Immigration
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Henley
The very simple reason is that some—particularly in the private sector, which is why I referred to private sector colleges—were involved in an abuse. If there is an abuse of the system, we have a duty to tackle it, and that is what we have done.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the Minister may be aware of a recent report from the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry entitled Migration Reform: Caps Don’t Fit. It concludes:
“Our research shows that one of the main reasons companies recruit from beyond the EU is their desire to explore and invest in new, overseas markets”.
It also says that, if the UK’s economic recovery is to be export led, this is a particularly important consideration. Does the Minister acknowledge that?
Lord Henley
My Lords, I think that I have followed what my noble friend has said. Obviously, we recognise the importance of universities—as I said in response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, they are a major part of our exports. However, I also see what my noble friend is getting at. I have not seen the research that she refers to, which talks about the need to bring in workers from outside the EU. However, the point that I was making in my first supplementary answer was that we have a cap on the number of skilled workers, and we have not got anywhere near that cap in the first six months of this year.
Justice: Evidence
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Henley
The noble Baroness is absolutely correct. I was not trying to imply any criticism of the group; I was saying that it has put forward a solution that we have found a number of problems with. We will continue to look at any ideas that it puts forward. If we could use intercept as evidence in a manner that was safe and appropriate, we would, but again I stress that we have to get the right balance between advantage, costs and risks.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, when I heard the Minister’s original Answer I wondered whether it was a case of changing the membership if you do not like what is being said, and in this case I would welcome that. However, does the Minister accept that the longer this goes on, the less trust and confidence there is among those of us who take an interest in this about whether there is a real determination to reach a good and useful outcome?
Lord Henley
My Lords, the only reason why the membership changed was because the noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer of Sandwell, stood down due to reasons of health. He has been replaced by Shaun Woodward, and there is nothing else behind that.
Marriages and Civil Partnerships (Approved Premises) (Amendment) Regulations 2011
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
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Baroness Verma
My Lords, to assist the House I suggest we hear from the Liberal Democrat Benches first, maybe then the Convenor of the Cross Benches, followed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and then the Bishops.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, we complain when primary legislation is not commenced or implemented. The first instinct of the noble Lord, Lord Alli, was absolutely right, though he then extended his arguments. We also complain when legislation is not clear. This is not the case today. The Merits Committee, of which I am a member, did not make a judgment on the merits of the substance of this order. It used its entirely standard language, drawing it to the special attention of the House on the grounds that,
“it gives rise to issues of public policy likely to be of interest to the House”.
That statement is quite uncontentious.
I can see from those already attempting to intervene that we will hear today closely argued analysis of a construction of the words “Act”, “authority” and “services”, and I am always glad to recruit such expertise to the cause. Essentially, however, the issue is, “Does the order do what Section 202 of the Equality Act provides?”. I believe that it does. Or, “Does it require any individual or organisation to do what they do not wish to do?”. I believe that it does not. The order cannot trump primary legislation, nor can it require what the Act itself precludes. As we have been reminded, primary legislation says that nothing places an obligation on religious organisations to host civil partnerships if they do not wish to do so. If there are differing views within an organisation, that is not a matter for government.
The noble Baroness uses in her prayer the word “pledge”. It is not a pledge—or rather, it is more than a pledge—because the words are in Section 202. That section is surely permissive: it is an opt-in, not an opt-out. We know there are objections to it, but that was a matter for 2010. I say that to those who would like to extend that section, as well as to those who would like to see it interpreted restrictively. To attempt now to reverse it, extend it or block it, is inappropriate.
I will be quick because there are so many noble Lords who wish to speak. I find it very difficult to see anxiety engendered among people with a particular view. I do not like to see people fed fear. I realise that something that may seem entirely reasonable to me may seem very prejudicial to you, whoever you and I are—that is, whichever side of the argument one is on. I will end by voicing what others might see as my own prejudices. That 46,000 couples have entered into civil partnerships is wonderful; 92,000 people have been able to give formal, legal expression to their relationship. It is a paradox that some who advocate celebrating marriage within a faith oppose extending it to other stable relationships. I welcome the order and look forward to taking forward Section 202.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
My Lords, I speak as a lawyer today. I concede my obligation to the House to set out my genuine view, because this is a legal issue and because I was formerly the Lord Chancellor. The noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, and the noble Lord, Lord Alli, agree the basis upon which Parliament—not only this House—passed the amendment to the Civil Partnership Act which abolished the prohibition on civil partnerships being registered in places of religious worship. My noble friend Lord Alli said at the time that there was no disagreement about this.
From the outset I want to make very clear that the amendment does not place any obligation on any religious organisations to host civil partnerships in their buildings. We made that clear by including in the amendment the words:
“For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Act places an obligation on religious organisations to host Civil Partnerships if they do not wish to do so”.
There is no doubt that that was the basis on which the provision was passed. If we have not given effect to that provision, we should not agree to these regulations. The only issue today is therefore whether as a matter of law we have given effect to it. It is for the House to make a decision about this. It is always possible to find a lawyer who says that something is arguable. It is for us to go through the provisions today and form a view about whether or not, contrary to our intention and to that of the House of Commons, we have somehow failed to achieve it.
I will very quickly go through the basic provisions so that we arrive at a clear answer. Section 2 of the Civil Partnership Act makes the moment at which a civil partnership occurs the moment at which the two partners sign the civil partnership document. Section 6 of the Act—this is, before the amendment—says that that signing can take place either at a registry office or at approved premises. It sets out provisions for premises to be approved by somebody called the registration authority. The registration authority is the local authority. The Civil Partnership Act gives the local authority discretion over whether or not they register premises. Section 6 of the Act as originally passed says that civil partnerships cannot be registered at religious premises. Section 2(5) says—and this provision remains—that there should be no religious element in relation to any registration of a civil partnership.
The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Alli, which was supported by Parliament, did two things. First, it removed the prohibition on religious premises being used for civil partnerships. It retained the approval process, so that local authorities still approve whether premises—including religious premises—can be used for civil partnerships. Secondly, it added to the Civil Partnership Act words to the effect that for the avoidance of doubt, this does not compel any religious organisation to host a civil partnership ceremony if they do not want to.
That is the legal framework that we now have to look at. On the basis of that legal framework, my initial conclusion is that Parliament has made its intention absolutely clear: Parliament does not want to compel anybody to host registration of civil partnerships unless they want to.
I wondered what could conceivably be the argument that we have failed to express our intention clearly. I have read the two opinions that have been provided on this. I will do my best to summarise them fairly and set out why they are plainly wrong, although not lacking in bona fides. The first argument, which was advanced by Professor Mark Hill QC in his opinion dated 8 November, is that because the regulations say that—for the avoidance of doubt—the law does not compel anybody to host a civil partnership if they do not want to, the regulations saying it would not, alone, be enough. I completely agree with that. A regulation saying that hosting is not required would have no effect at all if the position was that the primary Act of Parliament did not get rid of the risk of any discriminatory legislation. However, the primary Act of Parliament does contain the prohibition, so it seems clear that Professor Hill is wrong about that.
I looked through Professor Hill’s opinion to find out what he said about the main provision in the Act, which appeared to be the critical provision. He said that Section 202, in referring to an Act, refers to the Civil Partnership Act and not to the Equality Act. I found that wholly unconvincing because the risk which the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, and the QCs identify is that there are provisions in the Equality Act, except for the purpose of this argument, that might be said to create a risk of some sort of action arising from the fact that you perform civil partnerships but not marriages, or the other way round. It seems to me beyond argument that the intention of Parliament must have been to get rid of that risk by putting in the very same Act the phrase,
“For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Act”,
gives rise to the risk of any compulsion. For Professor Hill’s opinion to be correct, you have to assume that this House and the Commons were unaware of the risk that the Equality Act could give rise to litigation when they put into the very same Act a statement that said that allowing churches to host civil partnerships does not lead to any church being compelled to host one. I cannot think of a judge who would give effect to such a nonsensical argument.
8 November was the date on which the advice of Professor Mark Hill was obtained. His advice came under some legal attack. Noble Lords will know that the legal advisers of the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of England, the Home Office and the Equality Commission have all said that there is no legal risk. Reinforcement was obtained from Mr Aidan O’Neill QC. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, for providing a copy of his advice. He gives a lot of ground in relation to it, recognising the difficulty that exists.
Protection of Freedoms Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I apologise in advance for a singularly technical group of amendments, but they need to be explained, if only so that Hansard can show to those who are not here why they have been put forward. They are inescapably dry, not to say turgid. This group contains Amendments 116 to 119, which amend Clause 37, and Amendment 132 which, via the Bill, makes four amendments to Section 22 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
Clause 37 incorporates new Section 23A into RIPA 2000, thus extending the cases when judicial approval has to be obtained for surveillance. It is a clause that is to be welcomed, as indeed is the Bill as a whole. Amendments 116 to 119 to new Section 23A are drafting ones, but having suffered from unnecessarily obscure wording during the original passage of RIPA, where I led for these Benches, it still remains one of the most complex statutes there is. I hope that the Committee will think that the amendments are worth while.
Amendments 117 and 118 delete what I think are superfluous phrases from Clause 37, the phrases being, “if any” in subsection (2) and “as the case may be”, which appears later in that subsection. Superfluity of language is to be avoided.
Amendments 116 to 119 to the same new clause rectify what seems to me to be a clear error of drafting. I may say that putting together this Bill must have taxed the drafting skills of parliamentary draftsmen to the limit, and one can hardly be surprised if there is the occasional wrinkle. Amendments 116 and 119 address a confusion repeated in new Section 23A. It distinguishes authorisations under Section 22(3), (3B) and (3F) of RIPA from notices required under Section 22(4) of RIPA. Broadly, authorisations allow surveillance to take place whether or not subject to judicial approval, whereas notices are mandatory and require postal or telecommunications operators to disclose data. Both authorisations and notices, which are distinguished throughout both RIPA and this Bill, can be renewed but they are renewable under different provisions in RIPA 2000 and in this Bill.
However, new Section 23A, set out in Clause 37 of the Bill, states in subsections (1) and (3) that the renewal of authorisations is derived from the same sections as the grant of the same. My Amendments 115 and 119 would rectify that by making it clear that renewals are made under subsections (5) and (6) of Section 23 of RIPA 2000. I am not now entirely sure, on rereading my amendments, that reference to Section 23(6) in Amendment 119 is appropriate, but the Minister will soon tell me. It is rather a lot to ask him to have a view on these arcane matters on the instant.
Amendment 122 contains four amendments to Section 22 of RIPA, which will be incorporated through this Bill. Subsection (1) of Section 22 of RIPA gives the context within which breaches of privacy so as to disclose communications data shall be permissible. At the moment, it says:
“This section applies where a person designated for the purposes of this Chapter believes that it is necessary on grounds falling within subsection (2) to obtain any communications data”.
Perhaps we tried when the Bill was passed to insert “reasonably” before “believes”. However, it is never too late and my first change to Section 22 would achieve just that. It seems obvious and follows the general tenor of this Bill that the belief of the designated person should be reasonably arrived at.
The third change in my Amendment 122 to subsection (5) of Section 22 again seems to me obvious: namely, that a lazy or perverse belief on the part of any official should not be sufficient to trigger the authorisations permissible under this important but necessary invasion of citizen privacy.
The second change of my four is to subsection (3) of Section 22 of RIPA 2000, which, as it stands, appears to allow a designated person in effect to delegate his or her power of authorisation to,
“persons holding offices, ranks or positions with the same relevant public authority as the designated person to engage in any conduct to which this Chapter applies”.
