Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Hamwee
Main Page: Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hamwee's debates with the Home Office
(1 day, 19 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support Amendment 57, to which I have added my name. I too thank the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium for all the help that it has given us. I also support Amendment 27.
For very good reason, and not for the first time, Amendment 57 would introduce statutory safeguards for individuals whose age is disputed. To the noble Lord, Lord Harper, I say: we do not suggest that we should prohibit visual assessments at the border. What Amendment 57 would ensure is that those assessments comply with child protection principles, especially the benefit of the doubt standard established in case law and international guidance. This principle requires that where age is uncertain, the individual should be treated as a child unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary. That is the principle which I believe we should stick to.
The amendments align with recommendations by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has already said. Crucially, the amendment also addresses the Government’s proposal to use AI-based facial age estimation. I feel that I am a broken record on the subject of facial age estimation, and indeed on age estimation in general. We have had to contend with the proposal to use X-ray systems to determine age, and time after time we have argued that not only is it inaccurate—a point made clearly by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—to use teeth or wrists for X-rays but it is unethical to expose people to unnecessary radiation and that X-rays should be used only for the benefit of the people concerned. We are delighted that the present Government are not proposing X-rays among their scientific methods, and we are also immensely grateful to the Minister for having conversations with us on this subject.
However, the AI systems suggested are not foolproof either. Indeed, independent evaluations show that these systems have error margins of between two and four years, as the noble Lord, Lord Harper, said, and they exhibit demographic bias, which is exactly what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has said—particularly, it turns out, for younger ages and minority ethnic groups. Academic research confirms that children’s faces are harder to assess accurately and that claims of near-perfect accuracy remain unverified. Overreliance on such technology risks replicating systematic errors rather than fixing them, so we will be replacing human error with machine error.
We all recognise that age assessment is complex and cannot be solved by one measure, but we believe that the Government need to listen to experts and adopt safeguards that make the system safer for children. Amendment 57 offers a practical, rights-based solution. It would preserve operational flexibility at the border, reinforce compliance with children’s legislation, and ensure transparency and accountability in the use of technology. I hope the Minister can give us some more details about how the trial of this AI technology will work, and indeed that he can reassure us that it will not be relied on unless it is truly accurate—but it looks as if we are a long way from that.
My Lords, I was too late to put my name down to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I am sure she will understand that the points that have been made on the second amendment in this group largely apply to hers as well.
The noble Lord, Lord Harper, tells us that adults game the system. I agree, but safeguarding applies both ways, both if someone is assessed as a child when he is an adult—it is usually a he—and if he is assessed as an adult when in fact he is a child. The question that we have is: where do you start from? How do you approach this: that claimants are fraudulent, or that claimants should be believed until the contrary is shown—the benefit of the doubt, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, has said? Where is the greatest danger? It will be obvious from my signature to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, where I believe it is.
I think, too—I will accuse myself of this; I do not want to accuse others of it—that there is a cultural bias. I say that even though I have a lot of Middle Eastern blood in me, so I should not be as biased as someone who is an ancient Briton, but I have detected it in myself.
I accept that this is a hugely difficult area and that technology is advancing almost as fast as we can draft amendments, which makes it all the more difficult. I am sure it has advanced a long way since the time I was stopped at the Gare du Nord because I seemed not to be the same as the person shown in the photograph in my passport because I was wearing earrings, which meant that the distance between my ears was not the real one.
I asked a couple of Questions for Written Answer recently. On the first one I got generalised assurance, so I asked some very specific questions, which inevitably got an Answer about the Home Office providing further updates regarding testing “in due course”. In a way, the thrust of my question today is to ask the Minister how and when Parliament is to be updated on what is going on—not just Parliament but all the stakeholders. It is not word I particularly like but it describes the variety of people concerned with this.
The Answer to my Question of 6 October included:
“If and when this technology is used in live cases, full information and guidance will be available to those undergoing”
facial age estimation
“as well as to staff involved in the process”.
That suggests that the Home Office will stay in its silo looking at the issues and at the process, without involving all those stakeholders who need to be included—social workers, for instance. In the case of the second amendment it is social workers in local authorities, because it the local authorities that have to carry the can and look after children under 18.
