(4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI will be as brief as I possibly can, given the hour. What is important in this amendment is to try to return to having a service standard. The amendment proposes a three-month service standard to determine asylum decisions. I know that the Minister, and others in the past, have looked at the issue and whether it might be six months. The important question here is whether there should be a service standard for dealing with these matters.
The history of this is that a service standard to decide 98% of straightforward asylum applications within six months was introduced in 2014 after a report which criticised delays in asylum decision-making. Of the claims that were submitted from March 2014 to the end of the year, only 8% received a decision within six months. In the second quarter of 2018, 56% of decisions were received within six months. In the third quarter of 2018, 25% received a decision within six months. Subsequent to that, the service standard was abandoned.
The reasons given by the Government at that time were:
“We have moved away from the six-month service standard to concentrate on cases with acute vulnerability and those in receipt of the greatest level of support, including unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. … Additionally, we will prioritise cases where an individual has already received a decision but a reconsideration is required. … the current service standard does not always allow us to prioritise applications from the most vulnerable people in the system if their claim is ‘non-straightforward’”.
That told me that there is a sort of on-off switch and a whole range of categories, and the Home Office would move the arrow to whichever one it thought was the most concerning at the time. I know that, in the context of things such as accident and emergency departments in the health services around this country, having a service standard is an important way—though it may not be kept—of having that focus.
Therefore, this seems to be an issue of prioritisation. The Home Office says that it can prioritise different targets or different circumstances rather than having a service standard. There was a large backlog of 91,000 at the end of 2024, with the associated costs to the taxpayer and slow decision-making hampering integration. Of those waiting for an initial decision, around 50,000 people had been waiting for more than six months. Arguing for a new service standard means that we could speed things up, because people would have a standard in mind.
I know that the Minister has dealt with this in the past in response to questions, but I would be grateful if he could say whether the Government have reviewed the potential benefits of reintroducing a service standard, what the current prioritisation is for asylum decision-making, and, of course, what the Government are doing to reduce the backlog.
My Lords, I have added my name to my noble friend’s amendment. I was not proposing to speak to it until recently. I may well have it wrong, but I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm the position. I think I read that arrangements have been put in place for bonuses for caseworkers who meet a standard. As I recall it, it was a very small amount of money, but if the Minister could tell the Committee what the standard is for asylum applications and say something about that bonus, it would be helpful. I am trying to ask that in a very neutral fashion.
I have Amendment 195, to which my noble friend has his name, relating to the use of artificial intelligence in the system. Obviously, artificial intelligence is going to be used. Asking whether it is used is probably like asking whether electricity is going to be used—of course it is these days. As this is about data as well, we start from the position that migrants are not criminals, and they should not be treated as criminals. Immigration, asylum seeking and refugee matters are civil matters, and any interference with privacy must be proportionate and subject to safeguards. I think we would all agree that our data is valuable, it is very precious, and that generally it needs regulation and oversight, and transparency is hugely important.
When I chaired the Justice and Home Affairs Committee, every Home Secretary we questioned assured us that the human would remain in the loop. Frankly, we were sceptical about what that really meant and the efficacy of it. The data subject must know what the authorities know, or think they know, about him. There is a lot more public discourse now about training of AI, but I doubt that we are all completely reassured about that. Immigration decisions are hugely impactful; they are life changing. The amendment would ensure that no machine alone may determine a person’s immigration fate, and that personal data remained insulated from algorithmic training.
(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Lord— I knew there was a word for it. We do not deny that there are examples on the statute book, but we objected to them at the time.
I think the answer is related to the nature of the offence which is before us. An offence which is punishable by a 15-year maximum jail sentence is a very serious and big crime to have committed. To put it simply, the suspicion threshold is seldom applied in our criminal law because such a low threshold —the noble Lord was saying that there are examples—is a disproportionate response to where someone has not been intending to commit a crime and with such a disproportionate sense of what harm they might be doing. The balance between the nature of the offence and the nature of the judgment which creates that offence is what is disproportionate.
(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberIn moving this amendment, I will speak also to Amendment 60. This clause, again, is about collecting information and reasonable excuses.
Clause 16(8) provides a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses. Our amendment is probing. We would like to see as many good reasons as are likely—I emphasise good reasons—in the legislation, rather than on each occasion being assessed by, in the first instance, someone fairly junior. In Clause 16(8), there is provision for an action or possession being for the purpose of
“providing, or preparing for the provision of, medical care or emergency shelter or supplies”.
Our amendment would insert “humanitarian support”. It seems that there is no difference between us as to the importance of promoting human welfare, so referring to it in the Bill follows from that.
I have been prompted having heard of so many refugees—I do not know whether this is a good example of a humanitarian matter or not—being keen to progress their education, or to work in a profession or another activity for which they have qualifications, but not when they get here being able to prove what qualifications they have. Bringing a document showing those qualifications would not be for the purposes of a “relevant journey”, but it is not irrelevant either to an asylum seeker for his or her future life. As I say, this is a probing amendment.
Amendment 60 concerns a matter raised by the organisation Justice and would except from the offences a person carrying out a legal activity, as defined—in other words, providing legal services. Perhaps I should declare—there have been a lot of declarations this afternoon and evening—that I was a solicitor, but that feels like a million years ago, so it is not personal. Everyone involved in the Bill will be aware of the shortage of good lawyers working in this field and available to undertake work on a legal aid basis or through a charity. The Bill is drafted widely, so it does not necessarily preclude the defence that it is for legal services, but I do not think that would be a huge encouragement to lawyers who might be worried about exposing themselves to a charge.
Lawyers, as a breed, are not always popular and are not always, in this field, trusted by the Government of the day, because the work almost inevitably means challenging the Government. If we are not further to risk access to justice, which is already an issue, we should not add further deterrents to legal practice in the asylum and refugee field. So the amendment proposes a specific exemption from prosecution.
My Lords, there are only two amendments in this group, both of which are from my colleague and noble friend Lady Hamwee. They both probe whether providing humanitarian support and legal services is a reasonable excuse in the offence in Clause 16:
“Collecting information for use in immigration crime”.
While we welcome the inclusion of the defence of “reasonable excuse” in Clause 16 and the inclusion of those examples already contained in the Bill, we consider there to be a notable and concerning omission, namely an exception for those providing legitimate legal advice and preparing legitimate legal claims.
Given that I have just received an email from those representing lawyers stating that the Ministry of Justice has increased the amount of pay that it is giving for immigration lawyers—it is not sufficient, I am told by the lawyers’ association, but there is nothing surprising about that—it would be very strange indeed if they were to be subject to any danger from providing that legitimate advice. Because those who represent asylum seekers in the UK provide legal advice about their rights and publicise their work, they should be confident that they will not be caught by one of the offences, given the wide drafting of the Bill. Although the Bill does not necessarily preclude a defence for such individuals, in our view, they should be specifically exempt from prosecution, otherwise those providing legal services to vulnerable individuals will be left in an uncertain position, which, in turn, will create an unjustified risk to access to justice and the rule of law.
(8 months, 1 week ago)
Lords Chamber