Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 26th January 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

111A: Clause 40, page 45, line 37, at end insert “as determined by the underlying assets in any structure or fund.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to align provisions in the Bill with the Mansion House Accord definition used for UK private markets to mean the underlying assets.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 111A would add the words

“as determined by the underlying assets in any structure or fund”

after “qualifying assets” in new Section 28C(1). Its purpose is simple: to ensure that when measuring investment in private markets via collective investment vehicles, we look at the underlying assets, not the wrapper in which they are held; we look at where the money goes, not the route it takes.

In debates on the Bill, I have been tracing the consequences of the Government’s approach to private markets. On the first day, I set out the competition concerns inherent in the Mansion House Accord as transposed in the Bill. Last Monday, I explained the role that listed investment companies play in transparency and valuation of private equity, as recognised by the Bank of England and the ICAEW. On Thursday, I explained the range of infrastructure that they fund and the regulatory changes that are designed to make investment easier but that have not been given time to work.

Today, I turn to the policy history of how long-term asset funds, LTAFs, were developed as an open-ended alternative to the closed-ended listed investment company and what was and was not agreed. The LTAF was developed through the productive finance working group, co-chaired by the Governor of the Bank of England, the chief executive of the FCA and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury. It was supported by senior representatives of the PRA, pension schemes and investment managers. It was an unusually high-level and accelerated process, driven in part by the then Chancellor’s public commitment to have the first LTAF launched within a year.

Precisely because of that elevated framework and compressed procedure, it is all the more important that we adhere to what the working group actually agreed. The record is remarkably consistent. Across almost every meeting of the working group, the minutes recognise that there were two established routes for accessing long-term illiquid assets: the new LTAF and the long-standing listed investment company. From the very first steering committee meeting on 26 January 2021, the minutes record that

“closed-ended funds facilitate investment in productive finance assets … Some members believed existing fund structures, such as investment trusts, were sufficient … several members suggested … adapting existing vehicles, such as investment trusts, rather than developing a new open-ended fund structure”.

At the first technical expert group meeting on 12 February 2021, the Investment Association stated explicitly:

“The proposal does not intend to replace existing structures”.


At the technical working group on 20 April 2021, it was confirmed that the LTAF was to

“complement, rather than replace, existing structures”.

Later in the process, on 4 May 2021, the steering committee agreed:

“The LTAF is not the only structure for investment in less liquid assets”.


The final road map, published in September 2021, reinforces this, stating:

“There are a range of ways to invest in less liquid assets, and all of them play important roles”.


In practice, for DC schemes and retail investors, those routes are the LTAF and listed investment company. Nothing in this policy process—not the minutes, road map, FCA contributions or the IEA’s own presentation—ever suggested that Parliament should legislate a single wrapper preference or exclude the listed wrapper route to private assets. On the contrary, the working group recognised two parallel structures capable of holding productive finance assets. It was explicit that the LTAF was to complement not replace the existing one.

When the public policy process is this clear, it is difficult to see why a private agreement should be allowed to override it. Yet the Bill does that, and the Minister says it is because of the Mansion House Accord. The effect of the Bill is therefore threefold. It is anti-competitive because it removes a functioning structure from the market and mandates a single route for accessing the same underlying assets. It is anti-policy, because it contradicts the working group’s own record—a record developed by the Bank of England, the PRA, the FCA and the Treasury, all of which recognise that listed investment companies already perform this role and were never intended to be displaced. It is anti-transparency, because it excludes the only structure where private assets are accessed, with all the benefits of public market transparency, daily market valuations, regular auditor disclosure and shareholder engagement, including AGMs and independent boards to hold managers to account.

The consequences do not stop at the DC default funds. Last night, one of the most senior asset management figures emailed me to say that this is not just a matter for pension schemes. Excluding listed investment companies will widen discounts to net asset value, with direct detriment to retail investors.

Next, let us examine the evidence of the origin of this exclusion. At Second Reading, the Minister said,

“we have aimed to stick closely to the scope of the Mansion House Accord, which itself is limited to investments made by unlisted funds”.—[Official Report, 18/12/25; col. 938.]

That is at best an approximation and, in substance, not true. There is no such definition in the accord. It points to underlying assets, explicitly defining that:

“UK private markets means where the underlying assets are based in the UK”.


It knows the difference between an asset and a wrapper.

The Minister’s letter after Second Reading says that the exclusion is to support the Mansion House agreement. That is even more approximate and perhaps an admission that it is not in the accord after all, but something done afterwards and now being justified in its name.

Treasury officials have said in meetings that the pension funds want it, but there is no public record of any such request. If the accord itself does not say it, the Government are doing it on the basis of something else. I must ask again: who asked for this exclusion? Where is the written evidence? It is not in the accord, any consultation or any published policy. It is not in the working group minutes, the road map or any regulatory framework on LTAFs or listed investment companies by the FCA. I have elaborated publicly available evidence showing that the policy process recognised two parallel structures. What written evidence can the Minister show the Committee that supports the exclusion of one of them? If the Government are relying on private representations, Parliament is entitled to know what they were and who made them.

I have written evidence from DC default pension providers and Mansion House Accord signatories, representing a substantial majority share of the auto-enrolment market. They say that the exclusion of listed invested companies was not something they agreed to or understood to be part of the accord. Some have been going back through their meeting records to check. Others have said that they had not realised that this was a provision in the Bill; that they are neutral on the wrapper; and that they thought that the exclusion meant only listed equities, not investments within a wider listed investment company wrapper, and would be against that exclusion. Others said that they use listed investment companies and would not want this.

I have my evidence and more is still coming. Where is the Government’s? This exclusion was devised within government without a proper evidential basis, or it is being done to please interests that have not been put on the public record, or Ministers have simply not appreciated the implications of what is being proposed. None of those possibilities is a sound basis for legislating away a long-standing structure with a clear history of positive economic outcomes.

It is explained as suitably targeted guard-rails. These are the kind of guard-rails over which you are thrown to the lions. We are being asked to legislate a single-wrapper mandate on the basis of assertions not supported by the public record. If the Government wish to exclude a structure that the Bank of England, the PRA, the FCA and the Treasury itself recognised as valid, they must show the evidence.

My amendment would restore the position that the working group adopted: what matters are the underlying assets, not the wrapper in which they are held. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

The noble Baroness knows that she and I disagree on this subject. I hold to my view that the buying and selling of shares is simply the exchanging of financial assets.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

May I intervene so that I do not have to take up time later? I cannot see the difference between the follow-on funding that you get with a listed investment company, if you have an IPO, and the subsequent follow-on funding rounds. With an LTAF, you have initial fundraising and subscriptions. With a listed investment company, you buy and sell on the market. With the open-ended LTAFs, you have redemptions, purchases and flow matching. If you are watching the money, those are equivalent processes.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

If the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, had listened, she would know that I said I thought what the Government were doing had gone too far, because there were instances where there was a necessary flow between the raising of funds and that flowing into new investment.

A number of noble Lords on this side of the Room have been talking as though this Bill stops pension schemes investing in listed assets or investment companies. It certainly does not; it merely says that they do not qualify if asset mandation is introduced. We ought to be concentrating on whether this is a valid policy objective—the Minister knows that I do not subscribe to that—to get money out of pension funds and into the real economy. We then ought to concentrate on which flows achieve that; certainly not all flows of buying investment trusts or other listed vehicles will achieve that.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, trustees will have to make their own decisions on that. I understand that, were mandation to come in, there would be constraints on this, but let me see whether I will pick up some answers to help with that as we go.

The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and, I think, the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, suggested that the Bill explicitly discriminates against listed investment funds. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, made this point previously. That concern is perhaps reflected in Amendment 124, which would remove the language that in general serves to exclude listed securities. Nothing in this language refers directly to investment funds or should be construed as a signal of discrimination, but I have listened carefully to the arguments made and I recognise that some people clearly feel otherwise. I am happy to take that away and consider further the arguments about signalling.

A number of noble Lords, starting with the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, emphasised the issue of underlying investments, pointing out that the Mansion House Accord includes specific language on this. It defines UK private markets as meaning

“where the underlying assets are based in the UK”.

Accordingly, new Section 28C(6) provides the mechanism to reflect this aspect of the accord. Amendment 127 relates to this point, and I will say more when I return to it. I have already recognised that DC funds may invest directly or through funds. That means that, if we ever came to exercise these powers, we would need to implement the regulations under new Section 28C in a way that suitably reflects this. However, we do not consider it necessary to amend the clause to achieve this, since there is sufficient flexibility in new Section 28C to prescribe descriptions of qualifying assets in a way that reflects this, subject to the constraints in new Section 28C(5).

On the matter of competition, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, made a more constrained speech than she did last week, and I commend her for that. The question of competition law was raised. For the record, there has been no breach of competition law by the Government, nor are we encouraging a breach of competition law. We strongly welcome the Mansion House Accord; I make that clear for the record.

I turn back to Amendment 127 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, because it picks up some of these points. This amendment would remove the provision that allows the Government, if exercising these powers, to specify that a proportion of assets subject to an asset allocation requirement should be invested in the UK. This aspect of the clause was developed with the Mansion House Accord firmly in mind. Under the accord, half of the 10% of default fund assets committed to private markets is intended to be invested in the UK. This provision simply ensures that the powers can operate as a backstop to that commitment. What constitutes a UK investment will vary by asset and will be set out in due course, with new Section 28C(6)(b) making it clear that this can be done through regulations.

Amendment 121, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, also relates to the definition of qualifying assets. Its effect would be to add to the list of examples of private asset classes that may be prescribed as qualifying assets in regulations made under new Section 28C(4). As the noble Baroness is aware, the Government have designed these provisions to mirror closely the asset classes covered by the Mansion House Accord. The clause does not perfectly correspond, word for word, with the drafting of the accord, but the effect is the same. To be clear, I can confirm that UK infrastructure assets, UK scale up capital and UK SME growth market shares, which I assume is what the noble Baroness meant when she referred to quoted companies, are all capable of being designated as qualifying assets, provided that they are not listed on a recognised investment exchange. They are very good examples of the sorts of assets in which these reforms should encourage investment; none the less, it is not necessary to list them individually in the Bill.

I have listened carefully to the many considered points and arguments that have been made in relation to qualifying assets. I recognise that there is not unanimity in the Committee, although it is always interesting when my noble friend Lord Davies agrees with the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and, at least in part, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, agrees with me; all things are possible, we discover, in Committee in the House of Lords. Given that, and given the arguments that have been made both here and previously, I hope that noble Lords will feel able to withdraw or not press their amendments.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate; I also thank the Minister for, from my perspective, attempting to defend the indefensible.

The Minister mentioned the industry documentation underlying the accord. I would be grateful if that could be forwarded to me, made a matter of public record and, perhaps, placed in the Library. As I said in my opening speech, if noble Lords want to know, I have had some 70% of the people representing the default funds—if you take their turnover—say that they did not think that they have agreed to the exclusion of listed investment companies. So something is going wrong here.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I should have quoted what I was referring to; I meant to do so but forgot, so I apologise. I was referring to the question and answer materials that accompany the accord on the ABI’s pensions website, which I am sure the noble Baroness has read. They say:

“The definitions of both global and UK private markets assets include directly held, or via investment through unlisted funds in property, infrastructure, private credit, private equity and venture capital”.


The Government understand that this reflects the intention of the accord to exclude investment in listed investment funds. I would be happy to send these materials round to noble Lords.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I am not sure that “directly held” applies to an LTAF either. The fact is that you have wrappers and underlying assets. It is discriminatory, and that should be tested. I still do not see how, when you have the public policy laid out by the high-level working group set up to create LTAFs, you can then say, “A private negotiation overrides that”. I stand by that.

