Commercial Payments Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st July 2026 Lords Chamber

My final amendment on ESG is not really about ESG at all or about seeking more and burdensome reporting requirements on small businesses and micro-businesses. Rather, it goes to the point, which has been raised in many previous groups, about how we give clarity at every opportunity on which businesses are not currently good or “gold” when it comes to payments. Given that these ESG requirements exist for large businesses, it would make them more effective and more useful not to add to those 93,000 words but potentially to reduce them, to have some more meaning in them and, particularly in the S and G of ESG, to have the sense that that company has to give detailed reporting on its payment practices. If the large companies made the S and G have far greater meaning in those reports, they could even be shorter as a consequence.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, my Amendment 81 in this group addresses a single issue. There is no possible way that the Small Business Commissioner can achieve his or her purpose without a strong whistleblowing framework incorporated into the office.

In this legislation, the commissioner is not even a prescribed person required to keep the disclosures of a whistleblower confidential. A complainant—someone raising an issue about wrong that they believe has been done to themselves—is very different from a whistleblower, who is identifying information which they believe demonstrates some form of bad practice, but they are not the victim of that practice and they are not bringing a complaint about themselves. That is one of the weaknesses in this legislation. Without those protections of being a prescribed person, even if the commissioner wants to keep an issue that she—later, it could be he—has discussed under wraps, all that will be subject to FOIs and subject access requests. Although there can be some redaction in those, it becomes extremely difficult when there is not a right of confidentiality.

Many suppliers who are paid late will be afraid to complain. That is simply a reality. They will be afraid to complain directly to the commissioner for fear of getting a reputation as troublemakers and losing future business. That is why the investigative powers of the commissioner are so important and such a significant part of the Bill. But in many cases, there is no way that the commissioner will be able to pursue an investigation without getting insider information. Insider information comes from whistleblowers, but very few will disclose the relevant information if it means the end of their careers and financial ruin.

The Bill presently offers no confidential route for a whistleblower and very little protection from detriment. An employee of a large company that is paying late, who speaks out to show that his or her employer is abusing payment rules and is consequently fired, can go to an employment tribunal. Some would say that is fine; that is the way to avoid retribution. He or she needs £40,000 to £50,000 to be able to get to a preliminary hearing. The case will not start for three years, because the tribunals are so backlogged. With appeals, even winning cases can take five to seven years. The word gets quickly around the industry, ensuring that the whistleblower cannot get another job. Some whistleblowers belong to trade unions. That trade union may well have an insurance agreement to pay for legal representation at the tribunal, but the terms of the insurance mean that the insurance company can withdraw if it decides the case is unlikely to succeed, or it can press for early settlement, which has the effect of silencing the content of the issue about which the whistleblowing was raised. Most insurance companies do one or the other; very rarely do they ever see a case through. For whistleblowers who are not employees—suppliers, associates, directors and competitors—there is not even the protection of the employment tribunal. There is absolutely nothing they can do to stop revenge and detriment.

The best investigators that we have in the finance and business sphere—HMRC, the SFO, the NCA and the CMA—all understand that whistleblowers are vital and have been strengthening their whistleblower framework, some of them very significantly, including with rewards. Most of their successful cases involve whistleblower-obtained evidence. The old trope that monitoring and supervision are sufficient has long been discredited. I would like to see an overarching office of the whistleblower sitting under the Cabinet Office, able to act as a hub with spokes going out to various people, including the Small Business Commissioner, but we are where we are and that does not exist.

I hope the Minister will look very seriously at the amendment I have put down and either accept it or come up with his own version. It provides for the Small Business Commissioner to have an office of the whistleblower within their purview. It provides a place for a whistleblower to make a disclosure that is protected and confidential, unless he or she gives permission for that disclosure to be made public—sometimes people will do that, particularly when taking a case to court. It provides for redress where the whistleblower suffers detriment. At the base of this, the commissioner would be a prescribed person and Parliament would receive annual reports. This is a missing element from the Bill and I hope that the Minister will address it, because, frankly, the effectiveness of the Bill will depend on there being an effective whistleblower route.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I make one brief observation on Amendment 83. When one looks back at the last group of amendments and at this one, one sees that what is happening, in effect, is the creation of an entirely alternate system of dispute resolution—a new form of court or adjudication procedure. It is also apparent from the focus of the debate that this is not easy legislation to follow. I therefore think that, if one is to provide access to justice—that justice now being provided by the Small Business Commissioner—we must put the rights into ordinary language.

As experience showed in the 19th century, when the county courts were created—which had the same idea as all this—once you let lawyers in, you destroy them. It is imperative that lawyers do not become involved because it will destroy the system. It destroyed the county courts and it destroyed workmen’s compensation. Tribunals were created to get away from the lawyers. I will come back to this in a further amendment, but the key is to make procedure and law accessible without lawyers, or this system will not work.

Mini-tender Offers: Protection for Shareholders

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Wednesday 15th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I will of course be happy to meet the noble Baroness. As I hope we are showing through the process on that Bill, we are trying to rightsize our regulation to ensure that it is appropriate.

I will not comment too much on this particular case. The CEO of the FCA is committed to doing a thorough assessment. We have to be careful about what is regarded as a fair market price for products. The market assessment and the ability to make an offer, and making sure that those financial promotions are appropriate, should be absolutely clear and within the remit of the FCA. An under market price could sometimes be appropriate if there is no liquidity in that market, but I agree with the noble Baroness: we need to look at this specific instance to make sure that there is no wrongdoing. We believe that the FCA has the right process to be able to do that.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, mini-tenders, even by firms otherwise authorised by the FCA, fall below the FCA’s regulatory threshold. In the future, can the Financial Ombudsman require remedy for an investor caught in a mini-tender bait and switch, or do the clauses in the new financial services Bill requiring the FOS to conform to FCA rules in effect permit the mis-selling?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

The noble Baroness is correct, of course. Mini-tenders are not a distinct regulatory category. However, we believe that the activities associated with them currently fall within in the existing regulatory framework, including financial promotion rules and market abuse legislation. Where those communications are misleading, the regulator absolutely has to act. Again, we remain open-minded. It is only right that the FCA does this assessment, then we will take it in to see whether regulation is appropriate.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 6th July 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to open day 5 of Committee on the Financial Services and Markets Bill. In moving Amendment 130, which is in my name, I will also speak to Amendments 131 and 168. This is the latest round of AI and technology amendments to the Bill. It is a Bill that is curiously silent on these subjects. At least today there is something timely about my intervention in that, as I am on my feet, across town Sheldon Mills is launching his review into artificial intelligence in financial services—more of which presently.

Amendment 130 seeks to require financial services firms to have regard to all the issues around digital and operational resilience across all their activities. I know that the Minister in his response will refer to the cyber resilience Bill, which is coming to your Lordships’ House in a fortnight. Indeed, there is much in that Bill to commend. But in consideration of the significant impact and position of financial services in the UK economy, I believe that it would be helpful to have something about digital and operational resilience in this Bill.

We are not just talking about foreign states or negative acts from international adversaries; we are talking about issues around supply chain, third-party overreliance and concentration risk on particular providers—for example, in the cloud. Circumstances change and financial services institutions, believing that things will always be as they are, may find themselves extraordinarily exposed by the flick of a switch with perhaps only 90 minutes’ notice. I ask the Minister to consider this when he responds and state, in respect of financial service institutions’ significant contribution and place in the UK economy, whether he agrees that clauses in the Bill pertaining directly to these subjects would be helpful in our endeavours.

Amendments 131 and 168 are on artificial intelligence. Certainly, some of these concepts are covered in Sheldon Mills’ review. Given the proliferation and already deep penetration of artificial intelligence into financial services institutions—and, indeed, its use by not only sophisticated but retail and individual investors—will the Minister not agree that considering AI, not just in these clauses but throughout the Bill, would be beneficial to all those involved in financial services? When we say, “all those involved in financial services”, we could just as easily say “everybody”. The principles are clearly set out in Amendment 131, which takes us to the issue that I have raised on previous days around the Government’s approach to artificial intelligence. As stated, that is a domain-by-domain approach, yet there is nothing currently within this Bill.

Amendment 168 returns to an issue of which colleagues will be well aware, because I raised it when we deliberated on the Financial Services Act 2021 and FSMA 2023. That is to have an officer responsible for AI in all financial services institutions that develop, deploy and use AI—in other words, pretty much all financial services institutions. This is not cumbersome; it is not about compliance and it is certainly not about putting burdens on smaller firms—the proportionality principle would mean that we would be talking about a function rather than an individual—nor is this about delegation or abdication of the board’s responsibility, or indeed the senior managers’ responsibility, to the business. This is about having a point person: somebody who can orchestrate, who can co-ordinate and who can have that crucial horizontal view across an organisation, to assist internally and indeed present externally as to how AI is being used and deployed, for the benefit both of AI use internally and of customers.

To conclude, without having clauses on AI in the Bill, I believe that the legislation will be chronically insufficient for the challenges of our time. That is not the challenges of next year or five years’ time: AI is already impacting financial services right now. To give one example, how can we consider the consumer duty without considering how AI impacts on all elements of that? The Mills review has much good in it, but this legislation is before us today, and I believe that we have an opportunity to thread AI through it for the benefit of individuals, of institutions, of all of our financial services and, through that, of the entire economy of the United Kingdom. I look forward to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I was delighted when I saw that the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, had put down these amendments, because it is so apparent, as he has clearly stated, that the whole issue of digital and AI is missing from this Bill. Because of the pace of change and the impact—and strength of the impact—across all our financial services, this is an issue that has to be dealt with and grasped with some sense of urgency.

Like the noble Lord, I have been very interested in the Mills review, although, as it was published today, I have only had time to skim its summaries and some of the newspaper references to it. It is clear that, certainly from Sheldon Mills’ perspective—I think that most of us have, one way or another, dealt with Sheldon Mills over the years and very much respect his judgment—the FCA may well be short of relevant powers in dealing with AI. He noted particularly a lack of powers under the critical third-parties regime, which made sense to me. In his recommendations, he also raised issues around the regulatory perimeter, another area that we have raised on more than one occasion.

In recent years, it has not been uncommon—though I dread it—for the Government to present on Report amendments that deal with an area that has been missed from the body of a Bill in Committee. On this Bill, that would allow a period of thought and the opportunity to absorb and consider what is presented in the Mills review. Since financial services Bills do not come around that often, I very much hope that the Minister will seriously consider taking advantage of the Bill to get those kinds of protections in place. If he fails to do that, we might collectively have to come forward with something on Report. Frankly, given the intricacy, detail and complexity, this is an area where the Government coming forward with an answer would, I think, be welcomed across the House and very much, I hope, within the spirit and theme of the amendments presented by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes.

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his comments today on AI and digital resilience and for his comments on previous days. I declare my interest as the director of South Molton Street Capital, which is regulated by the FCA.

These amendments raise an interesting point about emerging technologies, digital resilience and the use of artificial intelligence in financial services, to be covered, as we have discussed, by the Mills review and the FCA itself. We will return to this subject in a later group, when my noble friend Lord Ranger of Northwood and the Opposition Front Bench will speak to our own amendments, particularly in relation to digital assets. We will also comment on supervision in a later group.

Both digital resilience and the proper use of AI are important. However, I am not convinced that this is the right way or the right place to tackle these issues. Our concern is that this could add another layer of regulation on firms that are already subject to a substantial body of obligations in this area. Financial services firms already operate under a wide range of frameworks relevant to AI governance, digital resilience and technology risk. The consumer duty, which we have touched on already, requires firms to deliver good outcomes for retail customers. The senior managers and certification regime provides a framework for accountability and governance. The FCA senior management arrangements and controls already require firms to maintain appropriate systems, controls, governance and risk management. Firms are subject to data protection law, including rules around automated decision-making and profiling. They are subject to equality law where discriminatory outcomes arise. They are subject to operational resilience requirements, outsourcing and third-party risk expectations, and, in some contexts, more specific requirements around algorithmic trading and market conduct.

We should therefore be cautious before adding new statutory requirements on top. That is particularly important because technology develops quickly and a prescriptive regulatory framework can rapidly become out of date. It can also lead to duplication, uncertainty and compliance activity that is focused more on satisfying the form of the requirement than managing the underlying risk.

I would be grateful for reassurance from the Minister about how Amendment 130 would interact with existing operational resilience and outsourcing requirements, and whether the Government believe that further statutory provision is needed.

On Amendment 131, the issues of transparency, bias, human oversight, and redress are all important, but they also overlap with existing duties on fair treatment, governance, data protection, discrimination and consumer outcomes. I would be reluctant to support an approach which simply adds a new AI-specific regime without first demonstrating that the existing framework is inadequate.

On Amendment 168, I understand the attraction of having a named individual responsible for AI governance. Accountability matters, but in financial services we have the SMCR regime to address supervision, and that regime is already quite complex, as we will address in a later group. A mandatory AI officer would probably cut across existing accountability structures in conduct, compliance, operations, risk, data and product governance. It could, in fact, cut across all existing supervisory positions.

This group raises important questions about the future of financial regulation. We must be alert to new risks, but we must also be careful not to respond to every emerging technology by simply adding another layer of regulation. The better approach is to ensure that regulation is proportionate, technology-neutral where possible and focused on real outcomes. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Mackinlay, makes so much sense to me on this issue. Having gone through the struggles of probate, I think that anything that will make it easier and more straightforward is good. I have worried since the announcement of the change that came with the last Budget, which brought pension pots into inheritance tax, that all kinds of consequences would significantly follow because most people who thought that they had a fairly straightforward settlement upon death will now find that they have handed a very complex picture on to their executors.

I want to put in a plea from personal experience: where there are people who have more than one nationality, or tax residency in one country and nationality in another, the nightmare becomes even more acute. I am not an adviser but I will give this advice: if one is aware that someone close is likely to die, it has almost become necessary to create a separate savings account to deal with all the relevant tax payments because it is so long before probate can be completed, particularly if that is in more than one jurisdiction. I felt at one point that I virtually lived at Kingston Crown Court because I was so often having to get new and updated copies of the death certificate to satisfy some new requirement from someone somewhere else. That is a painful and difficult time, but what the noble Lord, Lord Mackinlay, suggests seems straightforward and effective. Even if it deals with only one small piece, that is something.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Mackinlay of Richborough for tabling Amendment 142B. I am especially sorry to hear of the difficulties that he faced with his father’s estate. That is typical. When people die, their loved ones and executors often have a difficult time, and one of those difficulties is the delay that they often encounter with probate, as I know from family experience, and as we have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer.

