Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Baroness Brinton and Lord Moynihan of Chelsea

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful for all the contributions to this, as usual, heated debate about recording data. I will focus mainly on data in my response from these Benches.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for starting by quoting some data sources, but neither she nor the amendment acknowledges the existing police guidance about capturing demographic data and annual data requirement 153, all the work already being done by the National Police Chiefs’ Council to review these policies following the April 2025 Supreme Court judgment, and its desire to develop a national standard for recording protected characteristics. In November last year, an equality impact assessment for the Law Enforcement Data Service noted:

“There is no legal obligation on any person with a GRC to inform the police that they have changed their name or gender”.


It is vital that data collection by public bodies has a clearly defined purpose and scope, and that staff have the right training and guidance to deliver services that support and accommodate all service users.

In addition, the Home Office produces the annual data requirement, which sets out requests and requirements for data that police forces should collect and report to the Home Office. Some are mandatory, some are voluntary. Requirement 153, which I referred to earlier, is voluntary and details how forces should capture demographic data

“in a consistent way by aligning it to ONS census 2021”.

This sets out that data about sex

“should be recorded in line with information on … birth certificate or gender recognition certificate”.

At the moment, it is not clear how widely this has been adopted.

Since 1974, the police national computer has been the main database of criminal records and is used by front-line officers from all police forces in the UK to understand who they are interacting with. In 2016, the Home Office established the national law enforcement data programme to replace the PNC and PND with the Law Enforcement Data Service or LEDS—sorry, another acronym. That will replace the existing PNC capability across all police forces this coming March.

The equality impact assessment for LEDS was published in November 2025 and considered how the programme would impact on those with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment. The EIA states:

“There is no legal obligation on any person with a GRC to inform the police that they have changed their name or gender. Where a person does wish this to be acknowledged then LEDS user can add an Information Marker”.


The EIA notes that the NPCC is undertaking a policy review following the April 2025 Supreme Court judgment, which

“aims to strike a balance that is both lawful and respectful of all individuals involved”—

that is a quote from the judgment—and that

“LEDS is being built to configure new policies as they take effect”.

The EIA also notes that a working group on national protected characteristics data recording standards was established by the Diversity, Equality and Inclusion Coordination Committee and the NPCC diversity, equality and inclusion lead. It is important to note, as has been mentioned by others, that the Supreme Court judgment in the case of For Women Scotland v the Scottish Ministers considered the definition of “woman” only for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010.

In addition to that, I have found an FoI dated May 2025 and the ONS response on a question about the collection of data. It gives a somewhat detailed response to about 10 different questions on how many people who have undertaken gender reassignment have been convicted of certain offences or groups of offences. Under the category of collection of data for gender identity, which is different from the sex registered at birth category, it says:

“We have to be robust enough to provide reliable estimates”.


It cannot provide reliable estimates. Why? Because the numbers are so low. As I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, knows, as she has been quoting data quite a bit, if you cannot rely on the data because it is low compared with the millions of women across the country, it becomes a problem to be able to include it. Why? Because the data will not show, or, if it is pulled out separately, individuals will become identifiable to the public. That is the fundamental problem.

So, I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment. The National Police Chiefs’ Council is already undertaking work to review policies in light of the Supreme Court judgment. The Supreme Court judgment was limited in considering the meaning of “sex” for the purposes of the Equality Act, not for wider legislation or policy. Frankly, it is unclear how this amendment would be practically workable; front-line police forces would be asked to challenge information provided about an individual’s sex. It is also unclear how the amendment would be consistent with data protection legislation, the Gender Recognition Act, and, indeed, Article 8 rights to a private life.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly to speak.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Baroness Brinton and Lord Moynihan of Chelsea

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

The issue we are trying to get to is where the boundary is between free speech and abusive behaviour. The police would have had problems saying that it was threatening if she said, “Oh, I was just dancing around the chair”. This is what they explained to me at the time. The issue that protected me was that she was abusive and insulting, and they could record it. Had they been able to find her, they could have checked to see whether it had happened elsewhere, which they thought would have been likely. That moves into the area of the next group, so I will not talk any further, but I am very grateful to the noble Lord for raising that.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that explanation. She clearly demarcated our difference in view as to where the line should be drawn. I suggest to noble Lords that it is important to draw the line at the threat of imminent violence. That has been a principle in the past, but it has been breached by recent laws and actions by the police.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, kindly supported this amendment—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