Unless my interpretation of this subsection in RIPA is misconceived, this less-than-clear wording would allow a designated person, whose designation has to be prescribed by the Secretary of State by order under Section 25, to delegate under Section 22(3) to persons in the same public authority of any office, rank or position inferior to that of the person making the delegation. Again, in common sense, that cannot be right; hence my insertion of “comparable” so that the delegation by an official under Section 22(3) must be to a person of comparable rank or position.
Lastly—noble Lords will be glad to know that I am coming to the end of this exciting oration—the fourth amendment in my Amendment 122 harks back to the earlier ones in this group. It would change subsection (4)(b) of Section 23 of RIPA by removing “authorise or”, since those words relate to authorisations whereas subsection (4)(b) is exclusively concerned with notices, which, as I have explained, are not permissive but mandatory, and require—that is the relevant word—this or that from the postal or telecommunications operator to which the requirement is addressed.
I am sorry to have taxed the patience of the Committee with these somewhat obscure points but I believe that these amendments would improve the Bill. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My noble friend may not like this question, but we are all family here, are we not? I absolutely agree that one needs a good supply of hot towels when reading this Act. Almost the last point he made was about his Amendment 122, which draws attention to Section 22(3), granting authorisation “for persons holding”—he would like to say comparable—“offices”. I read that as meaning that if you are designated to grant authorisation, you can allow a colleague, whether or not of the same seniority, to engage in the conduct that is referred to in Section 21. What that seems to be doing is saying that the designated person is in a position to grant authorisation, but it is perfectly okay to grant it within his own authority and that the conduct referred to in Section 21 does not mean delegating or granting authorisation to a third party. I am sorry if I have added to the need for hot towels.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I am not perfectly sure that I understood my noble friend’s point. I think she is talking about comparability.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
Yes. The reason I think that Section 22(3) of RIPA is wrong is that it does not make any requirement, as I see it, as to the rank or the position of the person to whom any delegation is made by the person originally designated under very carefully confined powers. As my noble friend pointed out, the definition of a designated person involves the Secretary of State making the designation, but when in Section 22(3) a delegation is in effect made, there is no such requirement. Where it refers to the same relevant public authority, that is fine. The person to whom delegation is made has got to be someone else in the same relevant public authority, but there is no requirement as to what rank that person is.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, my point was that I do not think this is about delegation of authority. I think it is about authorising the conduct which, were it to be proposed to be undertaken by someone in a different organisation, would require authorisation.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, my noble friend may be right. We disagree, as things stand, as to the meaning of Section 22(3) which, I think she will readily agree, is obscurely worded.
Baroness Hamwee
“(2A) Subsection (2) shall not apply to an authorisation granted in contemplation of any surveillance undertaken in pursuance of Part 3 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 or the Noise Act 1996 in respect of noise.”
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I think I need to take my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury aside to explain that whisky may dull the pain but caffeine keeps one on the job better.
Baroness Hamwee
I do speak for myself. I hope Amendment 124, at any rate in the drafting, is a little more straightforward. I declare an interest as one of a number of vice presidents of the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, from which this amendment comes. The amendment is concerned with environmental health and, in particular, with noise.
There has been, I understand, a long-running issue as to whether the investigation of noise nuisance requires covert surveillance. It is not the Home Office but in fact Defra which has mainly been concerned with this. Environmental health officers listen to noise in its context and record, one of the technical terms, anything listened to which brings—as I understand it since it is as the institute understands it—what it does within the meaning of Section 26(9) of RIPA. The Home Office takes the view that dealing with noise nuisance does not ordinarily require covert surveillance and so it is not caught by RIPA. Perhaps this amendment covers it if and when it does. Therefore this amendment is a probing one. The institute is generally in support of the need for judicial authorisation but so far as its work is concerned in this area there are some difficulties.
As this has been long running, it is able to anticipate the arguments that may be made against the need for such an amendment so I am going to start with the response and then its response to each of the Home Office’s likely responses. The first is that surveillance follows complaints so quickly that obtaining authorisation would not be reasonably practicable and that this excuses the need for authorisation. The institute says that the exception is when surveillance is undertaken as an “immediate response”, such as when a police officer sights a suspect in the street. There is always going to be a delay between the making of the noise complaint and its investigation. Secondly, if local authorities warn noise perpetrators that they may be monitored surveillance following that will not be covert and so will not be caught by RIPA.
Giving a warning causes delay. It rather undermines the duty on local authorities under the Environmental Protection Act to investigate complaints and quite obviously it would tend to be self-defeating. I dare say many noble Lords will have experienced complaint in different contexts to noise or what they may perceive as noise. I perceive muzak as noise. I have often asked for it to be turned down. It is turned down temporarily in a place of entertainment and up it goes again. Thirdly, if local authorities warn noise perpetrators that they may be monitored, again surveillance will not be covert and so not caught. I beg your pardon. I should have said that giving a warning takes the investigation out of RIPA and the measurement of sound pressure levels does not require authorisation. But there is no numerical standard for noise nuisance because environmental health officers have to judge the noise in context. Depending on what else is going on, the noise may or may not be intrusive, and for evidential purposes it is accepted practice to record it.
Fourthly, private information is unlikely to be obtained because perpetrators have no right of privacy to information that is audible outside the premises it is coming from. However, the institute draws attention to the definition in RIPA of “private information” by reference to its content as distinct from its audibility. Fifthly, surveillance carried out without authorisation is not necessarily unlawful. That is the case where there is an equivalent process of authorisation in another statute, but that does not apply in this case. Lastly, the whole thrust of this part of the Bill is the protection of magistrates’ approval against unjustified snooping by local authorities, and both I and the institute have sympathy with that. The Home Office has confirmed in Answer to a parliamentary Question in another place that there is no evidence to suggest that noise investigations are being carried out inappropriately by local authorities. We have read of instances where local authorities have rather overstepped the mark in their use of the powers, but this is not one of those examples.
In the hope that I have not taken too much of the Minister’s speech in anticipation of the answer, I beg to move.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her introduction to the amendment, and indeed she has anticipated quite a lot of what I will say in response. None the less, there are some things that are worth emphasising, and I hope that in doing so I can give her some assurances. I certainly agree that noise nuisance is something that is clearly intolerable to the person experiencing it and that in many instances the noise under investigation may occur at night, so anyone who is subject to that kind of disturbance feels strongly about the situation they find themselves in and wants any action to deal with it to be rapid. However, Amendment 124 is unnecessary because the sort of noise we are talking about, that which causes disturbance and affects people’s lives, is not caught by RIPA.
Before I go on to cover some of the topics raised by my noble friend, let me say that Home Office officials have already met representatives of the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health and of Defra to discuss these points. We have said that we shall work with them on revising the RIPA code of practice on covert surveillance in order to make it clear that authorisation under RIPA is unlikely to be necessary for noise abatement reasons. Surveillance conducted and governed under RIPA relates to private information only. It requires that when public authorities obtain private information covertly, they do so only when it is necessary and proportionate, in line with our right to privacy. However, the privacy implications of someone making a loud noise will usually be such that RIPA is not engaged. Loud machinery, alarms or music, for instance, are not private information, and if the noise emanating from someone’s house because of, say, an argument is so loud that it can be heard in the street outside or the adjoining property, it is highly questionable whether the people concerned have a realistic expectation of privacy. If the noise involves violent or threatening behaviour, then it would always be appropriate to call for the police.
If the council’s policy is to serve an abatement notice warning that monitoring may be carried out, then that monitoring cannot be deemed to be covert in nature, which my noble friend has already anticipated. In these scenarios, a RIPA authorisation would not be required. This is made clear in the RIPA covert surveillance code of practice; that code has statutory force.
The only instance where a RIPA authorisation definitely would be required is where a local authority noise monitoring device was calibrated to boost the signal so as to record conversations which could not be heard outside the property with the naked ear. However, this would constitute intrusive surveillance and RIPA does not permit local authorities to do this. Most people would agree that this would be an unwarranted breach of someone’s privacy. I therefore maintain that local authority noise monitoring would not normally require to be authorised under RIPA; that this is already made clear in RIPA; and that it therefore would not be subject to prior magistrate approval. However, as I say, we are meeting with the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health and Defra to look at the code of practice. Before I ask my noble friend to consider withdrawing her amendment, I wish to reinforce the Government’s view that noise disturbance of the kind she describes is an important matter. However, I do not think that her amendment is necessary.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I agree that very often in the sort of situation about which the noble Baroness and I are talking, any conversations which take place are not very edifying or instructive—“indiscreet” might be the term for them. I live fairly near a pub so that is why I make that comment. I have learnt a lot of bad language over the years as I have heard it in the very late hours.
I welcome what the noble Baroness says about the possible revision to the code of practice, but I am concerned that if the legislation requires authorisation the code of practice cannot undo that requirement. However, I will read what she has said and discuss it with the institute. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
“Matters subject to legal privilegeInvestigatory powers: legal privilege
(1) In section 5 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (interception with a warrant), after subsection (6) insert—
“(7) But an interception warrant does not authorise conduct undertaken for the purpose of doing anything in relation to—
(a) a communication, insofar as the communication consists of matters subject to legal privilege;(b) communications data, insofar as the data relate to the communication of matters subject to legal privilege. (8) In subsection (7), “matters subject to legal privilege” means matters to which section 98(2), (3) or (4) of the Police Act 1997 applies, but does not include a communication made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose.
(9) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the determination (on an application for an interception warrant or otherwise) of the question whether, in any case, a communication is made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose.
(10) A code of practice issued under section 71 may in particular contain provision about—
(a) the steps to be taken to minimise the risk of conduct undertaken pursuant to an interception warrant resulting in accidental acquisition of a communication, or communications data, falling within subsection (7);(b) the steps to be taken if it appears that such conduct has accidentally resulted in acquisition of such a communication or data.”(2) In section 22 of that Act (obtaining and disclosing communications data), after subsection (9) insert—
“(10) An authorisation or notice under this section does not authorise or require anything to be done for the purpose of obtaining or disclosing communications data relating to the communication of matters subject to legal privilege.
(11) In subsection (10), “matters subject to legal privilege” means matters to which section 98(2), (3) or (4) of the Police Act 1997 applies, but does not include a communication made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose.
(12) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the determination (on an application for an authorisation or otherwise) of the question whether, in any case, a communication is made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose.
(13) A code of practice issued under section 71 may in particular contain provision about—
(a) the steps to be taken to minimise the risk of accidentally obtaining or disclosing communications data falling within subsection (10) in the course of anything done under this section;(b) the steps to be taken if it appears that anything done under this section has accidentally resulted in such data being obtained or disclosed.”(3) In section 27 of that Act (authorised surveillance and human intelligence sources), after subsection (4) insert—
“(5) An authorisation under section 28 or 32 does not authorise surveillance for the purpose of obtaining information about—
(a) anything taking place on so much of any premises as is in use for the purpose of legal consultations, or(b) matters subject to legal privilege.(6) An authorisation under section 29 does not authorise any activities involving conduct of a covert human intelligence source, or the use of such a source, for the purpose of—
(a) obtaining matters subject to legal privilege,(b) providing access to any matters subject to legal privilege to another person, or(c) disclosing matters subject to legal privilege.(7) In subsection (5), “legal consultation” means—
(a) a consultation between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client, or(b) a consultation between a professional legal adviser or his client or any such representative and any other person made in connection with or in contemplation of legal proceedings and for the purpose of such proceedings,except in so far as the consultation consists of anything done with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose.(8) In subsections (5) and (6), “matters subject to legal privilege” means matters to which section 98(2), (3) or (4) of the Police Act 1997 applies, but does not include anything done with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose.
(9) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the determination (on an application for an authorisation or otherwise) of the question whether, for the purpose of subsection (7) or (8), anything is done with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose.
