Public Order Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 14th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Government for Motion C—yes, I did say that. In very turbulent and polarised times in our country, it is a real pleasure to be able to welcome it. Noble Lords will notice that there is a fairly minor tweak to the original amendment passed by your Lordships’ House. We said that a constable should not exercise powers for the principal purpose of preventing someone reporting, and the Government have replaced “principal purpose” with “sole purpose”. I for one am convinced that the precious and vital protection for journalists and others reporting on protests, rather than participating in them, is provided. The Minister wrote and said that they do not think that this is necessary but are doing it anyway. That is not ungracious. It is gracious, because I happen to think that this protection is vital. The Government disagree but they are doing it, so I am happy to thank them.

I remind noble Lords, as the Minister did, that the provision is in response to real cases: real journalists were arrested and detained last November, some for many hours, just for doing their job. The offence used when it was suggested that journalists were giving the oxygen of publicity to protesters was the fairly vague conspiracy to cause a public nuisance. While the Government have been consistent in their position that additional protection is unnecessary, no one at any stage of proceedings on the Bill could point to a single legislative provision on the current statute book that gives this protection. Therefore, I am grateful to the Minister for the way in which he has engaged with this and responded, not least to what I think was the largest defeat that the Government suffered on the Bill last time.

I am particularly grateful to Charlotte Lynch, the LBC reporter who visited us last time, having experienced the really quite traumatic incident of being arrested, handcuffed, put in a police van and detained for seven hours. This causes her some anxiety even to this day. She carried on and reported on that experience, and that has been very important for future journalists in this country, I hope that noble Lords will agree.

I am grateful to the all-party group, Justice, and Tyrone Steele, who worked with us on this amendment. I am especially grateful to the five distinguished Conservative Members of your Lordships’ House, including the former governor of Hong Kong and a former leader of the Conservative Party, who did the very difficult thing of coming through the lobbies with Her Majesty’s Opposition. I give my absolute respect to them.

I am, of course, grateful to my noble friends, the Liberal Democrats and many Cross-Benchers who supported this vital protection. I give especial thanks to the co-signatories of the original journalists’ protection amendment, including the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott. It was a great comfort and support to have such a distinguished journalist and former newspaper editor on my side in this.

My enormous thanks also go to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. We disagree about some things, but not about this. In particular, I thank my co-signatory, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, not only for co-signing this amendment and bringing his noble friends with him, but for a lifetime of public service in policing and in your Lordships’ House. He is the most diligent and distinguished face of the police service in this country. When we reform that service, it will better reflect his values. That career of public service could not be better demonstrated than by him being here today, after suffering such unspeakable loss in recent weeks.

I do not want to take your Lordships’ time on the next group, so will say now that I support the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and my noble friend Lord Coaker in the remarks that they will make about suspicionless stop and search. Stop and search is always difficult and challenging for police community relations, but suspicionless stop and search is positively toxic and not something that we should be increasing in these troubled times in our country.

Finally, I come to the difficult question of the meaning of “serious disruption”, not for the purposes of some offences, but for the whole Bill. We have the narrow policy question of what the threshold should be before a number of criminal offences and intrusive police powers impugned what would otherwise be totally peaceful and innocent dissent. That is the narrow question.

We also have a rather deeper and broader—almost philosophical—question of common sense and the English language. Is “serious” significant, as I believe, or simply more than minor? Is it a simple binary, like a child’s 18th birthday that turns them from a minor into someone who has majority; or is there a whole range of disruption that one can face in one’s life from something that is minor to something that is really quite a lot more than minor—that is significant?

This is a serious question and the threshold should be high. I am reminded of George Orwell’s famous essay “Politics and the English Language”—my favourite writing of his—in which he reminded us that distortion of language can quickly lead to abuses of power. This is a Public Order Bill and this ought to be a very serious threshold. However, if noble Lords prefer their literature to be accompanied by music, I will invoke not George Orwell but Cole Porter:

“There’s no love song finer, but how strange the change from major to minor”.


I urge all noble Lords who care about these things, who take a bipartisan approach to fundamental rights and freedoms in our country, as those distinguished five Conservatives did last time, to support Motion A1 in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I have been reflecting on the speeches which we have just heard. Listening to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and his point about the threshold, I have been thinking about what would be more than minor that was not significant. Looking at the examples that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, gave, it seems to me that if one discovered people tunnelling under an area that was going to be HS2, that is not only more than minor; my goodness me, it seems to me to be significant. I was also thinking about the closing of four or five motorways. So far as I am concerned, that seems to be both more than minor and significant. I just wonder, rather hesitantly, whether we are arguing about a position where the difference between “more than minor” and “significant” is extremely small. I cannot at the moment think of a word that I would use that was more than minor but not significant. That is where I stand—a slightly different position, I confess, from what I said on the last occasion.

Public Order Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 7th February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise in support of my noble friend Lord Coaker and of my friend the distinguished former police officer and consistent advocate for rights and freedoms, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Stop and search is always a vexed question; even stop and search with reasonable suspicion is a vexed question. Of course, we must sometimes have it in a democracy, when people are reasonably suspected of various crimes, but even that becomes difficult because the threshold of reasonable suspicion is so low. Stop and search with reasonable suspicion in this Bill is problematic because certain offences in it, for example locking on, are so vague. Therefore, the range of items for which you could be stopped and searched on reasonable suspicion include, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, pointed out, things that you might pick up in John Lewis. They could include, for example, your mobile phone if that might be used in connection with the offence of locking on, and so on.

However, my priority is of course stop and search without suspicion. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has rightly pointed out, this has classically been for things such as terrorism and carrying weapons, rather than carrying things such as bicycle chains or mobile phones. Noble Lords will see the problem, which is particularly vexed in the context of the statistics, year on year, on the disproportionate numbers of black and brown people who will be subject to stop and search. Too many young people, boys in particular, have had their first experience of the state and the police service via a racially discriminatory stop and search, because that, unfortunately, has been the culture of policing for too long. We now add a new layer: that there will be lots of young women, not least today, who are particularly concerned about being stopped and searched by the police. That is not a happy thing to have to report, but I am afraid it is the reality.

When I was a young director of Liberty, the National Council for Civil Liberties, almost exactly 20 years ago, what was then Section 44 of the Terrorism Act allowed suspicionless stop and search where it was considered expedient to preventing acts of terrorism. When an arms fair took place in Docklands, large numbers of protesters, not terror suspects but protesters, were prevented from getting anywhere near that fair. They were hassled and detained, sometimes under Section 44 of that Act. Initially, the Metropolitan Police denied that they would ever use such powers in such a way, until questions were asked in Parliament, including in your Lordships’ House.

I sent a young lawyer from Liberty down to Docklands; he came back with large numbers of notices that had been issued to protesters and journalists, and predominantly to black and brown people, under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act. That was stop and search without suspicion. It took many years to take that case all the way to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, where of course it was found that that power was just too broad. Suspicionless stop and search is very ripe for abuse, so I urge—

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I have great sympathy for the noble Baroness’s argument and that advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but could she explain whether her objection to Clause 11 would be removed if subsection (7) were removed? It is in Clause 11(7) that what seems to be highly objectionable language occurs. It says that the constable

“may … make any search the constable thinks fit whether or not the constable has any grounds for suspecting that the person … is carrying a prohibited object”.

Supposing that that provision were not in the Bill—is the rest of Clause 11 objectionable?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

This being not Committee but Report, the simplest and speediest answer that I can give to the noble Lord’s question is that Clause 11 is about suspicionless stop and search. He has picked out a particular subsection in the scheme, which would have been interesting in Committee. But the crucial thing is that Clause 11 is on stop and search without suspicion, not in the context even of terrorism, where it can come with greater justification—for example, when everybody is stopped and searched on their way into the Peers’ Entrance if they are not a Peer, or at the airport, where everybody is treated the same. But, by definition, that will not be the case in this scheme. This broad power will be used against young people all over London on the day of a protest. It will cause such strife and will poison relationships between the police service and the people it serves. For that reason, I urge all noble Lords to reject in particular this power to stop and search without suspicion even of the protest offences to which I object in the Bill.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

I too speak in support of the amendments to remove Clauses 10 and 11, to which I have added my name. I declare my registered interests as the co-chair of the national police ethics committee and the chair of the Greater Manchester Police ethics advisory committee.

Stop and search can be an extremely useful tool in the police kit box, but, like many tools, it works far less well if it is overused or used for the wrong task. Eventually, it loses its efficacy entirely. I have several broken screwdrivers at home that bear witness to my own excesses in that regard, as well as to my very limited DIY skills. That is the danger we run when we extend stop and search powers in what, at times, feels like a knee-jerk reaction. They are simply the most obvious tool at the top of the box, whether they are appropriate or not. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, indicated, stop and search becomes, as it has in the past, so discredited that it reaches a point where, like my screwdrivers, it is counterproductive to use it, even in circumstances where it would be right and appropriate to do so.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, reminded us, with some chilling figures, of its disproportionate use against certain sectors of society—young black men in particular —which damages confidence in policing not just with regard to stop and search but more generally. It is because I am passionate to support our police that I have such worries about anything that tends to diminish that public confidence. I have the greatest concerns where stop and search is undertaken without suspicion; such powers are even more at risk of simply being used against people who look wrong or are in the wrong place. They become especially prone to the unconscious bias that we might try to shake off but all to some extent carry within us. Should these amendments be pressed to a Division, they will have my full support and I hope that of your Lordships’ House.