Fortunately, the judge took a different view. I think that we have to accept—and I was not the judge and do not know what his thoughts were—that the tweet was clearly seen enough times by the public at the moment when a small number of people were causing real concern outside hotels that had asylum seekers in them who had absolutely nothing to do with the Southport stabbing. That was the issue. Therefore, I believe that this is exactly where the balance lies between rights and responsibility, to go back to John Stuart Mill, where we started in the previous group.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for letting me intervene. Will she agree that it is unfortunate that there is a general perception that this lady—on whose case I do not rest any of my argument, or place any reliance, as I discussed in my 40-page submission to the Macdonald review—was inveigled into pleading guilty by being kept on remand in a case where it would not have been usual to keep such a person with such an alleged crime on remand? She pled guilty because she thought that she would be released early—more fool her, it turns out—and as a result of her pleading guilty, the matter referred to by my noble friend Lord Young, that she said “for all I care”, which may have turned out to be an excuse that led to her exoneration in front of a jury, much like that 17-minute jury decision that he mentioned, was never litigated, so that we could have discovered what the law said as to whether her tweet reached the standards for criminal conviction. Does the noble Baroness not think that unfortunate?

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I do not think that it is unfortunate given that the judge said that 310,000 views of that tweet happened at a time when there was discord on the streets. My argument is not about Connolly’s case; it goes back to Article 10 in the Human Rights Act, which says that along with freedom of expression or freedom of speech there are rights and responsibilities, and it is the role of the state to have laws to protect people. It cannot have been right to think that even one person seeing that tweet could have started one of the arsons in the bins outside one of the asylum seeker hotels. I do not know whether that happened; the point is that 310,000 people saw it, and that is the difference with her last phrase, which probably most people did not see or did not take in the way that the noble Lord has indicated—he has raised his eyebrows at me, but there are different ways of taking it. I do not want to get into the detail of that; I am trying to make the argument that, for every instance of freedom of speech by an individual, there are quite often consequences that may or may not end up as a crime as well. That brings me back to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, raised earlier—that the level of hate crimes is increasing. We also know that hate crimes are seriously underreported.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

I apologise for intervening again, but does the noble Baroness not accept that had that matter been litigated it would not have been before the judge? It would not have been for the judge to rule; it would have been before a jury, which is something that we in this country enjoy and that unfortunately there are moves to suppress. It would have been in front of a jury, and a jury would have been able to decide whether that final point justified her exoneration.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

The noble Lord said that he did not rely on Lucy Connolly in his earlier argument; he is now trying to rely on that case here. I am trying to make the point that it is more complex than he made out in his earlier contribution. I would like to make some progress, if I may.

The previous Government’s LGBT survey in 2018 showed that fewer than one in 10 LGBT people reported hate crimes or incidents. The noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, has explained one of the reasons for that. The other reason, I know from friends who have also experienced this sort of hate crime, is they do not believe that the police will do anything. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Young, that that is one of the reasons why there is concern about the police: too often, people who are targeted in this way feel that they do not get the help that they need.

As has been described, there is no single piece of hate crime legislation. It includes aggravated assault, which the noble Lord, Lord Young, was particularly concerned about. The point about hate crime is that it is not just the individual; the protected characteristic means that they and their community are also affected by it. We have spent many hours on previous groups on this Bill discussing the absolute abhorrence of antisemitism. If actions in Israel can cause people in the UK to start attacking members of our Jewish community, either verbally or against a person or their property, then that is absolutely unacceptable. That is one of the reasons why I would never want hate crimes to be removed.

Research by Professor Mark Walters of Sussex University shows that hate crimes do not affect just those individuals targeted; he describes them as having a “ripple effect” through their wider communities. Some people will avoid certain routes and places, and others will not leave home at all, particularly in our Jewish communities at the moment, but the same is true in certain areas for our Muslim communities. If laws about hate crime are weakened or repealed, it would send an appalling message to these communities of faith, as well as to LGBT and disabled people. Do the supporters of the amendment really no longer regard it as important that the state recognises the communities that have protected characteristics—their vulnerability—as warranting distinct legal recognition and criminalisation?