(10) A code of practice issued under section 71 may in particular contain provision about—
(a) the steps to be taken to minimise the risk of conduct undertaken in reliance on this Part accidentally resulting in information of a kind mentioned in subsection (5) being obtained or in any of the things mentioned in subsection (6)(a), (b) or (c) being done;(b) the steps to be taken if it appears that such conduct has accidentally resulted in such information being obtained or such things being done.””
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, this amendment was suggested to me and drafted by the Bar Council. Although it looks long and a bit daunting, I hope the Committee will understand that the point which it addresses concerns a simple point of principle, and the practice of that principle. The principle is the need to protect legal professional privilege. The Bar Council is seriously concerned that RIPA violates legal professional privilege by permitting authorities secretly to obtain information about privileged communications, in particular private meetings and other communications between a lawyer and a client. I was pleased to be asked to table this amendment as I feel very strongly that a lawyer and his client should be able to speak freely, and that the lawyer should be able to take instructions without fear of them being listened to.
The right of someone in custody to a private consultation with a lawyer is expressly protected by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The importance of an accused person being able to confer with his lawyer in private has also been emphasised in numerous cases under the ECHR. Indeed, it has been said that it is a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice rests.
The need for reform of RIPA was revealed by a case in 2009, In Re McE, when the House of Lords held that Part II of RIPA permits the covert surveillance of meetings between defendants and their lawyers. Noble Lords will be aware of recent high-profile cases involving CHIS—covert human intelligence sources— that have emphasised the need for privilege to be protected expressly; for example, the case of the undercover police officers, PC Mark Kennedy and DC Jim Boyling, infiltrating protest groups pursuant to RIPA authorisations. The Government’s partial response to In Re McE was to make two orders and two codes of practice under powers contained in the Act, one relating to directed surveillance and the other to covert human intelligence sources, which altered the authorisation procedures, but these do not address the fundamental problem.
We have already referred to the complexity of RIPA. The new clause has been carefully drafted—I am happy to say not by me—to ensure that covert powers of investigation cannot be used to target legally privileged information, while at the same time ensuring that privilege is not abused for a criminal purpose and that the regime caters for a position where it turns out that the privileged material has been acquired accidentally. The provisions would prevent the targeting of legally privileged material. The draft clause uses the code of conduct as a vehicle for guidance on minimising the risk of accidentally obtaining privileged material.
What I understand is called in the trade the “iniquity exception” has been reduced in scope. The Police Act 1997 takes matters out of privilege if the item or communication is,
“in the possession of a person who is not entitled to possession of them”
or is held or made,
“with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose”.
The Bar Council points out that the first of these exceptions would be counterproductive but it has reduced the scope rather than simply taking out the exception, which would perpetuate the problem that it is seeking to deal with. The wording in subsection (6) of the draft clause defining what cannot be targeted by a CHIS is borrowed directly from one of the 2010 orders made following the case to which I referred.
The provision about surveillance is based on evidence from solicitors that legal consultation involving protests or other multiple-defendant situations often take place in private premises—noble Lords will remember that one of the recent examples was of protesters at a power station whose group had been infiltrated by a police officer—and this amendment covers premises in so far as they are used for legal consultations. The other of the 2010 orders to which I have referred makes specific provision for targeting any place in use for legal consultations—in other words, it limits the premises and therefore limits the scope of the order. The definition of legal consultations that has been used is, however, very similar to that used in the order that is already in force.
It is a long amendment but, as I say, at the heart of it is a simple but very important proposition. I beg to move.
Lord Scott of Foscote
My Lords, I am in general sympathy with the objective behind this amendment but have some anxieties about the effect of subsections (9) and (12), which mirror one another in similar language. They seem to say that the question of whether a communication has been made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose is to be determined in accordance with regulations or provisions made by the Secretary of State. Whether a particular communication is protected by privilege or that privilege is forfeited because the purpose of the communication was to further a criminal purpose is the sort of issue that could easily come up in legal proceedings before an ordinary court. On this notion that the Secretary of State could pre-empt that, I note the language,
“make provision for the determination (on an application for an”—
interception warrant, which I can understand—
“or otherwise)”.
That “or otherwise” seems to carry the power right through to legal proceedings where the question of privilege is an issue. I would like some elucidation on the intention behind these two subsections.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I will endeavour to respond as comprehensively as I can to the issues raised in this short debate. I appreciate the concerns raised by the Bar Council but your Lordships will understand that no one can regard themselves as beyond the law or immune from investigation or prosecution. Nevertheless, RIPA recognises the special relationship between a lawyer and client, and puts in place special protections for any covert obtaining of material subject to legal and professional privilege.
RIPA already limits obtaining legally privileged material to intelligence and law enforcement agencies investigating serious crime or acting in the interests of national security. In each case, whether it is interception or surveillance, internal authorisation is by senior official—for instance, the director-general of the Security Service or a chief constable. In addition, and crucially, this is then subject to external independent approval, either by the Secretary of State or a surveillance commissioner, before any covert action can be taken.
The RIPA codes of practice, which have statutory force, provide further safeguards. The interception code makes it clear that where communications which include legally privileged communications have been intercepted and retained, or where the subject of the interception is to be a lawyer, the matter should be reported to the Interception of Communications Commissioner during his inspections and the material be made available to him, if requested.
In addition to safeguards governing the handling and retention of intercept material as provided for in Section 15 of the Act, caseworkers who examine intercepted communications should be alert to any intercept material which may be subject to legal privilege. Where there is doubt as to whether the communications are subject to legal privilege, advice should be sought from a legal adviser within the intercepting agency. Similar advice should also be sought where there is doubt over whether communications are not subject to legal privilege due to the “in furtherance of a criminal purpose” exception. The covert surveillance and covert human intelligence source codes make it clear that such independent external approvals will be granted only where there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make the authorisation necessary—for instance, where there is a threat to life or limb or to national security.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, have already made reference to the McE case. In 2009, the former Judicial Committee of your Lordships’ House ruled in that case that RIPA could be used to authorise the covert surveillance of legally privileged consultations but that this needed to be subject to an enhanced approval process. The enhanced RIPA safeguards were tested in the case of RA v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland where the High Court of Northern Ireland ruled that the RIPA regime was lawful and provided sufficient safeguards against abuse. To be clear, those new safeguards have been tested in a court of law and were found to be robust.
In reference to the comments made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, about the amendment put forward by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I will of course leave my noble friend to respond to him. Given these existing stringent limitations and safeguards on public authorities obtaining legally privileged material under RIPA, and the fact they have been tested in court, as I have said, and have been found to be robust, I would suggest to my noble friend that this amendment is unnecessary and I invite her to withdraw it.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, this being Grand Committee, of course I will withdraw the amendment. The noble Baroness’s reference to the role of the commissioner and some other comments seem to be steps taken to deal with the issue after the horse has bolted. But I will read her comments carefully. The point that no one is immune from prosecution is not something with which I seek to argue. It is a parallel but different point.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, make a very interesting point about regulations made by the Secretary of State. I did not mean to disclaim responsibility for drafting the amendment; I meant to give credit to others. But I did not draft it and I do not think that it would be right for me to attempt to respond in any detail at this point. The noble and learned Lord set me an interesting dilemma and I shall think about it after today’s Committee Sitting to consider how one might address it.
I do not believe that the Bar Council would have gone to the effort of dealing with a matter about which the current Lord Chief Justice has himself expressed disquiet had it felt that an amendment was not necessary, so I will be talking to the council between now and the next stage. Other noble Lords have asked if there might be a meeting to discuss a number of issues, and this is one that will be particularly amenable to some further discussion, if that is possible. I do want to imply anything as regards the noble Baroness, but for myself this is pretty much above my pay grade. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Elected Local Policing Bodies (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2011
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I am sure that we are all very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Henley, for his explanation of the two statutory instruments that we are debating together this afternoon. As he rightly said, it is only a few weeks ago since we finished proceedings on the Government’s misguided proposals to establish elected police commissioners, but the Opposition will take a constructive approach to these regulations and the many others that are due to come to your Lordships’ House over the next few weeks and months.
As the noble Lord suggested, the regulations under consideration have been developed to a very tight timetable to enable London to transfer early from the current Metropolitan Police Authority to the new Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. The problem is that, because of the rush, we are not being allowed sufficient time or opportunity to explore the implications of the regulations for the rest of England and Wales before we deal with the issue in London. Can the noble Lord give me some idea of the timetable for all the other regulations that will be produced? There is some hint that there is a less than cohesive approach to doing this. For instance, while a shadow strategic policing requirement and protocol have been laid, the finance code has not—unless that has been done very recently. That makes it difficult to understand the balance of powers between the chief officer, the PCC and the panel because we do not have a complete picture.
Similarly the regulations on PCC complaints have been laid but the regulations on panels have not. Again, that makes it difficult to understand how the complaints process will work, for instance, in relation to the powers of the panel to suspend PCCs. It would be helpful if the noble Lord, either here or perhaps in correspondence, could set out the programme that the department is working to so that Parliament can consider the many statutory instruments that will have to be laid.
There are three matters missing from the regulations that I wish to put to the noble Lord. The first is the absence of any code of conduct or other means of defining what acceptable behaviour is and is not in non-criminal complaints that are subject to informal resolution. The second is the absence of any sanctions or similar powers for the panel in dealing with PCCs that misbehaved. The third is the absence of any provisions dealing with powers of the panel to suspend PCCs or the process that it should follow. I should be grateful if the noble Lord would comment on that.
I have, of course, discussed this with the Association of Police Authorities, which is worried about the lack of clarity with regard to both acceptable standards of behaviour and the panel’s power in relation to informal resolution. That might result in complainants believing that it is better to frame their complaints in criminal terms in order to ensure that they are dealt with satisfactorily. The example that has been given to me is rude behaviour by the PCC, and we have to reflect that this is a political officeholder. Rude behaviour is not unknown from such political office holders—not, of course, the noble Lord himself, who is always an example of chivalry, gentleness and kindness, but there are politicians who do not have the noble Lord’s high standards.
Taking the example of rude behaviour, the risk for the APA is that this might be framed as harassment, conflict of interest or fraud in order to ensure that it is dealt with by the IPCC, whose role is much clearer under these regulations, and that there is a proper resolution with meaningful sanctions, in contrast to it being dealt with under informal resolution. This is an important point on which the noble Lord might be able to reassure me. Clearly, however dubious I am about the elected police commissioners, one does not want a lot of complaints being made in an unscrupulous way, which would actually inhibit the police and crime commissioners in the course of their duty. I would certainly be worried if there was a temptation by complainants to, in a sense, upgrade their complaint in order for it to be dealt with by the IPCC because there is a lack of clarity about how the informal resolution process might work.
We then come to the issue of what, if anything, a panel can do under the informal resolution proposal to ensure that a PCC makes reparation for bad behaviour. If the panel has no powers in that respect, what happens when a police and crime commissioner rejects a means of reparation that the panel has suggested? What recourse does a complainant then have to ensure that the matter is resolved to his or her satisfaction? Again, I put it to the noble Lord that, if the complainant is dissatisfied, one of their options might be to have recourse to the media. The risk of that, I suppose, is that publicity will have an adverse impact on public trust in policing.
The noble Lord will be aware that one of my concerns about the whole notion of elected police commissioners is that it will reduce public confidence. Clearly we can argue about that, and I am very tempted to invite the noble Lord to have another debate about the principle, but I will not do that. However, Parliament having enacted the legislation, it is important that we work together to make it as effective as possible. I am concerned that, if the public do not have confidence in the informal resolution process, as I have said, either they will upgrade complaints in the future or the process will be discredited, and you may well find that the position of the PCC is also discredited. So I think that this is worth looking at.
