Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 15th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, it is our job to look at how things will and will not work and what the alternatives are. The noble Baroness takes a perfectly legitimate position that says, “If this won’t work, what will?” In a way, that underlines a lot of the discussions we have been having in this House: we need some time to discuss this Bill and we have not been able to have that.

My name is to the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt. We are questioning the ability of the care home manager to be able to do this at all. The words that have been used to us by the stakeholders—we have now talked to dozens of stakeholders in the last month or so—are “capability” and “capacity” of care home managers. Professionals question the capability and local government and other institutions question the capacity. Those words are being used constantly while we discuss this issue.

It is also worth mentioning the voice of the care home managers themselves, which is starting to emerge. We recently had a briefing from a large group of care home managers who feel that they are not qualified to take on this role or to carry out assessments and that the administrative burden they could carry could mean that they will not have the capacity to take on the extra work to carry out liberty protection safeguard assessments.

There is some confusion here with what the Minister said during the first day in Committee and in the letter he wrote to us all following Second Reading. I admit that I am confused as to whether we are talking about initiating and carrying out assessments and what the powers of the care home managers are. It seems that the Bill team and the Minister have given us several different descriptions of what those roles might be. That has not helped our consideration of our concerns.

Mencap has stated that it believes that the views of the cared-for person have to be at the heart of this part of the Bill and that it should be refocused accordingly. The comments made by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, suggest that that has not yet been achieved, and that the role of the care home manager makes it less rather than more likely. That has been said to us not just by Mencap but by many stakeholders. They are concerned that the cared-for person is not at the heart of the Bill. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether the Government have got this aspect of the Bill right and whether they need to find a different way of delivering it.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I wanted to respond in part to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. The original legislation was brought in on the basis of agreement across all parties in the House; so, too, was the report which reviewed the workings of the Mental Capacity Act. There was a unanimous view that DoLS need to be revised; they are not working.

It is interesting that many of the criticisms that have come to light in recent months have been from people who do not defend the current system but who have grave concerns not just about capacity but about some basic assumptions being made—not just about the role of care managers but about how the arrangements will work in practice. There is a quite legitimate view that the legislation will not solve the problem nor necessarily deal with a backlog; it will just shove it somewhere else. We need to think our way carefully through that because, as I will go on to say in debates on later amendments, there is no doubt that there is a watering down in the legal protections proposed by the Government. The noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, are therefore right that we should examine in some detail exactly what the Government are proposing, because up until this point it has been quite difficult to understand it.

I thank the Minister for sending his letter of 4 October —he did so in the characteristically open and respectful way in which he treats this House. However, I want to ask a question which is germane to what the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is trying to achieve in her amendment. The letter states:

“Care home managers will be responsible for arranging the assessments that are needed for the authorisation. In most cases, they will use assessments that have been completed by a social worker or a medical professional or others as part of the care planning process. This means we will reduce the duplication that exists in the current DoLS system and ensure that people access the safeguards they need”.


Exactly what assessments is the Minister talking about? DoLS assessments are different from assessments under the Care Act. It would be very helpful if he could say that, because it is one of the fundamental assumptions that we are all working to and which may turn out to be incorrect.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)]

My Lords, I want first to thank noble Lords for their amendments and for their contributions to the debate. Reflecting on our first day in Committee and on Second Reading, it seems to me that an enormous number of the questions with which we are dealing are about the creation or definition of a new role for the care home manager—a number of the amendments that we will consider today deal specifically with it. I shall deal with those and the many questions that noble Lords have asked.

Given that it has been more than a month since we had the first day in Committee, I would like to reflect on some of the other issues that were discussed on that first day to demonstrate that there has been some progress. I will also explain why, although we are undoubtedly dealing with some difficult and complex issues that we know we have to get right, I am confident that if we work together, we can do that. I am quickly going to pick three issues in respect of which there has been some progress.

The first issue that was raised is extending the scope of the Bill to include 16 and 17 year-olds. I said in Committee that we would look at that and I can tell noble Lords that we will bring forward proposals to include that group in the scheme. I will also reflect on the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton, Lady Finlay and Lady Barker, about the role of the cared-for person being front and centre. In fact, that was the one obligation to consult that was not translated from the Law Commission report into the Bill. Clearly, if we want to get the improvements that we want to see, it is essential that that person’s wishes and feelings about proposed arrangements be at the heart of the model, so we will ensure that the Bill reflects this.

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[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

As the noble Baroness says, there are conflicts of interest of various kinds; the important point is that there are protections against any conflict of interest. Typically, those will be through the regulatory authorities, whether the professional bodies or the CQC, which of course inspects all care homes and has found that 80% of them provide good or outstanding care. I believe that there are systems within the current regulatory framework that will provide for that oversight and prevent conflicts of interest. There is also the fact that the responsible body will carry out the reviews and that there is an opportunity to refer to an AMCP.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, the Minister has made several points, each of which needs to be gone over with great care—but I want to take him back to one of them. In his letter of 4 October, he said that the Bill is explicit that a necessary and proportionate assessment must be completed by someone who is suitably qualified and that case law establishes who is qualified to conduct other assessments. However, that is not actually so. What the Bill says in paragraph 16 of Schedule 1 is:

“The determination required by this paragraph is a determination that the arrangements are necessary and proportionate … The determination must be made by a person who appears—(a) to the care home manager, if the arrangements are care home arrangements, or (b) to the responsible body … to have appropriate experience and knowledge”.


So that wording does not say that it has to be a medically qualified person, and I am not sure whether case law establishes that a capacity assessment must be carried out by a nurse or a social worker. Under the Mental Capacity Act, you get best interest assessors who are not medically qualified; that relates to an amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. I suggest to the Minister—and I will suggest this quite a lot—that it should be in regulations rather than in the code that the minimum standards for completing assessments should be made.

On the first day in Committee the Minister said:

"Care home managers are already required to make applications and to consider capacity and restriction. Effectively, the new model recognises what they are doing but also allows for a further escalation”.—[Official Report, 5/8/18; col. 1829.]


At the moment care home managers do not make many of the assessments. They do not do capacity assessments. They do not make decisions about whether somebody is objective. It is not up to them whether an advocate comes in to see somebody. It is taking the truth to its outer limits to liken what happens now to what is intended under LPS.

When the Minister uses the word “escalate”, what is clearly understood not just by noble Lords but by stakeholders is that many of the protections, such as access to an advocate or to an AMCP, have deliberately been weakened in the Bill from what they are under DoLS. So I do think the Minister is somewhat overstating the case. That is what has given rise to many of the fears that have been expressed by a remarkably wide range of stakeholders. I therefore take some issue with what he said.

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

We believe that case law does establish that suitably qualified people need to be appointed. Clearly that is something we need to continue to discuss to persuade the noble Baroness that that is the case, but that is our understanding. As she pointed out, “suitably qualified” can include medical and other qualifications.

On care home managers’ capacity, they are of course carrying out some assessments. The intention is they will carry out more assessments. I agree with the noble Baroness on that point. The point that the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Thornton, raised was about the capability and capacity of this group of people to carry out these roles. On our previous day in Committee I committed to explain how we would ensure that that group of people had the requisite training and skills to carry out these kinds of assessments.

The noble Baroness made a point about weakened access. I want to update the House on our thinking about making sure that the person is consulted. We are trying to create a more proportionate system such that, where all those concerned with the care of a person are content that the arrangements have been properly put in place, it does not need to be escalated and reviewed by an AMCP or similar person. The problem we have at the moment is that the system takes every decision to the highest possible level. This is not about weakening access but about trying to have a proportionate system and also about making sure—we will debate this further tonight—that at every stage there are the right opportunities to seek advocacy support and to refer concerns so that an AMCP or responsible body can intervene and review a case if necessary.

Unless we find a way to deliver a more proportionate system we will simply be re-enacting the system we have now, which is not working. This is why I am so keen to work with noble Lords to make sure that we can determine the proper role and responsibilities of, and checks and balances on, care home managers so that we can get the system right and deliver a reform that saves money, enables more people to have their cases reviewed and enables us to make sure that people are protected, which is what we want to do.

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[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for moving the amendment. It gives me the opportunity to return to the question I asked previously, to which I do not think we have yet got the right answer. It is about the nature of the assessment. The noble Baroness talked about the sort of assessments made under the Care Act—assessments to support somebody. They are not DoLS assessments, which assess whether someone is being deprived of their liberty. In what the Minister has said so far, in reference to care home managers, there is a failure to make that distinction. A DoLS assessment is a very serious assessment of whether someone has been deprived of their liberty. It can also be viewed in court. It is some stretch for a care home manager or someone in a community setting—making genuine operational assessments about supporting somebody—to make a decision that deprives that person of their liberty. We will come on to records of authorisation, but I have to say nothing the Minister has said so far has reassured me we are talking about an assessment system that would come anywhere near DoLS or be accepted by a court.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, if I may come back very briefly on that, the noble Baroness makes an important point. I worry that some of the DoLS assessments are very long and complex, yet make little difference to the lived experience of the person on the receiving end of care, so I hope they will become better tailored. A badly drawn-up care plan could also be presented in court if there was a dispute, not only the assessment forms. Some of the forms I have seen will have taken a great deal of time to complete; I wonder whether the detail replicates that obtainable elsewhere, and whether there is a problem of proportionality. Also, I worry that we should be looking at the minimum amount of restriction on liberty, rather than deprivation of liberty. If someone is imprisoned, the whole system has failed. They must be encouraged and empowered to live as well as they can while being kept safe from dangers that, without due care and attention, would probably end for some of them in their deaths—wandering on to a motorway or whatever.

[Baroness Barker]

I take the point made by the noble Baroness; she is absolutely right. There are some pretty awful assessments. I am not sure the Bill will stop that—I think she is rather wishful in her thinking if she thinks otherwise. She will have talked to practitioners, as I have. Sometimes DoLS work really well, particularly when trained assessors use the conditions. These can be something quite simple, such as the right to see a priest once a week or go out on a pass. I find myself in a slightly different position from the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. As I sit in these debates I find myself becoming ever more defensive of DoLS because some of the case made against them is exaggerated. A lot of the reason for the backlog is not that the system is complicated but that there are not enough assessors out doing the work. I take the point made by the noble Baroness, but I still go back to the need for assessors who are trained, understand their purpose and carry it out in a proportionate and timely way.

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[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I am grateful to Members of the Committee for their sympathy and for giving me breathing space. I was flustered by flipping forward and almost missing out this group of amendments.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, the issue of concern is the distinction between the person who is responsible for somebody’s care and the person who manages a care home—they are of course different. What we are trying to get right here—I understand that this is what the amendments are exploring—are the relevant responsibilities of those people, bearing in mind that we want to integrate liberty protection safeguards into the process of care planning.

The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, knows huge amounts about this topic and I very much respect her opinion. She pointed out that DoLS assessments are different from assessments under the Care Act. There are some overlaps. As she will know, there are similar questions or parts in both assessments concerning consent, for example, but she is right that they are different types of assessments. I want to explore whether her or indeed the Committee’s concern is that those assessments should not be carried out by care home managers or whether—a more positive view—they should be carried out by certain types of professional. Those are subtly different points. Perhaps I may give her the opportunity to respond in a moment, as I am really keen to explore this matter.

Clearly, we are trying to make sure that those who have the professional expertise to carry out certain types of assessments do so. Equally, we are trying to make sure that a co-ordinating body has responsibility for ensuring that these assessments are carried out in a proportionate way and are included with care assessments in an overall care plan, with people being answerable to the relevant regulatory bodies. If the noble Baroness would not mind, I would be grateful if she, along with other noble Lords, gave her perspective on that. I want to make sure that we determine the appropriate role of the care home manager.

[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister very much for that because it enables me to point out something that I am sure he and all noble Lords know—that, when it comes to deprivation of liberty, the body which is ultimately responsible for that in court is not the care home but the state body, which would be the NHS body or the local authority. The Minister said that responsible bodies currently receive from care homes the referral forms and then do a desk-top assessment of those. Yes, they do that; however, they do it in the knowledge that the person will be seen by a qualified person. The problem with the Bill as it stands is that that is not an automatic assumption that a responsible body can make because of the gatekeeping role of the care home manager.

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[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

I thank the Minister; I am very grateful to him. If I have understood it correctly, the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, supports my Amendment 30A, which requires that a registered professional—who, if they really get it wrong, would lose their registration—who has responsibility for the care plan and appropriate experience and knowledge, should make the determination. In other words, it is not good enough just to be a professional. I go back to the example of people with a head injury, who need a highly specialised assessment and overview so that a lead can be taken on the care planning process.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords—

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

I will just finish, if I may. I completely share the concern about self-funders. They must have a care plan, because they are in receipt of care once they are in the system. It is appalling if there are people who are paying to be cared for in some kind of chaotic way without a proper, co-ordinated plan that they and their family can know about, so that everyone coming and going, be it out of hours or whatever, can understand what is happening.

I am beginning to think that there is not that much difference between us, and I agree that the current forms are inadequate. I apologise if, in the previous debates we have had, my comments about notification from the care home manager to the local authority were not well worded—on re-reading, I can see that, and I accept that I was wrong in the way that I worded it.

