Baroness Butler-Sloss
Main Page: Baroness Butler-Sloss (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Butler-Sloss's debates with the Home Office
(1 day, 12 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I add a few comments in support of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—but without repeating him—on the proposed ouster clause suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in his Amendments 421 and 422DA. The schedule of proscribed organisations is often added to and rarely subtracted from. At present it has about 98 entries, if you include Northern Ireland as well as the rest of the world. That includes a number of nationalist movements from around the world that are, or have in the past been, committed to violence in pursuit of their aims.
Despite the recommendations of successive Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation, the annual review of proscribed groups by the Home Office and the NIO was discontinued in 2014. As far as I know, that automatic annual review has not been reinstated. There is no requirement in law that proscription should have to be renewed every three or five years, or indeed at all. In my report on the Terrorism Acts in 2016, at paragraph 5.24, I recorded the Government’s admission, which I found breathtaking, that no fewer than 14 groups on the list no longer satisfied the statutory requirements for proscription. Even more breathtakingly, they did not try to stop me saying it. There were almost certainly other groups in respect of which the same thing could have been argued, yet most of those groups remain on the list.
One group, the al-Qaeda offshoot to which the current President of Syria belonged, was recently deproscribed on the initiative of the Home Secretary. But if an application to the Home Secretary is turned down, it then takes money and determination to challenge a proscription in POAC—the tribunal that exists for this purpose. A handful of applications have been made by organisations that have definitively rejected violence, and these have been successful. With great respect to the noble Lord and without reference to the Palestine Action case, I am not persuaded that there is any good reason to block this necessary avenue for recourse.
My Lords, I strongly support the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. It seems to me entirely sensible, for the reasons set out so well by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I agree very much with what he said about the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, that Palestine Action should not be proscribed. It is not that I have any sympathy with it—it is a deplorable organisation that does a great deal of damage. If in fact the other laws required to deal with such appalling organisations are not sufficient, the Government should bring to this House, as well as the House of Commons, stronger laws to deal with them. But it is not, in my view, a terrorist organisation.
My Lords, I will deal with this group as briefly as I can. I too support the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. The idea that you can bundle together organisations and then proscribe them as a group seems ridiculous. Parliament should be faced with one organisation at a time when it votes—that is a matter of common sense. MPs must be entitled to decide on the proscription of particular organisations individually, and the fact is that many Members of Parliament resented being asked to proscribe three organisations together.
Of the three organisations, the other two—Maniacs Murder Cult and the Russian Imperial Movement—were plainly terrorist organisations that ought to have been proscribed, and it was invidious for Members of Parliament to be told that it was an all-or-nothing decision. That amendment should plainly be accepted. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that, try as he loyally might, when the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, spoke to this in Committee he could say only that this has been done before and is the way we have generally done it. That is no answer to the argument so elegantly put by the noble Baroness.
Turning to the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, I will deal with Amendments 421 and 422DA together. Both contain what are commonly called ouster clauses; they have been spoken to by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, it is the right of the courts to pronounce on the legality of the actions of the Home Secretary. The amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would, in effect, outlaw legal challenges to proscription, no matter how irrational, or what lawyers call ultra vires, or contrary to the evidence the proscription may be. An exception is suggested in the amendment: if a right to a fair trial would be totally nullified. As a test, I respectfully suggest that that is an entirely meaningless exception.
My Lords, I also support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and others, and thank them all most warmly. They seem to me appropriately comprehensive and detailed. I have been following the developments in chatbots for a year now: they are massive, they are rapid, they are driven by the pursuit of profit and shareholder value, and not by the welfare of individuals, whether adults or children. There is a tsunami of harm coming towards us, affecting not only the most vulnerable but the whole of our society. We urgently need this kind of regulation and risk assessment for chatbots.
The comprehensiveness and detail in these amendments are simply the application of the precautionary principle to the development of new technology. Technology should not be unleashed on the world if it has the capacity to break people, to do harm and to infringe on personal liberty and well-being. We do not allow harmful technological developments without adequate safety standards in any other area. It is unthinkable that a car would be released into the public if it was at risk of harming them. Similarly, you would not put people on an aeroplane if there were a significant risk of harm. You would not even buy a washing machine if it could bring harm in your kitchen. Yet chatbots are released on the world to be experienced, in private, by young children, with all the ensuing damage. It is vital that this strengthening is put in place, and that it is put in place urgently. I cannot imagine how the Minister could argue against this series of amendments and their urgency today.
We need to look at the example that we set to the rest of world, both as a Parliament and as a jurisdiction. A few weeks ago, I took part in seminars organised by a research institute in a university; they had the aim of educating civil servants and government officials in good and safe governance of AI across the continent of Africa. The world follows the example that is set in this jurisdiction and others. For the sake of our children and for the sake of the world, we need to resist and make safe the development of this technology. I support these amendments.
My Lords, for the reasons that have been so excellently given already and, in view of the time, I support all the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron.
My Lords, I will also try to be brief. I completely support everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has said. I would like to draw out two arguments that have been made to me today as to why her amendments should not be supported and explain why they are wrong.
The first argument is that we should wait for an overarching AI Bill. We will be waiting for a very long time. Those of us who have worked in trying to regulate social media for the last 15 years know that we must not let the perfect be the enemy of the good. I wholeheartedly reject that argument.
The second argument that has been made to me today—and I find this astonishing—is that the risk assessment is overly burdensome. We are regularly told that generative AI is one of the world’s most transformational technologies. That means it is capable of enormous good and enormous harm. The risk assessment in Amendment 433 is simply asking that the makers of these chatbots identify and understand the risks of harm—that does not seem overly burdensome to me. Further, it asks that the risk assessment
“is kept up-to-date … takes … account … of the Online Safety Act … assesses the risks to equality of treatment of individuals … assesses the risks to … privacy … assesses the risks … from the choice of underlying models, data sets …and … is in an easily understandable written format”.
I really struggle to understand how that could be overly burdensome. In fact, I would argue the absolute opposite: it is the basic foundation of decent regulation, and we should be wholeheartedly supporting the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron.