Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

We all agree that we need reliable data and, by the way, that should and can include data on gender reassignment as a separate protected characteristic, even on self-ID in terms of keeping that information. It should not be the basis on which we collect crime data in relation to the different sexes, although it is important to acknowledge that it is possible that transgender people, or those who identify as transgender, might well be the victims of crime more regularly, or they may be the perpetrators. I am happy to know that information as well, but not through the conflation of sex and gender in the bottom-line collecting of crime statistics.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I just looked about my person at my identification documents and found my House of Lords pass, which at least at this point does not record my birth sex. I suppose “Baroness” might arguably do the trick—or not, I do not know. I suspect it would not be enough for the supporters of these two amendments. I also looked in my handbag, and my two bank cards do not record anything approximating my biological sex.

In an earlier group, I heard noble Lords opposite speak very compellingly about what the police are up against and how they are tearing their hair out because of the bureaucracy. Last week, I agreed with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, in particular and other noble Lords opposite when they spoke to an amendment to ensure that, were there to be digital ID, the police could not demand that information on request in the street. A number of noble Lords made very strong and passionate speeches on that issue.

I wonder about the workability and the wider consequences of the amendment, were it to be added to primary legislation. It is very broad in scope, dealing with anybody who is subject to arrest or a charge or caution for any offence. It would place a firm obligation on the police to record the person’s birth sex and any discrepancy between that and what the person identifies as or what is on any documents that they present. How on earth is this to work without, I suspect, far more intrusive searching than is necessary for every offence, from a minor public order protest offence to shoplifting to insider trading? In each scenario, the police would be required to make a determination of the person’s biological sex, requiring a fairly intrusive examination and challenging and questioning. That would be quite a traumatic and degrading experience for anyone and might be disproportionate to the offence being investigated.

I agree that crime can be highly gendered; we know that because all we have learned about violence against women and girls, but I fail to see that this kind of determination is necessary at the point of arrest for insider dealing or even for a protest offence. And, if we are talking about headaches for the police, I can imagine in a large protest every arrestee being briefed by their comrades and colleagues deliberately to identify in a mischievous way just to give the police a headache.

I ask noble Lords to think again about the contradictions in the positions that they are taking on this very long Bill. Workability, proportionality and whether this kind of intrusion into the lives of not just people who have changed sex or are transexual but of anybody who is subject to arrest and charge, particularly a woman with short hair, for example. I am reading stories about women who have had mastectomies for breast cancer being challenged in gym changing rooms because of the way they look.

I ask noble Lords to think about the wider consequences and the proportionality of what they propose.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. All of us who care about the safety, security, integrity and autonomy of women are also concerned about, for instance, a so-called trans-inclusive strip search policy which allows, for instance, a 6 foot 4 inch man who self-identifies as a woman to search a very vulnerable young woman at a police station. That is an issue of great concern, and were we to adopt this amendment, it might be ameliorated.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention, but that is a separate issue—it is about who is allocated to which duty at the police station, and it is perfectly reasonable for the police themselves to organise who conducts a strip search and who conducts a strip search on whom. That is not what the first or second version of the amendment is about; it is about an obligation on the police to make a determination of the biological sex of anybody they are arresting, charging or cautioning. It comes from noble Lords who, as I understand it, oppose compulsory digital ID that could conceivably require some determination at the point of registration. I applauded those compelling speeches last week from noble Lords about that being too much of an intrusion on the citizen who is innocent until proved guilty at the point of encounter with the police. How are the police going to do this?

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

I have never spoken in this Chamber on digital ID; I want to make that clear for the record, because the noble Baroness used the plural in talking about all those present. I also want to come back on her very emotional intervention, for which I am grateful as she clearly feels very passionately about this. Most of us have more confidence in the police than she may be demonstrating, because a lot of this is common sense, as the public at large understand. Some 50% of the population are women and girls, and they deserve to be protected. The number of people we are referring to is very small, but among that number are some really bad actors. This is a foundational principle of our criminal justice system, so how does she square the emotional circle in saying that this is not possible without infringing rights?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

As a woman, I have often been called emotional in debate, but that is the nature of the patriarchy. I did not mean to be emotional; I am just trying to ask about the practicality of this proposed obligation on the police to be the determiners of the biological sex of a person they arrest, not for sex offences but for any offence. I heard in some of the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for example on the importance of knowing as much about a prisoner as possible, an argument for making a clear determination in a prison setting, because one needs to determine who should be imprisoned with whom. I understand that. I can certainly envisage this being highly proportionate and relevant for arrest and investigation for sex offences, but that is not the breadth of this proposal. This is for any arrest, charge, caution or suspect, which would be overbroad and a complete administrative and practical nightmare for police officers.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

Can the noble Baroness clarify a couple of things? First, does she recognise any problems at all about the data as it is presently collected—in different forms by different police forces, and then used as national crime data as though it is reliable and consistent? Does she have any qualms? I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, would be happy to work with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, as great legal minds working together, emotionally or non-emotionally, on better wording. I can understand that, but the import of this is the data.

Secondly, the noble Baroness rightly points out that many of us are committed to campaigning against violence against women and girls. How can we reliably know how many women and girls are victims of such violence or who the perpetrators of that violence are? We cannot just assert it unless we have reliable statistical data. That is the point of the Sullivan review, which I hope she would show some respect towards even if she is not quite clear that she supports this amendment.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

To be clear, a perpetrator is someone who is convicted, not anyone who is arrested. As I tried to suggest in response to the comments about incarceration, it is much easier to justify greater intrusion at the point of conviction, particularly if someone is going to prison. I do not think this is about drafting; it is about the practical policy the amendments are proposing. How on earth is it viable to put this obligation to be the determiner and decision-maker over somebody’s biological sex? Is it reasonable to put that on every constable? I look forward to hearing from the noble Lord on the Opposition Front Bench, because he served as a police officer for many years and with some distinction. He may know better than I whether this will be welcome for police officers in their everyday duties, for every arrest and every offence.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I have attached my name to this amendment. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, who has been courageously raising these issues of gender identity and sex, over many years and before it was fashionable, through the prism of wishing to protect the safety and security of women. I applaud her for that. I also thank my noble friend Lady Cash, who speaks with great professional expertise and experience.

Notwithstanding the passionate case put by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, it is surely the case that policy, particularly when we are dealing with sensitive issues such as crime data and violence against women and girls, which is rightly a government priority, should be formulated and delivered on the basis of robust, peer-reviewed, empirical evidence. Who can logically argue against that? That is what the amendment is principally about.

We have heard about the Sullivan standard. The context in which we are working in putting forward this amendment is that sex is a protected characteristic and the Equality Act 2010 has been clarified by the Supreme Court. It is extremely disappointing that the Equalities Minister, Bridget Phillipson, continues to obfuscate and delay proper timely guidance being issued by a number of bodies in respect of, for instance, access to single-sex spaces. The Supreme Court stated plainly that under the Equality Act, “sex” refers to the material reality of being female or male. That determines how single-sex spaces function in a mixed-sex society, from women’s changing rooms to prison, and justifies excluding men where doing so is necessary and proportionate. That remains the case, which is why this amendment is very important. It is in that context that it would hopefully be incorporated into the legislation.

As we know, the Sullivan review was commissioned in February 2024 with the aims of identifying obstacles to accurate data collection and research on sex and gender identity in public bodies and the research system, and setting out good practice guidance for how to collect data on sex and gender identity. Sullivan recommended that:

“Data on sex should be collected by default in all research and data collection commissioned by government and quasi-governmental organisations … The default target of any sex question should be sex (in other words, biological sex, natal sex, sex at birth). Questions which combine sex with gender identity, including gender identity as recognised by a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) have a mixed target”.


She also recommended that:

“The Home Secretary should issue a mandatory Annual Data Requirement (ADR) requiring the 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales and the British Transport Police (BTP) to record data on sex in all relevant administrative systems. Relatedly, police forces should cease the practice of allowing changes to be made to individual sex markers on the Police National Computer (PNC)”.


This is about public trust. That is why my noble friend is quite right to refer to the situation of Police Scotland, which in November 2025 moved officially to record the biological sex of all suspects. The chief constable stated that it will ensure that

“by recording accurately biological sex, our crime data is accurate”.

The Scottish experience proves that it is possible to maintain a respect-based approach in person, using preferred pronouns in custody, while ensuring that the official record reflects the material facts needed for “statistical rigour”. The deputy chief constable of Police Scotland, Alan Speirs, confirmed that recent legal rulings provide the necessary clarity that “sex” in law refers to biology. This gives police the mandate to record it as such without infringing on the Human Rights Act or the Equality Act.

If police forces do the wrong thing on this, it can result in calamitous situations. I declare my interest as a member, at least for the next month, of the British Transport Police Authority. The British Transport Police, without any proper guidance from the National Police Chiefs’ Council or Ministers, decided unilaterally in autumn 2024 to launch a transitioning and non-binary search guidance policy, which meant that even individuals without a GRC were permitted to search anyone, including a woman, provided that the person doing the searching, for instance, said that they were a woman—even though they were a biological man.

