I am sure the hon. Member will have imagined, I cannot agree, given the number of cases overturned. We have had some data from the Minister in her letter of 6 October, and 44% of human rights appeals are being allowed. Those are appeals where the initial decision was wrong. Emphasis needs to be on clearer processes, in which people can truly participate and get their information to the Home Office the first time, with the Home Office not losing it or reading it mistakenly, or any of the other problems. That is so important. These changes to the judicial process are the wrong solution to the wrong diagnosis, as with those in the Courts and Tribunals Bill.
Melanie Onn
One of the issues that the Bill seeks to address is the fact that, when it comes to the appeals process, people have been left for far too long. The longer they are here, the more routes of appeal they have. Does the hon. Member not agree that that needs to be resolved?
Siân Berry
I agree about the growth in the backlog, but as I said earlier, the analysis is pretty clear that that growth comes from an increase in refusals as well as the increasing speed with which the Home Office is making decisions. To me, those two things go together. The increase in refusals is likely to represent an increase in mistaken refusals—refusals that should not have happened. We cannot get away with just looking at the proportions here, either. We have to recognise that this will result in a number of people being treated as badly as they possibly can be by a country in which they are trying to seek asylum, having already had to leave the country in which they would much prefer to stay due to human rights considerations that are not properly taken into account at the initial decision stage in 44% of cases.
Siân Berry
I have very nearly finished, so I will press on. At its heart, the IIAA fundamentally represents another ill-thought-through Government proposal to create a truncated legal process. It is part of the previous Prime Minister’s misconceived attempts to pander to the disturbing ideas of Reform UK and its even more unsettling offshoot, Restore Britain. We saw from Reform UK’s proposals yesterday that only standing up for asylum rights will do in the face of its politics, and that the far right of politics will never be happy with anything other than the total removal of asylum rights.
Meanwhile, measures like those in clause 1 of this Bill will prove impractical, expensive and ineffective in addressing the backlog, and they will hurt the most vulnerable people in the world. These proposals must be dropped, if not today then well before the Bill leaves the House of Commons. I will vote against clause 1.
Anna Turley
I thank all hon. Members for speaking in the opening debates. As we have discussed, clause 1 and schedule 1 will establish the IIAA, with the key aim of overhauling the current system and driving down the unacceptable waiting times, which are causing significant problems in the system. As I set out, we know that public consent for our asylum system is fraying, and we have heard that from colleagues today.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion set out very clearly and passionately that the current system is letting down those who are genuinely fleeing war and persecution as well. Genuine asylum seekers are not served by a process that gets ensnared in legal chew and does not have the opportunity to correct errors quickly. This is about enabling us to streamline the process, reduce errors and deal with people quickly and fairly in a much more managed way than the current system, which is letting everyone down on all sides, including those who are going through the process. As has been demonstrated, they are living in limbo at the taxpayer’s expense for far too long, and that is making it increasingly difficult for their cases to have a fair hearing. We all know the phrase about justice delayed, and I am afraid that that is the situation we are currently in.
I have set out the case fairly substantially, so I will not go over the arguments about the principles behind this again. Independence from Government is a cornerstone of the establishment of this new authority, and clause 1 seeks to protect that. Government amendments 22 to 24, while technical, will allow for the full operation of the IIAA when they begin their important work of determining cases. I want to come back to some of the questions raised by the hon. Member for Stockton West about transition and so on. As we have discussed, the scale and nature of the current asylum appeals caseload cannot be sustainably managed within the existing limits of the first-tier tribunal. Our assessment is that a fundamental reform is required to create a system capable of handling caseload volumes at speed while maintaining quality of decision making, fairness and independence.
Tom Gordon
The Government have already increased the first-tier tribunal sitting days by 19% and set a 24-week target. Is there a reason why the Minister does not want to see those measures work before dismantling the judge-led system? Could she elaborate on that?