[Baroness Barker]

I do not want to get up the hopes of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, too strongly. She is a medic and therefore her go-to place is medical qualifications. There are some excellent best interests assessors who are not engaged in the care of the person. I wish to make that point. I shall keep coming back to the valid point of the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, about the need to wind up with an affordable and manageable system. Noble Lords who have been involved in discussions with stakeholders will not be surprised to know that some of us think there is a way in which that could be done but it would involve reliance on advocates and assessors. Having said that, I agree with the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Monday 15th October 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

17: Schedule 1, page 11, line 9, after second “a” insert “written”

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I move Amendment 17 and will speak also to Amendments 19, 54 and 57, which are in my name. Like other noble Lords, I thank the Minister for statements he made earlier about having listened to concerns over the duty to consult with the person and over the inclusion of 16 and 17 year-olds. He will appreciate that a number of amendments tabled by noble Lords stemmed from that deep concern about the lack of a statement on the Bill that the person being cared for should be seen by the person arranging for their assessment.

On a matter of form and detail, I do not like the term “cared-for person”. I prefer the scheme used under the Mental Capacity Act, where the person is referred to as P. They are considered as a person in their own right; they are subject to the legislation as a whole person. It is a stylistic matter. We got there with “unsound mind”; perhaps if we keep going, we might be on a roll—you never know—so I throw that in.

These amendments dig at some of the same concerns as those at which the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was getting on a previous set of amendments. As noble Lords will know, under the DoLS legislation there is a duty to ensure that not only does the cared-for person know what their rights are and have access to justice, but the people who care for them also know that what is proposed is the least restrictive option. There is a real question under the liberty protection scheme, as laid out, as to how somebody who lacks capacity or the people who look after them would know that. Furthermore, there have been concerns—assuming the care home manager was responsible for much of the assessment—over how they too would know that what was proposed was a least restrictive option. These amendments are about seeking to establish a duty to ensure that people are fully informed.

That takes us to another basic criticism of the Bill, which is about what I would say was an overreliance on the code of practice. Noble Lords have many years’ happy experience—some of it on the other side of the Dispatch Box—arguing about the importance of codes of practice as opposed to law. There has to be a statement in the Bill for anything in a code of practice to have force. As the Minister will know, practitioners need only have regard to the code of practice; effectively, they may not have regard to it. It matters more towards the back-end of the Bill, where much of the Mental Capacity Act is amended.

Put simply, nowhere in the Bill does there seem to be a duty to provide this information to the cared-for person or to the people who care for them. In the coming set of amendments the Minister will no doubt make much of the new requirements to consult, but that is something slightly different. We felt it was important to restate this and back up what is already the intention under the best interests of the Mental Capacity Act, but that we felt had been ignored in this Bill. I beg to move.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, I added my name to Amendment 17 because I think it is important that things be written down clearly, particularly for the cared-for person—which is the term we are using—if they have fluctuating capacity or need to absorb things very slowly but want to understand. Also, their families and those concerned about them will not necessarily be there when someone comes in to assess them or formulate a care plan, but they will certainly have concerns and they may have a very good idea about wishes and feelings that could have been overlooked—not maliciously, but because people did not know about them. A written record will provide evidence for everybody about what is happening.

The way the consultation is conducted should therefore, I agree, demonstrate that restrictions have been proportionate and necessary, and that alternatives have been considered—and the reason they have been discounted should be given. I would like us to give people much more access to all their clinical records; the caring family, in particular, should have access to the records. Often, information held by family members and others close to the person is effectively like gold dust when it comes to planning their care, and would benefit from being shared.

Where someone’s condition deteriorates, if this has all been written down clearly you have a baseline against which you can measure changes. If they improve, the baseline shows the reason that things were put in place as restrictions, which could then be lifted. Again, that gives a benchmark against which to measure, which would make care more personalised. I hope this concept will be well received. I am unsure as to whether it should go in the Bill or in the code—it is easy to put lots into the Bill—but the principle is important.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)]

Well, I shall see whether I can lift the gloom from the noble Lord. I think that there was a slight mischaracterisation, in that the Government are listening. Indeed, we have responded and made changes. I hope that in responding to these amendments I will be able to show further that we are taking a positive and constructive view on improving the Bill, making sure not that it removes rights but quite the opposite—that it provides access to liberty-protection safeguards for people who do not currently enjoy them.

I begin by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for leading the debate and I also thank other noble Lords. I shall go directly to her Amendment 17. Of course she is right, as are other noble Lords, about the arrangements for the cared-for person—person P—being written. I am very happy to confirm to all noble Lords that that is our intention and that we will make sure that the Bill reflects it.

With regard to other amendments, the entire thrust of policy across government, whether in health and care or anything to do with data, is about providing more people with the information that the state holds about them. I can give the absolute commitment to noble Lords that that is what we intend to do in the Bill and in changes that we make to the Bill going forward. It is essential that cared-for persons, their families, appropriate persons, IMCAs and so on are given full information about their authorisation and their relevant rights, including their rights to review and appeal. I can tell noble Lords that that will be set out fully in the code of practice.

On the code of practice—I can see the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, grimace—I will say two things. First, it is a statutory code of practice involving a consultation arrangement and a laying before Parliament—noble Lords know how these things work. The noble Baroness asked about the force of the code of practice and it is true that the Bill says “have regard to”. But case law confirms—I am happy to write to noble Lords with this opinion—that the code of practice must be followed unless there are cogent reasons not to do so. That means that there will be some occasions when the code is not practised, but those not following it will have to justify, potentially in court, why they did so in the interests of a person’s care. So the code of practice is statutory and it has very great force. It is worth pointing that out, not least because on this group and future groups we will be talking about information or an instruction that will be within the code of practice. I will take the opportunity to make that clear at this point.

[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister for that. This is a very important part of our discussion. I have two questions which I am absolutely certain he will not be in a position to answer, but I hope that he will write to me. First, how many cases of a failure to follow the code of practice rather than a failure to follow the law have gone to the Court of Protection? Secondly, can the Minister confirm that the original Mental Capacity Act code of practice was never reviewed and that it is not possible to make individual amendments to a code of practice: it has to be changed in its entirety? I shall not put the Minister on the spot now but we need to return to those matters in a further discussion because they are really important.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

The noble Baroness is quite right: I do not have the answers to those questions, but they are very good questions and I will make sure that we answer them for noble Lords in a communication following this debate.

On the point about access to information, I think that two other aspects are worth considering. One is that under the general data protection regulation, which came in on 25 May this year, the cared-for person or their family, IMCA or somebody holding a lasting power of attorney—that is, somebody acting on their behalf—will, and indeed does, have access to their authorisation record. I believe, although I will clarify, that that has to be done free of charge. I know that that is certainly the case with medical records and GPs. In terms of access to information, that is an important advance.

Again, I want to get further clarification on exactly what is involved, but the NHS and the LGA have created a programme of local health and care record exemplars. It happens in a few parts of the country and it is about creating a single health and care record that contains all the information about a person’s health and care. Obviously it spans both health and care settings. That will be available not only to inform the care carried out by a clinician or someone in a caring role but information to that person and those with responsibility for them.

That obviously has huge implications for improving joined-up care. It is an important programme by which we set a lot of store. What I will take away from this discussion is the need to ensure that what we are describing here, around access to information by the cared-for person or by those caring for them, ensures that they will have access to the local health and care record, which would contain the kind of information we are talking about. If it does, we have a vehicle; if it does not, we need to think about what the right vehicle is.

The amendments in this group also support the IMCA to help the cared-for person understand their rights under liberty protection safeguards. I can confirm that this will be a key role for the IMCA. It will be defined in their job description and, again, contained in the code of practice.

Once again, we have already made changes, and are committing to changes in the Bill, that will deal with the questions raised about access to information. I absolutely concur with the sentiment behind the questions. There is good reason to believe that expanding programmes and mechanisms in the system will give us the opportunity to do that, and in a much more thorough way than is done now. I want to continue to work with noble Lords to make sure that we get that right as we move towards Report, so that it is properly reflected in the Bill. I hope that, on the basis of my comments and reassurances, the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, will feel a little less despairing and the noble Baroness will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister for his comments. I hear what he says about GDPR, but if he could send Members a small briefing note, that would be extraordinarily helpful. Clearly, there has been a significant change. I and other noble Lords will remember times in the past when individuals were not able to access historic care records because they contained information about a third party. A whole series of cases had to go through the European courts to establish exactly what the rights of access to care records were.

I will study what the Minister said. However, we need to be absolutely certain that the spirit of these amendments is reflected. Perhaps we may come back to this at a later stage with a simple amendment introducing a requirement in the Bill to provide information. How that is done can be set out at considerable length in a code of practice, but the requirement to do it needs to be in the Bill. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 17 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, on again introducing this discussion on a difficult topic. I do not share her pessimism that it is impossible to find a definition. It would be quite simple to have a definition in the Bill which would enable us to distinguish between those who are and are not being deprived of their liberty.

The fact that people are deprived of their liberty, in reality, by their condition is an irrelevance. We have to stick with what is happening to people; what we, the state or the carer are doing to the individual. We would not find it too difficult to decide what is or is not a restriction. You can compare the living accommodation of a person in a care situation to that of someone who is living in the same place without those restrictions. Care home managers would not have too much difficulty in saying who was and who was not restricted.

We should not give up trying to have some kind of definition that lists those conditions. People might be receiving sedative medication so that they cannot move around and others might be restricted physically—there are still people being restricted physically—in dreadful chairs and so on who cannot move about. We could define fairly well what the conditions are. I hope we will come back on Report with some clarification of what they are so that we can put something in the Bill. I worry that if they are in the code of practice it will be so flexible that it will result in a postcode lottery, with one area’s policy different from another’s. That would be a disaster.

We should be able to get something in the Bill. I hope that we will not give up at this stage.

[Baroness Barker]

Following on from the observation made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, one of the most common restrictions of liberty is medication and medication reviews. We often think of it as being physical but it is not. New medicines often come online and create change. I take her point and hope we will be able to work towards a definition.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I will not add much more because the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has done us all a favour by putting forward great questions exploring the Cheshire West ruling. The Joint Committee on Human Rights agrees that a definition needs to be found, otherwise—the noble Baroness is right—we will be back in a situation where things have not gone right and we end up in court again. We all need to put our minds to this. We should be able to find a definition and I look forward to the Minister leading that particular discursive discussion across the Committee.

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Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

21: Schedule 1, page 11, line 41, after first “person,” insert “based on evidence,”

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, again I preface my remarks by saying that these amendments were drafted when the role of the care home manager was less clear than perhaps it is now. Nevertheless, they take us to the important point about determinations on mental capacity and the requirement to make sure that they are evidence based. In the Bill as it stands, a huge amount of discretion is given to care home managers and people involved in care to determine whether someone has capacity. We do not believe that that is right. Determining whether someone has capacity is difficult to do and something for which a great deal of training and experience is required. We keep coming back to what would be acceptable levels of training and qualifications to exercise that determination.

Amendment 21 seeks to provide that there should be an evidence base and that those making the capacity assessment should go through it and be ready to justify their decisions accordingly. I will go back to a point and reiterate it, although it must be rather boring: a DoLS assessment is different from a care assessment, and whoever makes and records such assessments should know that they are challengeable in court, which is a big responsibility.

Amendment 22 again endeavours to make sure that the person carrying out the assessment of capacity should be properly qualified, a point I have made before. I do not think that the Bill as it stands is sufficiently robust about the level of professional training needed and therefore this is a matter to which we should return.

Amendment 25 in a way follows on from our previous discussion. With this Bill we will move into a new position where the assessment of capacity is not as clearly specific to the situation as it is under the Mental Capacity Act. We are also moving towards a position in which assessments can be rolled over for longer periods. I am not saying that that should not happen and I take absolutely the point that a number of the assessments being required under DoLS are unnecessary. When someone has had a diagnosis of dementia, for example, their capacity to make decisions may not fluctuate or change, but we need to be altogether a lot more precise in the terminology being used in the Bill. It is not just a change in someone’s condition but may also be a change in their circumstances which has led to the deprivation of liberty. We are bringing in a new test to show that things are necessary and proportionate. I do not think that it is that clear or that it will clarify the decisions which are going to have to be made. This is an attempt on our part to move away from what we believe to be a position where the subjective judgment of care providers would have been given too much weight in the determination of capacity. The amendments on that issue are probing in nature and I beg to move.

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to lend my support to Amendment 21 tabled in the name of my noble friend Lady Barker and to speak to Amendment 22, which is tabled in my name. Amendment 22 is essentially about who should be able to determine whether an individual is, as it currently states in the Bill, “of unsound mind”. That is the terminology being used, but I would prefer to see terms like a “disorder” or a “disability” of the mind. That is one of the three key authorisation conditions. Perhaps I may say again how very pleased I am that the Minister has indicated his willingness to look at some new language so that we do not use the term “unsound mind”, which in my view is stigmatising and has no place in today’s society.

