(1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I of course wish the Committee a very happy Christmas when that moment comes, but it was not just in seasonal spirit that I signed the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough. As he indicated, free expression is a two-way street, and I suggest that it is a two-way street in at least two ways: first, because all democrats, of whichever side of the aisle, ought to guard it jealously, and, secondly, because it must be applied with an even hand, even to people, ideas and causes with which we seriously disagree.
Before entering your Lordships’ House, I worked for 15 years at Liberty, the National Council for Civil Liberties. In that time, I saw the concept of behaviour causing or even just likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress used and abused to arrest and even prosecute people in a way that I believe all Members of the Committee would consider abusive, certainly when applied to people like us or causes with which we agree.
“Alarm” and arguably even “distress”, as opposed to a reasonable fear of a threat or of harm, are very broad. Harassment is a course of conduct and therefore a bit more objective and less broad. Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 obviously create two specific criminal offences, but the rubric of “harassment, alarm or distress” also now forms the linchpin of anti-social behaviour, with its quasi-civil and criminal orders and the even broader approach that police guidance and police websites take to the concept of anti-social behaviour. However, that matter was discussed earlier in Committee.
The two offences that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, has identified have, in my direct experience over many years, been applied broadly, indiscriminately and, ironically, in a discriminatory way to, for example, peaceful protesters and to anti-monarchists for wearing republican slogans on their T-shirts when a member of the Royal Family is in town. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, gave other examples of words that can offend or cause alarm and distress, as opposed to fear or the threat of real harm. I gave the example of the anti-monarchist who was not just arrested but, I believe, charged for the T-shirt in question, but there are also cases of youngsters being charged, certainly being arrested, for being cheeky with the police. I think this cannot just be blamed on the police when these concepts on the public order statute book are just too vague and too broad.
To attempt to leaven the spirit yet again the week before Christmas, I am reminded that today at PMQs, and not for the first time, the leader of the Opposition made reference, if euphemistically, to the Prime Minister’s private parts. Of course, that sort of thing would never happen in your Lordships’ House, but whatever noble Lords think of that approach to parliamentary debate, people on our streets, ordinary people, have been arrested and charged for less. Can that really be right? I think not.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I will say a few words in support of the amendment. I agree with the difficulty of categorising alarm in the same manner as harassment and distress. Harassment and distress can be objectively measured or distress objectively assessed, but when it comes to alarm, I think what noble Lords have said so far is that it may cause a shock to hear somebody in your group saying something so different to anything you could imagine being said.
I can give an example of a representative image or a representation which may be designed to shock. I was a supporter of Brexit in a very remain constituency, Cambridge. We usually invite people at the end of term, and I had a Vote Leave poster in my window, but as they were coming to a party to celebrate the end of term, I said to my husband that I would take it down because I did not want to upset them. Afterwards, none of them ever could imagine that I might support leave. When I told them, they said, “We had no idea. We couldn’t have imagined we knew anybody in Cambridge who voted leave”. I suppose you could say that I was trying not to spoil their day because people take these matters very seriously, but you could say that alarm could be equated to an instance of thoughtlessness, bad manners or a deliberate intention to shock, as some people will do, but it is not a matter to criminalise. For those reasons, I support removing “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 but would leave harassment and distress because they can more objectively be measured.
(1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, for the avoidance of doubt, I think we need to put it on record that everyone deprecates racially aggravated abuse of hard-working, decent emergency workers—that is taken as read. But the noble Lord is asking us to consider legislation when we already have a situation, under Section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020, which permits a court to consider any offence that has been racially or religiously aggravated. Section 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provides for a separate offence where a person commits an offence under Sections 4, 4A or 5 of the Public Order Act.
Much as I would love to be intervened on by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who I believe will be supporting my amendment later on, I am intervening on the Minister, and we are not allowed to intervene on interventions.
If I may beg the Committee’s indulgence, I finally say to the Minister that the Select Committee on the Constitution specifically said:
“Clause 107 criminalises ‘insults’ and clause 108 introduces the term ‘distress’. This potentially leaves people open to criminal sanction on a subjective basis”.
Not only do we already have existing legislation, but the language in this new legislation is sufficiently loose that it will give rise, I think, to unintended consequences.
I hope the noble Lord will accept that I am not indicating that he or anybody else would accept that language, but the point is that we have to define and be clearer about the definition in relation to racially aggravated insults. The reason that we brought this forward is that, on the back of police representations from senior officers in Surrey Police—and from Sergeant Candice Gill, who was herself racially abused—and with the support of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Surrey, having examined this internally, we believe that the law needs to be clarified, which is why we have brought this legislation forward.
