Victims and Prisoners Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 31st January 2024 Lords Chamber

“like nailing jelly to the ceiling”.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a total privilege as always to dip my first toe into your Lordships’ Committee on this very important Bill. It is a pleasure, not for the first time, to be in support—it is always very loud at that end of the Chamber; I am just saying —of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. I would say that they robbed my arguments, but they are their arguments and we share them.

I think the amendment is a no-brainer. It is not partisan and not controversial. In a previous era, the controversy would have been about cost. The argument against it in a previous era would have been, “Goodness me, we would need armies of people”, probably women, “sitting there, typing away with headphones on, to deliver these transcripts in real time”—but of course we are not in that place any more. Even in that previous era I might have argued, because I am who I am, that it was a price worth paying, but we are not in that place.

I also give respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, whose previous group I heard—she is not in her place at the moment—because in a way my argument and what we are discussing in this group is similar to what I just heard.

The cost implication is not such a problem now because of AI—there is wicked old AI but also positive AI, right? AI is already being used across public services, in the City and in financial services. I have some qualms about AI making decisions instead of humans that have a huge impact, but not when it is supporting transparency. This amendment is, in a way, about translation, just like the last group was. How can victims be part of this process if they do not have a record of what happened?

The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, made an analogy with Hansard, and it is quite a good one. Looking at friends around the House, I ask how many times, in honesty, when the adrenaline is going and the heart is pacing, have noble Lords left the Chamber to be glared at or congratulated by friends and colleagues, and remembered word-for-word what happened. And I am talking about noble Lords who have the privilege of being legislators and being in this place. This is the point the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, made so well. If that is a problem for us as human beings, imagine not being a noble Lord giving wisdom in your Lordships’ House, but instead a victim of crime with all the pressures we all know about. They go into the court and, in the current underfunded system, do not even know if they will bump into the defendant and the family members, or know what will be said about them or what their community think, et cetera. This applies as much to the previous group on language translation as it does to this important amendment on transcription.

How lucky are we, in this generation, with all the challenges we face, to have the technology that would now allow us to give a transcript to a victim of what happened? This is not a partisan amendment; this is not a difficult amendment. This is something that the Minister—who I know really cares, from a lifetime of public service to the rule of law—and his colleagues could deliver. I really believe that this is so deliverable. Therefore, I urge the Minister and his colleagues, hopefully with the benefit of AI so no one has to take everything down, really to think about this. It is an easy win for everyone. To have a record they could look at after the event with family, friends and lawyers could make such a difference to people who are scared, excluded, have adrenaline rushing and experience the fight or flight of being a victim—sometimes of minor crimes and sometimes very serious crimes. I look at my noble friend Lord Winston. I sometimes think we could do with this when we go into see an oncologist. In these difficult moments in life, if we could have this opportunity, with family, friends and advisers, to look at a record of what happened, it could really help people. As I say, it is not a partisan or ideological amendment, but such amazing 21st-century common sense. I support the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Newlove (Con)]

My Lords, I am listening to all of this. My brief, from my team, is to correspond with Ministers, but I will speak, I hope in a succinct way—because I do waffle at times and get so distracted because I am that passionate—and as eloquently as other speakers in the Chamber.

I have dealt with transcripts—I am showing my age here—since 1980. This is how I know we should not have to have this discussion. As a committal court assistant, I used to take evidence down and do these transcripts the old-fashioned way with headphones and typing. That got abolished because of cutbacks. I then became a legal PA where I did barristers’ briefs. Again, everything was all there for the client, the defendant and everyone else, indexed.

Then came Garry’s murder. I listened to everything at a 10-week court trial. I listened to my daughters giving evidence. They wanted to come back and sit in the court, but as a mum I advised them it was too brutal for them. I am very glad I did, because five QCs goaded by defenders is not something I want my children to see after seeing their dad kicked to death. So, I know that element of it. I did get a summary of the judge’s direction, but I do not remember that document to be perfectly honest because it is so traumatising. I found a lot more out from the media, believe it or not, because they could see the dock and they give out everything 24/7—even to this day, I check on things because my mind is a blur.

Parole hearings are where statements are made. People do not know what date the parole hearing will be, they are just asked to do it and it goes off—not into the iCloud, but into something they cannot control. In all of this, the defendants and the barristers for the offender have a copy. The offender has a right to see these copies. In parole hearings, the offender has a right to see what I say about the impact of the crime. Surely, we should be able not to pilot this scheme, but to have the decency to just give a copy. We can go to the Post Office and pay 15p for a photocopy of a document. We have a digital system now even for passport photographs; we can go in a photo booth and give a code number and it appears on GOV.UK. Surely, we can have a copy of the transcript—the direction, the sentencing, how it was all resolved—for whenever a victim decides to pick it up. It is at their discretion, but surely we should not be looking at the monetary value of their damage, of the direction of the sentence and the direction for the judge, because it is so important to victims.

I ask my noble and learned friend: could we have further discussions and make sure that every victim of crime, not just those of rape and sexual abuse, has the opportunity to have that document whether in their hand or digitally? For too long it has been the offender’s right to see everything and surely now, while we are discussing victims legislation, we could have that in this Bill, to say they have a right free of charge, and let them have that document for sound peace of mind.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I am very grateful for those interventions. I have personally seen this in operation in Manchester, but it may have been that the court had particular availability of rooms that is not generally the case.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

That is where Ministers are taken.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I am extremely grateful for that important intervention. As a number of noble Lords pointed out, although from various quarters adults can—sometimes quite vociferously—speak for themselves, children cannot, on the whole. They are the silent ones. We have heroines such as Poppy but on the whole, we are dealing with a cohort that does not have the ability to raise its own profile, for that fairly obvious reason. I am grateful indeed to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for making that point. For myself—I cannot commit the Government—I would say that we need available a part of the code or something that is particularly child friendly, so that at least some children can themselves consult it and understand their rights. So the Government’s door is not at all closed on this point. If I may say so again— I am conscious that sometimes I sound a bit like a broken record—can we please work on the practicalities of the code and on bringing everybody up to the same sort of level, rather than getting hung up on rather dry legal points?

I think I have covered in general terms the spirit, drift and direction of the amendments. I have to make one point on Amendment 100A which it does not at all please me to have to make. The difficulty with that amendment, as the Government see it, is that it relates to cases of suspected abuse. We have in the Bill a definition that turns on the existence of criminal conduct, and if there is criminal conduct, there is a victim. The Government at the moment are reluctant to extend that to suspected criminal conduct. That is a difficulty.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

But that is not quite right, though, is it? I do not believe that the definition of a victim in the Bill requires there to have been even a charge of criminal conduct, let alone a conviction, so I do not quite understand the reasoning that says we are concerned about suspected criminal conduct.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

We may slightly be dancing angels on a pin. It may well be that if a regulated professional says to an authority, “I suspect there is criminal conduct”, there is enough there to say that there actually is criminal conduct to enable—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

For clarity, it is important, given that I intervened on the Minister before, to refer the Committee to Clause 1, “Meaning of ‘victim’”, and to subsection (5) in particular, which says that

“It is immaterial … that … no person has reported the offence”


or that

“no person has been charged with or convicted of the offence”.

Therefore, if no person has even reported the offence but a victim is still a victim, I believe—with huge respect to the Minister—that victims of suspected crime are included in the definition of “victim” that is the foundation of His Majesty’s Government’s Bill.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I am not sure that we are really in disagreement on this. As I think I pointed out several times on the last occasion, criminal conduct does not depend on whether something has been reported; I had a discussion with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about that before. We are discussing what level of evidence there has to be before somebody has to say that there is criminal conduct. Somebody has to judge whether there is criminal conduct if the thing has not been reported to the police, prosecuted or charged. It may well be that, in the circumstances the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, refers to, the fact of that kind of reference may be enough to establish criminal conduct. However, if it turns out that the suspicion is wrong, there has not been criminal conduct. That is the only point I am making: it is either covered already, or it should not be extended to the situation being envisaged. I do not think I have made myself very clear, but I was struggling to do so.

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Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

23: Leave out Clause 2 and insert the following new Clause—
“The victims’ code(1) Schedule (The victims’ code) to this Act contains the code of practice as to the services to be provided to victims by persons having functions relating to—(a) victims, or(b) any aspect of the criminal justice system.(2) In this Part, the “victims’ code” means the code of practice in Schedule (The victims’ code) as from time to time amended by way of subsection (4) below.(3) The victims’ code shall make provision for services which reflect the principles that victims—(a) must be provided with information to help them understand the criminal justice process;(b) must be able to access services which support them (including, where appropriate, specialist services);(c) must have the opportunity to make their views heard in the criminal justice process;(d) must be able to challenge decisions which have a direct impact on them.(4) The Secretary of State may amend the victims’ code by way of regulations made by statutory instrument.(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.(6) But the Secretary of State may make regulations under subsection (4) only if satisfied that such amendment would not result in a significant—(a) reduction in the quality or extent of the services provided in accordance with the victims’ code, or(b) restriction in the description of persons to whom services are provided in accordance with the victims’ code.(7) The victims’ code may restrict or vary the application of its provisions to— (a) victims of specified descriptions (including those who are victims by virtue of specific conduct or conduct constituting specified offences);(b) specified persons who have functions of the kind mentioned in subsection (1).(8) The victims’ code may include provision requiring or permitting the services which are to be provided to a victim to be provided to one or more other persons—(a) instead of the victim (for example, where the victim has died), or(b) as well as the victim.(9) The victims’ code may make different provision for different purposes including different provision for—(a) victims of different descriptions;(b) persons who have different functions of a kind mentioned in subsection (1);(c) different areas.(10) The victims’ code may not require anything to be done by a person acting in—(a) a judicial capacity, or on the instructions of or on behalf of such a person; (b) the discharge of a prosecution function, if that function involves the exercise of a discretion.(11) In this section, “specified” means specified in the victims’ code.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment places the victims’ code on a firmer statutory footing as a Schedule to the Bill, amendable by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure. Another amendment will follow to add the Schedule referred to in this clause.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

It is an interesting time for me to be beginning this group. I do not know whether the usual channels have had the opportunity to consider timing.

House resumed.

Victims and Prisoners Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 31st January 2024 Lords Chamber

Debate on Amendment 23 resumed.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, now we are once again resolved into a Committee, I can say that it is particularly humbling to follow the last group. Once more, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and to all the other survivors and survivor advocates we have heard from this evening and will hear from again, no doubt, before this Bill is done.

In speaking to Amendment 23 I shall also speak to its consequentials, Amendments 139 and 140, with support, for which I am grateful, from my noble Fred—my noble friend Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede—and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I hope the Minister will forgive me because this may be caricatured as legalism, angels dancing on the head of a pin, et cetera, or legal weeds, but I believe that putting the victims’ code on a firm statutory footing is incredibly important and something all parties and all Members of your Lordships’ House ought to support.

My reasoning is twofold. In a later suite of amendments, I will suggest that the victims’ code needs more teeth—not the sharpest teeth, but just some teeth. We will debate that later. If we are going to create some statutory powers to enforce the victims’ code, which I think is a pretty good code, we should all think about the fact that we have it. I thank the Public Bill Office and all those who were involved in putting the code on the many pages the Committee will see. It is a code full of very positive rights for victims but, sadly, too many of them are not real in practice at the moment. So, I am grateful for that.

One of the reasons I want to put the code on a statutory footing, as I have said, is that I am dovetailing these amendments with later amendments to give the Victims’ Commissioner some modest powers to enforce this noble code when it is not put into practice by the public authorities that have that duty. But even before we get to the amendments that will come later in the Committee’s consideration, there is value in putting this code on a statutory footing in the Bill, which is supposed to be a Bill for victims.

I have been a human rights lawyer for 30 years this year. That is an admission one does not want to make for all sorts of reasons—some personal and some political, I guess—and I have so much respect for English and Welsh common law. I believe it has done so much for fair trial rights and defendants’ rights: the golden thread and so on. Ironically, it is international human rights norms that taught me most about victims’ rights. The presumption of innocence, the burden of proof and all of that is pre-ECHR in our system, and I defend it. If anyone googles me, they will find all sorts of associations—“I am a terrible person who supports terrorists and murderers” and so on. I do not, but I do really believe in fair trials. I do not believe that any victim benefits from a miscarriage of justice. When there is a miscarriage of justice, there are two victims—and many more.

It is slightly ironic that, in our contemporary politics, politicians get brownie points for saying, “Let’s lock up more people. Let’s lock them up for longer. Let’s create more criminal offences” and “Let’s put more statutory provision on the books”—not to get stuck in the legal weeds or dance on the head of a pin, but as performative politics. Yet we do not create the facilities the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, has been campaigning for: simple things such as a separate room for the victim at a murder trial, translations, and transcripts. All the things we were debating earlier this evening just cannot happen, but what can happen is longer sentences, more crimes et cetera. We can do that legislation —the legal weeds stuff—but we cannot do the basics.

I respect fair trials, and I respect a great piece of human rights legislation that goes back to 1984. The Thatcher years’ Police and Criminal Evidence Act did so much for suspects’ rights and defendants’ rights, including in the police station—and not just in its codes, but in the Act itself. It is framework legislation that creates all sorts of precious and important rights for suspects and defendants.

I believe that victims need at least the equivalent of that. It is a modest ask. For someone who completely believes in the presumption of innocence, fair trials and suspects’ and defendants’ rights, it is time for victims to have their equivalent. Putting the victims’ code on a statutory footing to make the Bill the equivalent of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for suspects and defendants would be the least that we can do for victims of crime.

Even without my later suite of amendments, which would give the Victims’ Commissioner some enforcement powers—modest ones, which we will discuss later—putting this on the face of the Bill would pay respect to victims. In this age once more of connectivity, it would make the code more widely known, talked about and accessible. I also propose that, because this would now be in primary legislation, it would be amendable only by affirmative resolution in both Houses. I also argue that the Victims’ Commissioner should at least be consulted alongside the Attorney-General and so on, because otherwise this is all talk.

We have been doing this talk for many years in a performative, posturing arms race. Noble Lords know what I am talking about—and there is no monopoly of vice or virtue in any part of your Lordships’ House. This is the least we can do. Do we believe in victims’ rights? Let us put them into the Bill, and then debate later what we do about them and the enforcement powers which I believe the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and those who follow her should have. I beg to move Amendment 23 and hope I will have the unanimous support of the Committee.

[Baroness Newlove (Con)]

My Lords, I speak in support of Amendment 23. In my previous term as Victims’ Commissioner, a government lawyer once described the victims’ code to me as “persuasive guidance”. Those two words spoke volumes to me, because they go to the very heart of what is going wrong with the treatment of victims in our criminal justice system. If the Bill is to have a substantial impact on the victim experience, the first thing we need to change is the culture of the criminal justice system. I fear that victims’ entitlements are all often viewed as “Nice to do”, “If we can”, or “How can we tick the victim box with minimum effort?” This clearly came across in the findings of the joint inspection report on the delivery of victims’ entitlements, published on 23 December.

Victims need to be seen as participants in the justice process and not as observers. For this to happen, they need more than “persuasive guidance”; they need statutory rights. We do not talk about the defendant having “persuasive guidance”. They have statutory rights, and rightly so—we would not expect anything less. Rights are to be respected and adhered to. As we have seen over the past 20 years, entitlements in the victims’ code have been viewed by many practitioners as no more than this persuasive guidance. For this reason, I support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, which seeks to place the victims’ code into a Schedule to the Bill.