There is both an emotional toll and a worry as to how to pay any IHT within the six-month window. Hopes that this might be extended by the Chancellor to 12 months have now been dashed, so this is a timely amendment. As I understand it, the issue is that, when someone dies, their bank, building society or investment accounts are frozen. Executors may then need to pay inheritance tax before probate can be granted, but they may need probate in order to access the funds from which that tax would be paid. The IHT423 direct payment scheme is designed to address that problem by allowing inheritance tax to be paid directly from the deceased’s bank, building society or investment account to HMRC before probate is granted. The difficulty, as we have heard, is that participation in that scheme is not consistent across all relevant financial institutions. That situation may mean that people have to find funds elsewhere, use personal savings, as we have heard, arrange borrowing or enter into more complicated interim arrangements.

The amendment rightly seeks consistency. It would require the FCA to make rules ensuring that the relevant regulated financial institutions facilitated the payment of inheritance tax through the IHT423 direct payment scheme. There may of course be operational legal issues that the Government will want to consider, but the basic principle seems right: if inheritance tax must be paid before probate, it would be in the interest of all if this inconsistency could be sorted out as a matter of urgency.

We should bear in mind that the interest mounts up at a punitive rate—4% above base rate, so that is 7.75% at present—and that it affects thousands of households every year. The Minister will know that more generally it will be a difficult year for those paying IHT, with IHT payable on pension pots from April 2027. That is all the more reason to show flexibility and sort out this issue, and to use the Bill to do so if that is necessary. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I am sorry that I was not able to be here last Wednesday for the debates on the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, and others that proposed the creation of an office for financial regulatory accountability. I have read the debates in Hansard and there is a remarkable similarity to three years ago when we debated similar amendments. This was a significant error in 2023 during the passage of the last Financial Services and Markets Act. It would have been a significant improvement to the ability of Parliament to hold the regulators to account—a complement rather than a replacement.

I shall touch briefly on the ability to scrutinise the proportionality of specific rules. I shall look closely in Hansard at the Minister’s comments during the second group, when he seemed to agree that the specific scrutiny of the rules is in fact important, contrary to the approach that the Bill now takes. This holding of the regulators to account by Parliament has become only more important and more difficult, I think, as we give yet more responsibilities to the regulators under the Bill with, as we have heard, the move of the PRS, the Consumer Credit Act and so on.

Amendment 142 would provide an alternative way of achieving something similar to the amendments that were discussed on Wednesday that might perhaps be easier for the regulators and the Government to accept. It proposes the creation of offices of regulatory evaluation within both the FCA and the Bank but, unlike the office for financial regulatory accountability proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, it would lie within the regulator, although it would probably have much the same role. Whichever way we do it, I am sure the Minister will have heard loud and clear the concerns that are shared across the Committee about the accountability of the regulators to Parliament, another of the main themes that are emerging as we load ever greater responsibilities upon them.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I cannot improve on the three speeches that have been made. I rise simply to make clear that on these Benches, we think that this amendment is really important.

We can see in Committee that it is purely random that we have the capacity to raise many of the issues. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and my noble friend Lady Bowles have a deep understanding of the market, as does the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, but it is purely random that they happen to be in the Lords. If we did not have the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, we would struggle to deal with many of the issues around digital assets and the revolution that is taking place. We have no system of ensuring that, in any part of the parliamentary process, there is the capacity to get to the relevant pieces of information, understand the underlying issues and play the role that Parliament should be playing—whether at committee level, with a Special Standing Committee, or as associated with the passage of a piece of legislation. None of that can be done without genuine, adequate and well thought-through information.

Looking at other Parliaments around the globe, in the US, the Senate and Congress have vast numbers of staff available to make sure that those who represent the voice of the people are truly informed in great detail with proper understanding of the articles that are before them and the regulations that they seek to uphold or overturn. We lack this here. We are still an amateur body, which is not appropriate for a modern society. This is a very significant change, but it must be a change in the right direction. From these Benches, we very much support it.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, we support the principle behind this amendment. It follows the same broad logic as the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Bridges. If the financial regulators are to exercise very significant powers, there must be a proper mechanism through which they can be evaluated and held to account.

This amendment seeks to require the FCA, the Bank of England and the PRA to establish offices for regulatory evaluation. Those offices would review the regulators’ actions, including rule-making, supervision, monitoring and enforcement. Only the changes to rules are currently considered by the cost-benefit analysis panels. The offices would be led by directors with a degree of independence from the boards and executive structures of the regulators themselves. They would report regularly to the Treasury and to relevant parliamentary committees. My noble friend Lady Noakes quotes an interesting precedent of such arrangements at the World Bank, the IMF and the European Investment Bank—all long-standing pillars of the international economic community.

It is good to welcome the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, to the debate, but this amendment raises very much the same issues as those that we discussed last Wednesday—at col. 501GC in Hansard, for those who were not present—with regard to the amendments from my noble friend Lord Bridges and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I was pleased to hear that the Minister has agreed to reflect further on the issues raised and to meet, with the Economic Secretary, the Financial Services Regulation Committee later this week. I look forward to the results but, in the interests of time, will not repeat what I have already said on the subject.

All these amendments raise a fundamental point. We are placing great trust in the regulators. That trust must be matched by transparency, evidence and accountability. Today’s cross-party amendment provides another route for the Minister to consider.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 146, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Altrincham, is a modest and probing amendment. It follows the discussion we had last week on speeding up the senior management and certification regime. It does not seek to change the regime immediately. It would require the Treasury to carry out a review and publish a report within 12 months on whether the new notification framework for senior manager appointments could be used where an individual had already been approved for the same or a similar function, including within the same corporate group.

The amendment echoes my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising’s amendment on a fast-track authorisation process for applicants who have been authorised before, but it would look at how that was working in practice a year after the Act came into effect. The Minister gave a hint that he was sympathetic to my noble friend Lord Howard and would be talking to the FCA about this, so I am hoping we can make some progress on this amendment.

We have heard from the industry that there are several problems with the SMCR regime. One concern is that the regime was originally intended to apply to a relatively limited number of senior people within a firm. Over time, however, roles have become more complicated, responsibilities have overlapped and some organisations have ended up needing a much larger number of people to receive SMCR approval. Regulation should not make legitimate business harder to do and should not slow down sensible appointments where there is no obvious additional risk, yet that is too often the practical effect of the regime as it stands.

The specific issue is what has sometimes been described as SMCR passporting. Where an individual has already been approved, has a strong regulatory track record and is moving into a genuinely comparable role, it seems sensible to explore whether a streamlined notification process could be used. That would have several advantages: it would reduce duplication, it could speed up appointments, it could reduce costs to firms, it could make it easier for groups to move experienced people into appropriate roles and it could allow regulators to focus their resources on genuinely new, higher-risk or more complex appointments. That is the point of the amendment. It does not prescribe the answer. It asks the Treasury to review the position, consult the FCA and the PRA and other relevant parties and report back to Parliament.

If we want the UK to have a regulatory system that supports growth and competitiveness, we need an approval process that is rigorous but also efficient. We should not require firms to repeat the same process unnecessarily where the regulator has already assessed the individual and where the new role is substantially comparable. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could give us some reassurance on this important matter and agree that an ex post review could be a helpful way of ensuring the direction of travel that I know we both want. I beg to move.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am always in favour of trying to provide streamlining, and this amendment offers a common-sense approach to that. However, an issue that I want to take up with the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, is that the focus of the FCA should always be on new hires, not previous ones. The ongoing fit and proper process is crucial, particularly if we are going to have lighter-touch regulation as people move from one position to another, but that ongoing process is critical. Perhaps the Minister could expand on that because I am not quite clear about how all the various changes in FCA rules change what has been an annual review process but now gives more flexibility in what that means.

I shall give some examples. I am not sure that when Sir Fred Goodwin—he was not “Sir” then, obviously—was appointed as chief executive of RBS anyone recognised that he was going to get caught up in what I think most people would describe as an addiction to completely irrational acquisitions, which eventually led to the collapse of a major bank. I am not sure that when Jes Staley was hired to be CEO of Barclays people were aware of the significance of his extensive involvement with Epstein. I am not sure that when the Reverend Paul Flowers was approved as chairman of the Co-operative Bank people were conscious that he was potentially someone who would become seriously addicted to and affected by a number of drugs, notably crystal meth. In other words, there is an ongoing process that is critical; it should not be only a one-time process. I hope that will be absorbed into the thinking if this amendment moves forward. The ongoing process is vital. Fit and proper is not a one-time-only process.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

My Lords, I rise quickly to support this amendment, which is exactly the sort of streamlining amendment we are looking to achieve in this Bill. I politely take issue with the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on people such as Fred Goodwin, Jes Staley or the Reverend Flowers. The FCA would not have picked up those problems; they all emerged much later. We should give credit to member firms for being able to judge who they should be hiring. If they are already licensed, why would notification not be sufficient?

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[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I endorse the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, about the political pressure that the Treasury will be under to recognise certain countries. Without adequate scrutiny, wider advice and deep analysis, the problem of overleveraging in some banking systems, despite them appearing perfectly respectable, would expose the UK and its financial sector to the dangers of debt and contamination.

I therefore have doubts about the economic implications of the Treasury making these calls on account of political reasons. We see this all the time, whether on international agreements—I sit on that committee—or on European affairs, whose committee I previously sat on. There is constant pressure by Governments to sign treaties that are rather bad for the UK and its various sectors, including financial services. I would have concerns if there were no adequate scrutiny and no proper advice taken on whether such recognition is a good thing for our systems.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly. As the Committee will know, I have expressed before my concern about heading towards a lowest common denominator. The constraints on the engagement of the regulator and Parliament in a process of recognition of overseas regimes is crucial. It provides transparency and challenge, both of which are constantly necessary. So these are well-drafted amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.

I want to go a little further. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, is not in his place, but he has tabled Amendment 164D, which would go further in seeking to instruct the Secretary of State to establish memoranda of understanding with a whole series of regulatory authorities. I have significant concerns about that, without the same set of constraints. We must be aware that, at the moment, there is fragmentation in the world in which we are living. International agreements are often treated as “pick and mix”. I object when we do that in the UK, but it is certainly a behaviour that we are watching in the United States at all times. We can see it with the development of AI and the various steps that the White House is taking. It is hard to work out whether or not it will go for AI licensing. A memorandum of understanding that passively accepted whatever the United States decided was the appropriate standard would trouble me hugely.

This is a very good set of amendments. Although the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and I often take very different positions on regulation and the primacy of financial stability, in this instance, she is absolutely right. There is nothing more troubling than reading all three objectives be put on a par. That has been my great fear. Anyone looking back on what happened in the 2008 crash will see that a focus on competition and growth without any focus on financial stability led to a crisis that I suspect nobody in this Room wishes to see again.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, as this is the last group, I too wish the Minister a very happy birthday. He will be glad to know that, on this side, we think this is an important part of the Bill. The overseas recognition regime, which would replace the arrangements put in place as we left the EU, could provide a valuable mechanism for recognising overseas regulatory regimes and allowing certain firms, services or market infrastructure from other jurisdictions to access the UK market without having to duplicate regulatory requirements unnecessarily.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st July 2026 Grand Committee

Debate on Amendment 99 resumed.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am sure everyone has reread the Hansard transcript and is fully on top of the debate that took place on Monday, so I will attempt to keep my remarks brief.

I am tempted to engage with the challenge from the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, on this group of amendments, to discuss in depth the issue of international rules on the one hand versus growth and competition objectives on the other. However, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, as the Whip, that I recognise that we are in Grand Committee and so will limit the comments that I make.

Looking at this group of amendments, it is important to say that my party believes in “better together” rather than “beggar thy neighbour”. International rules provide trust, confidence and certainty, which are key to long-term and sustainable growth. This country plays a key role in shaping international rules in sectors that we care about, including finance. The Bank of England is incredibly highly respected, as are our other regulators. There is extensive participation in key bodies, such as the Financial Stability Board, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and others. Indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, gave a long list of the various committees in which regulators are engaged. I think she thought it might make them go native, but I consider that it is an important opportunity and area of their influence. We remain a player in making those rules, despite Brexit.

International rules need to provide flexibility, but they mean absolutely nothing if we pick only what suits us in the moment. The world is not thriving in the beggar-thy-neighbour world of Trump in the United States, of Russia and of China. The Committee will not be surprised that I am not sympathetic to Amendment 99, which would reduce international standards to a “have regard”.

As for the other amendments on this sector, I have no problem with the reporting amendments, but I am cautious of Amendments 102 and 104A, because they could easily be read as an instruction to waver on the Bank of England’s primary objective of financial stability. We must be careful not to abandon that focus on financial stability. Some people find volatility attractive—it is certainly a way in which the financial sector has frequently made much of its money. But the cost to ordinary people of both boom and bust and continuous volatility has been exceedingly high. The cost to businesses that need a significant measure of certainty is extremely high. Therefore, we will not be supporting these amendments, though, as I say, the reporting amendments make some sense to me.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, for me, the group speaks to the essential balance which underpins the purpose and function of effective financial regulation. Of course regulation must promote safety, stability and confidence in the system, but regulation must also support growth, competitiveness and innovation. It must help ensure that the United Kingdom remains one of the world’s leading financial centres.

We have often spoken about the contribution that financial institutions and financial services firms make to the UK economy; they provide employment, tax revenue, investment, lending, infrastructure and global influence. This group is about making sure that we put our money where our mouth is. If we say that competitiveness and growth matter then those principles must be reflected in the way regulators act, report and make their decisions.

That is why Amendment 99, to which I have added my name, is important. It would shift the requirement from “aligning with” international standards to considering international standards. That is an important distinction. International standards matter, and in many cases the UK will rightly wish to follow them, but we should not place ourselves in a position where we become passive rule-takers when it is not in our national interest to do so. We can see some rules, such as the unbundling of research in MiFID II, having totally the wrong effect—in this instance, regulating research so heavily that less research is produced, particularly for smaller firms. I know this from relatives who work in analysis; I do not think that is an interest to declare, but it is evidence. Another example is the EU’s sustainable finance disclosure regulation, which is now under review because it is too complex and burdensome.

The whole point of having an independent post-Brexit regulatory framework is that the UK should be able to design rules that work for our markets, our firms and our economy. The UK’s position in financial services is not secured by right. Other jurisdictions are moving quickly. We know the compliance costs are generally higher in the UK, so unless we offer a regulatory environment that is clearer, more cohesive, more predictable and more conducive to growth, it is likely that firms, capital and innovation will go overseas, the opposite of what we and the Government want. We are already seeing this risk in areas such as digital finance. Firms in digital assets, payments and new financial infrastructure need clarity and confidence. Where they do not find it in the UK, they look elsewhere. The Employment Rights Act is also having a chilling effect.