Anna Turley
We have put in substantial investment. I mentioned at the beginning that we have increased the judicial workforce by 21% to 311 judges, with 61 new fee-paid judges and 25 salaried judges starting between January and March this year, but we cannot continue to increase the judicial workforce at the rate that we need to deal with the ever-burgeoning appeals process—it is simply not sustainable. We need a system in which we can recruit people far more quickly and flexibly to make important decisions. I will come on to this later in our discussions, but we trust all sorts of people with important decisions, whether magistrates or planning inspectorates. We are building a workforce that will be making serious and consequential decisions, and we are doing so in a way that is not reliant on a slow process to increase the judicial workforce, which simply cannot cope with the increase in volumes of appeals.
Tom Gordon
I appreciate the Minister being generous with her time. Is she able to rule out this model becoming something that other tribunals, such as benefits or property, might end up seeing, with Departments gaining greater statutory powers over the tribunal hearing appeals against them?
Anna Turley
I think we have been clear, and the Bill is clear, about the safeguards—not least the statutory requirement for Ministers to respect the independence of the authority. Those important safeguards are on the face of the Bill, and we are very clear about that.
To continue responding to the questions from the hon. Member for Stockton West, we are establishing the authority to offer increased and more flexible capacity and an enhanced ability to prioritise cases in the public interest. We expect a significant period of dual running, where the first-tier tribunal will continue to hear the existing appeals. That will run in parallel to the new Independent Immigration Appeals Authority, and will ensure continuity and that backlogs are addressed as quickly as possible.
On costs, implementations and benefits, as I mentioned earlier, we will bring forward detailed plans for the new authority, which will include the costs. Work is continuing across the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to refine those costs and establish comparable current costs for the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber. Those are not yet agreed or publishable for either comparison, but throughout the business case we will develop the full programme costs, affordability and benefits.
In terms of when we will start to make decisions, the authority will be introduced through a phased transition. The first-tier tribunal will continue to hear existing appeals in parallel, as I said, while the new authority begins to take on specific cohorts of new cases. We know that the new system will be quicker. The current system is taking too long to deliver decisions. The Bill creates a scalable appeals system with greater capacity and faster processes, while retaining independent scrutiny and fairness on individual decision making.
I have hopefully answered most of the questions that have been raised so far, so I will conclude by summarising the Government amendments in this group. Although technical, they will allow for the full operation of the IIAA when it begins its important work of determining cases. Therefore, I commend them to the Committee.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Siân Berry
I beg to move amendment 66, in clause 2, page 2, leave out lines 24 to 28 and insert—
“(2) The executive and non-executive members of the IIAA specified in subsection (1) are to be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission.”
This amendment would require the Chair, Chief Executive, Chief Appeals Officer, Professional Standards Officer and adjudicators of the IIAA to be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 25 and 26.
Amendment 67, in clause 2, page 3, line 6, leave out “a senior” and insert “an”.
This amendment would require all adjudicators deciding appeals for the IIAA to have legal qualifications or experience.
Government amendment 27.
Clause stand part.
Schedule 2.
Siân Berry
I will speak to amendment 66, about the appointments process to the IIAA, and amendment 67, about the legal qualifications and experience of adjudicators.
Under the Bill, the chair of the IIAA will be a Home Office appointee. The chair will decide the IIAA’s chief executive, who will then appoint adjudicators. By contrast, I believe that the leadership and decision-making roles in the IIAA should be decided by the Judicial Appointments Commission, the body that appoints judges. That would plainly and simply ensure independence from the Government and Parliament, which the Bill does not currently guarantee. We cannot risk leaving policies like this under the day-to-day political control of anyone in Government. Every safeguard must therefore be in place to make sure that this or any future Secretary of State cannot direct the outcome, prioritisation or disposal of these cases. My amendment 66 would fix that and make appointments to the IIAA the responsibility of the Judicial Appointments Commission, not Ministers or their appointees.