That advice was quickly rescinded. I argued, as a member of the authority, that it was a disastrous mistake. It cost many thousands of tax pounds in legal fees that the force has had to pay as a result. The organisation Sex Matters launched a possible judicial review against that decision. It took the focus away from policing, front-line activities and operational efforts in order to engage in virtue signalling on the basis of the preferences of the chief constable and the senior officers at the British Transport Police. It did not do anything about the 11% clear-up rate for offences of violence against women and girls that, unfortunately, remains prevalent on the transport network in this country.

I cannot understand how any noble Lord, on the basis of tackling crime and the objective of having the data available to allocate resources properly, can realistically argue against the amendment because it has the background of the Sullivan review and Ministers’ acceptance of the Supreme Court ruling in 2025. On that basis, the Ministers should look benignly on the amendment, because it is not onerous and draconian; it is realistic, fact-based and based on empirical research. Therefore, it should be adopted because, if nothing else, it would greatly improve the efficacy of this largely important Bill, which we on this side support. It would mean that police officers could properly address the issues with the facts behind them, rather than the ideological absolutism that unfortunately marked much of the debate and the hostility to collecting data in the criminal justice system on the basis of gender identity rather than sex. It is a good amendment, and I hope that the Ministers will be able to support it.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I will not detain the Committee—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

The noble Lord was not here at the start of the debate.

[Baroness Donaghy (Lab)]

The noble Lord was not here at the start of the debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

It is Front-Bench speeches.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

It is Front-Bench speeches.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

The noble Lord has the right to speak in Committee, of course. Conventionally, we tend not to hear from Back-Benchers after the Front Benches have started winding, but of course he has the right.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 438C in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, on the recording of ethnicity in police data. I do not profess to have the noble Baroness’s expertise in this area in terms of her work at the Equality and Human Rights Commission or as a distinguished lawyer, but her aspiration to have clear, consistent and transparent data is increasingly important for politics and with the public, which is why I wanted to speak.

Following on from the Casey review, the then Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, announced that collecting ethnicity and nationality data in child sexual abuse and exploitation cases would become a mandatory requirement. This recommendation to collect targeted information was made after the review had found that there was a paucity of data nationally concerning the ethnicity of perpetrators who were part of the rape grooming gangs. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, had found that, as we have already heard, only three local policing areas, Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire and South Yorkshire, had such data.

The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, concluded that while this was sufficient evidence to show that there were “disproportionate numbers” of men from Asian and specifically Pakistani heritage among the suspects, as well as those convicted, that conclusion had been avoided for too long. She criticised official “obfuscation” that misled the public.

Yvette Cooper concluded:

“While much more robust national data is needed, we cannot and must not shy away from these findings”.


I think that sums up a very positive development. It recognises that we need to collect more data on ethnicity if we are not to get ourselves into a political scandal, which the grooming gangs question was, and not to obscure the detail. Local residents, members of the public and, of course, victims felt very frustrated that these things were not allowed to come out.

With much more acceptance of the positive role of acknowledging ethnicity and data in the wind, we should look at expanding that. This much more open approach now needs to be applied to crime statistics more generally. In fact, in this new atmosphere, the issue has also affected policing. In the wake of the Southport murders of those three little girls, the police slowness in releasing the details of the suspected perpetrator, Axel Rudakubana, when he was arrested, caused immense political tensions, as we know. The almost wilfully misleading description of the suspect as a 17 year-old from Lancashire who was originally from Cardiff led to a sort of pseudo form of misinformation, creating an information vacuum that led to false rumours. Misinformation started online that the killer was a Muslim asylum seeker, which was completely incorrect.

Accurate data and accurate descriptions play a valuable role. The Met Police chief, Sir Mark Rowley, declared that it was right to release the ethnicity of suspects, pointing out the importance of being

“more transparent in terms of the data”

that the police release. This amendment is trying to make sure that the data collected is accurate. It is not just a debate about it being released.

The Southport incidents led to guidance being developed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing, recognising public concerns, to ensure that police processes are fit for purpose in an age of rapid information spread. But I do not think that this response should just be about combating misinformation—that should not be the main driver. In order for us to have accurate information, the main driver should be that the public have a right to know and understand offender and victim profiles accurately. The police, very specifically, need to understand the data to aid in the prevention and detection of crimes. It is arguable whether decisions to release information should be left up to police forces—that is not what we are concerned with here—but data collection certainly needs to be mandated, and a failure to act on this can lead to tensions.

I want to counter one thing. In some of this debate, campaigners have tried to suggest that such data collection may overly encourage focusing on racial backgrounds, fuelling right-wing conspiracy theories or pandering to racism. I do not think that is fair. Not a week goes by without the public asking questions about incidents because they are concerned for the safety of their communities. Sometimes that involves ethnicity. The noble Baroness, Lady Cash, made it clear that this is much broader than the issues that I have raised. This is also about the ethnicity of victims and ensuring that people from different ethnic backgrounds are not discriminated against or unfairly treated by the police. We have to be much more open and not shy away from or be frightened by this kind of data—it is essential for good policing and for reassuring the public that we are not trying to hide behind not revealing or not collecting ethnicity data for political or ideological ends, as we did with the grooming gangs.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, this amendment focuses on the recording of ethnicity in police data—not the sensitive, balanced issue of when to publish. I rather agree with what I understood her remarks to be about that: it is probably best left in operational police hands, because there are sensitivities about it. The recording of ethnicity has been a controversial subject in different jurisdictions over the years. Parts of continental Europe—Germany, for example, for obvious historical reasons—take a very different view to recording ethnic data. But I think there is value in having some recording of ethnicity in police data, not least as a means of attempting to grapple with race discrimination, for example, in stop and search.

My question is about subsection (2) of the new clause proposed by Amendment 438C. Again, it is this issue of police observation rather than self-identification. The amendment focuses on the 18 categories in the census. We are all familiar with that census and often fill out questionnaires that look at those 18 subcategories. That is one thing when you are self-identifying—it is very easy for me, for example, to use the census categories, because I know my story and I know my history. But I challenge even noble Lords and noble friends in this Committee, without the benefit of Wikipedia or smartphones, or stuff written about me and my history, to determine which of those 18 categories I would best fit into.

I worry about how this would work if an officer must record the police-observed ethnicity of the individual using the 18-category classification employed in the most recent census for England and Wales, including determining whether somebody is British Asian, British Pakistani, mixed race, et cetera—

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

As we are in Committee, I welcome the noble Baroness’s comments on this. The 18-category classification is the gold standard of identification. In practice, a police officer may have a conversation with a suspect. Reality needs to be injected with a bit of common sense. If an individual does not know how to self-identify, a conversation helping them to locate their particular geography or identity may be facilitated with the common sense of the officer concerned. If there is an alternative, I welcome it, because I hear that the noble Baroness is in agreement on the principle and the general direction. What therefore would be a good system?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash. At the police level—at the level of arrest—it has to be some version of self-identification. The police need to ask—and, if necessary, have the conversation—but it cannot be that the police observe, decide and adjudicate. That is not viable. The noble Baroness may disagree with me, but if this is going to happen in relation to race and ethnicity it will probably have to be self-identification. As I say, anything else at the level of arrest or charge is not practical.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I declare my interest that my son is a senior lecturer at Swansea University, specialising in online radicalisation. He advises a number of Governments and parliaments, including our own, and other public bodies, including on Prevent.

In the previous group, we noted that the police are in the middle of changing the databases that they use for recording data and moving to the new law enforcement data service. The details are due to be published very shortly, we hope, in March this year. It is important that proper data is collected on ethnicity. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, quoting the review of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, because those points are extremely important.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, these Benches support Amendments 474, 475, 438ED and 438EE, which all stand in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and to which I am pleased and privileged to have added my name alongside the noble Baronesses, Lady Morgan of Cotes and Lady Barran. I pay tribute to the relentless campaigning on behalf of bereaved families by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and to her utterly moving and convincing introduction today. I also pay tribute to all those bereaved families who have fought for these provisions.

I associate myself with everything the noble Baroness said about the implementation of and the intent behind the Online Safety Act, which has not achieved what we all set out for it to do. Together, these amendments address a singular, tragic failure in our current justice system: the loss of vital digital evidence following the death of a child. There has been powerful testimony regarding what is called the suspension gap. That occurs when a coroner investigating the death of a child feels unable to issue a data preservation notice because a police investigation is technically active, yet the police might not have prioritised the securing of digital evidence. During this period of hesitation, data held by social media companies is deleted and the opportunity to understand the child’s final interactions is lost for ever.

Currently, many coroners remain unaware that they can request data preservation notices in the early stages of an investigation. We have heard heartbreaking reports from bereaved parents that coroners feel unable to act while police investigations are active. Because inquests are routinely suspended during these investigations, the data is often deleted due to account inactivity or routine system operations before the coroner can issue an information notice.

The Molly Rose Foundation and the 5Rights Foundation have been clear. Automatic preservation is essential, because data is the key to joining the dots in these tragic cases. We cannot allow another child’s digital history and the truth about their death to vanish because of bureaucratic delay. As Ofcom has recently clarified, service providers are not required to retain data they do not already hold. They simply need to notify the regulator if information is missing. During recent consultations, major providers such as Meta and Microsoft did not object to preserving data from further back, provided it was still within their systems.