Amendments 100 and 101 are important because they would strengthen accountability around the competitiveness and growth objective. It is not enough for regulators simply to say that they have considered competitiveness. Parliament needs to see how that objective has been applied, what evidence has been used, what impacts have been assessed—for example, on SMEs, which are a key feature of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral’s amendment—and how regulatory decisions have affected firms and markets over time.

Amendment 102, which I have also supported, would extend the secondary competitiveness and growth objective to the Bank of England’s financial market infrastructure functions. The same should apply to Amendment 104A on payment systems. If we want a dynamic payments ecosystem, competitiveness must be considered across the whole regulatory architecture.

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[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, both the amendment and the speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, were sensible in terms of making us think about bank capital requirements and whether we have got them right. As she says, the first step is undertaking proper analysis to be able to work out whether that happens. I noticed she caveated everything that they may not be right. They may be right, but they may not.

My worry is that that is a sensible position to take but it did not sound like the position being taken by the Leader of the Opposition when she made her speech last week saying that she was going to reduce bank capital requirements to release £450 billion in capital. Where did the calculation that hundreds of billions are sitting idly on bank balance sheets come from? Where do those hundreds of billions come from? If we are going to release £450 billion, what is the calculation in the reduction of bank capital requirements that sits behind that calculation? While I feel quite supportive of the issues that the noble Baroness was raising, we need to be sure—I hope she will agree—that we do not jump the gun on this.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, was rather generous in his comments. Sometimes it is important to speak truth to power. This is a lowest common denominator strategy. We have heard it before from the Conservatives, and it is repeated with enthusiasm today. I heard so many of these arguments back in the early 2000s. It contributed and was a fundamental part of the reasons why we ended up with such a major financial crash with huge financial and political consequences that echo through to this day. I could see the argument being made that we need to take proper care that we are looking at capital requirements and that we need to assess them and look at the consequences and do so on a regular basis. That is already part of the programme and certainly would always need to be part of it.

I notice that in line seven of the amendment the phrase is,

“while also considering financial stability”.

If ever there was a phrase lowering the significance of the primary objective with which we tasked the Bank of England, that phrase does it—merely a consideration of financial stability. I was afraid when the growth and productivity objectives were introduced as secondary objectives that quickly the attraction of the phrases would cause them to cannibalise the primary objective. This is a very good example of the way in which that, frankly, has been happening.

I have seen across so many of the measures in the Bill a step away from the precautionary principle—in this case, of looking for appropriate capital requirements, whether in equities or in MREL—to a notion that we deal with all this through a resolution regime. I am suspicious of resolution regimes and of after the fact ways of ensuring financial stability. I would much rather we did not have a bank failure that we must then attempt to remedy through the use of something like bail-in MREL, which I do not think will ever work. Frankly, MREL is held by insurance companies and pension funds, and we are never going to wreck them to save a major bank. I am very concerned about the change in approach that we are hearing today from the Conservative party.

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[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

My Lords, I shall briefly speak in response to the noble Baroness, and I once again draw attention to my interest as an adviser to the chairman of Santander. I want to make three quick points.

First, I overwhelmingly agree with the thrust of the amendment. I think analysis of this critical issue is important for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, said. He will know much better than I do how notoriously difficult it is to compare the regimes of the United States, the UK and the EU. If noble Lords are interested in this and cannot sleep, I advise them to look online at recent reports that have come out. The Financial Times reports a law firm called Alvarez & Marsal pointing to the impact of the US’s current moves in prudential regulation and how that has unleashed a considerable amount of bank capital. Meanwhile, the ECB has pushed back with its own analysis showing that the US and the EU are broadly on par, so we cannot compare the others. The European Banking Federation has recently come out with its analysis of this issue.

As far as I can see—I stand to be corrected by others—a lot of this depends on how we measure not just the regulatory and prudential aspects but the supervisory actions, and how supervisors can put buffer upon buffer, depending on the banks, the GSIPPS and who you are looking at within the perimeter. This analysis will be very important, and it could be very worthwhile, but it has to try to overcome the enormous problem that exists, now matter we how bridge it. That is the first point.

The second point, flowing from that, is that the more I look at this, the more I think that the objectives—and, underlying those, the culture—of the regulators and supervisors seem to be almost more important here. When you look at the difference in regulatory approach, be it by the Singaporeans or the US, you find that it is largely a matter of the culture within those bodies, where they are coming from and the messages that the politicians are sending them.

I will cite just one example. Picking up on what the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said—we disagree on this violently, I know—I am very interested in the US approach. Secretary Bessent in the US Treasury gave a speech about eight months ago where he told the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which is a key body that brings together regulators and supervisors, that low growth was in itself a financial stability risk—let me repeat that: low growth was a financial stability risk—and that they needed to act accordingly. That sent a signal, as far as I can tell, throughout the entire regulatory and supervisory environment in Washington and the States, and they have acted accordingly. That has had more of an impact than necessarily what the capital requirements are for various bodies.

The final point is on SMEs. We will not have a long debate about this, but I would make one point here about the demand from SMEs for lending. We can debate the role of capital requirements—I think there is more of a role for and more impact from capital requirements on bank lending than perhaps the noble Baroness does—but where we would probably agree is that it is the overall general environment in which SMEs are operating that will stimulate demand for lending. If you have a Government who are piling pressure after pressure on SMEs—to be taxed more on employment, to have more regulation, et cetera—that will dent their demand for lending and for more investment. That is what will happen. Therefore, it is very important that we look at that issue per se in the round. With that, I will sit down.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I probably have a right to reply, because it is Committee and we can speak more than once. The noble Lord, Lord Bridges, and I often find a whole lot of common ground, and I agree completely that the environment in which SMEs are operating is extremely difficult. However, if he goes back and looks at the numbers produced by the Federation of Small Businesses, he will find that there is significant demand for borrowing, which is continuously turned down and rejected. I just want to make sure that the noble Lord understands that side of the picture.

I have no problem with people going away, as I said, and doing proper analysis and trying to understand exactly what the picture is, but there is another side to that, and it is not included in this amendment. If I was amending it, I would add a line, because we need an analysis of the cumulative risk that has been reintroduced into the financial sector by everything from Solvency UK to the whole range of changes—I think I listed them once in a Second Reading speech, and it went on for nearly a page and a half—that have been made. Measuring that cumulative risk would be extremely instructive to us when we start to look at issues such as financial stability. But for goodness’ sake, if we are reducing financial stability to no more than a “have regard”, which is exactly what this amendment would do, we are stepping into really dangerous territory.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for raising this important issue. Prudential capital requirements play a vital role in ensuring that our banking system remains resilient, supports sustainable lending and underpins confidence in the wider economy. We have heard a range of views on capital requirements today. The UK’s framework is internationally respected and has been carefully designed to balance growth with financial stability.

Amendment 120 would require HM Treasury to publish within 12 months a report reviewing the impact of capital requirements on lending, borrowing costs, competition and economic growth, alongside financial stability, drawing on consultation with the Bank of England and the regulators. I genuinely recognise the intent behind the amendment. However, it is unnecessary, as the Financial Policy Committee is already undertaking a comprehensive review of the UK’s bank capital framework through precisely the lens that the amendment seeks, including the impact on lending, growth and financial stability.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Can I just check whether it is looking through the lens of treating financial stability as only a “have regard”? Is that what the Minister is saying? The amendment says “considering”. It is a “have regard” statement.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

No.

The FPC has been tasked by Parliament with responsibility for the stability of the financial system overall. It is the right body to carry out this review, which needs to balance the economic impacts of capital requirements against the protections that they may offer. Getting the balance right in the prudential framework and bank capital requirements has been a key priority for the Chancellor and an issue she discusses frequently with the industry.

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, raised the issue of international comparisons. The FPC set out its assessment of international comparisons when it reviewed this in December 2025. It found that the requirements are broadly in line with international comparators. In some areas, such as leverage requirements on domestic firms, the FPC noted that the requirements may be higher. However, I assure the noble Baroness that it noted leverage as an area for further reform that it plans to cover in next week’s update.

As noble Lords may be aware, the Chancellor sets out the annual remit and recommendations for the FPC. The most recent remit letter was sent last November and sets out clearly that the UK must regulate for both risk and growth, and remain competitive in a changing world. As part of that, the Chancellor recommended that the FPC’s review should ensure the UK’s capital framework strikes the optimal balance to deliver resilience, growth and competitiveness. I assure the noble Baroness that the FPC understands this balance. In December 2025, the Financial Policy Committee reassessed the optimal level of system-wide bank capital, reducing its benchmark from 14% to 13% of risk-weighted assets.

For these reasons, while I understand the objective, this amendment is unnecessary and risks undermining the clarity and credibility of the current regime. We will come back to this discussion over the coming weeks. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I shall be extremely brief on this. I and my colleagues take the position that from this collection of amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, the Government could craft something really effective and create the information base and the capacity for Parliament to have very appropriate oversight of the regulator. The point I particularly want to add is that this is not hostility to the regulator. Part of the regulator’s problem is that it is trying to communicate to so many different parts of the political framework, with very different levels of understanding.

We have all seen that five-year strategy from the FCA. Let us admit that it is a completely vacuous document, but I can understand that those who crafted it thought that they were dealing with people who had almost no grasp at all of how the finance sector works, operates and is directed or regulated. We have given it the absolutely impossible task of not knowing whom they talk to, in what level of detail, and what information to provide. I would say that, from a regulator’s perspective, having an educated oversight body would remove a huge burden and create a proper and constructive conversation, in the end benefiting both sides. I hope the Minister will take away that this is not some hostility to the regulator; this is a process that will make sure that Parliament can do its job but also that the regulator is far better positioned to be able to do its job and communicate and understand.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have brought our attention to past debates on these knotty issues from a position of great expertise. All the amendments raise fundamental questions about how we hold our financial regulators to account. We fully support the principle that sits behind these amendments: that Parliament must have proper oversight over the way in which the regulators work. That includes their internal operations, their rule-making and their engagement with firms and consumers, the quality of their impact assessments, their effect on competition and competitiveness, and the burden they pose on the wider economy.

This point has been underscored by many noble Lords throughout our debates on the Bill. If the FCA and the PRA are to be given greater powers and a wider remit, as proposed, that must be matched by greater transparency and stronger accountability. Greater delegated power cannot simply mean more decisions being taken further away from Parliament, with fewer mechanisms for scrutiny. The Minister has written to noble Lords setting out existing mechanisms. That letter refers, among other things, to the ability of noble Lords to ask Parliamentary Questions and to the work of our excellent Financial Services Regulation Committee. Parliamentary Questions have their place, but they are not a systematic mechanism for reviewing the performance, effectiveness or proportionality of regulators. Committees do valuable work, but they cannot be expected to provide continuous expert institutional scrutiny of the FCA’s and PRA’s operations. What is needed is a mechanism through which the regulators can be reviewed, tested and held to account.

The problem is that we have an accountability gap. My noble friend Lady Noakes, from her unique position as chair of the committee, has highlighted the scale of the task that it now faces, so we need an independent source of analysis and expertise. The amendments in this group provide a number of serious and compelling proposals for how that might be done.

The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would provide for periodic independent reviews of the regulators. A recurring independent health check of the FCA, the PRA and the relevant Bank of England functions could help Parliament understand whether the regulatory system is working as intended, whether burdens are proportionate, whether the regulators are engaging properly, and whether firms and consumers are being treated fairly. I thought we had a good example of the problem in the earlier discussion on Sections 165 and 166.

The amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Bridges propose a more permanent structure: an office for financial regulatory accountability. This is a valuable suggestion. As I understand it, the office would assess the FCA’s and PRA’s overall performance against their statutory objectives and regulatory principles. It would also analyse impact assessments for specific pieces of financial regulation in order to determine how those regulations contribute to the regulators’ objectives. As my noble friend Lady Lawlor suggested, their reports could include individual precedents and examples to bring problems to light. That is the sort of scrutiny we need.

The two parliamentary committees would have an important locus in scrutinising the reports from the office, improving overall parliamentary accountability while not getting in the regulators’ hair in a way that they are not set up to do. The proposed arrangements would also allow Parliament to see not only what concerns have been identified, but how the regulators intend to respond to them. Significantly, the office would be required to prioritise the analysis of regulations which restrict domestic competition, reduce the United Kingdom’s international competitiveness in financial services, create new compliance costs or have a significant impact on business and individuals in the UK economy —an excellent objective. As we heard from my noble friend Lord Bridges, it would not interfere with operational independence.

The regulators have become powerful institutions. They make rules, issue guidance, set expectations, supervise firms, authorise market entry, influence conduct and shape the competitiveness of one of the most important parts of the UK economy. As we heard from my noble friend Lady Noakes’s committee, they suffer from a culture of risk aversion, fuelled by the current system. It is no longer enough simply to say that the existing accountability mechanisms are adequate. There is clearly a deficit in oversight and that deficit becomes more serious as more power is transferred from Parliament and primary legislation to regulators and rulebooks.

If the Government are asking Parliament to accept that shift, they must accept the need for stronger accountability. Essential parliamentary scrutiny has to trump deregulation. The challenge is set for the Minister and I hope he will provide the clarity that we really need—a request that was echoed by the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, who, in another bit of history, I served under very happily on the EU Services Sub-Committee.

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[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak to this group of amendments. Amendment 127 is also in my name, and I thank my noble friend Lady Altmann for co-signing it. These amendments are my latest attempt to get some focus on innovation and technology in a Bill that is currently, strangely, surprisingly and unfortunately largely silent on this subject. It is my latest effort, but it will not be my last.

If we take a step back when it comes to open finance, how have we got to where we are? It is something in which everybody across the UK should take incredible pride. Open banking was created here. I offer anybody who believes the false dichotomy that recurs with tedious inevitability—that you can have either regulation or innovation—open banking as a deliberate, willed and intended regulatory intervention to address a market failure. Has it had a measure of success? That is not for me to say, but open banking, which was made in the UK, has been replicated and taken up in just shy of 80 jurisdictions around the world, many of which have taken it much further and much faster than the United Kingdom.

Although open banking is an excellent, positive and inclusive innovation, it still has not come to fruition in terms of mass take-up. However, we should consider how these principles can apply to open finance. We have some good stuff in the Data (Use and Access) Act, but we need more to provide a focus on what open finance can do, not least in obviously adjacent sectors such as telco and energy. My Amendment 126 seeks to do exactly that by looking at what is possible with the data that is currently out there. This would not be a data grab. It would not push citizens off the ball, to give an up-to-the-minute analogy; it would enable and empower those citizens who are often at the sharpest end of financial services and who may even be unable to avail themselves of financial services at all. Imagine being able to look in real time, on a consented basis, at existing alternative data, such as rental history or other activity, to empower an individual to access financial services, perhaps for the first time, or to access better financial services. All too often, what happens is that those who have the least have to pay the most. How can anybody tolerate that in 2026? Open finance could be enabling, empowering and transformational. We have the technologies. I suggest that Amendment 126 would be a tiny element of the next step on that journey.