I will expand on some key points. According to the Bill, all members of IIAA, senior and junior, will be appointed either directly by the Home Secretary or by someone appointed by them. The chair of the IIAA, for example, will be appointed directly by the Home Secretary, and adjudicators will be appointed by the chief executive, who is given their role by the chair. The Home Office’s fingerprints will therefore be all over the membership of the IIAA, from top to bottom. As has been consistently clear, this Bill drags asylum appeals closer to the Home Office, risking the independence and fairness of appeals in a serious way. By contrast, tribunal judges, who currently hear asylum appeals, are appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission, which is independent, with no direct input from Ministers.
Evidence has consistently shown over many years that Home Office officials face significant and sometimes inappropriate pressure to make decisions, including asylum decisions, in accordance with political goals. The independent chief inspector of borders and immigration found that that was the case as part of Operation Bridora in 2022, which was a Home Office strategy designed to speed up the processing of Albanian asylum claims. The chief inspector concluded that Ministers imposed an arbitrary and secret target on Home Office officials for only 2% of Albanian claims to be successful. In addition, in a report from the chief inspector this year, it was found that the Home Office was prioritising the quantity of decisions over their quality.
The Home Office’s institutional history is anathema to the independence and fairness that is needed. The ties between the IIAA and Home Office could impose political pressure on the IIAA to operate in accordance with Home Office preferences rather than law and facts. If Ministers are sincere about creating a truly independent appeals body, the safeguards to ensure independence should be robust and tried and tested. My amendment would make all appointments the responsibility of the Judicial Appointments Commission, not Ministers.
Ben Goldsborough
I understand the hon. Lady’s concerns about independence from the Government and other bodies, but many bodies across Government are involved in complex cases, such as in criminal law. For example, the Criminal Cases Review Commission is appointed by the MOJ to look into miscarriages of justice. Are we honestly saying that the IIAA would not have those same safeguards, in this case from the Home Secretary rather than the Lord Chancellor? Within the Bill, we are introducing a process that maintains independence while keeping accountability to Parliament, which will be vital in securing our constituents’ trust in a fair and transparent process for our immigration system.
Siân Berry
The hon. Member is right that, sometimes, appointments of supposedly independent commissioners are made—I had experience of that recently in relation to equalities—but there is often a political element to the appointment and the direction they seem to take. We must always appreciate that and guard against it. Taking the appointments one step away from the Home Office may not completely remove the possibility of that, but the Judicial Appointments Commission is a robust body doing a similar job already and should have this role. That is what my amendment seeks to introduce. The Judicial Appointments Commission has two decades of experience in appointing independent judges, and I think it is the body best able to ensure the independence of candidates for adjudicators.
David Smith
Before the hon. Lady moves on, I wish to build on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk. It is a well-established principle within governance that quasi-judicial bodies are appointed by the Government. For example, the chief planning inspector is appointed by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. The chief inspector of prisons is appointed by the Secretary of State for Justice. The Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman is appointed by the Prime Minister. Furthermore, the Bill outlines that only the first chair and professional standards officer will be appointed by the Home Secretary. Is the hon. Lady arguing that all those other appointments made by Government have the same illegitimacy?
Siân Berry
All I am pointing out is that the Home Office’s record on this kind of thing is not brilliant, and that there exists a body far more appropriate than the Government’s proposal for direct appointments. I do not quite understand why Members are arguing so hard against that, when I am certain that the Judicial Appointments Commission would be happy to take up the role.
Mr Jonathan Brash (Hartlepool) (Lab)
The issue is about consistency. The hon. Lady mentioned specifically the Home Office. Well, the Home Secretary appoints the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration, the Migration Advisory Committee chair and the Domestic Abuse Commissioner. Why is this different? Surely, the hon. Lady’s argument is fundamentally inconsistent, given what the Home Secretary already does.