I conclude by offering a modest proposal that goes beyond these clauses and the Bill. Could the Minister seek to gain a commitment from His Majesty’s Government to refrain from any extension of stop and search powers until such time as it is clear that the existing powers are being used properly and proportionately? Such a self-denying ordinance might lead to us have an intelligent conversation about how better to focus the use of stop and search. We could then look at whether there are circumstances in which those powers should be radically extended—but not before then.

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Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

54: After Clause 18, insert the following new Clause—
“Protection for journalists and others monitoring protestsA constable may not exercise any police power for the principal purpose of preventing a person from observing or otherwise reporting on a protest or the exercise of police powers in relation to—(a) a protest-related offence,(b) a protest-related breach of an injunction, or(c) activities related to a protest.”Member's explanatory statement
This new Clause would protect journalists, legal observers, academics, and bystanders who observe or report on protests or the police’s use of powers related to protests.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, we now come to the totally uncontroversial matter of protecting journalists from abuse of police power. This is an amendment in my name and also those of the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. We are honoured to have as our guest today the young LBC reporter Charlotte Lynch, who was arrested by Hertfordshire police for doing her job last November. The noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, will explain.

[Baroness Boycott (CB)]

I shall be brief, because I know that time is of the essence. I begin by reading a very short extract from a news report for 28 November 2022—a couple of months ago:

“The BBC said Chinese police had assaulted one of its journalists covering a protest in the commercial hub of Shanghai and detained him for several hours, drawing criticism from Britain’s government, which described his detention as ‘shocking’ … ‘The BBC is extremely concerned about the treatment of our journalist Ed Lawrence, who was arrested and handcuffed while covering the protests in Shanghai,’ the British public service broadcaster said in a statement late on Sunday.”


I shall substitute a few words here to make the point. I substitute “Charlotte Lynch” for “Ed Lawrence”, “the M25 in Hertfordshire” for “Shanghai”, and LBC for the BBC—and another world. Charlotte, like Ed Lawrence was handcuffed for doing her job. She was held in a cell with a bucket for a toilet for five hours; she was fingerprinted and her DNA was taken, and she was not allowed to speak to anyone. Her arrest took place just two weeks before Ed Lawrence’s. Is this the kind of world we want to live in?

As many noble Lords know, I have been a journalist and a newspaper editor. I have sent people to cover wars and protests, and I believe fundamentally in the right of anyone in the world, especially in our country, to protest about things they believe in. You protest only when you cannot get anywhere with anything else, when letters to MPs, to the local council and the newspaper have been explored and you take to the streets. But just as this is a fundamental right, so is it more than just a fundamental right—it is a duty— of journalists to report on demonstrations, because demonstrations are where we see where society is fracturing and where people really care. I cannot believe, as a former newspaper editor, that I would now have to think that it might be more dangerous to send a journalist to Trafalgar Square than to Tahrir Square. I urge noble Lords to vote for this amendment.

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[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

May I respond to the noble Baroness, because I think she misrepresented what I said? I think I said that the officer would be intervening because of criminal behaviour, not because someone was a journalist or was suspected of being one. That would be the reason. There may be cases where an officer has intervened because they thought someone was a journalist and they did not want it to be recorded. I am not saying that has never happened; that would be wrong. There is no doubt about that. My point was only that the only reason for an officer to intervene should be—in principle, from the law—because the person is committing a criminal offence. That is what the Bill is all about: defining what is criminal and what is not. Therefore, I do not think it is fair to represent what I said as picking on someone because they are a journalist.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I wonder if I could help the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, because he has not, with respect, read the amendment—or at least not very carefully. To be clear, there would be nothing to prevent the arrest of a journalist, filmmaker, legal observer or anybody else if the officer suspected the commission of a criminal offence, including offences in the Bill that I disagree with. The protection is only against the use of police powers for the primary purpose of preventing the reporting. That is a judgment that is left to the officer, but what he cannot do is to say, “You’re a reporter. You’re giving protesters the oxygen of publicity, and I’m gonna arrest you.” That is the protection given here to people such as Charlotte Lynch, who could not possibly have been reasonably suspected of locking on or committing any other criminal offence. Such people could be suspected only of what they were actually doing: their job as reporters in a free society.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

And how is an officer to know?

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble and learned friend makes a very fair point, but the College of Policing and the National Union of Journalists awareness training is a little more recent than the 40 year-old PACE codes.

The College of Policing’s initial learning curriculum includes a package of content on effectively dealing with the media in a policing context. In addition, the authorised professional practice for public order contains a section on the interaction of the police with members of the media. This includes the recognition of press identification. It should also be noted that it is entirely legitimate for a police officer to inquire why an individual may be recording at the scene of a criminal offence if they deem it appropriate. We do not want to suggest that this is unlawful.

In light of those factors, while I completely understand the direction and purpose of the amendment, we do not support it because we do not deem it to be necessary. These defences are already covered in law.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this short but vital debate. Once more to respond to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who I am not sure has read the amendment—

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I have.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

This amendment is not about preventing the arrest of anybody, journalist or otherwise, who is reasonably suspected of committing a criminal offence, including offences in this Bill. There is no definitional problem, because what is defined is the purpose of the arrest, not the identity of the person. This is important because even after Charlotte Lynch’s arrest, a Conservative police and crime commissioner took to the airwaves to say, “You are giving the oxygen of publicity to protesters.” In other words, “You are complicit in this kind of disruptive action by reporting it.”

If a senior Conservative police and crime commissioner took that view, it is perhaps understandable that some hard-working, hard-pressed police officers in difficult times might take the same view. The offence for which Miss Lynch was arrested was the very open-textured “conspiracy to cause a public nuisance”. Therefore, if a journalist has been tipped off that there is to be a demonstration that may or may not turn out to be disruptive and they go to do their job of reporting, some police officers, it would seem, and others may believe that in some sense to be complicity in causing or conspiracy to cause a public nuisance.

I also want to thank the Minister and his Bill team for meeting me just yesterday—although of course the Home Office press office had already told various media outlets that the Home Office was doubling down on this amendment. At that meeting, I asked the Minister and his colleagues to explain the basis for Ms Lynch’s arrest being unlawful. By the way, many other journalists have recently been arrested; what was the basis for these being unlawful arrests? I got the answer that noble Lords just got from the Minister.

What is said to be unlawful about Ms Lynch’s arrest is not that she is a journalist, but that individual officers were taking direction from their superiors and not exercising their own judgment. That is a technical and very important matter, but it is not the issue at stake here. I asked the Bill team and the Minister: where is the authority, the legal provision, in primary or even secondary legislation, that says that journalists should not be arrested, for example for conspiracy to cause a public nuisance, just for reporting on something that itself may be a public nuisance? There was no authority and no provision offered. So vague assertions about PACE codes that do not even deal with my specific point are really not going to cut it—not on something as important as free reporting in a free society.

I have moved this amendment and I seek to test the opinion of your Lordships’ House.

Hillsborough Families Report: National Police Response

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Thursday 2nd February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend asks a very good question, and I am happy to say that some of the initiatives that have been taken support the sorts of things he is talking about—for example, the removal of means testing for exceptional case funding to cover legal support for families at an inquest. That broadens the scope and access for families. We have also refreshed the Guide to Coroner Services for Bereaved People. I hope that goes some way to answering my noble friend’s question.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it goes some way but, sadly, not far enough. It should not be a matter of exceptional case funding, should it? If public authorities are funding themselves and the police are funded, why should the bereaved families, in any situation and in any inquest, not be funded at a matched level?

Public Order Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 30th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I would have thought that the necessity for the Lord Speaker to retire for five minutes might be termed a “serious disruption” of the working of this House. However, the point I want to make, briefly, concerns the use of the phrase “capable of causing”. According to Amendment 48, a senior police officer will make the decision. What on earth will he base the decision on? It would certainly be easier with Just Stop Oil or Extinction Rebellion, but, as we know, there are many other processions and disturbances—particularly in London but right around the country—that he would not know to what they were leading or what they would be like. How on earth is he to assess whether they are capable of causing serious disruption? I find the issue very difficult to understand. I hope the Minister will explain what is really meant by a police officer deciding what is “capable of causing” serious disruption.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and a daunting privilege, as always, to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. My views on the necessity and desirability of this proposed anti-terror-style legislation are no secret. But whether noble Lords are for or against this Bill—whether they are for or against its new offences, including thought crimes, stop and search powers, including without suspicion, and banning orders, including without conviction—all noble Lords must agree that the concept of “serious disruption” has been used throughout the Bill as a justification and trigger for interferences with personal liberty.

So, “serious disruption” should be defined. However, His Majesty’s Government resisted any definition at all, all the way through the Commons stages of the Bill and in this House, until this late stage, notwithstanding attempts by some of us on this side to provide a single overarching definition very early on, in Committee, and despite even senior police requests for clarity. What a way to legislate, bearing in mind that we are here at all only because of late amendments to last year’s bus—sorry, Bill—the police et cetera Bill, which would have had this whole Bill dropped into it, again at a very late stage.

Just over a week ago, via a Sunday afternoon No. 10 press release—because No. 10 press officers never rest on Sundays—and with no amendment even attached to that press release, we learnt that there was to be some sort of definition so that

“police will not need to wait for disruption to take place”.