Amendment 127 suggests an innovation unit for the Financial Conduct Authority. I am well aware that the FCA already has an innovation unit internally; it does excellent work. In terms of the work of regulators across the piece on innovation, it is far more than market-leading. It goes back to the innovations on which the FCA has led for more than a decade: the excellent fintech regulatory sandbox, the digital security sandbox and the tremendous AI sandbox, which was announced last year. They are all market-leading not just in this country but internationally. It is fantastic work. It is similar on other emerging technologies, such as quantum.

Therefore, in no sense is this amendment suggesting that the regulator is not looking at emerging technologies. What this amendment seeks to do is to empower the regulator further by putting that innovation unit on a statutory footing and bringing in external voices and expertise to be part of it, not a board of the great and the good, white, male, pale, stale, but experts in the area of emerging technologies. What a fabulous addition that would be to the excellent work that it is already doing. It would be a minor change, but it would have a major impact. I very much look forward to the Minister’s response and the discussion on this group. I beg to move.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am absolutely delighted with these two amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. To begin with Amendment 126, I have long been, as he has, a real supporter of open banking and see the potential for it to expand into open finance, and have been utterly frustrated that it languished for so many years. I am convinced that, under the current leadership, real change is happening and real progress is being made. I hope that is a correct assessment, and in other places the Bill continues to assist that process. It is absolutely logical that entities are looking for financial services and going to one provider that they presumably know or can access but are failing to find a satisfactory answer, and cannot then avail themselves of the ability to talk to the rest of the financial services provider world. Open banking and open finance provide those mechanisms.

I have one caveat. In proposed new paragraph (c) to be inserted by Amendment 126, the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, explained that the framework needs to provide for

“interoperability between different categories of financial service providers, including digital asset providers”.

I agree completely with that. The question is who pays. Traditionally, it has always been the banks that have paid. I took a position earlier in the Bill, and continue to take it, that all users of the payment system should be contributing. This should not be something that falls on the banks while the tech companies, in particular, end up with a free ride. That will leave us with an unsustainable system that is far less effective than it could be if it had the full resources of all those who participate and potentially benefit from it. It would also engage them in innovation, which is addressed in Amendment 127.

I can see the advantages presented by Amendment 127, but there is one more feature that I want to add. One of my permanent frustrations with the regulator has been that it does not step in when there is market failure. It always says that if a new company or business comes in that will fill a gap, it will regulate it appropriately—that is its contribution to encouraging players to come in and fill the space where there is market failure. One good example is lending to small businesses, but there are many more market failures that the FCA will happily acknowledge, but then say it is nots its job to get that gap filled.

The US regulators take a very different view: if there is a market failure, they will be proactive in trying to design incentives and opportunities to go out and, in effect, market to relevant players so that the gap is filled. A simple example in the United States, thanks to the regulators, is something I call “bank in the box”—I have to be careful because there is a company of that name. It was devised to enable small players to come into the lending space. In the box were all the regulatory pieces that a banking service needed to offer, so that it would be very simple for a new player to simply plug in the investors at one end and the particular customer base at the other. It also means that, in time of failure, that small bank can easily be recovered, because all the complex content of regulation and compliance is in the box in a way that that is understood by the others within the system.

I have talked to the FCA and asked about bank in the box. It says that if someone comes forward with it, it will gladly regulate it, but it will not take a step that would encourage the provision of some such service. I would love to see this approach to market failure incorporated in the innovation discussion. Regulators are incredibly influential; it is amazing what a few words from a regulator, or a proposal from a regulator, will do to make sure that action actually happens.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 29th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

If I might talk on this point, I have huge sympathy with the overall direction of where people want to go on this. Climate risk is clearly relevant for any financial manager managing the assets—the cash—of any ordinary citizen, be they a vicar of the Church of England or simply a worker setting money aside, and that needs to be taken into account.

Even if you do not buy that argument, there are financial risks that go with climate that need to be recognised—for example, assets that will become stranded if we responded to the climate crisis, which should not be recognised as being valuable today. By the way, if I were to find an institution that is a mile ahead of the regulation in trying to make this take place, the Church of England pension fund is exemplary of what it is that we want to do.

As I look at this, I find it rather ironic that we are focusing on the FCA. In the past five years, if there is a financial regulator that has taken steps forward on this, it is the FCA rather than the others. I think—I have tried to check on the internet—the UK now has the highest number of transition plans by companies, and the highest standard of transition plans by companies, of any country in the world. I want to celebrate the companies doing that and the senior appointments that the FCA put in place to make these sorts of things happen.

It might be a good idea for us to scratch our heads about those regulators that, even where there are clear rules on reporting on financially material matters, are finding it difficult to see them enforced. We might want to raise those sorts of issues as well as additional reporting. If it is additional reporting, as the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, said, let us be sure that we know that the extra reporting is bringing about some good.

In Amendment 80, and perhaps in some other amendments, there is a question about parliamentary oversight. Does the Minister consider that parliamentary oversight might be kept under review so that we know that we have a financial services industry that is properly responding to the risk of climate change, and might perhaps do some other things as well?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I shall be exceedingly brief because the position of my party has been so well-voiced by my noble friends Lady Northover and Lady Sheehan, and there is a great deal more to say in the clause stand part debate in today’s fourth group. My party has made it very clear that it has a deep commitment to the climate, nature and sustainability agenda. I am conscious that it has become quite fashionable in financial circles to say that this agenda should not be the concern of the Bank of England or of any of the regulators. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, can indicate to me where in the five-year strategy of the FCA he can find any reference to it, because I cannot.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

For five years, there has been a director of ESG at the Financial Conduct Authority who has specifically taken responsibility for ensuring that, where relevant, it is embedded in what the FCA is doing. Most of the feedback I get from the FCA and financial practitioners suggests that he is called Sacha Sadan, and that he had a senior role in financial services beforehand and has had considerable success in being able to do that. Is it perfect? No, I am sure it is absolutely not perfect. We have a long way to go, but I want to do something that says, “Let us celebrate some success when we have it”.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I always join in celebrating success but, from our perspective, this is a pivot moment away from what has been the practice and emphasis over the past several years. Indeed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, said, there was consensus across the parties, with perhaps different strategies, but this appears to be a time when much of this has changed, or is about to change or is changing. I have to say that it makes absolutely no sense. Climate risk is so obviously a financial and economic stability risk, as indeed is the loss of nature and the issue of sustainable growth; surely “sustainable” belongs in growth programmes that we put in front of us.

I am also very conscious that the City and others, which have tended to have very short-term perspectives—typically the next quarter’s results—have voiced opposition to the inclusion of climate and nature in the financial regulators’ remit and that it should have the significance it has had to date, and I am very afraid that the Government are now responding to that particular set of views. Moving these regulatory principles from the Bill—from primary legislation—into a “have regard” for the five-year strategy strikes me as an acquiescence with those voices we are hearing from the City. To me, there is some confirmation in not finding a firm strand in the FCA’s own five-year strategy; that is its forward look, not its historic look backwards.

In a few minutes the Conservative Party will speak, and it will make its own position clear, but I understand that Kemi Badenoch has now said that her party, if in government, would scrap the Climate Change Act. That is a very significant change. I know it is motivated by fear of Reform, but it really has an impact on the overall discourse and the cross-party commitment we have had up to this point.

I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester—I think it was him, although I may have attributed this to the wrong person—that this is a very strange week in which to downgrade the significance of climate change. I happened to be in conversation with my daughter in the midst of last week’s heat. When I described what we were doing, she said, “I guess the universe has heard the intention and it’s decided to bite back”. I think it must have been the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, who made the remark; I am so sorry not to have recognised that.

I think that both Labour and the Conservatives hope that by Third Reading, we will have forgotten the extreme heat and they can reassert a much more convenient and easy agenda of pretending that climate change is no longer an issue of urgency. It has now dropped down the scale and there are other issues of much greater urgency on which we must focus, and this one can be largely set aside. But I and my party continue to look at it as a series of risks that will cause extraordinary pain to ordinary people in Britain, both relentlessly and increasingly—and not just to people in the UK but to far more vulnerable countries across the globe.

The Bank of England and the financial sector have crucial and powerful tools in their hands. Those tools are vital if we are to redesign our world to limit nature loss and climate change, and to ensure that we grow sustainably in the future. As the Bill is now structured, it takes away from those tools and will encourage their being regarded as secondary or tertiary instruments, to be used only when it does not irritate certain voices in the City of London. That is not appropriate for the legislation we pass today.

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Amendment 103 would further require the PRA and the FCA to report on their work in implementing the principles in Amendment 80. The regulators already report on all their objectives and principles through their annual reports. In addition, they must respond to HM Treasury’s remit letter once a year to set out what actions they have taken. As I have said, the Government have ensured that that remit letter asks them to support the transition to a climate-resilient, nature-positive and net-zero economy.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Let me ask a direct question of the Minister. He referred to the actions that he expects from the FCA. I take it at its word, with its five-year strategy, but I cannot find any reference to anything to do with the climate, nature or even sustainability anywhere in there. Have I missed a page? It is a bit difficult to do that when there are only 20 pages, with very little written language, but it seems to me that, if this matter were of any significance, it would have been somewhere in that document. Is the FCA just anticipating what it believes to be the direction that it is getting from the Government, as reflected in the actions that are being taken in the Bill?

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[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as an employee of Marsh, the insurance broker regulated by the FCA. A number of amendments in this group discuss the downgrading of the “have regard to” requirement for proportionality, which would be a backward step. At a time of intense global competition, the Bill should strengthen proportionality, not weaken it. These amendments do that by replacing Clause 17’s downgrading provisions with a clearer, more robust and more meaningful principle, based on the distinction between wholesale and retail markets.

There remains a clear need for a better balance between these two sectors. Evidence supports this. A survey of chief risk officers conducted by the City of London Corporation identified simplification of regulation as the single most important step that regulators could take to foster growth and innovation. Similarly, a recent Prudential Regulation Authority survey showed that fewer than 60% of respondents believe that its current approach to proportionality makes the UK a more attractive place to do business, with most of the remainder expressing neutrality. That is hardly a vote of confidence.

In practice, the current one-size-fits-all approach is flawed. London’s world-leading wholesale insurance market is increasingly subject to rules designed for retail consumers. These regimes impose additional compliance burdens and costs, yet offer little meaningful benefit to sophisticated corporate clients, who require flexibility to negotiate bespoke arrangements tailored to their risks. This is what I have spent my working career doing, and I have never dealt with retail consumers, other than being an insurance buyer myself. There is a massive difference between the companies I advise and seek insurance for and the consumers such as me. Indeed, their premiums are often significantly larger than what I am trying to insure. The two entities should not be regulated by a one-size-fits-all regime.

The Financial Services Regulation Committee has highlighted this issue, noting that failure to distinguish between wholesale and retail drives bureaucracy and costs. Evidence from the London Market Group revealed that one UK broker, for example, employs far more compliance staff domestically—almost four times more—than in the EU on a proportional basis. Stronger proportionality would not weaken consumer protection; it would enhance it, allowing regulators to focus on where risks are greatest. In short, we should seize this opportunity not to weaken proportionality but to make it work properly for growth, innovation and the effective protection of consumers.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I very much support the two amendments of my noble friend Lady Bowles. There is often an assumption that those of us who feel that regulation plays an important role have no instinct or desire to see proportionality in place, which could not be more untrue. My history is as a commercial banker, back in the days when we used to participate intensively in writing the loan documents and creating the covenants associated with our lending, whether to small companies or to some of the largest on the globe. Frankly, covenants that were off the shelf were completely inappropriate for providing the protection we needed in many cases. They were just useless exercises in paperwork for the companies involved. We used to reshape the loan agreements on that basis and, frankly, it worked exceedingly well.

When I look at the amendments, I am glad that proportionality is being recovered from the scrapheap that would result from Clause 17. That is important, and the way that my noble friend Lady Bowles, framed it is particularly significant. Both for the PRA and the SRA, the focus is proportionate to the benefits expected to result from the imposition of the burden or restriction, recognising the difference in size, nature and objectives. I agree with her that this really needs to be considered through the lens of genuinely sustainable—as in durable as well as environmental—growth. That is a very important addition to the discussion.

I am disturbed by Amendment 81. I am not disturbed by most of it, but when I read

“proportionate to that level of risk and whether the burden or restriction enhances UK international competitiveness”,

I begin to get somewhat queasy, because the lowest common denominator is not where we should be headed. We need to genuinely assess risk—the cost of dealing with and understanding it—in a very direct way. I have always thought that a distortion was introduced by the competitiveness objective, and I am afraid that it is reflected in Amendment 81, in my reading at least.

I hope that the Minister understands that proportionality is not something for five-year strategies. It is central to the work, culture and behaviour of a regulator; as such, it clearly belongs in principles that sit on the face of the Bill.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes and other noble Lords for bringing forward their amendments in this group.

I was glad to hear that the Minister will meet the Financial Services Regulation Committee to discuss this part of the Bill. I am sure he will be as disturbed as I was to hear about the widespread fear of regulated businesses in expressing any criticism of the regulators—the most important regulators in the land, to quote my noble friend Lady Noakes. We certainly rely on financial services and good regulators for growth in this country.

The central theme of this group is the proportionality of regulation. That is an absolutely fundamental requirement for all regulation; it is particularly so when we are talking about small and medium-sized enterprises, which are less able to afford the costs of regulation—in terms of diversion of time, regulatory fees and legal fees—and are the most held back by excess regulation.

There were 5.6 million small businesses in the UK at the start of 2025. They account for three-fifths of employment and around half of turnover in the UK private sector. Total employment in SMEs was 16.9 million—60% of the total—with turnover estimated at £2.8 trillion, or 51% of the total. Having financial services that operate with proportionality and common sense is important to them; indeed, almost every single one of these firms will access and use financial services through the course of their operations. It is even more important to the thousands of SMEs that operate in financial services, whose remit is of course being extended by the Bill, and the thousands more SMEs in the legal and professional firms that advise on financial services.

In practice, regulation often falls most heavily on precisely those smaller firms least able to absorb it. The reasons are obvious: SMEs do not have large compliance departments or in-house legal teams; and they do not have armies of advisers whose job is to interpret regulatory requirements. In many smaller firms, people wear many hats, as I know well. This means that a regulatory requirement that may be manageable for a large institution can be a serious burden for a smaller firm. Above all, regulation should be designed in such a way that it protects consumers and supports market integrity without imposing unnecessary burdens.