The noble Lord also asked me to examine why it is covering only race and religion, why we do not cover protected characteristics of sexual orientation, transgender identity and disability, and why the Government have not tabled such an amendment. He will know that the Law Commission is already examining its review of hate crime laws. It is a complex area, and it is important we get the changes right. I will tell him this: we are considering that and have given a manifesto commitment to do so, and, ensuring that we do that, we will bring forward conclusions at Report stage in this House to give effect to those manifesto commitments on sexual orientation, transgender identity and disability to extend the proposals still further. I give him notice of that now so that he does not accuse me of pulling a fast one on Report. We will do that, but we will have to bring forward the details of it in due course.
Briefly, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, is quite right that I have long shared some concerns about the rubric and precise drafting of concepts of alarm and distress—we are coming to them later—so of course I have concerns about them being adopted into the precise drafting of the offence. But, on the basic principle, is not the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, that there is no point in citing provisions on racially aggravated offences if the conduct is not an offence and that the justification for taking the serious step of applying Public Order Act principles to a domestic dwelling is that these emergency workers have no choice but to be in that dwelling, sometimes putting themselves in harm’s way as part of their service to the public? On the principle of having an offence such as this, I wonder whether my noble friend agrees.
I do agree with my noble friend. As I said in my introductory remarks and as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said, when an emergency worker turns up at a house and enters that property for a health reason concerning an individual in the property, a criminal justice reason involving activity that is causing threat and alarm and/or fire service duties, they do so to fulfil a duty. They have to stay in that property. If they are abused on the street before they enter the property, that is a punishable offence, yet unless this law change is accepted, when they enter the property that abuse is considered a principal part of the job that they have to just take on the chin. I do not accept that. That is why we included Clauses 107 to 109.
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and to support the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, not least because my noble friend Lord Hendy—who is, sadly, not able to be in the country this evening—co-signed her amendment.
If anyone imagines or suggests that the job of the Health and Safety Executive should be limited to the inspection of heavy machinery or physical infrastructure, as opposed to social infrastructure, then they are not just living in the last century but arguably the one before that. For the Health and Safety Executive to look at its role in such a limited way is also incredibly gendered.
I hope that my noble friend the Minister will look favourably on the intention of these amendments, because they sit so comfortably with other measures that the Government are attempting. The noble Baroness put it very well when she said that this is essential for the credible functioning of the violence against women and girls strategy. Last night, during the course of the Second Reading debate on the Victims and Courts Bill, it was wonderful to hear another Minister, my noble friend Lady Levitt, talk about further work and an expanded regime on allowing whistleblowing and the busting open of non-disclosure agreements that cover up illegal activity—which often means violence against women at work. What the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, is proposing sits so comfortably with that.
I cannot believe that my noble friend the Minister will think anything different not least because, just a few minutes ago, he spoke so passionately about protecting emergency workers when they have to go into difficult and dangerous settings and how they should be protected even from abuse, let alone from violence and more serious criminality. It would be odd if there was no duty on the employers of emergency workers to look at risk, adequate training and culture in the workplace and at what measures might be taken within teams and with training for those same emergency workers. As was suggested by the noble Baroness, this is about joined-up thinking and coming up with a violence against women and girls strategy that the whole Committee and all parties can get behind. I am feeling optimistic about my noble friend the Minister’s reply.
To Committee colleagues on the opposition Front Bench, I would say that there are inevitable concerns about any additional burden on employers. I am seeing nods that suggest that my suspicions are correct. But these duties can be as appropriate. If noble Lords and Committee members have concerns about the precise drafting of the amendments, those can be dealt with before Report. The duties would be to prepare and revise assessments that are appropriate for a particular business—and businesses and workplace settings are so different; they include very vulnerable and secluded settings, with visits and travel, including to people’s homes. This only need be about strategies and training as appropriate; the duties need not be an undue burden on good employers of good faith who have many women workers in particular, although I would like to see all protected.
I hope that the entire Committee can get behind the noble Baroness. I am delighted to see the first ever woman general secretary of the TUC looking as if she might be due to speak after me.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I first seek clarification from the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, on his sums. I do not do sums either but, if I heard him correctly, he said that a worker spends 50% of his life at work. If that is what I heard correctly, that is 84 hours a week.
(2 weeks, 1 day ago)
Lords ChamberThe Government recognise that the algorithm needs to be examined, and that is why we have asked His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary to present an urgent report to the Government on the mechanisms of the algorithm. In the meantime, facial recognition technology is a useful tool. If missing people walk past a facial recognition van, they can be identified. If people are on a wanted list, they can be identified. If people appear on a Ring doorbell, they can be put against a facial recognition database to see whether they have committed an offence and be further questioned. There are good things about that, but the consultation is about how we can better regulate it. HMCIC will look at how we can deal with the issues with the algorithm over the next few months.