I know that the Pensions Minister received a letter from a past lord mayor, Alastair King, who is one of the architects of the Mansion House initiatives, on 22 October last year. He relayed that he had encountered both support for the investment trust market and concerns that the Bill did not acknowledge the potential of the investment company structure. That evidence—one of the architects asking, “What’s going on here?”—also seems to have been ignored.

I come to the same basic point: for me, the Government have not provided a clear, public or specific rationale for this exclusion. I would say that neither has the ABI, but I did not know that it runs the country. All of the evidence points the opposite way to what the Government have done. Officials have confirmed in meetings that no assessment of using listed investment companies has been carried out, despite the clear steer of the policy in the working group to do so. It seems that this Q&A from the ABI overrides a Bank of England/FCA/government working group. That cannot be so. The only explanation ever offered is that there are “suitably targeted guardrails”—a phrase that has never been defined, evidenced or justified. What do you have to guard from in a listed investment company? Competition? Transparency? That is a very strange thing to say; it is an instrument of division and discrimination, protecting secrets.

Let us remind ourselves of what we are dealing with: two collective investment vehicles, each of which is a wrapper holding protected assets of net asset value for the pension scheme. That is where they differ from an ordinary equity. An ordinary equity does not have any protection for the assets; if the company goes bust, it is bust. If the listed investment company goes back to the net asset value, the assets are still there for the pension fund. That is the difference, which is why a collective investment vehicle such as a listed investment company belongs with the LTAF; it does not belong with an equity.

I still do not see why they stick so closely to some Q&A but, whether by design or by accident, they have produced a proposal that I still say is without foundation, without evidence and, frankly, without integrity. It is irrational and procedurally unfair, and it fails to take account of relevant and public considerations, relying instead on things that have not been consulted on and that have been presented through private industry discussions. I have never seen anything like this before. There are simple ways to make it fair in various proposed amendments in the rest of this group, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann—

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

The noble Baroness has spoken for five and a half minutes now. Whether she is pressing or withdrawing her amendment, this should be brief.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I have only two more lines. I will just remind noble Lords that there are simple ways to make this fair and reasonable, as spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. These give a free choice of instrument, with no compulsion—and yet there is still resistance, with no rational explanation. This is, of course, not the end, unless the Government see their error, but for now I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 111A withdrawn.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, all the amendments in this group raise important issues. I hope that none of them will be necessary, because I hope that we will have got rid of the power from the Bill, so these will become irrelevant details. I have Amendment 130 in this group, which would modify the mandation power by removing new Section 28C(15). This subsection “overrides any provision” of a trustee or scheme rules that conflicts with the mandation power. Thus, if the scheme had been set up with investment parameters that, for example, ruled out investing in private equity, and the Government then specified private equity, the wishes of the employer expressed in the scheme’s governing documents would be completely overwritten. Since there is no requirement in the Bill, as I understand it, for the Government to specify more than one asset class, it is quite possible that the Government could specify a required asset class that conflicted with things that had been deliberately set up when the scheme was set up.

I can understand, of course, why the Government want to encourage pension schemes to consider investing in alternative asset classes. I do not think you will find much resistance to the concept of investing in alternative asset classes. But I simply cannot understand why the Government think they should have a power to force schemes to invest in a particular way, if a conscious decision has already been made not to invest in that asset class. The Government might not agree with that decision, but I hope we do not live in a world where the Government can simply ignore the clearly expressed wishes of those they govern. I hope that we still live in a free society. Subsection (15) seems to me to extend the powers of the state too far, and we ought not to go along with it.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I have several amendments in this group: Amendments 154, 157, 158 and 159, which I will not say much about because I am fishing in the same pond as everybody else. If there is this mandation, we are anxious to know how it works, and we think the review should come earlier—I have put in some of the things that I think it should look at. I will spend more time on my Amendment 131, which is about prior steps that would have to be taken before there was any exercise of the mandation and regulations were made. It is about the prior steps that must be taken before the Secretary of State can exercise the regulation-making power in new Section 28C—what I termed the devil’s clause once before, although we now know that it is the ABI clause.

It is probably worth pausing here to remind ourselves whom the ABI represent: it is the Association of British Insurers and it represents the insurance companies, which are the manufacturers of the LTAFs, as was indicated earlier. It had a meeting in which, as usual, it displayed the slide that says, “We’re not colluding and breaking competition law, but we’re just going to agree that we won’t be investing in the other vehicle that has protected net asset value, and we’ll do a Q&A that says that’s not happening”. Interestingly, the insurers present at that meeting seem to have either forgotten about it or are telling me that they did not agree to anything. However, I leave that hanging.

If the Government wish to enforce a power of this potential scope, which, as has been explained, is much wider than the example in the Bill—a power that could reshape asset allocation across the pension sector—it must be subject to proper safeguards. These prior steps are not obstacles but constructive checks that should support the Government’s own objectives.

Proposed new paragraph (a) would require the Secretary of State to

“review the effect of any voluntary agreements or coordinated commitments relating to asset allocation”.

We have had a lot of policy alignment, pledges and so forth, and we all want the voluntary method to succeed. But if the point comes that regulations are contemplated, it is essential to understand what the voluntary route has already achieved, where the evidence points and why it did not happen.

Proposed new paragraph (b) would require an assessment of

“the impact of any such agreements on asset allocation, pricing and valuations”.

If the Government are concerned about market functioning, they should be equally concerned about how co-ordinated commitments affect pricing signals and valuation discipline. This is simply good policy hygiene because it ultimately affects workers’ pensions.

Proposed new paragraph (c) would require a review of

“the likely effect on returns to pensions savers”.

We all hope for the double benefit: better long-term returns for savers and productive investment that supports the UK economy. But we must analyse whether that is happening in practice, and if not, why not, before moving to a regulatory footing.

Proposed new paragraph (d) would require the Secretary of State to “obtain clearance” from the Competition and Markets Authority, and that is entirely consistent with the CMA’s pro-competition remit and with the competitiveness and growth objectives embedded in FSMA. Any use of this power must reinforce the UK’s competition framework, not bypass it, and where co-ordinated commitments already exist in the market, the Government must be certain that any regulations they bring forward meet a clear public interest justification.

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[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I hope that this little group is fairly self-explanatory.

In Amendment 141, I am again seeking to provide more certainty in relation to the savers’ interest test for exemptions to the asset allocation requirements and ensure that providers are not required to alter their asset allocation until the authority has made its determination or they have received the outcome of the referral to the Upper Tribunal. This is a probing amendment for debating purposes. I hope that we will get further light from the Minister when she replies.

My noble friend Lady Noakes has just reminded me that I would also like to speak to Amendment 140, the “starter for 10” in this group. Here I am seeking to remove the time limit for savers’ interest exemptions to the asset allocation requirements that would be set by the authority. I thank the Committee for its forbearance in allowing me to speak to Amendment 141 as well.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 146 to 150. This group of amendments is all about trustees. Although I submit that nothing in this Bill should unsettle the basic foundation of our trustee law, there remains extensive debate in the courts and academic literature, and among trustees, on how far wider policy objectives and emerging risks can be taken into account. I am trying to address some of those.

Amendment 146 would simply reinforce the obvious: fiduciary duty remains the overriding principle of pension governance and trustees must act in the best financial interests of members. That is the cornerstone of trust law. The courts have been clear for decades that trustees must prioritise members’ financial interests above all else. Yet the combination of the Mansion House rhetoric, promotional language in the Bill and the possibility of future regulations has created real anxiety among trustees about whether they are expected to prioritise government preferences over member outcomes. This amendment aims to remove that ambiguity. It would restate the law, reassuring trustees that their primary duty has not changed.

Amendment 147 follows on from that in seeking to introduce a safe harbour. Trustees are increasingly worried about being second-guessed, not for misconduct but for failing to meet expectations that are not clearly defined. Many are lay trustees. They act in good faith, take professional advice and follow their fiduciary duties. They should not face penalties or adverse consequences because they did not meet a quota or chose a different route to the same underlying assets. A safe harbour is a standard legal mechanism used in other regulatory regimes. It protects trustees who do the right thing, prevents retrospective reinterpretation of policy signals and ensures that trustees can make decisions based on evidence, not fear.

Amendment 148, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, addresses systemic risk. Trustees already consider systemic risks: climate change, economic resilience, supply chain fragility and other long-term factors that materially affect pension outcomes. The Pensions Regulator already expects trustees to consider these issues, but the statutory framework is uneven and expectations are not always clear, so this amendment would codify best practice. It would ensure that trustees consider systemic risks as part of their fiduciary duties, while making it explicit that this does not mandate investment in any particular vehicle. It is about risk management, not direction of capital. Trustees are careful and sensible people and will observe the policy direction, including on private assets. As I said last week, before we had the devil’s clause, there was broad agreement that it would be far better to trust the trustees.

Amendment 149, again from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, addresses structural discrimination. I have already dealt extensively with how the Bill risks creating unequal treatment between different collective investment structures. Trustees should be free to choose the most appropriate structure for their scheme, whether listed or unlisted, based on liquidity, valuation, discipline, governance or member outcomes. The amendment would simply ensure a level playing field. It would prevent distortions, protect competition and ensure that trustees are not nudged away from structures that have served savers well for over a century.

Finally, Amendment 150 deals with herding risk. Regulatory herding is a known danger, which we have seen most recently and dramatically with LDI, where regulation, guidance or professional advice pushes everyone in the same direction at the same time and systemic risk increases, not decreases. The Mansion House agenda, if interpreted too narrowly, risks creating precisely that kind of clustering. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to avoid mandating or promoting investment in a way that induces herding and ensure that any guidance emphasises diversification and risk management. It is a simple “Do no harm” provision which learns from recent history. It is also embedded in the terms of the Mansion House Accord, as spoken to last Thursday by my noble friend Lord Sharkey. Trustees must not be forced to purchase assets that do not exist, do not exist safely or do not exist at a fair price.

None of these amendments would obstruct the Government’s objective. None would prevent investment in productive finance. None would limit trustee discretion. What they would do is ensure that trustees remain protected, that their duties remain clear and that the Bill does not inadvertently distort markets, undermine competition or create new systemic risks. These amendments are modest, sensible and protective. They would strengthen the Bill, support trustees and safeguard the long-term interests of pension savers. It is what we should all be thinking about.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I support mandation. I am in favour of the Government introducing the measures in this Bill, in principle. All Governments have a duty, not just a right, to deal with market failure. If the current investment advice and structures that we have are failing to deliver investments in the growth that we need in our economy, then the Government have a duty to act. I am not yet convinced that they have all the mechanics of mandation right, but that is the process we are going through at the moment in investigating how it will be achieved.

I am not so sure—I ask my noble friend the Minister to guide the Committee on this—about a question raised at Second Reading to which there was no answer, which applies to this part of Bill. Do the Government understand that the inevitable corollary of mandation is responsibility for the outcome? Outcomes may be better. We are told at length that this will improve things; the aim is to grow the economy to achieve good investments.

The Government may not have a legal responsibility to make sure that happens, but they certainly have a moral responsibility when they are saying how members’ money should be invested and they also, inevitably, have a political responsibility to ensure that they produce a system that enjoys broad public trust. A failure to achieve the Government’s objective will break that trust. Do the Government appreciate and understand the implications of what they are doing?

Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

46A: Clause 11, page 13, line 20, at end insert—
“(4A) Value for money regulations must take account of—(a) a VFM assessment over 3, 5 and 10 years;(b) the nature and spread of assets and their purpose in the portfolio including diversity, stability and risk management;(c) the characteristics of the members of the scheme;(d) whether comparisons, benchmarking, scaling and advisory consensus risk herding, market movements, lack of diversity or systemic risk;(e) fee structuring, including performance fee management and inter-cohort fairness, including managing how the J-curve effect and consolidation can shift costs or benefits between different cohorts of pensioners.”

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, those noble Lords who have examined the Marshalled List will know that Amendment 46A constitutes what was in Amendment 46 but with an extra paragraph (e) in the proposed new subsection; that is the difference. The amendment proposes a small number of matters that value for money “must”, rather than merely “may”, take into account. The Bill ultimately leads to schemes being graded as performing or non-performing, so the framework must be sophisticated enough to reflect long-term investment reality, not just short-term metrics.

Value for money is a judgment about appropriateness, risk, purpose and fairness. Paragraph (a) of the proposed new subsection is based on long-term assets requiring a long-term view. I suggest assessments over three, five and 10 years, but that is to illustrate the point, rather than being a fixation. Private assets often show negative early returns and we need a way of understanding valuations through the cycle, especially where valuations drive fees. As more investments are moved into private assets, especially if back books have to be adjusted to meet authorisation percentages, there will be cluster effects. I worry about that and its effect on value for money.

How can we check valuations in the private equity context as well? There is a lot of literature around how it is useful to have a market price comparator for what is an otherwise opaque and infrequent exercise. Listed investment companies are routinely used in institutional analysis as a valuation cross-check for private assets because they provide daily pricing for similar underlying exposures and frequent net asset value valuations. For example, the ICAEW’s 2020 report, Fair Value Measurement by Listed Private Equity Funds, notes that listed funds provide observable market prices for benchmarking unlisted investments. The Bank of England has noted in several financial stability reports that market price vehicles, including listed funds, provide useful information about liquidity conditions and valuation dynamics in private markets, particularly when model-based valuations adjust slowly. These valuation and transparency credentials make it all the more extraordinary—and, I dare say, suspicious—that the Bill shuts them out.

My second point—paragraph (b)—is that value must be assessed in the context of the nature, spread and purpose of the assets. Long-term infrastructure behaves differently from assets for liquidity or inflation protection. The question is whether the assets are good value for what they are meant to do. Some assets, or the way in which they are packaged, serve hybrid purposes—as listed investment companies have long done—combining private asset exposure with market liquidity. Directly held assets have fewer fees, but selection and achieving wide diversity are more challenging. LTAFs will package a mix of illiquid and liquid assets and it will be interesting to see how it works over time.

My third point—paragraph (c)—is that value must be seen in the context of the characteristics of members. Those on lower incomes cannot afford excessive risk or prolonged losses; they are more likely to remain in default funds, and trustees will be mindful of that. A more cautious strategy in lower returns may be entirely legitimate for value for money. Trustees must retain the ability to choose strategies that are appropriate for their members, not strategies that score well on a narrow template. This is particularly relevant because assessments created for the DC default funds may well be adopted more widely.

My fourth point—paragraph (d)—concerns the risk of herding. Too much measurement, comparison and advisory consensus can drive correlated strategy. The Bank of England has repeatedly warned about pro-cyclical behaviour and systemic vulnerabilities. A value-for-money framework must not unintentionally reinforce those behaviours; not going with the crowd is sometimes the value-preserving strategy. If we reduce value for money to consensual metrics, we will distort behaviour and risk repeating the mistakes of the charge cap era.

My final point—this is the new one, paragraph (e)—concerns fairness between cohorts. Private assets, especially private equity, typically follow a J-curve: early losses or flat value followed by rising value and, often, high late gains. Gaming or late realisation of value scores high in performance fees. That can be emphasised deliberately or just through the valuation timetable. Thus early cohorts end up bearing the set-up losses while later cohorts—these are long-term assets, so it may be 10 or 20 years later—are the ones that benefit from the late-stage gains. This will be exaggerated, too, if there is back-book adjustment. Performance fees and valuation-linked fees distort fairness over time. If value for money is to be fair, these effects need to be managed—as, indeed, they do for the payment of the pensions.

Additionally, as funds scale, investment will shift from external vehicles to internal management—the models used in Australia and Canada and, increasingly, by Nest and USS in our own pension funds. It will be important to observe how that affects fees and performance.

I strongly support the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on member services, which I would have added to my essential list if I had thought of it first—but I did not steal it. I have added my name to the amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, on fee transparency, with the caution, again, that we must not repeat the mistakes of the current cost disclosure regimes, which do not properly recognise where costs are borne. I note that it will take more ingenuity than fee percentage transparency to get the full picture out of private equity. I beg to move.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I strongly support Amendment 46A from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to which I have added my name and which she so eloquently explained. I will speak to my own Amendment 47, which she referred to and which looks at the value-for-money ratings from the point of view of members. For me, that is an extremely important element that is often overlooked when concentrating on the investment side alone—not that that is not important.

I draw the Committee’s attention to some of the specifications that I have made in my Amendment 47, which I think are crucial to understand when one is choosing a pension scheme for one’s workforce. The quality of service for members can be extremely important and can indeed drive adequacy in ways that are not recognised by the investment side. The investment side is of course important, but if quality of service and the education, guidance and support provided to members are working well, that can be a driver to encourage members to increase their contributions. Ultimately, that can be at least on a par in importance with investment performance over time. If members gradually build up their contribution levels to, say, twice what they were before by adding 1% a year every time they get a bonus, that combined with the investment performance can be an extremely powerful driver for value for money over the long run, which is of course where we are meant to be examining and assessing the schemes.

On communications with members, I have specifically included in that what I call “jargon-light” communications, because I have not yet seen a communication with members about pensions that does not include baffling or off-putting terms, including—I will come to this later—the very term “default funds”. We all know what this refers to, but if you are talking to a young worker or someone in later life who is not on a high salary and does not know a lot about pensions and you tell them that what they are supposed to do with their money is to put it into a default fund, that may not sound terribly attractive to them. The last thing that most people want to do with their money is default.

The Minister is looking somewhat askance at my remarks, but this is just one example. I apologise—perhaps she is just looking at something in her notes. Certainly, those are the kind of looks that one sometimes gets from the pensions industry, which does not tend to understand that the ordinary person has never heard of a default fund and it does not sound particularly attractive. If we can include, in communications, words in plain English that may sound more enticing than the usual pension jargon, I think it could be helpful. I would argue that that is potentially a measure of the value offered in a workplace scheme, which is what the ratings are going to be looking at. I hope that the Committee will understand the aims of my specifications in Amendment 47 and, perhaps as we go through, Members of the Committee may suggest other elements.

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I am very conscious of how long I have been speaking. I hope I have been able to answer most of the questions and to reassure noble Lords. The Government believe the right balance is there: there are clear powers in the Bill, there is technical detail in regulations and there is a lot of detail about the proposals in consultation. Given all that, I hope that noble Lords will decline to press their amendments.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, it falls to me to do the summation as a stand-in. I thank the Minister for her comprehensive reply. I wish I could speak that fast. It answered quite a lot of the points that I raised. It is obviously quite irritating for us when we commence a Bill and then consultations that provide a lot of the key points and information trail behind the Bill. We spend some time thinking about it and then discover we have to do a consultation response. I do not know how the timings for these things would fit together. Nevertheless, it would be quite nice for some of those key points that are being consulted on to perhaps find their way into the Bill somehow. I just point that out.

What is an Act of Parliament supposed to do? It is supposed to give you the front-end lead-in to what people’s expectations are. They cannot easily be expected to go wandering around on regulator websites and rulebooks, because, my goodness, I find those difficult. Talking about finding things difficult, when I retired from being a Member of the European Parliament, I got a booklet sent through because, for some of my time there, I was in the UK pension fund that applies to MPs and MEPs. This was just after I had finished negotiating all the post-financial crisis financial services legislation. I looked at the scheme rules and I gave up. I lost the will to live and thought, “Well, I’ll just take what comes, thank you very much”. If it is going to do that to me, what is it going to do to the ordinary person? We have to take a lot more care about more gentle lead-ins and simple ways of explaining things. Of course, that was some time ago.

I think we have had quite a good trot around the factors. I would still like to see something distilled from the work that has gone on which is accessible and where people might look for things if they are curious—they might be people representing people—and not have to resort to complicated scheme books and complicated regulator rules. Maybe we will have an update by the time we get to Report on the timings and dates and what has come out of these consultations. I suppose it will be a bit early for that. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 46A withdrawn.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, supported by my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott, I am glad to be leading off in another group of amendments, largely designed to probe the Government and clarify their thinking, plans and rationale on the small pots regulations in the Bill. Indeed, I know that many industry bodies are watching our proceedings with interest and will be taking note of what the Minister says. This is after we had a series of meetings with those at the sharp end in the industry, as she will probably guess.

I will speak briefly to the other amendments in this group before turning to my own. First, I speak to the amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who is not in his place, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. Ensuring that a qualifying dashboard service has been available for a period before small pots can be consolidated seems an entirely sensible and proportionate measure. If we are to move pension savings automatically, often without an active decision by the member, it is surely right that individuals should first have a practical opportunity to see and trace their pots in one place and to engage with them themselves.

I also welcome Amendment 81 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which, as I understand it, would ensure that a pot is not treated as dormant where contributions have ceased for a legitimate and expected reason, such as a temporary break from employment with an intention to return. This strikes me as a pragmatic refinement that would better reflect real-world working patterns and help to ensure that consolidation targets genuine dormancy rather than planned inactivity. I have no doubt the Minister will explain that in more elegant terms than me.

Amendment 88, in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, addresses the definitions set out in Clause 34, which itself gives the Secretary of State a broad power to alter the definition of a “small” pension pot, including increasing the threshold, with no upper limit set in the Bill. The amendment would retain flexibility but place a clear ceiling on how far that power could be used. I look forward to my noble friend’s remarks. I know that my noble friend will expand on that point, but I would be grateful if the Minister could also explain why an upper limit is not currently included and how the Government envisage safeguarding against this power being used to capture significantly larger costs in the future. That is an important question that I hope will be raised.

I turn to my first amendment in this group, Amendment 79, which would replace the 12-month dormancy period in Clause 22 with an 18-month period. This is a probing amendment intended to test the rationale for the Government’s choice of a 12-month timeframe. The definition of “dormant” is critical, because once a pot meets that definition it may become eligible for automatic consolidation with no active decision by the member. Many savers engage with their pensions only intermittently, often on an annual basis, and employment patterns do not always follow neat or predictable cycles. Therefore, extending the period to 18 months would allow the Committee to explore whether a full year of inactivity is genuinely sufficient to infer disengagement, or whether it risks capturing individuals who are simply between roles or engaging on a longer cycle.

I want to be clear that this amendment does not seek to undermine the policy of small pots consolidation, which, as the Minister knows, we broadly support. Rather, it is intended to probe how the Government have balanced administrative efficiency with member protection, and what evidence has informed the choice of a 12-month period rather than a longer one. I would therefore welcome the Minister’s explanation of how this timeframe was determined, and whether alternative periods were considered.

Amendment 80 would leave out Clause 22(3)(b). This too is a probing amendment; it is intended to explore what the Government mean by the reference to “prescribed exceptions” in the definition of a dormant pension pot. As drafted, Clause 22(3)(b) assumes that a pot may be treated as dormant not only by reference to contribution inactivity but by whether a member has taken steps to confirm or alter how their pot is invested, subject to exceptions that are left entirely to regulations. Many savers remain in default investment arrangements by choice and engage with their pensions only intermittently, often in ways that are not easily captured by scheme records. Therefore, it is not clear what types of member action the Government intend should prevent a pot being treated as dormant, nor what kinds of behaviour might be carved out as exceptions.