Too often, police seize a physical device but fail to notify Ofcom of potential breaches of the Online Safety Act. These amendments work in tandem. Amendments 474 and 475 would freeze the evidence automatically and provide the legal mechanism to preserve data. Amendments 438ED and 438EE would ensure that the police and coroners are fully aware of their responsibilities and protocols to collect that evidence. Together, they would ensure that potential online harm is treated with the same priority as a physical weapon in every investigation into a child’s death.

These amendments are about ensuring that our coroners system is fit for a digital age. They provide the speed and technical certainty required to support bereaved families in their pursuit of justice. We cannot continue to allow a lack of process to obscure the truth about why a child has died. We cannot allow the deletion of evidence to become the enemy of justice. I urge the Minister, as have the noble Baronesses, to accept these amendments as a necessary modernisation of our investigatory framework.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, if I needed persuading—and I am not sure I did—the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and her supporters have certainly persuaded me that there is a serious problem here. As legislators who spend hours in this Chamber, we all know that law without enforcement is a dead letter in a sealed book, and not what anyone wants to be spending their lives on. If, as it seems, there are gaps of responsibility and agency between coroners, the police, Ofcom and, dare I say it, the great big untouchable tech imperium that monetises our data and effectively monetises our lives, those gaps need to be dealt with.

Just as I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, not just for her commitment but for her expertise on online harms, I will say that my noble friend the Minister is probably one of the most expert and experienced criminal lawyers in your Lordships’ House. If these precise amendments are too broad and too onerous for catching children who, for example, were too young to have a device, I am sure that my noble friend the Minister will be able to address that. Between these noble Baronesses and other noble Lords of good faith, something can be done.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group and I am glad that my noble friends Lady Barran and Lady Morgan of Cotes have signed them on behalf of these Benches. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and, of course, to all the bereaved parents and family members who are campaigning still to tighten and enforce the law in this important area, based on their terrible experiences.

We know that there are some gaps in the law. The noble Baroness’s amendments address, first, implementation and making sure that coroners are aware of the powers that the Online Safety Act has given them. Very sensibly, her amendments are about spreading knowledge and awareness so that, on behalf of the families of young people who have lost their lives in these terrible ways, coroners can find out the truth and hold that to account. In some ways, that is the easier problem to solve. Of course, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said, the coroners are not technical experts: there is always a generational gap. The apps and the social media that are second nature to the young people using them can be mystifying to the parents, the coroners and the police who have to look into them in the most terrible circumstances. We need to make sure that everybody is aware of how the apps work and how the Online Safety Act works too.

The noble Baroness pointed out a trickier problem, which is the extraterritorial effect, particularly with relation to the law in the United States of America. She is right that the previous Government spoke to the previous US Administration about things such as the Stored Communications Act, which the noble Lord, Lord Allan of Hallam, raised in our debates on the Bill. It was a problem that we were aware of and, as the noble Baroness noted, there has been a change of government on both sides of the Atlantic.

Perhaps when the Minister responds, or perhaps later in writing, she will say a bit more about the changing dynamics and the discussions that are being had with the present US Administration. It is clearly having an effect on these cases; the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, mentioned the inquest into the sad death of Leo Barber, when the Schedule 5 notice was unable to be brought into effect. I would be keen to hear from the Minister, either today or later, about the more recent discussions that His Majesty’s Government have had with the US Administration on this important aspect.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 449, I will speak briefly to Amendment 454. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her support for Amendment 449. I have a nasty feeling that I may be uniting my noble friend Lord Cameron and the Minister in opposition to my amendments; I will forgive them on this occasion. I am also extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for his support on the previous group—I rather hope I might get some support from him on this occasion.

The purpose of Amendment 449 is to ensure that Parliament has as much information as possible before a decision to proscribe is made. I accept, of course, that it is not possible for Ministers to disclose in general debate all the information which they may have received in private and which, in their opinion, justifies proscription. I worked in the Home Office and the Foreign Office for around seven years, so I am under no illusions. Of course, the Minister, who has a similar track record, will be under no illusions either.

Having regard to the serious consequences of proscription, we need to do all that we reasonably can to ensure that, when a proscription order is made, Parliament is as well informed as it can be and that the justification for the order is well based. Otherwise, we are wholly reliant on the judgment of officials and Ministers. Without being unduly personal, on matters of such importance, I do not wish to be exclusively reliant on the judgments of Boris Johnson, Suella Braverman or Liz Truss—however informed and considered some may suppose them to have been.

Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee could provide a way forward. Amendment 449 would create a precondition to the Secretary of State’s ability to make a proscription order. Proposed new subsection (3A) would require that, if circumstances allow, before the Secretary of State makes an order, the Secretary of State must place before the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament

“a statement of the reasons for making the order”

and, in such circumstances, a report of that committee must be published before the order is made. I accept that there may be circumstances in which the urgency of the matter demands more immediate action. Proposed new subsections (3B) and (3C) address that eventuality. In effect, the procedure would be the same as that provided for in proposed new subsection (3A), but it would be retrospective.

In either event, the Intelligence and Security Committee will be able to examine the stated reasons in much greater detail than the House could do in public session. A degree of scrutiny and interrogation should be possible. The report of the ISC could be very important, reassuring Parliament as to the propriety of the order if that is the opinion of the ISC, or alerting Parliament if the ISC is not supportive of the order. I do not pretend that this would be a complete safeguard. However, it would certainly be an improvement. On that basis, I commend Amendment 449 to the Committee.

On Amendment 454, I think I can anticipate the arguments that will be advanced by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. She and I agree on an awful lot, and I know I shall support her on this matter.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a member of your Lordships’ Delegated Powers Committee. Of course, I speak for myself only but very much with those concerns in mind.

As noble Lords have heard from my friend who is also noble—but I cannot call him a noble friend—the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, I will speak to his Amendment 449, which I support, and my Amendment 454. I am grateful for his support and, on the latter amendment, for that of my noble friend Lord Hain, who is very sensibly not in his place at this hour. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame.

In contrast with the previous group—I am sad that there are not more participants from the previous group here—these are modest process amendments that are capable of uniting everyone who spoke for and against the various amendments in that group. Both these amendments are about increasing parliamentary involvement in and scrutiny of exceptional executive power—in particular, the power to proscribe an organisation as a terrorist organisation under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act.

To be clear—this may surprise some Members of the Committee—I believe that such powers are capable of being proportionate. In a democracy, no one should be allowed to organise a private army, in particular one that targets humans, and a democracy is proportionately able to respond by proscribing a terrorist organisation. It is none the less an awesome and exceptional power for the Executive to say that people will be prosecuted not just for their terrorist actions but for fairly broad and loose associations with people who may or may not be guilty of terrorist offences.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The time gap between informing and debate would be for the Security Minister to determine. In most cases, I would expect—without wanting to put a burden on my noble friend Lord Beamish as the chair of the committee—that the chair would probably want to contribute to that debate and would be able to inform the House if they felt there were issues they wished to draw to the attention of the House. Although my noble friend Lord Beamish is the chair who sits in this House, there will be a senior Member from the House of Commons who would also be able to answer to the Commons on any issue. So the noble Viscount is right, but the spirit of his amendment is met—though obviously that is for him to make a judgment on.

Amendment 454 had support across the Committee from the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Verdirame, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti asked for proscription orders to include one single organisation at a time. Historically, proscription orders have come in groups on many occasions. At the beginning of 2001, some 20 groups were proscribed in one order that took effect under the first statutory instrument made under that order. Four more organisations were proscribed on 1 November 2002, 15 were prescribed on 14 October 2005, and so on. In the interests of parliamentary time and the speed and flexibility needed to put those orders down, that was the case then and it was the case when we tabled the order with three organisations in June and July last year in this House and, at the same time, in the House of Commons. Security issues sometimes require a speedy response, and those issues were dealt with in that way for that reason.

I will give my noble friend one more reason, which she may want to reflect on. There is a threshold for proscription under the 2000 Act. Whether noble Lords like it or not, the decision of the Government was that the three organisations bundled together in the debate in July of last year had all met that threshold. I was available, as was the Security Minister in the House of Commons, to answer questions about each and all those organisations. The advice from the security services and officials, and ministerial examination and judgment of that advice, was that all those organisations crossed the threshold. Individuals might have wanted to vote against each one individually, but if they had, they would have been voting against exactly the same principle in each case—that the organisation had crossed the threshold.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister as always for his patience, fortitude and engagement but, with respect, the historical precedent does not answer the constitutional question: would it not be better for Parliament to have an up-and-down vote? Given that Parliament has already decided that it has a role in approving these proscriptions, would it not be a more meaningful approval if it was one organisation per order? Multiple orders can be drafted and signed on the same day. I say this having worked as a Home Office lawyer, including on terrorism matters.

Finally, I say to my noble friend, who I respect so much: this is not about him and it is not about the current Home Secretary. This is about the future and about the checks and balances that noble Lords opposite spoke about so passionately.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

425: After Clause 166, insert the following new Clause—
“Service as a police officer: aggravating factor in criminal sentencing(1) On sentencing for any criminal offence, current or past service as a police officer shall be presumed to be an aggravating factor.(2) Where in a particular case, a court decides against any such aggravation justifying an increased penalty, it shall state the reasons for this decision.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause and another in the name of Baroness Chakrabarti relate to the criminal sentencing of serving or retired police officers. This amendment creates a rebuttable presumption that such service should be an aggravating factor.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I will rise slowly to allow for the appropriate exodus.