I return to Amendment 22. Currently, the authorisation arrangements in this part of the Bill state that a medical assessment has to be made but do not state who has to make it. It is likely that most people would assume—indeed, it may well be that the Government are assuming it and no doubt the Minister can reassure us on the point in his response—that a medical assessment needs to be carried out by a registered medical practitioner. However, it would be helpful and reassuring to have that made clear in the Bill. The report published earlier this year by the Joint Committee on Human Rights is clear that, in order to comply with human rights law, any deprivation of liberty under Article 5 requires,

“objective medical evidence of a true mental disorder of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement, which persists throughout the period of detention”.

Given the requirement for “objective medical evidence”, my contention is that there needs to be a guarantee in the Bill that only a registered medical practitioner with appropriate training has the power to determine whether someone has an unsound mind or mental disorder, depending on which language is going to be used.

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[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who took part in this debate. It has clarified some matters to a certain extent. I very much welcome the Minister’s suggestion that we should meet further. There is agreement on the part of everybody that we want to cut down the number of unnecessary repetitions of assessment, but to do that we need to be quite clear that the assessments are done correctly and by the correct person.

The Minister talked about qualifications changing and wishing to move towards a competency-based arrangement, but the parallel with Mental Health Act and approved mental health practitioners is a good one. All sorts of people from different disciplines and backgrounds are approved mental health practitioners. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, illuminated, a whole number of people from different professional backgrounds could be AMCPs. The important thing is that they have demonstrable expertise in this legislation. I yet again make the point to him that he talks about using different assessments, but assessments under this legislation are not the same as care assessments. They are particular ones. We have not had the discussion about the implications for the changes to Care Act assessments if this Bill goes through, but we need to because we need consistency between the two.

Nevertheless, I am heartened by the Minister’s response. We are not quite there yet on this. We need to do a number of different things to make sure there is consistency and clarity across the range of professionals engaged in doing these assessments, and that the people who are being cared for and their families, and care home managers, can have a reasonable expectation that these crucial assessments—it is assessment of someone’s capacity; it is a really important one—are done consistently under the Act. It is when assessments are done badly that these things start to unravel. I very much thank the Minister for his response and at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 21 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group, Amendments 60 and 62, to which I shall speak briefly. To reiterate, the responsibility for this law lies and remains with the responsible bodies, and not with the care providers. If things go wrong, it is they who will end up in court. Consequently, and rather like the bodies under the Mental Health Act, they retain responsibility for ensuring enough sufficiently trained people are available to ensure that the law is applied properly.

Part of the reason for all noble Lords having such an interest in this issue is that we know from the review of the Mental Capacity Act that availability of trained staff is one of the biggest reasons why the Act failed to be properly implemented. Furthermore, we have statistics on the patchy nature of implementation by local authorities and some in the health service. Some authorities absolutely get this and implement it properly, but a lot just do not. It is an almost random distribution, which has a knock-on effect.

The other reason for noble Lords wanting to talk about these issues is the impact assessment. We have not really talked about the impact assessment for this Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, used some particularly strong words, but she let them off very lightly, because I do not see how that impact assessment stacks up. Perhaps I may ask the Minister about one of the many assumptions made in the impact assessment. My understanding is that it assumes that training under this Bill will be needed for 10% of doctors and 10% of social workers. Can the Minister explain—if not now, then perhaps at a different juncture—that assumption and how it has come to be? I would be really surprised if the figure for social workers was 10%. Ten per cent for doctors is possible, but a figure of 10% for social workers needing to be trained under this Bill seems very low. My amendments were designed to enable us to have this sort of probing debate.

[Baroness Murphy]

I support the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, on some of the training issues. Like many people here, I suspect, I have spent a great number of years training junior doctors in how to use mental health legislation, as well as social workers and occupational therapists. One of the most difficult things is to convey the culture of what we are trying to achieve in legislation of this kind. We all refer to the European court and the agreements, but what we are trying to achieve for individuals and why is difficult for many people to grasp when they have grown up in a very didactic, academic environment, where these things are not necessarily considered.

A key aspect of that cultural shift which is so required is the problems that arise between relatives, carers and professionals over what should happen to an individual. All the way through this Bill, I have been scratching my head and thinking, “Will this solve the Bournewood problem?” All the cases from Bournewood onwards have arisen because of a cavalier approach or attitude by professionals to discussing with relatives and carers what the individual wanted, needed or was used to. If we do not get those things right, we will not solve the problem and there will be another case because it will all be up again for grabs where the professional training has not been accurate.

I note that there are some very specific proposals about care home managers. There are some very specific difficulties about what training care home managers currently have, and it is absolutely basic and rudimentary. It is largely about keeping the accounts right. We need to find a way to get the culture of what we are trying to achieve for individuals and families into this Bill. Exploring those training options is crucial if we are to avoid another Bournewood.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 15th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jolly (LD)]

My Lords, a cared-for person has rights, and it is the duty of all those dealing with that person to understand those rights and to ensure that they are respected and recognised. I am certain that the rights of a cared-for person should be at the heart of liberty protection safeguards. One way to ensure this is to provide an automatic referral pathway to an AMCP in those cases of dispute, objection or disagreement that cannot easily be resolved. We know that a group of cases referred to court has been pivotal in ensuring that people’s rights are upheld in the field of mental capacity. These cases provide AMCPs with the authority to refer to the court. If this authority is on the face of the Bill, it will provide an added level of reassurance that the interests and wishes of the cared-for person will be fully considered.

Cared-for people are found in many different settings in this context—in hospitals, care homes and, indeed, their own home—whether they are supported by friends and family or by a care provider. I believe that this amendment will have particular relevance in cases involving potential deprivations of liberty within the cared-for person’s own home. Although the Minister’s letter addressed after Second Reading stated that all applicants will be subject to an independent review before authorisation, the Bill as it currently stands does not reflect this—nor the ability of the AMCP to refer to the court any issues that have evaded amicable resolution. I wonder whether the Minister will look at this when he sums up, and bring back some government amendments on Report to resolve these omissions.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, some amendments in this group are in my name. The purpose of putting these amendments down is to enable a debate about the extent to which the Bill relies on family members to take responsibility for escalating up and—as it seemed to us when we started to read the Bill—challenging care home providers, as well as challenging any deprivation of liberty. We know from the experience of Mark Neary that he relied heavily on provisions of the Mental Capacity Act—particularly covering review procedures—to equip him with what he needed to challenge what was being done to his son. It seemed to us that, because of the way the Bill was written, there was a greater expectation that it would fall to relatives to bring matters before the court, which is not easy to do.

We realise that going to court is an expensive and time-consuming business. We do not want to refer cases to court where there is no need to do so—we want to rationalise—but in our view this part of the Bill is inadequately written. It does not contain sufficient safeguards, and therefore we wanted a debate on these matters to probe exactly what support family members will have where there is a need to challenge decisions made under LPS.

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[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I have added my name to two of these amendments. We heard earlier that the Minister has agreed that the Bill at some point in the future will reflect the need to consult the cared-for person. This is clearly a great advance and sets the context for the debate on this group of amendments. I particularly commend the suggestion that the consultation should be not just about what the assessment has concluded should be done to the cared-for person—I fear that the sense of the Bill at the moment is “done to”—but what the alternatives are.

This is where I come back to one of our problems with the architecture of the Bill. So much responsibility is given to the care home manager who, inevitably it seems to me, must think about residence in a care home as being the only option because their job is to make sure that occupancy is of the highest level in order to maximise the viability of the home. It would be good to know how the Government think with this Bill and the new arrangements we are going to ensure that the alternatives are properly looked at before someone’s deprivation of liberty is actually authorised.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, can I take this opportunity to ask the noble Baroness some questions? Can she confirm my understanding that this duty to consult does not come under Article 4 of the Mental Capacity Act? As I read the Bill, the responsible body or the care home manager is under a duty to consult only in so far as they deem it to be practicable or appropriate to do so. They make that decision. Is that correct? Under DoLS, if somebody was “unbefriended” and if there was nobody to consult, that automatically triggered the right to an advocate. I do not believe that is the case under the Bill. Finally, this duty to consult is a stand-alone one. What happens as a result of that consultation? For example, it does not make it clear that if a family—like Mark Neary—objects to a placement, it does not trigger the need for an AMCP or another assessment. Yes, there is a long list of people but, as I understand it, there is no nearest-relative rule as there is under mental health legislation. There is no sequential order. My basic question is: what happens as a result of this duty to consult? It is not clear to me that anything necessarily happens.

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[Baroness Hollins]

My Lords, my Amendments 38, 39, 40, 41 and 43 would add in families, friends and carers. They build on and support Amendments 15 and 16, which were debated earlier and tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly. They would require that every cared-for person has access to an approved mental capacity professional, regardless of whether the assessor considers that the cared-for person might object to the care and treatment proposed.

Not everyone will be able or willing to risk expressing an objection to those currently providing their care. It can be very hard for a person to object to care given by a staff member on whom they may be totally dependent, and may feel obliged to agree with, when they view them, correctly, as somebody who has power over them. I suggest that for some people this will not be an easy judgment even if they are trying to object, particularly if they have difficulty communicating. It is often the case that family members are the most skilled at communicating with their loved ones, as I suggested earlier, and are therefore most likely to understand their feelings and wishes—feelings which may be communicated with subtlety or nuance, and which are unlikely to be confided to unfamiliar people or people perceived to have power over them.

In those situations where someone is not able to communicate their objections, it is vital that their family and others with an interest in their welfare are able to object for them and to trigger a referral to an AMCP—someone whom they can be confident has the right expertise. Otherwise someone with profound communication impairments might not be able to object while those close to them have serious concerns about the arrangements, yet are not able to request an AMCP. Those with the most profound impairments must not miss out on the involvement of an AMCP in this situation. In the 2014 report from the House of Lords post-legislative scrutiny committee, Nicola Mackintosh spoke about the compliant nature of many incapacitated adults. She said that,

“if you have a vulnerable person detained in a care home who is physically or verbally expressing a wish to leave, those cases are more likely to be raised before the court than cases involving a compliant, incapacitated person. That was the case in the Bournewood case. I do not think the DoLS scheme has cured the illegality”.

I do not think that the Bill, as amended, will fill the Bournewood gap. My Amendment 44B has identified a similar issue to that in Amendment 44A, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton. It has been tabled to protect the rights of people detained for treatment in assessment and treatment units, and other hospital settings, for treatment for mental disorder. It would include NHS and independent hospitals. These are often the most restrictive settings where the liberty protection arrangements will apply and there are serious concerns about the rights of patients with learning disabilities who are placed in these settings.

However, due to the rules governing the interface between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Mental Health Act, which this Bill leaves largely untouched, these patients will not receive any independent assessment by an AMCP. The reason for this, as I understand it and put as simply as possible, is that the Mental Capacity Act cannot be used to authorise a detention if the person is viewed as objecting to their detention; the Mental Health Act must then be used. This means that patients detained in hospital under DoLS or its successor, the LPS, will by definition be regarded as not objecting by those responsible for their detention. This would include people such as HL in the Bournewood case, who may not be capable of expressing an objection or whose behaviour is hard to interpret by those who do not know them well.

Under the Bill, a person will qualify for an assessment by an AMCP only if there is reason to believe that they are objecting, so for this group a specific trigger is needed to ensure that their detention is scrutinised by an independent, specially trained professional to ensure that it is justified, having regard to the alternatives. Last year there were 4,670 DoLS applications for patients in this category. I hope the Minister will agree that it is important for people in these settings to have access to an AMCP automatically.

I have also had some communication with Professor Sir Simon Wessely today, but I did not achieve the same certainty as my noble friend, who is not in her place. I hope that the Wessely review will remove the learning disability exemption in the Mental Health Act, which allows people with a learning disability to be detained if their behaviour is abnormally aggressive and so on, and that instead their detention will be on the same grounds as for any other person. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barker]

There are two amendments in my name in this group. Amendment 44 is designed to probe an issue that is clearly worrying lots of noble Lords: that the condition that triggers an AMCP is that the person is objecting to their care in a particular place. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, is always very good at helping us to understand legislation from the point of view of people with learning disabilities. My background and my chief concern is with older people with dementia who are probably disproportionately likely to be overlooked by this provision because they will not necessarily be vocal.

I return to the questions raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton: why would you object if you do not know what you are objecting to? What will happen if you do object? Will you receive any help? Currently, best interests assessments are required for DoLS detentions but, as I understand this, where a person does not object they do not get to see an AMCP. If they are in a care home, it is the care home staff, but in hospital and community settings the responsible body can use evidence from other assessments to make a determination for somebody. What is the evidence base for this? Do we know how many people currently object to their care and treatment? Why is that considered a sufficiently robust basis on which to make this a criterion in law? There is something deeply flawed and deeply wrong about this.

Amendment 59 may seem a bit strange on the face of it. It inserts a requirement to keep a record of refusals of authorisations. One of the things that the Select Committee of your Lordships’ House found was that the evidence base for DoLS is very sketchy. I have to make it clear that the Select Committee’s report was put together and came out just around the time of the Cheshire West ruling. In the light of that ruling, the number of applications shot up. We have never had a robust evidence base for the way DoLS work. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, that this is not going to close the Bournewood gap, but we should at least try to cover up some of the deficiencies there have been in the past. Therefore, trying to get together some basic stats and information, including how many times things like DoLS have been refused, is important.