My Lords, notwithstanding their being of the party that introduced the ground-breaking and vital Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the previous Government allowed the mushrooming of police use of this technology with no express and specific statutory authorisation. Does my noble friend the Minister agree that it is unacceptable, for both democracy and the rule of law, to roll out this technology further, however useful it is, without an Act of Parliament?
My noble friend raised the issue, but I maintain that it is a valuable use of resources to help with crime prevention. We have organised a consultation, which opened on 4 December. My noble friend and anybody else can submit evidence or comments to that consultation over the next 10 weeks. When it is complete, the Government will assess the regulatory framework. We already intend to establish an oversight body to examine how that regulation will operate, which will require further work by the Government.
(3 weeks, 6 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare several interests. I am a co-chair of the All-Party Group on Modern Slavery and vice-chairman of the Human Trafficking Foundation. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Brown. She has done a brilliant first amendment and I am delighted to support her. I played a very small part in the Modern Slavery Act: I was involved in the pre-legislative scrutiny and an earlier report that persuaded the then Home Secretary, now the noble Baroness, Lady May, to put the Bill in place.
Exploitation of children is in the Modern Slavery Act, but it is rather masked and has not been taken seriously, particularly by the police. Perhaps more importantly—this is one thing that the noble Baroness, Lady Brown, did not say—under the Act, a child who is exploited cannot consent to exploitation and cannot commit an offence. That is absolutely crucial, and it probably ought to be expressed again in primary legislation.
I enormously admire a great deal of what this Government are trying to do. I went on behalf of Action for Children to a very useful meeting with Diana Johnson and Jess Phillips, where I got the impression that they were going to move forward on this. But what is offered in this Bill does not really meet the need. To put into guidance what was put in primary legislation 10 years ago seems to make it less important. I ask the Minister to reflect on why you would want to put into guidance something that was expressed, not as well, in primary legislation 10 years ago.
The time has come to deal with county lines. A great deal of work has been done by the National Crime Agency. At long last, at least some magistrates’ courts realise that children who are ferrying drugs around the country—and cash, nowadays, as well as drink and various other things—are in fact victims and not perpetrators. But it is not fully known. The police do not seem to understand it. We need to explain, through primary legislation, to whoever is now in charge of modern slavery in the police that we are talking about child exploitation, of which modern slavery is a component. There is no doubt that these children are enslaved, but I suspect that, in this country, the word “exploitation” is rather easier to understand—and it is time it was there.
This amendment is brilliant. It could perhaps be improved in certain ways, but it asks the Government to do something really practical which, when I went to that very useful meeting, I got the impression they were going to do.
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown, but she may not need much support, having received the much-coveted gold star from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who, I am very proud to say, supports a later amendment of mine on raising the age of criminal responsibility—which, I am ashamed to say, is barbarically only 10 in England and Wales. The UN recommends that it be 14. In Scotland it is 12 and the heavens do not seem to have fallen.
I have a couple of specific points to make in support of my noble friend’s amendment. If I may, I will be as bold as to predict what my noble friend the Minister and his advisers might be about to say in response. If they are about to say that my noble friend’s definition is unnecessary because the definition can be taken from the offence itself in Clause 40, I would like to get in first with two points to counter that. If I am pessimistic and wrong, so be it. Noble Lords know that I do not mind looking a fool.
The first point, which has already been made clearly by my noble friend Lady Brown, is that we need a definition that is about not just a specific criminal offence but interagency working and interventions across services, well in advance of any investigation or prosecution for a criminal offence.
I do not think the second point has been made yet. If the Committee compares the elements of my noble friend’s definition with the definition of the criminal offence in the Bill, it will see that the Government’s approach misses something very important that is to be found in my noble friend’s definition: enabling the child, not just causing the child, to engage in criminal conduct. That addition is important because “causing” is a harder thing to prove and a greater step in grooming. Currently, the Government’s definition is
“causing the child to commit an offence”,
or, indeed, “facilitating” somebody else to cause the child to commit the offence.
To prove causation in law is a serious matter. Enabling—making it easy, making the tools of the trade available, providing the opportunity—is a lower threshold, which is appropriate in the context of children. My noble friend made the point that currently in law they are treated as victims but also as perpetrators, and sometimes it is a matter of luck as to whether you will find the adult and the public service who will take the proper approach, in my view, of always treating the child as a child and as a victim, and not criminalising them. This is the point about “enabling”.