I have Amendments 425 and 426 in this group. They are probing amendments only, and therefore I do not propose to detain the Committee for too long, not least as these follow the excellent previous debate, for which I commend the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, and all the participants. Many of the sentiments in that discussion informed my thinking behind these two amendments.

Let me explain. Like other noble Lords, I have a huge amount of respect for the overwhelming majority of police officers in this country, perhaps best exemplified by those who keep us safe outside and inside this building, and indeed those former officers who contribute so ably to debates in your Lordships’ House. Unfortunately, that is not the whole story of policing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As I just said, it can be done in court in front of a judge on appeal. The decisions are taken by the police and crime commissioner and/or the Home Secretary, who is accountable for those matters, and the Government intend to hold to that position. It may not satisfy the noble Baroness, as ever, but I look forward to her support on the key issue, which is improving vetting to make sure that we do not have those significant bad apples in the police force in the first place. That is our key focus in the White Paper and the measures in the Bill.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. I said these were probing amendments because I thought it was important that we discussed in Committee on this Bill the issues of police standards, discipline and public confidence, as well as all the other measures that we are constantly debating to do with additional police powers. I am so grateful.

I say gently to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, that in his response to the pension forfeiture provision he spoke as if this was not already an established principle. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, got it right when she said the issue here is about how you will inspire most public confidence when forfeiture proceedings are happening. Would there not be some benefit in this being part of the sentence and therefore being given greater publicity because it has been announced in an open Crown Court? I think that is really the only difference between us.

I am grasping at any straw of how we might try to improve confidence in policing in this country, where, year on year, this is not happening. I was particularly grateful to my noble friend the Minister for, in a sense, responding to the provocation of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, to talk about what he plans with the White Paper and so on. I am sure we all look forward to engaging with all that. For the moment, though, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 425 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased to follow the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, and share some of his concerns about this amendment. Before I share those concerns, I ask the noble Lords opposite to explain the relationship and potential contradictions between this amendment and their amendment in the next group on digital identity. It is a shame that these amendments do not sit in a single group, because it would have been easier to expose the thinking behind and relationship between them. That amendment, prohibiting the police requiring someone to show a digital identity document in the event that they are stopped and searched, could have been drafted by my former colleagues at Liberty. This amendment, on diluting protections against arbitrary stop and search, would certainly not have been drafted by my former colleagues at Liberty, so noble Lords opposite seem to be pointing in two different directions when it comes to the relationship between the citizen and the state on the street.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

As usual, the noble Baroness is making a cogent and persuasive case, but I do not think she concedes that we are not talking about suspicionless searches; we are talking about an expectation that violence will happen—there will be a violent incident rather than a seriously violent incident.

I just leave her with the figures: in London, from 2021, there were 311,352 stop and searches, and they had fallen to 135,739 in 2024. At the same time, there was an 86% rise in knife crime. The argument that those of us on this side are making is that there has to be a balance. None of us wants racially profiled overpolicing, but at the same time, we have to find a reason why when we reduce stop and searches, there is an inevitable increase in knife crime.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I hear the noble Lord, but with respect, this provision relates to suspicionless stop and search. That is a term we use to describe a stop and search power that does not require reasonable suspicion that the person who is about to be stopped and searched is a criminal, is equipped or whatever it is.

The power in Section 60, therefore, is a suspicionless stop and search power, which is why it needs to be circumscribed and why there have to be certain conditions met before an area can be designated, because the normal law of the land, as noble Lords will recognise, is that anywhere in the land a constable can stop and search an individual whom they reasonably suspect of carrying a knife or being otherwise involved in criminality.

[Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)]

Section 60 in and of itself is a special circumstance, so whether it is suspicionless needs to be looked at in that context, and I would just like to offer the noble Baroness this context. There is no such thing as non-serious violence. Let us be very clear, when we are talking about the impact of knife carrying in particular, that any knife that has ended up in the body of a person has been shown to multiple members of the community and been used to create terror before that tragedy has happened. The idea that a stop and search is only potent when it leads to an arrest or a charge is simply incorrect. Having been a youth worker for over 35 years, I have worked with some of the most gang-involved people in the entire country, and they will tell you that they will be armed because they do not believe they are going to be stopped. Every time you do a stop and search, it sends a ripple, particularly to those who need to hear the ripple, that it could happen, so it lowers their propensity to go armed. Just because it does not lead to a charge, that does not mean it has not been effective.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention, but I return to my central point, which is, as he pointed out in his intervention, that the normal law of the land is for stop and search on reasonable suspicion that the individual in question is a cause for concern: “I have reasonable suspicion that that person may be carrying a knife, et cetera, or otherwise involved in criminality”. These are special powers given to a relatively junior police officer; this is not a chief constable, let alone a magistrate or a judge. It allows a police officer to change the law of the land for a time-limited period for that area, to change what the stop and search regime is in that area. It is quite right that a power of that kind be tightly circumscribed because of the problems that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, spoke about and because citizens do have rights to go about their business without fear of arbitrary stop and search.

This brings me back to my question about the relationship between Amendment 411, which is in this group on its own, and Amendment 415, which noble Lords opposite have in a separate group, and the apparent dichotomy between them. Amendment 415 says that, where there is a stop and search, an officer should not be allowed to require the presentation of digital ID; it does not even say “compulsory digital ID”. So if, as I think the Government now propose, digital ID becomes available to people to partake of, if they want, as a more convenient method of ID, we are going to have circumstances where noble Lords opposite will have more routine stop and search, but when a stop and search happens, an officer would not be able to ask the person searched to identify themselves if all they have with them is digital ID. That seems like a contradiction to me. I, for one, have always been very concerned and opposed to compulsory single identifiers, not least for the reason that they will lead to routine stop and search with people required to identify themselves to the police when they have done nothing wrong. I should be very interested if noble Lords opposite could square the relationship between this amendment and the one that follows.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, there is now considerable evidence about how stop and search powers are used in practice, their impact and long-term consequences, not least in building trust, which is so vital for effective community policing. Stop and search powers, especially under Section 60—suspicionless powers —already fall disproportionately on marginalised communities, particularly black and minority ethnic young men. Lowering the threshold from “serious violence” to “violence” can only increase the frequency and breadth of those powers and with it the disproportionality. This is not an abstract civil liberties concern but goes directly to trust and confidence.

It is also just 18 months since the Home Office accepted the findings of a police inspectorate report that identified serious shortcomings in the use of Section 60 powers, including low arrest and seizure rates for weapons, inadequate training and failures to adhere to statutory duties, such as PACE Code A or voluntary frameworks such as College of Policing APP guidance.

From a Liberal Democrat perspective, the test for expanding intrusive powers is a simple one. Is there a clear and compelling operational case, supported by evidence, that the existing powers are inadequate and that widening them will improve outcomes without unacceptable collateral damage to rights and community relations? We do not believe that the case has been made here. What is on offer is a lower legal bar for the most intrusive stop and search powers we have, imposed on communities that already experience it acutely, with no serious account taken of the long-term impact on policing by consent. On that basis, we cannot support the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I say this as best I can to the Committee: to my knowledge, there has been no request from the police for that reduction in threshold to allow them to exercise further stop and search powers. Indeed, as has been shown over the last 15 or 16 years, the use of stop and search has significantly decreased to around the 5,000 figure, as I mentioned earlier. I hear what the noble Lord says, but I am not sure that the police themselves want to exercise that power to control crowds at football matches. I will leave it at that, if I may.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Does my noble friend the Minister agree with me on this issue? I think he does, because he said earlier, when the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, was momentarily not with us, that minor scuffles are not serious violence and that stabbings and so on clearly are. To my own mind, a common assault between people outside the pub on a Friday night probably does not meet the threshold of serious violence, but knife robbery et cetera does.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I did indicate that minor scuffles would not be seen as serious violence. I am not trying to determine from this Dispatch Box the use of a Section 60 power by a police officer on the ground because of the level of violence the police have witnessed and wish to act upon. If we look at the figure 16 years ago, it was significantly higher than in the 12 months prior to now, at just over 5,000. The law has not changed but, going back to the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, police practice and police assessments have meant that they do not need to use that power. In parallel with that, the Government believe that if we wish to make an impact on knife crime, stop and search is a tool in extremis but better education, youth futures programmes and policing hot spots are more effective ways of reducing the problem overall. With that, I hope that the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness: I read that quote as well and was very worried about it, and the idea that we should all aspire to total surveillance and living in a panopticon. When I saw that—it has been doing the rounds on social media—I assumed it was fake news. I cannot believe that from a Labour Cabinet Minister, even from a Home Secretary—we know funny things happen to people when they go in the Home Office; I was there myself for a bit. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will assure us when he responds that there is no question of building a total surveillance state or, indeed, Bentham’s panopticon. I share the noble Baroness’s concerns, and I am grateful to her for raising them.

