Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th February 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

469: After Clause 196, insert the following Clause—
“Age of criminal responsibilityIn section 50 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, for “ten” substitute “14”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would raise the age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales from ten to 14 years so that no child under that age could be tried for or convicted of a criminal offence.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 469 is in my name and the names of the noble and learned Baronesses, Lady Butler-Sloss and Lady Hale of Richmond, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester.

I ask Members of the Committee to think back to when they were 10—if that is not too difficult. Perhaps they were studying the Victorians in primary school. If so, they might have been astonished to learn that children of any age, even younger than 10, could be prosecuted in the 19th century. But there was an important nuance; even in the Victorian Juvenile Offenders Act 1847 and its spiritual successors, the Children Act 1908 and the Children and Young Persons Acts 1933 and 1963, there was a presumption of doli incapax—that children below 14 are inherently incapable of forming criminal intentions. This had to be rebutted beyond reasonable doubt by any individual prosecution. This is the very thing that will have spared many of us from criminalisation at tender ages for our misdemeanours in formative years. Of course, most of us also have the safeguards of loving, diligent parenting and/or class privilege.

When we foregrounded this debate in an Oral Question just over two weeks ago, my noble friend Lord Watts, who is not currently in his place, in his own inimitable style, suggested that my concern about our low age of criminal responsibility was somehow a middle-class preoccupation. I agree that class is relevant to this question, but, with respect to my noble friend, his analysis is rather upside down. It is not children on the playing fields of our famous public schools who are likely to be referred to the police for the fisticuffs, minor thefts and criminal damage that is almost inevitable in early years; it is instead the poorest and most vulnerable, such as children in care, who are also preyed upon by groomers and exploiters, and even blackmailed with the threat of being reported to the police by their abusers.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who participated in what I felt was a very thoughtful debate. Though it is invidious to do so, I would like to single out two contributions in particular.

The first is the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington. It is quite a big thing to come to Committee and say, “I have listened. I still have concerns, but I have changed my mind in the face of an argument from the opposite side of the aisle”. I pay tribute to him for that, remembering that it was his party, not mine, that took us into the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in the first place. I am very grateful to him. He does great credit to his party and this House.

I must thank the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for a lifetime of public service and of considerable distinction at the Bar, on the Bench and in your Lordships’ House. It was she who gave the answer to the legitimate concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, about what would fill the gap in relation to dangerous and bad behaviour by young children if they were not to be criminalised: they would be dealt with in the family court and would be supervised and treated with a welfare approach, rather than a criminal justice one.

I thank everyone. I am obviously disappointed to some extent with my noble friend the Minister’s response, but I hope that the door is not slammed closed. I understand that a Back-Bench amendment is not necessarily the way to deal with something of this complexity and magnitude. However, I note, for example, that the Bar Council of England and Wales is currently conducting a commission into the age of criminal responsibility. I hope that, if the Government do not engage with it, they will at least watch those developments very carefully. This amendment was tabled on the basis of an age of 14; I may consider returning on Report with the proposition of age 12. For now, at least, and with thanks, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 469 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

470: After Clause 196, insert the following new Clause—
“Safeguards against abuses by Covert Human Intelligence Sources(1) Section 27 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) For subsection (1) substitute—“(1) This Part applies to criminal conduct—(a) under an authorisation under this Part, and(b) where the conduct is in accordance with the authorisation.”.(3) For subsection (2) substitute—“(2) This part also applies to civil liability in relation to any conduct which—(a) is incidental to any conduct within subsection (1), and(b) is not itself conduct an authorisation or warrant for which is capable of being granted under a relevant enactment and might reasonably have been expected to have been sought in the case in question. (2A) If a person acts in accordance with a criminal conduct authorisation under section 29B (covert human intelligence sources: criminal conduct authorisations), the nature of that authorisation and compliance with it shall be considered and deemed relevant to—(a) any decision as to whether prosecution for a criminal offence by that person is in the public interest,(b) any potential defences to such charges of criminal conduct, and(c) any potential civil liability on the part of that person, and the quantum of any damages.(2B) The protections in subsection (2A) only apply where the conduct is not carried out for the primary purpose of—(a) encouraging or assisting, pursuant to sections 44 to 49 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (incohate offences), the commission of an offence by, or(b) otherwise seeking to discredit,the person, people or group subject to the authorised surveillance operation.”.”Member's explanatory statement
These amendments replace provisions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 as amended by the Covert Human Intelligence Sources Act 2021 granting complete advanced criminal and civil immunity for authorised operatives and agents, with a public interest defence as long as they did not act as agents provocateurs.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am trying the patience of the Committee, but Amendment 470 is in my name.

