Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Foster of Aghadrumsee
Main Page: Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-affiliated - Life peer)(1 day, 12 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I beg leave to move the amendment standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow.
The financial aspects of this Bill are the easiest for people not involved to understand. It does seem bizarre that at a time when we are borrowing money and scratching around for savings, we are raising taxes here in order to fund tax cuts in Mauritius. I do not want to detain noble Lords, so I will not go over the figures again. We had an expert disquisition from my noble friend Lady Noakes at Second Reading.
Even if we were to accept the Government’s figures, we still face an immense imbalance in where the money is going. I come back to the point that we were making just before dinner, about the wrong that everyone accepts was done to the Chagossians and what restitution would look like. The Minister said they had been very badly treated. Well, badly treated or otherwise, their compensation, if we measure it purely in financial terms, comes to a one-off £40 million settlement for good—whereas, even on the figures offered by the Government, we are paying Mauritius £101 million every year for the next 99 years. Who is the wronged party here? How is it that having done this harm to population A by moving them, we then reward the population that is in fact making permanent their exile and deepening their sense of grievance?
Never mind whether it is £3.1 billion, £35 billion or somewhere in between, at Second Reading my noble friend Lord Altrincham made the point that this is money being sent out of the country. We can argue about whether there is merit in Governments spending cash here to stimulate growth. I personally am of the camp that says it does not work. It is better to leave that money directed by people who are attached to it; they spend it more wisely and the growth impact is much higher. But I will allow that there is some impact in stimulating the domestic economy, even when a Government spend money badly. There is none at all when you just take a sum of money and send it several thousand miles away, which is what is being proposed here.
The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, are about impact assessments, particularly on the financial consequences for the United States, as well as for us. I just want to tackle the view that this is a great deal for the US—that, however inconvenient it is for us, we are left with the bill and the US gets to keep the base. Every pound that we send to Mauritius to lease the property that we currently own is a pound that we are not spending on defence. It is a pound taken away from NATO and from the western alliance. That is just the immediate and direct cost of what happens when you take a freehold and then decide to pay for it as a leasehold.
There is then, it seems to me, an underexplored indirect cost: how have we now incentivised future Mauritian Governments to monetise this territory? If they can get this sum of money out of us, why not lease other parts of the archipelago to other powers? The Minister has said, of course, that in the treaty they are not allowed to for military purposes. The treaty says they cannot use these things for defence purposes, but I wonder: down the line, if Mauritius was indeed incentivised to make more money and leased an island for supposedly civilian purposes, then very gradually it was turned in a secret way by an unfriendly power into a more direct military installation, is that something realistically that is then going to trigger a military reaction from us?
It seems to me that the only way of ensuring that we do not have unfriendly neighbours in the Chagos Archipelago is not to have these islands being leased out in the first place, and the best way of preventing the islands being leased out is to hang on to them ourselves.
The noble Lord referred to £40 million. I assume he is referring to the trust fund that is going to be set up.
However, as he is fully aware, that is totally in the hands of the Mauritian Government. No Chagossian from here can access that money. Is that not something that should be considered?
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for that important correction. This would not be the first time this has happened. The sums that were disbursed to Mauritius in the 1970s, supposedly to be spent on the welfare of the Îlois exile community, were hung on to. They were disbursed very late, and their value had been significantly eroded by inflation in the meantime. Indeed, given that record, there is little wonder that there should be bad feeling from a lot of Chagossians towards the Mauritian Government.
Unusually in this House, the noble Baroness and I were on the same side in the 2016 referendum, so we are familiar with the argument that here is a little bit of your money back; we are spending it for you, and you should be grateful. It was an unconvincing argument to the British people in 2016, and I think it will be an unconvincing argument to the British people and to the Chagossian portion of the British family in 2025. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 53 in my name and that of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond, who unfortunately cannot be here this evening. It is clearly a probing amendment to give the Committee an opportunity to consider the implications for the UK of another possibility affecting Article 11, the economic partnership of the treaty. That possibility is that, within the 100 years-plus of the treaty, the Diego Garcia military base might become unusable, due to natural causes or because of a sea level rise triggered by global warming. While the loss of use would have military consequences, due to the wording of the treaty the UK’s financial obligations to Mauritius would appear not to be affected.
