Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased to follow the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, and share some of his concerns about this amendment. Before I share those concerns, I ask the noble Lords opposite to explain the relationship and potential contradictions between this amendment and their amendment in the next group on digital identity. It is a shame that these amendments do not sit in a single group, because it would have been easier to expose the thinking behind and relationship between them. That amendment, prohibiting the police requiring someone to show a digital identity document in the event that they are stopped and searched, could have been drafted by my former colleagues at Liberty. This amendment, on diluting protections against arbitrary stop and search, would certainly not have been drafted by my former colleagues at Liberty, so noble Lords opposite seem to be pointing in two different directions when it comes to the relationship between the citizen and the state on the street.

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[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

As usual, the noble Baroness is making a cogent and persuasive case, but I do not think she concedes that we are not talking about suspicionless searches; we are talking about an expectation that violence will happen—there will be a violent incident rather than a seriously violent incident.

I just leave her with the figures: in London, from 2021, there were 311,352 stop and searches, and they had fallen to 135,739 in 2024. At the same time, there was an 86% rise in knife crime. The argument that those of us on this side are making is that there has to be a balance. None of us wants racially profiled overpolicing, but at the same time, we have to find a reason why when we reduce stop and searches, there is an inevitable increase in knife crime.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I hear the noble Lord, but with respect, this provision relates to suspicionless stop and search. That is a term we use to describe a stop and search power that does not require reasonable suspicion that the person who is about to be stopped and searched is a criminal, is equipped or whatever it is.

The power in Section 60, therefore, is a suspicionless stop and search power, which is why it needs to be circumscribed and why there have to be certain conditions met before an area can be designated, because the normal law of the land, as noble Lords will recognise, is that anywhere in the land a constable can stop and search an individual whom they reasonably suspect of carrying a knife or being otherwise involved in criminality.

[Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)]

Section 60 in and of itself is a special circumstance, so whether it is suspicionless needs to be looked at in that context, and I would just like to offer the noble Baroness this context. There is no such thing as non-serious violence. Let us be very clear, when we are talking about the impact of knife carrying in particular, that any knife that has ended up in the body of a person has been shown to multiple members of the community and been used to create terror before that tragedy has happened. The idea that a stop and search is only potent when it leads to an arrest or a charge is simply incorrect. Having been a youth worker for over 35 years, I have worked with some of the most gang-involved people in the entire country, and they will tell you that they will be armed because they do not believe they are going to be stopped. Every time you do a stop and search, it sends a ripple, particularly to those who need to hear the ripple, that it could happen, so it lowers their propensity to go armed. Just because it does not lead to a charge, that does not mean it has not been effective.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention, but I return to my central point, which is, as he pointed out in his intervention, that the normal law of the land is for stop and search on reasonable suspicion that the individual in question is a cause for concern: “I have reasonable suspicion that that person may be carrying a knife, et cetera, or otherwise involved in criminality”. These are special powers given to a relatively junior police officer; this is not a chief constable, let alone a magistrate or a judge. It allows a police officer to change the law of the land for a time-limited period for that area, to change what the stop and search regime is in that area. It is quite right that a power of that kind be tightly circumscribed because of the problems that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, spoke about and because citizens do have rights to go about their business without fear of arbitrary stop and search.

This brings me back to my question about the relationship between Amendment 411, which is in this group on its own, and Amendment 415, which noble Lords opposite have in a separate group, and the apparent dichotomy between them. Amendment 415 says that, where there is a stop and search, an officer should not be allowed to require the presentation of digital ID; it does not even say “compulsory digital ID”. So if, as I think the Government now propose, digital ID becomes available to people to partake of, if they want, as a more convenient method of ID, we are going to have circumstances where noble Lords opposite will have more routine stop and search, but when a stop and search happens, an officer would not be able to ask the person searched to identify themselves if all they have with them is digital ID. That seems like a contradiction to me. I, for one, have always been very concerned and opposed to compulsory single identifiers, not least for the reason that they will lead to routine stop and search with people required to identify themselves to the police when they have done nothing wrong. I should be very interested if noble Lords opposite could square the relationship between this amendment and the one that follows.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, there is now considerable evidence about how stop and search powers are used in practice, their impact and long-term consequences, not least in building trust, which is so vital for effective community policing. Stop and search powers, especially under Section 60—suspicionless powers —already fall disproportionately on marginalised communities, particularly black and minority ethnic young men. Lowering the threshold from “serious violence” to “violence” can only increase the frequency and breadth of those powers and with it the disproportionality. This is not an abstract civil liberties concern but goes directly to trust and confidence.

It is also just 18 months since the Home Office accepted the findings of a police inspectorate report that identified serious shortcomings in the use of Section 60 powers, including low arrest and seizure rates for weapons, inadequate training and failures to adhere to statutory duties, such as PACE Code A or voluntary frameworks such as College of Policing APP guidance.