Some other, rather more technical issues have been raised. Is there not a need for regulations to state explicitly that a force cannot be asked to undertake the investigation of a PCC if he or she is the PCC for that force or connected to that force through collaboration, agreement or close association? It is probably implicit in paragraph 19(3)(b) but would there be argument over how “impartially” should be interpreted?
I understand the logic of appointing the PCC’s chief executive as monitoring officer to the panel—covered in paragraph 7—to achieve national consistency, particularly in Wales where panels will not be part of local government and so will not have automatic access to monitoring officers in local authorities. Is there a risk of putting that chief executive in a difficult situation? Remember the concept of corporate sole means that the employer of the chief executive is the PCC himself or herself against whom a complaint is being made. Is there not a risk that the monitoring officer will not be able to effectively carry out that duty?
The panels will be asked to judge whether a complaint is serious or not. I assume that means that they will look to the monitoring officer for advice. Again, I point out to the noble Lord that there will be a delicate relationship between the role of the monitoring officer’s chief executive and the PCC who is their direct and only sole employer. It is rather different in corporate set-ups where the company secretary or board secretary would probably carry out that role. It is rather different if it is the chief executive. Might the Government be prepared to look at that, in terms of advice on how it might work in practice?
Paragraph 15(3)(a) raises some concerns. Complaints brought by employees to the PCC cannot be dealt with through these regulations where they concern a PCC’s conduct only towards his or her staff. I well understand that there needs to be provision within employment procedures for handling much of this through established grievance procedures but might there be a possibility that that will not address the situation where an employee is accusing, say, a PCC of a criminal complaint such as harassment? What, for instance, would happen in the case of alleged harassment?
What about joint complaints to the chief constable and deputy or assistant chief constable? With the chief constable becoming the appropriate authority for chief officer complaints, there is concern among chief authorities about the potential situation where a joint complaint has been made against the chief constable and someone in the chief officer team. This could result in a chief constable effectively investigating their own complaint. That might strike at public confidence. The question here is whether that should then give the PCC locus in relation to any less senior officer. I would be grateful for some clarification on that.
Are there enough checks and balances around the PCC’s ability to dismiss the chief officer? Of course, we have discussed this in our debate on the Bill. It is worth making the point that PCCs will have to take account of general law considerations when exercising their powers to dismiss a chief constable. It is not a matter for the regulations but it might be one for the guidance that I hope will be given to PCCs on this matter. Indeed, I would strongly advise the Minister’s department to look seriously at the advice and training or development to be given to PCCs on these matters. On that, I assume that there will be some development programmes for the newly elected PCCs. I would certainly put that proposal forward to be considered.
Turning to the fees regulations, these look straightforward. The opportunity to debate the issue of working dogs’ tails with the noble Lord, with his vast experience of such matters, and with his fellow Defra Ministers from past years would be invigorating, but I shall desist. However, I want to ask him about the financial code. A draft code has clearly been circulated round the usual bodies that comment on police matters. My understanding is that a final agreed version is not yet available, but that the work on the drafting has identified a number of challenges. The real issue here is the introduction of two corporates sole, the chief constable and the police and crime commissioner. The audit and all financial matters are unduly and unnecessarily complicated because of that structure. If there is any information that the noble Lord could give me, I would be grateful.
Baroness Hamwee
Like the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, I resist entering into a debate on working dogs’ tails, although it was the very point that I marked when I first read the regulations. I will not repeat questions that he asked that arise from concerns expressed by the Association of Police Authorities, save about a couple of matters, one of which is to ask about updated information on what I would describe as interlocking regulations; they may not formally interlock, but in practical terms they will.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, talked about politics being played with in complaints. It is not always the subject of a complaint who has played politics; quite often the complainant uses procedures to play politics.
It is not directly a subject of the statutory instruments, but closely related is the proposed funding of police and crime panels. I have heard concerns that the funding will be very low indeed, only enough for one member of staff and perhaps four meetings a year. These regulations are, one hopes, only a small part of the remit of the police and crime panels, which need to be funded—not extravagantly, but adequately and appropriately. The legislation gives them a wider remit than just complaints.
Thinking about that made me wonder whether that was why, in the consultation process, it was proposed that the police and crime panel should be able to delegate to the chief executive of the police and crime commissioner; the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has already referred to that. I am a bit uneasy, not because of the point about impartiality or objectivity which the APA has raised, but because it seems to confuse the roles of the two entities.
Nor am I immediately convinced about using the local code of conduct in the case of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime and the deputy if the deputy is an Assembly Member, because of their own role in creating that local code. That raises some quite interesting issues. We do not really know where we are with codes and local government yet. I asked one of my colleagues who is still a councillor, and he says that a lot of consultation is going on, but of course these are to be local decisions, even if local authorities adopt the same or a similar standard.
I also want to ask about Regulation 26(4) of the complaints and misconduct regulations; this is a detail, I know.
I was interested that the IPCC will be able to take a view as to whether what is a possible criminal offence is “appropriate”—that is the word—to be considered by the Director of Public Prosecutions. I am sorry that I gave the Minister so very little notice of this matter. As I have said to him, I only managed to look at these regulations at lunchtime. But it seems rather odd to put that power in the hands of the IPCC.
I am interested that the regulations modify Section 22 of the 2002 Act. They seem to do little more than substitute the dramatis personae. As now, the Secretary of State’s approval will be required for commission guidance but, as far as I can see, the power for the Secretary of State herself to issue guidance is new. It may be that the 2011 Act has allowed for this. I would just pause on regulations adding that right for the Secretary of State—not that you could ever stop a Secretary of State issuing guidance—but it might affect the status of the guidance. I do not know whether the Minister will be able to answer my question, which, in effect, is: is there a substantive change brought about in this by the regulations?
Lord Henley
My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for making clear that they do not want me to go any further on working dogs’ tails and we will leave that for another day. Perhaps I may start by making a brief reference to my noble friend Lady Browning who, after all, took the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act through Parliament. She completed that before she stood down, at which point I moved to the Home Office, and we are very grateful to her for all that she did. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is mistaken in describing that Act, which is now on the statute book, as being misguided. As I have made clear, it is now a done deal and Parliament, as I have said, has spoken.
The noble Lord also complained about the rush that is taking place. I do not believe that there is a rush. Obviously, things are marginally tighter for London where things happen faster than in the rest of the country, but the rest of the country has until 22 November 2012. I am sure that it—and the Met—will cope. Certainly, we have had no expressions of concern from the Met about that.
The noble Lord also asked about training programmes and what we are going to do to get the PCCs into the right position for when they are set up, which is obviously of very great concern to my right honourable friend, Nick Herbert, the Minister with responsibility for policing and crime. He chairs a transition board, which includes all the key parties, including the chief executives of police authorities. I assure the noble Lord that everyone involved will be included. My right honourable friend has got the message and he is making sure that something effective will be set up and that we have an efficient transition.
The noble Lord was also worried about the number of further instruments that will be needed to set up these regulations. I referred to a jigsaw and this is just a part of it. Not all of what is coming through will be statutory instruments that will need to go through this House, although some will be. In order to get the detail right, it would probably be best if I wrote to the noble Lord to give him a timetable to assist him in this matter.
He also spoke about the absence of any code of conduct, which was also raised by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I must make absolutely clear that these bodies will be subject, as elected bodies, to all the noble principles by which we abide. That was clearly set out in the protocol. It is also obvious that they will possibly wish to establish certain locally designed meaningful codes of conduct which they think are appropriate for them. Again, that deals with one of the concerns of my noble friend.
The noble Lord was worried about the absence of any sanctions for dealing with police and crime commissioners. What he must remember is that they are democratically elected bodies. Ultimately, that is the sanction. That is why we brought them in and why we think they will do a good job. They will conduct their business in public, so transparency will be a key tool in how the public view them. I think that this will be a great improvement on the system we have at the moment.
Accession (Immigration and Worker Authorisation) (Amendment) Regulations 2011
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I am sure that the Grand Committee is grateful to the noble Lord for his extensive introduction to these regulations. I was particularly interested in the advice that he read out from the Migration Advisory Committee. He will be aware that when the extension was agreed beyond January 2009, the committee reported in a similar vein at that time and said the impact of lifting the restrictions would be small but that the risks to the labour market were mainly on the downside. That led it to recommend a cautious approach. I assume that the committee is continuing that advice on the basis of that same philosophy.
I take the point the noble Lord made that it is difficult to attach facts and figures to this measure but does he accept the committee’s assessment of its impact? I would be interested to know whether he can put any figure at all on the likely impact of extending the measure by a further two years. He will know that the Merits Committee rather took the Government to task as regards the laying of the regulations and made the point that they have had rather a long time to consider the extension but, by leaving it to the last moment, it will have to be put in place. In a sense we are legitimising that through the current process. The Merits Committee would have preferred the policy to have been agreed somewhat earlier, which would have allowed the regulations to be laid before Parliament in draft and be subject to approval by resolution of each House. Will the noble Lord comment on that? What is his response to the Merits Committee?
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, on the point about the timing of the measure, is the Minister satisfied that individuals and employers will not experience any practical problems as a result of that? I cannot quite get my head round what practical steps need to be taken. Is it the case that an application has to be made for a new accession work authorisation document and that there may be individuals—this goes to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about numbers—who might have expected that they could continue to work for the same employer in this country beyond the end of this year but will, in effect, be given a matter of a very few working days to apply for the authorisation? Perhaps it is not as few days as from now until the end of December as the regulations were made—oh no, the regulations come into force on 30 December. I am getting very confused about the dates. I suppose that the warning was there for the employers but the regulations will not be made until the day before they need to be in formal terms, but there may be practical implications for individuals caught up with this. I hope that I have made myself at least moderately clear. The Minister is nodding, so I am glad about that.
In applying the tests, which the Minister has told the Grand Committee are about both the labour market and skills, will there be any changes from those that have been applied? My other question was about other EU member states. The Minister told us what some states are doing, so are we to understand that, in effect, the other member states are all maintaining their own status quo apart from Spain, which is reimposing restrictions, so that there is no other change across the European Union? The point has already been made that this cannot be looked at in isolation.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for referring to the Migration Advisory Committee and its work, on which we are very dependent. He then asked me to speculate how many individuals might come in if we did not seek this further two-year derogation. I do not think that it would be helpful to try to do so. I offer as a little warning some advice to the noble Lord. He might remember that the Government, of which he was a member when Poland and other countries acceded to the European Union, did not seek any derogation on that occasion. It was suggested that the numbers coming here would be very small indeed. I forget the figure, but as we saw, the numbers coming in were exceeded by a matter of 10 or a hundredfold. That is why the noble Lord’s Government were very keen in 2006, with the further accession of Romania and Bulgaria, to make sure that we did have proper controls on the numbers coming in. We obtained that derogation, which other countries also obtained, for five years that could then be extended for a further two years. I shall not speculate on the numbers because, as the noble Lord will remember, it is very easy to get them wrong and to do so by a factor of—let us say, X, but a big factor.
The noble Lord then went on to complain about the timing and mentioned the Merits Committee. I appreciate that we received some criticism, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee also mentioned those problems. I can say that I think many people will have known that this was likely to happen as we had the ability to extend the five years by two years, as long as we did so by the end of this year. We issued this SI on 23 November, which, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee knows, does not come into effect until the end of the year. The Migration Advisory Committee published its report somewhat earlier in the month so we all knew that it was coming, and most employers knew that it was coming. My noble friend had some concerns about the difficulties that some employers may have but I can assure her that any individual who is working for an existing employer will not require fresh authorisation if he stays with that employer. Obviously, there will be a difference if he moves. There will be no changes to the criteria for granting authorisation at all.
