Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord German Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 3rd November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, the evidence coming out in our debate today is that there are a lot of examples where people are being wrongly assessed as adults. Last weekend, I met a group of local authority leaders who told me about a situation last November, regarding unaccompanied children who had been kept in hotels and were coming out into their care. I asked whether it had improved, and they said that the numbers may have changed but there were still examples of young people who had been taken out of the system because they had been wrongly assessed. The current system for determining the age of unaccompanied children seeking asylum remains deeply flawed. I think there are not many who would accept that it is all working really well.

We already have some indication that the cohort of people being sent back to France included a number of children, largely because they were inspected rapidly upon entry by Border Force officials. As we know from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, appearance, demeanour and physical development are all affected by environment, life experiences and ethnicity, and making visual assessments is notoriously unreliable.

In answer to the point that there will be some people who will play the system, we need to understand that, when children are wrongly treated as adults, they are denied the rights and protections afforded them as children. That risks them being placed in adult accommodation, detained or even prosecuted. That is a clear safeguarding failure. Misidentification of children as adults poses a greater safeguarding risk than the reverse, primarily because adult systems lack the robust protections necessary for children. We have already seen cases where individuals who raised that their age was under 18 were subsequently arrested and charged in the adult criminal justice system, leading to time spent in adult prison on remand, or a conviction on immigration offences.

The stakes in this Bill are extremely high, with the new offences related to immigration crime contained within it carrying substantial periods of imprisonment, sometimes up to 14 years. It is critical that we safeguard against the unintended consequence of criminalising vulnerable individuals seeking protection.

I know that the Government have started to look carefully at these issues, as we had this discussion during Committee. The Government said that there were concerns about how such an amendment would operate in practice, mentioning the risk of delays that could arise from waiting for a full assessment, and that it would potentially frustrate the removals process and add to asylum backlogs. But at that time the Minister gave assurances, as he will know, that existing safeguards are in place. He named three: that the Home Office decision on age for immigration purposes is not binding on UK courts; that the Crown Prosecution Service is advised of age-dispute issues and determines if pursuing prosecution is in the public interest; and that the Home Office has introduced an additional safeguard, whereby an abbreviated age assessment conducted by qualified social workers is provided for individuals assessed as “significantly over 18” who maintain their claim to be a child and are identified for potential criminal charges. However, these assurances do not go far enough when a child’s liberty and future are at stake.

First, relying on the CPS’s prosecutorial discretion and the court’s ability to take a decision on age retrospectively is insufficient, when we know that individuals have already been wrongfully detained and imprisoned in adult settings. The risk of unlawful detention must be mitigated at the earliest possible point—before the charges proceed. Secondly, the proposal of an abbreviated age assessment is inadequate in the context of criminal law. This amendment would require a comprehensive Merton-compliant age assessment, which adheres to professional standards and best practice, and involves gathering information holistically.

On Amendment 57, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has said, we need to engage with all parties in respect of this matter. There are so many different interests here, not just local authorities and the key people within them but those who have expertise in this area. It is a difficult area, and we therefore need to bring together all that expertise to ensure that justice, through a full assessment, is preferable to the costs, both human and financial, of wrongful imprisonment or unlawful detention.

The Government are right to focus on improving the robustness of the process. That includes looking at what the NAAB does, how it operates and whether it is up to the job of doing the things that we have been talking about in this debate. Facial age estimation technology is almost a case of saying, “We may have that possibility in the future”, but, as with anything—such as if we were trying to tackle new drugs or give new treatments to people—we should not do it without sound advice that it is in order and would produce the right results. The question must remain open on that matter, and I am sure the Minister will know that the exploration of this issue may have some way to travel.

Amendment 27, in the name of my noble friend, is a fundamental safeguard. It would ensure that expert, child-focused social work assessment occurs before an individual is drawn into the criminal justice system as an adult. We know that this amendment has been supported by organisations across the children’s sector. It would ensure that the principle of protecting children from criminal proceedings is enshrined in law by requiring a high standard of age verification by appropriate experts before any prosecution can proceed. We support the intention of Amendment 57, also in this group. There are very serious matters here that I hope the Minister will address.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, we begin the second day on Report with the first of two groups on age assessments. As in Committee, they have produced a stimulating debate.

The two amendments in this group, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Lister, approach the issue from a different standpoint from our later amendments. That is perhaps not surprising, but it will also come as no surprise that we take a different and opposing view from the underlying principles of both these amendments.