As I mentioned at Second Reading, the treaty makes some valiant assumptions about the steadfastness of relationships between the countries concerned. That aside, it would be helpful to understand why, if only as a precautionary principle, no mention of this possibility —the functional failure of the base—or how it might be handled is covered in the treaty. I assume that the possibility was considered by His Majesty’s Government and the United States in their preparations for negotiation. Can the Minister confirm this? Was it decided, based on historical records, that the risk of an earthquake, tsunami or other natural cause was so remote that these need not be considered?
Indeed, in his response in the debate on 30 June, the Minister mentioned that, like all small atoll islands, it is naturally dynamic. While not wishing to speculate on future erosion, he said that scientific surveys had concluded that the overall natural land area of the island had decreased by less than one per cent over the last 50 years. But what about sea level rise? There is a widespread presumption that sea levels will rise in the future. The amount of rise, its timing and spread in the world’s oceans is still speculative, but, based on realistic IPCC global warming projections, estimates for the Chagos atoll indicate rises that would impact on the functioning of the Diego Garcia base. They suggest that, within 100 years of the treaty, the runway and hard standings will not be covered, but some of the domestic and fuel storage areas could become submerged, either intermittently by diurnal tides or on a permanent basis. There could also be difficulties with quayside berthing and the present availability of fresh water. This is but a résumé of findings that were sent to FCDO officials in January, before the treaty was signed in May this year.
Maybe the United States, having done its own assessment, believes that it will be possible gradually to strengthen the sea defences as necessary to maintain the base’s operational capabilities. It would be helpful if the Minister could indicate what assessments the United States has made of sea levels. Looking at the wording of the treaty, as I mentioned at Second Reading, there will be the opportunity to attempt to resolve any issue about payment by the arrangements for settling disputes contained in it. But, whatever arrangement might be accepted by both parties today, it does not follow that the same consensus might be possible later, due to changes in the individuals and their perceptions then. There seems therefore to be good reason to have an agreement with Mauritius now, before ratifying the treaty, on how the eventuality of the base becoming unusable would affect Article 11.
My Lords, I rise very briefly to commend the noble and gallant Lord on his amendment. It is an incredibly sensible amendment that should not be contentious because, if there are difficulties arising out of natural causes or disaster, it would be unthinkable for His Majesty’s Government to have to continue to pay large sums of money to the Government of Mauritius. I hope that that will be taken on board.
Secondly, I will refer to the treaty, which, at Article 11, talks about the economic partnership between the United Kingdom and Mauritius. There are three parts to that. The first is the annual sum that has to be paid: there has been lots of conversations around what that is and what it might amount to. The second is the trust fund, which the Minister knows I take a particular interest in and which we will discuss in the eighth group of amendments. The third is the multiyear funding as part of a development framework for projects to be undertaken by the Mauritius Government across 25 years. We have heard very little about this multiyear funding. I wonder whether the Minister could elucidate that and give us some details in relation to what that is and what it is thought to be. In the treaty, it says that the amounts, payments and modality for all those three issues will be agreed separately. So it is important for the House to have some clarity in relation to that and I look forward to hearing from the Minister.
My Lords, I was going to say that this has been an excellent debate, but it has not really been much of a debate seeing as nobody from the Labour side has bothered to get up and try to defend the Government’s actions on this matter. Not even the Foreign Office trade union crowd on the Cross Benches have come along to justify the Government’s actions on this. I note from the media reports that apparently the Mauritian AG is in London for discussions, no doubt to celebrate his brilliantly successful negotiation. He will probably find that the Foreign Office has given him another £100 million today for his trouble in coming over here in the first place.
It would not be right for me to begin my contributions without mentioning the excellent forensic speeches of my noble friends Lord Altrincham and Lady Noakes at Second Reading. It seemed to me very convincing that the Government have increasingly got their numbers wrong. I look forward to the noble Baroness attempting to explain her financial figures again.
I am sure that some noble Lords will argue—maybe the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, will—that this agreement has been made and there is nothing we can do about it. They might say that it is an unfortunate oversight, but we cannot change the agreement. However, the treaty, as we have discussed previously, has not yet been ratified; it is not final. The Government could still change their approach. It is unlikely, and it would take political will, but everything is possible.
Now that we know that the treaty is not inevitable and that the overall cost expected when the agreement was reached was wrong, I hope Ministers will take the opportunity to reconsider. In any other walk of life, a decision-maker faced with a significantly higher cost than expected would reassess their position. Why are Ministers failing to take that responsible approach with taxpayers’ money? The Chancellor will get up next week and tell us that the country is bust, and that we need to raise taxes and cut spending, but the FCDO seems to take no account of the extra costs when negotiating this agreement.