I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for, I think, answering the question that I put to him in the previous group, which is that his objection is to a single compulsory identifier. I share his concerns if that is the problem. I would not want us all to have to carry a single compulsory identifier, digital or otherwise, which becomes a licence to live that you can have demanded of you at any time. The compulsory element was always the problem, not having an optional identifier —for instance, if you choose to have your passport or driving licence on your phone instead of as a physical document. I understand that even lots of noble Lords now pay for their refreshments with their mobile phone; this is the world that we live in. The problem is with a single compulsory identifier, not with the option of having a digital ID, as opposed to a paper ID. I hope he will nod and indicate that we are in the same place on that.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I also support Amendment 415 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which seeks to introduce a new safeguard for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 regarding the potential future use of digital identification by law enforcement. I too am grateful for his explanation about the single identifier. I remind your Lordships that there were a number of amendments in some Home Office Bills about three years ago when the Home Office was trying to get access to DVLA data and, indeed, to personal medical data for anyone who might have been present at the scene of a possible crime—not the victim or the possible perpetrator, but anyone who was literally just present. I am glad that, in opposition, his party has decided to change its approach on this. It is very welcome.

I also echo the good news that the amendment is, I hope, fully redundant because of the Government’s announcement, but I look forward to making sure that some of the very minor concerns being expressed are recognised by the Government.

This amendment would provide the protection to individuals, should the Government introduce a digital identity document scheme, that a constable would be expressly prohibited from requiring a person to produce such a document on request or asking for it to be produced for inspection. Crucially, it would also prevent the police using

“any information contained within, or obtained from, a digital identity card for the purposes of investigating a criminal offence”.

That echoes the amendments that our Benches tabled to earlier Home Office Bills.

We on these Benches are fundamentally opposed to any form of compulsory digital ID. We must ensure that a digital identity scheme does not become a tool for “papers, please” policing in a digital format. As organisations such as Big Brother Watch have warned, the expansion of digital identification, such as the proposed access to the DVLA database for facial recognition, risks creating a huge and disproportionate surveillance power that, in effect, places the majority of law-abiding citizens in a permanent digital police line-up without their consent. Can the Minister confirm that it is the case that surveillance will not be used?

The Government have previously suggested that digital ID could serve as an alternative form of ID for specific purposes such as age verification for online sales. However, without the explicit prohibition contained in Amendment 415, there is a significant risk of mission creep. If we allow the police routinely to use digital ID as part of their investigative toolkit, we fundamentally shift the relationship between the individual and the state. This amendment is not about obstructing modern policing; it is about ensuring that privacy rights and civil liberties remain the default. We must codify these protections now to ensure that any future digital identity framework cannot be weaponised into a widespread surveillance system.

From these Benches we are glad about the Government U-turn, but we need more detail to ensure that those protections remain. It is for Parliament and not for operational police discretion to set the boundaries for how the state identifies its citizens. I urge the Committee to support this amendment and hope that the Ministers will give us an encouragement that it is not needed.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, that was a powerful speech, but it really is not the case that all protesters are in the position of Martin Luther King, Emmeline Pankhurst, Mahatma Gandhi and the noble Baroness herself. There are protesters who have good reason for wishing to conceal their identity. If I am a protester against the current regime in Tehran and join a protest in London in order to express my views, I will be genuinely and properly concerned that my identity being revealed may well lead to action being taken against my family and associates in Tehran, and I have a very good reason for not wanting to have my identity disclosed.

I am concerned that Clause 118(2) is too narrow. It provides a defence for a person who has concealed their identity: showing that the reason they are wearing a mask is for

“a purpose relating to the health of the person or others, the purposes of religious observance, or … a purpose relating to the person’s work”.

Those are the only defences. That does not cover the example I gave—I could give many other examples—of the protester concerned about what is going on in Tehran. So I suggest to the Minister that, although I do not support the wish of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, to remove these clauses, I do think she has a point about the narrow scope of the defences in the clause.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made her point so ably that I was not tempted to speak, until I heard the counter-speech from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. It is simply ahistoric to suggest that the suffragettes—those protesters who everybody loves now but who were once incarcerated and tortured by the British state—

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

They went on hunger strike.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Indeed, they went on hunger strike. It is simply ahistoric to suggest there was not a significant clandestine element to their operations. I am sure that, if one were to examine other examples the noble Lord gave, one would find greater complexity than he offered us in his very glib comments about protest.

Just minutes ago in this Chamber, noble Lords from across the House expressed their horror at what has been happening in Iran. On any given day in your Lordships’ House, similar comments will be made about Hong Kong or protests anywhere else in the world. It is of concern that organisations that many of us respect, such as JUSTICE, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and so on, are now writing very concerning reports about silencing the streets of the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I am quite open- minded about the clause on face coverings and whether it is a good or bad thing to have face coverings at protests. I have just a couple of points for the Government in considering whether to change the provisions in any way.

First, imposing more conditions, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggested, to narrow the provisions might be laudable but will make them harder and harder to enforce. The officers on the street can take action only on what they see, and if the person alleges that they have a member of their family in Iran, or wherever it happens to be, it will be quite hard for the officer on the street, so it may make no difference at all to the initial action. At the ongoing investigation and prosecution that might follow, they may then want to rebut—if they intend to—the claim that that defence is available. It will impose more burden on the prosecution, so we must be very careful about the conditions that we impose on it.

Secondly, although we tend to think about face masks being worn by only some people in the crowd, we could anticipate that everybody in the crowd wears a mask. If that is the case, it can be quite intimidating, and it makes normal policing quite difficult to embark on. For example, one way in which you would notice if someone has a bail condition that they should not attend a protest is whether you can recognise them. In terms of general investigation, if everybody has a mask, it is quite difficult to distinguish one person from another. We might anticipate some of the things that we saw in the 1930s. We have the Public Order Act 1936, which was intended to stop people from wearing uniforms. It could become a kind of uniform, or at least an aspect of a uniform, to signify support for a political purpose.

This clause needs some thought if it is to go forward. I ask for as much consideration as possible for the enforcers, who will be criticised if they get it wrong, but we can anticipate now whether they might be left in an invidious position.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I rather agree with the noble Lord’s concern about how ever more protest laws are to be operated in practice by police officers, who are dealing with a growing and ever more complex statute book. But I wonder what he thinks about the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, that the powers already exist to require and direct people to remove a mask, which could be done to individuals. In the hypothetical situation that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, gives of everyone wearing a mask as a form of intimidatory uniform, what does he think about the fact that the power already exists? What is an officer to do, faced with those duplicative powers and offences?

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

It is a fair question. I would only say that, generally speaking, if you have a large crowd and a significant number within it wearing masks, the chances of you telling them all to take them off are very limited. If I understand the proposal, it is to prevent people arriving at the march with a mask rather than having to deal with it once they arrive. If you have to deal with it, you will have to deal with it. That is the only thing I would say: having allowed people to mask up, you cannot then expect officers to deal with a crowd of 5,000 or 6,000—it is just impractical. That is the argument against it, but I understand why the argument is made.

--- Later in debate ---

I totally reject the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that somehow I am in a Nineteen Eighty-Four dystopia by producing some limits on protest where there is criminal action taking place. It is perfectly reasonable for Parliament to determine legislation as to how and when protest is policed, so that the right to protest is upheld to the same point that the rights to enjoy life or to not have criminal activity are upheld.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am so grateful to my noble friend the Minister for giving way. I am glad to hear him restate his commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights. He will know that that statement at the beginning of any Bill is not a certificate of compliance but a belief in the compliance of the contents of the Bill. I wonder whether my noble friend could help me understand whether there has been any assessment in the department of measures such as this in the hands of a future Government who do not share his commitment to human rights and how such powers might be used.

On the issue of having powers to limit expression when offences are taking place, as my noble friend said a couple of moments ago, I remind him that in Clause 119, which is the mechanism for designation, the test is not that offences are taking place; it includes preventing the possibility of offences. In relation to compliance, he will know that any limits on convention rights must be proportionate, yet the test for designation in Clause 119 is not proportionality but expedience. Can my noble friend help the Committee understand why the human rights language of proportionality has been substituted for the test of expedience?

Finally, can my noble friend say why protest has been singled out in this way and not, for example, carnivals, religious prayer vigils or other gatherings of people where they might conceal their identity?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There were a number of points there. If my noble friend will allow me, I intend to answer the points made during the course of the debate. I say to her straightaway that we have published our analysis of the ECHR obligations; I can refer her to it. I will ensure that if she does not have it to hand, I will send it to her. It is published and is available for that.

As I will come on to in a moment, the rights that we are seeking in this piece of legislation for protesters, the community, the Government and police forces are measured in a way that I believe is acceptable. In recent years, policing large-scale protests has posed significant challenges; the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, referred to that. While most participants exercise their rights peacefully and lawfully, a small minority have engaged in criminal acts while concealing their identity. It is because the police have highlighted this issue with existing powers to identify those committing offences during protests that we have brought these issues forward. It is essential that the police can identify those committing offences during protests, not only to ensure accountability and justice but to protect peaceful demonstrators and the wider public from harm.

As a whole, Clauses 118 to 120 strike a careful balance. This will not apply to all protests. It applies only to protests that have been designated by a senior police officer of inspector rank or above. In addition, as was mentioned by a number of contributors to the debate, although the police currently have powers to remove face coverings in designated areas, they themselves have said to us—this goes back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe—that those measures are not always effective in the context of managing protests. People often comply but then replace a face covering later, which is difficult to monitor in large gatherings. The new offence addresses this by making it unlawful to wear a face covering once a locality has been designated by a police officer—not by a Minister or by the Government—in the light of upholding rights as a whole.