It cannot be right, as is proposed, for a person to be automatically assumed to be a child where their age cannot be proved by way of documentary evidence. We know that too many illegal migrants purposefully tear up or coincidentally lose their passports or identity documents, or, as has been said, lie about their age, so as to game the system once in the United Kingdom.

My noble friend Lord Harper made several compelling arguments in respect of both these amendments. I have little to add, except to say that we have seen too many cases where individuals have claimed to be children, despite being grown adults. To these Benches, that represents a grave safeguarding failure. For all those reasons, we cannot support these amendments.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, we should of course be aware of public feeling, but we should also not inflame it. We need to be careful with that. The noble Baroness’s Amendment 32 seeks to leave out Clause 41(17), which states that the amendments made by most of the subsections in that clause

“are to be treated as always having had effect”.

We should be very wary of the retrospectivity contained in them. The Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, is about to finalise, I hope, a report on the rule of law, and we point to retrospectivity, or retroactivity—I am never sure whether there is a difference—as threatening the rule of law, along with legal certainty and so on. I am therefore glad that the noble Baroness tabled this amendment.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I will make just a brief intervention from us on this matter, which was raised in Committee. I am grateful to the Minister for telling me what reasons he had for not taking out Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act. It raises some further questions, which I guess the Minister might have been expecting. Essentially, the noble Baroness’s amendments aim collectively to inject greater protection of civil liberties and to ensure proportionality in the use of detention powers, and they demand clarity regarding the mental element required for the new immigration offences in the Bill.

In his letter to me, the Minister said of Section 12 that

“policies to differentiate in line with the provision can be resumed if required”.

He said that they

“are not currently in use”,

and they have not been in use since this Government took office. He said:

“This Government is prioritising steps to restore order to the asylum system”,


et cetera, as one might expect. But, he continued:

“While the Government reviews the approach, it would not be appropriate to remove these provisions from the statute book”.


Can the Minister tell me what review of what approach will determine whether this provision should be removed, and whether, in the immediate future, there is any intention to recommence Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act?

In conclusion, having some clarity on this matter would be useful. The Law Society, as noble Lords might expect, says that the retention of Section 12, by removing the

“court’s ability to decide for itself whether the detention of a person for the purposes of removal is for a reasonable period”,

risks increasing unlawful and prolonged detention. There is currently a legal aspect to retention; I know that it is not being used, but we need to ensure that the fallback described by the Law Society is in place. I look forward to the Minister’s response to those questions.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by making plain our opposition to the amendments in this group. In Committee, we spent much time rehashing the arguments over the Illegal Migration Act 2023. We have made our position abundantly plain. It is obvious that there exists a gulf in opinion regarding that Act between many of us in this House. This is Report, so now is not the time for me to repeat those arguments. As noble Lords know, we strongly oppose the repeal of the bulk of the Illegal Migration Act, but I should say that it is at least some solace to us that the Government have deemed it right to retain Section 12. Since we support the Government’s intent to keep that section on the statute book, we oppose Amendments 28, 30 and 32, notwithstanding the elegant arguments of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.

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[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend and the three amendments that she has in her name, Amendments 29, 69 and 79B.

Amendment 29 seeks to repeal Section 29 of Illegal Migration Act and to remove individuals who have sought to use modern slavery protections in “bad faith”. We have heard clear warnings that Section 29 represents a dangerous expansion of the public order disqualifications originally introduced by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. Crucially, Section 29 transforms the disqualification of potential and confirmed victims of trafficking and modern slavery from a discretionary power to a mandatory duty—unless compelling circumstances exist. This mandatory disqualification extends to non-British nationals sentenced to imprisonment of any length for a crime of any seriousness. This blanket approach fails to consider that victims of modern slavery are frequently coerced by their traffickers into committing criminal offences. By lowering the threshold so severely and making disqualification mandatory, there is an increased risk that vulnerable survivors will be denied protection, denied a recovery period and ultimately be removed from the United Kingdom, potentially exposing them to re-trafficking or retribution. The International Organization for Migration has explicitly called for the repeal of this section.

The Government argued in Committee that Section 29 needs to be retained for its potential “operational benefit” and to allow flexibility in reforming the national referral mechanism. While reviewing the national referral mechanism is vital, retaining a measure that institutionalises the potential criminalisation of victims is fundamentally unjust and unnecessary. Section 29 seriously undermines our commitment to tackling modern slavery. We must uphold our duty to protect the exploited.