This amendment is intended to prove whether investment-related actions are an appropriate proxy for engagement, how prescribed exceptions will operate in practice and whether the approach adequately reflects real-world member behaviour. I would welcome the Minister’s clarification on how these exceptions are envisaged and why this test has been included in the definition of dormancy.

Finally, my Amendment 82 concerns the level of parliamentary scrutiny applied to regulations made under Clause 22. As drafted, the Bill applies the affirmative procedure to only the first set of small pots regulations or regulations that meet certain specific triggers. Thereafter, changes to the consolidation regime may be made under the negative procedure. This amendment is probing and is not dissimilar to one raised previously in Committee. It is intended to test whether that approach provides sufficient ongoing parliamentary oversight. The regulations made under Clause 22 will govern when and how small dormant pension pots may be consolidated, often without an active decision by the member, and they therefore go to the heart of member protection and confidence in the system itself.

The amendment would require all such regulations to be subject to the affirmative procedure, ensuring that Parliament has the opportunity to scrutinise and approve changes to this framework wherever they are made, not just at first use. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why the Government consider the negative procedure appropriate for subsequent regulations in this area, and whether there are safeguards to prevent significant policy changes being made without fuller parliamentary scrutiny. I thank in advance the Minister for her comments and answers and all other noble Lords for their contributions on this group, which I feel concerns an important matter. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, my Amendment 81 is very small; I hardly need to say anything about it. It came from one of those occasions when you are going through the Bill and you write a little query which you then convert into an amendment. It concerns Clause 22(3)(b), which says that a pension pot can be moved into a consolidator if

“the individual has, subject to any prescribed exceptions, taken no step to confirm or alter the way in which the pension pot is invested”.

There are instances in which a person may want to stay attached to a pension fund they have in a workplace, particularly if they do not necessarily have a long relationship with an employer or have done some intermittent work and then gone off to have a family, because they may have an informal agreement to go back. How do you cater for that? I realise that it might just fall under “any prescribed exceptions”, which you write in a note to deal with, but that is the basis of the amendment. I am sure it will be very simple for the Minister to say, “Yes, that is covered”.

While I am on my feet, I support Amendment 83. I also support Amendment 88 from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, because it is worth having some guardrails for things that are doing very well.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 88 proposes to limit the power in Clause 34 to increase the size of the pot classified as small so that it is limited to £10,000. I welcome the fact that the power to make regulations under Clause 34 has to be consulted on and that they will be subject to the affirmative procedure, but we know that Parliament has close to zero power to alter the content of regulations, so it is important that the guardrails around the power are sufficiently strong.

There is widespread acceptance in the industry that there should be consolidation of small pots of £1,000 or less. I understand that there are already around 13 million pots of that size, and that is predicted to rise to over 30 million in only a few years’ time, so this is clearly an important issue. There is a concern, however, that the Clause 34 power could be used beyond its core purpose, which is to ensure that multiple small pots do not accumulate within pension providers and that individuals do not lose track of their own pension pots. It is one thing to use the power for sensible tidying up, but it would be quite another if the power were used to drive further consolidation, for example, which would not necessarily be in the interests of either savers or pension providers.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, this is a busy group and I shall not detain the Committee by speaking to all the amendments therein, but I do want to welcome the amendments that have been tabled by other noble Lords, which will allow us to have a detailed and, I hope, fruitful debate and discussion on these important matters.

Amendment 89 is a probing amendment. It would leave out new subsection (1B), which allows the Secretary of State, by regulations, to exempt descriptions of relevant master trusts from the approval requirements in conditions 1 and 2, covering both the scale default arrangement and the asset allocation approvals. The purpose here is to understand the intended scope of this power and the safeguards that will govern its use. As drafted, new subsection (1B) is very broad: it permits exemptions for

“any description of relevant Master Trusts”

and gives examples, including schemes designed to meet the needs of those with protected characteristics and hybrid schemes.

I have three straightforward questions for the Minister at the outset. First, why is it necessary to take such wide exemption powers in the Bill, rather than tightly defining the circumstances in which exemptions may be granted? Secondly, how will the Government ensure that exemptions do not create a route by which schemes can avoid the central policy intent of this chapter: namely, improving outcomes through scale and an appropriate approach to asset allocation?

Thirdly, can the Minister clarify whether these exemption powers are intended, in whole or in part, to apply to collective defined contribution schemes, or other non-standard money purchase arrangements? If so, what is the rationale; and if not, will she put that clearly on the record? I am mindful of the recent debate that we had in this Room on the CDCs. I hope the Minister can respond to those points.

I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, will set out her reasoning for Amendment 92, so I do not wish to pre-empt or emulate what I know will be a very well-reasoned and informative set of remarks. But, as I have added my name to the amendment, I will briefly say that I welcome this proposal. It would put in the Bill a clear signal that a trust which provides “exceptional” value for money—as assessed by the regulator under its VFM framework—could be a legitimate basis for exemption from the new approval requirements. It seems sensible that trusts that already provide exceptional value for money should be trusted to carry on their good work under the established framework in which they are already operating.

Amendment 100, in my name and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, to whom I am grateful, seeks to provide helpful clarity, not to weaken regulation, by making clear that schemes offering genuinely specialist or innovative services can demonstrate that they meet the exemption. This is important because innovation in pensions does not always mean novel technology alone; it can include specialist provision for particular workforces, new approaches to member engagement or delivery models that better serve groups who might otherwise be poorly catered for. Without clarity, there is a risk that worthwhile innovation is discouraged simply because schemes are uncertain about how the exemption will be interpreted.

The amendment also gives the Secretary of State the power, through regulations, to define “specialist or innovative services”. That provides appropriate flexibility, allowing the definition to evolve over time, while ensuring proper scrutiny and regulatory oversight. The amendment supports innovation without undermining member protection, and it gives both trustees and regulators greater certainty about how the exemption is intended to operate. I therefore hope the Minister will look favourably on it and speak to the point that is raises.

Amendments 105 and 107 are intended to ensure that group personal pension schemes are treated fairly and proportionately under the new scale requirements in Clause 40. We are clear that scale alone is not always a reliable proxy for quality or value. There are group personal pension schemes that are smaller by design yet provide highly specialist or innovative services, for example, to particular sectors, workforces or member needs, and that deliver good outcomes despite not meeting a blunt asset threshold. Amendment 105 creates an additional route for relevant GPPs to meet the quality requirement, by allowing those that satisfy an innovation exemption not to be automatically required to meet the scale requirement.

Amendment 107 provides the necessary framework for that exemption. It allows a GPP to demonstrate that it offers specialist or innovative services, and gives the Secretary of State the power, through regulations, to define what those terms mean. That ensures flexibility as the market evolves, while retaining appropriate regulatory and parliamentary oversight. I hope the Minister will see these amendments as a constructive way of balancing scale with innovation, competition and member outcomes, and I look forward to her response.

Amendment 135 would revert the eligibility test for new entrant pathway relief under Clause 40 to the simpler principle-based formulation contained in the Bill as introduced. The purpose of the new entrant pathway is clear: to ensure that credible, innovative schemes are not locked out of the market simply because they are new and have not yet had the opportunity to build scale. As the Bill is currently drafted, that test has become more prescriptive, with a risk that genuinely innovative entrants could struggle to qualify despite having strong growth potential. By refocusing the test on whether a scheme can demonstrate strong potential for growth and an ability to innovate, this amendment would restore the original balance between safeguarding member outcomes and allowing healthy competition and innovation in the market. This amendment would simply ensure that the pathway for new entrants remains realistic and proportionate and is aligned with the policy intent.

Finally, Amendments 165 and 166 are probing amendments about parliamentary scrutiny—back to that subject. Clause 41 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations setting out how the Pensions Regulator will assess whether master trusts meet the scale requirement and have sufficient investment capability. These assessments will have a direct bearing on which schemes can operate, which must consolidate and how the market develops over time. As drafted, the Bill provides that the first set of regulations is subject to the affirmative procedure, but all subsequent regulations may be made under the negative procedure. I think we have heard this before. Amendments 165 and 166 would remove that distinction, so that any regulations in this area would require affirmative approval.

The question that these amendments pose is simple: if the initial framework is considered significant enough to warrant full parliamentary scrutiny, why should later changes, potentially just as consequential, receive a lower level of oversight? These regulations are not mere technical updates; they go to the heart of how scale and capability are judged, and therefore to the structure of the pensions market itself. It therefore seems reasonable that Parliament should retain the guaranteed opportunity to debate and approve changes of that kind whenever they are made. I look forward to the Minister’s explanation of why the negative procedure is considered sufficient for subsequent regulations and whether there is scope to strengthen ongoing parliamentary scrutiny in this area. I look forward to contributions from other Members of the Committee and particularly to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly to Amendment 92 because it is a “what it says on the tin” amendment. It arose during a conversation. Somebody asked me what happens if a scheme is doing very well but is forced into consolidation because it does not meet the scale requirements. Would there be any legal consequences if it did not do quite so well under consolidation? On whom would those legal consequences fall if, as a result, somebody received a worse pension? Is there any comeback on the scheme because it was not big enough and so got consolidated? Is there any indemnity? Is there any making up? Let us take a theoretical situation in which the consolidator it goes into ends up doing very badly—I would hope that would never happen, but this is just to probe the safeguards around such circumstances. I could not answer the questions. It may be that there is something in the vast number of papers I have not read and the Minister can advise me. There is nothing terribly special or secretive behind it, it is just something that could happen, and can I obtain clarity about what comeback there may or may not be?

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

The important thing here is clarity. The noble Baroness mentioned a single scheme. I am not going to comment on individual schemes, for reasons she will appreciate—she would not expect me to do so, I know—but we have to set some clear boundaries. The boundary has to be somewhere. As I said, we have actually gone for the bottom end of what was consulted on. We have created a transition pathway precisely to give schemes the opportunity to grow; they need to be able to persuade us that they have a credible path to do that.

In the case that the noble Baroness mentioned, if there were some particular market conditions that caused problems across a sector, she will be aware that in the Bill there is something called a protected period. There are powers in Sections 20 and 26 of the Pensions Act 2008 that give regulators the ability to delay temporarily the impact of the scale measures. That is to ensure that the consequence of a scheme failing to meet the scale requirement—having to cease accepting any further contributions—is planned and managed. There is a range of reasons why that might happen. It might be about an individual scheme that has been approved as having scale but has failed to meet the threshold or it might be a market crash that affects all schemes. There is flexibility there for the Government.

However, the principle is that we have to set some boundaries around that. The Government have reviewed the evidence carefully, and we have concluded that the point that we have chosen is appropriate. We have created a transition pathway in order to do that, and we have created new entrant pathways in order to accommodate those situations. We believe that that will protect members’ interests.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

The Minister has not yet mentioned whether there is any kind of indemnity or legal consequence. What the legislation does is not neutral in the sense that it provides cut offs and reasons not to invest. Is a company doing something wrong by continuing when it should say that it will not be able to make £25 million and it should roll up now? These are issues about which questions have come to me. It has not been looked at in the research. Could the Minister write to me to say whether there are any legal dangers for either side and whether there would be any compensation if the value of the pension becomes less than expected?