That senior police officer, who will be at least of the rank of inspector, must reasonably believe that a protest is likely to occur, that it is likely to lead to criminal behaviour—that is the critical point, which comes to the contributions from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and others—and that it is necessary to act to prevent or reduce such offences. That is an important caveat, not the Nineteen Eighty-Four dystopia that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, seems to—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his detailed responses and for his patience in taking interventions. Could he in a moment deal with my point about why the word “expedient” has been used in Clause 119 rather than “proportionate”? He himself has talked of proportionality many times, and of course he will know that the test for lawful interference with convention rights is proportionality rather than expedience. And, in the light of comments made in this Committee by noble Lords such as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who does not oppose the provision outright, would he consider, between now and Report, adding an additional defence of fear of reprisal to the health provision, for example?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The wording in the Bill is the wording the Government have agreed. That is the position that we have taken. We may have a disagreement on that. If my noble friend wishes to put an amendment down on Report to change that wording, that is a matter for her. She has made a further suggestion about a further defence. Those are matters that I suggest should be considered by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. If she wishes to expediate that quickly, she has the opportunity along with anybody else to table an amendment on Report. But the Government have given serious consideration to this and Clauses 118, 119 and 120 are the result of those considerations. They are at the request of the police, they are proportionate, and they are, in my view, compliant with human rights. I commend them to the House and in a gentle way urge the noble Baroness, either today or in the future, not to seek to withdraw them.

--- Later in debate ---

I am deeply ashamed that even on my side of the House, people who associate themselves with the rights of workers to be able to work inside communities that are trying to express themselves can be intimidated by people. Giving this discretion to the police, who have had to experience this for a long period of time, is a very proportionate measure. I hope that the Government keep firm in rejecting the accounts that have been given by others as to why this needs any change.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, the Committee is in the business of precision and proportionality. Those two concepts have rightly been raised by a number of noble Lords and my noble friends. It is because of reasons of proportionality and precision that I agree that the concept of “the vicinity” is too vague and too broad. I say that while completely acknowledging that places of worship are sensitive places and that it is completely proportionate within the European Convention on Human Rights to give them some extra protection.

There is precedent in Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for the concepts of “area” and “vicinity” being too flabby and too broad. Noble Lords may remember that this allowed an area not defined to be designated for the purpose of suspicionless stop and search. In 2003, in response to the anti-arms demonstrations at the ExCeL centre in the Docklands, a number of protesters were stopped and searched and issued notices. Only through the parliamentary debates and litigation that followed did the public become aware that all of England and Wales had been designated during the Iraq war. That was the breadth of the area for suspicionless stop and search—a power that was used as an anti-protest power.

That does not mean that there cannot be limitations, but they need some definition. After many years of litigation in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, the UK Government were found wanting because of that breadth and the blanket nature of the power, because there was no definition. I am trying to help my noble friends in government by suggesting that concepts such as areas and vicinities will be better for definition, so I support my noble friend Lady Blower and commend her remarks in speaking to her amendment.

I also commend my noble friend Lord Hain and remind the Committee that he was not just an anti-apartheid activist in his day, digging up sports fields and whatever else he was digging up—

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

I was sitting on them, not digging them up.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am sorry. He was sitting on them. I do not mean to defame him.

My noble friend of course went on to be Northern Ireland Secretary and therefore has some understanding of the need to balance rights—the rights of peaceful dissent but also the rights of people to go about their business, particularly in their homes and places of worship and so on. That is proportionality and precision.

This vice of vagueness with the concept of “vicinity” is mirrored in the concept of “area” for the purposes of cumulative disruption. As with the Section 44 provision that ended up being impugned in the Strasbourg court, “area” for the purposes of cumulative disruption is not defined, so we are looking at a very broad power here. I say to noble Lords, with all solidarity with their concerns about, for example, synagogues and places of faith and worship, that provisions such as these can be applied as much to a counterprotest as to a protest, and to one group or another group at different times. When we legislate, we need to have a mind to how these powers might be used in the future.

To those noble Lords who spoke of a new quasi-terrorist proscription but for groups that do not quite meet the threshold—

[Lord Walney (CB)]

Not terrorist.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Not for terrorism but for extreme protest et cetera that by definition does not meet the test of terrorism but something less than that, I urge extreme caution. There is a reason why powers to proscribe have to date been limited to terrorist groups—that exceptional threat—and the reason is that guilt by association is extremely dangerous when you are dealing with broad communities, potentially millions of people, and protest movements.

I have no doubt that some of the activities by some suffragettes—and we saint them now; everyone in this Committee saints and canonises the suffragettes—would meet the terrorist threshold. But does that mean that we want to tar them all in the same way and suggest that the entire movement should be subject to proscription? I urge caution with that and with any amendments in this group that go further than is precise or proportionate.

House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 8.39 pm.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I of course wish the Committee a very happy Christmas when that moment comes, but it was not just in seasonal spirit that I signed the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough. As he indicated, free expression is a two-way street, and I suggest that it is a two-way street in at least two ways: first, because all democrats, of whichever side of the aisle, ought to guard it jealously, and, secondly, because it must be applied with an even hand, even to people, ideas and causes with which we seriously disagree.

Before entering your Lordships’ House, I worked for 15 years at Liberty, the National Council for Civil Liberties. In that time, I saw the concept of behaviour causing or even just likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress used and abused to arrest and even prosecute people in a way that I believe all Members of the Committee would consider abusive, certainly when applied to people like us or causes with which we agree.

“Alarm” and arguably even “distress”, as opposed to a reasonable fear of a threat or of harm, are very broad. Harassment is a course of conduct and therefore a bit more objective and less broad. Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 obviously create two specific criminal offences, but the rubric of “harassment, alarm or distress” also now forms the linchpin of anti-social behaviour, with its quasi-civil and criminal orders and the even broader approach that police guidance and police websites take to the concept of anti-social behaviour. However, that matter was discussed earlier in Committee.

The two offences that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, has identified have, in my direct experience over many years, been applied broadly, indiscriminately and, ironically, in a discriminatory way to, for example, peaceful protesters and to anti-monarchists for wearing republican slogans on their T-shirts when a member of the Royal Family is in town. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, gave other examples of words that can offend or cause alarm and distress, as opposed to fear or the threat of real harm. I gave the example of the anti-monarchist who was not just arrested but, I believe, charged for the T-shirt in question, but there are also cases of youngsters being charged, certainly being arrested, for being cheeky with the police. I think this cannot just be blamed on the police when these concepts on the public order statute book are just too vague and too broad.

To attempt to leaven the spirit yet again the week before Christmas, I am reminded that today at PMQs, and not for the first time, the leader of the Opposition made reference, if euphemistically, to the Prime Minister’s private parts. Of course, that sort of thing would never happen in your Lordships’ House, but whatever noble Lords think of that approach to parliamentary debate, people on our streets, ordinary people, have been arrested and charged for less. Can that really be right? I think not.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I will say a few words in support of the amendment. I agree with the difficulty of categorising alarm in the same manner as harassment and distress. Harassment and distress can be objectively measured or distress objectively assessed, but when it comes to alarm, I think what noble Lords have said so far is that it may cause a shock to hear somebody in your group saying something so different to anything you could imagine being said.

I can give an example of a representative image or a representation which may be designed to shock. I was a supporter of Brexit in a very remain constituency, Cambridge. We usually invite people at the end of term, and I had a Vote Leave poster in my window, but as they were coming to a party to celebrate the end of term, I said to my husband that I would take it down because I did not want to upset them. Afterwards, none of them ever could imagine that I might support leave. When I told them, they said, “We had no idea. We couldn’t have imagined we knew anybody in Cambridge who voted leave”. I suppose you could say that I was trying not to spoil their day because people take these matters very seriously, but you could say that alarm could be equated to an instance of thoughtlessness, bad manners or a deliberate intention to shock, as some people will do, but it is not a matter to criminalise. For those reasons, I support removing “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 but would leave harassment and distress because they can more objectively be measured.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, for the avoidance of doubt, I think we need to put it on record that everyone deprecates racially aggravated abuse of hard-working, decent emergency workers—that is taken as read. But the noble Lord is asking us to consider legislation when we already have a situation, under Section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020, which permits a court to consider any offence that has been racially or religiously aggravated. Section 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provides for a separate offence where a person commits an offence under Sections 4, 4A or 5 of the Public Order Act.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Much as I would love to be intervened on by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who I believe will be supporting my amendment later on, I am intervening on the Minister, and we are not allowed to intervene on interventions.

If I may beg the Committee’s indulgence, I finally say to the Minister that the Select Committee on the Constitution specifically said:

“Clause 107 criminalises ‘insults’ and clause 108 introduces the term ‘distress’. This potentially leaves people open to criminal sanction on a subjective basis”.


Not only do we already have existing legislation, but the language in this new legislation is sufficiently loose that it will give rise, I think, to unintended consequences.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope the noble Lord will accept that I am not indicating that he or anybody else would accept that language, but the point is that we have to define and be clearer about the definition in relation to racially aggravated insults. The reason that we brought this forward is that, on the back of police representations from senior officers in Surrey Police—and from Sergeant Candice Gill, who was herself racially abused—and with the support of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Surrey, having examined this internally, we believe that the law needs to be clarified, which is why we have brought this legislation forward.