The government amendments and signatures to amendments from other noble Lords were not published until about 24 hours later, so there was a whole media round of debate the next morning—this was before the conviction of Police Constable Carrick—concerning unpublished amendments. I hope that the Minister will tell us when he first knew about this new approach of having a definition, and why it was heralded by press release rather than discussion in your Lordships’ House.

As for the substance of the issue, government amendments are confusingly piecemeal and set the bar too low before a number of intrusive police powers and vague criminal offences kick in: “more than minor” hindrance is not serious disruption. More than minor is not serious enough. They cannot be serious.

I face more than minor hindrance in congested London traffic every day or even when walking through the doors and corridors of your Lordships’ House at busy times. The definition of civil nuisance at English common law involves “substantial interference” with the use and enjoyment of my property. Should it really be harder to sue my neighbour for polluting my private land than it will be under the Government’s proposal to have my neighbour arrested for protesting against pollution in the public square? Obviously not—or at least, not in a country that prides itself on both civil liberty and people’s ability to rub along together and even disagree well.

Instead, the single overarching and more rigorous Amendment 1 defines “serious disruption” as

“causing significant harm to persons, organisations or the life of the community”.

That is the overarching definition, and it includes “significant delay” in the delivery of goods and “prolonged disruption” of access to services, as set out in the Public Order Act 1986. To help the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the concept of prolonged disruption is already in the 1986 Act as amended by last year’s bus, the police et cetera Act, so that is not a novel concept. We are really talking about significant harm instead of more than minor hindrance. I urge all noble Lords, whether they are for or against the Bill in principle, to vote for that.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I would like to speak next because my amendments have been mentioned and it is probably best that I explain what they are. I stress that the amendments under discussion are not my amendments: they are Amendments 5, 14 and 24 in this group, which substantially repeat amendments I tabled in Committee. There is a certain amount of revision of the words but essentially, I am making the same point as I did in Committee. They seek to give effect to a recommendation by the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who, as I speak, is still a member of that committee, for adding his name to the amendments.

The committee noted that the three clauses concerning locking on, tunnelling and being present in a tunnel—the offences that are the target of my amendments—use the term “serious disruption” to describe the nature of the conduct that the Bill seeks to criminalise. The committee noted that this could result in severe penalties, such as providing the basis for a serious disruption prevention order, and took the view that a definition should be provided. On that issue, I think there is a wide measure of agreement across the House—perhaps with the exception of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—that a definition is needed because of the nature of these offences and the consequences that follow from them.

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[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

So there is agreement that a definition is needed because of the nature of the crime and the consequences that follow from it. The committee noted that a definition was given in Sections 73 and 74 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has referred. Those sections deal with the imposition of conditions on public processions and public assemblies. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, seeks to adopt the same definition for the purposes of the Bill.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am sorry to be a hindrance to the noble and learned Lord, although I hope no more than a minor hindrance. The concept of “prolonged disruption” is a tiny part of the definition, but my noble friend Lord Coaker’s Amendment 1 does not replicate the definition in Section 73 of the 1986 Act. The new overarching principle that we would introduce with Amendment 1 is

“significant harm to persons, organisations or the life of the community”,

and that is not in the 1986 Act. It is not the provision that is limited in that Act to processions or indeed assemblies.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness and accept her correction. Of course the catalogue that follows is very much the catalogue that we see in the 2022 Act, and it was that which took our attention in the committee. Our view was that the definition is not suitable for use in the Bill because of locking on and, especially, tunnelling. The committee said that the definition should be tailored to the very different defences with which we are concerned in the Bill, and recommended that the meaning of the phrase should be clarified in a proportionate way—for a reason that I will come back to, because the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, mentioned that point—in relation to each offence. That is what my amendments seek to do. I suggest that they are more in keeping with what the Constitution Committee was contemplating than the amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker.

I have tried to provide definitions that are tailored to each of those three offences and are short, simple, proportionate and easy to understand. After all, this is a situation where guidance is needed for use by all those to whom the offences are addressed. That audience includes members of the public who wish to exercise their freedom to protest; the police, who have to deal with these activities; and the magistrates, before whom most of any prosecutions under these clauses will be tried.

At the end of my speech in Committee, my aim was to invite the Minister and his Bill team to recognise the importance of the issue and, if my amendments were not acceptable, to come up with a more suitable but just as effective form of words. As noble Lords can imagine, as we so often issue invitations of that kind and those words were uttered more in hope than expectation, it was rather to my surprise that on this occasion my hope was realised when the Bill team began to take an interest in what I was seeking to do. I am grateful to them and to the Ministers in the other place and in this House for the discussions that then followed, which helped me to improve and finalise my wording. I cannot claim that I have found an absolutely perfect solution, but I think what I have done is achieve the best that can be done. Certainly, it is very much better than the alternative that is before your Lordships.

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[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

These are the words we are dealing with. “Significant” is the word in the Amendment 1 and it is defining “serious disruption”, but we are trying to find words that define what we mean by “serious disruption” in the case of these three offences, which is my point. I come back to the point that the important word is “more”, because I am trying to establish the threshold at which it is right that the police should intervene. The problem with “significant”, of course, is that can mean different things to different people in different contexts.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I think the difference between us is that the noble and learned Lord is suggesting that there is a binary: there is “minor” and there is “significant”, and therefore anything “more than minor” must be “significant” or—forget “significant”—“serious”. To understand the intention behind our amendment, one needs to think about “significant harm”—“harm” as in damage. Harm and damage, and significant harm and damage, are well understood in the law, as he knows. As for his concerns about the long list, it is a replication of provisions previously in the 1986 Act for assemblies and processions. To reiterate, it is a non-exhaustive list of examples. The crucial part of our definition is “significant harm”. I think an ordinary person on the street would understand “significant harm” as more serious a minor hindrance or one iota more than a minor hindrance.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I was looking to identify the threshold at which one reaches the point where, on my approach, one moves beyond a minor disturbance to something that becomes significant. That is why I use “more” for the point at which, I suggest, given these particular offences, it is right that the police should then intervene. I asked the question: once one reaches that point, in the case of the tunnelling, why should that go on and on? People are arguing about whether we have reached the stage where the harm is caused is significant without the further guidance of being directed to the point at which it becomes significant.

The problem with the words that the noble Baroness is addressing to me is that they can mean a range of things within the compass of the word “significant”. I am trying to direct attention to the particular offences and consequences that follow from the activities being carried on. That is why I suggest that “more” is the most important and significant part of my formula.

As for locking on, the other of the three offences, I do not have a long catalogue of things that may be affected. There is always a risk that something might be missed out, so I have tried to capture what is put at risk by the omnibus words “their daily activities”. But here again, the threshold that I am seeking to identify is to be found in the words

“more than a minor degree”,

for the reasons that I have explained. Again, the question is: why should the police wait any longer once that threshold is reached?

I come back to the point about proportionality that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, mentioned, and the reasonable excuse point. Proportionality is very important and the threshold has to be put into the right place, because we need to consider at what point the interference with the convention rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association becomes disproportionate.

In its judgment in the recent Northern Ireland abortion services case, delivered last December, the Supreme Court said in paragraph 34:

“It is possible for a general legislative measure in itself to ensure that its application in individual circumstances will meet the requirements of proportionality … without any need for the evaluation of the circumstances in the individual case”.


In other words, there is then no issue for a jury to consider or a magistrate to address his or her mind to; it will have been sufficiently addressed if the issue identified in the legislation is in the right place.

As to whether that is so, some guidance can be found in a decision of the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg court in a Lithuanian case called Kudrevičius in 2015. That case was about a demonstration by farmers, of which a number have happened in recent years. They had gathered in a number of groups to block the traffic on a number of public highways. The court said that in that case the disruption of traffic that resulted could not

“be described as a side-effect of a meeting … in a public place, but rather as the result of intentional action by the farmers”—

in other words, they were intending to disrupt the highway—and that

“physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities”

of others, the court said,

“is not at the core of”

the right to freedom of assembly. That in itself, however, was not enough to remove their participation entirely from the scope of the protection.

That is the background for what the court then decided. It said that “Contracting States”, which included ourselves,

“enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in their … taking measures to restrict such conduct”

and that the farmers’ intention—a serious disruption of the highways to a more significant extent

“than that caused by the normal exercise of the right of peaceful assembly in a public place”—

was enough to enable the Court to conclude that the criminal sanction which was imposed there was not disproportionate. That is an example of a case which went across the border from being a side-effect of what was happening to something that was a deliberate obstruction of traffic, which is what locking on is all about, and a deliberate interruption of, let us say, the HS2 development, which is what the tunnelling is all about.

My approach also has the support of a decision by the Divisional Court in March last year in a case called Cuciurean. That case was about tunnelling. It affected only a small part of the HS2 project, it lasted for only two and a half days and the cost of removal was less than £200,000. However, the prosecution for aggravated trespass was upheld as not amounting to a disproportionate interference with the protester’s rights. I am sorry to weary your Lordships with those references, but, having looked at those and other case law, I believe that the position I have adopted in these amendments strikes the correct balance for the proportionate treatment of the rights we are talking about.