Amendment 69 would introduce a new clause to strengthen protection for victims of slavery or human trafficking by placing a duty on the Secretary of State to amend the Modern Slavery Act 2015. This amendment seeks to establish crucial firewall arrangements. Its intention is to safeguard vulnerable individuals by preventing public authorities, when determining whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking, sharing information with immigration authorities that might result in deportation or prosecution for an immigration offence. That firewall is critical for many people to report on what is happening to them.

We must ensure that these victims feel safe seeking help and engaging with the national referral mechanism process. Without a robust firewall, a victim coerced into illegal entry might fear that disclosing their history of exploitation to obtain assistance will simultaneously expose them to immediate prosecution and removal. It is chicken and egg, egg and chicken. This is an unacceptable dilemma for them to face.

Amendment 69 seeks to weaken the grip of traffickers and enable victims to come forward and seek justice. By implementing this firewall, we align safeguarding duties with our enforcement aims, preventing information provided for protection purposes being weaponised against the victim by the state.

Amendment 79B seeks to address a fundamental vulnerability in our system: the inherent conflict faced by a victim of labour abuse who is simultaneously subject to immigration controls. This secure reporting clause is designed to prevent information disclosed by a victim or a witness of labour abuse being used for a purpose within Section 40(1) of the UK Borders Act 2007, which of course is the gateway for immigration and nationality purposes.

This firewall is desperately needed because exploitative employers rely on the fear of their workers that authorities will prioritise issues around their immigration status over the abuse that they have faced. Unscrupulous employers use threats about illegality, detention and removal as a method of control and coercion. This turns the state’s immigration framework into a tool of the exploiter—Amendment 79B would combat this.

These Benches also oppose Amendments 29A and 31A, which are a reversal of the modern slavery safeguards that appeared in the Illegal Migration Act. Sections 22 to 28 of the Illegal Migration Act removed protections for victims of modern slavery who had arrived in the country without a valid visa. The current Bill includes the repeal of those sections, a step that is widely welcomed, because these positions could have been catastrophic for survivors. Therefore, we support the Government in proceeding with these amendments and in removing those sections from the Illegal Migration Act. Section 29, as proposed here, is dangerous because it expands the scope of public order disqualifications and makes them mandatory. This measure mandates disqualification for potential victims of modern slavery unless there are compelling circumstances, even if they have been convicted of an offence of any length.

In conclusion, we support the Government in their intention of removing those sections in the Illegal Migration Act and press them on a way in which the firewall of which we have spoken earlier can be protected.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, efforts to tackle modern slavery are indeed a noble and important cause—we all agree on that—but, as my noble friend Lord Harper said in Committee, there is a balance to be struck.

My noble friend Lady Maclean of Redditch has made many of the points I would have made, and I will not repeat those arguments, particularly on Report. Suffice to say, however, that protections which were initially intended to protect victims of modern slavery have now become loopholes that are being exploited by those with no right to be here, and whose claims are too often totally spurious. It does our country no good. It does not build public faith in the immigration and asylum systems when illegal migrants abuse modern slavery protections to circumvent their own legitimate deportation.

To that end, my noble friend Lady Maclean is right to highlight that the Government have a number of legislative tools at their disposal. It is unfortunate that they are seeking to repeal those powers, and even more unfortunate that the Liberal Democrats wish to remove those others that the Government intend to retain.

We take particular issue with Amendment 69. When it comes to tackling the border crisis, surely there cannot ever be enough information sharing. The noble Baroness’s amendment would prohibit public authorities mentioned in it sharing information regarding a suspected victim of modern slavery. We fear this may only encourage more people to make spurious claims in a last-ditch attempt to halt removal from the United Kingdom.

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly in support of my noble friend’s amendment. In July I visited Harmondsworth IRC as a member of the APPG on detention. One lesson I learned from that was about the poor quality of legal advice and access to it. I heard from talking to some of the men who were detained and NGOs working there that the failure to provide decent legal advice for the detainees is a systemic issue that needs addressing urgently.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, at the beginning of his remarks, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said that this was Pro Bono Week. I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that he has fulfilled his job for this House. I am sure that the Minister will be very grateful for the advice that he has given pro bono and I hope that, if he asks for more, the noble Lord will be willing to give it.