My noble friend the Minister is very experienced in these matters. Whatever he comes back with, I would like him and his advisers to consider the question of the lower threshold of enabling, not just causing. If there is to be a further compromise that includes some element of my noble friend Lady Brown’s amendment, I hope that that is taken on board.
The most formative time in my professional life was as a Home Office lawyer. I know what it is like to work on big Bills and to defend them as originally crafted and drafted. But it is wise, especially in this House, to take good advice and to bend a little when it might improve legislation for the benefit of victims.
My Lords, first, I absolutely congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, on her excellently motivated amendment. It is very thought provoking. In particular, this sentence caught my attention:
“The victim may have been criminally exploited even if the activity appears consensual”.
That is one of the most difficult challenges. For some years I have been involved in the grooming gangs scandal, and one of the most horrible parts of that was when the police took the decision that the young 14 or 15 year-old, precocious though she—a general “she”—may have been, was somehow actively consenting to her own rape or sexual exploitation. It was about the notion of this being a child, because the young girl may have looked more adult—it was literally as superficial as that—and about the type, if we are honest, in class terms. Therefore, it was said that she could not be a victim and she was accused of being a prostitute, and so on. We are familiar with that. That is the reason why that sentence stood out to me.
However, I have some qualms, and I want to ask genuinely what we do about those qualms, because I do not know where to go. I am slightly worried, because county lines gangs, as the noble Baroness will know, are a young men’s game. Some of the gang leaders are younger than one would ever want to imagine in your worst nightmare. That is a problem with this, in a way, and with how you work it out. If you have a general rule that this is always a child, how do you deal with the culpability and responsibility of a 17 year-old thug, not to put too fine a point on it, who is exploiting younger people or even his—and it is generally “his”—peers? I am not sure how to square that with what I have just said. It also seems that there is a major clash with the age of criminal responsibility. I am very sympathetic with that not being 10, but how do you deal with the belief that someone aged under 18 is a child, yet we say that a child has criminal responsibility? Perhaps I am just misunderstanding something.
My final reservation is that if we say that everybody under 18 has to be a victim all the time, would that be a legal loophole that would get people off when there was some guilt for them to be held to account for? I generally support this amendment, but I want some clarification on how to muddle my way through those moral thickets, if possible.
My Lords, if the Committee will allow me, I will begin by detailing the government amendments in this group. We know that criminal gangs conducting activity such as county lines drug dealing do not stop at internal UK borders, and children are criminally exploited across the UK. To go to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned, this is why—at the request of the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice—we are making provision in the Bill for child criminal exploitation prevention orders in Scotland and Northern Ireland. That is at their request, and I hope that also answers the point from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. Since the Bill covers England and Wales, this means that the offence of child criminal exploitation will now apply UK-wide. These amendments have been tabled because, since the Bill was published, we have had those discussions and this is a way of making sure that we have a UK-wide approach.
These orders will give the police and courts across the whole of the United Kingdom powers to prevent child criminal exploitation happening in the first place, or happening again, by putting prohibitions and requirements on an adult who poses a risk of criminally exploiting a child. As I have mentioned, these provisions have been drafted in collaboration with the Scottish and Northern Ireland Governments and consequential amendments are therefore required for England and Wales to ensure that the orders function smoothly across the United Kingdom.
Finally, we have tabled some other amendments to put beyond doubt that assessment of whether an individual has engaged in child criminal exploitation, or associated conduct, in an application for, or imposition of, a child criminal exploitation prevention order is to be determined by the court on the basis of the civil standard of proof; that is, the balance of probabilities. This is appropriate given that there are civil rather than criminal proceedings in this case. The application of the civil standard of proof is well precedented in many similar preventive orders across the statute book and is important to ensure that an order can intervene earlier in the course of a child’s exploitation so that it can be prevented. I hope that I have wide support across the Committee for those measures—I think I do.
Amendment 232B is in the name of my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown. I welcome her moving her first amendment in such a positive way. She has secured the support of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which is a fairly impressive bunch on a first amendment, so I say well done to her on that. Her amendment seeks to create a further definition of child criminal exploitation.
I say to my noble friend—and I think that this was anticipated by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—that “child criminal exploitation” is already defined in Clause 40 by the description of conduct amounting to an offence. It is where an adult
“engages in conduct towards or in respect of a child, with the intention of … causing the child to”
engage in criminality. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, raised a number of issues for which I am not accountable, but which my noble friend may wish to respond to. That is the Government’s view on the purpose of Clause 40. Clause 40 captures activity online, through the use of technology and whether or not it is seemingly consensual. This definition also operates for the purposes of the child criminal exploitation prevention orders.
