Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Cash Excerpts

Friday 16th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 68A. I am conscious that I asked the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, whether lasting power of attorney can be used. I am pleased to say that, in the debate, he said no. However, I am concerned that we may start to see quite a lot of case law emerge with this Bill if it becomes an Act. It is therefore really important that we start to put the level of protections into the Bill, as has just also been suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Berger.

The reason I am particularly keen on the lasting power of attorney issue to be put into the Bill is in recognition that this could become something that people—I recognise that these are people who are getting towards the end of their life and may have less than six months to live—would expect, if they had already transferred their decisions to a person acting with an LPA, in order to start making these decisions. However, I think the sentiment of the Committee, and certainly that expressed by the noble and learned Lord as the sponsor of the Bill, is that that should not be the case. That is why I particularly want to see this in the Bill.

I appreciate that I do not have a Bill team of civil servants to say whether this is precisely how it should be addressed, but I hope that it is been sufficiently comprehensive, also considering Sections 9 and 11 of the other Act, to make sure that, if somebody is to make this decision, it has to be wholly and exclusively their own. It cannot be done within fluctuating conditions where people interchange on who is making the decision; it must be just the one person whose life it is who considers whether to take their own life.

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

My Lords, I support this group of amendments for a specific reason. I tried to ask the Minister this question during their closing speech last week, but there was not time. The Equality and Human Rights Commission gave evidence at the Select Committee—I declare an interest that at the time I was a commissioner, but am no longer—in writing and orally, expressing grave concern about the adequacy of the equality impact assessment. The points coming up in support of this group raise real questions around this.

I ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to say when we will see addressed the gaps identified in that evidence given by Alasdair Henderson, a commissioner at the EHRC, and in a follow-up letter written to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, identifying specifically where the EHRC was concerned. When will we see a follow-up to that? It seems to me that many of the points in this and subsequent groups are about the vulnerabilities of individuals because of certain protected characteristics and the lack of protection for them. The EHRC has expressed no position on this Bill but is very concerned about it. I think the same applies to many Members of this House. We need answers to these questions to inform this debate fully.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 40 and 59. The changes I propose may seem puzzling or pedantic, but, when dealing with legislation about life and death, every word matters. My amendments aim to bring the same care for language to subsections (2) and (3) as is used in subsection (1), which sets out that only if the conditions in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) are met then assistance to end a person’s life, in accordance with Clauses 8 to 30, may be provided. If any of these conditions is not met then the action is subject to the existing criminal provisions of the Suicide Act 1961.

As they now stand, subsections (2) and (3) do not set out conditions in this way. Rather, they describe other parts of the Bill. Clause 1(2) is framed as an observation about Clauses 8 to 30, and Clause 1(3) apparently sets out a geographical marker for the certain steps provided for elsewhere in the Bill that “must be taken”. Subsection (2) therefore seems entirely redundant, since it purports merely to note what is said elsewhere. Subsection (3) is puzzling. Is the “must” a mistake or should it be “may only”?

Perhaps more important than such redundancy, inelegance and imprecision in drafting is that, in their present form, subsections (2) and (3) do not deprive those who act in contravention of the paragraphs they contain of the protection of the law from assisting suicide. They fail to make it explicit that this remains prohibited and punishable unless it meets subsections (2)(a), (2)(b), (3)(a) and (3)(b). My amendments would remove this perhaps unintentional looseness—the sponsor may wish to comment on the intentionality or otherwise—by making it explicit that assistance to end a person’s life may not be provided unless subsections (2)(a), (2)(b), (3)(a) and (3)(b) are all met.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I apologise. I do not know whether the noble Lord feels that he is withdrawing a compliment or withdrawing an insult, but I get what he is doing.

To the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, before she gets to her feet, I say that she is right. In relation to the ECHR points that were raised by, I think, Mr Stevenson, who was the commissioner—I have the name wrong.

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

It was Alasdair Henderson, who gave evidence to the Select Committee and raised a lot of the concerns that have been reiterated by the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, and others today. Indeed, the point that the noble and learned Lord makes about being poor and having a choice is something that is really of concern to the EHRC, which raised that in evidence orally and in writing and, subsequently, in the letter to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. Indirect discrimination, because of circumstances, is one of the problems with this Bill that troubles us most greatly. That has not been addressed, which is why the EHRC, without taking a position on the principle, has asked for that clarification. I would like to know whether it needs to write formally to request that, or is its evidence before the Select Committee and its subsequent letter adequate? Can the noble and learned Lord please clarify?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

The commissioner for the EHRC raised a number of points in relation to the risk of discrimination under the convention. The Government have done an equality impact assessment and, broadly, they adopt the approach that it is unlikely that the courts will interfere in a deliberate choice made by the Government, or the legislature in this case, as to what the limits would be of an assisted dying Bill. I agree strongly with that. It is the approach that the English courts have reflected in relation to assisted dying, and it is the approach that the European Court of Human Rights has taken as well. I therefore do not think that the views expressed by the commissioner to the Select Committee are right, but I am more than happy if the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, would like to raise specific ones—or all of them—she can do so with me, and I can raise them with the Government as well.

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[Baroness Cash (Con)]

I am grateful for the chance to clarify my point. It is not about litigating any of those complex issues. The EHRC is the regulator for this type of law in this country. The EHRC evidence, given before the Select Committee and written subsequently in answer to the committee’s questions, is that the equality impact assessment is inadequate, and it requests that those inadequacies be clarified. I do not have the text to hand, but it specifies in its letter to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the protected characteristic categories that it is particularly concerned about. That inadequacy, which was just now highlighted by noble Baroness, Lady Berger, is what is leaving us with our hands tied behind our backs and unable to give an answer in this debate.