Of course, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, will not press his amendment—although I have no doubt he will feel he should—because I believe it is not fit for purpose. It is not right to introduce a general definition of that kind, which is perhaps all right for one of three offences but is completely out of place for the other two. It is not good legislation. We try in this House to improve legislation. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, I do not think his amendment improves it. On the contrary, I suggest that my amendments do improve it and, when the time comes, if I have the opportunity to do so, I will seek to test the opinion of the House.

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[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

The noble Baroness makes a good point. I was going to come on to a point that she made, but the point the police are making is that, if there is a lack of precision around something as simple as obstructing the highway, can we help them? People have alluded to the fact that the police have asked for help, and that is one of the things Parliament can do: explain more clearly how obstruction can be a protest that is beyond the criminal boundary, particularly when political motives are involved. Generally, the police will try not to get involved in that, which why they are seeking help in asking for more legislation, rather than less, although in general I think they would say that they do not need any more legislation.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, explained very well why he would like to approach this issue in a different way. The problem I have with his amendment is that it refers to a “prolonged disruption”, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. I particularly do not like its reference to health. What if someone is having a heart attack or another very serious medical issue that involves minutes rather than hours—or days, in some cases?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Just to be clear one more time, prolonged disruption is just an example. One does not need prolonged disruption for significant harm to be caused to a person, an organisation or the life of the community. I cannot think of a more significant harm than a person with a heart attack not being able to be transported in an ambulance.

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Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

2: Clause 1, page 1, line 5, at end insert “without reasonable excuse”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes the lack of a reasonable excuse a component part of the offence of locking on, thus placing the burden of proof upon the prosecution.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I first thank noble Lords; so too does Cole Porter from the grave, because “how strange the change” would have been from “major” to “just a little bit more than minor”.

This second group deals with the concept of “reasonable excuse”, which noble Lords will remember is present in a number of the new criminal offences in the Bill. As noble Lords have heard, some, including locking on in particular, are very vague and dangerous. I have some amendments, with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, that attempt to set straight a reversed burden of proof, inappropriate in criminal law, where the Government have sought to place the burden on the innocent cyclist with the bike lock or the protester, or whoever, to demonstrate that they had a reasonable excuse when, really, the lack of a reasonable excuse should be a component part of the criminal offence and, indeed, something that a police officer considers before arresting someone.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has said eloquently many times in your Lordships’ House that criminal offences need to be fit for purpose not just in a courtroom or even during a charging decision in a police station, but on the ground when an officer is considering who to arrest. Therefore, it is important that the lack of a reasonable excuse be a component, core part of the offence and not something that a hapless bystander or protester has to prove.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will speak to other amendments in this group that he has tabled. I support all of them, whether my name is there or not; it is there in spirit. I would like to be clear about that and, similarly, with attempts to improve these offences and improve the definition of “reasonable excuse”. But, on account of time, I just want to focus on and prioritise the importance of not supporting the government amendments or, should I say, the amendments that Ministers have now signed in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead.

It seems harsh, to say the least, to single out “protest” from all the potential excuses that may or may not be reasonable in a particular case and a particular set of circumstances. Why single out protest as something that can never be reasonable? That seems to me to be an attempt to take proportionality out of the mind of a decision-maker—not just a court but a police officer on the ground. I think that is a mistake.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, will no doubt cite very leading authority on circumstances in which proportionality is so clearly part of an offence that there is no need for second guessing at the arrest or prosecution stage. But that will not be the case in relation to some of these offences and, I venture, locking on in particular.

I will not attempt to repeat the eloquence of my noble friend Lord Coaker with the various descriptions of linking arms, but the idea that an offence that can be committed with such trivial activity should not have an element of proportionality put in the mind of a decision-maker is of huge concern to me.

Without further ado, I commend the various amendments that I have described, but also ask noble Lords not to support any attempt to single out protest as the one excuse that is never reasonable. That seems rather unreasonable to me. I beg to move.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness on her amendments and am opposed to Amendment 8 from the Government and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, which seeks to exclude and narrow down very dramatically the scope which, I submit, should be present in this offence for a defence of reasonable excuse.

Why should not a demonstration against measures concerning, for example, climate change as a question of fact and degree for the trial judge be adjudged reasonable, as was the case in DPP v Ziegler, which went to the Supreme Court. It is perfectly true and perfectly right that I should acknowledge this. Indeed, my noble and learned friend Lord Hope drew my attention way back at the end of last year to the latest Supreme Court decision, which he mentioned today with regard to group 1, in the Northern Ireland abortion case. It is a reference from the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I entirely understand that that is the noble Lord’s view. The test of proportionality will, of course, be decided on the facts of each case as it arises, which will be matters that will feed into the decisions taken by the police and CPS in the charging process.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in an incredibly thoughtful debate—your Lordships’ House at its best, if I may say so. Noble Lords will forgive me if I do not mention everyone, for obvious reasons of time, but I am particularly grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, for explaining that sometimes reverse burdens make sense when the criminality is just so obvious, such as carrying a bladed article in public, but that linking arms is generally not thought of as the same kind of criminality.

I am also grateful to the noble and self-deprecating Lord, Lord Paddick. He may not be a lawyer, but he is certainly a better lawyer than many of us lawyers would be police officers, I suspect. His brilliant exposition of the Northern Ireland case in particular, including by way of his last intervention, demonstrates that Ziegler is not dead. As we have heard from many noble Lords in this thoughtful debate, protest is not a trump card; it will not always be a reasonable excuse for criminality. But sometimes it might be. It is not irrelevant to these matters. Good law is about rules and discretion and, without the right amount of discretion, injustice will follow.

Most of all, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, because it was his particular thought experiment that made me most concerned about a mass demonstration such as the one on Iraq—but it could be on another subject under another Government in future. We are talking about a mass demonstration where, quite deliberately, the police do not run around arresting everybody; they use their discretion in the public interest not to do so, so as not to cause a very hazardous situation to human beings and public order, or because they simply would not be able to arrest a large number of people.

In my development of the thought experiment from the noble Lord, Lord Deben, instead of just not arresting people and just ensuring that people are safe, certain police officers arrest only a certain type of person—say, only people in wheelchairs, or only women, who are easier to arrest, or, dare I say it, only people of a certain race. If those people alone were then prosecuted and were not permitted to argue a reasonable excuse that they were just on the demonstration like everybody else, I suggest that a grave injustice would follow. The fact of the protest is never a trump card, but sometimes it is highly pertinent.

I shall not press the amendments in my name to a Division, because I have decided, on the basis of this debate, that the priority in the time that we have is to vote against the government amendments, which is what I would urge all those concerned about this to do.

Amendment 2 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

9: Leave out Clause 1

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lord, we come to the next group, and I have put my name to leaving out Clauses 1 and 2, on locking on and going equipped. I will not rehearse the problems with the vague nature of the offence of locking on, which, at its lowest, could literally be linking arms; or going equipped, which is a thought crime that could criminalise people carrying all sorts of innocent items in their rucksacks—bicycle locks or even potentially, in the context of the way in which some journalists or photojournalists have been arrested of late, the camera they were going to use to photograph the locking on, because they knew there was a protest. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will speak to some amendments he has tabled in the group to tighten and improve some of the more serious offences, and the Minister will of course speak to the government amendments, which I do not believe, for once, are incredibly controversial. I beg to move.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I support the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Quite honestly, we are trying to amend this awful piece of legislation and really, it is not enough: we should just kick it all out, including these government amendments.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group take issue with offences listed in the first five clauses of the Bill, so it might be helpful to set out exactly why the Bill is so necessary and how it differs from existing public order legislation. The Bill seeks to speed up the ability of police to pre-empt, intervene and respond to the evolving tactics we have seen from—what can best be described as—a selfish minority of protesters. It also seeks to establish clear stand-alone offences, which target disruptive and dangerous behaviour, and impose sentences that are proportionate to the harm caused.

I have heard many times that the police already have the powers necessary to deal with disruptive behaviour, such as tunnelling or locking on. I disagree. We have only to look at the high levels of disruption as recently as a few months ago to see that more needs to be done. The Bill provides police with the powers necessary to combat these specific offences while ensuring that those who seek to cause serious disruption on private, as well as public, land are held to account. It is completely unfair that the hard-working public have to face misery and disruption caused by individuals locking on to a road or tunnelling under a building site, only to see the perpetrators arrested several hours after beginning their actions and then let off with a light sentence.

Clauses 1 and 2 are a key part of the Government’s plans to protect the public from the dangerous and disruptive protest tactic of locking on. We have seen protesters who use locking on and who tunnel be acquitted on technicalities. Therefore, it is important to have clear, stand-alone offences for locking on and tunnelling. This ensures that those intent on causing serious disruption for others can be brought to justice quickly and given a proportionate penalty that reflects the harms they have caused. The “going equipped to lock on” and the “going equipped to tunnel” offences enable the police to intervene earlier to prevent serious disruption. Dealing with a tunnel or a lock-on is extremely resource-intensive, taking hours of police time, which could be much better spent tackling other crimes and disorder on our streets. Surely noble Lords would agree that enabling the police to act before the acts are committed is in everyone’s best interests.

The Government are on the side of the public and will act to ensure that the public are protected from these disruptive acts. We welcome Extinction Rebellion’s sensible new year’s resolution to

“prioritise attendance over arrest and relationships over roadblocks”.

However, Just Stop Oil and Insulate Britain are digging their heels in and have committed to continue trampling on the lives of others. Faced with this threat, it is clear to me that Clauses 1 and 2 should stand part of the Bill. Therefore, I respectfully ask the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, to withdraw Amendment 9.