My noble friend has made a very strong case, through personal experience as a constituency MP in east London for almost 20 years, on the impact of county lines gangs on young people. I fully accept, understand and appreciate where she is coming from on those issues. That is why the Government introduced Clause 40 in the first place. It is also why the Government are introducing a bespoke stand-alone offence of CCE, along with the CCE prevention orders, to signal unequivocally that using a child to commit crime is against the law and that those children are victims of a crime. I also agree that any apparent consent of the child to involvement is irrelevant to whether they have been criminally exploited, and that criminal exploitation can occur online and through the use of technology. I understand my noble friend’s amendment, but these points are captured by the definition of CCE in Clause 40, which does not include a child’s consent and captures adults’ conduct by means of any method or control.
Obviously, I correctly anticipated the response that was coming, but I would be grateful if my noble friend would deal with this point about “enabling”, which is a substantive point of difference in the two definitions. Enabling is easier to prove than causing. “Causing” is closer to a child being used, which is reflected in my noble friend Lady Brown’s definition, but I do not think that “enabling” is in the Clause 40 definition as it stands.
I appreciate my noble friend’s comments. If she will bear with me, I will come on to that point in a moment. I am doing this in a structured order to try to address the points that are before the Committee today.
I say to my noble friend Lady Brown that, within the Bill, we are also taking the power to issue statutory guidance to chief officers. The noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and my noble friend have looked at that, and I will return to it in a moment. The guidance will include a descriptive definition of CCE, setting out in lay person’s terms the conduct captured by the offence, and will provide practical guidance on how the CCE offence and orders should be applied.
An important point, to go particularly to what the noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said, is that in Clause 60—which we will come to in later considerations—the Secretary of State has power to issue statutory guidance to chief officers of police about the exercise of their functions in connection with the prevention, detection and investigation of CCE offences and CCE prevention orders. I hope that the Committee will recognise that, importantly, the relevant police officers will be under a legal duty to have due regard to that statutory guidance when exercising functions in relation to the CCE offences and the CCE prevention orders. On the question of the statutory guidance, which my noble friend and others have touched on, the guidance has not been issued yet because the relevant legislation has not yet received the consent of this House or indeed Royal Assent. On the applicability of both of those conditions, statutory guidance under Clause 60 will be issued, which will place a legal duty on police officers to adhere to it.
My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti mentioned a very important point. There is a clear difference in what my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown has put forward, supported by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I hope this helps: the forms of conduct that are likely to enable a child to commit criminality are expected in most cases to also meet the test of conduct by an adult intended to cause, or facilitate the causing of, a child to commit a future crime. The nature of the offence, which is broad and large, will ensure that it captures offenders who will use children for crime. I believe that that is the right format. Both my noble friends have said that “enable” is a critical word. I believe that a separate definition is unnecessary, as it would have no legal impact over and above what is already in the Bill. It could cause confusion among police and prosecutors about which definition they should be applying.
The statutory guidance, which I emphasise will gave a legal bass and will be issued under Clause 60, is the appropriate place to provide the extra detail to understand proposals that are covered by the amendment, but which are already in scope of the clear and simple legal terms of Clause 40. I know that that is the defence that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti expected me to use, but it is the defence: Clause 40 is what it is, and the guidance will also be statutory.
I will sound like I am repeating myself from Question Time, but, very shortly, we anticipate bringing forward a policing White Paper looking at a whole range of mechanisms to improve police performance. If the noble Baroness will allow me, I will wait for further detail on the policing White Paper, which I have already said to the House will be published before Christmas, to allow for further discussion on a range of efficiency and improvement matters for policing. The point she makes is worthy of consideration, but I will park it until a later date in the parliamentary calendar.
I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his detailed response, but will he reflect on the potential distinction between “enabling” and “causing”? Will he go back to parliamentary counsel and be clear that enablers will always meet this threshold of causation? I am really concerned about that. I understand that my noble friend has rejected the idea of a separate free-standing definition and is worried about confusion between the offence definition and a general definition, but in blending the intentions of the Government and those of my noble friend Lady Brown, it would be helpful to know that that language of “causing”, without specific mention of enabling, is watertight.
I am grateful to my noble friend for further pressing me on the issue. I have tried to explain to the Committee where the Government are on this. We always reflect on debates in Committee, because there are always opportunities for my noble friend and others to bring matters back on Report. I am giving the Committee today the Government’s view that the definition in Clause 40, plus the guidance issued under Clause 60, will be sufficient to cover the objective of ensuring that we have this offence on the statute book and monitored and enforced by authorities.
To the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, I have just remembered that we will have further discussions on police training in later groups in Committee today, but the White Paper will deal with a whole range of matters on improving police performance.