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

90: Clause 40, page 38, leave out lines 26 and 27
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, linked to others in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted, is consequential on an amendment leaving out the inserted section 28C from Clause 40. That amendment removes the Government’s broad mandation power.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I did not expect to lead this group, but due to the diligence of the Public Bill Office in tracking down consequential amendments, my Amendment 90 has come to the top.

My Amendment 110, which is my main amendment in this group and on which I will focus my remarks, seeks to delete new Section 28C of FSMA. At the heart of new Section 28C is the asset allocation definition, which is flawed not because of its aspiration but because it rests on a complete misunderstanding of what investment trusts or listed investment companies actually invest in, and it excludes them.

Last Monday, I explained the anti-competitive and reputational effects of encouraging the flow of investment exclusively via the new LTAF vehicle and excluding the long-standing listed investment company structure. Today I have touched on the role that they play in valuation. Before turning to the wider reasons why this clause is fundamentally flawed, I will dispel another misconception I hear in circulation: “Investment trusts do not do infrastructure”. Well, I do not know what you call the Thames Tideway Tunnel, Sizewell C, utility-scale onshore and offshore wind, schools, hospitals, hydroelectric schemes, solar and nuclear energy, space, communications and satellites—but I call them infrastructure. All are substantially invested in, at the building stage, by investment trusts. Perhaps the Minister would accompany me to see some of these, although maybe not in space.

I also hear the claim that they do not do the big infrastructure projects that the Government are focused on. That is not really true, but there is nothing in the asset list of private equity, private debt, venture capital and interests in land that says, “Only the mega size”, or that stops them being qualified assets when held by another route. Anyway, we all need all scales of infrastructure investment and ongoing funding for expansion.

On Monday this week, our much-vaunted new prospectus rules came into effect; they make it easier, cheaper and faster to raise both IPO and follow-on capital. This applies to listed investment companies, too. What was this for? It was precisely so that companies can grow faster, bigger pools of capital can be raised more efficiently and larger infrastructure projects and bigger funds can be built. What is the point of celebrating our new financial market regulation if the Government then block the very vehicles it was designed to support? Why are some people in charge of investment—yes, some of them are to blame, too—still of the mindset that investment trusts do not do primary investment, at the very moment when rule changes are being made to build on the boom in primary infrastructure investment that has come through this route in recent years?

I come on to mandation more generally. I am not against the underlying intent of encouraging more pension investment in private assets. However, there is already a far greater awareness of the need to do that. The policy argument is won, but we have only just got to setting up LTAFs and the listing rule changes. The Government have not given the financial industry the chance to show what it can do. It is hardly a vote of confidence in our largest industry—financial services. What message does that send to the world? It says, “Go somewhere else; we have to bully to get things done in London”. What does it say about our famous and canny asset management in Edinburgh? If the Government want to add encouragement, use “comply or explain”—or, better still, “always explain”—to add transparency and understanding to the system. My goodness, neither the Government nor parts of the pensions industry seem to know what goes on in the wider asset management industry. Do not just ask the same people who have driven the old pension investment strategies.

Then we come to trustees. I have amendments elsewhere in the Bill aimed at clarifying that they can and should look to wider systemic and economic effects, but they should not be overridden. At their core, members’ interests are paramount for trustees. New Section 28C does not have members’ interests paramount. It threatens deauthorisation and the disruption and cost that that would cause if, in the judgment of trustees and in full knowledge of the characteristics of their members, they consider that a little less infrastructure or private equity is appropriate. What if the phasing of big projects means that there is a dip when investments exit? What if you are still in the J-curve dip? If some things perform badly, or the rush to invest exaggerates prices, do trustees have to keep pumping money in at poor value? No, that is the moment for explanation and perhaps a modification of strategy, not compulsion or deauthorisation.

Let us be clear: a deauthorisation power of this kind is not neutral. It creates a structural pressure towards consolidation. If a scheme risks losing authorisation simply because its trustees judge that a different phasing or balance of assets is appropriate for its members, they get closed down or forced to merge. That is backdoor consolidation, not member-focused governance.

These are some of the reasons why I want to remove new Section 28C entirely. It does nothing but harm. It is economically inept, competitively unfair, legally unprincipled and blind to the regulatory opportunities that have only just come on stream. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow—and I did—my noble friend discussing the reserved mandatory powers in the Bill. I will speak to my Amendments 111, 161 and 162. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for adding his name to all three and the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for adding his name to the first.

The purpose of these amendments is to remove the reserve power of mandation from the Bill. The case against these reserve mandatory powers has been set out by a large number of important institutions. Most criticism seems to focus on the issue of conflicts with fiduciary duty. Critics of mandation have argued, correctly in my view, that directing trustees to hold a fixed share of specified assets conflicts with the trustees’ duty to act solely in the interests of their members. Mandation of investment in specific asset classes for policy reasons rather than on a risk/return consideration risks subordinating members’ interests to political objectives.

This also exposes trustees to legal liability for breaching their duty, especially if the investments are seen as politically motivated or fail to deliver competitive returns. The lack of legal clarity around the scope of fiduciary duty, particularly regarding systemic risks or broader economic impacts may well exacerbate trustees’ concerns about litigation and regulatory risk.

I know that the Government are alive to the fiduciary duty issue and have promised to produce statutory guidance to help. At our meeting before Second Reading, I asked the Minister whether this guidance would have binding provisions. The answer was no. The guidance will have, apparently, the same force as the many other “have regards” in our financial services sector. I also asked the Minister whether we could see a draft of this guidance before the end of Committee, but I have not had a reply to date. I therefore ask the Minister again whether we will see draft guidance so that we may scrutinise it before the end of Committee, or at least on Report. It is easy to understand, in these circumstances, why some legal experts and industry groups have called for a statutory clarification of fiduciary duty and argue that only primary legislation can provide the cover that trustees need to invest confidently, as the Government wish, without breaching their duties.

There is also the question of definition. What is the appropriate test for “productive” when applied to mandated assets? What is the appropriate test for “UK investment”, or even “qualifying assets”? Can the Minister say what these tests are and when they are likely to be available to Parliament for examination? There are other significant concerns with mandation. For example, it may produce lower returns and higher costs if it drives crowded trades, pushing schemes into lower-quality or overpriced assets simply to hit targets. As the large DC providers have noted, if there are not enough good-quality opportunities in the mandated classes, schemes may be forced into illiquid or sub-optimal funds. This concern has been made clear as a condition of voluntary participation in the Mansion House Accord. Then there may be a risk in reducing diversification. Concentrating pension assets in restricted geography or restricted asset classes inevitably increases vulnerability to UK-specific economic shocks.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am sorry I did not namecheck the noble Viscount in responding to the second point. I intended to respond by pointing to the safeguards and the guardrails that have been built in. That was the nature of the response to that.

In response to the first question, I thought I said that the Government accept that this is not the only issue and that we are addressing the other ways. We have been looking at the other barriers and investment opportunities. We also mentioned that the FCA has looked at examples. It is not the only thing; we are looking at the other things as well. We think there is already significant progress, but we think this reserve power is a way of ensuring that progress goes forward and not backwards on this issue.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I will be brief. There is a lot that could be said, but we will have other opportunities later on in this Bill.

This should have been a happy Bill, doing good for ordinary workers and building the economy, looking after the future in two interconnected ways. For the main part, we had cross-party policy consensus and continuity. We had public and industry support, which is just what you need for issues such as pensions and long-term investment, aided by significant and consensual regulatory changes—culminating this week—that should enhance diversity, choice and transparency in investment decisions.

However, at the heart, we got this devil’s clause. The Government have not given development a chance and such a reserve power is a massive intervention. It is a clause that, where there was unity, brings division; where there was trust, brings doubt; where there was confidence, brings concern; and where there was hope, brings despair. No wonder noble Lords oppose it. It ticks every bad box. I urge the Government to think again. They have not given policy and process any due regard and therefore I am sure that many of us will return to this on Report. But, for now, I will withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 90 withdrawn

Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Willetts (Con)]

I am not against such payments. As I say, I think this is highly discretionary—there would be a negotiation. I absolutely understand that argument, and we have all received letters from the people suffering financial distress in some circumstances because of not having pre-1997 inflation protection. But I just want to bring in another consideration and try to find out where it would fit in when the employers or the trustees are reaching a decision.

The Government have a policy, or rather we now have on a cross-party basis, a successful policy of auto-enrolment. The levels of pension contribution to the next generation, who are not in these schemes, are way lower than the pension contributions that have generated these large surpluses. It would be great if we could see increasing contributions. Where might a decision fall if an employer says, “We have now turned our scheme into surplus because of the work of the company, and one thing we could do with the money is to put some enhanced contribution into the auto-enrolment pensions of the next range of employees, whose pension rights at the moment will be far lower than those of the people covered in this debate”?

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I am quite pleased to follow the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, because I feel that we are fishing slightly in the same pond. I added my name to the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and I support doing something for the pre-1997 people. When you look at something as long-term as pensions and you have different cohorts coming in, moving along and coming out, you have to somehow get into cohort fairness. You will always have the circumstance that people have paid into something and then they get something out when there is something else in the pot. We will come to this even more so when we start to deal with private assets, so I shall not go on at length here, because I will go on at length there. I am in the same camp as the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, in thinking that you do not say that it is clean cut and these people are in and those people are out—you have to look at fairness more broadly across the piece.

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I first became a pension fund trustee in 1997. The trustees at the time knew that there was a turning point, and it was probably just as well to get someone who might be alive 30 years later at least tutored in the principles of pensions at that moment—so it was clearly a moment in time. How right they were, because 30 years later, here I am.

I recall that it was a difficult moment for the scheme of which I was a member, and the private company for which I worked. Since the Barber reviews of 1991, with regard to the benefits payable in the final salary scheme, which was still open, it was the will of the directors that at all costs the final salary scheme should remain open and open to new accruals. Progressively, the benefits were diluted from RPI to RPI capped at 5% to RPI capped at 2.5%. Every step was taken and every sinew strained to keep that scheme open. But in 2003, the actuary reported that, on a scheme with assets of just £5 million, £4 million extra had to be tipped in; that was a sucker punch, and the scheme was inevitably at that stage closed to new members.

It turns out that the assumptions that were made, with the benefit of hindsight, were overly prudent. The deficit was exaggerated. But notwithstanding having put more than £4.41 million—that is the number that sits in my mind—into the scheme, three years later there was another £2.6 million to find as well. My goodness, the company could have made much better use of that capital to grow the business, rather than to fill a hole that history tells us was not there to the extent that it appeared.

We are in a situation where our scheme, which we kept open as long as we could, could not stand it any longer when we got to 2003. There was another turning point in 2006, in “A-day”, but I shall park that to one side. All that money was tipped in—and the suggestion that all the money that has gone into the scheme is some sort of pot to be shared now down the line, equally or in some proportion with the members as well as the company, is a false premise. Without the commitment of these private companies in those darkest days, the schemes would have closed much earlier and members would not have participated for those extra increments that they did.

I listened carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, who asked what happens for all those people in the pre-1997 schemes. Well, here is the GMP rub. Astonishingly, I received a payment in the past six months, wholly unexpectedly, from my pre-1997 accrual, for the guaranteed minimum pension. So the suggestion that members are not sharing in any of the benefits of the pre-1997 scheme is a further false premise.

I am no longer a trustee of the scheme, but I know the trustees. The professional and actuarial costs associated with calculating these GMPs have been quite extraordinary. In fact, it would be much better for the trustees to have just made an offer, forget the GMP, and everybody would have been much better off.

