Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (Tribunal Composition) Order 2012
Baroness Drake Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
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Baroness Drake
My Lords, my involvement with employment tribunals is recorded in the register of interests. Issues of fair or unfair dismissal are at the heart of workplace relationships. The first-tier employment tribunal is in effect an industrial court where evidence is assessed and decisions made on what is fair and reasonable conduct. It was intended that those decisions would be rooted in the industrial context and business realities.
That is why lay members were introduced and why they should be retained in the hearing of unfair dismissal cases. The presence of lay members brings to the employment tribunal system both legitimacy from the view of the claimant, and a significant component of knowledge of social relationships at the workplace acquired through observation and participation. Employment tribunal decisions that are made jointly by a panel of people who pool legal and other knowledge and experience are better for that range of skills. This is particularly important when, as has been said, one considers that unfair dismissal claims are often questions of fact rather than complex legal points.
The Government argue that allowing judges to sit alone on unfair dismissal cases will bring cost reductions and efficiencies. Removing lay members’ automatic presence from unfair dismissal cases will save around £140,000, together with perhaps a further £500,000 as a result of needing to recruit fewer lay members—a most modest saving when one considers the challenge being posed to the industrial jury concept when dealing with unfair dismissals. As for inefficiency, the timetabling of cases is as much driven by the availability of judges as it is by lay members.
The Government argue that employment tribunal judges are highly competent, which I fully endorse—of course they are, but that is not the issue. What is important is that the legitimacy and benefit of a tripartite industrial court system in unfair dismissal cases remain. That is important for a series of reasons. In unfair dismissal cases people often feel very hurt and upset and the dismissal may be a life-changing experience, whatever the merits of their case. The employment tribunal must decide the reason for the dismissal and whether the employer acted reasonably in treating that reason as sufficient for dismissal. Where a tripartite tribunal finds against a claimant, that is a powerful message: the lay and the legal are of a common view. However, they have had their day at the tribunal, and that tripartite tribunal has expressed a view. Where that decision is taken by a judge sitting alone, the claimant may well feel more minded to pursue an appeal. I believe that legitimacy in the industrial context will be perceived to be less valid without that tripartite system.
Postal Services Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts(12 years, 11 months ago)
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Baroness Drake
“( ) Before making an order under subsection (1)(c), the Secretary of State must obtain a certificate from the government actuary stating that in the actuary’s opinion, the allocation of assets between the different sections is appropriate having regard to the liabilities and obligations of each section.”
Baroness Drake
My Lords, in moving Amendment 56, I will also speak to Amendment 57.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, for his courteous and helpful letter that addressed several issues relating to the Royal Mail pension plan raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, my noble friend Lord Young and myself. I welcome the assurances that: the Government are developing a joint communication plan with the trustees so that members are provided with information on the benefits that will transfer to the new public service scheme ahead of that transfer; active members will receive a seamless service from the new public service scheme and the Royal Mail scheme, including the provision of combined benefits statements; benefits which transfer from the Royal Mail scheme to the new public scheme will be replicated exactly; the governance arrangements for the new public service scheme will be the subject of consultation with the trustees and members’ representatives; and the Government must consult the trustees on the use of powers set out in Clause 17. I welcome that and the Minister’s confirmation that I am correct in my understandings.
However, there remains a matter of continuing concern. The Bill gives the Secretary of State considerable powers to make amendments to the Royal Mail pension plan, including the smaller Royal Mail pension plan—I call it “Mark II”—that is post transfer of assets and liabilities to the new public service scheme. These powers include the ability to transfer assets between the Royal Mail scheme and the new public service scheme, to which accrued pension rights will be transferred, and to divide the Royal Mail scheme into different sections, to allocate assets between the different sections and to determine which company or companies is a participating employer in any given section—this in preparation for the sale, retention and restructuring of different parts of the business. I am concerned that the Bill does not allow for some balancing mechanism of protection for scheme members when the Secretary of State exercises those powers. These amendments seek to address that.
I accept that, on the setting up of the new public service scheme, the Bill limits the assets that the Secretary of State can transfer out of the Royal Mail scheme such that the ratio of assets to liabilities in the Royal Mail scheme is no worse immediately after the transfer of those assets than it was immediately before. However, the valuation of those liabilities and assets is to be done in a manner determined by the Secretary of State. There is no explicit role for the Royal Mail scheme trustees, acting on the advice of their scheme actuary, to exercise a judgment on whether the assets remaining in the Royal Mail scheme are adequate in terms of value or appropriate in terms of the types of assets retained or transferred. Similarly, under Clause 17, when the Secretary of State exercises his or her power to divide the Royal Mail pension plan into sections and to allocate assets and liabilities between those sections, there is again no explicit role for the trustees acting on the advice of the scheme actuary.
Amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Young in Committee sought to address this concern by strengthening the consultation rights of the trustees and involving the Pensions Regulator in any assessment of the transfer of assets and liabilities, particularly between the new sections of the Royal Mail pension scheme. Having reflected on that debate in Committee, I recognise that the Government would probably not want to give the Pensions Regulator the power to impose any methods, assumptions or penalties on the Secretary of State when transferring assets between schemes or sections of the Royal Mail pension plan. Similarly, the Government may well be reluctant to give the Royal Mail scheme trustees a potential power of veto on the transfer of pension assets, which could impact on the sale process itself. None the less, the concern remains that the Secretary of State retains considerable powers when it comes to determining the adequacy and appropriateness of the actual assets transferred.
The issues that we are dealing with here are fundamentally actuarial, ensuring that the assets of the Royal Mail pension plan and its sections are adequate and appropriate in terms of matching assets to liabilities. If these decisions have to be justifiable as a matter of actuarial opinion and the actuary concerned cannot be the Royal Mail scheme actuary acting for the trustees, the best candidate for the job in my view is the Government’s own actuary, GAD.
Amendment 56 to Clause 17 would address transfer of assets between the newly created sections of the Royal Mail scheme and Amendment 57 to Clause 21 would address assets transferred from the Royal Mail pension scheme to the public service scheme. The amendments would require the Secretary of State to obtain a certificate from the government actuary stating that in his opinion, in the first instance, the allocation of assets between the different sections is appropriate, having regard to the liabilities and obligations of each section and, in the second instance, the selection of assets transferred and the assets remaining in the Royal Mail scheme is appropriate, having regard to the liabilities and the obligations of the Royal Mail scheme and the new public service scheme established under Clause 16. In my view, requiring such a certificate from the government actuary would provide a form of protection to the scheme, its trustees and its members when the Secretary of State exercises his powers under Clauses 17 and 21.
The Secretary of State has very wide powers to allocate assets and liabilities and materially alter the strength of an employer covenant backing any of the new sections of the Royal Mail pension plan. These must be seen in the context that, under Clause 8, the Secretary of State has powers to transfer property rights and liabilities between the holding company and other companies that are wholly owned by the Crown, which may occur prior to, and be in preparation for, sale or mutualisation. These powers in Clause 8 could be exercised so as to have the effect of materially weakening the employer covenant supporting any section of the remaining smaller Royal Mail pension plan. To give an example, the Secretary of State could create a separate section of the Royal Mail scheme for Post Office Ltd under Clause 17 and determine which assets and liabilities are allocated to it. The Secretary of State also has the power to decide which assets and property rights are held by Post Office Ltd as a company under Clause 8. When these are taken together, they are considerable powers and reinforce the need for a protection mechanism for scheme members. I believe that certification from the Government’s actuary will provide, before assets and liabilities between schemes and sections are transferred, that degree of protection. I beg to move.
Lord De Mauley
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, for giving us another opportunity to discuss the vital provisions in the Bill on the RMPP. Amendment 56 relates to the selection of assets left with individual sections of the RMPP created under Clause 17. That clause allows the Secretary of State by order to divide the RMPP into sections. The Government intend that this power will be used to create a separate section in the RMPP for Post Office Ltd. This is necessary as Post Office Ltd will be separated from Royal Mail, because it is not part of the sale under Part 1 of the Bill. Amendment 57 relates to Clause 21 and the selection of assets left with the RMPP as a whole once the deficit is transferred to the Government.
Part 2 of the Bill will allow the Government to take over the historic deficit in the Royal Mail pension plan. We intend to do this by transferring approximately £35.9 billion of liabilities and £27.5 billion of assets from the RMPP to the Government. This means that Royal Mail will be left with an appropriately sized pension plan to manage.
We intend that only liabilities relating to the salary link—that is, real growth in salaries for active members—and ongoing pension accruals will be left with the RMPP. We estimate that the salary link portion will amount to approximately £1.5 billion of liabilities remaining with the RMPP at the point at which the Government implement the measures in Part 2. Subject to state aid clearance, we intend to fund fully the liabilities remaining with the RMPP at the point of transfer, which would mean the RMPP also retaining £1.5 billion of assets.