I have learned two things from what has been said so far in this debate. First, we have a crisis of legal aid. No one who has spoken has said that it is all fine and dandy. Secondly, what is available is not working well.

On the first of those, a survey by Bail for Immigration Detainees found that only 42% of people held in IRCs had a lawyer in their immigration case in 2025. That is a steep decline, down from 75% in 2012—some years ago. For those detained in prison, 71% of respondents had not received legal advice under the scheme. The second concern raised is of course about what is provided; that is the 30 minutes, often considered to be of doubtful quality and insufficient. As professionals have argued, immigration law is highly complex: those of us who are working on the Bill will understand that this is a very highly complex area of work. It is unrealistic to believe that a detained person, who may be traumatised, speak little English or have just arrived, can navigate this complex labyrinth of law on their own and without professional assistance.

The amendment is necessary not merely on humanitarian grounds but to protect the integrity of the rule of law itself—first, access to justice, and secondly, practical effectiveness. I do not want to repeat the points about cost, which are obviously going to come up in the response, but it would save taxpayers’ money: invest to save early. That is quite clear from everything that has been said so far. We must be clear also that a failure to provide legal aid can amount to a breach of fundamental rights, particularly under Article 6 of the European convention, so this amendment offers a practical and necessary solution to a systemic failure. It mirrors existing successful arrangements, such as the immigration police station advice scheme, which is used when detained persons are found to have no criminal element in their case. It would simply ensure that an immigration lawyer is allocated to an individual upon entering detention, providing a necessary check against unlawful incarceration and ensuring fair process.

I end with a quote that was given by one of the organisations working in this field:

“Ensuring prompt legal counsel for detained persons is not merely a gesture of goodwill; it is the necessary foundation for a fair judicial process. A system that incarcerates first and allows access to justice later is like starting a race 48 hours behind the starting gun—the individual is severely disadvantaged before they even begin to fight for their rights”.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, in Committee we had a very detailed and well-informed discussion of this amendment in the existing framework of legal aid in the asylum and immigration system—with a House full of eminent lawyers, this was always bound to be the case. On our side, of course we welcome efficiency, and we have looked hard at this amendment, but we are not persuaded by the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and other noble Lords that the proposals they advance will have the beneficial effect that they seek.

Amendment 33 would ensure that any person detained under a relevant detention power would have access to a raft of legal aid within 48 hours, but to move from the current situation, where a person is given a 30-minute window for free legal advice, to one where there is a 48-hour window in which legal aid can be given, would come with entirely unknown costs. The current system already diverts scarce resources away from those in genuine need: every pound spent on repeat litigation, in particular, is a pound not spent on border security, faster processing or refugee support. We are unable to support Amendment 33.

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[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, it is entirely positive that we can say, “Let’s look at the wording of this”; we might have some qualms about whether we need to reword it to avoid unintended consequences—that is fine. The noble Lord, Lord Mackinlay, made a good point: this is a very important moral debate. It is one that more and more people in the country are frustrated that Parliament is not having, so it is positive that we are doing so today.

I will emphasise three things. First, we often consider what will happen to the safety of people if we deport them to countries that we deem unsafe. But the key question is actually: what about the safety of British citizens? They get forgotten in that whole discussion. We end up with this ridiculous situation where we say, “Oh, I’m really worried about this person who has committed a serious sex crime. If they are returned to their country, they might be thrown into some terribly unsafe prison. They might be beaten up or killed for the fact that they’re a sex criminal. We’ve got to save them”. We say that rather than emphasise the victims of that person. That is why people get frustrated about the topsy-turvy nature of this.

Secondly, until we legislate on this, the British public could rightly say that the Government have no control over a decision, which they want to make, to deport foreign nationals who commit crimes in this country. That is entirely appropriate for legislation, even if we need to work out the wording so that it is proportionate.

Finally, we are about to start the Sentencing Bill, which I am very interested in. The state of prisons is incredibly depressing at the moment. In fact, while we are talking about unsafe places, I do not know that going to prison here is safe for anyone. They are overcrowded and there are serious problems with our prison system. It is unexplainable that we would have people in that prison system, taking spaces that we just do not have, when we should, by right, be able to say that they do not deserve to be in this country. They broke the social contract after they were given an opportunity to be here. Sometimes they are illegal—that is different—but if they are given the right to remain, and then they murder, rape or steal from their fellow citizens, they have broken the basis on which we trusted them to stay. That is reasonable to say.