If this amendment is successful, for the first time we will be able to say that victims have statutory rights. This would be a significant step forward for the victims and place a much greater responsibility on key agencies to deliver compliance. The amendment cannot by itself change the landscape but, if coupled with greater accountability, effective scrutiny and better public awareness, it is one of the many steps we need to take if we are to deliver transformative change for victims.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and others, who have spoken in this part of the debate. To take up at once the challenge of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, the Government’s position is that there are no specific amendments, including Amendment 108, which could or should be promoted into the Bill—they should all be dealt with in the code, in the right place. The difficulty of putting specific matters in the Bill, among other difficulties, is that you make a policy choice, irrespective of the available resources and the available situation in different areas, and so forth, as to which—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I was just going to finish my sentence, but of course I give way to the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am sorry for being premature. I totally see the Minister’s point about the challenge of taking particular parts of the victims’ code and putting them in the Bill. That is why some of us are offering the suggestion that the whole victims’ code should be in statute. I hope that that would assist the Minister, because he would then not be picking and choosing particular aspects of the code, as the whole code of victims’ rights in this country would be in primary legislation, subject to amendment and so on. That would make victims’ rights a little bit closer to the appropriate rights of suspects, defendants and convicted criminals.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for that intervention and clarification. Perhaps I could explain why the Government do not think that this is a positive way to go.

The first point is that the present code is still a statutory code. It is grounded in statute, authorised by statute, has been subject to negative resolution in Parliament and therefore has a legal status. The Government’s position is that putting the code in a schedule to the Bill does not materially increase its legal enforceability, or indeed its legal status. Therefore, there does not seem to the Government to be a compelling reason to do it in either case. The Government would consider the present code to be subject to judicial review. There could be a legal challenge; in fact, the legislation on the face of it accepts that the code is admissible in legal proceedings, and so forth. So we already have a statutory code, and we are dealing with quite a fine point—whether putting in a schedule really has any material effect. The Government’s position is that, certainly legally, it has no effect—but in practice there is a very significant downside.

The downside is that what you have on the statute is no longer user-friendly and no longer contains the information that victims want when they reach for the code and want to know what to do, where to go, what the telephone number is and what the website is that they need to consult. You cannot put that in the statute, and I invite noble Lords to compare the code as currently reproduced in the amendment we are discussing with the code as published. The latter sets out 12 rights very clearly, has boxes that explain various things, tells you where to go, elaborates on the rights, et cetera, all in very user-friendly language. Either you abandon that—in which case, you abandon the signposting and everything we were discussing in the previous group—or you have two documents. And that, in the Government’s view, is not very satisfactory. Although we all have touching faith in the interest of the general public to read long schedules in the statutes that we pass, that is not actually the way to raise awareness. You raise awareness through other means.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her intervention. Let me have another go at explaining it. The code is not in itself a statute. Once you go down the route of having a code and not a statute, you effectively have a framework that is still a legal framework—it is still legal guidance that gives people rights. The code says that you have 12 rights and lists them: this is what the authorities have to do and this is what you do if those rights are not observed. It is a legal framework; we are talking about degrees of legal right, but these are legal rights. If you wanted to, you could go to court and say that you have not had them.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

No, you could not.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

Well, that is not the Government’s advice.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I think the short answer is that the purposes of those later clauses is to impose a statutory duty on the relevant bodies. The purpose of Clause 2(3) is to set out the principles. In terms of these, the Government’s view is that “should” is a more appropriate word than “must”, because the principles are very broadly expressed. Noble Lords might argue that “should” and “must” are almost interchangeable. I think we are again drawing really fine distinctions.

Perhaps I could just deal with two or three other points that arise on this part of the Bill. One is the question of the affirmative procedure as against the negative procedure. If I may say so, at the moment the code is subject to the negative procedure. Noble Lords can pray a resolution against it—of course there is going to be a debate in Parliament. I would respectfully suggest that it is more flexible than our somewhat—on some occasions at least—torrid debates in the Moses Room on affirmative resolutions. Noble Lords cannot change anything, it is very formalistic, and I respectfully suggest that making it an affirmative resolution is not a material improvement.

To keep the whole structure flexible and adaptable—I have used various words beginning with “a”, and I think I could add “adaptable” to this cohort—the Government suggest that it is not a useful move to put the code without the accompanying description in the statute itself; that in itself has no material effect on the Government’s view.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who participated in this debate.

I remind noble Lords that Clause 5 makes it clear that failure to comply with the victims’ code, currently and as proposed in the Bill, does not make a person liable to criminal or civil proceedings. The code has no legal teeth.

Let us cut through a bit of the legal waffle. The noble Baroness the Victims’ Commissioner is right: this is a code without enforceability. No victim can enforce their rights in any court in the land, and even the Victims’ Commissioner appointed by the Government of the day cannot enforce the code. That is why the amendments in this group dovetail with later amendments which would give the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and her successors and heirs, some modest powers to issue notices to public authorities, to publish those notices and, in extremis, to take legal action.

With the greatest respect to the Minister, to say that there is no difference between the scheme that is offered in these amendments and the current position is just not accurate as a statement of law. He said that this amendment is unnecessary and unhelpful. I hope that I have dealt with that. He said he did not want to burden the legislation with a schedule. I do not want to burden victims because this Bill is supposed to be about them. I know where the balance of the argument is between a few extra pages in a schedule and this toothless, illusory, broken promise to victims.

As for the arguments about how clunky it looks to have a code in a schedule to legislation, compared with the sparkly thing that could be on the Victims’ Commissioner’s website, we have that all the time. The convention rights—which may not be totally popular with everyone on the Benches opposite—are popular with me and mean a lot to people. They are in a schedule to the Human Rights Act. They are popularised in all sorts of ways to all sorts of people. They know that this is not a code of guidance; it is a Bill of Rights.

As I have said before, parties on both sides of this House have, for many years, talked the talk about victims’ rights—more legislation, longer prison sentences, et cetera—but have not actually delivered a right to see the transcript, to have a separate room at the court, to be treated with dignity. Let us have this debate but let us not pretend that there is no legislative or legal difference between the current and proposed positions.

I am disappointed by the Minister’s response. Because I have so much respect for him as a lawyer and a former senior judge, I urge him and his colleagues to think again about this. It would not cost a penny, but it would mean so much to so many people. Putting this and the subsequent amendments that we will debate on a legislative footing would give the Victims’ Commissioner some judgment and power to give this code teeth.

For the time being—but only for the time being—I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 23 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

24: Clause 3, page 3, line 28, at end insert “and the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses”
Member's explanatory statement
This refers to the duty on the Secretary of State to prepare a draft Victims’ Code. The Victims’ Commissioner has a statutory duty to “review the operation” of the Victims Code. The amendment would put a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to consult the Commissioner when making any changes to the victims' code or issuing any statutory guidance relating to it.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, at the risk of trying the Committee’s patience, we are now talking about the role of the Victims’ Commissioner. Again, the thrust of these amendments moves in a similar direction and gets more into the specifics of the role of the commissioner.

Even under the scheme as currently proposed by the Government under the various provisions of the Bill, the government-appointed Victims’ Commissioner has very little respect and power. Even in places where the Secretary of State must, for example, consult the Attorney-General, there is no similar obligation to consult the Victims’ Commissioner. I find that constitutionally odd. It seems that one does not require a statutory duty to consult the Attorney-General. One hopes that in a rule-of-law Government and with cabinet government, it would be commonplace, without statutory provision, for Home Secretaries, Justice Secretaries and Cabinets to consult the Attorney-General. Maybe I live in the past and that is another place.

The Victims’ Commissioner is a creature of statute; therefore, there should be statutory duties to consult the Victims’ Commissioner, particularly when there are the sorts of provisions that the Government are already proposing in their own scheme.

I have, perhaps, taken up too much time already. In short, wherever there are powers and duties and anything proposed in the Government’s case to protect the victims by improving the code or compliance with the code, there must be a role for the Victims’ Commissioner. The Government should not be afraid of that because they appoint the Victims’ Commissioner. One would hope that they would appoint someone whom they trust and respect and who has at least enough judgment to be the guardian of the victims’ code and of this whole approach.

Anything less is really, as the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, suggested in her remarks earlier, a bit of an insult to victims. This is not just a toothless tiger; at the moment I wonder where even the gums are. It is embarrassing. At least in the Government’s own case, with their own scheme as currently devised, this suite of amendments, to put it shortly, is putting the Victims’ Commissioner in every place where she should be.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords in the Committee, in particular the Minister. He will forgive me if I was overly animated; I hope he does not think that we have fallen out as I find it hard to envisage circumstances in which we would do so.