My Amendment 22 would require a review of the overall financial cost of the agreement. With such uncertainty about the overall costs, I think this is an entirely reasonable amendment that would give greater transparency to taxpayers on how much of their money will be sent to Mauritius, over time, as we have said before, to fund tax cuts over there. We pay more tax over here, but the Mauritians will be able to cut their taxes with the money that we are very generously sending to them.
As I said, on value for money we are being told to expect spending cuts at the Budget on 26 November. Before the Government cut a single extra service for the British people, Ministers should first consider cutting their surrender deal with the Mauritian Government. In my view, most of the British public would be aghast when presented with the fact that the Government have surrendered territory to a foreign state and simultaneously somehow found themselves paying for the privilege. This is a clear failure to deliver value for money to taxpayers.
My Amendment 70 would require the Government to make a statement explaining why they believe that each payment to Mauritius represents value for money. My Amendment 75 would require the publication of a schedule of expected payments to Mauritius along with their dates. The Government should not resist measures which increase transparency on the financial elements of the agreement.
I gave a wry smile when the noble Lord, Lord Weir, asked the Minister for the breakdown of the costs of this agreement between the MoD budget and the FCDO budget. I hope he has more success than I have in asking this question, because I have asked it five times and she has refused to tell me how much is being paid out of the different budgets. One was beginning to suspect that she does not even know how much money we are handing over on behalf of this deal.
I additionally ask the Minister what powers Ministers have to ensure that the money we hand over to Mauritius is spent as agreed. The noble Baroness, Lady Foster, particularly highlighted the trust fund supposedly set up for the benefit of Chagossians, but how they spend it is entirely within the control of Mauritius. There have been well-documented corruption cases in Mauritius; how do we know how that money will be spent? I think we should be told or Ministers should at least seek to find out.
Finally, Amendment 74 relates to a slightly separate question on the part of the UK-Mauritius agreement relating to the employment of Mauritians on the Diego Garcia military base. I tabled it to ask the noble Baroness some specific questions on the practical effect of the article of this agreement. Can she confirm whether this article means Mauritians will be prioritised for employment on the Diego Garcia military base over, for example, British citizens or Chagossians? Who ultimately would their employer be? This also speaks to value for money. Can the Minister confirm whether her department has made any assessment of the impact of the provisions relating to the employment of Mauritians and how much that will contribute to the cost of running the base?
I understand fully the nature of the noble and gallant Lord’s concern. He has explained it well and repeatedly, and I have committed to come back to him with a further response. I do not think I can do any more than that tonight.
Before the noble Baroness leaves that point, I fully respect the noble and gallant Lord’s position on the base not being available due to natural disasters—or, as we called it when I was a solicitor, an act of God—but what happens if the base becomes simply unusable because of an act of aggression by a bad actor in 50 years’ time, which we have no sight of at this moment? The point is that if it becomes unusable for whatever reason, whether by act of God or an act of aggression, will we still continue to pay for a base that we cannot use?
I simply cannot answer that because it would depend so much on the circumstances and on who would be culpable. I do not know. I will think about that and come back to the noble Baroness. It is very difficult to respond to hypotheticals. I could create a few hypotheticals that answer those specific questions but I do not think that would necessarily get us anywhere. She is probably after something a little more concrete than that. I will give that some further thought and see whether I can come back to her with something more satisfactory. I guess, ultimately, that if there is some unavailability we have the option of breaching the terms of the agreement through non-payment, which would end the agreement. However, I will look into our legal position in that situation and make sure we have some clarity so that we can consider this further if we need to.
On the issue of the split and how the money will be found, the noble Lord opposite—in his usual charming way—suggests that we have not really thought about this. Some of the money will come from the FCDO and some from the MoD. It is all government money; it is all taxpayers’ money. I really do not understand the preoccupation with this. That split will be fair. We are very used to paying for things jointly. We do it all the time on various things. This is not an unusual situation.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 89 in my name and in support of the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Callanan.
At Second Reading, I raised the broad issue of the royal prerogative, and the Minister is aware of my, perhaps inquisitive, interest in that. That broad power is in Clause 3, and the specific reference to His Majesty’s power to make Orders in Council comes in at Clause 5, particularly in Clause 5(1)(a). That is powerful. For the benefit of the Chamber, I repeat what that says:
“His Majesty may by Order in Council … make any provision that appears to His Majesty to be appropriate as a result of the Treaty”.