Amendment 19, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, limits the extent of the offence of causing serious disruption by being present in a tunnel to tunnels which have been created through the commission of the offence of causing serious disruption by tunnelling. I thank the noble Lord for tabling this amendment and accept the need for clarity in distinguishing between those who cause serious disruption in a tunnel created for the purposes of or in connection with a protest, and those who cause serious disruption in tunnels such as the London Underground tunnels.

My noble friend Lord Murray previously committed to considering this matter further: subsequently, the Government have tabled Amendments 21, 29 and 30. These amendments provide that the offence of causing serious disruption by being present in a tunnel, as defined by Clause 4, is committed

“only in relation to a tunnel that was created for the purposes of, or in connection with, a protest.”

The Government’s amendments provide clarity in the legislation on the scope of the offence. This means that people who cause serious disruption in tunnels not created for the purpose of or in connection with a protest—such as the London Underground tunnels—would not fall within the scope of Clause 4. In contrast to Amendment 19, it also includes no additional burden for the courts when prosecuting offences under Clause 4, in that they would not be required to show that an offence has occurred under Clause 3 as well.

Finally, Amendment 31 raises the threshold at which an object may be captured within the scope of the “going equipped to a tunnel” offence, as doing so would limit the effectiveness of the offence. We are trying to ensure that the police can act proactively before these harmful tactics are used. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, raises the threshold for intervention too high. In light of this, I hope noble Lords will support the amendments in the Government’s name and reject the other amendments in this group.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in this short debate. I believe it was such a short debate because so much of the argument has been rehearsed in the first two groups. I thank the Minister for the tone of his remarks. The reason that so many noble Lords voted as they did in the first two groups is because of their profound concerns about the breadth and vagueness of these offences. The brevity of this debate is in no sense any indication of support for, for example, locking on—an offence that could find a courting couple, if that is not too antiquated a term, who linked arms being accused of being capable of causing disruption to police officers and, if an argument ensues, finding themselves in the territory of locking on. It was a revelation in one of the debates on the Bill when the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom—who is now in his place—said, in response to a challenge by one of my noble friends, that, yes, linking arms could be attachment.

There are reasons why, for example, people in wheelchairs might attach themselves to the wheelchair in order to feel safer during a busy demonstration. There are so many unintended consequences. Even if one thought it were legitimate to create specific—or bespoke, which is the phrase normally used by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby—offences to tackle the suffragettes of the future, this offence is so broad and so vague that it would catch people who do not even intend militant protest at all.

With respect to the Minister, when he tells us that the events of recent months make this legislation necessary, how does that square with the comments of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester? Gluing yourself to the road, with the intended consequence of being caught, has already led to prosecution and conviction. Legislating does not stop bad things happening but, with bad legislation, more bad things will happen. The law will be brought into disrepute, and the relationship between the police and the public will be further fractured at a time when it is under grave strain for a number of reasons that we need not rehearse.

In the light of the first two votes, His Majesty’s Government are going to have to do some serious thinking before the further passage of this Bill on these offences, the definition of “serious disruption”, the issue of “reasonable excuse”, and the need to protect journalists such as Charlotte Lynch, who the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, mentioned earlier, and a number of others who have been arrested under existing offences, including conspiracy to cause a public nuisance—no reasonable excuse for them before detention in a police station for many hours. The Government are going to have to think again.

In closing—because we may not get to the journalist protection amendment this evening—when the Home Secretary Ms Braverman appeared before the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who is in her place, as chair of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee, before Christmas, she very kindly agreed to consider the subsequent amendment in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, to give specific protection to journalists. I have not yet heard a response from the Home Office. I have followed up with emails to the Home Secretary and to the public correspondence section of the Home Office. I hope that, before we reach that later amendment, there could be some consideration, as was promised to your Lordship’s Justice and Home Affairs Committee before Christmas.

I shall withdraw my opposition to Clause 1 standing part for the reasons I gave. I have every confidence that, in the light of the last two votes, which may have come as a surprise to them, the Government will sensibly now give some consideration to the way forward for this Bill.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

38: Clause 7, page 7, line 39, leave out subsections (7) to (9)
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes the Secretary of State’s power to make regulations by statutory instrument amending subsection (6) to add a kind of infrastructure or to vary or remove a kind of infrastructure; or to amend section 8 to re-define any aspect of infrastructure included within the new criminal offence.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, now we turn to the offence of interference with the use or operation of key national infrastructure, which is clearly a matter of considerable concern to the life of the community and to the balance that we have been discussing between peaceful dissent and the rights and freedoms of people in a democratic society.

The definition of key national infrastructure becomes very important in relation to a new criminal offence which attaches to it a maximum of 12 months in prison. My Amendment 38 is perhaps fairly predictable for an amendment in your Lordships’ House: it seeks to remove the Secretary of State’s ability by regulations or statutory instrument to amend the definition of key infrastructure. As your Lordships will understand, it would be just too easy for any Government, now or in the future, to amend the definition in a way that was not proportionate, and to add matters and items to key infrastructure that the public did not consider to be key. On principle, I do not think that criminal offences should be created or amended in that way by Henry VIII powers. That is the reason for my Amendment 38. It is the sort of amendment that I would have tabled to any number of criminal justice Bills. It is not specifically about protest; it is an objection of principle to amending important definitions within criminal law in that way.

Amendments 39 and 40 in the group, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, similarly try to tighten important definitions, but I will leave him to speak to those. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, just said, I have Amendments 39 and 40 in this group. As we discussed in Committee, while there may be some sympathy for measures designed to stop protesters blocking motorways, airport runways and railway lines, the legislation as drafted—covering anyone who interferes with the use or operation of any key national infrastructure, including being reckless as to whether it could be interfered with—could criminalise those legitimately protesting on railway station forecourts or concourses or those protesting outside or inside airport terminal buildings who do not intend directly to impact train journeys or flights. Clause 7(4) is extraordinarily broad in its scope, in that anything that prevents the infrastructure being used or operated to any extent for any of its intended purposes is covered.

For example, those awaiting the arrival of a controversial figure whose presence is arguably against the public interest, and who wish to demonstrate their objection to the person’s presence in the United Kingdom, should be excluded from the overbroad remit of this offence. I accept that they may be committing other offences, but to be prosecuted for interference with the use of key national infrastructure when this is clearly not the purpose or intention of the protest does not appear to be right. Amendments 39 and 40 seek to restrict the offence to infrastructure that is essential for transporting goods and passengers by railway and air respectively. We support Amendment 38 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, on the regulation-making powers of the Secretary of State to add, alter or delete the kinds of infrastructure covered by this offence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation. As I said previously, rail and air infrastructure are each complex, interconnected systems, and it is not an easy exercise to find rail and air infrastructure that you can describe as non-essential to the running of services.

Adopting this carve-out could pose a risk of ambiguity as to whether certain facilities—sidings, depots, maintenance facilities, freight facilities, air infrastructure used for pilot training, air shows and, potentially, trials of flights, aircraft and so on—would be covered. It would therefore create ambiguity for the transport industry, the police and protesters, and would give protesters another opportunity to delay prosecutions where the prosecution has to prove that the infrastructure targeted was “essential”. I also note that these are not safe places to conduct a protest, although this has not necessarily stopped people in the past. It is therefore the Government’s view that all parts of our rail and air transport infrastructure must be protected. For these reasons, I respectfully ask that noble Lords do not press their amendments.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful once more to all noble Lords who spoke in this short debate. Once more, not testing the opinion of the House should in no way be taken as consent, let alone enthusiasm, for what the Government are doing here.

The criminal law should be an exercise in precision technical drawing, not impressionist art. However, this Government, and the Home Office in particular, are painting with a very broad brush. These broad powers and offences, which we have debated at length, are a blank cheque not just for police officers to use and misuse by accident or design, but for the Secretary of State to further define and amend this serious criminal offence of interfering with key infrastructure without the proper scrutiny that comes with primary legislation.

I am grateful to the Minister for at least giving me the assurance of the affirmative procedure. However, the problem with even the affirmative procedure is that, at a time of great public concern about the next protest movement down the track—the one that has not made the new year’s resolution that this Minister approves of—a list of amendments will be made to the regulations governing what is to be key infrastructure. Some of them will be sensible and acceptable, and some will be outrageous. Members of the other place and Members of your Lordships’ House will be put in the invidious position of saying yes or no without the kind of scrutiny and line-by-line consideration, voting and amendment that is possible with a criminal justice or public order Bill. This need to sub-delegate seems all the more extraordinary when we are getting public order Bills every year at the moment. This just does not compute to me.

Having tested the patience of noble Lords and the Minister, I will not test the opinion of the House.

Amendment 38 withdrawn.