I accept that the figures reported on GOV.UK are only up to quarter 2 of 2024, so I am making the point as a general one for all of us and not accusing the Government of anything, but they show that in three of the quarters the issue was resolved with the claimant being over 18. In fact, the numbers show that there was very little difference between those under and those over 18 in the particular quarters, but in the other five quarters considerably more were found to be less than 18, including 240 at less than 18 compared to 18 plus, 744 at less than 18—I am fudging my figures. I do not mean to fudge them; I am just making a mess off them because I have not written them out properly. But the differences in the numbers at less than 18 were considerably more than those found to be over 18.
The inspector made a number of recommendations. The formal response is that the Government have accepted them all. That is then followed by an explanation which, again, does not seem to be as precise as I, for one, would like it to be. I hope, in particular, where the Home Office has said in response to the inspector that the date of implementation will be December 2025—next month—that the Minister will agree to report on those various points very soon, perhaps in February, because December is not very far away. If things are going to happen in December, and I can see he is checking this, it would be very helpful for the House to know that a system is in place for reporting on what is going on.
My Lords, I will briefly set out why I do not think this is a particularly helpful amendment, which I am sure the noble Baroness is not entirely surprised to hear. Despite what she said, I am not sure the amendment is entirely intended to be helpful.
This is an area in which there is a balance to strike. The noble Baroness is quite right that the Illegal Migration Act shifted the balance—a little—in favour of the Home Secretary; the balance had drifted too far in the other direction. I strongly support the need for some limits and constraint on the ability of the Home Secretary to use detention powers, but if you are not careful, those who try to frustrate the system inappropriately—people who have no right to be here—will use the rules to frustrate an attempt legitimately to remove them from the country.
I saw many cases of people who had no right to be in the United Kingdom, and who had failed on a number of occasions to stay here through the legal processes, using this as another tool. If you have strict, bright-line rules, the danger is that people game and frustrate the system. The Home Secretary does not want to detain more people than is absolutely necessary; there is a very significant cost in doing so. As she well knows, the Home Office does not have an unlimited budget, but it is necessary to have these powers.
Certainly, the powers that were in place before the provision the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, is trying to repeal needed strengthening. As I said, this moves things in the direction of the Home Secretary, but as with all the Home Secretary’s powers, she has to exercise them in a reasonable and lawful manner, and all the decisions she takes are challengeable by judicial review.
The Illegal Migration Act still refers to whether the detention is “reasonably necessary”. It still has that test, so the Home Secretary has to exercise that judgment. If somebody feels that the Home Secretary has got that judgment wrong, it is still open to them to challenge it. However, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that the balance has shifted in favour of the Home Secretary.
I come back to what I said in the earlier group: there is a balance to strike here. Much of the debate so far is coming from one particular angle. I do not criticise the noble Baroness for doing it, but the other side of the argument needs to be put, so the House can hear a more balanced argument. We need a firm system which allows people to come to and stay in the United Kingdom if they are following our rules or have a legitimate asylum claim; equally importantly, where they do not, they should not be able to use rules and regulations that are there to protect people, in order to frustrate the legitimate exercise of that power.
To all those who want an asylum system, or one that allows people to come here legitimately, I urge them to be careful what they wish for, because we are getting to the point where the public are losing patience. Ministers are ultimately accountable both to the House of Commons and to the House of Lords, but if the public do not feel that Ministers are accountable, or if they feel that they do not have the powers to deliver a system the public want to see, public belief and confidence in the system will disappear, and that would be very dangerous. Those who want a more liberal system would rue the day that that happened.
Therefore, having that balance is necessary. The changes made in the Illegal Migration Act to the powers on detention moved in the right direction. The fact that the Government, despite doing a pretty wholesale removal of the powers in that Act, have not removed this one suggests that Ministers think that shift in the balance was sensible. I therefore hope that it remains in place. Regretfully, if the noble Baroness presses her amendment to a vote, I will not be able to support it. I hope she understands why, and I suspect it will not be a surprise to her to learn that I am unable to support it.
My Lords, we should of course be aware of public feeling, but we should also not inflame it. We need to be careful with that. The noble Baroness’s Amendment 32 seeks to leave out Clause 41(17), which states that the amendments made by most of the subsections in that clause
“are to be treated as always having had effect”.
We should be very wary of the retrospectivity contained in them. The Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, is about to finalise, I hope, a report on the rule of law, and we point to retrospectivity, or retroactivity—I am never sure whether there is a difference—as threatening the rule of law, along with legal certainty and so on. I am therefore glad that the noble Baroness tabled this amendment.