I know, as will other noble Lords, that among professionals, or rather among stakeholders, there was a big discussion prior to Cheshire West about whether having lots of DoLS applications was an indication that in fact you were a good provider or whether that would somehow be indicated by the fact that you had none. That is not the right calculation; you can argue it either way.

We still need to get to the bottom of the transparency of the decision-making around this. That was my reason for tabling what might seem to be a rather strange amendment.

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords—

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[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

I beg your pardon; I have an amendment in this group as well. Oh dear, I seem to have spattered them in every group.

I have a real concern that triggering a review that is based on whether or not the person is thought to be objecting is far too narrow, and that anyone who has concerns about that person should be able to trigger a review independently—whether that is family, friends or somebody working in the place where the cared-for person is supposed to be being cared for.

I have an interest, or at least an experience, to declare: some years ago I was asked to help the police look at a care home where they had serious and justified concerns. The alert had come from somebody working at an extremely junior grade within the care home, not from anybody senior or from a professional. Following that, I was asked to review the case notes in detail. The people concerned all had severely impaired capacity and, often, an inability to express themselves—but, by meticulously looking at the case notes, one could see trends, and when I mapped them against the staff off-duty rota the trends became clearer.

I am very concerned that, if we leave this just as it is written, we will not allow the very people who have contact, possibly on a day-to-day basis, to put up a red flag about what may be happening in one person’s life. It may be that nine out of 10 people in an institution are very happy, but if one of them is not and one member of staff has got to know them and sees subtle changes in their behaviour, that member of staff must be empowered, with the cover of anonymity, to trigger an independent review, because that may be the only way to protect the cared-for person.

I put in my amendment that a review should be triggered if,

“the rationale … is based on the risk to others”.

The concept of “risk to others” is quite difficult to justify being in this Bill rather than in the Mental Health Act as the sole rationale for using the Bill, so I think that it becomes an exceptional circumstance that warrants that type of review. Similarly, if the restrictions are on contact with named persons, I worry that there could be a bias from the staff towards the named person. When somebody is very upset, they may appear to be an aggressive or angry visiting relative and may be a bit more difficult to handle—but actually it may be that that is simply the way that they are expressing their anxiety and their emotions towards the person who is now deteriorating and want to do their best for them. I worry about excluding a close relative without great justification; it should not be undertaken lightly.

[Baroness Barker]

When the Minister responds, will she confirm the point made to us by a number of stakeholders that harm to others, rather than harm to self, which is the basis of decision-making in best interests, is included in the Bill—because it is not explicitly ruled out and it was in the Law Commission’s proposals. If that is the case, that is a very significant change. The number of people included may well differ solely for that reason.

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[Baroness Stedman-Scott]

I appreciate that very much; I am touched and can confirm that you have passed that exam with flying colours.

This is clearly another important element of the Bill, and I thank everyone for their contributions. I pick up the point about independence in the system, and have always been of the view that when you have situations like this, some independence is greatly helpful. Without wishing to make you laugh or belittle what we are trying to do, I say that I have just spent some time in the States and was subject to the awful rigours of President Trump and the Kavanaugh situation. I can tell you there was no independence there whatsoever. So I am absolutely at one with all noble Lords about independence when making judgments and trying to help people improve their lives.

I think the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, made a terribly important point. Where somebody is having something explained to them and does not feel comfortable objecting, or feels the environment is not right—I doubt there is one of us who has not been in that position at one time—it is horrible. We have to make sure the environment is correct and healthy for people to do so.

I think the points the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, made, in referring back to the evening exam question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton—how do people know?—have to be answered. I take on board the point raised and think we must get to the bottom of that. However, I can tell you that approximately 30% of people do object to their DoLS review, if that is helpful. Also, the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, raised an important point about evidence base. In a job once, someone wanted me to get the evidence for what we thought we were doing, and I was terribly nervous about it because I thought I would be out of a job. Actually, when we got an independent group in to look at it, we were just blown away by the evidence, which you could not argue with. I know it is costly to gather evidence, and I have no idea if it is practical or realistic here, but I have no doubt the case will be stronger one way or the other for having some evidence. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, made numerous excellent points today, but the independence and the review is what is resonating in my mind. I am glad to confirm to the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that harm to others is included.

[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister very much for saying that. It is a very significant point she has just made, and perhaps one that noble Lords may have to come back to at a subsequent stage.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott]

The noble Baroness is pleased with me; that makes me worried.

The amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, would mean that the referral to an approved mental capacity professional would also be required in the following circumstances: if any person interested in the person’s welfare does not wish them to receive treatment at the place, if any other person interested in the person’s welfare makes a request, or if there is reason to believe that an approved mental capacity professional should carry out the review. I am assured that the Bill is already explicit—where it is reasonable to believe that the cared-for person does not wish to reside or receive care or treatment at a place, an approved mental capacity professional must consider their arrangements. If an objection is made on the person’s behalf by a family member of the person or someone who is interested in their welfare, we would generally consider this to constitute a reasonable objection. We will provide detail—including examples—of when an approved mental capacity professional should complete a review in the code of practice. We plan to set out in detail where this would apply in the code of practice but it will include complex cases such as arrangements proposed for people with acquired brain injuries, and people in independent hospitals receiving mental health treatment.

While I understand the intention of the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, the effect would be that any objection by any person with an interest in the person’s welfare would trigger a referral to an approved mental capacity professional. In short, this would mean that anyone could trigger a referral. An acquaintance from social media or a distant relative would be able to raise an objection. While this might be appropriate in some cases, there may be others where it would not represent the person’s wishes and feelings. As currently written, the amendment would undermine the purpose of the duty, which is to ensure that the views of the person are central to the process. I am sure that noble Lords agree that a focus on the views of the cared-for person is vital. That is why the Government have made this core to the new model.

The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, would require a referral to an AMCP when others have expressed concerns, when an authorisation is being justified because of risk to others, or when the arrangements involve restrictions on contact with named persons. I thank her for raising these points and we will consider this carefully for the code of practice. I also hope I can provide reassurance that the Bill only enables authorisation of arrangements that give rise to a deprivation of liberty necessary for the purpose of receiving care or treatment. We would not ordinarily expect the liberty protection safeguards to be used to authorise a restriction on contact and we will make this clear in the code of practice. I am also sure that the noble Baroness is aware that risk to others is being considered as part of the Mental Health Act review.

The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, wants to ensure that an AMCP conducts the pre-authorisation review for everyone in an independent hospital receiving a mental health assessment or treatment. I am sympathetic to this and wish to consider the matter. Such cases should be referred to an AMCP. Detail of this will be provided in the code of practice.

We have tried to respond to all the points made by noble Lords this evening, but there is more to do. If it is acceptable to your Lordships, we should carry on talking about these issues. The Government are absolutely committed to doing this. On that basis, I hope that I may have passed the exam set by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, will be able to withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

This group of amendments relates to the authorisation record. I have added an additional criteria in Amendment 50B because there may be arrangements put in place after an initial authorisation has begun—or that were subject to conditions—and parts of the authorisation may need early review. Amendment 62A is designed to ensure consistency—the care home manager will not do the assessments but will arrange them. Amendment 58B relates to renewal; if part of an authorisation no longer has effect it must be reassessed from scratch, not simply renewed. Amendment 58C requires that original evidence is submitted, not a second-hand report. It would allow the responsible body to see the authentic assessment rather than an interpretation of any original material.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I am afraid that I think some of the amendments standing in my name have been wrongly grouped. I am sorry; I have been busy this afternoon going through everything else and I am now a bit stuck regarding the procedure and what I should do. I will speak to them, although I am rather reluctant to start this group.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott]

My understanding is that the noble Baroness does not have to speak to them.

[Baroness Barker]

But am I right in thinking that if I do not speak to my amendments today, they will automatically fall?

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

It might be of assistance if I intervene here. If the noble Baroness is referring to amendments in the group beginning with Amendment 58A, I understand that if she does not speak to them now, they can be dealt with in the next group.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I am no expert in parliamentary procedure but my understanding is that, as they come after the amendment we are considering now and indeed the one that we would consider next, they can be retabled.

[Baroness Barker]

I am grateful. I will do that.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for initiating this discussion. Clearly the purpose of her amendments is to make sure that an authorisation cannot be renewed if it wholly or in part ceases to have effect. In some cases, an authorisation will not be renewed if in part it is no longer valid, but there might be other cases where minor changes to the restrictions are needed and that should not prevent an authorisation being renewed. We want to provide further detail in the code of practice and I would appreciate the opportunity to work on that with her.

The noble Baroness has also tabled amendments outlining that authorisation records should detail when arrangements are not authorised or if they are authorised with conditions, and that in care home cases responsible bodies should consider other relevant information, as well as information provided by the care home manager. I can tell her that in some cases if arrangements are not authorised, it might be useful to include them in the authorisation record. However, given the debate that we had on the previous grouping about the general trend towards the inclusion of data or information within records that are then made available to patients, their families and so on, I want to reflect on whether they should always be included and I will come back to that on Report.

The Bill allows the responsible bodies to consider information other than that provided by the care home manager, and further detail on the circumstances and kinds of information will be provided in the code of practice. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness is reassured and will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

Health: Contraceptive Services

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Thursday 11th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

I thank the noble Lord for his question and reiterate the point I made; of course public health budgets have been under pressure and we know why that is. Nevertheless, there are some positive outcomes in the changing of services, such as services moving online, as they have done in London with good effect. It is also worth saying that, in the same survey that the noble Lord referred to, more than 50% of local authorities had either kept the same levels of service or increased them. That is also worth focusing on. Nevertheless, I recognise that there are pressures and that there are behaviours that we do not want to see, such as increasing abortions among the over-30s. We are making the case, and will be doing so in the spending review, for the benefits of public health spending on issues such as this.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, the provision of access to contraception is a part of the GP contract, but there is a growing number of GP practices that neither provide the service nor refer their patients elsewhere. What are the Government doing to stop that unacceptable situation for growing numbers of women?

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

The noble Baroness is quite right that there is an obligation in the GP contract. We are in the process of renegotiating the contract for the next financial year, and I shall certainly take that issue back and feed it in to the team that is carrying out the negotiation.

In Vitro Fertilisation: 40th Anniversary

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Thursday 13th September 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, every day, my school bus used to go past a building which, in those days, looked very reminiscent of the Victorian workhouse that it had once been. It was a little general hospital that nobody paid much attention to, until that day in 1978 when Louise Brown was born—within kicking distance of Boundary Park—in that hospital. It is a source of ongoing pleasure to the people of Oldham that she was born not in New York, not in London and, best of all, not in Manchester. The story of why she came to be born in an obscure district general hospital and how the world-beating team came to be there is a very interesting story, which can be read in the books by the noble Lord, Lord Winston, and I suggest that noble Lords do so.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for the opportunity today to right a wrong. Everybody knows about Steptoe and Edwards; very few people, me included, knew about Jean Purdy, who was a central member of that team. She ran the lab, but she did a lot more than that. She was co-author with Robert Edwards of 26 academic publications between 1970 and 1985 and she has been credited with being the first person ever to recognise and describe the formation of an early human blastocyst. But, like many a woman in science, she has been overlooked and forgotten. Sadly, she is no longer with us—she died in 1985—but let us give her memory its rightful recognition today.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, set out in helpful detail the history of legislation on this issue and the part played by this House, which it is important to recognise. Back in 1984, Baroness Warnock and her committee set out the ethical framework under which all subsequent consideration has taken place. In 1990, as the noble and learned Lord set out, the legislation came to the fore. It stands as a robust framework within which all the developments in science and societal changes have been assessed ever since.

It is on that note that I wish to proceed. Those who have followed my work in this House, particularly in a debate that we had in December 2016, will know that I have an ongoing interest in surrogacy, and I will talk principally about that today. This week has seen the #Scream4IVF campaign, led by the charity Fertility Network, which demands fair access to IVF fertility treatment. Be warned: it will be having a rally outside Parliament on 10 October, when it will be possible to witness the longest scream. I leave that to your Lordships’ imaginations.

Surrogacy UK and some of the other charities carried out some work throughout 2016. Principally, they went back to talk to Baroness Warnock about why she took the position on surrogacy that she did when the legislation was introduced. At that time, there was a very strong feeling, shared across the board, that we did not want commercial surrogacy ever to take hold in this country. On reflection, Baroness Warnock has said, we made the laws on surrogacy so tight that they have turned out over the longer term to be rather too restrictive.

Surrogacy was available prior to IVF, but the development of IVF opened the door to what is called gestational or host surrogacy. That made three significant changes: couples where both people could provide genetic material but where the woman was unable to carry a pregnancy to term could have a child who was biologically connected to both of them; if an embryo was created using a donor egg and the male partner’s sperm and the female could not carry, the traditional route of surrogacy could be avoided for those who wanted to use the help of a surrogate who was not biologically related; and others who had been unable to have children could now do so—that meant, for example, that gay male couples were now able to have children using surrogacy.