In a week when our entire politics is reeling from the betrayal, treachery and most likely serious criminality of a now disgraced Peer, I hope we might all empathise with victims of abuses of power by covert human intelligence sources—CHIS—or police or other agency spies. Notwithstanding the ongoing public inquiry into the decades-old spy cops scandal, the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 granted prior and absolute criminal and civil immunity to officers and agents of a whole host of public bodies if acting under a new scheme of pre-authorisation to commit crime. By this one Act, the centuries-old principle of equality before the law was breached.

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[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

The noble Baroness makes a very fair point. I was referring to the issue of county lines and why children may be used. I deprecate the unacceptable activity to which she refers; none of us would support the fathering of children in a pretended relationship, so she makes a very fair point.

I was talking about Huntingdon Life Sciences and animal rights activists. That violence escalated to a significant level over a number of years, which culminated in the violent attack on and near-death experience of the then chief executive of Huntingdon Life Sciences. It was a very unpleasant period. Therefore, there was a reasonable case to be made that the Metropolitan Police, Cambridgeshire Constabulary and others needed to embed officers and intelligence assets within the animal rights movement to alleviate the risk of further serious criminal activity. That was an animal rights issue, but it could easily not have been.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, concedes very fairly that she does not want to circumscribe cases where you have to do long-term surveillance of, say, a terrorist plot which might be carried out were it not for police activity and long-term embedding of people. That is separate to cases where there has not been an operational rationale for preventing criminal activity, so I accept that there is a difference.

That is why this amendment is rather heavy-handed. No doubt the Minister will refer to the commissioner, who will look at whether these activities are timely and appropriate, but words matter. Incidentally, when the noble Baroness mentioned the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021, I think she made an unusual inference that it was to facilitate criminal activity. I may have been mistaken in hearing that and she may want to intervene.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, is completely right; that is the purpose of that Act. The Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act is all about authorising CHISs to commit offences, because we understand that that is sometimes necessary to keep your cover.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

That is true as far as that goes. However, in the wider context, the principal objective of that legislation is not to enable people to commit crimes but to prevent people being subject to endless civil and criminal litigation that may arise from their duties as representatives of public bodies, be they the security services, the police et cetera. So I think that the noble Baroness is being slightly unfair to the Ministers at the time who put through that legislation. What she outlined was clearly a corollary of passing that legislation, but it was not the principal reason, as I am sure she will concede.

The reason I wanted to speak is to interrogate the details of this amendment. Looking at paragraph (2B)(b) of the proposed new clause, I wonder what is meant by

“otherwise seeking to discredit, the person, people or group subject to the authorised surveillance operation”.

That seems a very wide-ranging paragraph and a recipe for much litigation in the future. Should it eventually be found on the face of the enacted Crime and Policing Bill, the way that it will be interpreted will give rise to a situation where the police, the security services and others are much more reluctant to enter into long-term surveillance of the kind I discussed earlier in seeking to thwart a terrorist plot, because of that quite wide-ranging and open paragraph.

Generally speaking, the noble Baroness has made a very fine point and I agree with much of what she said, but I genuinely do not understand the point of that paragraph. If it is a way of describing an agent provocateur, I understand that—and, because she is a prominent lawyer, she will no doubt tell me where that is found in other pieces of legislation. However, currently, that paragraph could be misinterpreted, and it will circumscribe the capacity of the security services and the police to do their job and protect individuals. For those reasons, while I am not necessarily against the amendment, I would like further clarification if possible.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it might not surprise the Committee to hear that I do not support this amendment and I am sure I will find myself making the same arguments as the Minister when he responds.