(3 weeks, 6 days ago)
Lords ChamberI assure the noble Baroness that it is not a slogan; it is a manifesto commitment to halve the level of violence against women and girls over a 10-year period as a matter of some urgency. She will know that we have been trying to recruit a chair for the national grooming inquiry over many weeks, and we are still trying to do that. The anticipation is that we will, I hope, achieve that as quickly as possible. We have enabled a Member of this House, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, to assist us in that recruitment, and this very afternoon we will have debates in this House on the Crime and Policing Bill on those issues. It is the Government’s intention to establish the inquiry as soon as possible, and I will keep this House updated.
My Lords, this feels like an appropriate moment to pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Gale, who has worked so hard on this issue for so long, and to remember the friend of this whole House, the late, great Baroness Newlove. What are the Government doing to ensure that the new Victims’ Commissioner is involved in the consultation and development of the strategy, and will the new commissioner be properly resourced to help to implement it?
I am grateful for the recognition of my noble friend Lady Gale. I looked this up today, and she was asking me questions about this issue in this very week last year, so she is not one not to be persistent on the same issues. I also pay tribute to the late Baroness Newlove for her work as Victims’ Commissioner. My noble friend will know that the Victims’ Commissioner had already been replaced from January next year. Self-evidently, we are hoping to produce the violence against women and girls strategy very shortly, but I will ensure that the new Victims’ Commissioner both examines the potential future government strategy and is involved in its challenge and its delivery.
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful for the noble Lord’s question. I take the view that the Government will determine ultimately which are safe countries. The Government will make that judgment. We are open to challenge and discussion, but the Government will have to make a determination on that. In doing so, we will look at a range of factors. What does the United Nations think? What do the other agencies think? In the end, however, the Government ultimately will have to determine. Again, let me just say that it may not even be a blanket “safe” for a particular country. It may be safe, for example, now, for individuals post an Assad regime to return to Syria, but it may equally not be safe for some individuals to do that. There is a case-by-case basis for the individual, but, ultimately, we have to make that call.
My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s commitment to human rights, and I know it is a sincere one, but the Statement itself appears to express some irritation with both Article 8, respect for private and family life, and even Article 3, the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment and torture. In the light of our own justice and prison system being found in breach of Article 3 in the High Court just two days ago, can the Minister say a little more—give us a little more specificity—about the detail of the proposed renegotiation of Article 3 that the Statement refers to?
I am grateful to my noble friend. We are seeking international reform of the application of Article 3. We will work with partners to reform the application of the ECHR’s prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment. That means we have to discuss it with our partners and get joint agreement, but it is an objective to which the Government are committed. It is one that will be tested. It will be in our consultation in due course. We will bring forward primary legislation with a definition of family life for the purposes of Article 8. That will be subject to scrutiny, but it will be within the spirit of maintaining our commitment to the European Court of Human Rights application. Those are fair and legitimate objectives, and I hope that my noble friend will support them in due course.
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I remind the House and declare that, as a former director of Liberty, I was in unusual lockstep with chief constables in opposing what was to become the cross-party mistake of police and crime commissioners. Does my noble friend agree that the design fault that distinguishes the PCC model from others that have been discussed, including committees of councillors, mayors and so on, is in the word “temptation” in the Statement? An elected politician whose sole raison d’être is policing faces the almost inevitable temptation to dip their toes, particularly in media statements, into operational matters, and it is that design fault we need to avoid in future.
I agree with my noble friend. Key to the potential new model is that the police mayoral model/policing board model will be accountable for setting the budget and for holding the chief constable, whoever he or she may be, to account for the delivery of a police and crime plan that the police and crime commissioner signs off.
The temptation is there now for a running commentary and wanting to be the front person on any incident in a community because, ultimately, that election depends solely on police and crime performance. It does not depend, as mayoral elections do, on a whole range of issues, many of which are not directly political but many of which are. So there is a shift there which I hope will be welcome. Again I say that, at some point, this House will have an opportunity to test our proposals, because legislation will be required to facilitate these changes.
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, noble Lords will recall that in Committee I proposed replacing Section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 because it is incomplete. That section attempts to comply with Article 31 of the refugee convention by providing statutory defences for refugees who have irregularly entered or are present in the UK but who have come directly from a country persecuting them; they have presented themselves to the authorities without delay and shown good cause for their unlawful entry or presence. However, as described by our Joint Committee on Human Rights in its report on this Bill, the statutory defence
“is not fully compliant with the Refugee Convention”.
Strangely, the defence is available only to refugees who have used false documents; it does not extend to refugees who arrive, enter, or are present here irregularly, with no documents at all.