The final point was about other member states. Obviously, it is very important to look at what other member states do because that will affect how many people come in. As the noble Lord will remember, when Poland and others were coming into the EU, other member states sought a derogation for a number of years. We did not and that is probably one of the reasons why a very large number came here. On this occasion things have happened differently, and as I mentioned in my opening remarks, Germany and the Netherlands are both seeking a derogation and Spain seeks to extend its derogation. Different things are happening in different countries of Europe, which is a matter for them to decide. We have made our decision based on the advice from the Migration Advisory Committee, which took into account what was happening in other countries in Europe. I shall write to my noble friend to give further details of what other countries are doing if she would like that. The important thing is that we took their actions into account in our decision.
Police: Officer Numbers
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Henley
The noble Lord is right to draw attention to the specialist work done by individual police forces. It is obviously a matter for each individual police force and the police authority to decide on the appropriate priorities. Certainly within the Home Office, we would want to encourage them to continue with that work.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I apologise to the House for missing the start of the Question. I had forgotten that Prayers were earlier today.
Police officers tend to retire at a relatively early age. For their own satisfaction, as well as thinking of the public purse, can the Minister say anything about continuing to make use of their expertise and experience, which is the product of both years and public investment?
Lord Henley
My Lords, obviously the training of an individual policeman is a very expensive process. We want to get maximum use of all policemen for as long as possible. Your Lordships will have noticed that some of the policemen who operate around this House tend to be at the older end of the spectrum. We are grateful for their expertise in providing protection for this House. Perhaps, as my noble friend Lord McNally implies from a sedentary position, they all look rather young to us. However, we do want to get as much use as possible out of all those policemen who have trained at such considerable public expense.
Protection of Freedoms Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I have Amendment 91 in this group, which is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Walmsley. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has obviously not been subject to Black Rod’s little talk about security in this place, which urges us all to wear our passes at all times—which I acknowledge I am not at this moment—rather than rely on people knowing who we are.
Lord Lucas
My Lords, I know that we are all supposed to do that, but I am sure that the noble Baroness has seen, as I have, groups of guests wandering around with unidentifiable passes and noble Lords with their passes on back to front so that you cannot see even whether they are a Lord let alone who they are. Eyeball recognition by the doorkeepers is much more reliable and efficient, and is probably cheaper at the end of the day.
Baroness Hamwee
Perhaps I had better not continue down this route—I could, but it would take more time than the Committee might like to devote to it.
Another point on which I am perhaps not with the noble Lord is that every school knows what every child is up to all the time—I wish that were so. I am sure that we are going to hear from the Minister about the balance between privacy rights and sensible use of technology—I hope that we are not going to hear about feed-in tariffs, which seemed to stretch the analogy a bit far.
The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, did not know, on reflection, what his Amendment 85 was about. I have been in that situation as well, but that is not so on this amendment, against which I wrote “silence equals assent”—I think that it is the difference between opt-in and opt-out.
Before I come to the detail of my amendment, I wish to pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about the technology being used in schools not being as sophisticated, if I can use that term, as technology used in other contexts. Can the Minister say how reliable the equipment is? That was the immediate question I had in response to the noble Lord’s comment.
My amendment does not contradict any of the other amendments that have been spoken to and is not inconsistent with the Bill. It provides that the relevant authorities, schools, academies and FE colleges should tell parents and children of their rights to refuse consent at least once in every academic year—in other words, it is about informed consent. The suggestion comes from the Children’s Rights Alliance for England, which supports the provisions in the Bill for ensuring that the institutions cannot process biometric data if consent is refused. I know that my noble friend will say a word about the convention rights.
I have been told by the Children’s Rights Alliance about research which shows that most children using these systems have not considered how long their fingerprints would be held for and they generally were not concerned. My response to that is that of course they would not—they are children and they do not necessarily think through all the implications of what they are being asked to agree to. Therefore explaining exactly what the subject matter is, both to them and their parents, is important. Other research—again, I am not surprised about this—shows that when schools have introduced a biometric system they have emphasised the benefits and not talked about the problems. All of this is natural human reaction.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred to the report of the Information Commissioner in 2008. The Information Commissioner made it clear that schools which collect data must be aware that children are data subjects and that they,
“should in the first instance be informed and consulted about the use of their personal data”.
This being the first principle of the Data Protection Act, he went on to say that,
“Fairness requires that schools ensure that pupils are informed about and understand the purpose for which their personal data is being processed”.
Our amendment would require that they are in a position to give consent—or, indeed, withhold it—but on an informed basis.
The Earl of Erroll
My Lords, this is an area which I have been thinking and worrying about because of the practicalities of it all. The part about children and schools is a well meaning and well intentioned effort to introduce legislation to make sure that children’s privacy is not breached and that no information is kept on them which could make things difficult for them in later life. It is very important that we should not do that.
However, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, we could try to make sure that the biometric information that is used for administrative purposes is not kept to evidential standards. In other words, the information could not be used in courts; it could not be linked up with the police computer; it could not be linked up elsewhere. That could be done simply by making sure that it is kept to a standard which is good enough to identify people for administrative purposes in populations of a few thousand, but once you raise it up to a national scale it does not work. For instance, under EU directives there have to be 13 matching points for a fingerprint to be admissible in evidence in court—that is, 13 out of 18. If only 10 or 11 were kept, which is probably quite sufficient for the school’s purposes, the information could never be linked with the main national databases. That might well be a way round it. That is contained within this group of amendments.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the amendment simply provides for the turnover of pupils generally on an annual basis. I certainly did not intend it to be reworded every year. Information goes out from schools frequently on an annual basis. Sometimes, it sits in the bottom of a child’s bag.
While I am on my feet, the noble Earl may be comforted if the Minister can confirm that, for the purposes of these provisions, writing includes e-mails and other forms of electronic communication, which I suspect it does.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
In the interests of time, I confirm that that is correct.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I think this is what lawyers refer to as a question of fact and degree. If the system were, as my noble friend puts it, enhanced considerably and that involved a real change, then there would have to be further approval from the parents and children concerned. If it were a minor or technical change, I think that would not be the case. I shall leave it there, as it is a question of fact and degree as to whether there has been a proper change. I am in the hands of my noble friend Lord Lucas, but I hope that with those explanations of the various amendments he will feel able to withdraw his amendment. I think this debate has been very useful. We might not all agree totally but, as always, it is a question of getting the balance right on these matters, and I hope we have got it more or less right.
Baroness Hamwee
Am I right in understanding—and I apologise if this sounds as if I am trying to put words into the Minister’s mouth—that his concern is the bureaucratic provision of a requirement to make information available every year but he accepts that consent under these clauses would not properly be given unless the parent or child, as the case may be, is properly informed?
Lord Henley
Parents and children, to the extent appropriate for the child’s age, must be informed in the appropriate manner, and we want to get that right. We just do not think it needs to happen every year. If, as my noble friend Lady Walmsley said, there were substantive changes to what was being proposed, then further consent would be required, but we do not have to do that each and every year. Once should be enough for the duration of that child’s journey through that school.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 101, and there are other amendments in this group. My amendments are quite simple. They are probing amendments. Clause 29(3) provides that provision may, in particular, be made in the code about standards applicable to persons using systems or processing information. When I read that, I hesitated and wondered what was meant by “standards” in this context. My amendment proposes inserting a reference to operational practices because it seems to me that they are relevant, rather than the people who are using or maintaining the systems as individuals. I beg to move Amendment 100 in order to help me understand the clause a little better.
Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 102, 106 and 112A. I thank the noble Lord for ensuring that the results of the first consultation on the proposed CCTV code of practice were published before the Committee stage in order to ensure proper scrutiny. The opposition amendments in this group seek to probe the Government’s thinking in this area and to tease out more detail of the shape of the final code now that they have reflected on the results of the consultation.
On Amendment 102, we are concerned that any future code should not force local authorities and police forces into disclosing the location of cameras. The consultation notes that some respondents,
“considered that there ought to be public access to a full list of camera locations and data retention periods”.
I note that the Government, although not committing to such a view, stated in response:
“The Government intends that the Code of Practice will increase transparency over the operation of surveillance cameras”.
It is right that, in some cases, CCTV locations are made public. Indeed, many cameras are clearly visible to the public and their visibility acts as an important deterrent to crime. However, it must be right that local authorities and police should reserve the right to conceal the location of other cameras, particularly those positioned in sensitive locations and deployed temporarily in order to apprehend criminals. There is also a real concern that, by disclosing the location of cameras and surveillance centres, there is a risk that these will become the targets of vandals and criminals wishing to prevent the detection of crime. Will the Minister give a clear assurance to the Committee that any future code of practice will not include a blanket requirement to disclose the location of surveillance cameras?
Amendment 106 probes the Government’s intentions with respect to the code of practice in relation to CCTV and ANPR footage that is used as evidence in court. Clause 33 currently provides:
“A court or tribunal may, in particular, take into account a failure by a relevant authority to have regard to the surveillance camera code in determining a question in any such proceedings”.
In fact, this would appear to be the only real enforcement tool at the disposal of the Government. Local authorities will be required to have regard to the surveillance camera code but they will commit no criminal or civil offence if they fail to adhere to it. The implication is that the Government envisage that local authorities and police forces will feel compelled to comply with the code for fear that otherwise evidence provided by their cameras will not be admissible in court.
This view is reinforced by the response to the consultation in which the Government note that the failure to comply can be tested in judicial proceedings. It is one thing to conclude that evidence should be inadmissible on the basis that it violates requirements under the Data Protection Act; however, it is quite another to jeopardise whole trials on the basis that, for instance, the location of the camera in question was not adequately disclosed to the public. What assurances can the Minister give to the Committee that enforcement of the code in this way will not lead to the police being hamstrung in their use of key evidence derived from CCTV cameras?
Finally, Amendment 112A seeks again to probe the Government’s intentions with regard to ensuring that there is clarity for local authorities on the overlap of existing requirements under the Data Protection Act and those under the proposed code of practice. This point was raised by a number of sources when the Bill was debated in another place. Indeed, the Information Commissioner has himself expressed concerns about the implementation of the code in this area. In a letter to my noble friend Lady Royall on 22 November the Information Commissioner noted:
“There is potential overlap between these provisions, including my role, and those set out in the bill relating to the Secretary of State’s Code of Practice and the activities of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner”.
In his memorandum to the Public Bill Committee, the commissioner goes further, stating that,
“there is a risk that regulation becomes frequently fragmented, confusing and contradictory, especially if commissioners take different approaches … there will be overlaps in their responsibilities running the risk that commissioners may adopt differing interpretive approaches and guidance on each other’s statutory provisions”.
The Government’s consultation recognises that there is an issue to be dealt with, and states:
“We shall take note of the concern expressed by respondents in the way we develop the role of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner and how this interacts with that of the Information Commissioner and the Surveillance Commissioners”.
To prevent unnecessary bureaucratic burdens and confusion in the public sector, I ask the Minister to take this opportunity to expand on how the Government aim to ensure maximum clarity and minimum overlap in the roles and requirements of the two commissioners.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, it may be helpful if I address this issue now so that we do not need to come back to it later. The wording is “standards applicable to persons”. Is the Minister saying that this refers to the standards used by persons but it is not applicable to them? If anything, it is about them: it is not who they are but how they work and the standards that they use. It reads as though it is much more personal.
Lord Henley
I think that my noble friend has got it right. If she has not, I will certainly write to her. The point I was trying to get across is that the standards apply to the process and not just to the person. I expect my noble friend is a better draftsman than I am—I give her an assurance that I did not draft this myself—but Parliamentary draftsmen are a law unto themselves. If we have not quite covered the point that my noble friend is making, we will look at it.
I was slightly surprised that Amendment 102 was spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, but I appreciate that it is a probing amendment and seeks to find out what we are trying to do. I repeat that the Government, despite what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, are committed to supporting the use of CCTV and ANPR—automatic number plate recognition—as very effective crime-fighting tools and to their being used with the support and confidence of the public. That is the important point we must remember. We need the support and confidence of the public, and that is why I mentioned the experience of Birmingham when debating an earlier amendment.