From a Liberal Democrat perspective, the test for expanding intrusive powers is a simple one. Is there a clear and compelling operational case, supported by evidence, that the existing powers are inadequate and that widening them will improve outcomes without unacceptable collateral damage to rights and community relations? We do not believe that the case has been made here. What is on offer is a lower legal bar for the most intrusive stop and search powers we have, imposed on communities that already experience it acutely, with no serious account taken of the long-term impact on policing by consent. On that basis, we cannot support the amendment.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I say this as best I can to the Committee: to my knowledge, there has been no request from the police for that reduction in threshold to allow them to exercise further stop and search powers. Indeed, as has been shown over the last 15 or 16 years, the use of stop and search has significantly decreased to around the 5,000 figure, as I mentioned earlier. I hear what the noble Lord says, but I am not sure that the police themselves want to exercise that power to control crowds at football matches. I will leave it at that, if I may.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Does my noble friend the Minister agree with me on this issue? I think he does, because he said earlier, when the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, was momentarily not with us, that minor scuffles are not serious violence and that stabbings and so on clearly are. To my own mind, a common assault between people outside the pub on a Friday night probably does not meet the threshold of serious violence, but knife robbery et cetera does.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I did indicate that minor scuffles would not be seen as serious violence. I am not trying to determine from this Dispatch Box the use of a Section 60 power by a police officer on the ground because of the level of violence the police have witnessed and wish to act upon. If we look at the figure 16 years ago, it was significantly higher than in the 12 months prior to now, at just over 5,000. The law has not changed but, going back to the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, police practice and police assessments have meant that they do not need to use that power. In parallel with that, the Government believe that if we wish to make an impact on knife crime, stop and search is a tool in extremis but better education, youth futures programmes and policing hot spots are more effective ways of reducing the problem overall. With that, I hope that the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness: I read that quote as well and was very worried about it, and the idea that we should all aspire to total surveillance and living in a panopticon. When I saw that—it has been doing the rounds on social media—I assumed it was fake news. I cannot believe that from a Labour Cabinet Minister, even from a Home Secretary—we know funny things happen to people when they go in the Home Office; I was there myself for a bit. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will assure us when he responds that there is no question of building a total surveillance state or, indeed, Bentham’s panopticon. I share the noble Baroness’s concerns, and I am grateful to her for raising them.

I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for, I think, answering the question that I put to him in the previous group, which is that his objection is to a single compulsory identifier. I share his concerns if that is the problem. I would not want us all to have to carry a single compulsory identifier, digital or otherwise, which becomes a licence to live that you can have demanded of you at any time. The compulsory element was always the problem, not having an optional identifier —for instance, if you choose to have your passport or driving licence on your phone instead of as a physical document. I understand that even lots of noble Lords now pay for their refreshments with their mobile phone; this is the world that we live in. The problem is with a single compulsory identifier, not with the option of having a digital ID, as opposed to a paper ID. I hope he will nod and indicate that we are in the same place on that.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I also support Amendment 415 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which seeks to introduce a new safeguard for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 regarding the potential future use of digital identification by law enforcement. I too am grateful for his explanation about the single identifier. I remind your Lordships that there were a number of amendments in some Home Office Bills about three years ago when the Home Office was trying to get access to DVLA data and, indeed, to personal medical data for anyone who might have been present at the scene of a possible crime—not the victim or the possible perpetrator, but anyone who was literally just present. I am glad that, in opposition, his party has decided to change its approach on this. It is very welcome.

I also echo the good news that the amendment is, I hope, fully redundant because of the Government’s announcement, but I look forward to making sure that some of the very minor concerns being expressed are recognised by the Government.

This amendment would provide the protection to individuals, should the Government introduce a digital identity document scheme, that a constable would be expressly prohibited from requiring a person to produce such a document on request or asking for it to be produced for inspection. Crucially, it would also prevent the police using

“any information contained within, or obtained from, a digital identity card for the purposes of investigating a criminal offence”.

That echoes the amendments that our Benches tabled to earlier Home Office Bills.

We on these Benches are fundamentally opposed to any form of compulsory digital ID. We must ensure that a digital identity scheme does not become a tool for “papers, please” policing in a digital format. As organisations such as Big Brother Watch have warned, the expansion of digital identification, such as the proposed access to the DVLA database for facial recognition, risks creating a huge and disproportionate surveillance power that, in effect, places the majority of law-abiding citizens in a permanent digital police line-up without their consent. Can the Minister confirm that it is the case that surveillance will not be used?

The Government have previously suggested that digital ID could serve as an alternative form of ID for specific purposes such as age verification for online sales. However, without the explicit prohibition contained in Amendment 415, there is a significant risk of mission creep. If we allow the police routinely to use digital ID as part of their investigative toolkit, we fundamentally shift the relationship between the individual and the state. This amendment is not about obstructing modern policing; it is about ensuring that privacy rights and civil liberties remain the default. We must codify these protections now to ensure that any future digital identity framework cannot be weaponised into a widespread surveillance system.

From these Benches we are glad about the Government U-turn, but we need more detail to ensure that those protections remain. It is for Parliament and not for operational police discretion to set the boundaries for how the state identifies its citizens. I urge the Committee to support this amendment and hope that the Ministers will give us an encouragement that it is not needed.