In dealing with both amendments, I want to provide some reassurance on the process that will be followed to transfer assets from the RMPP to the Government. Before any assets are transferred, a valuation of the RMPP will indeed be undertaken by the Government Actuary. That valuation will follow standard actuarial principles and reflect the assumptions agreed between the trustees and Royal Mail for the March 2009 triennial valuation. The output of that valuation will be an up-to-date view of the value of the assets and liabilities in the plan. As a result, there will be no benefit in value for the RMPP, or a section of it, in selecting one type of asset rather than another. As noble Lords have highlighted in their proposed amendments, however, it is important that careful consideration be given to the type of assets that are left with the RMPP and to how those assets might be allocated between the Royal Mail section and the Post Office Ltd section of the plan.
We fully recognise that the assets to be left with the RMPP, and the individual sections, should reflect the future investment strategy of the trustees, and that it should be the trustees, in consultation with the respective employers, who set that strategy, rather than the Government. Jane Newell, the chair of the RMPP trustees, stated during her evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the other place that she would look to engage with us on the selection of assets to be left with the RMPP. I assure noble Lords that officials, with advice from the Government Actuary’s Department, have indeed been engaging with the trustees of the RMPP and are making good progress. Indeed, the Government are obliged under Clause 24 to consult the trustees before any orders are made under Part 2 of the Bill.
It is also important to bear in mind that the trustees would be free to sell any assets left by the Government and to change their investment strategy as they see fit. Of course, given the costs that this would involve, it is in everyone’s interest that we continue to work with the trustees to reach a satisfactory agreement on this issue.
I understand that concerns have been raised—the noble Lord, Lord Young, and I have corresponded on this—that the Government may seek to make changes to the RMPP by way of the powers in Part 2, even after the pensions changes that I have described have been implemented. I am happy to make clear that the Government intend to use these powers on a one-off basis only, and have no intention of making any substantive changes to the RMPP under Clauses 17 or 18 after the implementation of the pensions solution.
Baroness Drake
I thank the Minister for that detailed response. I am conscious of the lateness of the hour and that the detail of pension valuations is not everyone’s cup of tea. I took from what the Minister said that the Government’s actuaries will be involved in making a full assessment of the value and type of assets in relation to liabilities before any transfers are made under Clauses 17 and 21. It would be very helpful for the record to show that. That is exactly what I sought to achieve.
I noted the assurance that the Government would not seek to deploy Clause 18 in a way that weakened the employer covenant. Wholly hypothetically, if Post Office Counters did not retain the Crown offices on its balance sheets and did not get a good settlement on the transfer of assets and liabilities, my concern is that the combined effect would not be very helpful to the members in that section of the Royal Mail scheme. However, the Minister has given assurances that that is not the Government’s intention, and that they will actively seek to ensure that the application of Clause 18 does not weaken the employer covenant behind any of the sections. Those assurances are very helpful and, if the record shows them, I can withdraw my amendment.
Postal Services Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts(13 years ago)
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Baroness Drake
“( ) On making an order under subsection (2), and prior to the transfer of qualifying accrued rights, the Secretary of State must inform—
(a) all members affected that they are to be transferred to the new scheme;(b) all active and deferred members of their accrued rights in the new scheme;(c) all pension members of the details of payments from the new scheme and when they will commence; and(d) all members of the details of the new scheme.”
Baroness Drake
My Lords, Amendment 24EB seeks to place a duty on the Secretary of State to provide certain information to Royal Mail pension plan scheme members before their accrued pension rights are transferred to a new public scheme.
Clause 16 allows the Secretary of State to create by order a new public scheme and to make provision to transfer members’ qualifying accrued rights under the Royal Mail pension plan on a date still to be specified into that new scheme, thereby allowing the Government to take responsibility for those liabilities. The pension rights that members of the Royal Mail pension plan have accrued up to that date will be covered by that government support. Pension rights accrued after that date will remain with the Royal Mail pension plan. I am sure that scheme members will be reassured by the additional security for the funding of accrued benefits which the new scheme provides because it will be backed by the covenant of the Government, but these members will still be looking for reassurances as to the protection of their individual rights and interests. I am sure that there is much detailed consultation between the trustees and employee representatives still to take place.