It is unclear to me why our country would privilege the refugee arriving by plane on a false passport over the stateless person or refugee with no passport or visa. Refugees are often compelled to flee with nothing but the clothes on their backs. What little they have may be stolen or lost along the way. I raised this anomaly in Committee, and my noble friend Lord Katz said that he understood what he called this “specific inconsistency”, very kindly agreeing to write to me on the point—that was on 13 October, at vol. 849, col. 113 of Hansard. As my noble friend helped explain to the Committee, also in col. 113, the defence is also imperfect and incomplete because it fails to protect from prosecution the refugee who, in fleeing persecution, stops in another safe country.
Sadly, those who drafted my noble friend’s letter to me of 24 October demonstrated neither his logic and compassion nor, frankly, any acknowledgement of what he actually said at the Dispatch Box. Indeed, the letter would be more fitting in support of opposition amendments proposed by, for example, the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, and rejected by the Government and my noble friend that day in recognition of refugees who transit countries en route to the United Kingdom. The Home Office letter said:
“The Convention is quite clear about the need for migrants to ‘come directly’ to benefit from the protections it affords them. In reality, not a single small boat that has reached the UK has set out from a dangerous country where migrants could not be reasonably expected to claim asylum. France, Belgium and the Netherlands are all signatory to the Convention and are entirely safe countries with functioning asylum systems of which migrants are able to avail themselves”.
It is as if last year’s general election never happened.
Therefore, almost all who arrive in the UK, even if eventually found by the authorities, by the Home Office or the appeal system, to be refugees, have no statutory defence to protect them from criminalisation and prosecution. That is contrary to a good faith interpretation of the refugee convention.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for even being in the Chamber, let alone participating in this short debate. I am particularly grateful to my noble friend for his courtesy and sincerity once more.
As to the advice that he has been given, I am afraid there is a circularity about saying, “Do not worry, because we will look very carefully at whether someone has a defence”, when, on the basis of the correspondence I have been sent and this legislation, there will be no defence, even for a genuine asylum seeker or a recognised refugee who came in a boat. To me, that is a huge contradiction: “Welcome to Britain. You are a refugee and the beginning of your life in the UK will be criminal prosecution”.
None the less, I know my arithmetic, and I do not want to test noble Lords’ patience much longer— I know that there is other business. I am afraid this will have to be sorted out by the DPP or in the criminal and appeal courts. Perhaps in the longer term, the Government may think again—who knows? For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I add my support for Amendment 1. There should be a review of all these orders before layering another one on. In fact, some of that work has been done: freedom of information data demonstrates that people from minority ethnic communities are far more likely to be subject to this range of orders—Gypsy and Irish Traveller people are also more likely to receive disproportionate criminal punishments on breaching the orders—so the lack of monitoring of the use of behavioural orders is disturbing. I am sure that my noble friend the Minister does not want to continue this cycle of criminalising vulnerable and disadvantaged communities, so please can we have a formal review of the impact of the orders currently in place?
My Lords, I find myself in agreement with many of the genuine human rights concerns already expressed around the Committee. I find myself in a bit of a time warp because these concerns were evidenced by the use, abuse, disrepute and ultimately disuse that anti-social behaviour orders fell into all those years ago. The criminalisation of vulnerable people, people with addiction problems, people with mental health problems, homeless people and so on is not hypothesis; it was evidenced by the practice of the original anti-social behaviour orders.
I therefore hope that, in his reply, my noble friend, who I know to be a very thoughtful Minister, will go some way to expressing how he thinks these new respect orders will improve on the very unhappy history of ASBOs. Other members of the Committee have already set out what happened in the interim. It would be useful if my noble friend the Minister could explain what will be different this time, why and how.
In a nutshell, my concerns are, first, that the threshold of behaviour likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress is low and vague. To be blunt, some people are easily alarmed and distressed. Harassment is the more objective, higher part of that threshold. That is the entry point at which vulnerable people can first fall into this quasi-civil criminal order that can sweep them into the criminal justice system rather than diverting them from it.
The second concern is that, once one is under the jurisdiction of such an order, it becomes a personal, bespoke criminal code for the individual. I remember the suicidal woman banned from bridges and the pig farmer who was given an ASBO because the pigs wandered on to the neighbours’ land. Is it really appropriate to have bespoke criminal codes for different people in different parts of the country? The postcode lottery point was made well, but there is also the issue of vulnerable people and minorities, who find themselves disproportionately affected.
Once you breach your personalised criminal code—which could be to keep away from a part of town where your close relatives live—you are then swept into the system. That is my third concern about these quasi-civil criminal orders: the ease with which vulnerable people with chaotic lives who have been let down by social services and society in general are now swept into the criminal justice system rather than diverted from it.