However, there have been some recent developments. In particular, back in 2017 a single person had a child by a surrogate abroad and brought that child back to live here in the United Kingdom. Under our present laws, a parental order could not be given for that child. As a result of that case, the Government found themselves forced to consider a change, and they issued a remedial order. The Joint Committee on Human Rights looked at the Government’s proposal and said that it thought that it set up other forms of discrimination against single people. That order was therefore withdrawn and a second one issued. That is the subject of a consultation that closes tomorrow. I sincerely hope that, when that consultation has finished, the Government will come forward, with some speed, with a new order that will allow single applicants with the genetic link to a child to apply for parental orders.

We had a fuller debate on the many issues of surrogacy back in 2016. At that time, the Government responded somewhat favourably. They have asked the Law Commission to carry out a review and to come forward with proposals for changes to the law. The Law Commission is doing its initial work. I met it over the summer and I think that the consultation will formally start in spring. I hope that when the Law Commission does its work and comes forward with a proposal, the Government will work with charities and the newly established All-Party Parliamentary Group on Surrogacy to come forward with legislative proposals, because there are people for whom time is running out. Their desperation shows in the letters they send to me.

I congratulate the Government on the guidance they produced in 2018 for those going through the surrogacy process—surrogates and intended parents—and the professionals involved in it. That was very supportive of surrogacy as a means of family creation. I reiterate the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, when we had a debate on surrogacy. He said that there are now many more ways in which to have children and there are many more different forms of families than there were when this legislation was put in place. It is time to update it.

I will follow what the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, said about emerging developments in genome editing. This is exactly the kind of scientific breakthrough and research and development foreseen by those who set up the original legislation. As she said, there have been developments. In 2012, a new genome editing process called CRISPR was developed. It has had a dramatic impact by enabling much more precise and practicable biomedical analysis. In 2015, Chinese academics published the first ever research in which genomes of human embryos were edited using that means. As the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, said, this potentially has an impact not just for identification of potential disease but for improvements to fertility techniques, because it will become increasingly possible to determine which embryos are most likely to succeed in delivering a pregnancy.

The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, is right: at the moment, these are simply matters for research. No application has been made for this to be used in reproduction, but, as we know, we are not the only people in the world to be engaged in this work and there may be a breakthrough in another jurisdiction. If that were to be the case, I think that people in this country for whom infertility or mitochondrial disease are a significant factor would wish to see us do as we have done in the past, which is to take into account that which the scientists are saying and to arrive at a conclusion.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, that it is important to be clear about the regulation of research and treatment. We have led the way in this country, and we should continue to do so. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, talked about the protagonists on behalf of research—those who were pro research—and those who were against. I am all in favour of there being research, but only when a strong regulatory framework is in action and when there is quite detailed and regular parliamentary scrutiny of legislation and the performance of regulators. The heavier we are in legal requirements and regulatory supervision, the more likely we are to enable progress to happen much more rapidly. The way in which we have dealt with these matters over the years has been infinitely better than in the United States, for example.

I share with others the belief that the upholding of the original ethical principles set out for us by Baroness Warnock remains important, but it is for us as Parliament, working with the scientists as we have done so often in the past, to be sure that we are ready and able to determine how those principles should be applied to emerging scientific knowledge and new treatments and techniques. Why? Fundamentally, it is because of women. All these laws apply first and foremost for the protection of women, not only so that they can have the families that they want but so that they have safe places to go in which to fulfil their dreams and from which they should never find themselves being forced into either unregulated or unethical practice.

This is the sort of work that we do best. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for reminding us of our responsibilities in this really important matter.

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[Baroness Deech]

My Lords, many years ago, before I was in this House, I was summoned to give evidence to a Select Committee of the Commons about the HFEA. I had hardly sat down when the chairman looked at me and said, “Who do you think you are, playing God?” I did not miss a beat. I said, “I am playing God because that power was given to me by Parliament”. I mean, who else could give me such a power? It goes to show how important, and how efficient, our law-making has been in this area, largely because of the expertise that was evident in this House then and is still evident today. This topic shows just how valuable the membership of the House is—it is full of ethicists, doctors, obstetricians and gynaecologists, theologians, and other people who know how these things work.

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, for his contribution; I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, and many others who, over the years, have pushed forward the legislation or helped to improve it, or have served on the HFEA. When we have debates in the future, as we must do, about surrogacy and genome editing, I expect that same expertise to show itself. It is a very good example to the outside world of why we have a second House and why many of our Members are appointed on the grounds of their expertise.

Guiltily and belatedly, I pay tribute to Jean Purdy, to whom I should have given credit. There is a certain element, in science generally but also in this field, of rather overlooking the contribution of women. My experience when visiting clinics and seeing patients was that IVF was very much something that powerful and confident men did to grateful, subservient women. I heard one in vitro fertilisation doctor say, “I have made a thousand women pregnant”. I wondered quite what was going through his mind and how badly he took it when it did not work.

There is another unsung female hero, if that is the right word: Mrs Brown. We appreciate the birth of Louise Brown, but let us imagine and reflect on the courage and fear that must have gripped Mrs Brown as she waited to give birth to the first-ever IVF baby.

[Baroness Barker]

We have talked today about how Louise Brown was the first IVF baby, but we have not mentioned the most wonderful thing of all, which is that loads of people in Oldham, some of whom I know, were invited to take part in this world-leading research programme. They took part not because they had money but because they lived in a United Kingdom that had a National Health Service. So it is absolutely right to mention Mrs Brown, but a whole load of men and women in Oldham, whose names will never be known, played a really important part in all of this.

[Baroness Deech]

I am very glad to hear that intervention from the noble Baroness. I have often thought about Mrs Brown and it is very sobering to realise how many other people contributed to the eventual success.

I look forward to this House debating changes to surrogacy reform, which I hope will come soon. I hope also that we will debate genome editing and how to regulate it in the future with the expertise that we have.

There is just one issue that I remain unhappy with. I think that there must be a missing letter. The noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, referred to a letter to me from, I think, Maria Miller. I wrote to the noble Lord in mid-July but I have no recollection at all of receiving a response.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 5th September 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, I start with an apology, as I have not spoken on the Bill before. I thank, in particular, POhWER, the organisation of which I am a patron, for alerting me to the Bill and to its concerns, as well as the concerns shared by a wide range of groups, including Liberty, Age UK, Mencap and so on.

As other speakers have outlined, it is essential that we get this absolutely right, because we are talking about potential deprivation of liberty. According to those organisations, people with dementia or a learning disability are at risk under the proposed changes. Therefore, I speak in support of Amendment 1, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and Amendment 20 in the name of my noble friend Lady Thornton. I believe that this amendment would ensure that the views of the donees and deputies already appointed by cared-for persons to make decisions in their best interests were given appropriate weight with regard to where the cared-for person resides for care and treatment.

I will say no more than that because there are experts on this issue in the Chamber. I sit willing to support but more willing to listen and learn.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise for being slightly late. I was taken by surprise at the swiftness with which we concluded our previous business.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, for many of the points that she made in her speech. It took a lot of work to get the concept of an advance statement on wishes into this legislation, and I, like her, regret that it has not been more widely adopted or accepted, particularly by the medical profession. She will know that when the Select Committee reviewed the legislation, one of the biggest disappointments was the extent to which the Mental Capacity Act had not been understood by the medical profession. She will perhaps remember that when representatives of different parts of the medical profession come to talk to us, they began by saying that in an A&E department it is extremely difficult to work out somebody’s advance decision. We knew that when we passed the initial legislation, but that legislation was not meant solely to take its lead from that; it was meant to apply to a whole range of matters just within medicine. It is a shame that the medical profession still relies on a very conservative interpretation of the existing legislation and takes a read-out from emergency situations when it really should not, as there is plenty of time to discuss with the person what is happening and to understand their previously stated wishes and feelings.

I am glad that the noble Baroness has raised this issue. She is right that at the heart of the Bill is a fundamental change from the Mental Capacity Act. There will no longer be a whole series of decision-specific assessments of people who lack capacity, and that is not something that I object to. Over the last few years while this legislation has been in place, we have quite often found people being subjected to unnecessary assessments. It is quite clear that when somebody has a medical assessment for advanced dementia, say, they will not have the capacity to make the same decision, even though they go to live in a different place. I accept that it is possible to make a decision of a lack of capacity and to carry that forward throughout a person’s care. What I am not clear about, though—given that people will be subject to fewer assessments, and therefore be less likely to have changes in their conditions brought to light—is the extent to which that will interplay with somebody’s statement of advance wishes. I would rather like it if the Minister, in his response, could talk about how that will work.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. The safeguards on liberty and safeguarding have been thoroughly confused by many people. That is fundamental. Whether we turn this around from safeguards against deprivation of liberty or safeguarding the liberty of somebody, I do not think that anything I have seen in the Bill has yet addressed that fundamental misunderstanding. In fact, in some cases, it probably compounds it. I want to put that on record as we discuss the many issues the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has introduced so well.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for her amendment and the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Murphy, for their amendments. I am delighted that the noble Baronesses were able to make it on time so that we could start on our deliberations of what are clearly very important issues.

The purpose of these amendments is to clarify that a liberty protection safeguard authorisation cannot override a valid decision to refuse care or treatment by the donee of lasting power of attorney or a court-appointed deputy or contained in a valid advance decision to refuse treatment. The comment that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, made at the start of the debate, about conflict and avoiding conflict by recognising valid decisions where they have been made, was very important. I hope that all noble Lords know that the intention of the Bill is to enhance the role and agency of those deprived of their liberty and those with an interest in the care and welfare of that cared-for person. That is why this debate on the first grouping of amendments is so important.

This debate gives me the opportunity to clarify and confirm that the Bill does not allow a decision to be made that conflicts with that made by a donee of a lasting power of attorney or a court-approved deputy’s valid, best interests decision. I am glad of the opportunity to do that. Section 6(6) of the Mental Capacity Act already provides for this, and the Bill does not change that. Therefore, an authorisation under the liberty protection safeguards could only be given if it was in accordance with a valid decision—namely, one that is authorised in the lasting power of attorney—by the attorney or deputy.

The Bill also does not change the current position regarding advance decisions to refuse treatment, and those will remain an important part of care planning. I absolutely recognise the important role that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and others in this House played in introducing that. I assure all noble Lords that there is neither the intention nor action in the Bill to water down the power and validity of those in any way. If a person has made a valid advance decision to refuse medical treatment, that treatment cannot be given and it would not therefore be possible to deprive someone of liberty in order to provide it. We intend to give further explanation of the legal position in the code of practice. I hope that that answers some of the key issues raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay, Lady Thornton and Lady Murphy, in their comments.

Those comments were echoed by my noble friend Lady Browning, and she is quite right to discuss the importance of support for those with communication difficulties so that they are able to enunciate the kinds of decisions and indications of future treatment that would adhere to their own wishes. We will return to this issue later in Committee, particularly when we get on to the issue of IMCAs—the advocates—but she is right to reiterate the point made in the proposed amendments that those acting on behalf of the cared-for person, whether they are the family, have an interest in care or have been formally appointed to do so, are, in the end, responsible for taking those decisions on behalf of that person, and their decisions should be respected, as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, pointed out.

The fundamental question that underpins these amendments is: why is the Bill not explicit on these issues when, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, pointed out, the Law Commission’s Bill is? Because there is no change in the current position, there is therefore no reason to outline what is already the case. Nothing is changed about what is already in the Act by what is being proposed through this Bill. Therefore, there is no need to reiterate what is already the case and will not be changed. I hope through the course of this debate that we have aired this issue. It is one that the Government agree with and, in the way that the Bill is structured, I can confirm to the Committee that there is no change in the status quo about the validity of those decisions.

With those reassurances, I hope that the noble Baroness is prepared to withdraw her amendment. I recognise that there is great concern, not least among many of the campaign groups, service providers, commissioners and others who are implementing these rules and laws every day, and they need to know that there is consistency. As we move between now and Report, I am more than happy to meet with noble Lords and others to discuss these issues and make sure that we can give every reassurance so that they can be sure that the law as it stands today has not changed and will not change as a consequence of this Bill.

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[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I make a brief intervention, primarily to underline the importance of two points that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, made when introducing his amendment. Like my noble friend Lady Jolly, I fear we have no alternative other than to carry on and scrutinise this Bill. The reasons for doing something have just been set out very clearly by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, but I retain two really key concerns which I raised at Second Reading.

The first—referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt—is that of timing and understanding the relationship with the review of the Mental Health Act. I understand that it is due in the autumn—I am not quite sure when—together with amendments to the Mental Capacity Act, given that both Acts relate to non-consensual care and treatment. It seems that the overlap between the two systems is one of the reasons why the current system is so complicated, and why so many staff struggle with it. Frankly, it is why I struggle with it so much. There must be real concerns that changes to address problems under one system will have unintended consequences for the other. Clarity is needed from the Government over when patients should be subject to one Act over the other, so that, in the words of Sir Simon Wessely, chair of the Mental Health Act review,

“arguing over the framework does not get in the way of delivering the care that the person needs”.

I could go on at length—I will not, your Lordships will be pleased to hear. I have just one more thought on this. In addition to the need for clarity on when the Mental Capacity Act or the Mental Health Act should be used, it is really important that patients do not find that they are deprived of their liberty by both Acts at the same time. There are examples of this happening, particularly when a patient has both a mental disorder and an unrelated physical disorder.