Rape: Operation Soteria

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Monday 23rd January 2023 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what are the most recent rape (1) reporting, (2) prosecution, and (3) conviction, rates in England and Wales; and how many forces have rolled out Operation Soteria.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the most recent statistics show that 70,600 rape incidents were recorded by the police in the year to June 2022; there were 2,326 prosecutions for rape and 1,019 convictions. Nineteen police forces and nine CPS areas are participating in Operation Soteria and informing the development of new national operating models for the investigation and prosecution of rape. These models will be available to all forces and CPS areas from June 2023.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for that Answer, but recent Home Office research, including under Soteria, revealed a dismal picture of police attitudes towards rape complainants and whether they are at fault for the crimes committed against them. British women are reeling from Couzens and Carrick. Is it not time that the Government took this problem out of the long grass and legislated for police vetting, training and disciplinary reform?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I spoke from the Dispatch Box last week on the review into dismissal processes. We talked a lot then about vetting and the various changes that have been made to both the vetting processes and the vetting verification processes, which are being advanced. Operation Soteria pioneered a new model which will effectively put the needs of victims above those of suspects. The initial evidence is that it is working. Avon and Somerset Police was one of the pioneering forces; it has reported an increase in its adult rape charge rate from 3% to over 10%. I do not think that is good news but it is progress.

Police: Employment and Discipline

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Monday 9th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I said earlier that this is under active discussion. I am not part of those active discussions, but I cannot imagine a set of circumstances where they would not be considering the speed of the process.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, why has it taken from October to January just to come up with basic terms of reference? How long will it be before this review, whenever it actually begins, concludes, given the concern throughout the country and certainly across your Lordships’ House?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I do not know why it has taken a couple of months to get to this stage, and I do not know how long the review will take, but I imagine that will be dealt with in the terms of reference.

Public Order Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th December 2022 Lords Chamber

I strongly urge the Government to accept this amendment, which provides holistic protections to ensure that journalists, observers and bystanders continue to have access to protest sites in order to report on what happens and to monitor police powers. It is an essential part of our democracy. I beg to move.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

The Committee will imagine the daunting privilege of attempting to follow that speech from one of the most senior journalists—and indeed one of the greatest environmentalists—in the Committee and your Lordships’ House. I want to speak briefly to explain why we have Amendments 117 and 127A. The reason is my poor draftsmanship when we conceived Amendment 117, for which I apologise. Amendment 127A is an improvement on Amendment 117 because of a defect that was pointed out to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott. Amendment 117 had protected journalists who were covering the policing of protests only, and, of course, we need to protect journalists who are covering protests as well as the policing thereof.

I would also like to take this opportunity to reassure the Minister that, notwithstanding my fundamental concerns about the Bill as a whole, and significant provisions within it, this journalistic protection in Amendment 127A—I am grateful to the other co-signatories and supporters across the House for understanding this too—notwithstanding our fundamental objections to various provisions that the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, referred to, would not in any way wreck those provisions, objectionable though they may be for my part. All Amendment 127A would do is protect journalists where any police power, not just the police powers in this Bill but police powers more generally, are being used for the principal purpose of preventing their reporting.

I know that it is very hard in Committee to persuade a Minister to think again, but this is not a request to think again about the Bill in sum or in part; this is requesting a protection for journalists that is required in relation to even the police powers that currently stand. In the case of Charlotte Lynch, and other cases to which the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, referred, journalists were arrested and detained under public order powers as they currently stand—not even the broader, blank-cheque powers to come.

So I hope that, in this Committee, those in the Box, and noble Lords and Ministers, will take pause for thought and think about whether we need a protection against current public order powers, and any to come, to ensure that the police are not using them to arrest journalists because they think that the reporting of protests per se gives the oxygen of publicity to protest and so on. Day after day, at Question Time in particular, Foreign Office Ministers stand at the Dispatch Box and—rightly and sincerely, in my view—criticise attacks on journalistic freedom across the globe. I think something like Amendment 127A would be a very important statement, putting that sincerity of Foreign Office Ministers into law in the home department.

So, I hope that noble Lords, Ministers, and Members of the whole Committee will really reflect on the noble Baroness’s speech.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of the Environment and Climate Change Committee. I want to ask the Government to listen very carefully to this discussion. We have a very real issue when really serious matters, which threaten all of us, do not appear to some of us to be properly addressed. That is a very serious matter for any democracy, and those of us who are democrats do have to stand up for the rule of law and do have to say that extreme actions cannot be accepted.

But it has a second effect too, and that is that we have to be extremely careful about the way in which we deal with those extreme actions. I do beg the Government to take very seriously the fact that these extreme actions will continue, because people are more and more worried about the existential threat of climate change. The Climate Change Committee spends a great deal of its time trying to ensure that there is a democratic and sensible programme to reach an end that will protect us from the immediate effects of climate change, which we cannot change, and, in the longer term, begin to turn the tables on what we as human beings have caused.

It is not always easy to do that in the light of others who are desperate that we should move faster and that we should do more; who are desperate because they are seriously frightened and are not sure that those who are in charge have really got the urgency of the situation.

It is very difficult to imagine that we are not going to have to cope with the uprising of real anger on this subject. As a democrat, I want us to cope. As a parliamentarian, I want us to be able to deal with these issues and ensure that the public are not threatened. I echo the Deputy Chancellor of Germany, a Green Member of Parliament, who makes it absolutely clear that the kinds of actions we have seen in this country from Extinction Rebellion and similar things in Germany are not acceptable in a democracy.

The other side of that argument is that we have got to be extremely careful about the way in which we enforce the law and how we deal with this issue. Journalists play the key part in this. They must be there to report on what happens. It is in our interest as democrats that that happens. If they are not there and cannot say what needs to be said without fear or favour, none of us can stand up and deal with the arguments of those who argue that democracy does not work and that somehow they have to impose their will.

I want the Government to recognise the importance of this. In this country, a journalist must have access without fear or favour. The police must not treat them in a way that has happened again and again, and which must stop happening. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, it is not happening because of what is in this Bill, which in general I do not have an objection to; it is what happens in any case. The fact that the police could hold a journalist for five hours knowing that they were a journalist is utterly unacceptable. You cannot do that in a democracy—and nor can we talk to other countries about these things if that happens here and we do not do something to enshrine in law the fact that it should not.

Earlier, I had to deal with the question of not opening coal mines in order to be able to stand up in the world and show that we too will carry out what we ask other countries to do. This is another, even more serious, case of that. We cannot talk about repression if we in this country can be shown not to have protected journalists in these circumstances.

It is a terribly simple matter. We must put on the face of the Bill, referring to all actions, that journalists should be in the position that the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, suggests. It may be that her amendments could be better done; it may be that the Government have a different way of doing it. The only thing that I ask, in order to protect democracy and ourselves—those of us who are moderates and believe in the rule of law—is that we need to have this assertion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Before the Minister sits down, and with my real thanks for the sentiment that he expressed, does he concede that public order powers in general are cast in broad terms? Charlotte Lynch was arrested for the offence of conspiracy to cause a public nuisance—a fairly broad concept—and a number of broad police powers and offences in the Bill are triggered by an undefined concept of serious disruption.

Does the Minister also concede that senior voices in policing have said that journalists who give the oxygen of publicity to protests are part of the problem? By giving publicity, they are feeding the fuel of serious disruption. I know that the Minister disagrees with that proposition but, given that there has been so much performative legislation, and that there is apparently disagreement in the policing world about what is and is not feeding a serious disruption, why would the Government not take this modest step to ensure that no one should be arrested for the primary purpose of preventing their reporting of protest?

As a point of clarification, the difference between Amendments 117 and 127A is not the class of people they cover; it is the class of activity that is being reported on. Amendment 127A is an improvement on my poorer drafting of Amendment 117 because it refers to reporting protests themselves and not just the policing.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with the noble Baroness that I do not agree with the proposition she just outlined from senior police officers. Having said that, I have not read those particular comments and cannot comment on the specifics. I go back to what I was saying earlier: it is not lawful to detain journalists simply there monitoring protests; it is against the law. The police made mistakes in these cases. As I said earlier, we agree it was completely wrong.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I have not been present for earlier proceedings on this Bill because of other commitments, for which I apologise. For that reason, I will say only a very few words. With everyone else who has spoken, I completely oppose Clauses 19 and 20 and support the amendments in this group restricting their ambit and the ambit of SDPOs, for all the reasons considered and voiced by my noble friend Lord Paddick in opening and all other noble Lords who have spoken.

The so-called serious disruption prevention orders amount to punishment that does indeed involve serious disruption: serious disruption of individual citizens’ liberties, imposed without a criminal conviction and on proof to the civil and not the criminal standard, and which can last indefinitely. These proposals are entirely inimical to principles deeply embedded in our law and to notions of crime and justice that we all hold so dear. They are an insidious attack on civil liberties. They threaten a gradual, incremental encroachment on civil liberties—the very type of encroachment that can ultimately lead to the destruction of those liberties themselves.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare a historical if not a current interest as a Home Office lawyer from January 1996 until the autumn of 2001. I was occasionally and habitually a happy and unhappy inhabitant of the Box.

I agree with—I think—every speech so far in this significant debate. I would go further than some in saying that I was always against this blurring of civil and criminal process from the beginning when, I am sorry to say, Labour did it. I was against ASBOs, CRASBOs, control orders, TPIMs, football banning orders and all the rest, because they were always about lessening criminal due process. That is always the intention when you blur civil and criminal process by way of these quasi-injunctive orders. Whether it is minor nuisance or suspicion of being associated with terrorists, whatever the gravity of the threat, you will catch behaviour without proper criminal due process and then prosecute people for the breach.