Siân Berry
I do not agree with that at all. This body will be making legal decisions. I will talk in a moment about how the chief executive and chair, who will be under the Home Office’s wing, will not be legally qualified to make those appointments. I cannot understand why every single safeguard should not be introduced in the Bill. Furthermore, this is a judicial process, so why should it not be the Judicial Appointments Commission? I fail to see the controversy with the amendment. The adjudicators will be making judicial decisions and considering law, evidence and facts. The Judicial Appointments Commission has the experience, the processes and—I am certain—the willingness to fairly test candidates’ skills and aptitudes in judicial functions. Therefore, the amendment would be highly appropriate, and I hope Ministers consider it.
Anna Turley
I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for introducing her amendments. I will address amendments 66 and 67 and respond to some of the points she raised, but I will first give an overview of the measures grouped for consideration, including the Government amendments.
Clause 2 introduces the IIAA’s non-executive and executive members and deals with their recruitment. Those are fundamental roles, needed to enable the authority to recruit more widely and to begin operating, and with the leave of the Committee, I will explain some of them now.
The chair and the professional standards officer are non-executive members. The Secretary of State will be responsible for their appointment in accordance with the existing public appointments process; there is clear guidance from the Cabinet Office for setting up new bodies. The chief executive and chief appeals officer are executive members. The Secretary of State will appoint the first holders of those roles on merit through fair and open recruitment. Subsequent appointments will be made by the chair in consultation with the professional standards officer. Ministers will have no role in subsequent appointments of the executive roles.
The IIAA adjudicators will also be executive members and each will be appointed by the chief executive as an executive adjudicator or senior adjudicator. All IIAA executive members will be employees, meaning they will be subject to the terms and conditions of their role, have employment law protections and could be subject to employment proceedings as appropriate. Such proceedings could be in respect of poor performance, and may even lead to dismissal, enabling the IIAA to take the action it considers necessary.
The IIAA will incorporate experience and expertise as much as possible and certain roles will have statutory appointment criteria. The professional standards officer and chief appeals officer must have practised as legal professionals, as defined in the clause, in the UK for at least five years or, in the opinion of the chief executive, have suitable experience in law-related activities. Government amendments 25 to 27 will make a small change to that arrangement, in that the chair, rather than the chief executive, will be the individual who decides whether the professional standards officer possesses that suitable experience.
Senior adjudicators must also meet appointment criteria. They will need to have practised as a legal professional, as defined in the clause, in the UK for at least two years or, in the opinion of the chief executive, have suitable experience in law-related activities. The IIAA will thereby be able to recruit from a much wider pool of potential candidates. Enabling those who have suitable experience in law-related activities to become a senior adjudicator will make the authority better able to retain talent and knowledge, as it will allow executive adjudicators with no prior legal background to be appointed as senior adjudicators. Being able to retain a strong pipeline of talent with clear opportunities for career progression will be key to our success.
Tom Gordon
The Committee has heard from several stakeholders, including UNHCR, which stated:
“Lowering professional requirements in response to capacity pressures risks undermining the quality of decision-making and may ultimately prove counterproductive.”
Will the Minister address that point?
Anna Turley
I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s challenge, but I am not sure how that is lowering standards. Just because they are not legally qualified does not necessarily demean the professional standards by which people will be making these decisions. I will explain more about our expectations of people in those roles.
Melanie Onn
Is it not the case that there will be people working in UNHCR who are not lawyers, such as people who have worked in refugee charities or who are experts in migrant work, and who have been doing that for a lifetime more than the time that somebody needs to go to law school in order to practise, or to go through the glad-handing process of becoming a judge? Would such people not be equally well qualified as somebody who has gone through an academic route?
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend makes a crucial point. We have to be really careful to say that having legal qualifications is not a prerequisite for having good judgment. We see all sorts of good judgment by professionals; it is demonstrated every day by magistrates, ombudsman and planning inspectors, for example.
Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)
The Minister mentioned magistrates. Magistrates are the backbone of our court structure, and they are not legally qualified. Does she agree that there is a huge precedent there and that magistrates do a great job?