The noble Lord, Lord Deben, made a good point: this is not an extreme position but a normal, commonsensical position. Based on everything I have heard from the Government, I think they agree with that. If they do, they need to legislate accordingly, which is what these amendments are trying to do.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I think it will be no surprise to Members of the Conservative Party that we oppose Amendments 34 and 72. It is quite interesting that, once the rat had been let out of the sack that the amendment was not capable of being put to the House, of course, this debate turned into a Second Reading debate about other issues on the way we should be talking about this matter. I will turn to that in a moment, but let us just take these amendments at face value as they are written, because that is what the Report stage of a Bill is about: reporting about amendments which we are discussing, not about raising other issues which should have been raised at Second Reading way back in the beginning.

These amendments embody an approach of absolute and mandatory deportation that sacrifices judicial discretion and proportionality in favour of unworkable rigidity, thereby undermining fundamental legal safeguards and international obligations. Amendment 34 proposes a sweeping new deportation regime. The explanatory material states:

“This new clause would require the deportation of any foreign national who is convicted of any offence in the United Kingdom”.


Further, it seeks to amend the Immigration Act 1971 by requiring a court to sentence a non-British citizen over the age of 17 convicted of “an offence” to deportation from the United Kingdom. You might call this the “Mars bar” scheme, whereby anybody who steals a Mars bar will be deported, or, perhaps, if that was not serious enough, you may have to steal a multi-pack of Mars bars rather than a single one.

We must oppose this proposal on multiple grounds. First, there is a lack of proportionality and balance. The amendment would introduce an obligation to make a deportation order with no exceptions and no discretion. Such an absolute provision ignores the circumstances of the offence, mitigating factors or the length of time a person may have lawfully been in this country. It comes to something when a noble Lord prays in aid the ECHR to support us against an amendment from the Conservative Party. That is an extremely interesting way forward.

Secondly, on risk of torture and human rights breach, this obligation to deport would apply even if removal would send the person concerned to a country where they would face torture or even, in some countries, where they have capital punishment. The proposal is unworkable and contrary to our international obligations.

Thirdly, on vulnerability in modern slavery, Amendment 34 would remove protections for under-18s and victims of human trafficking. For example, a small child who arrived in the UK, committed a crime, was sentenced to prison and was subsequently found to be a victim of modern slavery for the purposes of forced criminality would be subject to automatic removal without any court or tribunal mechanism to consider the circumstances of their case.

Fourthly, on eroding criminal safeguards, Amendment 34 seeks to amend Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 by omitting instances of “knowingly” from certain immigration offences. Removing this element of mens rea—a lack of knowledge as a defence—will likely result in consequential deportation decisions being subject to more challenges under the European Convention on Human Rights.

Amendment 72 would place a duty to remove foreign offenders on the Secretary of State. It mandates that a deportation order must be made against any non-British citizen who

“has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment”—

this is different in this amendment—and “has completed their term”. Crucially, it dictates that:

“The Secretary of State must make the deportation order … within the period of seven days”.


This amendment falls foul of some of the critical flaws in Amendment 34—first, in terms of an unworkable timeline and mandatory duty. Placing a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to execute a deportation order within a rigid seven-day period against any person sentenced to imprisonment disregards the complex process required for removal, particularly when a human rights for protection claim is lodged.

Secondly, there is an absence of scrutiny and due process. Such an absolute obligation removes necessary judicial oversight and requires deportation without considering the individual’s human rights. The objective of mandating deportation in this manner risks encouraging offending behaviour and would not necessarily increase removals from the UK.

Thirdly, the amendment conflicts with legal principles. In mandating deportation for any offence, conviction without exception, it ignores the fact that deportation orders can be made against those who are victims of coercion or human trafficking. To support these kinds of absolutist amendments, especially in the context of deportation, is incredibly difficult for anyone who believes in the rule of law and due process.

We must remain resolute in our commitment to deport those who abuse our hospitality by committing crimes in the UK, but the paths produced and proposed by Amendments 34 and 72 substitute effective, balanced legislation with measures of legal absolutism. We must empower the Government to act decisively, but we must do so in a way that respects fundamental rights, due process and proportionality. These amendments fail all those critical tests.