Such support will be dependent on transparency on the part of the system operator about the purpose of their camera deployment and the area in which the cameras are being used. Not only would Amendment 102 send a signal that operators can be more covert about their use of CCTV but, more fundamentally, it is likely to run contrary to the Data Protection Act. The Information Commissioner’s existing CCTV code of practice is very clear on the general requirement to let people know that they are an entering an area with CCTV coverage. The guidance states:
“The most effective way of doing this is by using prominently placed signs at the entrance to the CCTV zone and reinforcing this with further signs inside the area. This message can also be backed up with an audio announcement, where public announcements are already used, such as in a station. Clear and prominent signs are particularly important where the cameras themselves are very discreet, or in locations where people might not expect to be under surveillance. As a general rule, signs should be more prominent and frequent where it would otherwise be less obvious to people that they are on CCTV”.
As I said earlier, we saw in Birmingham that public confidence can very rapidly be undermined if the police and others are seen to be imposing these systems without the appropriate public consultation or support.
That is not to say that there will not be occasions when covert surveillance needs to be conducted using CCTV. We are not ruling that out. However, in such cases the surveillance will need to be properly authorised under RIPA. Clearly, in such cases there would not be the same expectation that the location of the relevant cameras was publicly disclosed.
On Amendment 106, I appreciate that it stems from a concern that justice might be prevented or denied in a criminal trial where the defence argued successfully that a small technical breach of the code is sufficient to demonstrate that CCTV or ANPR evidence is flawed and not of a sufficient evidential standard. From that starting point it might be possible to construct a scenario where, in an attempt to invalidate that evidence against their clients, lawyers would be falling over the detail of a relevant authority's performance against the code and seeking auditable records of any decisions made. We believe that that evidence may be very valuable in any trial, but it is rarely going to be the only source of evidence. I find it difficult to foresee a scenario where a case would be dismissed just because CCTV evidence is argued as inadmissible due to the system operator being in some way non-compliant with the code. The amendment should be seen in the context of a code that is intended to be a reference document to help ensure that surveillance cameras are used proportionately and effectively but which does not impose absolute requirements on operators. Against that backdrop, we do not believe that the provisions will give rise to the fears expressed by the noble Lord.
On Amendment 112A, I have a degree of sympathy for the spirit that underpins it. It seeks to ensure coherence between the requirements in the surveillance camera code and the Data Protection Act and I can see why there might be concerns about overlapping guidance in this area. Those concerns are precisely the reason why we are proceeding with the development of the code through close discussion with the Information Commissioner and his office. The Information Commissioner is keen to work with us to help ensure that there is effective regulation of surveillance cameras with clarity and coherence for both system operators and the public. I believe that that work will ensure that not only the code of practice but the roles and responsibilities of the two commissioners fit together and everyone can be directed to the right place for guidance, information and advice.
I think that I have dealt with the point raised by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and I hope I have dealt with the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am grateful for that clarification. Under Clause 34, the Secretary of State is to appoint the Surveillance Camera Commissioner. My amendment proposes that the appointment instead be made by Her Majesty by Letters Patent. The reason for this amendment is that the Information Commissioner, to whom we have referred several times this afternoon and previously in Committee, and who before holding this office was in a previous incarnation the Data Protection Commissioner and before that the Data Protection Registrar, is appointed through the process which I propose here. The roles of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner and the Information Commissioner seem to be complementary; there is a lot of common ground and certainly they have quite a lot of mutual interest. My amendment seeks to understand the distinction in the modes of appointment. Are the Government seeking to create some sort of hierarchy or, briefly, why is there a difference?
Before he had to leave the Committee the Earl of Erroll came over and said that he supported my amendment. Possibly his support is greater than the thrust of my amendment, at any rate at this stage, but I thought I should report that to the Committee. I beg to move.
Lord Henley
I am grateful to my noble friend for her amendment and for her explanation of what it is about. I am also grateful that she assured us that she had the support of the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, who I think has some very important hereditary role in Scotland which probably influenced him in his view of insisting that this should be a matter for Her Majesty rather than the Home Secretary.
I will make just a few remarks about the role of the commissioner which I hope satisfy her concerns. It is a role which will be pivotal in promoting first the new code of practice, and in assessing its effectiveness and impact. In particular, the commissioner is charged with encouraging compliance with the code, reviewing how it operates, and providing advice on the code. Precisely how the commissioner decides to fulfil those duties will be a matter for him, but it will involve an impartial and independent assessment of all the issues. Independence is something we want to stress.
As we have already made clear, as did my honourable friend when he debated these matters in another place, our intention is to combine the new role of the commissioner with that of the existing Forensic Science Regulator. The existing regulator, Mr Andrew Rennison, was appointed by the previous Government as the interim CCTV regulator. He therefore already has considerable grounding in this area, and he has established a wide range of contacts with interested parties. That will be helpful in his new role of promoting and monitoring the code of practice.
At the same time his work as the forensic regulator will provide a useful complement, as well as much relevant background, in the area of seeking to improve the consistency of use and standards of performance of CCTV. Improving the evidential value of camera usage and images is also an important area, and one which cuts across both roles.
At the moment—and I will come on to this—I appreciate that sometimes these matters are dealt with by the Home Secretary and sometimes by the Crown. However, I do not see the need to depart from the normal practice, that is that the appointment is made by the relevant Secretary of State, in this case my right honourable friend. As with any other statutory office holder, we would expect the Surveillance Camera Commissioner to discharge his responsibilities independently of ministers and without fear or favour.
As with other public appointments, the appointment process will be overseen by the Public Appointments Commissioner and from April 2012 it will be regulated by the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments code of practice. This will be the case whether the appointment is made by my right honourable friend or by Her Majesty on advice from the Government.
The amendment would not actually provide a materially different outcome in terms of independence of the officeholder. I appreciate that my noble friend has drawn a comparison with the Information Commissioner, suggesting that there is some sort of hierarchy between different appointments as to who makes them. However, that office has a somewhat wider remit and plays a key role in regulating the Government itself. The additional assurance provided by the appointment by Her Majesty is therefore justified in that case but I do not think it is warranted here, given the somewhat narrower focus of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner, and would not lead to a different outcome.
I hope that that assurance is sufficient for my noble friend. I assure her that we will want a robust, independent commissioner dealing with surveillance cameras and that the appointment process provided for in the Bill will secure that outcome. Although I appreciate that there are occasions when it is appropriate that Her Majesty should make the appointment on the advice of the Government, there are other occasions when it is just as appropriate that it should be by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary. I hope therefore that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, that response is helpful, particularly the comment about the Information Commissioner regulating the activities of the Government. Of course, the Minister will understand that we think that the way the Government use cameras should also be regulated, as in my noble friend’s Amendment 107. I accept that there will not be any difference in reality in the process, except for that last stage. It is important to have had the assurance that there is not a hierarchy in importance or in powers. I was concerned that there should not be, given the potential mutual interest—as I said, it is not quite an overlap—and I think we have had that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
“Commissioner’s report on alteration or replacement
As soon as the Commissioner considers it practicable but in any event not later than three years after the date provided by section 35(2)(a)(i)—(a) the Commissioner must prepare a report about the alteration or replacement of the code which shall in particular include reporting on extending the code to operators not initially subject to it;(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament; and(c) the Commissioner must publish the report.”
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, this amendment proposes that the commissioner should, within three years, prepare a report about the extension of the code to other operators. We have already touched on this in referring to Clause 33. My noble friend Lord Phillips, who has been taxing me with notes asking me to justify the drafting of this section, which is not my responsibility, asked under a previous amendment not about the extension of the code but about which operators were subject to it. He was asking why this chapter starts by appearing to be quite general and then becomes more restrictive once we get into the detail of Clause 33. He is nodding; I hope that I am interpreting him correctly.
My understanding of this is that because, under Clause 33(5)(k), more persons can be added to those who come within the definition “relevant authority”, Clause 29 and the succeeding clauses are drafted in that slightly wider way. I share my noble friend’s concern that “relevant authorities” should extend to a wider group of operators than are listed in Clause 33(5)(a) to (j).
A similar question was asked during the Committee stage in the Commons, and the Minister, James Brokenshire, said:
“The report—
this is the regular report to the commissioner—
“will be an instructive and formal means for the commissioner to telegraph clear recommendations about the code, its application and whether it is achieving its intended objectives”.—[Official Report, Commons, Protection of Freedoms Bill Committee, 26/4/11; col. 364.]
My amendment takes the matter wider to those who operate the code.
It occurred to me only during this debate that it will be helpful to have—and I am sorry to be technical, but the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, will probably tell me that I am not accurate in this question—reassurance that the sui generis rule does not apply and that by having a list that is very specific we are not stuck to those organisations and persons who are similar to those listed in paragraphs (a) to (j) of Clause 33(5). Clearly there is concern that a much wider group of persons—private companies do not quite come within this—and all operators of CCTV, those who run shopping malls, for instance, should not be brought within the scope of the code. We know how the concerns have started, but the more we talk about it, some of us feel that there should be a code that is observed by all operators. While I understand that getting experience of the use of the code under one’s belt might be a good thing, I think that we would like to know that the position will be reviewed in fairly short order. I beg to move.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I would just like to add a few points to those made very effectively by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I regret to ask the Minister some questions, because it always seems churlish to spring technical questions upon a well meaning Minister, but I hope he gets advice from his rear quickly.
First, Clause 34 “Commissioner in relation to code” states that in Clause 34(2)(b) that the commissioner has the function of,
“reviewing the operation of the code”.
I agree with my noble friend Lady Hamwee that that does not, on the normal reading of those words, extend to consideration of the exercise of power to specify new bodies to be caught by the code under Clause 33(5)(k).
Secondly, will the Minister confirm that there is nothing in Clause 35 “Reports by Commissioner” that appears to authorise the commissioner in making reports to consider the point of extension of the code, which I would have thought justifies Amendment 113?
Finally, all those arguments would count for nought if in Clause 33(5)(k) the proper construction of “any person” is to confine “any person” to bodies comparable to “relevant authorities”. My own view is that it does not. In view of the opaqueness of the drafting of this part of the Bill and, as I said earlier, the fact that Clause 29 refers twice to “persons” but not at all to relevant authorities, I feel we need to be very clear of our ground here. In my humble view, there is a lot more concern about the operation of CCTV cameras by private interests than by public ones. I cannot think, for example, that the Sub-Treasurer of the Inner Temple is likely to abuse the CCTV cameras within his or her purview, but I am afraid I can foresee that some private operators might get up to things that are extremely undesirable.
The end of all that is whether the Minister can say to us now that he will take this away, look at it and if necessary bring forward his own amendment at the next stage of the Bill. I hope he might do that. I apologise again for springing this rather nasty group of questions upon him, but I was unprepared for the debate as it has evolved.
Lord Henley
Obviously, I will take advice from those who are skilled in drafting, which is a skill that I have never learnt and I have no way round it. To me, it is quite clear that there is a relevant authority, and we list the relevant authorities, but “relevant authority” can be extended by subsection 5. Relevant authority is mentioned in subsection (1), but “any person” in subsection (2) would include all those in subsection (5)(a) to (j) and paragraph (k) when it expands the role of paragraphs (a) to (j). I suspect that we will not get very far by arguing this now, but it might be that we could discuss it later. It might be something that I can assure my noble friend that we will look at with the relevant drafting authorities to make sure that we get it right if he thinks that we have got it wrong.