In 2021, Parliament passed the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act, which was introduced to this House by my noble and learned friend, Lord Stewart of Dirleton. Its effect was to create a legislative framework through which covert intelligence officers can be authorised to participate in conduct which would normally be criminal. The criminal conduct authorisation might be granted under Section 29B of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, as inserted by the 2021 Act, only if it is proportionate and necessary, in the interests of national security, prevention of crime and disorder, or in the interests of our economic well-being. Subsection (6) of that section also requires the person authorising the criminal conduct to ensure—and this is important—that all alternative avenues that do not make use of criminality have been exhausted. Subsection (7) states that the decision to grant an authorisation is required to comply with the Human Rights Act 1998. Finally, there is an explicit goal for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

Therefore, there already exists a number of safeguards to prevent covert intelligence officers overstepping the bounds of their authorisation and to ensure that the authorisation itself is tightly drawn and strictly necessary. When a criminal conduct authorisation is granted, the officer to whom it relates is permitted to engage in the specified criminal conduct and cannot be prosecuted for that conduct. It is perfectly well understood and accepted that covert agents do, on occasion, have to engage in such criminal conduct in the course of their operations. It is absolutely right that the law protects them when this is the case.

It is also worth noting that the 2021 Act did not create new powers for the police and intelligence services; it simply placed on a statutory footing the mechanism by which they can be authorised to engage in criminal behaviour. This is surely preferable to having the whole system working on the side and in the dark.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, proposes in her Amendment 470 to remove the criminal and civil immunity provided to officers when they commit a criminal offence in pursuance of an authorisation to do so. She proposes replacing it with a defence to criminal or civil charges. However, she has also included an exception to that possible defence—when an officer encourages, assists or attempts to discredit the person who is under surveillance. I find this a startling exception. If a covert officer is given a criminal conduct authorisation and that authorisation, taking into account all the available safeguards, includes permission to commit an inchoate offence, I cannot see why that officer should not be able to do so. Certainly, the officer should not be held criminally or civilly liable.

I am sure the Minister will have further points to add, but we on these Benches cannot support this amendment.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Is the noble Lord saying that he supports officers or their assets acting as agents provocateurs, inciting crime rather than investigating it?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I am not saying that at all. We all recognise that things have gone wrong, but what I say generally is that this type of policing—indeed, quite a number of aspects of policing—is about testing the law. Certainly, this is the case with the involvement of CHISs.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Given what has been said, I will reflect on the comments that have been made. It is important that Sir Brian Leveson has his independence and oversight. I shall look at my gut feelings on this, but I will consider it, take advice and see where we are outside the debate today. In relation to my noble friend’s amendment, I still hope that, given what has been said today—a valuable discussion has been had—she will withdraw it.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Again, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in what I think was an important and thoughtful debate. There is quite a lot of common ground, actually. There is common ground that we must have covert human intelligence sources. They must play a role in investigating the most serious crimes, in particular. There is further common ground that part of keeping someone’s cover in, for example, a criminal gang or a terrorist cell, must inevitably sometimes include participating in criminal activity; otherwise, those around them will spot that they do not belong. Again, that is common ground. There is also common ground that it was right to put activities that were previously completely in the shadows on a statutory footing, as happened in 2021.

The difference between some Members of the Committee and others is about whether, when someone is authorised to commit criminal offences in such a role, that authorisation should bring advance total immunity for all purposes, civil and criminal, or whether instead the authorisation should equip them with a public interest defence. That is the difference between us. It is a question of principle but also of practice as to where the balance should be struck, and which system—the one currently on the statute book or something like the one I propose—would give a better balance of safeguards for the brave and genuine public servants who do this work without abusing the trust, but also for the rights of citizens to be protected from abuse. That is the difference between us. Which mechanism provides the most proportionate approach? I do not think there is a gulf, but this is something to keep under review and keep discussing.

As I said earlier, in the report from which the Minister read selectively, Sir Brian Leveson talks about reporting being good, but even he concedes, in the same report, a lack of “specificity” on occasion, only a “general descriptor”, a “number of errors” and so on. So there are some issues that warrant serious and ongoing scrutiny.

My noble friend the Minister may regret telling the Committee that he now has special responsibility for inquiries in the Home Office—his kindness may be a liability—but I suspect that we will want to keep pressing him, not least on the progress of the inquiry on the past but, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, on the way the system is operating today. The report suggests that the system today is not operating in the way that we would ideally like. With that, for the moment at least, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 470 withdrawn.