Amendments 83 and 84 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, to which I have added my name, go to this underlying point by seeking to elevate proportionality in the FCA and PRA frameworks; it is pleasing to have the support of my noble friend Lord Ashcombe and the Liberal Democrat Front Bench in this. Proportionality should not be a box that regulators tick after the main decisions have already been made; it should be central to how they think about regulation from the outset.

The amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, raise an important point about tailoring regulation to the size, nature and objectives of different firms. The regulatory framework should recognise that a mutual does not have the same objectives as a major bank, and that different business models can present very different risks; the noble Baroness explained all that eloquently.

I would also like to comment on Amendment 86 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes. As she said, the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 requires regulators to act in a way that is transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent and targeted, ensuring that regulation is effective without being unnecessarily burdensome. Those are fundamental points and likewise need to be protected as guiding principles.

In closing, I would be grateful if the Minister could assure us: first, that proportionality will be genuinely embedded in regulatory decision-making, ideally by amending the Bill on the lines of Amendment 83. We hope he will look at this issue very seriously. Secondly, can he assure us that the FCA and PRA will in future be expected to take account of the particular position of SMEs, mutuals and smaller firms when designing and applying rules? A proportionality duty would go a long way to fixing the problem and would seem to fit in well with government policy to support small business promoted by his other department, the DBT.

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However, there is a more general problem. I conclude by just pointing out that in fact there is a responsibility on the Government to ensure that all sectors of society can obtain a minimum desirable level of protection, including those on low incomes, that will enable them to remain financially resilient to shocks, and unexpected shocks, which would typically be insured.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in general across this set of amendments and specifically to Amendment 141 in my name, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann.

In the general remarks, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, that I am excited and thrilled by his amendments in this group and I support every one of them—I would even open champagne; I am that pleased. I say to my noble friend Lady Tyler that I totally support the amendments that she has introduced here. I share with both of them the perception that financial inclusion is absolutely at the core of the requirement that we must place on our financial services sector and on the regulators that deal with it.

To pick up on a point that my noble friend Lady Tyler made, the consumer duty does not deal with financial inclusion, and that is exactly right. The consumer duty is very much a protection against mis-selling. It is not a duty of care, which could indeed have required that gaps left in the market are filled and the regulator take steps to fill them; the regulator was absolutely determined not to have that responsibility when this House attempted to make it address the issue, and the Government of the day were also very determined that the regulator should not play that role. We cannot look to the regulator to be a key player in financial inclusion.

In the five-year strategy of the FCA—I really have read that document—there is reference to financial inclusion; in fact, it is in big, black, bold letters. The problem is that what it anticipates as the role that it will play is to try to address how low financial capability holds people back from accessing financial services and how it could support them in managing their financial life. That is important and it matters, but the reality is that for many people who are excluded, the way to give them support is not to try to get them digital—it would be brilliant if you could but that is not the reality—but to deal with those people as they are in the world that they live in. There is absolutely no reference in this five-year strategy that you could in any way interpret as related to what has become the Richard Lloyd review—to things such as banking hubs. It is focused solely on the individual, whereas issues that we have addressed in previous groups have also been about the financial exclusion of small businesses from financial services. There is no reference to any of that.

I have had so many conversations with the FCA over the years, and it has said things like, “Yes, if we had a set of community banks, that would be absolutely brilliant; CDFIs are absolutely wonderful—not our job. If they appear, we will make sure that we regulate them appropriately, but it is not our job to fill that gap and we resolutely hold to that position”. That clarity needs to be here in this debate. I will not repeat what has been said because it was so well said by the three previous speakers, but I very much hope that the Minister will pay serious attention to this issue. From things that he has said in the past, I hope that he takes it to heart. It very much belongs in a very central way in primary legislation.

The issue I am raising is perhaps not an obvious one to raise in the context of this Bill, but it is in scope. It is dear to my heart, but I think it is widely supported. I am using this opportunity to deal with an issue that, frankly, the Government should have dealt with without any problem. It is child trust funds and the ability of young adults with learning difficulties to access those funds that sit in in their name. My party leader, Ed Davey, who, as I think all in this Committee know, has a son with very severe learning difficulties, has written of his eight-month battle to access the child trust fund put in place and invested in for the benefit of his severely disabled son, who is now 18. The fund should be easily accessible when a child turns 18, but, as the Davey family found out the hard way, this is not true for children with learning or other disabilities who lack the capacity to fill in the forms themselves.

The process of applying to the Court of Protection for a deputyship order is Kafkaesque, consumes endless time and places such a burden and cost that many parents give up altogether. The many steps, and my goodness there are many, include obtaining written permission from three different relatives to demonstrate that you are unlikely to abuse the funds that you will access, and obtaining various doctors’ assessments—well, perhaps that is fair—but then the courts kick in. The Court of Protection charges £412 for a deputyship order. It requires you to obtain insurance against misuse, and the Davey family found that that cost £48. Then comes the Office of the Public Guardian, which charges £100 for its assessment, and it then levies an annual supervision charge of £320. If you add this up, it basically becomes £1,000 to be able to access a child trust fund for your severely disabled child.

What is really extraordinary is that most child trust funds do not have a lot of money in them. I think the average amount is £2,000. You would have to spend 50% of it to be able to access that fund for your child. The people accessing it are parents whom the DWP already relies on to deal with a variety of much more significant pots of money to support that child. I use the Davey family not to ask for any kind of sympathy, but here is an MP whose wife is a lawyer, and they cannot work their way through this maze. How are people without those kinds of expertise going to work their way through this system?

Unfortunately, there is a new legal offering from specialists who will, for a significant sum, offer to negotiate the way through for you. That is a practice that none of us wants to encourage. There are a few child trust fund managers who handle the process a bit better and have been helping some of the people whose funds they manage to minimise the process, but it is a lottery in terms of finding that you have taken out your child trust fund with an entity that takes that approach. Charities estimate that 80,000 to 123,000 young adults are essentially locked out of their child trust funds.

I tried to look for what response the Government have been making to the overtures of the charities and other civic society groups that have been out there trying to speak for these youngsters. Two things came to my attention. The only response I could find from the Department of Justice was that it has now digitised the application form and provided a guide.

My amendment would force the FCA to simplify the whole process for CTFs paying out under £5,000 in any one year. It is formulated around an amendment put before the House in 2021—I am pretty sure that is the correct year—by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, who is really skilled in developing, designing and presenting the appropriate amendments. In speaking to that amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, who was the Minister when child trust funds were put in place, made it very clear that no one had thought of this particular set of problems and that that was why the system was designed in a way that set up this obstacle course. It was not intentional or planned; it was simply a failure to recognise what could happen and has in fact happened.

I say this to the Minister: all the arguments we hear in support of the Bill are about deregulation; here is a piece of deregulation that I think no one could argue with, and which I would definitely and clearly support, as would my party and, I suspect, many others. If the Minister cannot control this himself, could he please go away and berate his colleagues? These youngsters need to be able to access their funds. We are talking about small pots. Simply digitising the 106 sections of the application form is not the answer.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, if I might add to this debate, I begin by noting the huge cross-party agreement we have on lots of the issues the Bill raises, most particularly on this issue of ensuring access to financial services for everyone. That is what is behind so many of the amendments here. It is also the issue that was raised in the debate about affordable credit by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, and at Second Reading by the noble Baroness, Lady Hyde, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall. We all, from all parties, want to know that such services are available to everyone. The question is simply how we can make sure that that takes place and that the industry that has to be there to deliver it buys in to making sure that those services take place. We need to be sure that our actions as rule-makers are helpful in that regard.

At Second Reading, I heard a number of speeches about excessive regulation, all doubtless intending to encourage financial services to do their job better. But there is an issue with regulation and how much of it there is. If there is any concern about this amendment, that is absolutely not its objective. Critically, we need financial services to be available to everyone; the question is whether, by regulating them, that gets us to where we want to be. Maybe it will, but we might argue that, unless we have persuaded those whom we wish to influence that they will strive to improve performance in this regard, the danger is that it might just be another regulation. Whatever we ask the FCA to report, we need to first take a step back and think through how this will affect performance on the ground. It is the finance industry that has to deliver this, and we need to be working in partnership with it—with the industry, customers, potential customers, the Government and regulators, moving ahead together. There are also initiatives, some of which might work, and which, if they had real momentum, with everyone behind them, might start to deliver the sort of things we want.

As many noble Lords know, I have done quite a lot of work with the financial services industry in Scotland. Its industry body, Scottish Financial Enterprise, has laid out as its objective that it intends to

“have a financial services system that allows every citizen and business of Scotland to connect and access appropriate services”.

Wow. Is that not exactly what we are trying to get to happen? But who is following up to make sure that that statement, that vision is realised? It feels to me that we need a new settlement, and institutions to see that such a settlement is delivered.

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[Baroness Bi (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of Norton Rose Fulbright. Some of my firm’s clients are regulated by the FCA and the PRA. I am not a member of the Financial Services Regulation Committee, which is why I am probably breaking what I have heard as unanimity by speaking in favour of Clause 17 remaining part of the Bill.

I note that the current accountability framework, including the role of the committee, was created only three years ago, pursuant to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 following Brexit. Before that, we have to remember that we were content with what was probably pretty limited oversight by the European Parliament, so hearing about the importance of very detailed parliamentary oversight when it comes to looking at every proposal that the regulators might have is a relatively new innovation for us.

I do not think it unreasonable for the Government now to consider how well that post-Brexit system has been working and to propose changes to a regime that the committee itself has criticised as overly complex and difficult to navigate. I note that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, commented at Second Reading how difficult it had been to hold the regulators to account under the current system. I am therefore curious about why noble Lords are keen to preserve a status quo that is far from ideal.

There has been significant opposition to Clause 17 and concern about the effect it could have on parliamentary oversight, but I am not convinced that that reaction is warranted. I do not think Clause 17 is a retreat from scrutiny, but it is looking to make it more targeted and effective by merely removing the obligation on the regulators to consider every step they take by reference to the eight FSMA regulatory principles for every day-to-day function. The obligation to notify all those processes to the parliamentary committee does not always lead to the kind of analysis or response and targeted feedback that we have been discussing. That volume of information that the regulators are producing has not led to a better system.

The result is that that documentation requirement has become a burdensome compliance exercise and not truly analytical. The Government’s consultation confirmed that the information produced is too granular to support effectively an overall assessment of regulatory performance, and nearly three-quarters of those who responded to that consultation were supportive of or broadly sympathetic to the approach the Government are proposing, and these are the customers, the regulated body, of the people that the FCA and the PRA are supposed to protect.

We should also acknowledge that Clause 17 does not abolish the Section 3B regulatory principles. The FCA and the PRA will continue to be bound to have regard to those principles when they are preparing or revising their five-year strategy plans, for which they will be held accountable not just by the parliamentary committee but by society as a whole. Those strategies will be subject to consultation and will create a public benchmark against which the regulators’ subsequent rule-making can be assessed and progress against the stated strategy can be monitored, in their annual reports if nothing else. I am not referring just to the glossy brochure that we have heard about.

It is also important to note that Clause 17 does not alter the requirement for the regulators to consider and document to the committee how they are pursuing their statutory objectives. In the case of the FCA, so much of the focus is on the competitiveness and growth objectives. That gives the committee a powerful accountability tool. There is nothing to stop the committee calling them in whenever it likes to talk to them about how they are meeting those objectives in line with the principles.

The requirement of the regulators to present their analysis to the committee on each of the eight regulatory principles in relation to each consultation is disproportionate. Its removal does not reflect a material dilution of the regulators’ obligations because the substantive matters of concern continue to bind the regulators in any event. Is it necessary for the committee to be involved in all the detailed work that the regulators need to do in order to exercise proper parliamentary oversight in what we all accept is a fast-changing financial services market in a post-Brexit regulatory environment where the FCA and the PRA now bear responsibility for significantly more rules than was contemplated when Section 3B of the original FSMA 2000 was drafted?

As a common law legal system, it is right that the Government ask the regulators to comply with broad principles and hold them accountable for the outcome without requiring parliamentary oversight of all operational steps and without expecting the regulators actively to consider and document their analysis of how they have complied with each principle every time they exercise their general functions, however routine they are. I know that there is a discussion about the system being modified and improved through this Bill, but that is not what we have at the moment.

The committee’s mandate is to scrutinise whether the UK’s regulatory framework and regulators operate effectively. That requires the committee to have access to meaningful information and a coherent standard against which to test the regulators’ conduct. The long-term strategy provides that broad standard, and the committee will still receive consultations and examine how individual proposals advance the strategy that the regulator has publicly committed to. Its constitutional role could therefore be strengthened rather than rendered ineffective. Clause 17 keeps the Financial Services Regulation Committee’s oversight where it should be: on the substance of regulatory performance, the delivery of publicly stated strategies and the real-world impact of regulation. It also frees the regulators from unnecessary procedural burden, so that they can focus on regulating well. The mechanism does not have to be the same as before, and keeping Clause 17 could materially improve it.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I did not intend to speak in this debate because the case has been put so well. However, having heard the noble Baroness, Lady Bi, I want to join the conversation because I think she has a very different perception of the role of Parliament from that of many others here. We have a responsibility as Parliament collectively—we are not the elected House but the appointed House—directly to the people of this country. The regulators are servants of that responsibility, not masters of it.

What the noble Baroness described is the ability for Parliament to intervene only at the very highest level in a very limited way and to pass huge authority over the financial sector, our financial stability and the economy to the regulators and then walk away. If we were to do that, we would be absenting ourselves from the very requirements that are at the core of a parliamentary system. She dismissed the pretty five-year strategy plan that we have from the FCA for 2025 to 2030, but it is exactly what is envisaged in this legislation: fairly high-level, simplistic comments of the kind that were probably developed by the public relations department.

The committee we put in place in 2023 was put in place not at the proposal of the Government or the regulators but by a Parliament utterly frustrated in not being able to carry out the responsibilities that it has as a Parliament. I have to say that the Labour Party was in a completely different place in 2023—it has now switched; I do not know why it has made such a volte-face. The Government of the day, the regulators and the financial sector were determined to narrow the capacity to scrutinise, to have a parliamentary view and to allow this Parliament to live up to its responsibilities. If we cannot have an expert committee able to look in detail at factors that so fundamentally affect the economy and well-being of the UK, we are, frankly, derelict in our duties. That is why this is a huge constitutional issue. If we were to repeat this in the area—

[Baroness Bi (Lab)]

I am not sure that we disagree very much on what the purpose of Parliament is and its relationship with the people of Britain, but the FCA asked for a risk metric from Parliament and did not get one. I have heard a lot about the obligations to the people but, if Parliament is so crucial to what the regulators need to do, why was no guidance given to the regulators about the extent of risk they should take in their operations?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I am not on the committee, so I cannot answer that particular question—I am sure others would be able to consider this issue. However, if the noble Baroness thinks that, because Parliament did not, in her words, provide political cover for activity that the regulators wanted to carry out, Parliament should then be removed so that the regulators would somehow be exposed, who would they be exposed to? They would not be exposed to a committee. The public does not have the ability. I do not see the regulators going around the country talking to ordinary people in regular communities about what they are doing; they do not engage at that level. Many APPGs in this House have asked the regulators to come and talk to them. They are nearly always refused or somebody junior is sent, so it is only through a limited committee structure that this Parliament has been able to hold the regulators to account at all.