I shall move on to the other questions that my noble friend asked about Clauses 34 and 35 and what the commissioner can do and how he can review the code. My noble friend felt that Clause 34(2)(b) on,
“reviewing the operation of the code”,
and Clause 34(2)(c) on,
“providing advice about the code”,
limit what the commissioner can do. Again, I stress that the commissioner is independent and it will be up to him to decide in the light of what is in statute. He will also have the ability to go beyond that should he so wish. The question that we come back to with the amendment concerns what sort of review we should have. I agree with my noble friend Lady Hamwee that it is quite right that we should keep the code under review, but I believe that the Bill provides adequately for that.
Clause 34 sets out the functions of the commissioner in some detail. They include encouraging compliance with the code and reviewing its operation. The commissioner is also asked to report annually on the exercise of those functions, and those reports will be laid before Parliament. In discharging those functions, we fully expect the commissioner to consider whether the code needs to be revised in any way and, no doubt, to offer advice and include recommendations to that effect in his annual report. We would also expect the commissioner to review from time to time whether the duty to have regard to the code should be extended to other operators, be they public or private, given that the extension of this duty is one of the ways in which he will be able, under Clause 34(2)(a), to encourage compliance with the code. Again, this is something that we want to do. Although the code will initially be binding on the relevant authorities only, we hope that others will look to it as the model by which they act. The commissioner will report annually on his functions so, again, we do not need to wait for up to three years, as suggested by my noble’s friend amendment.
With those assurances and that explanation, and accepting the point that we will certainly look again at what my noble friend Lord Phillips had to say about the drafting—I do not agree with him, but I might be wrong; I frequently am—I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the Minister referred to compliance by relevant authorities and others who might look at how it is working. That takes us straight back to Clause 33(5)(k) and whether the person referred to there is to be construed in the normal meaning of that language. I have been trying to catch the eye of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, to tempt him to enter into this, but he has resisted, which is probably quite right. I see now that he is not going to resist.
Lord Scott of Foscote
Everyone who is mentioned in subsection (5) is either an individual or a corporate body and would fall within the meaning of the word “person”.
Baroness Hamwee
I think that might assist us. We are concerned that private corporations, if that is a concept that one can have, should be caught within the term “person”. The example that I used was the operator of a shopping mall. However, perhaps it is not fair to continue this debate in public. My noble friend Lord Phillips and I have made our concern very clear, and this debate is a little circular, so at this point the best thing I can do is to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Immigration
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Henley
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is right to point out that we owe a lot to immigrants, particularly in those so-called hard-pressed services. However, there are a great many employed people in this country. As he will remember, a previous Prime Minister, Mr Gordon Brown, made a point of wanting British jobs for British people. Those jobs could be done by people here if they were able to take them up. Regarding the noble Lord’s substantive point about the genuineness of marriage, that is something we want to address and are addressing.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the Office for Budget Responsibility has drawn attention to the link between migration and growth. Its July report on fiscal sustainability mentioned that immigrants are more likely to be of working age than the general population. Will the Minister acknowledge the importance of this factor, given our generally ageing, and therefore less economically productive, society?
Protection of Freedoms Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, perhaps I may make some more general points following the comments in particular of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard. I struggled with both the terms “day-to-day” and “close and constant” and rather came to the conclusion that there may not be a snappy phrase that will deal with the issue that noble Lords have identified so powerfully. We may know the situation when we see it, but we may not be able to find a couple of words to describe every such situation about which we are concerned. I was glad to read—noble Lords referred to this—that the Government will provide guidance on the question of supervision. However, the guidance cannot go beyond the legislation.
It troubles me that we may be trying to find a way of putting succinctly into legislation something that will not quite fit. This might be an occasion when we have to be a bit more verbose than we would normally want to be—I do not know; other people’s language skills will be better than mine. However, I was left with the concern that we should not rely on guidance saying something in addition to what the legislation says, because it cannot.
I hope that the guidance which emerges at the end of this process is easier than the language in the Bill. I struggled an awful lot with the double negatives. It will not be a service to those who are working in the field if we cannot produce something that is much easier to follow.
I want to add one other thought which is very much implied, if not explicit, in what other noble Lords have said. Whom does a child trust more: the worker, for want of a better word, with whom he develops a close relationship; or a supervisor who has perhaps not been in a position to create the same trust, because the supervisor is the authority figure and may not be perceived as being on the child’s side?
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for, in effect, finishing off this debate. She took us back to the general, which is what I want to start off with. I think that it was the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, who was somewhat critical of what we are proposing in this area and quoted a great deal from, I think, User Voice. I was then grateful for the intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, the author of the Soham report, who reminded the Committee that, as he put it, what had followed his report—the recommendations, if I may summarise them—was not exactly quite as proportionate as he felt it should be. I stress that we are looking for the right degree of proportionality and the right balance in the Bill. That will obviously be difficult to achieve. I am therefore grateful for the chance to address just some of the issues in relation to this amendment.
Sticking with that generality and the quotations that the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, gave from User Voice, I should remind her that there was considerable support for the Bill and the proposals in this area when they came out. I can quote Anne Marie Carrie, the chief executive of Barnardo’s, who said that the Government’s proposals were a “victory for common sense”. She said:
“There is already enough safeguarding in place for people who have unsupervised, substantial access to children”;
and that:
“This approach will make it easier for grandparents, parents and neighbours, who should be able to play an important role in a child’s life without unnecessary red tape”.
There was also support from the Scout Association, Nacro and others—I could go on. The question that we want to address is how to get the right degree of proportionality.
The amendments are very much in three groups. I do not know the intention of the noble Lords who tabled the various amendments, but if it is thought that we might vote on them, I should say that I am fairly sure that the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, would not be consequential on Amendment 58. However, we will get to that in due course.
Amendments 58, 61 and 62 were tabled by my noble friends Lady Heyhoe Flint and Lord Addington. I am grateful to them, and to my noble friend Lady Walmsley, for reminding us that my honourable friend Lynne Featherstone and I had an opportunity to discuss this matter with a large number of representatives of the sports and leisure sectors as well as a number of my noble friends at a meeting in the Home Office. There have been subsequent meetings and we have listened very carefully to the arguments presented. I think that we have taken on board some of those concerns.
Obviously one of those concerns is that supervision is very difficult to provide in the context of sport. That is what we want to deal with at this stage. The Bill now requires that we provide statutory guidance in relation to supervision to assist sports governing bodies, and others, to decide on whether a particular employee or volunteer falls within or outside the scope of regulated activity. As we have made clear, we intend to consult on draft guidance in advance of Report. I can assure the Committee that we will include the sport and recreation sector in that consultation. I can also assure the Committee that the guidance will include elements specific to that sector.
The noble Baroness, Lady Royall, asked me whether I could get the response to that consultation out before Report. I appreciate that Report, given the speed at which we are moving, is some time off and getting a response to that consultation might be somewhat difficult. However, we certainly hope to get the consultation out and that will be useful for the House to have a look at in advance of Report.
We do not, in principle, see the need to move away from the notion that where individuals can be properly supervised, then in some circumstances there is no need for their work to fall within regulated activity or for barred-list checks to be made. Proper supervision should help to reduce the risk of improper conduct and of inappropriate relationships developing. Noble Lords have spoken about the dangers in this area. I appreciate that there have been some concerns about what supervision means and whether this will apply, for example, to an assistant sports coach. However, I should say that we are not seeking to define supervision by a title, such as “assistant” or “deputy” coach or trainer. If such roles are working independently of the head coach and not being supervised, they would remain in regulated activity.
This provision is intended to provide additional flexibility for employing organisations and to help ensure that individuals are not dissuaded from volunteering. One of the bodies that commented on this was the Scout Association, which said that it preferred to supervise individuals when they first join the organisation before barred-list checks become necessary. There is of course no compulsion in the Bill for an organisation to provide supervision. Where it is unable to do so, activities will remain regulated and barred-list checks must be made.
My noble friend Lord Addington looked for examples of what would be adequate supervision. This will obviously vary according to where you are and what you are doing. In a classroom or indoor venue, the supervisor should be in the same room for the majority of the time, excepting that they may on occasion need to leave for a short break. In a classroom, a teacher or other adult in a regulated activity should be in the room with the supervised assistant and be able to see their work for most of the time. Matters would obviously be different in an outdoor context, and my noble friend was right to draw on this. On playing fields, one coach or supervisor should be able to supervise an individual on the same or a neighbouring pitch—for example, an assistant football or rugby coach helping with the same match or on a next-door pitch, but not across a vast number of pitches or where activities take place at a considerable distance. My noble friend also gave the example of an assistant coach who might have some special expertise that his superior would not understand. Again, if that were the case, the appropriate checks would have to be made because, I should make clear, the whole matter would be a question of tact and degree according to the facts of the case at any point.
Perhaps I may also say a word or two about the drafting of Amendment 61, because the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, raised a concern regarding the meaning of “recreational”. As drafted, that amendment would not in any event achieve the desired intention. It would not extend the list of establishments to include sports venues. It simply adds sport to the description of work in the existing list of circumstances. Its effect, therefore, is that supervised volunteers coaching sports in schools would be in regulated activity, but supervised coaches elsewhere—paid or unpaid—would not be. In addition—a point queried by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall—it provides no definition of a recreational activity, which could mean that the amendment would inadvertently catch a wider range of activities than intended.
Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton
Can the Minister give the assurance which I understood his noble friend Lady Hamwee was seeking? He used the term “proper supervision”. I understood the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to say that there ought not to be anything stronger in the guidance than the wording in the Bill defining “supervision”. It would be very helpful if the Minister could give an undertaking that that fear is totally unfounded and ensure that his sense of “proper supervision” is defined as much in the Bill as in the guidance.
Baroness Hamwee
Perhaps I should see whether I can make myself absolutely clear. My concern was that primary legislation must trump guidance and that guidance cannot go further than the legislation. That is what I was trying to express.
Lord Henley
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is a lawyer and she has expressed exactly how it should be. Obviously guidance does not go beyond the legislation. That is one reason why I shall resist the amendments put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, which ask for close and constant supervision, because we think that that goes too far. However, I shall address that in due course. The important point is that we have to get this guidance right. To get the guidance right, we have to get the consultation right, and I hope to have the consultation available before we reach Report.
Perhaps I may now deal with the noble Baroness’s Amendments 59, 60, 63A, 64 and 65. As always, we want to strike the right balance. Balance is the new word that I have learnt in the Home Office, and it is very important in this Bill that we get that right. I think it was the theme behind what the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, said. It is a question of proportionality. Our definition in this provision insists that it must be substantial. For example, an occasional, or even weekly, meeting between the supervisor and the supervised would not be sufficient.
The noble Baroness’s amendments would change the wording to “close and constant”, which would render the definition of supervision unworkable and go against the Government’s intention of having more proportionate disclosure and barring arrangements. If you think about it, the words “close and constant” are pretty severe. I gave the example of the classroom environment, and “close and constant” does not even allow leaving the room occasionally. They would in effect mean that the work of a volunteer working in a sports club under the supervision of a qualified sports instructor would become regulated activity if that qualified instructor left the room at any stage, because the supervision would then not be constant. That goes too far and undermines our proposals to scale back disclosure and barring to common-sense levels by imposing an unrealistically high test for supervision.
We believe that the Bill as drafted, coupled with the statutory guidance that we will publish following the consultation, will produce the right result in setting the boundaries of regulated activity. For that reason, when we get that consultation out, I look forward to comments from all around the country and from all noble Lords, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, will feed his experience into it.
Finally, I turn to the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Walmsley. Amendment 63 seeks, in effect, to bring all those who work in FE colleges within the scope of regulated activity. I should first stress that all paid teaching and non-teaching staff in establishments, including further education colleges, that wholly or mainly provide full-time education to children will remain within regulated activity and therefore must undergo a barred list check as part of their pre-employment checks. In addition, the unsupervised teaching, training, instruction, care or supervision of children in further education institutions will remain a regulated activity, even where such an institution provides education mainly to adults.