That is my first point. My second point, which was made very cogently by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is about the consultation that is taking place with the sector. Like everyone else, I have received a large number of briefings in the past few days. Frankly, it has been difficult to take them all on board. I have done my best. I was particularly concerned by a survey that was published only a couple of days ago by an organisation called Edge Training. I do not know it personally, I do not know exactly what else it does, but I do know that it was a survey of 900 people and nearly half the respondents were best-interests assessors, with the rest being primarily social workers, health professionals and independent mental capacity advocates. I will not go through what they said, other than to say that there were really very high levels of concern—80% this and 90% that—particularly in relation to the new roles being placed on care home managers, the potential conflicts of interest, plans to charge care home managers with deciding whether it is in a resident’s best interests to have an advocate if they lack capacity to request one, and the lack of a specific requirement to consult the person themselves about a proposed deprivation of their liberty.

My conclusion from all this is that the sort of consultation that should have gone on with the sector for a change such as this, which really has to work—this is not political, it is about something that has to work on the ground and people who do this have to understand it and feel that it does work—cannot have happened to the extent to which I think it should have happened, and that has real importance for the pace at which this can be taken forward and the consultation and implementation timescale.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I just want to share the thoughts that I had over the summer, when we had a very long time to look at this proposal. I have been wrapping my head in wet towels looking at this legislation, trying to work out what it is all about, and to answer a key question: why this Bill now? I am still not happy that I have the right answer.

The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, referred to the Mental Capacity Act as a “monstrous” Act—the DoLS part of it. But let us be fair, when the Select Committee did its review, we found that the Act was held in quite high regard; the problem with it was that it was not properly understood and that had caused problems with its implementation. It is true that we said in the Select Committee report that there needed to be an absolute root and branch review of DoLS, but we prefaced all our recommendations for the review of the Act on one other premise, which has been ignored by the Government. We said that one of the reasons that we saw for the failure of the Act to be properly implemented was that there was no central ownership of the Act and no single body responsible for its implementation. The Government have chosen to ignore that. Instead, they have shoved responsibility for the MCA on to the CQC, where it does not get specialist attention. There is nothing like the attention paid to the Mental Capacity Act that there is to the mental health legislation, and yet if it is not properly implemented, people can be deprived of their liberty.

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[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

I am grateful to the Minister, although I am reeling from the shock that he thinks that I called for a second Second Reading debate to take place on a Clause 1 stand part discussion.

I of course agree that the current system is not fit for purpose. I agree with the Minister and with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and other noble Lords. I agree with the need for a streamlined system, but it has to be the right system. I say to the noble Baroness that one of the briefings that I received was from 39 Essex Chambers, which is pretty expert in this area. It was a very interesting piece by Victoria Butler-Cole which sets out seven changes to the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill that the courts are likely to make unless Parliament gets there first.

We have to be very careful that in wishing to support the Government to get a streamlined process through we do not build in mistakes and errors that, rather like the Cheshire West decision, will lead to the court, and then to further legislation. In her piece, Victoria Butler-Cole says that the Court of Protection has a record of rejecting capacity assessments conducted by consultant psychiatrists with years of training in mental health and specifically in relation to the MCA. The Bill permits care home managers to assess capacity in this context. There is no way that will withstand scrutiny by the court, and there are likely to be even more cases in which assessments of incapacity are overturned as care home managers with little or no relevant training are required to carry out what can be a complex task. That seems to me to be the problem.

I know that this has to be signed off by the local authority. The impact assessment makes it clear that in the vast majority of cases that will be a desktop exercise. That does not fill me with confidence that these assessments will be scrutinised effectively by local authorities which themselves are very hard pressed. That is why I think that, when it comes to the detailed amendments, this is a very important part of this legislation. We need to be very careful to ensure that this is going to work effectively.

On training, the noble Lord has made some very welcome comments, but I refer to the fact that there is an annual turnover of 27% in this sector among the people who are going to have to do this work. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, that I was trying to be polite. This is a very vulnerable sector, with low-paid people who have low qualifications being asked to deal with issues to do with the fundamental liberty of people in this country.

My gut feeling is that it will not do. This cannot be left to care managers. The Government will have to look again at the Law Commission’s assumption that local authorities would do the work. I of course do not wish to prevent Clause 1 standing part of the Bill.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I hope that it is permissible for me to rise again. For the avoidance of doubt, will the Minister confirm that I understood him correctly? Is he saying that the role of the care home manager has not changed? I understand that, under the existing law, a care home manager may request that somebody’s capacity be assessed, but that assessment is not usually done by them. That assessment is done by somebody else. Is he saying that that is not going to change? I am sorry, but I think it very important that noble Lords understand what the Minister says.

[Baroness Thornton]

I understood that the Minister said “escalate”, which means that something changes. Perhaps when he is answering the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, he could also explain the word “escalate”.

The Government may need to think about carrying out some form of assessment of the appropriateness and suitability of care home managers to undertake this task. If that has not been done, perhaps it needs to be done in the next month or so.

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[Baroness Murphy]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, has produced a perfectly adequate descriptor which would substitute perfectly well for “unsound mind”. We always face this difficulty in discussing terms that relate to stigmatised disorders. We have to keep changing the language to keep it up to date and to refresh people’s thinking about what we are dealing with. “Unsound mind” went out in the 1960s and 1970s—I do not think that I have ever diagnosed anybody as being of unsound mind—and we must now have an alternative. We do not need the convenience of it remaining as it was back in the 1950s. Therefore, I support the descriptor given by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. It is a very good one. We have used it before and it would be perfectly adequate. Let us ditch “unsound mind”.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I shall not detain the Committee for long but it is important to recap on a bit of history. The original legislation that came before your Lordships’ House on this issue—the Mental Incapacity Bill—was subject to the first ever pre-legislative scrutiny. In going through that then very innovative procedure, Members of this House and another place did a couple of things which at that time were game-changing. One was that we invited people who lacked capacity to come and give evidence to us. But we went further than that. When we produced our report, we invited them back to discuss with them what we had listened to and what we had changed. One of the first and most important things that we did was to change the title from the Mental Incapacity Bill to the Mental Capacity Bill. We also, for the first time ever, produced an easy-read version of a Bill.

I strongly support my noble friend Lady Tyler because this feels like a real regression in thinking. I understand that the term is there because somebody somewhere believes that it has a legal meaning. We came up against those same arguments all those years ago and this House led the way in getting lawyers and counsel to change their minds. I do not see a reason for us not to do the same again.

I wish to add one point. I vividly remember listening to the people whom we invited back to talk to us after we had produced our report. At this point, there were only Members of your Lordships’ House in the room—the Commons were busy and had not turned up. I remember one particular gentleman who said, “When I first saw this, I thought it was really rubbish, but actually you’ve done quite a good job”. I have to say that in all my years in your Lordships’ House I do not think that I have ever received a more sincere accolade. That is not to belittle anybody’s contribution to this, but I think that my noble friend has made a very strong point.

[Baroness Thornton]

These Benches support the amendment. As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and others have said, the reference to unsoundness of mind is offensive to those with learning disabilities, dementia and brain injuries and their families. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, has just demolished all the legal arguments for including the phrase in the Bill, and indeed a lot of organisations, including the Royal College of Psychiatrists, say that it out of place in today’s society. The GMC argues that it is not clear what added protection or benefit is achieved by using the term. VoiceAbility says that “unsound mind” is not used in modern psychiatry and that it could lead to debate in disputes. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will be as agreeable about this amendment as he was about the last one.

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[Lord Woolf (CB)]

If the real purpose is to ensure protection under the Human Rights Act for those we are concerned about, has the Minister considered whether that might not be achieved merely by stating that the category of people we are looking at should have the benefit of the relevant section of the Human Rights Act? When I say the Human Rights Act, I mean the convention.

[Baroness Barker]

The Human Rights Act was in force when the Mental Capacity Act was being debated. During the passage of that Act we considered very carefully what language we should use. Is the Minister saying that we got that wrong, and have there been cases of people who have fallen into the gap? If so, how many are there, and can he give the evidence by which the Government arrived at the conclusion they have now?

[Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)]

It might be complex to find the right nomenclature, but I heard the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, say that this was a starter for 10. I cannot see why we have to regress to 1959 language in the Mental Health Act without further exploration of whether we could redefine the term about perhaps affecting the mind, to take in that very small minority of people with severe physical illness that occasionally affects the mind. We have worked so hard to destigmatise both learning disability and mental health that it seems very sad that we cannot work a bit harder at this point on this issue.

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Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

7: Schedule 1, page 10, line 7, leave out “and” and insert—
“(ba) the arrangements are in the best interests of the cared-for person, and”

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, Amendments 7 and 8 in my name are yet another attempt to make some sense of this Bill. Perhaps they might not have been tabled had we been able to have more discussion over the Recess. As several noble Lords have already mentioned, there has been considerable disquiet about the non-appearance of best interest assessments in this Bill. Indeed, a number of noble Lords attempted to table amendments that, at the very least, like this amendment, were trying to probe where the best interests of the cared-for person would come into play.

This particular part of the Bill—Part 2 of Schedule 1 —is on “Authorisation of arrangements”. In putting down these probing amendments, I was particularly taken by the briefing given to us by the Law Society, which suggested:

“Remove the distinction between the ‘arrangements’ and ‘care and treatment’ as it will result in difficulties when applied in practice. For example, how would a person’s capacity to make medical treatment decisions or decisions about contact with others be distinguished from decisions about the ‘arrangements’ to provide that treatment or to prevent contact with others?”.


In light of that, at the very least we ought to be asking the Minister how this is going to work. I accept a number of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, about the clumsiness of the existing DoLS procedure, but the removal of best interest assessors is one that has caused a fair degree of disquiet among the different groups.

Amendments 7 and 8 are also meant to begin to probe a key provision in the Bill—the assertion that the arrangements need to be “necessary and proportionate”. There is no further explanation in the Bill about what the term “necessary and proportionate” might mean, who will make the decision and on what basis it will be judged and reviewed. This goes back to some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, that, given the increased role— let us say that—of care home managers, they will be making the assessments of what is necessary and proportionate.

No doubt I am going to be told that these amendments are either deficient or unnecessary, but they are here to begin to probe some very unclear but key parts of the Bill about the authorisation of arrangements. In that vein, I beg to move.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, I support the principle behind Amendment 8 in particular. Perhaps this is something the Minister will want to view as going in the code of practice, as I am not sure that putting this on the face of the Bill is necessarily the right place for it—although I completely understand the sentiment, which is to avoid serious risk. We live in a risk-averse system, and it is serious risk that we must be concerned with.

A case that I heard about in the last few days came to mind. An elderly lady with dementia became extremely agitated when it snowed. Because of her tendency to wander, she was not going outside unescorted. A conversation with her son revealed that she had been a meteorologist, so her view was that when it snowed she had to go outside and measure the depth of the snow and telephone the Meteorological Office. What they did was simply wrap her up really well, let her go out and measure the depth of the snow, give her a telephone and let her make a mock phone call to the Meteorological Office. She was very calm and happy. You do not want her to go wandering because she is near a main road and a railway line and all the other risks, but it was not a serious risk to let her out in the garden, well-wrapped up when it was snowing. That illustrates the granularity of the need to take appropriate decisions focused around the individual person.

Other cases that do concern me are those people who will become sexually disinhibited when exposed to great temptation. That struck me about a case I came across in a home for people with a history of sexual offences. There had been a DoLS in place for somebody not to go unescorted through woodland because, if he came across a young girl on her own in woodland, his sexual drive would overcome his rational behaviour—exposure to porn sites would also overcome his rational behaviour. However, the rest of the time, he could live well. Sadly, that DoLS was apparently overturned by the Court of Protection and, within weeks, he offended and ended up being imprisoned for his offence, but he had been living well with an enormous degree of freedom prior to that point. I think that the serious risk to the cared-for person has to be considered, because there the risk to him was that he would offend and, sadly, that came true.

I hope that the Minister will look sympathetically on the sentiment behind this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate for their desire to be brief, which I know was shared by others who have not been part of the discussions on the Bill, but it is also important to be comprehensive in discussing these issues because, as pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, the best interests of the people being cared for is what this is all about.

I know that this is an issue for noble Lords; it was raised at Second Reading and has been raised again in this debate. It is important to state that best interests decision-making for care and treatment remains fundamental to the Mental Capacity Act. In a way, it is the founding stone around which the rest is built. The liberty protection safeguards sit under the aegis of the Act. The Bill does not change that. One request made by noble Lords at Second Reading was for us to publish the Act as amended by the Bill. We have done that; I understand that it is in the Library. I can make sure that a digital copy is circulated, and I will make sure that it is sent to all concerned. Clearly, understanding the flow of how it is read in not just legislation but the code of practice is critical. I want to make that clear and I understand that important desire.