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend is right to pay tribute to our incredible army of magistrates, who are volunteers. We are talking about professionals who will have a whole process of support, qualification and assessment. It is wrong to say that legal qualifications should be the only prerequisite for that kind of judgment.
Tom Gordon
I want to press the Minister a little further. While our magistrates do incredible work, they often hear cases concerning relatively low-level crimes. Does she think that is comparable to understanding immigration and asylum claims, which might be really complex, from people fleeing political violence overseas?
Anna Turley
I am afraid I completely disagree with the hon. Gentleman. The decisions that we ask our magistrates to take, which may result in restrictions on liberty, are life-changing. I think they are just as important as the decisions that we are discussing.
David Smith
To reiterate the point, as someone who stood to be a magistrate and was accepted, I can say that there was no requirement for legal qualifications, but there are still really important decisions that have to be made. Also, as I understand it, in the current system, first-instance asylum decision makers in the Home Office do not require legal qualifications, so this is not new.
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend makes a really important point. As I have set out, there will be senior appointees within the organisation who have legal qualifications, so any concerns on any aspect of law can be immediately referred to seniors. We do not have to have people with those incredibly costly and time-consuming qualifications to enable people to make these decisions. That is a really important point of principle.
Schedule 2 introduces important protections that will enable the authority to operate independently and autonomously. It makes it clear that the IIAA is not to be regarded as a servant or agent of the Crown. The disqualification of IIAA members from serving simultaneously as members of any UK legislatures underlines the expectation that authority members will be impartial in the performance of their functions. To further protect the IIAA from undue influence, all IIAA members, inclusive of senior officers and adjudicators, must be appointed on merit and based on fair and open competition.
The schedule limits the grounds for removal of non-executive members to serious misconduct, conflict of interest or being unable, unwilling or unfit to carry out their functions. Those in these important roles cannot be removed through the involvement of the Secretary of State. Executive members of the IIAA, the chief executive, the chief appeals officer and the adjudicators will be employees. The terms of their employment are to be set by either the Secretary of State, in the case of the first chief appeals officer and chief executive, or the IIAA, in the case of future appointments of senior officers and adjudicators.
The IIAA will be accountable to Parliament as a public body. Schedule 2 places a duty on the IIAA to report annually, providing Parliament with a means to scrutinise the authority on the performance of its functions. I hope hon. Members agree that the schedule strikes the right balance between operational autonomy and parliamentary accountability.
Let me move on to the amendments tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. Amendment 66 would give the Judicial Appointments Commission a role in appointing not only adjudicators, but the IIAA’s executive and non-executive members. These are completely different statutory roles from judicial offices, with their own employee arrangements and distinct governance, leadership and adjudicative responsibilities, and it would not be appropriate to apply the single judicial appointments model to them. That is designed for people who are legally trained to be candidates for judicial office. That is not what the adjudicators will be. They are not legal appointments—professionals who will be highly trained, yes, but not legal appointments.
The Bill establishes clear and transparent appointment arrangements appropriate to each role. The non-executive members and the first chief executive and chief appeals officer will be appointed by the Secretary of State. Subsequent appointments of the chief executive and chief appeals officer will be made by the chair, and adjudicators will be appointed by the chief executive. Those appointments must be made following fair and open competition, as set out in paragraph 2 of schedule 2. Ministers will also be under an express duty on the face of the Bill to uphold the independence of the IIAA.
To be clear, there will be no direct involvement of Ministers in the recruitment processes for adjudicators. I therefore do not consider that involving the Judicial Appointments Commission in appointments is necessary or appropriate.
Matt Vickers
I will deal first with the amendments and then with the clause. Amendment 66, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would require every member of the authority, from the chair to each adjudicator, to be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission. I understand that that is offered as a guarantee of independence; in practice, it could rebuild the very recruitment pipeline that the Government say they are trying to escape. The case made for part 1 is that reliance on judicial availability has left the system without the capacity or the flexibility to meet demand. Routing every appointment through the commission would import that constraint on to the new body on its first day. We cannot support that.