Amendment 63 would go further by bringing into regulated activity all work by any staff in further education colleges providing education to even a small number of children where staff have the opportunity for contact with children. Under the current scheme, such work is “controlled activity”. Controlled activity is to be abolished under Clause 68. We believe it is disproportionate and unnecessary to require such individuals to be subject to the same level of checks as those working in an institution wholly or mainly for the full-time education or care of children, for example in a primary school or a nursery.
The Government do not consider it proportionate for the state to require or allow barred list checks on activities that are currently defined as controlled activities. Such activities generally entail only incidental contact with children. I question whether all colleges would really welcome a duty to check hundreds of staff just because the college takes on, for example, half a dozen 17 year-old students.
Baroness Hamwee
Will the Minister move away from the wording of this amendment—I take the point he makes about it perhaps being too blanket in its coverage—and address the point about who is a child for the purposes of the protection that we are seeking to apply? I think that is what underlines the points made by my noble friends in addressing this. Technically, this may not be right, but they are concerned about the subject of the protection.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I understand the concern, and I think it might be necessary for us to have further discussions on this outside the House. I think my noble friends understand the importance of proportionality—I use that word again. The example I was giving when my noble friend interrupted me was about a college that takes on half a dozen 17 year-olds being affected. It might be that if it was half a dozen 14 year-olds, things would be different. It is a question of balance which, again, we will have to look at. I was about to say that the amendment goes too far; my noble friends agree that it goes too far. They will not press it, but obviously there might be scope for further discussions in due course.
Amendment 66 could also be very wide-ranging in its effect. It sets out that a regulated activity provider may decide whether other activity that it carries out is analogous to regulated activity. It also creates a new duty on the Disclosure and Barring Service to provide information that would otherwise be provided only in respect of regulated activity for any such activity that the provider decides is similar to regulated activity. We have stated that we do not think it is right to provide barred list information for activity that is not regulated activity. We have set out in Clause 64 what activity should be defined as regulated activity in relation to children. This amendment would in effect give regulated activity providers the ability to define any activity as similar to regulated activity and request barred list information from the Disclosure and Barring Service; for example, they could designate someone who has merely the slightest contact with children in a sport or recreation setting, or an employee providing first aid as an ancillary part of their job.
We do not think that Amendment 66 does what it says on the label, as it were. Again, I might have misunderstood what my noble friend is getting at with that amendment. If she would like to have further discussions, I am prepared to do that, although the last time we had discussions it resulted in her bringing forward this amendment, so it does not necessarily always help.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I hope that we can dispose of this quickly. Clause 72 deals with information about barring decisions and my question is about the consent given by the object, if I can put it that way, of an inquiry who may consent to the provision of information when that consent, we are told in proposed new Section 30A(4) of the 2006 Act,
“also has effect in relation to any subsequent … application by”,
the same inquirer. I would be grateful if the Government can confirm that, in this context, consent can be withdrawn. I would read it that way and think that it is implied. However, there is certainly one example within the Bill: Clause 27, concerning biometric information of children in school, which deals with the consent of the parent and which says in terms that consent,
“may be withdrawn at any time”.
If it is necessary to spell that out in Clause 27, I would like to be quite certain that consent can be withdrawn effectively under the proposed new section contained in Clause 72. I beg to move.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for her explanation in moving her amendment. Clause 72 introduces proposed new Section 30A into the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. That section will allow regulated activity providers and others with a specified connection to a person to ask the Secretary of State whether that person is on the relevant Independent Safeguarding Authority barred list, or lists. For this, the person must provide their consent to the release of information about them. Proposed new Section 30A specifies that consent given for one such check would serve as consent for subsequent checks about that person made by the same party, as my noble friend has already explained. The aim of that final provision is to reduce bureaucracy for employers and others. If a person has consented to the provision of information, it makes no sense for an employer to have to seek a new declaration from them every time that they need to do a new check. Clearly, however, the consent must be valid.
In moving her amendment, my noble friend seeks to specify that prior consent will not be valid for future checks if that consent has been withdrawn. Our view—this is where I hope to be able to give my noble friend the assurance that she seeks—is that the current drafting of the Bill achieves this policy intention. If consent has been withdrawn then, according to the terms of the clause, there is no consent and the employer would have no basis to proceed. Operationally, employers will need to confirm that they have valid consent, or they will not be entitled to carry out a check.
It is probably worth mentioning, while I have the opportunity, a wider point in the context of Clause 72. Consent could be freely given, given the potential detrimental consequences to an individual. This was something which the Information Commissioner raised in a letter that he sent quite widely to noble Lords between Second Reading and Committee. He was seeking some clarification on this. Importantly, there is only a certain degree to which the state can and should intervene in the relationship between employer and employee. Naturally, if an employer should do anything untoward, an employee has access to the appropriate legal remedies but we do not anticipate that most employers would seek to coerce their employees.
The alternatives in this case are a system where consent needs to be given or one where it need not be. We choose the former because while pressure by an employer can never entirely be ruled out, it is better than information about someone being given to a third party without their knowledge. As the Information Commissioner noted in the briefing that he provided, a barred list check under proposed new Section 30A is only one of various ways for an employer to discharge their duty to check barred status so, should consent ever be an issue, there are alternatives. However, it is worth pointing out that criminal records checks themselves require the person who is the subject of the check to make the application.
Overall, I hope that what I have been able to say provides reassurance to my noble friend that the policy intention of her amendment, with which we agree, is catered for in the current drafting and that she will therefore feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the Minister read my mind. I had wondered whether to draw to the attention of the House the points made by the Information Commissioner, and I thank her for answering them without my asking. Her response on what is meant by “consent” is helpful, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Dear
My Lords, I shall be brief. I support the amendment as set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall of Blaisdon, who has made a very adequate case for this change. I have changed my mind on this issue over, I suppose, the past six months or so. I had for a long time thought that the current legislation, the Protection from Harassment Act, was sufficient, but I now realise that the terminology in it is too strict. The term “violence” needs to be ameliorated in some way and the wording in the amendment that refers to “fear or alarm” would take us closer to the course of conduct referred to in many parts of your Lordships' House.
This issue has grown in modern society over the past 10 or 20 years. I do not offer any suggestion as to why that has happened. Perhaps we have, paradoxically, an anonymous society on the one hand and a society with a plethora of information in it on the other. There is certainly a growth in technology and perhaps a celebrity culture. Whether celebrity is real or imagined hardly matters; the fact that it is now possible to become the focus of someone’s attention is clearly at the root of what is proposed. I believe that we need to do something to alter this very tight definition of violence. The question of whether the wording of the amendment is too prescriptive I leave for a later debate. Personally, I think that much of the legislation coming through your Lordships’ House is far too prescriptive, and that in itself presents a trap. I hope that the Minister can take away the comments of this House, including my own, to examine what has been said, and perhaps we can return to this matter for further consideration on Report. I support the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, perhaps I may raise two small points. They seem almost trivial in the context but they are important and, as the noble Baroness said earlier, the opportunities for this sort of discussion are limited to Committee. I appreciate that this is existing legislation in Scotland. My first point relates to proposed new subsection (4) in the amendment, which states,
“where A knows, or ought in all the circumstances to have known”.
The existing Section 4(2) brings in the notion of a reasonable person. I read the existing law as objective and this proposal as being subjective, and I am not sure whether it is strong enough.
My second point relates to new subsection (2) of the proposal, where it would be necessary for the course of conduct to cause “fear or alarm”. Again, I wonder whether that is strong enough. What if the victim is a particularly resilient person? Should the person engaging in the conduct be able to do so because of the toughness of the victim?
Lord Sharkey
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, for tabling this amendment, whose objectives I strongly support. As noble Lords have already noted, the situation relating to stalking in England and Wales is entirely unsatisfactory. It is clear that the offence of harassment is not an effective way of dealing with the problem of stalking. It is not effective for the protection of possible victims; it is not effective for the successful prosecution of offenders; and it is not effective in the delivery of appropriate punishment for those who are found guilty.
A recent survey conducted by the members of the National Association of Probation Officers showed that the overwhelming majority of victims were in constant fear and many were physically injured. Most victims claim that there are a number of incidents before they feel they can go to the police. Often their complaints are not properly investigated, and the perpetrator’s behaviour escalates over time if there is no criminal justice intervention or treatment.
It appears that stalking behaviour is simply not recognised by the majority of professionals who have to deal with the cases. Probation staff are concerned that when sentences are handed down they are often too short for rehabilitation or treatment to occur, or even to match the gravity of the offence and its effect on the lives of victims. We should not allow things to continue as they are. The suffering caused to victims is often harrowing and sometimes life-destroying.
The current methods for dealing with the problem are clearly inadequate. However, as noble Lords have pointed out, there is an obvious way forward, which is to learn from the experience in Scotland. As noble Lords have indicated, Scotland chose not to introduce a version of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997—currently the law in England and Wales—on the grounds that the Act did not transfer powers into practice. Instead, a new law, on which this amendment is based, was passed in December 2010 creating a specific offence of stalking and offences of threatening and abusive behaviour. This legislation has the support of the police, who have themselves adopted new operational guidelines to ensure proper awareness of stalking and harassment. There are clear signs of the success of this Act, even at this very early stage.
I acknowledge that the Government take this matter extremely seriously, and I know that the consultation on the issue runs until 5 February. It is important that we learn from it. Nevertheless, I urge the Minister to take account of the strong views expressed today and the terrible plight of the victims of stalking and not to delay legislation on this issue one moment longer than is absolutely necessary.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, has put forward an extremely helpful amendment. The reason for thinking that is because, tragically, there have been too many instances when minicab drivers, and indeed licensed taxi drivers, have turned out to be a danger to those whom they ferry. Those instances are comparatively rare, and of course it is much safer to use a licensed vehicle than otherwise, but the danger remains.
My only regret is that the noble Baroness, in her normal ingenious way, has not found a way to encompass what I consider to be the increasingly dangerous fraternity of rickshaw drivers in London. I am sure that a few extra words would have enabled us to have a licensing regime for rickshaw drivers on top of all this, with the added protections of enhanced record checks. I appreciate that I have now caused a flurry on the Front Bench while the correct answer as to why that is incredibly difficult is explained to the Minister. However, as I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is about to speak, I am sure that he will have a chance to mug up on the subject.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, perhaps I will give the Minister thinking time, but I was going to say that rickshaw drivers present more dangers than those which are the subject of this Bill—the noble Lord has referred to the small number of very horrific examples.
I support my noble friend. There have been important steps in licensing over the past few years, certainly in London, but legislation cannot remove every risk. A perpetrator may not previously have been caught or may just be starting on a course of action. However, the more tools that are given to employers and to the organisers of different activities, the better—within the overall objective of a sensible regime that is not overbureaucratised.
Perhaps I might make one comment, which I wondered whether I should come in with in a previous discussion when I think the Minister was accused of being unimaginative about the amendments. I can tell the Committee that at the meeting which I attended with the various sporting groups, which has been referred to, both our Minister and Lynne Featherstone made it absolutely clear that an employer or an organiser cannot abdicate responsibility to an unthinking bureaucratic process. I, for one, was very impressed at that meeting by the common-sense attitude being displayed. We were being reminded that we cannot do everything through legislation. We will do as much as we can, but we cannot do everything.
Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton
My Lords, should the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, need additional support, I worked with the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner of Parkes, on extending the checks and the licensing to the minicabs. For some time, some of the other cab drivers resisted licensing minicab drivers. I am quite sure that the Minister will agree that, should the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, who has presented her case strongly and got all-round support, need additional support, then I can recommend the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner of Parkes.