I am grateful for the Minister’s clarification of the Government’s intention in Clause 3(3): that the consultation will be broader than just the Attorney-General and will include the whole Cabinet or any relevant Secretary of State. I may be a fool but I always thought that, in our constitution, the Cabinet, the Government and the Secretary of State were virtually indivisible and there was no need to create statutory duties on individual Secretaries of State to consult each other. I may be wrong about that but the Minister’s argument is that he needs provision in the Bill for the Secretary of State to consult the Attorney-General, yet no similar provision is required for the Secretary of State to consult the statutory creature—the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, does not look like a statutory creature; she is a wonderful human creature—that is the Victim’s Commissioner. I am confused about that but perhaps, in due course, the Minister and his colleagues will deliberate it; I like the noises that I am hearing about possible reflection.

Without provisions of this kind and of the kind that we will debate in the next group, this whole part of the Bill will be Conan Doyle. In particular, for fans of Conan Doyle, this is The Adventure of Silver Blaze. This is the curious incident of the victims’ code that made friends and did not always bark in the night. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment and not bark in the night.

Amendment 24 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, this group is about giving teeth to the toothless tiger that is the victims’ code. To be clear, currently in law, and as proposed by the Government’s scheme in this Bill, the only indirect enforceability would be that if anybody has any other kind of proceedings against a relevant public authority, the victims’ code can be taken into account. That is it. That is not an enforceable right in any usual sense of the concept, because enforceable rights require duties that must be enforced.

Various options have been proffered by noble Lords in the Committee in the various amendments in this group. Mine is Amendment 31, on which I am grateful for the support of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and, once more, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I propose here that the teeth, to some extent, go to the Victims’ Commissioner. As I said in the debate on the previous group, the Government appoint the Victims’ Commissioner; this is not some dangerous person who will be litigating everywhere. This is an appropriate person who has been appointed by the Government of the day.

I am not suggesting that victims should be able to sue directly in the courts on the victims’ code. Frankly, there is no legal aid for them to do so anyway, and I do not want them to be traumatised by more litigation when they have been so traumatised by the principal proceedings in which they have had such a bad experience. But I do want them to have real rather than illusory rights, which can be enforced.

The thing about enforceable rights is that they become more real just because they exist, because the public authorities concerned will take note. I believe they will take greater note when they know that down the road, in extremis, there is a potential reckoning if they continue to ignore victims in the way that they have, to deprioritise them or to do whatever it is that has led to some of the stories we have heard in Committee this evening.

My proposed scheme is to replace the current Clause 5, the toothless tiger, with the following enforcement procedure. Incidentally, this is not about specific cases. It is not about the Victims’ Commissioner doing something that she does not do at the moment and getting involved in this criminal case or that; there would be obvious problems with that. This is about general practice. When, for example, it comes to the notice of the Victims’ Commissioner that women are being treated appallingly when they report rape and have their mobile phones taken or are not allowed to speak to counsellors—clearly things that would never happen in real life; I am just hypothesising for a moment—the Victims’ Commissioner in the first instance would do what she does already, which is to try to engage with the public authorities at length and persuade them that there is a problem in general that needs to be dealt with.

However, there are measures in the proposed new Clause 5(4) for when that is not being complied with. In the first instance, in Clause 5(4)(a), the Victims’ Commissioner would be able to issue a notice of general guidance. It would not be about a specific case but would be general guidance to the relevant public authority about its practice that, in her view, was not complying with the code. Whether it is about separate rooms in the Crown Court or the information being required, the victim is not being treated according to the code, so the commissioner issues the notice, initially in private.

If that is not complied with within a reasonable period of time, under Clause 5(4)(b), the next tool in the armoury—which is still pretty modest—is that the Victims’ Commissioner would be able to publish that notice. In my view, that public notice is another tool for accountability in relation to the intransigence of public authorities that are simply not complying with the code.

There is then a further step. One would hope that it would very rarely happen, but maybe sometimes it would need to. This is not about specific cases and would not involve individual victims having to go through legal proceedings, but in extremis the Victims’ Commissioner would be able to start proceedings in an appropriate court or tribunal, defined in rules by the Government, to seek enforcement of the code. That would be only the Victims’ Commissioner, not any litigant in the land who was being mischievous with their money, or lefty human rights lawyers and all that stuff. It would be the Victims’ Commissioner, who is trusted and was appointed by the Secretary of State in the first place.

I think that is a pretty modest and balanced scheme for giving the toothless tiger not great big scary teeth but just some milk teeth so they can nudge these public authorities, which have had all this time and all these years with the current code and the current scheme, which is going to be replicated in the Bill proposed by the Government. It would get the Victims’ Commissioner a little bit more by way of a power to deliver for the victims that she serves.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I hope I can do this in the time allotted, as they say.

I shall speak to Amendment 51 on training in relation to support for victims. Very simply, Clause 6 directs that criminal justice bodies must take reasonable steps to promote awareness of the victims’ code to victims and other members of the public, but the Bill does not mandate that professionals within these bodies receive any training in the code. There is no point in this provision in Clause 6 if those who are to carry it out—those who are acting on the ground within the agencies, under the chief constable or within the prosecution service—are not aware of their duties or trained properly to deliver them. This part of the Bill risks being a fig leaf. To make it effective, those responsible for it must be trained in delivery. Is this not just common sense?

The evidence base is that there is a need to provide training and that it is clear that there is a widespread lack of awareness of victims’ rights. I take you back to two surveys. In 2019, the London victims’ commissioner conducted a review into compliance with the victims’ code of practice. She heard from over 2,000 victims of crime. The review revealed examples of unacceptable service. It showed that a proportion of those who work in the criminal justice service lack the skills or training to understand and respond to victims’ needs effectively. Victims suffer the consequences of those problems time and again; they simply were not informed of their rights. In short, the code was not delivering.

Let me give some examples. Fewer than a third of the victims reported being told about the code of practice. Of course, some of them may have forgotten, but certainly a large proportion were not told. As a result, they did not know what their rights were—they did not know they had any rights. It is no use giving the victims rights if they do not know about them. Largely, the police and the Crown Prosecution Service are not trained to do this. It is not because they are wicked people; they just do not know about it. There are many other deficiencies. Read the review if you want to know more.

More recently, in June 2022 the office of the Victims’ Commissioner launched the Victim Survey, an online survey of victims of crime in England and Wales that asked them about their experiences as a victim of crime. I will give a few examples. Fewer than a third, only 29% of respondents, were aware of the victims’ code. The same percentage said that they were offered the opportunity to make a victim personal statement. In other words, if that is right, 71% were not offered that opportunity. Again, allowing for some people not being very capable or bright, it shows a large proportion, on any basis, were not informed of really basic information.

Data from the user satisfaction survey in London shows that only 25% of victims were made aware of the victims’ code. In the same period, the answers showed that 50% were offered victim support services—in other words, half were not; and 59% were given the opportunity to make a victim personal statement, so around 40% were not. It is the “nots” we are interested in here. Only 12% were offered information on compensation. Again, making allowances for the fact that it may not have been appropriate or necessary and that some people are forgetful, a large proportion were not told about possible compensation and how to claim it, and that is important. Even a small amount of compensation can make an individual who has been the victim of crime feel a bit less disgruntled. I speak as someone who sat as a recorder in the Crown Court for 20 years.

Those are all rights in the victims’ code. They are all failures; just read the survey for more. It is plain that there is no training. We need it and it should made part of the statute. So, I commend this amendment to the Committee.

Imprisonment for Public Protection

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Tuesday 16th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, the Government accept that there are certain special mental health issues for a number of these prisoners. They are being tackled, as far as we can do so, within the existing system. The action plan to which I referred contains provisions in that regard, particularly on improving psychological services and providing better support for prisoners on licence to avoid later recall. I do not accept the second part of my noble friend’s question that it follows that we need special legislation to deal with this.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, we must all be so grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for his continued campaigning on this issue, and we are grateful to the Government for responding at such length to the rapporteur. If everything in the IPP garden is so rosy in relation to indeterminately detained people, some of whom would have got a sentence of only months for their actual crime, why did the Government abolish this sentence in the first place, and why did the noble Lord, Lord Clarke, as late as 2016 call the threshold that prisoners have to meet to secure their release both ridiculous and absurd?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I do not assert that everything in the garden is rosy. This area is one of the acute—perhaps the most acute—dilemmas faced by the Ministry of Justice. Your Lordships will be aware that the subject of IPP prisoners is being addressed in Part 4 of the Victims and Prisoners Bill currently before Parliament, which we will shortly discuss in detail in Committee, and I am meeting noble Lords on Thursday to take that discussion further.