The following paragraph goes on to explain that that can be a
“consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving provision in relation to … this Act, or … an Order under paragraph (a)”.
I want to thank the Minister for her letter, which she very kindly sent to me yesterday. In it, she alludes to this particular issue and says that “Clause 5 of the Bill creates a new statutory power for His Majesty to make such provision by Orders in Council as he considers appropriate as a result of the treaty”. This led to my Amendment 89, because I am just trying to seek clarification of this power. In particular, I want to establish whether that power can be used by His Majesty, for example, to withdraw the United Kingdom as a party to the treaty and withhold any payment due to Mauritius if Mauritius violates any terms of the treaty.
This is not a lengthy matter for discussion. In responding, I would ask the Minister, if she opposes my amendment, and I anticipate that she may, to be specific about the ground of objection. It may be that she says, “I don’t want the Secretary of State being mixed up in anything like this, it’s just unnecessary and tiresome and he’s got enough on his plate without being burdened with all that”. On the other hand, she might consider that this is an incompetent use of the royal prerogative. I would be interested in understanding that better.
It would be more alarming if the Minister said that she does not consider that, if Mauritius violates any terms of the treaty, the UK will be able to withdraw and cease payment. It is rather along the lines of the point raised by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, who is not in his place. There is a basic issue about whether the thing is working or not. In his case, the thing is not working because the base has disappeared under the ocean. In the dim and distant past in contract law there was something called “frustration of the contract”: if the underlying purpose disappeared, the contract evaporated. The Minister has undertaken to investigate that further and we shall await that.
I really want to understand, if Mauritius violates the treaty, what practical solution is available to the UK: whether it is paying the money, coming out of the treaty or taking whatever other remedial action is necessary. I shall look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I will speak briefly in relation to Amendment 77 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, on the process for the establishment of the joint commission. This is critically important because, while the treaty does talk about the process of setting up the joint commission in Annex 3, there is no determination as to whether that person, as the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said, will be a Member of Parliament, will be accountable to Parliament or will be a civil servant. It would be very helpful if we had more detail in relation to that matter.
It brings me back to my days studying constitutional law at Queen’s University, Belfast, when Professor Brigid Hadfield used to lecture us about the mischief behind the law. She would say, “Read the debate in Parliament to find out what the mischief was”. I was just thinking of her there when I was listening to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. It would be really useful to find out what the Government’s position is in relation to this joint commission, because it could be a very critical part of the post-agreement scenario, where there is accountability to this place. I would really welcome clarity in relation to that matter.
My Lords, I would like to address Amendments 11 and 12 in my name, which both relate to the terms of the lease. Over the years, I have often heard leaseholders wish they had, or propose to acquire, the freehold. They feel that, as leaseholders, they are in a very inferior position and that the freeholder has the whip hand and, of course, at the end of the lease, the freeholder, like as not, gets everything back and leaseholders potentially lose everything. This is the first time I have ever heard of someone wanting to swap a freehold for a leasehold and, at the same time, claiming that they will be more secure as a result. Of course, they will not—and even less secure, given the terms of this agreement. Amendment 11 relates to whether or not the lease is renewable.
The lease is dealt with in Article 13 of the treaty, which says that it has a duration of 99 years. What happens at the end of 99 years? Is it automatically renewable? No. Under Article 13.5, the UK has a right to first refusal for a further 40 years on the same terms as offered to any third state. There we have it. Mauritius can offer the UK-US base to a third state in 99 years’ time and force the UK and USA to outbid some other bidder—it might be China, India, Iran or any other country with interests in the Indian Ocean around it, such as Saudi Arabia. There are lots of countries that can afford and might like to have this base. We would have to outbid them to retain what had been maintained and invested in for the previous 99 years. I have no reason to suppose that it would not be as valuable in the future then as it is now.
My Lords, I think Article 6, “Resettlement of Chagossians”, is the most misnamed article in this treaty. It tells us that,
“Mauritius is free to implement a programme of resettlement on the islands of the Chagos Archipelago other than Diego Garcia”.
I am thankful to live in a democracy where I am free to do all manner of things; sometimes I choose not to do all manner of things for various reasons. I am quite sure Mauritius will take the same view in relation to resettlement of Chagossians on the outer islands.