My Lords, I will make just a brief intervention from us on this matter, which was raised in Committee. I am grateful to the Minister for telling me what reasons he had for not taking out Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act. It raises some further questions, which I guess the Minister might have been expecting. Essentially, the noble Baroness’s amendments aim collectively to inject greater protection of civil liberties and to ensure proportionality in the use of detention powers, and they demand clarity regarding the mental element required for the new immigration offences in the Bill.
In his letter to me, the Minister said of Section 12 that
“policies to differentiate in line with the provision can be resumed if required”.
He said that they
“are not currently in use”,
and they have not been in use since this Government took office. He said:
“This Government is prioritising steps to restore order to the asylum system”,
et cetera, as one might expect. But, he continued:
“While the Government reviews the approach, it would not be appropriate to remove these provisions from the statute book”.
Can the Minister tell me what review of what approach will determine whether this provision should be removed, and whether, in the immediate future, there is any intention to recommence Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act?
In conclusion, having some clarity on this matter would be useful. The Law Society, as noble Lords might expect, says that the retention of Section 12, by removing the
“court’s ability to decide for itself whether the detention of a person for the purposes of removal is for a reasonable period”,
risks increasing unlawful and prolonged detention. There is currently a legal aspect to retention; I know that it is not being used, but we need to ensure that the fallback described by the Law Society is in place. I look forward to the Minister’s response to those questions.
My Lords, I also have Amendments 69 and 79B in this group, which includes Amendments 29A and 31A from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean. Amendment 29 would repeal Section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act, a section which, like others, is not in force.
Section 29, if enforced, would broaden the public order disqualification to mandate—because “may” becomes “must”—that potential and confirmed victims of modern slavery and human trafficking are disqualified from protection, identification and support; are denied a recovery period and limited leave to remain in the UK; and may be removed from the UK, unless there are compelling circumstances which mean that the provisions should not apply. I say “broaden” because it includes the deportation of people who have committed low-level offences, which takes us into the territory of Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, which I think is now quite generally regarded as being inadequate—if not in its own terms, though there is some consensus around that, in that the offenses which are excluded are too few and it does not exclude some that are not so serious.
The clause provides a defence for modern slavery victims who are compelled to commit a crime, but it is also inadequate in the awareness of the clause, and therefore whether it should be brought into consideration in a prosecution. The Illegal Migration Act provision was criticised by a previous independent asylum seekers commissioner, who said that limiting the public order exemption would
“severely limit our ability to convict perpetrators and dismantle organised crime groups”.
I emphasise those words because the focus of this legislation is, as I understand it, intended to be on the perpetrators and organised crime groups.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights raised the same point and the Government responded, saying that this section would, if commenced, bring all foreign national offenders into scope for mandatory consideration of disqualification from modern slavery protections. I again emphasise those two words because it is not mandatory only if there are “compelling circumstances”, which is a difficult phrase—difficult ever to prove.
Amendments 69 and 79B would both restrict information sharing between public authorities when vulnerable, abused or exploited people are involved. They have particular need of protection and the concern extends not only to people who are exploited and who would like to be able to report the exploitation; it applies also to other people—their colleagues—who would like to report on their behalf but are concerned about exposing themselves. I do not want to repeat what I said in Committee, although I do not resile from it.
We had some banter then about a photograph of the Ministers celebrating the passage of the 2015 Act, if that was the right occasion. We have had some discussion about the series of photographs. I was sent a photograph as well, which included both the noble Lord and me supporting the position of overseas domestic workers. I think the Minister thinks that was an even earlier occasion. However, the passage of time has not changed the issue, even though we may look—certainly I do—rather different from how I did in that photograph. The Minister reminded us that the Bill is about tackling organised immigration crime. He used the term “turbocharge”, and I have already talked about the commitment we should have to victims. I have searched for a sort of equivalent terminology and all I have come up with is “not steamrollering them”.
The Minister referred to the NRM—the national referral mechanism—providing
“a structured, compassionate route for potential victims of modern slavery to receive help without fear of intimidation and immediate immigration consequences”.—[Official Report, 10/7/25; col. 1486.]
The problem is that they do fear, and they are deterred from reporting, whether on their own behalf or on behalf of someone else. He said also:
“In the immigration White Paper, we have made specific reference to Kalayaan”—
that is, the organisation which supports overseas domestic workers—
“and domestic workers, and I will reflect on those points as we go through”.—[Official Report, 10/7/25; col. 1484.]