Victims and Prisoners Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 18th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is an absolute privilege to follow that outstanding speech from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. I hope he will forgive me for associating myself with every single word of it. I declare my non-pecuniary interest as a council member of both Justice and the Howard League for Penal Reform.

I am also grateful for the opportunity to speak in advance of the forthcoming maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, who I had the pleasure of working for as a government lawyer in the late 1990s. He may not forgive me for saying it—and please, do not hold it against him—but I learned so much from him in those days, as a young lawyer, about law, good government and policy-making. I found him to be almost the personification of qualities in the subsequently much maligned Civil Service: independence, integrity, intellect and humanity. In a year when we have lost the noble and learned Lords, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Judge, I think the arrival of the noble Lord, Lord Carter, on the Cross Benches must be particularly welcomed.

I now come to the Victims and Prisoners Bill, and I welcome the way that this debate has been opened by all the major groups in your Lordships’ House. In a December that will feel not quite like Christmas for too many struggling families, including those blighted by crime in this country, the Government bring us a not quite Christmas tree Bill. While I welcome its much delayed arrival, and the much delayed arrival of any Bill supposedly aimed at enhancing victims’ rights, I query, like the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, whether it would not have benefited from a tighter focus in some places, or at least some pre-legislative scrutiny.

However, my greatest concern, perhaps, lies in the way the contradictions at the heart of the Bill represent those at the heart of the Government. I have no doubt that the Bill has been much improved by the arrival of the new Lord Chancellor—rightly, one of the more liberal and more pro rule of law members of the Cabinet. We see that reflected in the removal of what would have been a Secretary of State’s direct veto over Parole Board release decisions. I am very glad to see that that has been removed. Similarly, there has been some movement, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, in relation to some IPP prisoners, but not all. On the IPP point, I look forward to listening to the noble Lord’s partner in crime, if I may call him that, my noble friend Lord Blunkett.

However, one need not be the greatest Kremlinologist to divine that, just days before the publication of the Rwanda Bill, the Lord Chancellor appears to have lost a battle with No. 10 over the disapplication of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act—which of course requires legislation to be read compatibly with rights and freedoms, so far as is possible—from the parole provisions of the Bill. I am very sad about that. I am also sad about the proposals mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, that would allow the Secretary of State to interfere with the independence and the composition of the Parole Board. I think that will be another provision that will require noble Lords’ attention in due course.

In the always affable and open spirit in which the noble and learned Lord the Minister opens these debates, I ask him to explain why this disapplication of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act was thought necessary in the case of this Bill. I ask him how it squares with his Section 19 statement—it is not quite a certificate; it is a statement of compatibility. Is it not just political signalling that if the Human Rights Act is not immediately to be repealed wholesale, it will instead suffer death by a thousand cuts, as a sop to those so-called “five families” who want their party to leave the European convention and, accordingly, the Council of Europe at next year’s general election? A little explanation of the thinking for the disapplication of human rights would be incredibly welcome.

In my experience, the convention on human rights has done more for victims’ rights in this country than, with respect, the common law ever did, and indeed more than party politics probably every did. One only needs to look at the case law to see that borne out, particularly in relation to the rights for the most vulnerable victims, including children and women, and victims of sexual crime. By contrast, the victims’ rights in this Bill, while well intended, are, to a large extent, toothless. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, about that. They are too much a dead letter in a sealed book, without the means to make them real or enforce them. I look forward to hearing from the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, about whether she thinks the Bill goes far enough, because I would like to see the victims’ code in the Bill and very clear methods of accessible enforcement. Otherwise, we are in danger of letting down victims yet again, by suggesting a promised land that just is not coming. That would be a terrible mistake after the lengthy wait for this kind of legislation.

Similarly, victims of major incidents are too narrowly defined and their protections are too weak. They should have more ready access to independent advice and representation. I have seen that in other inquiries and compensation schemes, not least Windrush and Leveson—on which I served—and so on.

There seems to be a lot of common ground between different groups in this House and a very receptive Minister, so I hope that we can all work together to improve the Bill in Committee and beyond.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend makes a perfectly fair debating point—and we are debating, so it is perfectly fair that he makes a debating point—but it is a debating point at the end of the day. The point is: are you prepared to take the risk of 1,200 dangerous people being released from prison? The Government are not prepared to take that risk. We can of course discuss it further, but I am just explaining what the Government’s position is: it is better to work with those prisoners to ensure that they are safe to release eventually.

That probably takes me on to the issue of public protection and related issues. First, perhaps I may clarify what seems to be a muddle that has arisen about the statement in the Bill that it is compatible with convention rights. The Bill is perfectly compatible with convention rights: it does not take away any convention rights at all. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act is a procedural provision only, which gives the court an—to use a neutral word—unusual power to reinterpret what Parliament has said in a manner that may not have been and probably was not Parliament’s original intention so as to render a particular provision compatible with the convention.

On the provision in the Bill disapplying Section 3, which at least one member of Sir Peter Gross’s commission thought we should get rid of, and on other parts of Section 3, Sir Peter himself recommended a rather complicated hierarchy of different ways of applying the section. It has been quite a difficult section to apply. Case law has gone all over the place over the years, although it has settled down more recently. It introduces uncertainty where the Government want to have certainty in this area: that this is the test for public protection for these prisoners, that is what Parliament has said, and that is the end of the matter.

If that was found to be incompatible with the convention in any case, hypothetically, the court would have to make a declaration of inapplicability, and Parliament would have to deal with it. But the underlying issue is the constitutional balance between the courts and Parliament. That is quite an issue, and it has not gone away, but that is how the Government understand this particular point.

As regards the question of the Parole Board and all the various provisions affecting it, it is worth making the point that when these very high-risk offenders are released, they live in the community. Who speaks for the people in the community who have to live with them? Are they represented at all in this system? The only person who can represent the interests of the community with whom released prisoners have to live is the Secretary of State. All we are doing is saying that if there is some doubt about the application of the public protection test, it is wise from the point of view of the system—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am sure that the noble and learned Lord understands the irony of that statement, set against his statement that victims’ rights should not be put on a statutory, enforceable footing.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I am not sure that I entirely understood the noble Baroness’s point, but it is perfectly true that I am thinking—rather, the Government are thinking; I should not put it in personal terms—about the potential victims of people who have been released and the actual families of those who have suffered at the hands of the offender. We are simply saying that there might be some very high-profile cases where it is sensible for there to be a second judicial look. That is a very much modified position from the position originally in the Bill, but it is, I hope, a sensible one.

I have used up my time, but I hope that I have covered most things. I apologise to noble Lords whose specific points I have not met. Anyone is fully entitled to write to me or ask me questions and I will, of course, answer them. If I may just finish with the words of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, who was kind enough to say he was going to be kind to the Bill. Let us be kind to the Bill and—

King’s Speech

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Wednesday 8th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, to the old adage that talk is cheap we might add the observation that legislation need not be much more expensive. Yet in both cases there may be inflationary claims or counterproductive outcomes that undermine liberty, equality and harmony in any society. As a close observer of our justice and home affairs over 28 years, I do not instinctively scoff at an apparently light legislative programme. I should add that I had the privilege of knowing and being advised and encouraged by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, over that time; he was a great constitutionalist and a kind man, and I send my condolences to his wife and daughters.

I congratulate both today’s maiden speakers. To the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, who has been left such large boots to fill, I say that I know that he will do it with enormous distinction.