The noble Lord also asked me to examine why it is covering only race and religion, why we do not cover protected characteristics of sexual orientation, transgender identity and disability, and why the Government have not tabled such an amendment. He will know that the Law Commission is already examining its review of hate crime laws. It is a complex area, and it is important we get the changes right. I will tell him this: we are considering that and have given a manifesto commitment to do so, and, ensuring that we do that, we will bring forward conclusions at Report stage in this House to give effect to those manifesto commitments on sexual orientation, transgender identity and disability to extend the proposals still further. I give him notice of that now so that he does not accuse me of pulling a fast one on Report. We will do that, but we will have to bring forward the details of it in due course.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Briefly, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, is quite right that I have long shared some concerns about the rubric and precise drafting of concepts of alarm and distress—we are coming to them later—so of course I have concerns about them being adopted into the precise drafting of the offence. But, on the basic principle, is not the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, that there is no point in citing provisions on racially aggravated offences if the conduct is not an offence and that the justification for taking the serious step of applying Public Order Act principles to a domestic dwelling is that these emergency workers have no choice but to be in that dwelling, sometimes putting themselves in harm’s way as part of their service to the public? On the principle of having an offence such as this, I wonder whether my noble friend agrees.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I do agree with my noble friend. As I said in my introductory remarks and as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said, when an emergency worker turns up at a house and enters that property for a health reason concerning an individual in the property, a criminal justice reason involving activity that is causing threat and alarm and/or fire service duties, they do so to fulfil a duty. They have to stay in that property. If they are abused on the street before they enter the property, that is a punishable offence, yet unless this law change is accepted, when they enter the property that abuse is considered a principal part of the job that they have to just take on the chin. I do not accept that. That is why we included Clauses 107 to 109.

--- Later in debate ---

For all those reasons, I am hoping and anticipating, without a huge amount of optimism, that we will have a slightly different response from the Minister this evening.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and to support the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, not least because my noble friend Lord Hendy—who is, sadly, not able to be in the country this evening—co-signed her amendment.

If anyone imagines or suggests that the job of the Health and Safety Executive should be limited to the inspection of heavy machinery or physical infrastructure, as opposed to social infrastructure, then they are not just living in the last century but arguably the one before that. For the Health and Safety Executive to look at its role in such a limited way is also incredibly gendered.

I hope that my noble friend the Minister will look favourably on the intention of these amendments, because they sit so comfortably with other measures that the Government are attempting. The noble Baroness put it very well when she said that this is essential for the credible functioning of the violence against women and girls strategy. Last night, during the course of the Second Reading debate on the Victims and Courts Bill, it was wonderful to hear another Minister, my noble friend Lady Levitt, talk about further work and an expanded regime on allowing whistleblowing and the busting open of non-disclosure agreements that cover up illegal activity—which often means violence against women at work. What the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, is proposing sits so comfortably with that.

I cannot believe that my noble friend the Minister will think anything different not least because, just a few minutes ago, he spoke so passionately about protecting emergency workers when they have to go into difficult and dangerous settings and how they should be protected even from abuse, let alone from violence and more serious criminality. It would be odd if there was no duty on the employers of emergency workers to look at risk, adequate training and culture in the workplace and at what measures might be taken within teams and with training for those same emergency workers. As was suggested by the noble Baroness, this is about joined-up thinking and coming up with a violence against women and girls strategy that the whole Committee and all parties can get behind. I am feeling optimistic about my noble friend the Minister’s reply.

To Committee colleagues on the opposition Front Bench, I would say that there are inevitable concerns about any additional burden on employers. I am seeing nods that suggest that my suspicions are correct. But these duties can be as appropriate. If noble Lords and Committee members have concerns about the precise drafting of the amendments, those can be dealt with before Report. The duties would be to prepare and revise assessments that are appropriate for a particular business—and businesses and workplace settings are so different; they include very vulnerable and secluded settings, with visits and travel, including to people’s homes. This only need be about strategies and training as appropriate; the duties need not be an undue burden on good employers of good faith who have many women workers in particular, although I would like to see all protected.

I hope that the entire Committee can get behind the noble Baroness. I am delighted to see the first ever woman general secretary of the TUC looking as if she might be due to speak after me.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I first seek clarification from the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, on his sums. I do not do sums either but, if I heard him correctly, he said that a worker spends 50% of his life at work. If that is what I heard correctly, that is 84 hours a week.

Facial Recognition Technology: Safeguards

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government recognise that the algorithm needs to be examined, and that is why we have asked His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary to present an urgent report to the Government on the mechanisms of the algorithm. In the meantime, facial recognition technology is a useful tool. If missing people walk past a facial recognition van, they can be identified. If people are on a wanted list, they can be identified. If people appear on a Ring doorbell, they can be put against a facial recognition database to see whether they have committed an offence and be further questioned. There are good things about that, but the consultation is about how we can better regulate it. HMCIC will look at how we can deal with the issues with the algorithm over the next few months.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, notwithstanding their being of the party that introduced the ground-breaking and vital Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the previous Government allowed the mushrooming of police use of this technology with no express and specific statutory authorisation. Does my noble friend the Minister agree that it is unacceptable, for both democracy and the rule of law, to roll out this technology further, however useful it is, without an Act of Parliament?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My noble friend raised the issue, but I maintain that it is a valuable use of resources to help with crime prevention. We have organised a consultation, which opened on 4 December. My noble friend and anybody else can submit evidence or comments to that consultation over the next 10 weeks. When it is complete, the Government will assess the regulatory framework. We already intend to establish an oversight body to examine how that regulation will operate, which will require further work by the Government.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I declare several interests. I am a co-chair of the All-Party Group on Modern Slavery and vice-chairman of the Human Trafficking Foundation. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Brown. She has done a brilliant first amendment and I am delighted to support her. I played a very small part in the Modern Slavery Act: I was involved in the pre-legislative scrutiny and an earlier report that persuaded the then Home Secretary, now the noble Baroness, Lady May, to put the Bill in place.

Exploitation of children is in the Modern Slavery Act, but it is rather masked and has not been taken seriously, particularly by the police. Perhaps more importantly—this is one thing that the noble Baroness, Lady Brown, did not say—under the Act, a child who is exploited cannot consent to exploitation and cannot commit an offence. That is absolutely crucial, and it probably ought to be expressed again in primary legislation.

I enormously admire a great deal of what this Government are trying to do. I went on behalf of Action for Children to a very useful meeting with Diana Johnson and Jess Phillips, where I got the impression that they were going to move forward on this. But what is offered in this Bill does not really meet the need. To put into guidance what was put in primary legislation 10 years ago seems to make it less important. I ask the Minister to reflect on why you would want to put into guidance something that was expressed, not as well, in primary legislation 10 years ago.

The time has come to deal with county lines. A great deal of work has been done by the National Crime Agency. At long last, at least some magistrates’ courts realise that children who are ferrying drugs around the country—and cash, nowadays, as well as drink and various other things—are in fact victims and not perpetrators. But it is not fully known. The police do not seem to understand it. We need to explain, through primary legislation, to whoever is now in charge of modern slavery in the police that we are talking about child exploitation, of which modern slavery is a component. There is no doubt that these children are enslaved, but I suspect that, in this country, the word “exploitation” is rather easier to understand—and it is time it was there.

This amendment is brilliant. It could perhaps be improved in certain ways, but it asks the Government to do something really practical which, when I went to that very useful meeting, I got the impression they were going to do.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown, but she may not need much support, having received the much-coveted gold star from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who, I am very proud to say, supports a later amendment of mine on raising the age of criminal responsibility—which, I am ashamed to say, is barbarically only 10 in England and Wales. The UN recommends that it be 14. In Scotland it is 12 and the heavens do not seem to have fallen.

I have a couple of specific points to make in support of my noble friend’s amendment. If I may, I will be as bold as to predict what my noble friend the Minister and his advisers might be about to say in response. If they are about to say that my noble friend’s definition is unnecessary because the definition can be taken from the offence itself in Clause 40, I would like to get in first with two points to counter that. If I am pessimistic and wrong, so be it. Noble Lords know that I do not mind looking a fool.

The first point, which has already been made clearly by my noble friend Lady Brown, is that we need a definition that is about not just a specific criminal offence but interagency working and interventions across services, well in advance of any investigation or prosecution for a criminal offence.

I do not think the second point has been made yet. If the Committee compares the elements of my noble friend’s definition with the definition of the criminal offence in the Bill, it will see that the Government’s approach misses something very important that is to be found in my noble friend’s definition: enabling the child, not just causing the child, to engage in criminal conduct. That addition is important because “causing” is a harder thing to prove and a greater step in grooming. Currently, the Government’s definition is

“causing the child to commit an offence”,

or, indeed, “facilitating” somebody else to cause the child to commit the offence.

To prove causation in law is a serious matter. Enabling—making it easy, making the tools of the trade available, providing the opportunity—is a lower threshold, which is appropriate in the context of children. My noble friend made the point that currently in law they are treated as victims but also as perpetrators, and sometimes it is a matter of luck as to whether you will find the adult and the public service who will take the proper approach, in my view, of always treating the child as a child and as a victim, and not criminalising them. This is the point about “enabling”.