I did word searches on the White Paper and I found one reference to domestic workers, though it was in another context, and I will return to all that in Amendment 44, probably on the next day of Committee—although, of course, if there has been any reconsideration to date, I would be happy to hear it. I could not find “Kalayaan”. I am not trying to make a cheap point, but, if it is there, perhaps I could be directed to it following the debate.
The most important point is that the Government recognise that there is a genuine concern around here and intend to reconsider the overseas domestic worker visa route. So any further information or news that the Minister can give the House today would be welcome.
The two other amendments in this group would retain Sections 22, 23, and 25 to 29 of the Illegal Migration Act; in other words, they would bring in Section 29, to which I have spoken, and other provisions relating to modern slavery, except one which applies to Scotland. They raise the question about how the noble Baroness considers we should treat victims of modern slavery and human trafficking, including those who claim to be victims, and what should be the future of the NRM. I beg leave to move Amendment 29.
My Lords, to follow on from what the noble Baroness has just said, my Amendments 29A and 31A would in fact reintroduce and commence the modern slavery clauses and provisions in the Illegal Migration Act 2023. The net effect of them would mean that individuals who have entered illegally would not be able to use modern slavery provisions as a route to frustrate removal, but it is important that we continue to support genuine victims at the same time. The reason I have tabled these amendments is that, while they were necessary back in 2023 when this Act was passed, the need for them has become even more pressing now.
I declare an interest as a former Home Office Minister who led on the modern slavery support system and has seen the challenges of operationalising this system and protecting victims of this awful crime, which is what we all want to do.
The world has changed. Since the Modern Slavery Act was passed, patterns of migration have shifted dramatically. The system that we built, for very good reasons, over a decade ago is now being stretched, and in some cases exploited in ways Parliament never intended. In particular, I can find no reference in the original debates that we intended to create a welfare and support system for victims of crime from all over the world, rather than for our own citizens who have been trafficked and abused. Yet that is exactly what is happening now.
In 2024, for the first time, 44% of referrals to the NRM reported exploitation overseas, overtaking those claiming exploitation within the UK, at 43%. This concern is shared across Parliament. I quote the Home Secretary who said, in response to the egregious situation that we saw connected to the one-in, one-out asylum-seeking individual who claimed that he was a victim of trafficking in France, that some asylum seekers were making “vexatious, last-minute claims” of being victims of modern slavery to block removal. The Home Secretary and the Government can simply use the measures already on the statute book. That is the fastest way to tackle this, if they can perhaps get over the “not invented here” objection.
When we have these debates, those who do the important work of supporting victims will claim and state, rightly, that it is impossible to provide definitive evidence that the system is being abused. I agree with that, which is why I have tabled amendments later on to address that point. But, whether we like it or not, there is a significant interaction between illegal arrivals and referrals into the NRM. Just this quarter, we have seen the highest number of referrals since the start of the NRM in 2009. The people who are being referred now are non-UK nationals: the largest groups being referred are Albanians, followed by Vietnamese. For context, in 2014, the entire system handled fewer than 2,500 referrals, yet last year it handled nearly 2,500 referrals just from Albania. This surge has placed immense strain on the system and on public confidence, and of course also on taxpayers and on the public purse, because the Government have committed to spending £379 million over five years on the modern slavery support system.
In the Lords debates on these clauses of the Illegal Migration Act that my amendment seeks to retain, my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth, speaking for the then Government, said:
“It is a central tenet of the Bill that a person who satisfies the conditions in Clause 2 will not have their asylum, human rights or modern slavery claims considered in the United Kingdom. It is a sad but incontrovertible fact that our modern slavery protections are susceptible to abuse by illegal migrants seeking to frustrate their removal from the United Kingdom. Whereas in 2019 just 6% of people arriving in the UK on a small boat and detained for return involved a modern slavery referral, the figure in 2021 was 73%”.”.—[Official Report, 10/5/23; col. 1784.]
Britain can be both compassionate and firm, but it cannot be naive. I follow my noble friend Lord Harper in asking this House to be honest that people will seek to lie about their experiences, especially when the incentives are so strong and the evidence threshold necessarily very low. These amendments would protect those exploited while removing incentives for illegal entry.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for calling me an expert on modern slavery matters. I dealt with the Bill 10 years ago, and a lot of swimming around the goldfish bowl has been undertaken since then. We should recognise the importance of that Act in establishing basic criteria, which the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, brought forward, and which I, as the then shadow Minister, supported and tried to stretch even further, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, continues to remind me.