There have been too many bad laws in this area over many years. Even finely crafted statutes are no substitute for the public investment that our crumbling justice system so desperately needs, or the moral leadership once provided by some of the greatest senior politicians of yesteryear from both sides of both Houses. Like other noble Lords, I shall of course engage with yet more sentencing, criminal justice and investigatory powers Bills as they come, and I shall seek to work with noble Lords across your Lordships’ House to strengthen protections in the Victims and Prisoners Bill. It is particularly good, with that in mind, to see the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, in her new and reinstated role. In remembering that the European convention has done more for victims’ rights in our system than any other single instrument, we should seek to remove the current disapplication of the Human Rights Act from that draft measure. I look forward to continuing positive dialogue with the new Lord Chancellor, who has been a relative breath of fresh air to his department.

I hope that noble Lords will forgive me for devoting my remaining minutes to things not explicitly included in His Majesty’s gracious Speech. If a week is a long time in politics, the last month or so has felt at times interminable. In 1960, the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan made his famous Cape Town speech, using the “wind of change” metaphor for both acceptance of decolonisation and disapproval of apartheid in South Africa. How sad that the present Home Secretary should use her recent party conference speech to turn his words of hope into pure populist fear of what she described as the “hurricane” of immigration to come, compared with the “mere gust” that brought her own parents to the United Kingdom.

The subsequent month has been a hellish eternity, I have no doubt, for the families of victims of Hamas butchery and hostage taking, and the besieged and bombarded civilian population of Gaza. No British politician, still less a Home Secretary, can unilaterally ease that distress, which inevitably extends to so many people in our own communities. However, they can at times make things worse—worse by collectively branding 100,000 mostly peaceful people as “hate marchers” in the context of a depressing rise in often non-protest related incidents of hate crime.

They can make things worse by repeatedly and performatively trying to influence or instruct a police service which, in this country at least, is supposed to be independent of government. Surely it is better to appeal to all those understandably moved by events overseas to show their aspirations for peace with calm and sensitive restraint in both conduct and tone—and better to let the Metropolitan Commissioner demonstrate the judiciousness that he has overnight, in watching the intelligence but seeking to allow safe outlets for collective expression, while keeping the King’s peace.

In dark times, they can make things worse by their language around homelessness. Big people and big leaders seek to build big tents, not ban them. That includes the flimsy makeshift shelters used by some of our homeless people—including, to our shame at this time of year, too many military veterans, in the middle of a cost of living and mental health crisis.

Once more, the Home Secretary’s campaigning language is lamentable. The only thing worse than a privileged person branding homelessness a “lifestyle choice” from the comfort of their warm home or office is throwing in yet more anti-immigrant rhetoric for extra spice and blaming the destitute for

“crime, drug taking, and squalor”.

So, how disappointing to read this morning’s reports of a continued push for more criminalisation to replace the Vagrancy Act 1824, which your Lordships voted to repeal so resoundingly and which must go in substance, not just form, before its fast-approaching 200-year anniversary.

Just as the Lord Chancellor’s oath, as we heard from the noble and learned Lord, is to respect the rule of law, defend judicial independence and provide adequate court resources, perhaps Home Secretaries could learn from the doctors and swear to “First do no harm”.

European Court of Human Rights

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Wednesday 25th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

It is probably no surprise to say that I am not privy to the contents of the King’s Speech but. as far as I am best aware, the answer to the noble Lord’s question is no.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I remind the noble and learned Lord that his boss, the Lord Chancellor, appeared before the Justice and Home Affairs Committee of this House just before lunchtime. I urge noble Lords to read that evidence and take heart from it, and I urge the Minister to do so too. I hope his words will be taken forward as commitment to the ECHR, and that Section 3 of the Human Rights Act will not keep being disapplied from future Bills in this House.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

As ever, I am happy to take the advice of the noble Baroness and read the evidence very carefully.

Joint Enterprise: Young Black Men

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Thursday 19th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I would like to press the Minister a little further following my noble friend’s question. The Supreme Court, no less, stated in 2016 that the law had been misapplied for 30 years. Leaving issues of race aside, that must mean that a lot of people who should not have faced life imprisonment have faced it. Will the Minister meet other interested noble Lords and campaigners, many of whom are mothers and sisters of those incarcerated, to consider whether for once legislators might assist in remedying judicial error, rather than the other way around?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, it is relevant to emphasise that the Supreme Court in that case said that only if a substantial injustice could be established would the change in the law be relevant to any future appeal. Of course, I am very happy to meet anyone in the category the noble Baroness refers to.

Illegal Migration Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 3rd July 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

152: Leave out Clause 53

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, the rule of law requires that Ministers are subject to the same rules as everyone else. This includes the possibility of discretionary interim relief in circumstances where courts believe that irreparable harm to one side in any litigation needs to be prevented while both parties await the final determination of an issue. Some noble Lords, including businesspeople and their lawyers, are perhaps more familiar with commercial than human rights litigation. However, the same principle applies. If I propose to dump or destroy the precious cargo entrusted to me because of alleged breaches by my customer, a court must obviously have the power to delay such drastic action pending crucial determinations of fact and law.

However, Clauses 53 and 54 would, first, completely oust the ability of UK courts to issue interim injunctions temporarily preventing a person’s expulsion to potential peril. Secondly, they would allow Ministers to ignore interim measures of the European Court of Human Rights, of the kind issued in the Rwanda case and those currently in place to prevent Russia executing Ukrainian prisoners of war. My Amendments 152 and 153 would remove these clauses, so as to respect domestic courts and the Strasbourg court. They are in no way wrecking amendments, as these courts only very rarely issue such measures against trustworthy, law-respecting jurisdictions such as we have been historically.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, the Bill establishes a bespoke claims and appeals process which provides for a person subject to the duty to remove to challenge their removal to a safe third country. The duty to remove will be temporarily suspended while consideration is given to any suspensive claim or appeal resulting from the refusal of that suspensive claim. That is of itself an effective remedy for those subject to the duty to remove, and these measures will ensure that all suspensive claims raised in response to a removal notice under the Bill will receive full judicial scrutiny.

Clause 53 is critical to the success of the Bill in preventing the United Kingdom’s domestic courts from granting interim remedies in relation to legal challenges which would prevent or delay the removal of a person who meets the removal conditions under Clause 2. Were other human rights claims and legal challenges to be made, they would be considered after a person has been removed. Clause 53 provides a necessary and effective safeguard against the endless merry-go-round of legal challenges that those with no right to be here use to thwart their removal.

Amendment 152 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would incentivise people to obtain injunctions or submit judicial reviews to delay or prevent removal, negating the carefully crafted and balanced provisions we have set out in the Bill, which I have just described. We cannot allow that to happen. The amendment would substantially undermine the Government’s ability promptly to remove those who enter the UK illegally, and our overall objective of stopping the dangerous small-boat crossings.

Amendment 153 similarly seeks to weaken the Bill by striking out Clause 54, which relates to interim measures of the European Court of Human Rights. Let me be clear: it is not the Government’s intention to ignore a Rule 39 interim measure. Indeed, Clause 54 provides a clear framework for a Minister to exercise discretion where a Rule 39 interim measure is indicated. That will mean that a Minister may suspend removal in response to a Rule 39 interim measure but, crucially, is not bound by UK law so to do. This will be dependent on the facts of each case.

As I have said before, the Government take their international obligations very seriously. Nothing in the clause requires the Government to act in breach of international law. I reassure the noble Baroness that reflections within the Strasbourg court are ongoing, and we are closely following the process. We are confident that they will lead to meaningful change.

The inclusion of Clause 54 in the Bill reflects our concerns about the interim measures process. We believe that there needs to be greater transparency and fairness in the process to ensure the proper administration of justice. We cannot allow our ability to control our borders to be undermined by an opaque process which does not give the United Kingdom Government a formal opportunity to make representations or appeal the decision. This process risks derailing our efforts to tackle the people smugglers and stop people from making the dangerous, illegal and unnecessary journeys across the channel.