My noble friend the Minister is very experienced in these matters. Whatever he comes back with, I would like him and his advisers to consider the question of the lower threshold of enabling, not just causing. If there is to be a further compromise that includes some element of my noble friend Lady Brown’s amendment, I hope that that is taken on board.

The most formative time in my professional life was as a Home Office lawyer. I know what it is like to work on big Bills and to defend them as originally crafted and drafted. But it is wise, especially in this House, to take good advice and to bend a little when it might improve legislation for the benefit of victims.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, first, I absolutely congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, on her excellently motivated amendment. It is very thought provoking. In particular, this sentence caught my attention:

“The victim may have been criminally exploited even if the activity appears consensual”.


That is one of the most difficult challenges. For some years I have been involved in the grooming gangs scandal, and one of the most horrible parts of that was when the police took the decision that the young 14 or 15 year-old, precocious though she—a general “she”—may have been, was somehow actively consenting to her own rape or sexual exploitation. It was about the notion of this being a child, because the young girl may have looked more adult—it was literally as superficial as that—and about the type, if we are honest, in class terms. Therefore, it was said that she could not be a victim and she was accused of being a prostitute, and so on. We are familiar with that. That is the reason why that sentence stood out to me.

However, I have some qualms, and I want to ask genuinely what we do about those qualms, because I do not know where to go. I am slightly worried, because county lines gangs, as the noble Baroness will know, are a young men’s game. Some of the gang leaders are younger than one would ever want to imagine in your worst nightmare. That is a problem with this, in a way, and with how you work it out. If you have a general rule that this is always a child, how do you deal with the culpability and responsibility of a 17 year-old thug, not to put too fine a point on it, who is exploiting younger people or even his—and it is generally “his”—peers? I am not sure how to square that with what I have just said. It also seems that there is a major clash with the age of criminal responsibility. I am very sympathetic with that not being 10, but how do you deal with the belief that someone aged under 18 is a child, yet we say that a child has criminal responsibility? Perhaps I am just misunderstanding something.

My final reservation is that if we say that everybody under 18 has to be a victim all the time, would that be a legal loophole that would get people off when there was some guilt for them to be held to account for? I generally support this amendment, but I want some clarification on how to muddle my way through those moral thickets, if possible.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, if the Committee will allow me, I will begin by detailing the government amendments in this group. We know that criminal gangs conducting activity such as county lines drug dealing do not stop at internal UK borders, and children are criminally exploited across the UK. To go to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned, this is why—at the request of the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice—we are making provision in the Bill for child criminal exploitation prevention orders in Scotland and Northern Ireland. That is at their request, and I hope that also answers the point from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. Since the Bill covers England and Wales, this means that the offence of child criminal exploitation will now apply UK-wide. These amendments have been tabled because, since the Bill was published, we have had those discussions and this is a way of making sure that we have a UK-wide approach.

These orders will give the police and courts across the whole of the United Kingdom powers to prevent child criminal exploitation happening in the first place, or happening again, by putting prohibitions and requirements on an adult who poses a risk of criminally exploiting a child. As I have mentioned, these provisions have been drafted in collaboration with the Scottish and Northern Ireland Governments and consequential amendments are therefore required for England and Wales to ensure that the orders function smoothly across the United Kingdom.

Finally, we have tabled some other amendments to put beyond doubt that assessment of whether an individual has engaged in child criminal exploitation, or associated conduct, in an application for, or imposition of, a child criminal exploitation prevention order is to be determined by the court on the basis of the civil standard of proof; that is, the balance of probabilities. This is appropriate given that there are civil rather than criminal proceedings in this case. The application of the civil standard of proof is well precedented in many similar preventive orders across the statute book and is important to ensure that an order can intervene earlier in the course of a child’s exploitation so that it can be prevented. I hope that I have wide support across the Committee for those measures—I think I do.

Amendment 232B is in the name of my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown. I welcome her moving her first amendment in such a positive way. She has secured the support of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which is a fairly impressive bunch on a first amendment, so I say well done to her on that. Her amendment seeks to create a further definition of child criminal exploitation.

I say to my noble friend—and I think that this was anticipated by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—that “child criminal exploitation” is already defined in Clause 40 by the description of conduct amounting to an offence. It is where an adult

“engages in conduct towards or in respect of a child, with the intention of … causing the child to”

engage in criminality. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, raised a number of issues for which I am not accountable, but which my noble friend may wish to respond to. That is the Government’s view on the purpose of Clause 40. Clause 40 captures activity online, through the use of technology and whether or not it is seemingly consensual. This definition also operates for the purposes of the child criminal exploitation prevention orders.

My noble friend has made a very strong case, through personal experience as a constituency MP in east London for almost 20 years, on the impact of county lines gangs on young people. I fully accept, understand and appreciate where she is coming from on those issues. That is why the Government introduced Clause 40 in the first place. It is also why the Government are introducing a bespoke stand-alone offence of CCE, along with the CCE prevention orders, to signal unequivocally that using a child to commit crime is against the law and that those children are victims of a crime. I also agree that any apparent consent of the child to involvement is irrelevant to whether they have been criminally exploited, and that criminal exploitation can occur online and through the use of technology. I understand my noble friend’s amendment, but these points are captured by the definition of CCE in Clause 40, which does not include a child’s consent and captures adults’ conduct by means of any method or control.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Obviously, I correctly anticipated the response that was coming, but I would be grateful if my noble friend would deal with this point about “enabling”, which is a substantive point of difference in the two definitions. Enabling is easier to prove than causing. “Causing” is closer to a child being used, which is reflected in my noble friend Lady Brown’s definition, but I do not think that “enabling” is in the Clause 40 definition as it stands.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I appreciate my noble friend’s comments. If she will bear with me, I will come on to that point in a moment. I am doing this in a structured order to try to address the points that are before the Committee today.

I say to my noble friend Lady Brown that, within the Bill, we are also taking the power to issue statutory guidance to chief officers. The noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and my noble friend have looked at that, and I will return to it in a moment. The guidance will include a descriptive definition of CCE, setting out in lay person’s terms the conduct captured by the offence, and will provide practical guidance on how the CCE offence and orders should be applied.

An important point, to go particularly to what the noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said, is that in Clause 60—which we will come to in later considerations—the Secretary of State has power to issue statutory guidance to chief officers of police about the exercise of their functions in connection with the prevention, detection and investigation of CCE offences and CCE prevention orders. I hope that the Committee will recognise that, importantly, the relevant police officers will be under a legal duty to have due regard to that statutory guidance when exercising functions in relation to the CCE offences and the CCE prevention orders. On the question of the statutory guidance, which my noble friend and others have touched on, the guidance has not been issued yet because the relevant legislation has not yet received the consent of this House or indeed Royal Assent. On the applicability of both of those conditions, statutory guidance under Clause 60 will be issued, which will place a legal duty on police officers to adhere to it.

My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti mentioned a very important point. There is a clear difference in what my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown has put forward, supported by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I hope this helps: the forms of conduct that are likely to enable a child to commit criminality are expected in most cases to also meet the test of conduct by an adult intended to cause, or facilitate the causing of, a child to commit a future crime. The nature of the offence, which is broad and large, will ensure that it captures offenders who will use children for crime. I believe that that is the right format. Both my noble friends have said that “enable” is a critical word. I believe that a separate definition is unnecessary, as it would have no legal impact over and above what is already in the Bill. It could cause confusion among police and prosecutors about which definition they should be applying.

The statutory guidance, which I emphasise will gave a legal bass and will be issued under Clause 60, is the appropriate place to provide the extra detail to understand proposals that are covered by the amendment, but which are already in scope of the clear and simple legal terms of Clause 40. I know that that is the defence that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti expected me to use, but it is the defence: Clause 40 is what it is, and the guidance will also be statutory.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will sound like I am repeating myself from Question Time, but, very shortly, we anticipate bringing forward a policing White Paper looking at a whole range of mechanisms to improve police performance. If the noble Baroness will allow me, I will wait for further detail on the policing White Paper, which I have already said to the House will be published before Christmas, to allow for further discussion on a range of efficiency and improvement matters for policing. The point she makes is worthy of consideration, but I will park it until a later date in the parliamentary calendar.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his detailed response, but will he reflect on the potential distinction between “enabling” and “causing”? Will he go back to parliamentary counsel and be clear that enablers will always meet this threshold of causation? I am really concerned about that. I understand that my noble friend has rejected the idea of a separate free-standing definition and is worried about confusion between the offence definition and a general definition, but in blending the intentions of the Government and those of my noble friend Lady Brown, it would be helpful to know that that language of “causing”, without specific mention of enabling, is watertight.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for further pressing me on the issue. I have tried to explain to the Committee where the Government are on this. We always reflect on debates in Committee, because there are always opportunities for my noble friend and others to bring matters back on Report. I am giving the Committee today the Government’s view that the definition in Clause 40, plus the guidance issued under Clause 60, will be sufficient to cover the objective of ensuring that we have this offence on the statute book and monitored and enforced by authorities.

To the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, I have just remembered that we will have further discussions on police training in later groups in Committee today, but the White Paper will deal with a whole range of matters on improving police performance.