All the privatisations of public corporations and utilities over the past 20 years have had carefully to address the issue of accrued defined benefit pension rights. The solution taken has not been the same in each instance. In the case of the sale of BT, a Crown guarantee was given. On the privatisation of the railway, the Government assumed responsibility for pensioner liabilities which existed up to the point of privatisation. Other privatisations have taken other approaches.
The pension arrangements proposed in this Bill, on the sale of Royal Mail, which are intended to facilitate privatisation and give greater security to members given the current level of deficit, are quite complex. They cover all categories of scheme members, active, deferred and pensioner, in respect of their pension rights accrued up to the specified date, which is yet to be determined. Some conditionalities continue between the new public scheme and the Royal Mail pension plan post privatisation. I am not arguing against that complexity where it enhances the protection afforded to scheme members, but it goes to support my amendment that members should know prior to the transfer to a new public scheme what their accrued rights are that are to be transferred to that scheme.
There are three concepts in this Bill which will need to acquire flesh: a qualifying member, qualifying accrued rights, and qualifying time before members of the Royal Mail pension plan definitively know who is affected, what the rights are and what the cut-off date is for determining the accrued rights that are to be transferred. The members will be anxious to know. It is human nature, given the importance of this matter, that they will be so anxious.
The other conditionalities relate to such matters as the increases in the value of pensions which occur after the qualifying date where they are linked, for example, to a final salary, and who bears the cost for this. The Bill reserves powers for the Secretary of State to amend the rules of the Royal Mail pension plan to address these matters. Complexity can carry ambiguity over the long term unless it is made very clear and people know precisely what their rights are and what the arrangements mean. Time moves on, key players go and memories fade. The BT Crown guarantee has had to be clarified at judicial review and the statutory framework of pension protection in the rail industry has from time to time required the assistance of legal opinion and clarification.
It is very important that members of the Royal Mail pension plan affected by this transfer of their accrued rights to the new scheme are personally informed before the transfer takes place so that they know who they are, what their accrued rights being transferred are and details of the arrangements and procedures applying in the new scheme. The amendment seeks to ensure that that happens. It would be totally unreasonable for them not to be so informed before the transfer of their rights to a new scheme.
I have absolutely no doubt that the Secretary of State will be motivated to treat people well, but people will be anxious. They need the confidence of knowing what is to be done to them before it is actually done. This will give them peace of mind. Clause 16(7) makes provision for an order to have retrospective effect; for example, where the effective date for the purpose of the transfer of pension liabilities has been agreed as a part of a wider arrangement with a third party and precedes the date of any order to set up the new pension scheme. The amendment does not prevent such a provision, but in the same way as the implementation of a retrospective date would be after the order had been made, so, too, the transfer of people’s accrued rights should not be implemented until after the individual scheme members have been provided with the relevant information about the treatment of their pension benefits.
Lord De Mauley
My Lords, my noble friend makes an extremely important point. The terminology is confusing but I think that he is talking about the RMPP scheme, the old liabilities and assets having been transferred out into what is rather confusingly called the new scheme. Therefore, he is concerned about the ongoing liabilities in the RMPP scheme. I will write to him, but I can tell him that £1.5 billion of funding will be left in the new scheme specifically to cover what is known as the salary link. However, I had better expand on that in writing, if I may.
Baroness Drake
My Lords, I hope that I may respond to some of the points made in the debate, particularly to the comments made by the Minister. Before I deal specifically with my own Amendment 24EB, I wish to comment on Amendment 24EC, which was spoken to by my noble friend Lord Young, as this addresses the Secretary of State exercising powers under Clause 17. As far as I can see, there is no explicit requirement on the Secretary of State to consult the trustees when exercising powers under Clause 17. Clause 17 gives the Secretary of State considerable powers. He can divide up the Royal Mail pension plan—not the new scheme but the Royal Mail pension plan—into different sections and allocate assets and liabilities between them, and he can allow different companies to participate in that scheme. The Secretary of State also has the power to determine what assets go on to the balance sheets of companies in preparing for privatisation or in a post-privatisation world.
These matters are of great importance to the trustees of the Royal Mail pension plan, which is left with accruing liabilities, or existing liabilities, that are not transferred to the new scheme. They will be very interested in the strength of the employer covenant backing any section so created, and what it does to the security of the members left in a particular section so created. In the occupational pension world, if you weaken the employer covenant to a particular section, that is a notifiable event—it is not something that you can breeze over. It is what the regulator exists for, which I suspect is why my noble friend raised the issue of the Pensions Regulator.