Although we do not always agree, I must commend the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in particular on a devastating critique of this use of copy and paste in my former department. Computers are wonderful things—until they are not. I will not labour the point, save to quote the right honourable Member for Haltemprice and Howden, who has done his best on this Bill in the other place along with Sir Charles Walker, from the Times this morning:

“Serious disruption prevention orders, or SDPOs”—


protest banning orders—

“can be given to anyone who has on two previous occasions ‘carried out activities related to a protest’ that ‘resulted in or were likely to result in serious disruption’”—

which is not defined—

“or even ‘caused or contributed to the carrying out by any other person’ of such activities. This is drafted so broadly so as to potentially include sharing a post on social media or handing out a leaflet encouraging people to go to a protest—even if you did not go on to attend that protest. Those issued with an SDPO can face harsh restrictions on their liberty, including … GPS tracking and being banned from going on demonstrations, associating with certain people”,

et cetera—and the orders are renewable indefinitely, as we have heard.

I am sorry if I have made noble friends feel uncomfortable. Do not think about these measures as they would be employed today. Think about how they could be used on the statute book by another Government, not of your friends and not of your choosing, in 20 years’ time. That is why, in a terrible Bill, Clauses 19 and 20 should not stand part.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I open by echoing what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said: all the arguments in all the amendments could become redundant if we support not putting Clauses 19 and 20 in the Bill. The strength of feeling demonstrated through this short debate leads me to believe that that may well be what we vote on when we come to Report.

I forget whether it was my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti or the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, who referred to this as copy-and-paste legislation. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, who gave the analogy of chicken coops being moved around to replicate these civil injunctions. But perhaps the most powerful speech we have heard was from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who gave six examples of SDPOs being tougher than TPIMs, which really caused me to sit back and reflect on the meat of what we are dealing with here today.

My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti said she has always been against what she called quasi-injunctive orders—civil orders—going all the way back to ASBOs. This caused me to reflect, as a magistrate, on which of those orders I deal with when I sit in courts. I deal with some of them: football banning orders, knife crime prevention orders and domestic violence protection orders—I think most noble Lords who have taken part in this debate think DVPOs are an appropriate use of civil orders. But, of course, the list goes on. That is really the point my noble friend makes: there are a growing number of these civil orders that, if breached, result in criminal convictions.

To repeat what I said, here we are meeting a very extreme situation in which people planning to get involved in protest or to help people do so can potentially be criminalised for that activity. The nature of the potential offence being committed is different.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, went through in detail, for which I thank him, the nature of the injunctions in Clauses 19 and 20, so I will not go through all that again, but I will make one point that he did not make. We are concerned that there does not seem to be any requirement for the person involved to have knowledge that the protest activities were going to cause serious disruption. That lack of a requirement of knowledge is a source of concern for us.

In the debate on the previous group, my noble friend Lord Rooker and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, spoke about the comments of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and my noble friend quoted from them. The noble Lord, Lord Beith, spoke about the Secretary of State issuing guidance to chief police officers and how that could go down a road whose potential political implications, in a sense, I prefer not to think about.

I will quote briefly from other committees which have reflected on this legislation. First, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has said:

“Serious Disruption Prevention Orders represent a disproportionate response to the disruption caused by protest. They are likely to result in interference with legitimate peaceful exercise of Article 10 and 11 rights. The police already have powers to impose conditions on protests and to arrest those who breach them. Other provisions of this Bill, if passed, will provide the police with even greater powers to restrict or prevent disruptive protest.”


Another committee, the Constitution Committee, said:

“The purposes for which a Serious Disruption Prevention Order can be issued are broad. They can be issued not only to prevent a person committing a protest-related offence but also to prevent a person from carrying out activities related to a protest. Such a protest need cause, or be likely to cause, serious disruption to only two people. This gives the orders a pre-emptive or preventative role. Furthermore, ‘protest-related’ offence is not adequately defined in this part of the Bill nor … is ‘serious disruption’. This undermines legal certainty. We recommend that the meaning of ‘protest-related offence’ is clarified more precisely.”


The Minister has a big job on his hands to try to convince any Member of this Committee that he is on the right track. The amendments in my name—the clause stand part amendments—are the quickest way to put this part of the Bill out of its misery.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

146: Clause 35, page 36, line 25, at end insert—
“(4A) No other provisions of this Act may be brought into force until a report by His Majesty’s Chief Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire Services on improvements to the vetting, recruitment and discipline of specialist protest police officers is laid before and debated in each House of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and another in the name of Baroness Chakrabarti, require parliamentary debate of a report by HMCI on improvements to the vetting, recruitment and discipline of specialist protest police officers before most provisions of the legislation may be brought into force. They further prohibit the bringing into force of the provisions in any police area under HMCI special measures.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate those still here. We end, of course, with commencement, because that is the tradition. In moving Amendment 146 I will speak also to my Amendments 147 and 149. I also support Amendment 148 from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and Amendment 150 from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and my noble friend. We are dealing with the tension between ever more police powers on the one hand and the lack of equivalence in resources, training and vetting for policing on the other hand. This tension has been more and more exposed in graphic terms in recent months and years.

We began this evening with the eloquent speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, who spoke powerfully about incidents of abuse of police power in relation to journalists. We were assured, I think sincerely, by the Minister that it was far from the intention of the Government that those things happened. The Government apparently agreed with me that those were wrongful arrests, yet they have happened more than once. There are some in the police community who hold the view that this is a legitimate thing to do to prevent serious disruption, which is undefined in statute. So, with the amendments, we are seeking to ensure that there is some check on the new blank cheque that we are putting on the statute book, in addition to blank cheques that have already been put there by broad concepts such as conspiracy to cause a public nuisance, et cetera. That is what we are trying to get at.

Amendment 146 prevents the commencement of most provisions of the Bill until there has been

“a report by His Majesty’s Chief Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire Services on improvements to the vetting, recruitment and discipline of specialist protest police officers”.

In another group, the Minister said, “If they’re trained, they’re trained”. So this is about ensuring that that is the case before additional power is granted. Amendment 147 is consequential to that.

Amendment 149 is crucial at a time when more than one police force is in special measures. It provides that provisions should

“not be brought into force for any area in which the police service is under special measures, the engage phase of monitoring, or other unusual scrutiny … by His Majesty’s Chief Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire Services.”

That seems to be a perfectly reasonably check on the new powers and a perfectly reasonable request to make of Ministers, so I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendments 148 and 150 in this group, and will speak also to Amendments 146, 147 and 149.

My amendments would mean that the new offences in the Bill—the delegation of functions and serious disruption prevention order provisions—could not come into force until the Government have laid before Parliament a report assessing the current capability of police services to use the provisions in those sections. Most of the 10 police forces inspected by HMICFRS said that the limiting factor in the effective policing of protests was a lack of properly trained and equipped police officers, not gaps in legislation. If that is already the limiting factor, what assessment have the Government made of the additional strain that the new provisions will have on already-stretched police officer numbers? What is the point of new legislation if the police do not have the resources to use it effectively—or, indeed, to use existing legislation effectively?

I can understand the principle behind Amendments 146, 147 and 149 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti; the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester has added his name to Amendments 146 and 147. Were it to be within the scope of the Bill, I too would support a moratorium on giving the police any further powers unless and until Parliament had a chance to consider a report by HMICFRS into the vetting, recruitment and discipline of all police officers, not just public order officers—particularly in forces that are subject to the “engage phase” of scrutiny by HMICFRS, commonly understood to be “special measures”. With so many forces requiring intensive scrutiny and intervention by HMICFRS, and public confidence in the police being so low, the police should not be given further powers until HMICFRS has reassured the public that they can have confidence in the police use of existing powers, let alone new ones.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

What I hope I said is that our expectation is that the provisions in the Bill will improve the ability of the police to “remove and deter protesters”, thereby alleviating some pressure on the police.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

That is very helpful. I agree with the Minister that police officers—we have a fine one in this Committee—and police forces should not be treated with a broad brush, but, and noble Lords will perhaps forgive me if I say it, nor should peaceful protesters. Hence, the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and hence the bulk of criticism of this entire draft legislation in this Committee. It is an unhappy privilege to be perhaps the last speaker in this Committee; I think I was the first. I am grateful to the Minister for his fortitude and courtesy. He wants to rise again.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I just want to clarify that I mean criminal protesters.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister but, of course, if the Government are able to keep expanding the definition of criminality, that does not give much cause for comfort about protecting peaceful dissent. I am none the less grateful to the Minister for his fortitude and courtesy throughout this three-session Committee. I hope that he and his colleagues will understand that what he has heard over these days and hours is very serious cross-party concern about these measures, reflected in vast sections of the country. I have no doubt that, after a good break and, I hope, a happy Christmas of reflection, colleagues will be back and some of these matters will definitely be put to the vote. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 146 withdrawn.

UK Asylum and Refugee Policy

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Friday 9th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as a member of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and as a long-time supporter of the wonderful charity Refugee Tales. It is a pleasure, as always, to follow the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and to mark the end of the 90th birthday week of my noble friend Lord Dubs in this way.