The key thing about the point made to me by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, is what I referred to in opening: a case-by-case basis. The Act, if commenced, would amend the public order disqualification to allow more foreign national offenders to be considered for deportation, but on a case-by-case basis for disqualification from the modern slavery protections on public order grounds. It is important that we do not have a blanket dismissal but do have the potential for the national referral mechanism, the Home Secretary and others to look at these matters on a case-by-case basis.
I hope that will satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. He shakes his head to say that it does not, but sometimes I cannot satisfy every Member of this House. I say to him simply that the case-by-case basis means that if someone wants to make the case that they should not be covered by this, the opportunity is there for them to do so. I therefore beg that the noble Baroness withdraws her amendment.
My Lords, with regard to the reporting restrictions, as in two of the amendments in this group, I say again that it is a matter of how those affected perceive the situation, because that affects their behaviour. With regard to Amendment 29, of course, the provision has still not been brought into force. I wish the Home Office had the courage of its convictions and got rid of it.
If we are being told, as I think we are, that the subject of modern slavery, protection for victims and so on may come before us in some new form, and is certainly being considered, that would be the point at which to bring in some of what is in Section 29 if that was thought to be appropriate—some but not all of it, perhaps. I can hope only that it remains not brought into force. I do not think that is a very good way to deal with legislation, but I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 29.
My Lords, I will raise two points. I very much support someone who has an order of deportation being removed, as I suspect the whole House does. However, Amendment 34 is not, as the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, suggested, for somebody who has a prison sentence; it applies to anyone who has been convicted of an offence. Does that mean that if somebody is convicted of careless driving, they are actually to be deported? On reading Amendment 34(2), that is exactly what it appears to mean. That seems to me a trifle extreme.
Secondly, although I recognise that deportation to a safe country that is prepared to take the person back is one thing, where, I wonder, does the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, intend that people who have come from unsafe countries should go to? What concerns me is that when someone from Afghanistan, Syria at the moment, Darfur or Iran, commits an offence, it is unlikely that they could be sent back there. Therefore, where, according to the wording of this amendment, should these people go?
My Lords, would the noble and learned Baroness agree that it could also be described as extreme that, as per Amendment 72, a deportation order would not be subject to appeal under the two Acts cited, or any other enactment, and that:
“A deportation order made under this section is final and not liable to be set aside in any court”?
My Lords, I support both these amendments. It is sensible that we set a presumption that those who are here effectively as our guests have to follow the rules. Insisting that they be deported if they commit crimes strikes me as very sensible. Putting it in statute is important. We have done this before in the past, when we were having problems with courts interpreting very broadly some of the human rights legislation around people’s right to a family life. We made some clear rules and put them in primary legislation in the Immigration Act 2014, and that largely—not entirely—dealt with those problems. There was a rule in there that if you were given a prison sentence of a certain length, you had to be deported. This is a logical extension of that. It would strengthen the Government’s hand in a number of the cases that my noble friends Lord Jackson and Lord Cameron set out, where Ministers sound as frustrated as the rest of us that they are not able to deport people, or, if they are, only after a very lengthy legal process.
To pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about challenging the deportation, my noble friend’s amendment is drafted as such because the person concerned would have had the opportunity under the criminal law to challenge his sentence if there was some issue with the legal case, but, having been convicted of the criminal offence concerned, it should follow that they are then deported. You should not get a second bite of the cherry to have, in effect, another appeal when you have already had the chance to appeal against the sentence in the first place.
The other benefit of these amendments is that, although initially they would indeed be challenging for the Government for the reasons that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, set out, including around where you can send people back to, the proposal would force the Government to do two things. First, it would force them to engage with some of the countries where returning people is more challenging. You can do that by sending people back before they finish serving their sentence—you have a prisoner transfer agreement, where they can go back to their home country and continue serving the sentence in that country, before their release from prison. That is the preferable outcome, where they still have a measure of justice.
The second thing the proposal would do is force the Government to confront the cases that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, set out. I accept that they are challenging, but it cannot be right that, because somebody is from a certain country, they can come to the United Kingdom, commit any level of criminality and, once they have finished their prison sentence, we cannot get rid of them.
We should force the Government to confront two tests. The first is to ask whether someone who comes from a country that we do not deem safe should forfeit the right to not be sent back to it by their conduct.