Hypothetically, if I were an employee of Post Office Ltd and I had accruing rights in the remaining Royal Mail pension scheme, I would want my trustees to be very alert to what assets were left on the balance sheet of Post Office Ltd, because they are the assets—the covenant—that are backing the future benefits or the benefits that are remaining in the Royal Mail pension plan. These are real issues for the trustees. This will remain an occupational pension scheme because, as I thought, the Minister has not said that Crown guarantee carries on in the Royal Mail pension plan.
I do not think that we have clarity about how the Secretary of State can exercise his power under Clause 16 to split up the Royal Mail pension plan and how at the same time the trustees can exercise their power to protect the employees so that their position as creditors or the strength of the employer covenant is not weakened and the members left in a less favourable position.
On Amendment 24EB, I fully recognise that the proposals in the Bill allow for the deficit to be taken over by the Government; that will clearly give a lot of people in the scheme peace of mind. I welcome the Minister’s comment that members’ protection is of great importance. I think I welcome his statement that there will be a comprehensive communication exercise before, during and after the transfer, which is clearly very positive and on the record. However, we still need clarity about what will happen before the transfer. What communication will there be then? If the Government could clarify that, in writing or in some other way, that might deal with the issue.
The Minister referred to the Royal Mail pension plan trustees having statutory obligations to provide information to pension scheme members, and that is absolutely true. However, we have a complex situation in that there is almost a Secretary of State override to impose certain powers or requirements on the Royal Mail pension scheme. The trustees cannot account for that—they cannot explain that. The Government might choose them as the conduit to do that, but they cannot make those decisions or answer the questions that arise because of powers exercised by the Secretary of State.
I anticipated that the inefficiency of double communication might be raised, but I am not persuaded that that is an argument for not allowing people the maximum information prior to transfer. That is the reason for civil servants and Royal Mail pension plan trustees coming up with an efficient communication plan; it is not really a reason for not giving full and proper information prior to transfer.
It would be helpful to obtain greater clarity about the information that would be provided. However, I recognise that the noble Lord was seeking to improve the assurances given on the importance of protecting members’ information.
Lord De Mauley
Before the noble Baroness withdraws her amendment, I am happy to provide some clarification on the points she raised. She asked about the Secretary of State being obliged to consult, and I mentioned Clause 17. I apologise if I was not clear enough. The Government’s position is that under the general provisions in Clause 24 the Secretary of State must consult the trustees on the powers set out in Clause 17. I hope that that is helpful.
The noble Baroness also asked about the Crown guarantee. Perhaps I should clarify the Government’s position, which is that an unfunded public sector scheme is a better option, because providing a Crown guarantee would expose the Government, and therefore taxpayers, to significant risks—for example, investment risk—that are not under government control. With a guarantee, it would not be clear as to what liabilities the Government would be taking on, because although they would assume responsibility for the deficit, the Royal Mail trustees would continue to exercise control over investment policy and discretionary powers in relation to benefits to members. Our proposal to establish a new unfunded scheme is consistent with the majority of existing public service pension schemes. The pay-as-you-go model provides members of the Royal Mail pension plan with certainty that their benefits will be paid, while minimising the taxpayers’ exposure to investment risk and future volatility in the scheme’s funding position.
I should say in answer to the noble Baroness’s second broad point that officials have already started to work very closely with the trustees to implement Part 2, including over asset allocation. These discussions are critical in helping the Government to implement the pension solution.
Baroness Drake
I thank the Minister for those further clarifications. They are helpful, although they trigger one or two queries. Any further clarity that can be provided in writing would certainly be helpful. I interpreted what the Minister said as the Government putting on record that if they seek to exercise their powers under Clause 17, they will consult the trustees. That is helpful.
My point about the Crown guarantee was that after the transfer of liabilities or accrued rights to the new pension scheme, there remains a Royal Mail pension scheme with either liabilities or accruing liabilities, and it will remain an occupational pension scheme. I sought to clarify whether the Secretary of State would not exercise any powers over that remaining pension scheme in a way that undermined the protections afforded to the Royal Mail pension scheme under the normal range of occupational regulations. That was a key point.
The Minister’s clarifications have been helpful. Ambiguities remain and I am sure that they will be the subject of further discussion. Any clarity that can be given to my noble friend Lord Young on what happens before the transfer would be helpful. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.