Finally, I share the concerns about making such orders available to even younger people, who really should not be anywhere near the criminal justice system. In a much later group—sometime next year, I think, when we will still be in this Committee and will be older, if not wiser—I have tabled an amendment, with the support of the noble and learned Baronesses, Lady Hale of Richmond and Lady Butler-Sloss, to tackle the shockingly low age of criminal responsibility, 10 years-old, that we still have in England and Wales.
In the spirit of Committee, I wonder whether I might challenge the noble Lord a little on this epidemic of child criminality to which he so graphically referred. I think we should park these arguably very rare cases of child homicide outside a debate on anti-social behaviour, but would he agree with me that, when it comes to fisticuffs—what would be common assault—or even theft, we know that quite small children in every home in the country are capable of fisticuffs with each other, between siblings, and taking things that are not their own? But is not a crucial difference in our response to those children? Anti-social behaviour on the playing fields of Eton rarely ends up anywhere near the criminal justice system, but looked-after children in particular are more likely to be reported to the police and end up criminalised at a very early age. So does the noble Lord agree that children in, for example, England and Wales are no more malign than children in Scotland, where the age of responsibility is 14? We should look to ourselves as adult society and our responses to these vulnerable children.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
The noble Baroness says that child homicides are very rare, but they have doubled in the past 12 years. All the statistics that I quoted were from the Youth Justice Board and the Office for National Statistics, showing a huge increase in knife crime. Then there are the police forces themselves; there is an article relating to the Met, or a discussion on a blog from yesterday, asking whether knife crime by children was out of control—and those are their words, not mine.
There has been a huge increase in viciousness, knife use and violent crime by children, and I suggest in my amendments that lowering the age to include 14 to 18 year-olds in respect orders might make a difference, if we could hive them off early. Of course, I accept that children in Scotland, as in England, Northern Ireland and Wales, will also have violent tendencies. My concern is that we are failing to intervene early enough to do anything about them; that is the whole cause of the problem in the past 30 years—a lack of early intervention to deal properly with children. For some, that will mean a caution or restorative justice; for others, it could mean better work from social services. But some prolific young offenders may need to be taken out of circulation, for their own benefit and to save the lives of other children.
(2 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberIt is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg. First, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Hanson of Flint on securing the considerable legal services of my noble friend Lady Levitt. The Government are very lucky to have them both steering this supertanker. There is much to commend: its focus on several vulnerable groups, including exploited children, victims of stalking, cuckooing and so on. I hope to speak to these parts in Committee. There is further scope to innovate in other areas genuinely to improve criminal justice.
I still have some concerns about an arms race begun over 30 years ago and escalated by some parts of this measure. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994—some noble Lords are too young to remember—began raising public expectations that Governments could legislate their way to a harmonious society. Politicians purported to do this even in times of austerity, amid real-time cuts to living standards, in the justice system, and to youth, mental health and addiction services. Continued rhetorical attacks on the judiciary and fiscal attacks on legal aid have left swathes of ordinary people thinking that the law is not for them. It will arrest and prosecute them for a growing array of crimes and misdemeanours but rarely protect them from abusive employers, landlords or unaccountable corporations. That is why I welcome the imminent Hillsborough law.
The disillusionment can be disastrous. Knee-jerk politics fights the alligators but never drains the swamp. I fear that we have been breeding alligators in a swamp in which only populist far-right politics thrives. We see this long shadow in compromises to due process rights, the unregulated deployment of technology at the cost of personal privacy, and always more police powers; every year, yet more powers—broad, vague and never mirrored by measures improving police vetting, training and discipline.
In 1994, it was the end of the right to silence, suspicionless stop and search, and restrictions on gatherings featuring music with a repetitive beat. Now, and for years, the target has been non-violent protest. I share the Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner’s concerns about our existing public order statute book; and now we have the measures proposed in this Bill, and those trailed as likely new government amendments to come in Committee, to restrict cumulative protest. Protests against asylum hotels make me very anxious. But I would no more ban them than those against job losses, benefit cuts, environmental degradation, war crimes, or racism and antisemitism. What would blanket bans on face coverings at protests mean for dissidents outside the embassy of an authoritarian foreign power? With all its churches, restrictions on protesting “in the vicinity of” places of worship could render our capital an extremely un-British protest-free zone.
Recently Ministers have warned, rightly, of the existential dangers of a far-right Administration. We must never write, let alone legislate for, a blank cheque for potential future anti-democratic abuse. While today is one for broad brushes and four-minute speeches, I hope noble Lords will come prepared for line-by-line forensic scrutiny of Bill and amendment text in the vital weeks to come. The other place may invoke the will of the people, but here we read the small print.