For the reasons I have set out, I therefore invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment and, if she is minded to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 152 or 153, I strongly urge noble Lords to reject the amendment.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am so grateful to all noble Lords who have stayed. I say to all noble Lords that the length of debate does not indicate its importance. I am particularly grateful to the Minister for his indication that productive discussions are still in train between His Majesty’s Government and the Strasbourg jurisdiction; I take from that a suggestion to reinforce my suspicion that Clause 54 was always a negotiating position to attempt to improve the due process position in relation to interim measures in the Strasbourg court. On that basis, I want to allow the Government more time to proceed with those negotiations before Third Reading.

However, in relation to Clause 53 and my Amendment 152, on depriving His Majesty’s domestic judges of the inherent jurisdiction to grant interim relief, that jurisdiction does not come from any government or party statute; it comes from the common law. To deprive His Majesty’s judges of the ability to grant interim relief is anathema to our common-law system. With gratitude, again, to all noble Lords who stayed—perhaps even more to those who did not speak than to those who did—I would like to test the opinion of the House.

Illegal Migration Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th June 2023 Lords Chamber

In my view, we cannot send people to countries that are not party to the convention and do not have an asylum system. Remember that we are sending people not to have our asylum processes carried out offshore by some other country. We will have declared these people inadmissible—they will never be allowed into our asylum process. We are going to deport them to other countries, where an application that they never made for asylum in those countries will be considered by us and by the country in question to have been made. But how can the country in question do that if it does not have a system for doing it? How should we accept that it is reasonable to require people to seek asylum somewhere else—which in my view is contrary to the convention—and to do so in a country that is not a party to the convention and has no asylum system? I put that all interrogatively—I may be wrong on all or several of those points—but the Minister needs to address them.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, in the submission that Clauses 5 and 6 and Schedule 1 should not stand part of the Bill. The reasoning becomes increasingly repetitive and circular, because these provisions are parasitic on the meat of the Bill, which is really Clause 2. That is the duty that the Secretary of State is quite deliberately taking upon herself so that it looks as if no discretion is being exercised, she must remove people and therefore the courts have no ability to supervise that judgment. That is the heart of the moral and practical problem with the Bill, so when we look at the parasitic clauses that follow on from Clause 2, we come back to that central problem.

There are so many reasons why this is wrong in both principle and practice. As always, it is a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, a most distinguished senior diplomat and former Permanent Under-Secretary to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—which is important. The poor old Home Office gets lumbered with all the tough talk and rhetoric and with translating press releases into legislation, but the foreign department has to represent this country all over the world, negotiate further treaties and hold its head up in its attempt to do so. The foreign department will no doubt try to persuade people that Mr Sunak is so right and that, as I said last time, we should be the hub of AI intelligence and the world regulator, and everybody should support the idea that these treaties should be formulated here. Once upon a time, we could have said that.

If any noble Lords, particularly on the Benches opposite, want to understand the importance of the refugee convention, not as it is being flexibly interpreted by the current Government but as it was intended after the war, they might care to read the correspondence between our wartime Prime Minister and the then Archbishop of Canterbury. That correspondence between Winston Churchill and William Temple is very revealing of what the obligations of the future treaty were going to be in relation to individuated justice for refugees, which of course is the problem.

We were treated last time to good cop, bad cop by two Ministers, from the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice respectively; I will leave Members of the Committee to decide who was which. But I think that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, was right in his rather forensic—if I may say so—examination to point out some tensions in the case as it was put by the two Ministers.

The Home Office Minister concentrated, quite rightly, on the message as we have heard it thus far: this is about deterrence; we do not want people to come here; this is all about stopping the boats. Therefore, he stressed the automaticity of Clause 2 and the absolute commitment—no ifs, ands or buts—to a duty to remove anybody who comes by an irregular route; no matter how genuine a refugee, they must be removed. When, as amendment after amendment was debated, and noble Lord after noble Lord gave the litany of heartbreaking cases of trafficked people, of gay people who should not be sent back to certain countries, and so on, the Minister from the justice department pointed up the possibility of exceptional non-suspensive claims—it will be all right, there will be the possibility of individuated justice in those cases. But, of course, both positions cannot be the case, and they were not intended to be. It was excellent advocacy, perhaps, but it does not stand up, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said so clearly in his introduction to the debate.

This is the blanket treatment of claims that were always intended to be considered in a case-by-case analysis. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, pointed out, there are countries, including very large democracies such as India, perhaps, that are perfectly safe for some people but not at all safe for others—because they are political dissidents, because they are queer, because they are women. That is conceded by the Home Office in the schedule that lists some countries as safe only for men.

It is a diplomatic nightmare to be creating this automaticity of “These are safe countries; these are unsafe countries” and to be telegraphing it in the schedule to the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Murray, will say, “There has been this development for some years under Governments of both stripes to have inadmissibility and presumptive safety”. It is one thing to say to your officials considering individual claims that some countries might be prima facie safe, but you still have a duty to consider the individual asylum seeker before you to determine what their story is. That was always the intention in the refugee convention and that is the obligation on signatories to it—and, I would argue, not just signatories any more because non-refoulement has become accepted as a principle of customary international law. That is what we propose to breach by this legislation.

That is how serious it is. The Bill is wrong in principle, wrong in practice and internally incoherent. Certainly, the arguments that have been put by Ministers—elegantly, charmingly, patiently, late into the night—do not hold together, and these provisions should not stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, following the eloquent speeches of my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, I would like to refer again to the proposal that Schedule 1 should not stand part.

Some of those countries breach protected rights. I ask the noble and learned Lord the Minister which of the countries on the list practise female genital mutilation and do not reserve refoulement only for men? Which criminalise homosexuality? Which criminalise humanism? Noble Lords may remember the case of the president of the Humanist Association of Nigeria, who has received a life sentence.

Surely it is very odd to remove people to those countries. Does the Minister think that that conforms to our signature to the treaties of international law?

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, in relation to the latter point, I repeat the point I made on Monday that this is precautionary. There is no reason to deprive oneself of the possibility of providing for “a part”. With an enormous country such as India, it may be that up in Nagaland or somewhere there are some disturbances, but that does not prevent us saying that India is a safe country. That is the Government’s answer to the first point.

Our answer to the second point is that the words “in general” have—I am open to correction and I will correct myself if I am wrong—stood for 20 years on the statute book without difficulty and do not preclude, in an individual case, an application being made to oppose removal on the grounds of irreparable harm. It is the combination of a general view that the country is safe with the possibility of individual protection. Those are essentially the answers I gave on Monday.

I entirely accept the noble Lord’s point that this is new, but, for the reasons I have tried to explain, it is a workable and, I submit, balanced approach to a very difficult problem which the Bill is trying to solve.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

As always, the Committee is very grateful to the Minister. I want to be absolutely certain that I have understood his case, because this is so important. My understanding is that he is reassuring the Committee on the basis that, first, nobody is going to be sent to the country that they fear in the first place—they are not going to be sent back directly to the country that they have escaped from and which they say was originally persecuting them—and, secondly, they can be sent only if there is a deal with a country. So maybe this is all going to be rhetoric in the end: we are going to tell the British people that we are stopping the boats, and we are going to warehouse more and more people under this whole edifice because there will be a duty under Clause 2 to remove people to places where they are irremovable to because there is no deal. Thirdly, the Minister points to the little chinks in the scheme whereby somebody might make some kind of exceptional non-suspensive claim. That is what I understand to be the three parts of his case.

On sending people to third countries that are unsafe because they are gay or because there is some other reason why that individual person would be at risk, it matters not that they would be unsafe in a third country or unsafe in a first country. In relation to the other little nudges and winks that he offers us—that this is perhaps fiction because in the end we do not have deals with a lot of these countries—that might be some comfort to people coming, and maybe even to those smuggling them, but it is certainly no comfort to the British people on the cost or on the toxicity of the debate we are having about stopping the boats, when actually the boats are not likely to be stopped.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, it is a question of judgment. The Government’s judgment is that this legislation will go a long way towards reducing the terrible risks that people and unaccompanied children are facing in crossing the channel in difficult circumstances, and will destabilise the business model of the people smugglers. Those are surely legitimate objects for any Government to pursue.