My thanks, like everyone else’s, go to the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury for convening this timely debate on the eve of Human Rights Day. I congratulate my noble friends—two maidens in Labour, if that is not a contradiction in terms—on their wonderful and contrasting maiden speeches. I look forward to the maiden speech of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester, which will follow in a moment.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, I always think it is apt that Human Rights Day is so close to Christmas, for the reasons he gave: Christmas is a time when so many people all over the world celebrate the birth of a very special refugee child. However, it is worth remembering why we celebrate Human Rights Day. Noble Lords will remember that it was in October 1942 that the then Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, famously wrote to the predecessor of our present most reverend Primate in the following terms:

“The systematic cruelties to which the Jewish people—men, women, and children—have been exposed under the Nazi regime are amongst the most terrible events of history, and place an indelible stain upon all who perpetrate and instigate them. Free men and women denounce these vile crimes, and when the world struggle ends with the enthronement of human rights, racial persecution will be ended.”


He was inspirational if perhaps optimistic, as it turned out.

In remembering the failure, and there was some failure, of the Allied powers to give adequate passage and protection to those desperate to flee the Nazis—I remind noble Lords that Albert Einstein was denied asylum and had to go to the United States for it—came even after Kristallnacht in 1938 heralded a policy of systematic genocide. Refugee protection is therefore perhaps the most poignant paradigm of post-war human rights.

Given the emerging understanding of the sheer horror of the pre-war and war years, it is unsurprising that the refugee convention should have been one of the earliest priorities of the post-war international legal architecture. It brings detail and binding effect to supplement the right to asylum in Article 14 of the universal declaration, came into force in 1954 and has been amended only once. The 1967 protocol removed the original limitation of the protection to those fleeing events before 1951 in Europe, so the subsequent protection was always intended to be worldwide and permanent.

We have heard how the convention defines a refugee as someone with a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political opinion, who is therefore unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin. As we heard from my noble friend Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, it is built on three principles: non-discrimination, non-penalisation and non-return, so the protection should be applied without discrimination on the basis of race, religion or country of origin but also, as international law has developed over time, on other prohibited grounds such as sex, age, disability, sexuality, and so on.

It recognises that the most desperate genuine refugees may have no choice but to flee—as from the Nazis—via illegal means using false papers, false identities and clandestine transport across borders, in breach of ordinary immigration controls of nations. The convention prohibits penalising them, for example, for criminal offences relating to their seeking of asylum or by way of arbitrary detention. Crucially, the convention absolutely prohibits their return or expulsion to places where their lives or freedoms would be in peril.

It further provides for minimum standards for the treatment of refugees. They should have access to courts, primary education and papers including travel documents. The UN high commissioner is charged with supervising the operation of the convention, which signatory states undertake to co-operate with.

The refugee convention is a vital part of human rights machinery in providing at least a basic safety net when individual nation states, which bear the lion’s share of responsibility for guaranteeing rights and freedoms, fail in that duty. To undermine it in thought, word and deed, as so many Governments have done for so much of our still-young century, is to forget or ignore the worst atrocities of the last one.

Independent Cultural Review of the London Fire Brigade

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Thursday 8th December 2022 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the Independent Cultural Review of the London Fire Brigade, published on 26 November.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who are here to contribute and to listen. I am also grateful to the Minister for taking the trouble to have a word about some of these very serious issues yesterday, and especially to my noble friend Lady Thornton, with her long knowledge of the London Fire Brigade and expertise in equality issues. It is also very good to see the former Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Greenhalgh, in his place opposite. Further, I am very grateful to the London Fire Commissioner and to the general secretary of the Fire Brigades Union for taking considerable trouble to engage with me in recent days. This is in sharp contrast to my experience of raising issues around, for example, the Metropolitan Police under its previous leadership.

The LFB and the FBU are to be respected for not doubling down—neither resorting to complacent comments about a few bad apples and so on, nor suggesting that to seek to reform the culture in a brave and essential uniformed service is in any way to undermine it. Quite the contrary, they have both persuaded me that they do not support the so-called “hero” mythology—and that is in a heroic service where members literally run towards burning buildings.

I congratulate Nazir Afzal on a painstaking report that makes painful and even devastating reading. I am sure that all firefighters in London, or certainly the overwhelming majority of them, are decent human beings. As noble Lords will remember, the report was commissioned after a young black firefighter and FBU member, Jaden Matthew Francois-Esprit, took his own life in August 2020. That is really not very long ago for the family, and I want to acknowledge that. His family had substantial concerns that he had been subject to racialised bullying.

As I am not an expert on the Fire Brigade, and there are experts in the Chamber, I shall focus on the words of others, and start with the report itself. Mr Afzal said that his review

“found evidence that supports a finding that LFB is institutionally misogynist and racist. We found dangerous levels of ingrained prejudice against women and the barriers faced by people of colour spoke for themselves. Not only were they more likely to be subject to disciplinary action, less likely to be promoted and largely unrepresented at senior levels, but they were also frequently the target of racist abuse.”

He also found examples of how this was driving some people of colour out of the brigade. There was, he said,

“evidence that talented people, committed to public service were being lost as a result.”

He was encouraged to see an increase in diversity at board level, but felt that

“there needs to be more urgency in rooting out deeply prejudiced staff and inappropriate behaviour and attitudes because they undermine the hard work of the many decent, public spirited people in the Brigade.”

He also found that

“LGBTQ+ staff and people who are neurologically diverse are treated unfavourably compared to others.”

That said, he emphasised that he wanted to make an “important distinction”—his words, not mine—with similar problems experienced by the Metropolitan Police, where there have been

“flagrant examples of police officers misusing power and allowing prejudice to shape their actions”.

Mr Afzal’s team did not find the same level of “operational bigotry”. I think that what he means by that is that, for the most part, he found the very bad and the worst behaviour to be directed towards comrades and colleagues within the fire service, rather than towards the public. That is not comforting, but it is a distinction. But this is not a service that is arresting people and stopping and searching them; it is rescuing people—but apparently not rescuing them on a racialised or sexualised basis.

It is encouraging that, for all the issues that management and unions have in this country at the moment—and have had for some time—my understanding is that the union encouraged its members to participate in Mr Afzal’s investigations, to co-operate with the team and to give testimony, including in an anonymised way. That was no doubt important, because the strength of this report, and one reason why it will be very hard for people to deny its veracity, is that so many people participated in the investigation. Continued partnership between the commissioner and the leadership of the service and the union will be essential; I really urge that partnership on both institutions, and more generally.

The Fire Brigades Union told me that

“senior management alone cannot address the serious concerns set out in the conclusions of the independent review. Many of the cases and incidents reported would already have been known to … senior management and many will have been a result of … failings, either individually or institutionally … The situation is set against a background of abolishing equality targets and national strategy since 2010”.

The union feels that the Government have perhaps focused on taking advice from the National Fire Chiefs Council, but that the advice needs to be more broadly taken, including in partnership with the FBU. I ask the Minister to consider having discussions with the FBU as the Government continue to digest and formulate their response to this very painful report.

I also want to quote the commissioner, Mr Rowe, whose colleagues got in touch with me when they saw this Question for Short Debate on the Order Paper. Much to my surprise, when the commissioner came to meet me and my noble friend Lady Thornton a couple of days ago, it has to be said that he came unescorted and unaccompanied by colleagues, advisers and so on. That was interesting and refreshing. He asked me to share this:

“The independent review of LFB’s culture led by Nazir Afzal is written by the 2,000 members of staff who responded to him. In that, it is both unassailable and undeniable. In hearing our staff so clearly and in such numbers, we must for their sake and the communities they serve accept this report and its recommendations in totality. My commitment to the many thousands of courageous public servants we employ and the people of London we serve, is that we will take that courage so often demonstrated in response and turn inwards to face this problem, seizing it as an opportunity to make real change.”


I return, finally, to Mr Afzal’s report and some final words from him:

“Unless a toxic culture that allows bullying and abuse to be normalised is tackled then I fear that, like Jaden, other firefighters will tragically take their lives. This review has to be a turning point, not just a talking point. Everyone who works for the emergency services should be afforded dignity at work. That is the very least they are owed.”


I am sure that all noble Lords would agree with that.

Metropolitan Police: Crime and Misconduct

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Thursday 1st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is an absolute pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton—the noble and ever-civil Lord, I say, because I think we should search for an adjective for senior retired police officers who come to this House. It is rather unfair that they do not have an adjective in the way that some senior lawyers and military people do. We have sparred many times over the years, but I think always from a shared position of support for the rule of law. When we have disagreed, we have done so well.

It is always an absolute honour to speak in a debate with my noble friend Lady Lawrence, who is, in my humble opinion, the greatest race equality campaigner in British history.

In the remaining three minutes, I will give two thoughts. I have one for the Minister that I will keep short, because I fear that I have made his ears bleed too much of late—there is supposed to be some kind of law against that sort of thing. I also have one short thought for the noble Lord, Lord Lexden.

To the Minister, I say: we both agree that operational independence is totally essential for the police service, but, in my view, it does not remotely interfere with the operational independence of the police service to have a clear and improved legislative framework to aid with this disciplinary problem. A police discipline Bill is now required to aid the new Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and other chief constables—I really believe that, and I am not someone who urges for unnecessary legislation. Governments of both persuasions are very quick and eager to legislate for police powers and then to blame the police when those overbroad powers lead to unintended and arbitrary consequences. The other side of that deal is surely that the Government should legislate appropriately for police discipline.

My short thought for the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, is simply that I thank him. I thank him for constantly reminding me in this place that support for the rule of law, properly constrained police powers and a proper holding to account of the sacred trust that we put in the police service are truly bipartisan matters in a constitutional democracy. We may sit on opposite sides of this Chamber, but he really has my undying solidarity, admiration and respect.