There is no right of resettlement or return in the treaty. I have a later amendment, on the Second Marshalled List, which deals with this. According to the treaty, there is no right of return or no right of resettlement—we need to be very clear on that. I think that is morally wrong. The language in this Bill deals with what I think is a failure of negotiation, to be honest, because I do not think it would have been beyond the wit of man to have had at the very least a right of return, if not a right of resettlement, in the treaty. With the Mauritian AG here in London, what better time to have a discussion about the right of return and the right of resettlement for the Chagossian people?
Amendment 72, in the alternative, seeks to have some accountability for the current aspiration in the treaty—in other words, after it is implemented—to look back and see what is happening in relation to the right of resettlement. That will give some transparency to why the wording in the treaty has been chosen and, again, get to the purpose of the article.
In conclusion, I strongly support both these amendments. It is wrong not to have a right of return and a right of resettlement in the treaty and the way in which it is presented in the treaty is wrong also.
I thank my noble friend Lord Lilley for leading on this group. The Chagossian community overwhelmingly wants to see a scheme for the resettlement of the archipelago, reversing the forced removal of the islanders in the late 1960s. As we know, many Chagossians living in Mauritius feel that they are treated, even now, as second-class citizens, and this should not be an acceptable situation. We will probe the treatment of the Chagossians in Mauritius more fully when we debate amendments relating to the trust fund.
Many Chagossians still want, understandably, to return to their homeland. The treaty is clear, sadly, that Mauritius shall be free to arrange for resettlement of Chagossians on all the islands of the archipelago except Diego Garcia, but it is not clear in the treaty what this might look like; nor is it clear how likely resettlement actually is in practice. My Amendment 72 is very simple. It merely requires the Government to publish the findings of a review of all discussions between the UK and Mauritius in respect of the resettlement of the islands. The resettlement under the treaty would be for the islands other than Diego Garcia, so this is not something that should undermine the operations of the base. Given that, we cannot see why the Government would be unwilling to share details of their discussions with the Mauritians on resettlement.
Can the Minister please set out clearly how often resettlement was discussed with the Mauritian Government during the negotiations ahead of the treaty, and what her department’s assessment is of the likelihood that Mauritius will establish a scheme for the resettlement of the islands? Would the UK support a resettlement effort financially? Could some of the existing funds that we are giving to Mauritius be used for resettlement? If not, what is the estimated risk that the Mauritian Government would refuse to undertake a resettlement on cost grounds?
In essence, our question to the Government is: what does this treaty mean for the Chagossian community’s hope of resettlement? If, in the Foreign Office’s view, this treaty effectively kills any hope of resettlement, does the Minister not accept that the Government should manage the expectations of the Chagossians and be very clear and transparent with them that that is what they have agreed? We want to end the lack of transparency around the Bill and I hope that the Minister will be able to do that today.
My Lords, we are very happy to continue. As I said earlier, the degrouping was done very late. I have been instructed that we have to carry on until the next group.
I note that, in the supplementary Marshalled List of amendments, the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, has two amendments which pertain to the environment. It would be much better if those were attached to the next grouping. Therefore, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that this is a good point to adjourn.
My Lords, following on from that, these amendments coming up are on really important environmental issues that the government party says it cares about very much. I know that there may well have been some agreement, but we Back-Benchers who are not in any political party do not get asked about our agreements on anything, so I would formally like to propose that this House do now resume.
I wish to oppose the noble Baroness in the suggestion, because I think we have made some good progress this evening and had some good debates. We are about to discuss some very important issues around the marine protected area. I am here and ready to do that, despite the bizarre late degrouping for no apparent reason, when we had a repeat of an earlier debate. I think it would be good to make some progress this evening.
I imagine that the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, would want his two amendments grouped with the other marine protected area amendments. Unfortunately, he is not here. It would be good to have all those amendments grouped together, so that we could have a thorough exposition of the environment, instead of part of it tonight and part of it next Tuesday. I would have preferred it if my Amendment 20A was grouped with the right of Chagossians to return, which was already debated but, because it was not, it now has to wait until next week. So I think there is an argument to have the next group next week, so that all the marine environment amendments can be heard together.
My Lords, the Question has been put that the House do now resume. I must now put that Question. I think on a show of voices the Not-Contents have it.
Obviously, we are not going to have a vote now, but it would be helpful for those of us who are non-aligned in this House to have more communication than we have had to date in relation to these matters. There seem to be quite a few of us.
Perhaps I might say to the noble Baroness that communication with regard to the degrouping was not equally applied to all, so I have sympathy with her. Perhaps if we continue with this group now, we might conclude this evening in an amicable way.
Amendment 15