Under the current system, there are two different best interests tests: one exists under Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act—the decision, usually made by a clinician, to provide care or treatment—and a second, separate, additional one falls within the tests required for the DoLS system. The Law Commission recommended that the DoLS tests be replaced with a necessary and proportionate test. In that sense, we are following where it led. Prior to a liberty protection safeguards authorisation being considered, the decision will need to be taken, normally by a clinician, that the care or treatment enabled by the arrangements is in the person’s best interests. As I said, that will apply under Section 4. Subsequently, it must be demonstrated that the arrangements to enable that care and treatment are necessary and proportionate. Of course, that is the single test applied by the liberty protection safeguards; it is a secondary test following a consideration of best interests.

The current requirement that the deprivation of liberty must be necessary, proportionate and in the person’s best interests is instead replaced by a single, primary best interests test in an attempt to avoid confusion and conflict—the word used by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, at the beginning of the debate—between two determinations. The focus of the second-stage test on what is necessary and proportionate is an attempt to remove this confusion. It is not an attempt to downgrade in any way the primary and prior importance of a person’s best interests being taken into consideration.

As well as giving that assurance, I want to pick up on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that avoiding risk to the cared-for person will form part of the necessary and proportionate test. There is already a principle in the Mental Capacity Act to use less intrusive arrangements, which will continue to remain, unamended, an important principle in the new model. As was brought to light by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and other noble Lords, the application of “necessary and proportionate” requires a degree of granularity that makes it difficult to overdetermine in legislation, and that is the reason why the code of practice is so important. That is why it will contain a range of scenarios, principles, circumstances and so on of what the application of a necessary and proportionate test should look like.

I hope that I have been able to assure noble Lords, whose considerations I take very seriously, that best interests are foremost in our minds and will remain so in the legislation, unamended by the changes brought in by the Bill. Clearly, I want to make sure that this sentiment and its legal power are understood by all concerned, particularly if there is concern in the wider sector. As I said, I do not believe that a second test is necessary; as said by the Law Commission, it could be counterproductive. It is important that we make sure of a clear understanding of the primacy of the best interests test. I would like to explore that with noble Lords to make sure that it is properly understood by all; we can do that between now and Report. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister for his helpful response. As we begin to get to the heart of the debate, he will understand that he and the Bill team can perhaps see the Bill as a whole, but the rest of us are struggling to do so. Therefore, we have to test individual elements of it, perhaps to a greater degree than he may think is warranted. None the less, it was helpful of him to put those statements on record. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 7 withdrawn.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 5th September 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

9: Schedule 1, page 10, line 8, at end insert “to safeguard the well-being, wishes and feelings of the cared-for person.”

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, we return to the topic that we were discussing before the break: the conditions that have to be met for authorisation of deprivation of liberty arrangements. During the dinner break, I reflected on what the Minister said in response to the previous Amendments 7 and 8, which were in similar territory. I understand entirely what he said about the best interests test being in the Mental Capacity Act and that being the first stage of assessment. However, on the secondary assessment for arrangements for either care and treatment or deprivation of liberty, the Minister seemed to suggest that there was a possibility of conflict between those two things or a misunderstanding of them. I will go back over some of that territory again; that may irritate the Minister, but it has been clear all afternoon that one of the main purposes that these proceedings in your Lordships’ House may serve is to enable people outside in the lobby groups, who, like us, have not been able to see a clear read-across from this Bill back to the original legislation, now to do so.

Amendments 9, 10 and 30 seek to reiterate or reintroduce concepts which will be very familiar to all those who took part in the deliberations during the passage of the Mental Capacity Act. Under that legislation, it was always to be made clear to a person who was possibly going to be subject to a deprivation of liberty, and to anybody involved in that decision-making, that the well-being, wishes and feelings of that person had to be taken into account, that any decision would be the least intrusive as possible, and that the arrangements being made for the person were the least restrictive, particularly with regard to where somebody should reside. That is for many people, particularly older people, perhaps one of the most contentious decisions. It is often one of the subjects on which there can be conflicting views between families and individuals or between professionals and individuals.

I have said before and—given that the one thing that has stuck out in the Bill is the enhanced role for care commissioners and, particularly, home care managers—I do not think it is unreasonable to go back again and satisfy ourselves that, when the authorisation of arrangements happens, these key parts of the Mental Capacity Act will again form part of the assessment. I hope, when we come to further amendments down the line, that they will be part of the record of decision-making. I do not make any apology for raising these amendments. I am sure the Minister will bat them back, but if he will do so with a deal of explanation then I think we will have served a purpose. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister for that reply. We started with the mental capacity legislation, which is explicit in having the person at the centre of everything that happens. Yet we know from several reviews that have been conducted, including the review by the Select Committee, that the implementation of that legislation has been very patchy. To then be faced with a piece of legislation in which consultation with the person is not on the face of the Bill seems to be moving a long way from that original principle.

I have let the Minister talk about the code of practice repeatedly and I have not mentioned it so far, given that we have other amendments to debate. However, we found out with the Mental Capacity Act that reliance on the code of practice was one of the reasons why the Act was not implemented as well as it should have been. We will come on to that in far more detail, but there are some things that are so fundamental to the operation of this that we should know by now that leaving them to the code of practice is not acceptable. We can talk about implementation within the code of practice, but there are some things that need to be on the face of the Bill. For me, we really have hit that. If we are not even going to attempt to consult people, that for me is a red line, so I am pleased that the Minister has agreed to talk to us about that.

The points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, about the weighting of the wishes and feelings are also important. Those wishes do not sit on an equivalent level with the views of everybody else. They should be pre-eminent.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hollins]

This needs emphasis because of the culture of care that we have in this country. There is still such a paternalistic attitude towards the person, that not to emphasise it is to miss the point.

[Baroness Barker]

I thank noble Lords for their support. We will need to return to this and I am glad that the Minister has taken that point.

Another reason for tabling the other amendments to ensure that arrangements are the least intrusive and least restrictive option is that, as we will debate on later amendments, the Bill is somewhat deficient in the extent to which it requires that people should be given information on which to base the consultation.

I make no apologies for raising this again at this time. It is something that I hope we will discuss between now and later stages of the Bill. I hope that the Minister can understand the reasons for the concerns that lay behind the amendment. Having said that, at this point, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

I shall give just a brief response to that. It is a good idea. The Government think that the proposals for care homes, how they will carry out commission-needs assessments and the process for reviewing and authorising where necessary are a critical part of creating a more proportionate system that does what it says it will do, rather than the current system, which says it will do a whole bunch of things and then does not actually do them. That is where we want to get to.

I am being robust, as it were, in defence of the model. I want to explain—I think noble Lords are enthusiastic about this—how this will work in practice with the kinds of people who are most likely to be in the most difficult situations, so there is a clear understanding of the safeguards that exist to prevent conflicts of interest, provide independent oversight, make sure there is advocacy to support, and so on. It is clearly the case that there is not yet that understanding, and we need it to proceed.

[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister for his explanation, which has been very helpful. Over the next few weeks, while he is seeking to give further clarification, I wonder whether it would be possible to explain this. One of the Government’s arguments is that the consideration of deprivation or the safeguarding of liberty should come much earlier in the care planning process. Most care is commissioned, most of it by local authorities. Can the Minister explain—perhaps not now at this late hour—how the commissioning of services will change to reflect the new system?

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

There is a useful flowchart that exemplifies it and brings it to life. I will make sure that it is shared. I agree that we need to find ways of bringing it to life, and that is something we can do outside this Chamber.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 16th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I am not saying that some Members of your Lordships’ House are not veterans on this subject, but I came in today with my hard copy of the Mental Capacity Act 2005: Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards—Code of Practice. I may be the only person who has one, but I went back to look at it over the weekend in preparation for this. I am very glad to be taking part in this debate, alongside the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, who will bring to it her fresh eyes: I think that that perhaps shows one of the great strengths of your Lordships’ House.

I start by saying that the legislation we are considering came about because a vulnerable adult, HL, was detained in a place he did not want to be and which his carers knew was not right for him. It turned out that he had fewer safeguards than someone who had been sectioned under the Mental Health Act, or who had been detained under the criminal justice system. As we dive into the detail of what is inevitably quite a technical Bill, I urge us all to keep that person, and the hundreds of thousands of people like him, in mind. As we look at a piece of legislation that is essentially more than a decade old we need to think about updating this legislation in light of changes in society. We know that by 2030 there will be 2 million people over the age of 65 who are ageing without children: they will not have close family members to look after their interests. I rather think that our acid test ought to be whether we think that what is being proposed will look after those people.

It has been apparent since 2007—we should bear it in mind that the legislation we are talking about was not part of the Mental Capacity Act but part of the mental health legislation—that the safeguards have been poorly understood and practised. That is because the two pieces of legislation do not work well together or, indeed, at all. The mental health legislation rests on the judgment and expertise of individuals, saying ultimately what they believe to be right for the safety of other people. The Mental Capacity Act is instead based around the principles of autonomy, empowerment and the importance of supporting decision-making. Mental health legislation is very strictly overseen by statutory oversight bodies. The Mental Capacity Act never has been and therefore it is not surprising that when it has been implemented, it has been implemented very patchily and has been reliant largely upon the dedication of interested professionals.

Noble Lords will have had a number of briefings which talk about the welcome extension of these safeguards to settings such as care settings. I do not have a problem with that; in fact, I welcome it. I think many care facilities, particularly those run by charities, which have long and dedicated experience in looking after people with learning disabilities, will implement this extremely well, but they will do so without sufficient oversight or a sufficient guarantee that if they do not do their job properly the people concerned and their carers will have the relevant access to information and right of appeal. If the Government had intended to sort out this fundamental issue that has been hanging around for 20 years, they would have waited until the current review of the mental health legislation, which is being carried out by Sir Simon Wesley and which is inevitably looking at DoLS, had been concluded, but they have not.

Unlike the Law Commission, which took great care to consult on its proposals, the Government have come forward with this piece of legislation on which there has been very little consultation. It is quite clear that the Government have gone through the Law Commission legislation and selectively picked pieces out of it, when in fact the Law Commission was trying to bring together a whole package of measures which, taken as a whole, would have been a robust defence of the liberty of individuals. So my first question to the Minister is: why this legislation and why now? Why not wait until the mental health legislation is reviewed? Why not have a consultation on which people with interests, such as the parents or the families of people who have been detained, could talk about what has gone wrong and what has not worked in the current system? I say to the Minister that if the hurry is about saving money, that is something your Lordships’ House will have to bear in mind as we scrutinise the Bill.

The Select Committee which reviewed the implementation of the Act, on which I sat, was concerned about very patchy introduction. We were right. We now have the figures, which show that in some parts of the country the waiting time for having one of these assessments done is longer than the time for which somebody is supposed to be detained. There is no doubt that this has to be changed. But the changes which the Government are choosing to bring in do not strike me as being sufficiently robust. The noble Lord, Lord Touhig, began to outline some of the main areas of concern.

There is also concern about the limiting of legal aid. I hope that other noble Lords, in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, will perhaps look at the limitation of legal aid. We are all in favour of having a system in which fewer people need to go to court fewer times, but when they do have to go to court they need to be able to be properly represented. Very few of them are in a position to represent themselves against local authorities or other authorities which have access to their own legal services. I would like us to look at that.

Secondly, the new definition of “proportionate” does not adequately reflect the best-interest tests that were in the original legislation. That is a severe problem. I understand, and noble Lords will appreciate, the desire to cut down on repetitious assessments and so on, but there is a danger that we might end up with decisions being made about a person’s capacity to make one decision which rest on information that was gathered for a wholly different purpose. That would not be right. I also think we have missed a trick in relation to the recognition that there are a number of people whose capacity to make decisions fluctuates. The Law Commission recommendation on that subject has not been picked up in the Bill.

Finally, I do not doubt for a moment that the Government have good intentions but there are several areas in which the detail of the Bill is deficient. We should also bear in mind the strong possibility that people who found themselves in the position that HL did all those years ago may not have the protection of the European Court of Human Rights in the future. Therefore, it is incumbent upon people in this Parliament to make sure that the human rights of those people enjoy greater safeguards than they have ever done in domestic legislation before. For those reasons, I conclude that the Bill before us is extremely flawed and deficient. I suggest that your Lordships bring their considerable experience and expertise to bear to change it radically before it goes to another place.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 16th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for an incisive, illuminating, at times technically complex but always wise debate, which has been a credit to the House. I will attempt to answer as many questions as I can. I will not try to cover all of them as we actually would be here all night, but I will have time to explore the major categories of issues. I hope noble Lords will indulge me as I do that.

I welcome my noble friend Lady Barran and congratulate her on a very passionate and moving speech. It is clear that she has already been a force for good in the world and we look forward to her bringing her singular qualities to the stage which she now fills with such great authority. I hope noble Lords also noticed the attendance for the first part of the debate of my honourable friend the Minister for Care, Caroline Dinenage, who obviously takes a close interest in this. She was at the briefing and we are working closely together to try to get the right Bill through this process.

I think the general tone of the debate was that there is a strong desire to reform the DoLS system and to end, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, pointed out, the lawlessness and the highly unsatisfactory current situation. My noble friend Lady Barran brought this to life. The truth is that the current system has overwhelmed local authorities and others. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, pointed out, Cheshire West has extended the definition to whom this should apply, such that the backlog of cases is now extraordinary. The only consequence of that is a denial of access to justice. The challenge we have in the Bill is to make sure that we do not have access to justice just in theory but that it actually happens, and it cannot happen if more than 100,000 people are getting it in theory but not in practice.