The noble Baroness’s analysis is essentially correct: if I am a national of a particular state and I make an asylum claim or human rights claim then I cannot be sent back to that country; I could be sent back to a country with which—she puts it somewhat colloquially, and I would not quite use these words—we have a deal. The country with which we have a migration partnership at the moment is Rwanda, so that is still a possibility, subject to the individual in that case being able to make an application for either a factual suspensive application or an application based on imminent and foreseeable and serious harm. That is how it works, and that is how the Government see it.

While I am on my feet, I will address the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about whether the threat of deterrents supersedes individual human rights. For the reasons I have given, our answer is that there is no question of superseding individual human rights due to the protections I have just explained. Refoulement is covered by the existing agreement with Rwanda, and I am sure it will be covered in future agreements.

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[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak on this provision, because when I read the Bill and saw it, I genuinely thought that it must have been a drafting error on the part of civil servants that Ministers had not noticed. Having listened to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, move his amendment, and to the other noble Lords who have spoken, it seems very sensible to me that this be taken back by the Government before Report. I am amazed that there was no consultation with the trade unions on this issue, which really does affect their members’ livelihoods. If this went through, I can imagine how workers on planes, ships and other forms of transport would react, knowing that it could be used against them.

It right that this Chamber address this issue, being an advisory, revising Chamber that gets things changed that we think are obviously wrong. In addition to what has already been said about consultation, why has this not been discussed properly? As the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, has said, many trade union members believe that the way we deal with illegal immigration has to change, but this is not the way to do it. This bit of the Bill must be taken out. The Minister should accept that there will not be support for it in this House, and that the other place has not, perhaps, thought about this in a sensible way.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton for tabling these amendments, which are supported by the trade union movement and by other noble Lords.

I will put my cards on the table: my personal position is that coercive powers of detention should be in the hands of the state, for a number of reasons. I think Ministers should be directly responsible for the use of coercive power in our democratic society, and those powers should be exercised by properly trained people who enter into a profession to exercise powers such as that. However, that is not everyone’s position. I know that reasonable people, including friends of mine with whom I disagree and some on the Benches opposite, believe, for example, in private prisons. Those are circumstances where there is a contract that a private provider enters into to provide services for detention, coercion and so on. I have problems with that; I will not bore the Committee with my various concerns about it, but I believe that there is an entire Wikipedia page devoted to G4S scandals. I am thinking also of Brook House detention centre and the various people who have died in the context of forced removal from the country. I have concerns about the use of private contractors to exercise some of the most coercive powers of the democratic state.

However, the problem that has been identified by my noble friend Lord Davies and others is even more serious than that, because these are not private guards who have been employed by AN Other private security company—although I am concerned about that, and the scandals speak for themselves—but people who are transport workers. They are used to giving service to the public, which is a very different job with a very different understanding, different training and, as the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, pointed out, different preoccupations and priorities from the use of coercive force.

On mixed flights, holidaymakers sit alongside deportees. To be fair, that is already a problem; under the regime that we have now, these problems have arisen for some time, but the Bill makes the problem worse. We also have to be realistic that, in the context of the challenges we will face on this planet in the years to come, more and more desperate people will come. The idea of having mixed flights, with transport workers now being responsible for a policy of transportation in addition to normal service provision with the priorities of customer safety, is a total nonsense. If the Government want to pursue the sorts of policy that we are seeing in this legislation, with controversy, coercion and desperate people who may want to fling themselves off the train, the ship or the plane, that is really not appropriate for transport workers. We are now getting into a transportation policy of coercive control and removal, and that really ought to be done by servants of the state, agents of the state, who have been employed for that purpose.

It is not just for the sake of their consciences or for the safety and security of the desperate people themselves—or indeed the terrible people. We keep calling them “illegal migrants” but that is a bone of contention, because of course these people are being removed without consideration of their asylum claims, so we do not know whether they are illegal or not. However, whether they are illegal or are genuine refugees, some of these people will be desperate and will resort to desperate means to escape removal, and the lovely people who I travel with on the trains, when I can, should not be charged with that task; it should be people who are genuine volunteers who have been properly trained, and they should be directly responsible to Ministers when things go wrong, which I am afraid they sometimes will. So the amendments are very well put and I urge the Government to think again.

The Minister will rightly say that this is not novel. I do not want to pretend that it is totally novel to give directions to conventional transport providers and to contract out aspects of immigration control; bit by bit, that has been happening for decades, and it has simply been turbocharged by this policy. However, it is not safe or ethical, and nothing good will come of it.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The powers in Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act will continue to apply to those being removed who are not subject to the new duty in the Bill but are otherwise liable to removal from the UK. The powers in the Bill will relate to those who fall within the cohort in Clause 2. They provide clarity and certainty by being present in the Bill in this context. It is also clearly right that the 1971 Act powers need to be applied to the Bill, so that is the purpose for their inclusion. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s question.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I hope I conceded earlier that we know that there have been directions issued to captains and others since the 1971 Act; that is not in contention. My concern, given the greater controversy of a forced duty to remove people who have not even had a refugee claim considered, and given the larger numbers that the Government clearly anticipate in relation to this policy, is about some of the detail. The Minister said that we need greater clarity, but that greater clarity will bring greater concern. I personally do not remember all this deeming of legal custody and the criminalisation of transport workers, certainly not in the original 1971 Act. Maybe more of that has happened over the years.

I ask the Minister to go back to the issues of policy and principle, and not just to rely on the precedent of the creep of legislation forcing these duties on transport workers. Whether that creep has happened or not—I can see that it has—some of us are really concerned about where it has gone. He said that this has passed without comment or controversy but that is not the case, is it? Every so often, somebody dies while being removed because of the coercion and force that is necessarily involved. If the people using that force are not prison guards, soldiers or police officers, but just common or garden transport workers, there is a real concern and controversy. I would be very grateful if the Minister would address that as a matter of principle.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am afraid I do not agree with the noble Baroness that there is a substantive difference in the fact that the people being removed under the Bill have had their asylum claims rendered inadmissible, because under the present law categories of people have inadmissible asylum claims and they too are subject to removal. They have been subject to the powers in the pre-existing legislation, so I am afraid I do not accept the premise of her intervention.

I should add that we regularly read of instances where there is disorder on an aircraft or instances where a pilot is obliged to land somewhere; then the doors are opened and the police remove a person from the aircraft. That detention can be as simple as keeping the doors closed until the agents of the law arrive to remove the necessary people, and similarly on trains with electric doors. The effecting of the detention is not going to be overly burdensome on the operators as a result of these provisions.

European Court of Human Rights: Rule 39

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Tuesday 6th June 2023 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the benefits of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, provided by Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to grant interim measures where there is imminent risk of irreparable harm to a claimant in an ongoing application.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

In memory of my late noble and learned friend Lord Morris, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, if I may, I associate myself with the tribute to the late Lord Morris.

The Government recognise that interim measures can be an important mechanism for securing individuals’ convention rights in exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless, the Government want the interim measures process to achieve a better balance between transparency, fairness and the proper administration of justice. Ministers, including the Prime Minister, have had constructive discussions with the Strasbourg court about reform. The court’s regular internal review of procedures began to look at the interim measures procedures in November 2022.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

As always, I am grateful to the Minister for his Answer. Does he agree with me that the current group of interim measures against the Russian Federation precluding the execution of prisoners of war is very important, and that, notwithstanding Russia’s current status outside the Council of Europe, anyone who thinks about ignoring those interim measures should think again? In the spirit of reciprocity, notwithstanding the discussions about process, will the Minister also think again about legislating to allow British Ministers to ignore interim measures from the Court of Human Rights?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, if I may take the last question first, that issue will be explored in more detail in Committee when we get to Clause 53 of the Illegal Migration Bill. I remind the House that the Rule 39 power is a very important power, particularly in relation to the circumstances affecting Russia. However, it raises at least five quite difficult legal questions. First, what is the basis of the legal power? Secondly, what is the procedure with which the power is exercised? Thirdly, what is the competence, in the civil sense of the term, of the single judge? Fourthly, what is the effect in domestic law of such an order? Fifthly, what constitutes a breach of the order? None the less, the Government’s focus is on constructive and helpful discussions with the Strasbourg court on improving the process.