I give huge credit to the committee that sits under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which was created against the resistance of the regulators and the Government. This, now, is their attempt to try to unravel what is turning out to be a very effective committee that is raising really important issues, creating a requirement for proper answers and initiating real investigation. That is what lies at the heart of this: an attempt to negate the effectiveness of a committee that has been making its mark, and which leaves the regulator feeling uncomfortable because it has to answer questions.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Is the Minister suggesting that, in dealing with the long-term strategy, there will be the same level of detail as is normally provided in guidance? I am somewhat confused when he explains that one is a substitute for the other.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

Could you repeat the question?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

If I understood the Minister correctly—do correct me if I am wrong—the FCA or the PRA will have the opportunity to provide guidance if they deem it necessary. But if they choose not to, that should not be worrying, because the equivalent statement will occur either in the five-year strategy or in a report on how the FCA is achieving its five-year strategy. Is he suggesting that that will be at the same level of detail as the guidance that is required today? That is what I am trying to understand.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I believe that they still have to publish the full guidance, but let me come back with a written response on that.

Turning to Amendments 90 and 92, the Government recognise the impact that changes in rules and guidance can have on firms, particularly smaller firms and regulated persons trying to understand what is expected of them. The government reforms are intended to avoid imposing full consultation and cost-benefit analysis requirements where proposals are genuinely minor or low impact, while preserving the wider consultation framework for substantive changes. Minor changes to rules include corrections, clarifications or minor technical updates, and it will be for the regulators themselves to determine whether a rule change meets this definition, as they are best placed to assess the impact of such changes. For example, last year, the FCA consulted on reducing late filing charges from £250 to £100. Under this provision, the FCA would not be obliged to consult and could make these changes faster.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

What if the change had been in the other direction and had added an additional £100 pounds? Would the FCA have been in a position to decide that that was not material for consultation?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I think there is a broad principle: we are trying to give the FCA the power to make those small changes in both directions.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will make a few comments on amendments in this group and speak particularly to my Amendments 54 and 57. I say very gently that I agree with the other amendments in this group. My noble friend Lady Bowles is looking for consistency in the consultation period. Unless someone has been on the other side of a consultation period—not setting it but trying to respond to it—they may not know that the real-life difficulties of the inconsistency, frankly, are often a barrier, not just an annoyance. Amendment 47A is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, and yes, it makes sense to have a payment systems panel on an issue such as this: we need to make sure that a full range of views and experience is taking a look at such a crucial piece of the financial plumbing.

On Amendment 55, I could not understand why ease of use should have been removed from the competition objective. That made no sense if we are thinking about people and consumers. I do not know whether the Government could explain that. I very much support the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. It had struck me but I did not do anything about it and I should have. His Amendment 49 deals with this capacity to exclude digital payment assets from definitions in payment systems, which just seems fundamentally wrong. We are moving in the direction of digital, these are coherent parts of the payment system and it is going to be relevant to the two amendments that I am about to discuss.

My Amendment 54 recognises that we are in a fast-changing world. We are increasingly in a time in which the payment system is made up of many more entities than just the conventional players. New schemes, platforms, exchanges and all kinds of services are coming on stream; these are key and many are digital. Amendment 54 emphasises that the FCA must, in its service-user objective, focus on “consumers”, a much clearer term than “users”. We have seen in the past that consumers get lost in this overall definition of users. It would require the FCA to look at the issues of inclusion, redress, access to cash, choice and interoperability from the perspective of the consumer in this increasingly complex world. As we move forward, many consumers will simply be bemused.

A simple example arose for me when, very recently, I spoke to an American firm planning to offer payroll services in the UK using 100% stablecoin. The firm is very confident that this will be in place shortly after the regulations are approved by the FCA. How does an employee receiving 100% of their salary in stablecoin turn that into cash at an ATM? Obviously, there are huge issues of access to cash, interoperability and who will pay for the necessary software and hardware changes.

Amendment 57 carries on with this theme and picks up an earlier group, addressing the need for all participants in the payment system, including tech companies, to pay their fair share. That is why the definition of “payment system” really matters and should not exclude digital assets. As the payments world changes so significantly, financial inclusion will be a far more complex issue, and it is untenable for the costs of this to fall just on the banks. My amendment makes it clear that every participant across all recognised payment systems must step up: we need a level playing field.

The intent of these really quite simple amendments is to help overcome the incredibly fragmented and confusing payments landscape in the UK, particularly when we look at it from the perspective of the consumer. It is an obstacle course and, frankly, general confusion and fragmentation let overseas entities take advantage of us. I am very troubled that the National Payments Vision of the Bank of England does not have digital assets in scope. The Bank issued its policy announcement on systemic stablecoin on Monday, and it says that its work will be in parallel with the National Payments Vision, but I am still trying to work out why the two are not properly linked together and coherent. There are new players in this field, and some are asserting that we need a single sovereign payments system to respond to core consumer needs and to join up the dots with consumers at its heart. I met the Canadian company Interac, and that is exactly what happens in Canada, so there are international examples, which do not seem to be under consideration in any of the material that I have been looking at.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for bringing forward this group of amendments, which raises several important questions around the future shape of payments regulation once the Payment Systems Regulator is brought within the FCA. I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes for introducing Amendments 47A and 101A with simplicity and clarity; I note the support from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer.

Despite the arguments of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, I do not favour extending the FCA’s service user objective to include consumer redress or access to cash; indeed, I am against a levy for such purposes. In any event, payment system operators do not deal with customers. That is done by financial services firms.

I am more receptive to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on applying the secondary growth and competitiveness objective to the regulation of payment systems. Does the Minister intend to do this? If so, can it be done by the proposed regulations or does it need to go into the Bill? I should add that, as with so much in the Bill, the framework is broad while the substance is left to later regulations. That is a real concern, as it leaves a lacuna in parliamentary accountability.

We have been through the arguments on consumer credit and in-person banking, but I log them again for good order. I want also to address two central themes running through this group: first, the need for proper industry engagement and accountability in regulation-making; and, secondly, the question of whether the new regime is sufficiently clear and future-proofed.

On the first point, we welcome the amendments that seek to strengthen the consultation requirements and ensure adequate time for meaningful industry engagement, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, set out in her Amendment 48. That would have a dual effect. First, it would increase transparency and accountability for regulators. If regulators are required to consult properly, explain their reasoning, engage with those affected and publish clear strategies, we have a better chance of understanding not only what they are doing but why they are doing it. One point that is clearly of concern to other noble Lords is the extent of the discretion afforded to the Treasury in designating and de-designating payment systems.

The second effect is that this would ensure that those affected by regulation have a meaningful opportunity to have some input in our deliberations on the Bill and our discussions with industry. It has become clear that the regulatory environment seems to be planned and developed at some distance from the firms that are expected to comply. New regulations, handbooks and guidance may make sense to the people sitting in the FCA or the PRA, but they do not always make sense to those at the coalface: firms, compliance teams, payment providers and market participants. They have to interpret them to implement them and live with the operational consequences.

In this case, those with an interest go way beyond the regulators’ normal clients. For example, concerns have been expressed by retailers, which are usually quick to spot practical problems. I remember well that, when I was at Tesco, we were introducing the euro into our businesses in Ireland and elsewhere. Because of inadequate consultation, the timing was wrong, with training and IT changes needed during the busy Christmas period—a recipe for cost and chaos.

This is a real problem. If regulation is developed in a silo, away from the experience of market participants, even well-intentioned regulation can become impractical, disproportionate or poorly targeted. We end up with the regulator and the regulated working from different understandings of how the market actually functions. That is why I hope that the Minister will look constructively at the amendments that seek to strengthen consultation, transparency and meaningful engagement both with professional bodies and with market participants. Without proper planning, there will be a risk to growth—and, indeed, to the UK’s reputation on payment systems, which has generally been good.

The second major issue is the question of what exactly is covered by the regime. Is the Bill regulating the market as it exists today or preparing the UK for the market as it will exist in a few years? We will speak about digital finance and digital assets in later groups, but the point is highly relevant here, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, mentioned. If the Bill is to modernise and improve regulation, why does it feel in places as though it is being designed for a market that may already be out of date? We have the legal system, the financial services expertise, the markets, the professional services ecosystem and the technology capability to be a world leader, but leadership requires clarity and confidence from the Government and I do not think we are yet seeing enough of either in this Bill.

That brings me to the wider point about accountability and scope, which was raised on Monday. If the PSR’s functions are to be absorbed into the FCA, how will this new regime be properly held to account? How will the Government ensure that payments regulation does not become simply one more area lost within the wider FCA structure? I would be grateful if, in addition to my initial questions about growth, competitiveness and the level of delegation, the Minister could address three points.

First, how will the Government ensure that industry and professional bodies are brought into the regulation-making process early enough for their input to make a meaningful difference? Secondly, how will the Government ensure that the new regime is sufficiently clear and future-proofed to capture new forms of payments and digital finance, rather than regulating for the market of the past? Thirdly, how will the new payments regime be held to account once it sits within the FCA and what mechanisms will exist to ensure that Parliament, industry and consumers can properly scrutinise its operations? A lot of clarity is needed on this part of the Bill, which we of course support in principle. I very much look forward to the Minister’s reply.

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I think this will develop as we get to Report, but my request is that we look at this all over again and say that professional bodies have been doing this very adequately for a long time. It goes along with the maxim, “If it ain’t broke, why are we trying to fix it?”.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will make some comments on the amendments that have been discussed and then speak to the amendments in my name. I have some sympathy with the issues raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and I very much hope that the Minister can clear up this issue of professional privilege and client confidentiality, because it seems to me that it is not in any way interpretable from the legislation or the Explanatory Notes, and it is key.

I also see that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, have tabled Amendment 69A to require a report on the transfer process, which seems very sensible. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has an amendment calling for a review of anti-money laundering and counter- terrorism financing supervision within three years. All those make some sense to me.

I will look particularly at Amendment 64A from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, because it hits part of the problem on the head. It seeks to require more effective intelligence sharing between supervisory authorities. It is that failure of intelligence sharing that many people consider to be the fundamental underlying cause of many of the problems we have today. It is not very clear that the proposals the Government are bringing forward are the easiest way to remedy that. I will say more on that later.

For my amendments in this group, I thank the Chartered Institute of Taxation and the Association of Taxation Technicians for both clarifying issues and proposing legal language. Despite all the steps we have taken over recent years, London remains the global centre of choice for laundering dirty money, whether from crime, sanctions busting or political corruption. Estimates suggest that 40% of all laundered money globally goes through the City of London or the Crown dependencies—up to £325 billion a year. The primacy of the London money laundromat is not an accolade we wish to retain.

Part of the problem has been the fragmentation of oversight by 25 separate public and professional bodies, supervising not just financial institutions but the many enablers, ranging from accountants to solicitors, property agents and service companies. In 2018, the Government set up within the FCA what they hoped would be the answer: the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision, which the noble Lord, Lord Mackinlay, described as the OPBAS—I thought it was an acronym, not an initialism. It was put in place to oversee the 22 professional body supervisors, not the public ones. We need to acknowledge that it has had some real successes, but it has not been as effective as we had hoped. That goes back to the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, who is no longer in his place: the primary reason for this, in most people’s opinion, seems to be relatively poor communication and co-operation between OPBAS and the law enforcement agencies. Frankly, I cannot find anything in this Bill that begins to deal with that.

One approach to remedying this situation would have been to have given OPBAS proper resources and more teeth. Instead, the Government have decided that the FCA should take on directly all supervisory responsibility for anti-money laundering and counter- terrorism financing. Many in the professional bodies are very correctly worried that the FCA lacks the expertise and capacity to carry out the role it is being given, which is much more complex than just enforcement.

Many of the firms that the FCA will supervise on these AML issues are small to tiny. The FCA has no significant history of supervising small and tiny firms, and no understanding of the different operations and pressures of these entities or their specialist activities. The firms—this has been one of the strengths of the professional bodies—need compliance support, education, expert helplines, hand-holding and guidance from a supervisor that knows their business model.

My Amendments 65 to 69 should be seen as part of a whole. They are collectively intended to try to tackle that problem, and to clarify and ensure a workable transition process. Amendment 65 addresses education guidance and compliance support. Amendment 66 requires a proper transition timetable. Amendment 67 requires the FCA to have the necessary expertise and experience in tax, accounting, legal services, trust and company service provision—it does not have that at the moment. Amendment 68 requires transparency on supervisory costs and the fees that the FCA will levy. Amendment 69 requires a report in six months on how effective the new anti-money laundering system is.

Frankly, all of that should have been in the Bill, and none of it should be controversial. Once again, we have a situation where the Government seek to pass primary legislation that gives Ministers and regulators a blank sheet of paper to fill in as they wish with secondary legislation. At this point, as far as I can understand— I looked but could not find it—we do not even have a promise to publish the regulations for consultation.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the stand part notice on Clause 14 and Amendment 69A in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Altrincham. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead—whom it is a particular pleasure to welcome to the Committee on this Bill—and to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for bringing forward a number of useful amendments in this group. My noble friend Lord Mackinlay of Richborough is right to summarise the concerns about and nonsenses of the money laundering regulations in general, which we should try to address as part of reform. We certainly support that.

The question we have to ask is whether the Government’s chosen mechanism is sufficiently clear, proportionate and workable. At present, I am concerned that it is not. Clause 14 represents a major structural change, moving front-line AML supervision for professional services from the existing professional body supervisors to the FCA. The Bill will allow FCA supervision of money laundering to be extended to several new areas—to 22 bodies in all, as we have heard, including solicitors, law firms, accountants, trust and company service providers and, in practice, estate agents. Yet, as with so much in this Bill, the framework is broad while the substance is left to later regulations. That is a real concern.

My Amendment 69A seeks to address that in part by requiring the Treasury to report to Parliament on the process for transferring responsibilities under Clause 14. That report would force the Government to set out how the transfer will work in practice, what steps will be taken to manage the transition, how costs will be assessed, how duplication will be avoided and how the FCA will acquire and maintain the necessary sector expertise—all points that have been raised in the debate.