The GMP issue illustrates the folly of going down the path that this amendment would lead us. All it is going to do is drive trustees into having more expensive calculations, actuarial adjustments, assessments and consultations, whereas, for the most part, the trustees are minded to make some sort of apportionment and that apportionment needs to be balanced, individual for the scheme in its own circumstances, based on how much excess money was tipped into the scheme for all those years in the post-1997 world. It is about having some sort of fair assessment, a fair apportionment. For the most part, the trustees of private schemes have the benefits and the interests of the members completely at heart and I do not see any circumstance when that does not happen.

This amendment is unnecessary for two reasons. On the one hand, trustees take these things into account. Secondly, that money is truthfully the employers’ money because they went above and beyond, listening in good faith to the professionals, the actuaries and everybody else who had put their oar in on the overly prudent basis, as it now turns out, to make good deficits that were not actually there. I say to noble Lords that for all the pounds that were put in post-1997, when other things happened in the macroeconomy and the Budget—which I will not detain noble Lords with—this country’s pension schemes could have been in a significantly stronger position than they are now had the trustees carried on as they were and not listened to some of the siren voices in government and the so-called professional advisers.

Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I apologise that I, too, missed Second Reading, for reasons outside my control. When you are in a party with two or three Members, it is very difficult to spread yourself in all directions. I have an interest in this area going back to when I was a trustee of the National Assembly’s pension scheme some years ago and, before that, I had involvement as financial controller of the Hoover Company and with Mars Ltd, which is one of the foremost companies in these islands.

I want to flag up one point as we look at the generalities in this comprehensive umbrella amendment—the position of employees such as those of Allied Steel and Wire in Cardiff in 2002, who found themselves on their backs without adequate safeguards for the pensions that they had. Over the almost quarter of a century since, those still surviving did not get justice out of the system. Whatever balance we have to strike in terms of risk—which is inevitably part of the equation—benefits, security and the longer term against the shorter term, we must also have some safety nets for those who fall through, through no fault of their own, as did the employees of Allied Steel and Wire.

I commend the Government for the steps they have taken for the coal miners, who have been in a difficult position, but if the coal miners were justified so are the workers at Allied Steel and Wire. I draw to the Government’s attention that the First Minister of Wales, the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, spoke about this last month and called on them to take action to recompense those who have lost out so badly.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I no longer have any financial interests to declare, having retired from the board of the London Stock Exchange at the end of 2025 after a long tenure, although that indicates that I have some history in that regard. I also have a history of policy engagement with local authority pension funds, the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum and IPO test marketing with various local authority pension funds. That is for background, so that people can understand some of where I have obtained my information.

I added my name to this amendment because I thought it was a good idea to have a list of purposes. We have before us a very long list of regulatory empowerments and, in some places, to do with value for money, I put a little list on the front of them. Somewhere or other, whether in this proposed list at the front, listed throughout or as a mixture of both, it would help us with structure and understanding. We ought to make our Acts of Parliament as readable as possible for the non-specialist. It is also quite important in that regard. It may not be a perfect list; you could ask for “more” instead of “greater” or take the “-er” off the end of words and make it look like it is not criticising. I do not want to go into that, but I did not take it as a criticism. I thought it was a list of what we are trying to do to make things better and, on that basis, I support it.

I would be very pleased if we could all work together to build a list that we were all happy with and that reflected a true convergence of minds. During the passage of the previous Pension Schemes Act, there was an awful lot of working together to try to find the right wording. The Minister was on this side then, and we went through it together with many of the other people in this Room. We should be getting something good up front that tells everybody what it is about, not using it as a way to tie the Government’s hands. I do not look at it like that; I look at it as something that is explanatory. But if it helps in the interpretation, so be it.

If we cannot produce a list like that, I have reservations about whether one should go forward and jump straight into a list. If you do not want it here, you have to put one in every clause, so maybe it is better to try to do a shorter one here. Those are the reasons why I support the amendment. I support the principle of it, and I am more than happy to work at trying to make it something that everybody could sign up to.

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I appreciate that I have spoken for some time on this group, but in a Bill as technical as this, it is important to set out the rationale behind the questions that I am asking. I thank the Ministers in advance for their responses. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I share some of the concerns that have been expressed. I added my name to Amendment 6, and I could have added it to Amendment 5 as well. Before I go further, as it is an early part of discussing this Bill, I should say that I am a great supporter of the notion that there should be investment in productive assets that support the UK economy. Although I am not that heavy on mandation, if anything I lean in that direction quite a lot. It is obviously done through advisers, and maybe that is one reason for being concerned about advisers—perhaps they have pushed it too much the other way in times past. Noble Lords can take it as background that I am very supportive.

I am concerned about too much forcing of particular kinds of investment, and restricting the routes to those investments or the resistance of the opportunity if the trustees think that it is not the right thing to do. That is why I have some support for Amendments 5 and 6, because I think they may go too far. One of the good things about Clause 2(3) and (4) is that they are optional. However, it still hints at a lot of things that could be done.

I am concerned about any kind of dictation on which advisers can be used, because they have been very powerful. If there is any control over which advisers are used, that is another way of controlling the fund. Given the obligations of trustees to consult advisers, and the liabilities attached to that, they have to remain independent. That is the direction that I am coming from; therefore, I do not want the Bill to give powers that could go too far. That is why I added my name to Amendment 6, and why I have some sort of regard for the content of Amendment 5 around the investment opportunities.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

This group is about asset pools in the Local Government Pension Scheme. I had not intended to intervene on this group, but I want to comment on the remarks made by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, in introducing this group of amendments on the Local Government Pension Scheme. I am relatively agnostic about asset pools. I am not sure that I am totally convinced by the Government’s line that big is necessarily beautiful, but I am open to that debate.

In introducing this group, the noble Viscount set it in the context of a large group of amendments introduced on much wider issues around the Local Government Pension Scheme than were originally expected—it was really just about investment in the Local Government Pension Scheme—and at a very late stage. It makes no difference to me personally, but fundamental questioning of the structure, running and management of the Local Government Pension Scheme was introduced at such short notice; we found about it only on Thursday or Friday. I can live with that, but I think that it was a little unfair to the people working in and running the scheme suddenly to produce this level of uncertainty. That was unwise. When you want to discuss these things, you start talking to the people involved first, but it is my understanding that it came out of the blue and everyone was totally surprised. Obviously, the issue was always there for discussion, so the fact that it has come up is not a surprise, but doing things at this moment and in this way was unfortunate and is causing problems for those trying to provide the pensions.

I believe that the fundamental premise introduced by the noble Viscount is wrong. The Local Government Pension Scheme is a notable success. Rather than setting up inquiries to discover what went wrong, we should be inquiring about what it got right, because it provides good pensions for a large number of people providing essential services. The average pension in the Local Government Pension Scheme is £5,000; that is because the scheme provides pensions mainly for people on low pay. It provides good pensions for people—often, for women with part-time jobs. It does so in a way whereby, in the forthcoming valuations—as I will expand on and discuss at greater length when we get on to the eighth group of amendments, because that is where the substantive discussion will take place—it faces a better record than private sector occupational pension schemes. We should be looking at its success and not, as the noble Viscount argued, the difficulties and failures.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I am sorry; I probably misunderstood the direction of the noble Baroness’s questions. I had better write to her to set that out. I think it is fair to say that—this might help a little—in contrast to external advisers, because asset pools are solely owned by old GPS administering authorities, they exist to provide services of their interests and they do not stand to gain financially, even from partner funds taking their advice or providing poor-quality advice. I am not entirely sure that that gets at her question, but the point is that we do not feel that there will be that impact from limiting sources of advice. I will write to her to provide more detail on that point.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I got a bit lost in the explanation, because the Minister also mentioned internal advisers. In replying, will he lay out where he thinks the advice is and what that power is doing? If it is providing a sort of override, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, suggested, to a particular type of adviser, as I was trying to suggest it might, then that is unacceptable. Perhaps if the Minister just lays out exactly what is there, that might clarify it. I hope that he will tell us that he will not override anything.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

That is very helpful. When I write to the noble Baroness, I will certainly make sure that we address the point around independent advisers. I appreciate the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asking for that kind of clarification, so my written remarks will address that point.

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I ask my noble friend the Minister: are the Government confident that, without specific references to social housing in the Bill, pension schemes will have the confidence that this investment sits appropriately with their fiduciary responsibilities? Do the Government consider that they have the necessary statutory remit to put policy and regulatory enablers in place to allow investment at scale in affordable and social housing by the LGPS and others? Will they ensure that the opportunity offered by the Bill to ensure that this happens is not lost?

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 12 in this group. I hate to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but he will have to wait a while before we get to Amendment 10.

As I mentioned earlier, a few years ago I had engagement with local authority pension funds concerning investment opportunities that could be tailored to their own areas. I discovered that they did not want it only in their own areas. They wanted to look at wider areas that included nearby local authorities, in some instances, as well as those further away where the economic responses to recession had fared better. There were some that wished that they had not just invested in some shopping centres in their own area but also in some in London and the south-east that had not lost so much money. That is not what I was trying to involve them in at the time, but these were the examples that came to me.

Those that were in more rural areas wanted some action from the cities. They viewed local investment through a broader lens of meaning things that help localities generally. They wanted to invest in local-sized infrastructure, but not necessarily only in their own areas—especially where some of these things could serve their areas from the outside. There is an example of waste management in Milton Keynes that goes beyond its area. Another example is that of a local waste management facility that recycles all the waste from kitchens. Normally, because there is quite a lot of toxic stuff in it, that waste will go to landfill, but this facility deals with all the nasties and converts it into energy. That facility is not just of interest to the local authority area in which it sits but to other ones too.

There is no suggestion that I wish to compel this in any way; I just want to draw attention to the fact that my personal experience brought this, which I was quite surprised about at the time. There was a focus on saying, “Do good in your own area”, but there was also a desire for the diversity to do good in other areas as well. Maybe you need it under a separate heading, but I just thought I would table this amendment to draw attention to this point and to make sure that, when it comes to regulations, maybe it is in the mind of the Minister and others that there should be some wriggle room around what is defined as local.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I added my name to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and I endorse his remarks. There is a clear need for social housing and I would be grateful if the Minister could explain to the Committee the impact of asset pooling and whether it perhaps interferes with funds from local authority pension schemes being invested in social housing.

There is a clear need across the country for improvements in the housing stock. Local areas can know what the need for build-to-rent might be or the need for social housing that is disability friendly or friendly for an ageing population. These areas are not necessarily the focus of some of the private sector housebuilders. Using this resource to improve the lives of local residents—perhaps it would improve the futures of pension scheme members themselves—as well as areas around the country, would be important and I would be grateful to hear the Minister’s views.

I also support Amendment 12, which was so well introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. It is essential that the resources in both local and national pension schemes are invested to benefit local and national growth. The diversification benefits of investing in areas much wider than just the local area are clear in terms of using pension fund assets to boost long-term growth, which is an aim the Government rightly have.

I know the Government want to use pension fund assets to benefit Britain, and it seems that local authority pension schemes offer an ideal opportunity for that. If these asset pools can invest more broadly than just the local area, and local authority pension schemes are encouraged to have a diversification spread across the country, I hope that would be a significant improvement and a tangible benefit from the funding that goes into these schemes and from the strong position they have built.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

10: Clause 2, page 4, line 24, at end insert—
“(4A) An investment strategy under subsection (3)(b) may not specify preferences between comparable or competing investment vehicles.”

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 10 says simply:

“An investment strategy under subsection (3)(b) may not specify preferences between comparable or competing investment vehicles”.