Amendment 67 would require every adjudicator to be legally qualified. It raises an important question, and the Opposition have our own concerns about qualification, which I will come to. What matters is that every adjudicator is properly equipped to make sound decisions quickly and that the authority can recruit enough of them to make a real difference.
Government amendments 25 to 27 provide that where a professional standards officer is appointed on the strength of experience rather than formal qualifications, it will be the chair and not the chief executive who judges whether that experience is sufficient. That seems sensible, since the officer who sets standards for adjudicators should not owe their appointment to the executive they oversee. I would be grateful if the Minister set out the rationale in a little more detail.
Clause 2 states that the Home Secretary is to appoint the chair, the professional standards officer, the first chief executive and the chief appeals officer. After that, the chair will appoint the two chief officers, and the chief executive will appoint the adjudicators who hear cases.
On qualifications, the Bill sets out a test for senior adjudicators: they must have spent two years in practice as a legal professional or have law-related experience that the chief executive considers equivalent. On executive adjudicators, the Bill is silent; clause 3(2) says only that adjudicators must receive “adequate training”. The Committee would benefit from knowing more of what the Government have in mind. What standard will an executive adjudicator be expected to meet before deciding a case, and how will it be tested? Will it be set out in the standards the professional standards officer must publish under clause 3(6), so that Parliament and the public can see it? That matters for speed as much as for fairness. Whoever is recruited, training and assessment must be up to the job. A poor first decision is one that is challenged, set aside and heard again, and every such case is potentially another year in which someone with no right to be here remains.
I have several further questions for the Minister. What criteria will the chief executive use to decide whether law-related experience is equivalent to legal practice? How many adjudicators will be recruited at the outset, and will experienced tribunal judges be encouraged to apply? Which categories of case will be reserved to senior adjudicators, and will the time it takes to recruit and train this new workforce add to the backlog in the meantime? Finally, when will the first appointments be made? Can the recruitment process begin before Royal Assent?
Anna Turley
The shadow Minister mentioned the Bill’s use of the phrase “adequate training and support”. In answering his question on that, as well as some of the other questions he asked that were more practical, it is really important for me to specify that it is not for the Home Office to decide that. The chief executive will be responsible for ensuring that the IIAA adjudicators have adequate training and support to maintain their independence from the executive. The chief appeals officer is responsible for overseeing the quality of decisions and developing a quality assurance mechanism. They will be able to identify any specific training needs of adjudicators and recommend them to the chief executive. It is really important that I confirm to the Committee that the IIAA is independent. It is not for the Government to decide what accreditation and continuous development will be required for the IIAA adjudicators, who will, in essence, be making decisions on appeals to which the Home Office is a party.
Siân Berry
I have heard arguments from Government Back Benchers and the Minister that, for example, Home Office officials are not required to be legally qualified. This is a notoriously complex area of law, and I cannot see how that does not reinforce the need for true expertise in appeals. We have also heard that magistrates are not required to be legally qualified, but magistrates’ decisions are backed up by appeals to a body of legally qualified people. The Bill seeks to remove that, so I cannot honestly agree with this measure.
There are two extra points I want to make from the written evidence that we received from JUSTICE. The first is about training. The Minister talks about the fact that adjudicators will be properly trained. According to JUSTICE, Home Office asylum decision makers were given 22 weeks’ training, but it was found that that was inadequate and did not provide them with the necessary information to perform their job effectively. I fail to see how things are going to work out any better for adjudicators taking the place of legally qualified professionals.
The Minister mentioned that legally qualified people advise magistrates and that legally qualified people will be available to advise the adjudicators. JUSTICE makes the point very well—
Siân Berry
I have not made the point yet, so I will carry on. JUSTICE makes the point that there is a paucity of specialist lawyers able to advise in human rights and asylum appeals, and that these lawyers are doing—