We have heard serious concerns from industry and professional bodies about spiralling costs, duplication and regulatory uncertainty. The Law Society described the proposal as

“a seismic shakeup to how law firms and their AML … obligations are regulated”.

It warned that the change risks diverting

“attention, resources and time from supporting clients and growing their businesses”

towards adapting to a new and uncertain compliance regime. That concern should be taken seriously. The Government and the FCA should be seeking to simplify requirements, reduce duplication and minimise the compliance burden, while maintaining strong safeguards against economic crime.

The risk of duplication is particularly important. Solicitors are already subject to a distinct regulatory framework. They have professional obligations, ethical duties, responsibilities to the court, duties under the rule of law and obligations around client confidentiality and legal professional privilege. If the FCA is now to be added to that landscape as a supervisor, the Government must explain precisely how the new system will avoid overlapping or conflicting expectations.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, I am particularly concerned about sector expertise: if the FCA is to take on these responsibilities, it must have people within it who understand the professions and bodies that they will be supervising. It must understand how law firms operate, how client accounts work, how professional privilege functions and how smaller or high street firms differ from large practices.

Costs are another major concern. I emphasise that small and high street firms are worried that a move to FCA supervision may result in higher fees and new compliance costs. Many of these firms are already under pressure. They serve individuals, families and small businesses in communities across the country. If the effect of this reform is to impose disproportionate new costs on them, it could have real consequences for access to legal services. The FCA does not understand how to deal with thousands and thousands of such firms.

We also need to understand how regional capacity will be maintained. Professional services are not confined to London; it is one of their charms. AML risks and compliance responsibilities exist across the whole country. The existing professional body model has the advantage of sector-specific and, in many cases, locally embedded knowledge.

There is also a specific territorial issue here, as we heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. The Law Society of Scotland has opposed the change and raised concerns about the compatibility of FCA supervision with the regulation of legal services in Scotland. The Government need to explain how these reforms will interact with devolved and existing statutory frameworks, as well as how they will avoid creating a two-track or conflicting regulatory regime. The noble and learned Lord also emphasised the SME issue, which seems to be a particular difficulty in Scotland.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am going to be exceedingly brief. I support the amendments in this group.

My noble friend Lady Bowles has hit on the fundamental reason for my strong opposition, which is the constitutional issue. By chance, I happened to speak to a senior regulator in the financial services sector—I am not going to use their name because it would not be fair to do so—shortly after the Bill came out. We started looking at its clauses, and that person said to me, “Ah, but, in the long-term strategy, we will be able to explain to people in detail why we are doing what we choose to do”. To me, that absolutely summed up the issue as a whole. There was no concept at all that there would be parliamentary insight, parliamentary oversight or engagement; it was simply going to be a much better vehicle to explain to people why certain things that had been identified as necessary were necessary and were going to happen. There was no sense of challenge anywhere at all. That is a really dangerous way for us to move our legislation.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all who have taken part in this short debate. We are sympathetic to the broad purpose of requiring regulators to think strategically, but, if the regulatory strategies are to be meaningful, they must not simply become static documents published every few years then left on the shelf. As my noble friend Lady Noakes said, that is not the way we do it in business. Common practice is for five-year strategies, reviewed annually, and annual plans.

The amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Ashcombe would reduce the strategy period from five years to three years. He is right that markets can change very quickly, as we keep hearing. A five-year strategy risks being set in stone for too long, unless the Minister is able to clarify that the plans will be updated regularly. If not, a shorter period, such as three years, would have real benefits. Perhaps the Minister can explain why the period of five years has been chosen and how he believes the strategies will remain agile and flexible.

I am delighted that the Minister said that he was prepared to accept Amendment 70 on competitiveness and growth. As I have said several times, the growth of the UK financial services sector is key to growth more generally. Regulation should say how the Government—or the regulator—understand that objective, how they are giving effect to it and how their regulatory approach is supporting growth in the market, because the UK has a large and dynamic financial services sector. My noble friend Lady Lawlor emphasised that point, which we should not forget, and we cannot assume that its international position is guaranteed. Regulation has a direct effect on investment, innovation, listings, lending and market depth, as well as on the attractiveness of the UK as a place to do business, so, if regulators are not required to think explicitly about this, the growth objective risks being honoured in theory but neglected in practice.

Amendments 71 and 74 on consultation are very welcome. As we have said in our debates on previous groups, bringing experts into the room in a timely way is a vital part of the regulatory process.

In my view, the boards of regulators have a part to play in the strategic plans, but my recollection is that those engaged in regulated companies were excluded from the non-executive roles on the PRA and the FCA. Is this still the case? My own board experience is that conflicts of interest can be managed. I believe that regulators will benefit from current knowledge from the industry, particularly given these new statutory strategies, the digital changes to which we keep referring and the expansion of the scope of the FCA. I would like to hear from the Minister what the current rules are—perhaps in a letter, as I have not raised this point with him before.

I also support the principle behind Amendments 72 and 75 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. They would require the FCA and the PRA to review their rulebooks and explain how they will simplify or remove rules that are outdated, unnecessary or duplicative. Regulation, as has been said, tends to accumulate. New rules and duties are added, but old rules are not always removed. Guidance, expectations and supervisory practice develop over time. A long-term strategy is not only about what new initiative the regulators want to pursue; it should also be about what the regulator can simplify. If a regular rulebook review is done with a view to making regulation less burdensome, cheaper to operate and supportive of growth, that will be a very positive step.

The amendments on Treasury recommendations also raise a serious question around accountability and regulator independence. There is, of course, a balance to be struck. We do not want day-to-day political interference in regulatory decisions but nor should independent regulators operate without clear strategic accountability to Parliament and the Government of the day, as my noble friend Lord Massey and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, explained better than I can. The Government should explain why the Treasury’s recommendation-making power is framed as it is, why it is limited in the way proposed and how Ministers expect it to operate in practice.

Finally, on the Clause 16 stand part notice, I understand the concerns raised in the debate. The value of that clause will depend entirely on whether the strategies produced are meaningful, responsive and capable of being scrutinised. If they become generic documents with broad statements of aspiration, they will add little. If they provide clear commitments, measurable priorities, proper engagement with growth and competitiveness, and a disciplined approach to reviewing the rulebook, they will be useful.

I very much look forward to a full response from the Minister to the points that have been made.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by explaining the Government’s purpose behind Clause 16 and why it should stand part of the Bill.

The Government have often heard feedback calling for the regulatory system to have an overall long-term strategy with clear goals, where the regulators consider the cumulative impacts of their policies and the interaction between supervision and rule-making. The reforms introduced by Clause 16 are intended to address this feedback and will improve transparency around the regulators’ long-term direction and focus, which the Government consider will support effective oversight and scrutiny of the regulators.

Clause 16 requires the FCA and the PRA each to prepare and publish long-term strategies so that stake- holders, including regulated firms, can better understand the regulators’ approach to the sector, and so that the Government and Parliament fully understand the regulators’ priorities and can more effectively hold them to account on how they are translating their objectives into actions and results. When the Government consulted on this proposal, it received strong support: 83% of respondents supported it and agreed that the regulators taking a more strategic and cohesive approach would benefit the sector by helping firms know what to expect.

I have listened carefully to the concerns raised by noble Lords. However, the Government remain firmly of the view that Clause 16 will support scrutiny. By requiring a clear long-term strategic overview, Clause 16 will help the sector understand and plan more effectively for regulatory initiatives and will help interested parties engage with the regulators at a strategic level. Without Clause 16, there would be no requirement for the regulators to set out, in one place, their long-term priorities and approach in advancing their objectives. The aim of the strategies is to make it easier, not harder, for Parliament and stakeholders to scrutinise whether the regulators’ actions are coherent and aligned with the framework that Parliament has set.

On Amendment 70, the Government agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that the FCA’s secondary international competitiveness and growth objective should be central to the formulation of its long-term strategy. Growth is the number one priority for this Government and the financial services sector, as many have noted, is key to delivering this. The Government always intended the FCA’s long-term strategy to set out its priorities for advancing our international competitiveness and growth objective. We are looking into this point to determine if this is fully clear within the drafting of the clause, and we are open to tabling an amendment on Report should we determine that it is needed. I thank the noble Baroness for bringing this to my attention and commit to keeping her and other noble Lords informed as this consideration progresses.

I turn to Amendments 69B and 73A. The noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked me to explain the Government’s thinking behind the time periods here. The Government have set the length of this strategy as five years because, as has been noted, it is the standard time period for organisational strategies and is very common in the business world, as many noble Lords will appreciate. It also aligns with standard parliamentary terms and therefore the requirement for the Treasury to issue recommendations to the regulators at least once per Parliament. However, the Government recognise that financial services markets can evolve quickly and it is important that the regulators’ strategic documents remain current and useful.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked me how the strategies would be kept under review. The Bill provides flexibility for the regulators to revise or publish a new strategy within the five-year period if circumstances require it, or to publish a strategy for a shorter period of time than five years. If they do the latter, it will need to be with an explanation about why this is appropriate. Five years is therefore a maximum interval, not a requirement to wait five years before making a change. For example, the Bill requires the regulators to consider whether they need to update their strategy or issue a new one whenever new Treasury recommendations are issued. The Government’s view is that this strikes the right balance between providing a long-term, stable framework and allowing regulators to respond when market, economic or regulatory conditions change.

On Amendments 73 and 76, the Government’s approach here is deliberate. The need for the regulators to take account of Treasury recommendations at a strategic level, rather than at the level of general functions, has been carefully considered. Under the new framework, the Treasury’s recommendations to the regulators regarding its economic priorities will inform the development of their strategic priorities. This is aligned with the change to the way that the regulatory principles will be applied, and I hope it demonstrates the Government’s confidence that influencing the regulators’ strategies is an effective mechanism for ensuring that they have an appropriate focus and are performing well.

Further to this, the framework has been carefully designed to ensure that Treasury recommendations are taken fully into account. As I mentioned earlier, regulators must consider updating or producing a new strategy whenever the Treasury sends a new recommendation letter. The regulators will continue to be obliged to respond annually to the Treasury on their actions in response to the recommendations separately from the strategy document. This will support continued transparency and accountability regarding how the regulators are taking government recommendations into account.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I just ask for clarification. The Minister talked about the way in which the Treasury will make recommendations and the regulator must take them into account. I did not hear the word “Parliament” anywhere in that. Where is the capacity for parliamentary recommendations and oversight to make sure that they are taken into account? Or is the purpose of this legislation to make sure that that does not exist?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I think this is part of a broader discussion. I am informed that this takes into account existing practices for how the reviews and overviews take place. Unless we decide, in the following debates, that we need an amendment to provide parliamentary overview, this will apply to the current regulatory framework as the oversight currently exists.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I do not want to get confused about this. My understanding is that this is already existing practice, but I will take this away and write to the noble Baronesses just to confirm that this is exactly correct. We are trying not to defer from the practice as it exists today, but I will write to clarify that.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I just add that the point of the principles is that they are, in effect, Parliament’s recommendations set in law. I am struggling to see how that fits into the question of who can recommend from this point in time.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I will write to the noble Baroness to clarify that.

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[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

There is a broad philosophical point being made about trusting the FCA and the regulators. Again, we will come back to this in further debates. It is a view that I understand, and we need to develop this through the process of the debate, but it is definitely not the intention to give them free rein to make laws randomly. I think we will have to come back to that later in Committee, if that is okay.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I ask for some clarification on this complex area. Under Clause 16, new Section 1JZA(7) states:

“A strategy may be revised by publishing a revised version of the strategy”.


Is the Minister confirming that, as it says in the Explanatory Notes, no consultation goes with that revision process?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

That is correct.

Amendments 71 and 74 seek to require the FCA and the PRA, when preparing or revising their long-term strategies, to consult persons they consider would be affected, including those they regulate. The Government have a clear expectation that the regulators’ strategies will be informed by engagement with industry, consumer representatives and other stakeholders. However, adding a statutory consultation requirement could lead to long delays between a new Government setting direction through a recommendation letter and the regulators putting a strategy in place.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Noakes, asked how the Government’s remit will work under the new system. The FCA and the PRA will now be required to have regard to their remit letters when producing or updating long-term strategies. The regulators will continue to be required to respond annually to remit letters, setting out the actions to which they will respond. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked about non-executive directors; I will write to her on that as I do not have the answer to hand.

The accountability of the financial services regulators is clearly an important matter of huge interest to the Committee. I have heard a range of views today on exactly what this should look like, and we will continue to debate this issue in relation to subsequent clauses. However, regardless of views on the wider matters of transparency and accountability, I am confident that the majority will agree that long-term strategies will add to our understanding of the regulators’ strategic priorities and approach, which must be a good thing. I therefore ask that Clause 16 stands part of the Bill.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I hope to keep the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, happy by being very brief. One of the things that came out of the committee’s report was the proliferation of principles and “have regards”, et cetera. It is ripe for a review and an overhaul, and I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I very much suspect that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and I would find significant differences in our ideal list of the regulatory principles in Section 3B(1) of FSMA. I will argue in the next group for a “have regard” to the risks of the private credit market to financial stability. In group 8, my colleagues will argue for a “have regard” on sustainability and in group 10 for a “have regard” on financial inclusion.

These are all probing amendments, but they reflect the need for principles to be reviewed, debated and potentially changed by Parliament, so that a review would have input from the regulators and from the Government, but the final decision would rest with Parliament, as it has always done in primary legislation.

To pick up one of the issues that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made about durability, constant churn is unacceptable and would leave the regulators and the financial sector in confusion, and none of us wishes for that. But I think that on the whole, we can look back and say that Parliament has behaved responsibly. Not everybody likes all the principles, but the financial system and the regulators have not had difficulty in delivering, or considering and making sure it is having regard to, those particular principles, particularly when financial stability is at stake.

To me, what underlies all this is the democratic process. I do not believe that principles can be abdicated to a regulator, which is what happens with the Bill—they go off into the long-term strategy. I believe this is for Parliament, and I would very much always support a review. Parliament has that right and that responsibility.

Some of us rather suspect that the removal of the principles to the five-year strategy has been to provide a covert way to diminish the climate change principles. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, whom I respect, would move them through the front door, but for many of us there is a strong suspicion that this is removing them through the back door so that the Government do not get the opprobrium that would follow from groups that are concerned about net zero and climate change. Some in the financial services sector are actually very dedicated to achieving climate change targets, but there are also plenty of voices that regard every climate change target and every net zero as a cost and a regulatory burden, and it seems to me that those voices have had very strong sway with the Government.

I suspect, frankly, that we would never have had climate change in among the principles had it not been for Mark Carney, and I very much doubt they will survive in any substance as part of the long-term strategy unless there is something of a volte- face in attitudes as we keep going through very extreme weather conditions and it becomes apparent that there is a huge financial cost and a huge risk to financial stability from the extreme weather conditions and the consequence damage to our overall economic circumstances.