This concerns the same part of the Bill that we were discussing in the previous group. In other words, if the Government are taking powers over what assets pension schemes may hold, even if that is a reserve power, those powers must not discriminate between comparable routes to access those assets.

It is a defensive amendment. Why do I need to table such a basic safeguard? It is because, later in the Bill, in new Section 28C of FSMA, the Government do discriminate for DC default funds. It excludes listed investment companies even when they can hold exactly the same underlying assets as the favoured long-term asset fund, the LTAF wrapper. That is how creeping cartels begin. Who is to say such direction will not next be targeted at a local authority pension fund, many of which have historically favoured listed investment companies as ideal for local infrastructure investment?

The Minister’s letter, which arrived on Friday, explains how the Government are now creeping the cartel onwards. The letter puts this front and centre. The Minister confirms that the exclusion of listed investment companies is deliberate and that the purpose of these powers is to

“support the Mansion House Accord”.

We have already been alerted to the competition law risks around the Mansion House Accord. An article by competition lawyer Matthew Hall in the Times last May warned that the accord risked co-ordinated investment intentions that could raise competition law concerns, and that government encouragement does not create a legal exemption. Those comments came before we learned about exclusions. Government legislation—which would mean regulations, not just the framework of this Bill—could override competition law, but only with a clear public interest justification and far more scrutiny than cosy discussions behind closed doors.

Let us look at the public record. In public, the accord—from the ABI, the City of London and the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association—refers simply to

“allocating at least 10% to private markets … and within that, at least 5% … to UK private markets”.

At the bottom, it defines UK private markets as being

“where the underlying assets are based in the UK”.

Thus, it is not looking at the wrapper they sit in; it does not exclude listed investment companies; and it does not require the use of LTAFs. It explicitly acknowledges looking through to the underlying assets.

In the Bill, that has been transposed to an exemplary asset list and a definition that deliberately excludes listed securities, and for that to cover listed investment companies, despite the fact that they are slightly different as they have exemptions for growth markets. Rhetoric has followed that anything listed is excluded. If the accord does not say it and no consultation or public document has said it, but according to the Minister it is being done in the name of the accord, something has happened in private—what and with whom?

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Altmann, for this amendment. I agree with them that funds in the LGPS should not be specifying preferences between similar investment vehicles in their investment strategies. I fear that the rest of my response may well disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and—though perhaps not to such a great extent—the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. I say in passing to the Committee that it is always good to hear consensus breaking out, even if it rather gets to the horseshoe theory of politics when it is my noble friend Lord Davies and the noble Lord, Lord Fuller. But let us try to end today’s Committee session on a positive note.

I will now go into the detail. Under our reforms, decisions on implementation of strategies, including selection of appropriate vehicles and managers, will be made by the LGPS pools, which will have the capacity and expertise to deliver the benefits of scale that we have discussed. It is the Government’s view that the draft regulations are already clear in that respect. This will be supported by guidance, setting out that investment manager selection is solely the responsibility of the pool. LGPS pools will make the decision on whether to invest through external managers and which managers to use, and there is nothing whatever to prevent them using investment trusts should they consider it beneficial.

This is where the space for disappointment potentially arises. I am aware of the concerns expressed in relation to the treatment of listed investment funds, notably investment companies and trusts, under the reserve asset allocation powers, which are relevant to DC pension schemes. That was set out very powerfully by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. The Committee will have the chance to debate these concerns when we reach Clause 40 and discuss Chapter 3, which deals with asset allocation for DC schemes.

To get to the heart of it, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, asked about the impact on the LGPS. To give reassurance, we are not excluding closed-ended investment funds from the LGPS. I can be absolutely clear that that is the case. We are not excluding them, and neither will local authorities be directed to exclude them. I hope that provides clarity as we discuss the LGPS elements of the Bill.

Having said that, we have had comments around investment and asset types, particularly from my noble friend Lord Davies, as well as others, on this group of amendments. We will take what has been said and consider it in time for the debate on this issue when we get to it in greater detail. In anticipation of that day—which we are all looking forward to, particularly at two minutes to Committee rising—I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I will be as brief as I can. I thank all those who have spoken in the debate, particularly for the support that I have received. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, is to some extent correct in that this is a proxy for what comes later, but I wanted to give the Committee that reflection time over competition law issues, because it is not necessary: exactly the same will happen without defaming listed investment companies and doing them down. The channels of how the investments are going to go will be the same. But the Minister has still not answered the question. Who asked for the exclusion? It is not in the accord. We have been told that it is in the accord but, as I have explained, the wording gives the opposite direction.

We have been told by Ministers that it is the pension funds, or anybody except the Government. It is somebody’s fault that it is there. I regret that I think it is deliberate rather than accidental but never mind that as long as it goes because it is not necessary to defend what the Government want to defend. That would be fine by me. It is relevant to local government funds because they invest so much that way. Therefore, it was a genuine concern that a reserved power could begin to replicate the reserved power in new Section 28C. It was not a totally bogus proxy, if I could put it that way. I have elaborated the point; as I have said I can do much more yet. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 10 withdrawn.

Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 18th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as a director of the London Stock Exchange and of Valloop Holdings Ltd. I also have experience engaging with local authorities and their pension funds, in relation to both funding proposals and policy. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park—she is no longer in her seat—on her excellent maiden speech. I welcome her to this House and look forward to her future contributions.

Like other noble Lords, I welcome much of this Bill, and my reflections are directed at what is missing or where small but significant adjustments could deliver real benefits for scheme members. I shall give some examples. When engaging with local authority fund managers on social impact investing, I found that while they valued local options, they also wanted diversity through investing in similar localised assets but beyond their immediate region. An amendment to reflect that flexibility, perhaps in Clause 2, concerning local and localised investments, may be worth considering.

On scale tests and value for money, should there not be some kind of linkage? Presently, some of the best performers in the DC market have assets under £10 billion. If such schemes deliver outstanding benefit for members, as demonstrated in value for money assessments, should they not be allowed to continue? Other issues in this space include whether the definition of “hybrid” is wide enough and whether the focus on forward looking metrics risks dismissing past performance, which surely still has relevance.

I also hope that some solution can be found for the many schemes in the charity and social housing sector that are disallowed from using retrospective confirmation measures due to an ongoing legal review. Concerns also remain about the PPF’s recent pre 1997 increases in the wind up trigger for DB superfunds, which create issues for funding levels and viability. Additionally, gateway test 1—that if a scheme is funded to buyout level it cannot enter a superfund—seems to prevent schemes augmenting member benefits via a superfund. Is that fair?

I turn to trustees’ fiduciary duty. It is undeniable that the Government have opened a Pandora’s box by taking the power of mandation, even if it is intended as a reserve power. I happen to think it is about time Pandora’s box was opened, emptied and hope allowed to get out, at least on interpretation of fiduciary duty. However, it is essential that this be done in primary legislation. Regulatory guidance or an SI is not enough. We are already seeing banks stung for compensation on car loans when lenders followed flawed guidance from the FCA.

Systemic issues such as the resilience of the UK economy and ESG are not abstract considerations; they directly affect pension scheme members’ long term retirement outcomes. Climate breakdown, financial crises and economic instability all influence the value of investments, the type of investments that need to be made in future and the returns available to members over time. They also determine how far pensions will stretch when drawn. These factors should already be integral to fiduciary considerations, requiring trustees to balance risk mitigation with support for long term stability. Yet trustees remain concerned about how to demonstrate alignment with member outcomes, even though investment results of any kind can never be guaranteed. Clarifying in this Bill that systemic factors are legitimate concerns would help.

At the same time, by naming and favouring certain vehicles, the Bill risks going too far and putting trustees in jeopardy. It could cause herding, market distortions and valuation bubbles and discriminate between comparable structures while failing to provide a safe harbour for trustees regarding financial benefit. The only way to achieve definite financial benefit would be through tax penalties for failing to meet mandated allocations, a possibility noted by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann.

We have already seen the dangers of herding in both DB and DC schemes, driven by regulatory and advisory consensus. Advice focused on global indices, coupled with regulatory encouragement, led to a retreat from UK equities, an overreliance on gilts and the use of nested leverage through repo borrowing, culminating in the LDI crisis. The only accepted defence that trustees have is that they take advice, but it is from unregulated advisers. While many are excellent, some were noticeably reticent when this House’s Industry and Regulators Committee investigated LDI. We found it striking that such influential advice was not regulated, unlike advice to individuals. This should be addressed, perhaps by making it a designated activity under FSMA.

I turn now to the discrimination against listing. The Government mandate investment into private assets but exclude that investment from being via listed entities, despite their ability to provide superior liquidity. Not all listed entities operate in the same way, and I am going to have to explain that later. It is openly acknowledged that the Mansion House provisions reflected in this Bill are tailored to LTAFs, the new long-term asset funds, which are themselves a variation on the EU’s LTIFs—the long-term investment funds developed during my time as chair of the EU’s ECON Committee. At that time, the UK rejected implementing LTIFs, with the Treasury assuring me that we did not need them because we had listed investment funds, also known as investment companies and trusts, which were better. Yet, under this Bill, they are explicitly excluded, even when investing in the prescribed assets, as the alt sector does.

This exclusion is extraordinary. Before the mistaken, and now nearly corrected, regulatory cost disclosure and cost cap debacle, listed investment funds were favoured by local authority pension funds precisely because they financed local UK infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and renewables, and provided venture capital to growth companies. Those local authority pension funds were major investors at IPO and follow on stages, often for the local infrastructure they were subscribing to. Many retail investors hold listed investment funds in their portfolios for similar reasons.

I have recently been told that somewhere in the Treasury there is a belief that listing and then trading shares is not new money. Interestingly, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, whom I very much respect and often find myself in common cause with, also made that point. That is not the proper story if you are looking at a listed investment fund. Listing is what keeps the underlying investment funding in place so that it is not sold out for redemptions, as happens with open ended funds like LTAFs. In fact, the way in which money is raised and then put into investments is a similar procedure to that of an LTAF or any other open-ended fund. The only difference is a clever trick: instead of having to sell off the investments if somebody wants to get liquidity and withdraw their shares, the shares can be traded on the market and there is no damage to the underlying investment. That does not seem to have been recognised in the provisions in the Bill.

It is interesting that even some LTAF providers have contemplated investing in listed investment companies because they want the liquidity, and that will enable them to stay listed in productive assets for longer while still having the safety of being able to trade and get their money if they need more money for paying pensions, so why discriminate against them? The fact is they are complementary investments. They are often going to be smaller and local-sized, as opposed to massive. They can be used in combination with LTAFs and it is very foolish and stupid thing to exclude them. I will certainly be tabling an amendment to try to adjust that.

Overall, it is about time that the Government’s discrimination and denigration of listed investment companies end. I say “denigration” because there is damage done to these companies by this wording in the Bill. How many times has this House talked about having to improve the state of our stock exchange, both for listed companies of the operating variety and for listed funds? What do we do at every turn? The Government and the Treasury do not understand and, here, seem to be undoing a lot of the good work they have tried to do in all the listing reviews.

The Bill contains important reforms, but it must not undermine fiduciary duty, encourage herding or exclude proven vehicles that deliver value. With constructive amendments, we can ensure that it strengthens pensions while saving members’ long term outcomes and delivering for the UK economy.

Jobs Market: Wider Economic Implications

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Thursday 18th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I welcome a particularly fine question from my noble friend. I could almost have said that myself; in fact, maybe I will. He makes a really important point. We need to have support in the investment of skills for young people: skills for today and for tomorrow. Simply putting them on to some kind of make-job scheme does not work. We actually need to invest in them, so my noble friend is quite right. At the Budget, we announced £820 million of investment into the youth guarantee to support young people to earn or learn, but there was another £725 million for the growth and skills levy. We are trying to invest in young people so that they will find ways of getting the skills and be inspired to get out there and make a difference.