As somebody who was new to this before preparing for the Bill, the situation almost sounds too good to be true. We are going to extend the number of people who have access to safeguards but we are also going to stop the system being overwhelmed and save money. This is achievable because it is about introducing a proportionate system that reflects the needs and wishes of the people whom it is there to protect, rather than having a maximalist approach that in theory applies to everyone but in reality does not and is sometimes random in its application, which is clearly unacceptable.

As many noble Lords have pointed out, the system that we need to create must be patient-led. It needs to have proper oversight and to deliver that access to justice which we have discussed. Clearly, if, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, pointed out, only one in 20 have benefited from the current system, it is highly inefficient. As many noble Lords also pointed out, there is a huge urgency here.

Many noble Lords pointed out the benefits of the new system. I will come to some of the challenges but, ultimately, this is about making sure that caring organisations take a more active role in the assessment of deprivation of liberty. Where they do so and integrate it into their care planning, we will provide a proper system of oversight and support for individuals deprived of their liberty in general but, specifically, for those who object, or whose families who care for them object. That is ultimately what we are trying to do and it is the intention of the Bill.

Several noble Lords, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly, Lady Greengross and Lady Thornton, asked about our consultations to date. There have been very wide consultations but this debate has shown that there is much work to be done over the summer, not just with noble Lords but with stakeholder groups, to ensure that we are not only explaining the consequences of what is proposed—I think there are still some misunderstandings about that—but able to demonstrate the benefits and, critically, learn how we can further improve what is proposed.

I turn to some of the issues raised. Several noble Lords including the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Finlay, Lady Greengross and Lady Tyler, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, talked about the absence of a statutory definition. I can tell the House that we are aware of that and are listening particularly to the recommendations of the Joint Committee. However, the debate demonstrated some disagreement over the right way forward. There are various options, such as definitions in the Bill or through a code of practice, but we clearly need to get to an answer in order to proceed.

We have talked about wanting a system that has the person’s wishes and best interests at the heart of the process. That was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and endorsed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Finlay, Lady Greengross, Lady Meacher, Lady Browning and Lady Hollins. It is absolutely right for us to be clear that there is no watering down of the interests of the individual concerned through this process. As the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Finlay, pointed out, capacities can fluctuate; as the noble Baronesses, Lady Browning and Lady Hollins, pointed out, they can also be varied—strong in one area and weak in another. Any system needs to take account of that and I can tell the House that it is absolutely not our intention to water down the role of a person’s expressed wishes. The best interest test still applies absolutely in the care setting, but the necessary and proportionate test is to account for those cases where a person may wish to do something regarding their liberties which is contrary to their best interests for their individual care. Striking that balance and making sure that there is proper oversight, with proper advice for people who are unable to enunciate their own wishes, is at the core of getting the Bill right.

As noble Lords have also pointed out, getting the Bill right is actually about getting a statutory code of practice right. It is out of date and there is a degree of urgency about improving it. I will return to that in a moment but, in talking about the statutory definition, I will finish on the power of attorney and the role of families. They still have primacy under the Mental Capacity Act, the principles underpinning which still apply. It will not be possible to deprive a person of liberty when the attorney acting on their behalf has stated that their best interests are served otherwise. I want to make that clear but it is something that we will need to explore and explain better. Attorneys will be part of the group that is to be consulted, and the Bill creates an explicit requirement for further consultation with families. Family members can also act as appropriate persons, so I think there is a greater strengthening of the role of those acting on behalf of a person deprived of their liberty in the process of scrutinising that and making sure that it is done appropriately.

[Baroness Barker]

If this matter is unclear to some of us who can claim to be fairly well informed on it, clearly, there has been a communication problem. Might I suggest to the noble Lord that it would be enormously helpful—as it has been in similar situations—to have a copy of the Act, as amended by the Bill, for us and interested parties to look at? Believe me, it makes the whole business a great deal clearer and easier to understand.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

That is an excellent suggestion. I should be clear: any confusion comes from a failure to communicate on our behalf, rather than there being any suggestion that noble Lords who are extremely expert on this do not understand what is proposed. There is a need to explain better exactly how all this will work in practice.

Obviously, the system depends on the quality and independence of the reviews, assessments and authorisations that take place; that issue was particularly raised by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. There were also questions asked by the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler, Lady Murphy, Lady Jolly and Lady Thornton, about the capacity of those carrying out assessments in local authority care homes, the NHS and so on to do them properly and in a way compliant with the law. I agree with noble Lords that in the coming weeks we will need to set out much more clearly how that independence support and those assessments will be staffed and provided, making sure that there are sufficient resources and proper training. I am reassured that training in the implications of the Mental Capacity Act is part of medical training, and that there are Health Education England resources for that. Clearly, all that will need to evolve as we go through this process and the Act itself is amended.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Greengross, Lady Tyler and Lady Murphy, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, asked about the interaction with mental health legislation and whether we should have delayed publication. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, described a tension between the two Acts. We are conscious of the interface—that is the term used—but there is an urgency to reform the system, notwithstanding its interaction with the Mental Health Act. We do not yet have a timescale on completion of the review and any subsequent legislation that might be required. There has been lots of talk about the work to reform—the committee, the Law Commission, the Joint Committee and so on—and we need to get on with this, cognisant all the time that subsequent changes may need to be made once we have the outcome of the Mental Health Act review. It is not in my gift to promise time for legislation in the future but we are cognisant of the need to make sure that our interface works, once we have the review itself completed.

Several noble Lords asked why the Bill does less than the Law Commission. We could spend a lot of time going through that, but I do not propose that we do so at this point. We can achieve non-legislatively several of the Law Commission’s proposals; it is made up of lawyers, so they prefer law but there are other ways of doing things. One of the key issues raised is the Bill’s not applying to 16 and 17 year-olds. There is clearly an important interplay here with the education, health and care plan process, but I have listened to noble Lords on the subject today and shall reflect on whether we can do something about it.

The code of practice was raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Greengross, and my noble friends Lady Barran and Lady Browning. Getting it up and running quickly is critical. Detailed work is going on, and we need to be very specific in it to provide reassurance about how it will work. Unfortunately, I do not have a timetable yet for its production, but I will endeavour to get hold of one. We need to make sure that its implementation is properly resourced. The CQC will continue to inspect its implementation, so there will still be that quality oversight.

A few other issues were raised. Many noble Lords referred to “unsound mind” being an unhelpful and, frankly, out-of-date phrase. I do not disagree. The concern here is the interaction with the jurisprudence and the ECHR itself. If we were to move on that—I make no commitment at this point—we would need to think it through very clearly, but I would like to explore it.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Jolly, asked about legal aid. I can confirm that it is, and will still be, available on a means-tested basis. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and my noble friend Lady Browning asked about advance consent—an issue that the Law Commission also raised. Again, there is an important distinction to be made here between an advance decision to refuse treatment, which will continue to be respected and is untouched, and advance consent to a future deprivation of liberty. Although that was in the Law Commission report, officials engaged in the process indicated that this did not receive support from families. There was a concern that you could sign yourself up to being deprived of your liberty at some point in the future, so it did not garner support. Perhaps it was the wrong subset or sample of people; nevertheless, we need to consider the best way forward on that.

Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, asked about the equality impact assessment. I do not have an answer at this stage about why it was not carried out but I will endeavour to get one.

To conclude, I hope that I have been able to summarise the main issues and topics. Clearly, there are some very big questions that still need to be answered, but I return to the point that my noble friend Lady Browning made, which is that we need to solve the problems this time. We cannot introduce another Bill or piece of legislation that just creates a problem three years down the line. It is not just about the Bournewood gap; it is about making sure that we avoid, and do not create, any other gaps. The words “nightmare” and “disaster” have been used to describe the current system, and that is why we need to act now, but clearly we need to act in such a way that we do not create another problem further down the line.

It has been clear from this debate that there is still much work to be done to provide the right kind of reforms that we all want to see. Looking at the Chief Whip, I am sure that we will have adequate time in Committee to make sure that the Bill is in the best possible shape. We saw a nod of the head from the chief, so that is good. This debate has demonstrated—the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said as much—that there is no group of people better qualified to improve this legislation and make sure that we get the right reforms. I look forward to engaging with noble Lords and others throughout the coming months to make sure that we can achieve that and deliver a Bill that provides for people deprived of their liberty the fair and proportionate access to justice that we all want to see.

Health: Stroke Survivors

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Thursday 28th June 2018 Grand Committee

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lingfield, that it is an absolute joy to take part in this debate with him this afternoon.

Following on from the noble Baroness’s comments, I can recount that about 20 years ago a lady called Mary Anne MacLeod Trump woke up in a hospital ward in New York following a stroke. Most of her nurses thought that she was speaking gibberish, but she was very lucky because one of her nurses was Irish and knew that she was speaking Gaelic. In fact, Mrs Trump had been born on the island of Lewis in Scotland and, unlike her son, did not routinely speak gibberish—it was just the effects of a stroke—and she recovered. The noble Baroness is quite right.

The noble Lord, Lord Lingfield, set out for us the state of stroke care in England and Wales today. However, one point is so obvious that he did not make it: we have a national health service and, consequently, we are in a uniquely good place to gather information about the detection, diagnosis and treatment of stroke and about people’s recovery from it. That is something that we often overlook but it is very important. Just in the last 10 years or so, the work that the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, has done in London in reorganising stroke services has had a measurable effect. Our National Health Service is able to measure, at scale, the effectiveness of new thrombolytic or clot-busting drugs as they come in. That is why we have a real forward steal on the rest of the world in this highly complex area.

In another place back in December, MPs talked a lot about the development of mechanical thrombectomy —I am pleased that I got that out; it is not the easiest word to say. It is a marvellous step forward in the acute treatment of stroke. The ability of surgeons to remove clots and stop further neurological damage makes an immense difference to patients and their recovery.

We are, unfortunately, able to have a 24 hours a day, seven days a week, service in only very few places. Like the noble Lord, I am very lucky to be living up the road from St George’s Hospital: we are okay. Other places are not. The ambition, surely, ought to be to make that service available at specialist neurological centres around the whole country, and easily accessible to the majority of the population as soon as possible.

A particular problem with thrombectomy is that it requires the input of several different medical disciplines, specifically surgeons and others who are not normally part of a stroke response unit. Far be it from me to accuse the NHS of territorialism, but getting surgeons to change their ways is not the easiest thing to do. I ask the Minister, therefore: will thrombectomy services be commissioned via specialist commissioning, and if the provision of the service requires redesign and redefinition—not just of the services but of the medical roles in the team—how that will happen? Does he believe, as I do, that STPs may well face a real battle to get so many people from different disciplines to change the way they work?

My understanding is that the department has not yet decided to refresh the stroke strategy; it is relying on the 2013 cardiovascular disease outcome strategy. Does the Minister believe that that is an adequate way for the department to require the NHS to look at some pretty significant changes among staff?

I also refer the Minister to the experience of some MPs who looked at provision in their local areas. They mentioned the tension between university hospitals and district general hospitals. It requires the might not just of NHS England but the department to look at this problem.

My next point is on research. We have one centre of excellence in research—certainly in thrombectomy—which I think is the University of East Anglia. It is one of several across Europe. I am a Liberal Democrat spokesperson and am therefore bound to ask what the Government are doing to make sure that, post Brexit, research and research collaboration continue? I know that the Royal Society is looking across the piece at the impact of Brexit on research, taking an unbiased and pragmatic view of it. I simply ask the Minister to tell us how the Government will keep an eye on that.

My third observation is that in 2016 Stanford University reported remarkable results from a very small-scale study—about 16 patients—on the use of stem cell therapies. These are often considered to be wonder solutions to quite an array of neurological conditions. I would not go that far: there is a lot to be done by neuroscientists before they realise the potential of stem cell therapy in all sorts of conditions, but principally such neurological diseases as Parkinson’s and possibly Alzheimer’s. If and when those trials are replicated on a larger scale and get to a further stage, where they might lead to some form of therapy, will the NHS build on its track record of work in stroke treatment by taking advantage of such developments?

On the question of rehabilitation, much of what the noble Lord, Lord Lingfield, said pointed to a system in which we have highly skilled staff but not enough of them. We have highly skilled therapists, physiotherapists and nurses—I have been in awe of the ones I have had to deal with—but we need to enable them to impart information first to care workers and secondly to family members, who are there in that golden six-week gap in which recovery can be advanced if people know what to do. To what extent are we asking our NHS acute staff, as part of their duty of care, to pass on information to carers to make sure that they can be there to assist and improvise with things which work?

What do the Government intend to do about the collection of data on post-acute service provision as part of the overall stroke strategy? The bulk of stroke recovery happens in the weeks and months afterwards.

The difference between acute provision and community provision would be that acute provision will help you deal with a physical deficiency, and a community service will help you deal with a lack of confidence. For most people, life after a stroke means living with a lifelong lack of confidence, but that can be aided, helped and treated.

We have done a lot in this country of which we should be proud, but with clever thinking we could do a lot more.