We also need to understand those who are not engaging. Alan Milburn issued a call for evidence this week. He is asking two questions: what is stopping more young people participating in employment, education or training, and what would make the biggest difference to support more young people to participate? We want to hear from anyone with knowledge, expertise or lived experience, so I urge noble Lords, with all their connections: let us all together try to get the answer to one of the most pressing questions facing our country.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, the Bank of England has canvassed for resignations to cut jobs to save £45 million and use more AI, and many other jobs continue to be lost to AI. What strategy have the Government got to ensure that their AI and tech procurements support British jobs? If mandating is okay for pension fund investments, where is it for government?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I think I might save the pension fund for the extensive debate we will have later, which is my Christmas present from the Chief Whip. That is all I can conclude. The noble Baroness makes a very important point. One of the things that the Government as a whole are doing is looking across the piece. The truth is that it is still quite early days in working out what, in the medium to long term, will be the impact of AI on the economy. There is evidence that jobs may be displaced in some sectors while in others jobs are created. While we are understanding the full impact, the challenge for us is to make sure we equip people with the skills that enable them to compete in the markets that are to come. There is a lot of work going on in my department, but also in DSIT and across government, to monitor this and develop strategies. In particular, there is work on investing in homegrown tech companies to make sure that we have the opportunities here in which we can invest and our young people can work.

Pensions Dashboards Regulations 2022

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2022 Lords Chamber

With what I hope are those helpful remarks, I very much welcome the introduction of the dashboard.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I was not expecting to have to do the dashboards but, as the Minister will know, I intervened during the passage of the Pension Schemes Act. I was there for the money and finance bits and discovered that I had a bit of a love/hate relationship with the dashboard. At first sight I love the idea, but then—as has been relatively eloquently explained, and I will not delve further—there are all kinds of problems, ranging from operational ones to the ones that interested me most. I think I am in exactly the same space here as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, as usual. What happens if it becomes a platform for advertising?

A good starting point is to look at paragraph 14 on page 9 of the impact assessment, which is about the rationale for the intervention and the pensions dashboard. It quite clearly mentions

“potential benefits/efficiency gains to pension providers if consumers are encouraged to keep track of their pensions, save more, potentially consolidate pots, and shop around for decumulation products”,

but those are benefits to the providers, as it says there. We need to be very clear: we want to make sure that the benefits to the providers do not leave out benefits to those with pensions.

Talking about consolidation, I understand that if there are a lot of really small pots, there is probably something to be said for sweeping those together. But having been self-employed for my entire working life, when I set up my own pension schemes I wanted a bit of diversity. I had several because I did not like the notion that one of the funds might go bust and I would be in trouble—if I had loaded it all into Equitable Life or something. Much to my disappointment, they all got consolidated into Aviva through the consolidation of the industry. Actually, that is not quite true; I still have some others. I carefully selected a completely different batch for my husband, but they also ended up all in Aviva.

Some diversity is a very good thing, because you get performance differences. You might want to phase how you take your retirement and it might prove to be more flexible. So the notion that you should force everybody to have one pot is bad news, to my mind, because you are cutting out diversity and the opportunity that that brings.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I latch on to the comments made by the Minister about commercial exploitation. That is a very important point. These pensions dashboards will not be cheap to make. If you do one, with all the wonderful data there, you will be very tempted to exploit it in some way; yet we do not have the information in front of us because that kind of thing comes presumably through the FCA route. I apologise that my information is not as full as it should be, as I too was unable to go to the meeting that was arranged. As there are several regulators involved and several parts of this puzzle to be brought together, it would be nice to have that bigger overview instead of having it in bite-sized chunks where you cannot fully see how they inter-fit.

Most of my other points have already been raised by others and I will not go back to them. However, I was slightly curious about delegated access. Again, it was indicated that, essentially, a financial adviser could have the delegated access. When I speak to a financial adviser, I do not necessarily want them to know what I have got everywhere. Again, as I have several different pots, I can get advice about one pot and not another. Assuming that everybody should have the full view is perhaps not the way to go. I do not know whether it would be possible, but it would be good if you could somehow choose which part is visible to somebody and which is not. I would like to have seen that, but it might be rather difficult.

I also wonder what the provisions will be for others, such as family members who may become involved in trying to help some of their older people sort out their pensions. Some people want that, some do not. They will not be regulated. Will they have to have some kind of formal or legally signed document to be able to take that position? Obviously, they can be sitting at your shoulder when you access, but there will be people who are incapacitated. How will their dashboard be accessed and what will be the safeguards?

I think just about everything else has been mentioned. I will just say that I agree with a lot of the questions. In general, I accept that we need this statutory instrument because it paves the way for everything else to come, but it would have been quite nice to see more of the parallel tracks coming to the same discussion. We will have a statutory instrument or something from the FCA, which will be separate from this. It would have been nice to have them as a package, perhaps debated together, so that we could cross-compare for whether there are gaps, how the different responsibilities will be bridged and how the information will be shared. All these things are yet to come.

[Lord Jones (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her introduction—a heroic introduction in the circumstances—and for the department’s lengthy Explanatory Memorandum. The department is clearly trying to help and has put in a lot of hard work to try to throw more light on a complicated subject. My noble friend Lady Sherlock is always up to the mark on complexity, and there is plenty of complexity in these regulations. The pensions paper is 41 pages long, which is not a criticism by any means. Surely these dashboards are positive, helpful and welcome.

Automatic Enrolment (Earnings Trigger and Qualifying Earnings Band) Order 2021

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Thursday 25th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument. The content is in many ways predictable and, I fear, my comments may be too. Having established the precedent for the qualifying earnings band to align with national insurance contributions lower and upper earnings it is no surprise to see that alignment is retained, and I see the obvious benefit of the simplicity that creates in adjustments for PAYE. It is also no surprise that the automatic enrolment trigger remains at £10,000.

The effect of that over time, as pay and everything else rises, progressively brings more people into pension savings in real terms. Although it seems one reasonable way to do that, I am afeared for the reasons that were just outlined by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, with regard to how to get more women saving for pensions. Just relying on, if you like, the indexation effect to mean that £10,000 effectively becomes less does not give sufficient acceleration. I would be pleased to hear more about what might happen in the mid-2020s, because it seems that it will be difficult if it is done in a big jump. But if it is done in incremental stages, we might be here in the 2030s with many people still losing out.

It is a great pity that there is an enlarging gap between that £10,000 and the income tax threshold, and that more people are at risk of being put into the unsuitable and somewhat misnamed net pay enrolment scheme, where they are not getting tax relief. The Government are aware of that problem and the call for evidence on pensions tax relief administration closed on 13 October. Can the Minister enlighten us about whether there have been any conclusions on how to stop the lowest paid being diddled out of a significant chunk of their pension contribution and eventual pension because of the administrative choices of their employers? Are there going to be checks on employers when they choose their system, to see how many employees they might have who would fall into that trap, or are we even going to get a nice surprise in the Budget: that HMRC will make it right? It is not beyond its power to do so.

That probably concludes the things that I have to say, except for one thought. Is it possible to find more ways to encourage those who are near the £10,000 threshold and then fall below it—so that they get unenrolled, then re-enrolled when they go above it—just to stay in, given the benefits of doing so? That is a way in which we can make sure that more people stay in and get their pension. It is also a matter of some urgency to address the age limit at which we encourage people to start saving. I do not see much of a reason for delaying that.

I apologise for my ignorance here, but can the Minister enlighten me about what interaction there is between how benefit assessments are made and pension payments? Is there any account or effect there? I feel I ought to know, but I am afraid I do not.

Social Security Benefits Up-rating Order 2021

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Wednesday 10th February 2021 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

I thank the Minister for her introduction and for the letter circulated previously. As far as I can tell, as a non-specialist, the increases are either as required in statute or as promised, with additional discretionary increases that can apply for one year only. That leaves me slightly confused as to what happens after that one year. Perhaps the Minister could explain, as I have not been part of the teams and meetings with her.

Broadly, I do not quarrel with the SIs. Where there are issues, it is with the underlying structures that, notably through the triple lock, reward at a higher rate than those benefits that apply to the harder up. I appreciate that the increase in the basic state pension in cash terms has been transposed over to pension credit but, given that there are other thresholds in play, are there pensioners who will lose out due to the increase in thresholds being less than the 1.9% cash increase?

Regarding the triple lock, can the Minister advise on where we are with the original catch-up idea, which came about because pensions had fallen behind earnings? We have had unexpectedly low earnings rises, and now again through Covid, and there has been low inflation. Originally it was projected that it would take until 2038 for the state pension to reach 26% of national earnings. Is there a new projected date by which that will be reached?

Once again, it is still unfair that the over-70s get the triple lock on only part of their pension and not the whole of it.

Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments & Ping Pong (Hansard) & Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 19th January 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

At end insert “, and do propose Amendment 4B in lieu of the words so left out of the Bill—

4B: Page 117, line 44, at end insert—
“( ) In exercising any powers to make regulations or otherwise to prescribe any matter or principle under Part 3 of the Pensions Act 2004 (scheme funding) as amended by Schedule 10, the objectives of the Secretary of State must include supporting the ability of the scheme trustees to decide the specific funding, investment risk management and diversification strategy that is appropriate for the long-term time horizon, liquidity and employer covenant of the scheme.””

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, we have come a long way since the probing discussions in Committee, when the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, first raised concern about whether there were steps afoot to cause de-risking of open DB schemes and the effect that that might have of shifting investment to gilts. I was among several noble Lords who agreed with that concern, and I followed up on Report with an amendment, kindly signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Vaux of Harrowden, which was passed.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

My Lords, I have not received any requests to speak after the Minister, so I now call the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, to reply.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am not normally a speaker on DWP matters—I am usually in the business and Treasury box—but, after a first foray on this Bill, or into this sweet shop, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, would put it, maybe I should come again.

I thank all those who have spoken in this debate. The issues have already been explained and the Minister in reply has given the reassurances that were sought. Before I formally withdraw the amendment, I thank the Minister for the way in which these proceedings have been conducted, for her geniality and openness and, similarly, thank the officials from the department and the Pensions Regulator, and everyone for tolerating me.

As has been said, the issues are complex and interlinked. I am grateful to hear the Minister say that the debate around this has been influential and has refined thinking. I acknowledge that some employers will abuse the system and, because of its complexity, I accept that the Government do not want to put words into the Bill that are hard to change and which might give rise to unintended consequences. Of course, I would have preferred to see a little something there, but I understand the reasoning. I accept that there will be good consultation around the regulations and that all of us are looking for the same results.

I thank again noble Lords who have spoken today and supported me in my previous endeavours and all those who gave their expertise in earlier stages of the Bill. I am pleased that we are joined by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, and think that we will benefit from his presence greatly in future. Others who have also assisted include my noble friend Lord Sharkey from these Benches, as well as the noble Baronesses, Lady Drake and Lady Young. I also thank the various pension schemes that have been generous with their time and information, so we were able to look at the sort of spread of assets and risks that they were talking about and did not come to this debate without a good basis of information; we knew that our arguments were supported.

It has been a good co-operative effort. I doubt that it is the end of the story, as there will be more consultations and things to watch. I hope and expect that the engagement with noble Lords by the Minister and the department and our co-operation with one another will continue. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion 4A withdrawn.