As I say, if the Government wish to change the principles, they should do it through the front door in the way that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, proposes: raise the issues, tell Parliament that they wish to make changes and argue in favour of those changes. But that is a fundamentally different approach from taking principles, which I suspect they dislike, and moving them to a long-term strategy so that they will, over time, dwindle but without visibility or any parliamentary input.

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, this is a welcome amendment because it raises important questions about the structure of our regulatory framework and in particular about whether the regulatory principle set out in Section 3B of FSMA—the eight principles—remain coherent, useful and properly calibrated to the circumstances in which we now find ourselves.

Over time, FSMA has accumulated objectives, secondary objectives, regulatory principles, “have regard” duties, reporting requirements and consultation obligations. Some of those are individually sensible and many were introduced for good reasons, but taken together, there is a real risk of regulatory layering. Duties and principles are added and new obligations are placed on regulators, but very little is ever taken away. The result is a framework that is increasingly complex and it is not always clear which duties genuinely drive regulatory behaviour and which simply sit on the statute book without translating into meaningful change.

The amendment asks the Treasury to review whether those principles are duplicative or remain necessary, and whether the framework could be simplified or improved. There is also a wider question, which was raised by the Financial Services Regulation Committee in its report last year, about whether these sorts of duties actually translate into anything meaningful in practice. It is one thing for Parliament to place a duty on a regulator to have regard to a particular principle or consideration—as my noble friend Lady Noakes mentioned, that is exactly what the Leeds reforms are trying to streamline—but quite another for that duty to shape decisions in a clear, measurable and accountable way.

Needless complexity matters for firms as well as for regulators. A complicated regulatory framework does not stay confined to the regulator; it filters down into consultations, supervisory expectations, compliance systems, legal advice and business decisions. If the statutory framework is unclear or duplicative, the burden ultimately falls on the firms that have to comply with it. At a time when we are asking financial services to support growth, investment and competitiveness, we should be especially alert to unnecessary regulatory complexity. The UK’s high regulatory standards are not in question, but there is a question as to whether the framework through which those standards are delivered is as clear, efficient and proportionate as it can be.

I therefore hope that the Minister will engage constructively with the amendment. I would be grateful if he could explain how far the principles have already been reviewed in preparation for this Bill, in the light of the comments from the Financial Services Regulation Committee. Do the Government accept that the accumulation of regulatory principles and duties can create complexity, and do they believe that the existing Section 3B principles remain fit for purpose? This amendment raises a valuable point; I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

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Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

78: Clause 17, page 21, line 34, leave out subsections (2) to (11) and insert—
“(2) In section 3B (regulatory principles to be applied by both regulators), in subsection (1), at the end insert—“(i) the need to consider—(i) the interconnections between private credit vehicles and PRA-authorised banks, insurance companies and pension fund, and(ii) the limitations of the FCA’s regulatory perimeter in managing the interconnection between private credit vehicles and non-regulated financial organisations.””Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment would replace the removal of the regulatory-principles duties in Clause 17 with a new “have regard” to risks to financial stability arising from the interconnection of private credit markets with banks, insurers and pension funds, as well as with non-regulated institutions.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, this is very much a probing amendment, but I thought that we ought to raise this issue; the Bill seemed an appropriate place to do so. Frankly, it is an issue on which we have hardly touched in Parliament.

Private credit markets are a phenomenon that has surged since the crash of 2008. Market-based finance accounts for around half of the UK and global financial sector assets, according to the Bank of England. Global private market assets were estimated at $18 trillion in 2025. As Sarah Breeden, a deputy Governor of the Bank of England, said in a speech made this year:

“They have not yet been tested, at that scale and complexity, by a broad based macroeconomic shock in a higher rate environment”.


At the same time, public debt is close to post-war highs, not just in the UK but globally, making it more difficult to respond to any financial shocks.

People sometimes see the private credit sector as distinct from other parts of finance. In the UK, the banking sector has lent to private credit funds at a scale to provide them with liquidity, with pretty much no transparency to evaluate the quality of funds. There is clearly co-investing and interconnections through derivatives. I cannot find good data to work out where the exposure lies, but there have been enough articles raising warning signs to convince me that there is something serious here that must be looked at.

UK pension funds have invested heavily in private assets. The Universities Superannuation Scheme has £7.8 billion in private credit exposure. Institutional providers such as TPT Investment Management have launched schemes specially for the use of UK pension schemes, and the Mansion House Accord encourages even more investment into these private markets. As I listened to the Pensions Minister during the passage of the then Pension Schemes Bill, I heard what sounded like claims that these private assets are high-return, low-risk assets and perfect for pensioners with very little savings. It is because of such a naive understanding of private credit, among other things, that that Bill was so important. That is why protecting the fiduciary duty of pension trustees dominated its passage; the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and my noble friend Lady Bowles were instrumental in making sure that that fiduciary duty remained primary.

The insurance companies are deep into this, too. According to the Bank of England, in evidence given to the Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee:

“The interconnections between private markets and the life insurance sector have grown considerably, with analysis by the IMF … showing that approximately 35% of assets held by US life insurers and approximately 23% of those held by UK life insurers were allocated to private credit”.


It is clear that if the private credit market goes wrong, it goes wrong for the whole financial sector. It is not an exaggerated fear: the sector has serious liquidity issues. Anyone who picks up a newspaper can see that firms such as Blackstone, Oaktree, Apollo and Morgan Stanley, to name but a few, are now limiting or refusing redemptions. We cannot ignore the canary in the coal mine.

The Lords FSR Committee published a report on this sector in January, entitled Private Markets: Unknown Unknowns. At the end of that process—I give some credit to the committee—the Bank of England announced that it would conduct a system-wide exploratory scenario that will involve the banks, insurers, private equity companies and pension fund investors, but on a voluntary basis. It will report in 2027. The committee is to be commended for focusing on the issues in this sector, but I do not think that this satisfies a reasonable standard of parliamentary scrutiny or reflects a parliamentary responsibility to the public to make sure that we avoid another major financial crash. Therefore, my amendment is designed simply to put pressure on the Bank of England in order to get proper answers. I am still disturbed that it thinks it will do so only on a voluntary basis. I hope that the Bill as a whole can be amended to restore proper democratic oversight, and then Parliament could engage with finding a solution. One of the reasons so few people in both Houses are aware of the concerns about the issue is that there is virtually no vehicle for a debate, for consideration and for action.

The second part of my Amendment 78 addresses a problem that I have never heard widely discussed. If the private credit market goes bad—and the banks, because they are entangled with that market, begin to divest loans—what happens to small businesses dependent on bank credit? We saw this behaviour in 2008. After the crash, banks continued to fund the big companies but found every way possible—many of them legal but I would consider unethical—to call in loans to small companies. In loan agreements that were being paid in full and on time, there would be a covenant somewhere in the documents that said that if loan-to-property values fell below a certain level, the loan could be called. I am pretty sure that the small business never really thought that that was a significant paragraph in its loan agreement, but it proved the trigger and we saw basically every major bank exercise it.

The FCA refused to act and has always held the line that the regulatory perimeter means that it cannot offer protection to small businesses and that, instead, caveat emptor applies. To me, this is untenable in the complex world of finance that we have today. I want the regulators to take a proper look at the whole issue of the regulatory perimeter, if we are to go into a cycle of financial shocks.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on what may be the most important amendment that we will discuss in Committee, and I hope we might discuss it on Report as well. As she said, there is a huge lack of discussion of this issue in Parliament, whereas if you go to the pages of the Financial Times, for example, you will see, pretty well every day, alarming reports and strong headlines expressing concern about the issue. I am aware that we are operating under heatwave conditions, as is the rest of the nation. As with our credit system, we have all been puffed up by a lot of hot air, much of which has indeed been financed by our financial system, so I will be quite brief, but I want to pick up a couple of points that the noble Baroness made.

The powerful argument about a voluntary engagement with the stress test is just laughable—with a sick kind of laugh. We know what voluntary regulation has done in so many different areas of our business sectors, and that is not the way to go forward. The noble Baroness also talked about pension funds, particularly about investing in private credit and the grave concerns that it raises. There is quite a bit of research that indicates that the people profiting from this are the managers and companies, and pension funds are getting the same or lower returns as they are from other investments.

The most useful way I thought I could add to this was to go through the Financial Times private credit headlines for this month alone. I will give a representative selection of them. The first is:

“Are insurers becoming dangerously addicted to private credit ratings?”


It is a question-mark headline, to which the answer is clearly given as “yes” in the article. Here are some of the others:

“Apollo’s flagship private credit fund hit by 17% redemption requests”,


“BlackRock private credit fund honours less than 40% of redemption requests”,


“Partners Group limits withdrawals at private equity fund for wealthy individuals”,


and

“Cliffwater’s flagship private credit fund redemption requests hit 17%”.


Rather than expound at length, I refer noble Lords to a single book: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff.

There is no reason to think that what we are doing now will be different from where we have been before. Private credit is a new structure of a very familiar form, and we have seen what happens with these new financial-engineering structures. The noble Baroness is doing an important job here of at least starting a discussion on this. That discussion should be held at much greater length in the main Chamber, and its subject should worry us all.

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[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the focus of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on the vulnerabilities in the private credit system.

Although the Government are clear that the growth of private credit has brought benefits to the real economy, we and the financial regulators are very conscious of the potential vulnerabilities in this sector. Just last month, the Chancellor and the Governor of the Bank of England joined their fellow G7 Finance Ministers and European Central Bank governors in agreeing that potential risks in the private credit ecosystem call for continued monitoring, including that of the interconnections with banks and insurers.

The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, would require the PRA and the FCA to consider private credit’s interactions with the wider financial system in all cases where the regulatory principles are engaged, or else their decision-making could be unlawful. I assure her that the regulators are already working to understand these vulnerabilities deeply and to address them where necessary. This work does not require placing additional duties on the regulators.

I will highlight the existing work of those regulators. First, the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee has been focused on the risks of private markets for many years, and the Chancellor’s most recent remit letter to the FPC asks that that work continues. I specifically note the Bank’s system-wide exploratory scenario on private markets, the SWES—as if we needed another acronym. It is examining how a stress scenario could affect the UK’s private markets ecosystem and interconnected banks, insurers and pension funds, with significant participation across the industry. The UK’s system-wide regulator, the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee, is the right authority to carry out this work, and its findings will be laid before Parliament when it is complete.

For its part, the FCA also maintains a close focus on these risks, including in its firm-level supervision. Where specific issues are identified, targeted interventions follow. We also welcome the FCA’s work to improve the visibility of risks and data availability through its reviews of the alternative investment fund managers directive framework, and its efforts to raise standards on conflicts of interest, valuation practices and risk management.

I note the noble Baroness’s concerns about the FCA’s regulatory perimeter, but I emphasise that the marketing of funds in the UK is indeed subject to UK regulatory requirements, protecting UK investors. Further, the PRA continues to assess and mitigate risks from private markets to the banks and insurers it regulates. This includes its 2024 thematic review of private equity-related financing activities with banks.

Finally, given the cross-border nature of the private credit ecosystem, the Bank and the FCA are actively engaged in international work, including at the Financial Stability Board, which is chaired by the Governor of the Bank of England. The Government believe that, under our regulatory framework, vulnerabilities in private credit are being understood and addressed where needed, but there is of course much room to improve. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will of course withdraw this amendment, but I wanted to get this issue on the agenda, and we need to continue to do so. I say to the Government: do not be complacent in this situation. A few weeks before the crash in 2008, everybody in government would have told you how well the financial sector was functioning. Being a cynic can be quite helpful.

I am particularly concerned about the impact on small businesses when we run into the next financial shock, because there will be one. That regulatory perimeter is a serious issue that the Government should be looking at. I do not know whether you can get the regulators to look at it voluntarily. As far as they are concerned, you go to Parliament only to explain; it is not where you take instruction. I am concerned about these issues. I look forward to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on private credit, which will come later. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 78 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

79: Clause 17, page 21, line 34, leave out subsections (2) to (11) and insert—
“(2) In section 3B (regulatory principles to be applied by both regulators), in subsection (1), at the end insert—“(i) the need to assess the impact on the taxpayer of any provision of backstop arrangements by the Bank of England to private stablecoin.””Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment would replace the removal of the regulatory-principles duties in Clause 17 with a new “have regard” to the risks to taxpayers should the Bank of England provide a liquidity backstop to private stablecoin.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, here I am again with another issue that I want to raise. It does not necessarily look like it, but this is another constitutional amendment. Digital money and stablecoin are coming. As I have said in the House before, I am not King Cnut but I am concerned that both the industry and the regulators treat stablecoin as merely a change in plumbing in the payments system. I understand the desire for the UK to be an attractive place for stablecoin companies and the need to build a substantial sterling stablecoin sector. What concerns me is that, at scale, it has huge consequences for the taxpayer to carry the liabilities, and it determines who has their hands on the levers of economic power. I will not pursue that last issue; it would take about 10 minutes and the Committee is beyond coping with that.

In October, the FCA will publish regulations for the non-systemic stablecoin players but, on Monday, the Bank of England launched its policy statement and draft rules for systemic stablecoin. The document is clearly a loosening of rules previously under discussion, but my attention was grabbed by the Bank’s confirmation that it will introduce a central bank liquidity facility for systemic stablecoin. In other words, if there is a run on stablecoin, the taxpayer is on the hook. It is true that liquidity facilities are offered to the banks but to extend this to stablecoin is a major decision. I am not saying that it is right or wrong, but a decision on this scale, with the liabilities that are consequent, is above the pay grade of the regulator. This should be a decision in which Parliament is fully engaged. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, the Financial Services Regulation Committee has also been looking at stablecoin, so I have a few words to say on the topic.

I go back to my earlier point: this is not a regulatory principle that can be applied by the FCA and the PRA. It has very little to do with them, as it is the financial stability part of the Bank of England that has issued the policy. The backstop is just one part of the arrangements, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, will be aware. A very significant part of the assets of stablecoin issuers also need to be held in unremunerated form at the Bank of England—30%, which is a significant amount of money. If the noble Baroness is worried about the cost to the taxpayer, she might also reflect on the gain to the taxpayer for all the time that there is not a crisis because the Bank of England has access to free money, which is part of the whole deal.

The stablecoin package needs to be looked at as a whole, rather than one small part of it being picked out. The noble Baroness may still disagree with it, but it is a calibrated package which balances the risks, including keeping one-to-one asset backing, which will also go a long way to allaying her concerns.

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I also note that, as drafted, the amendment would place requirements on the FCA and PRA to consider the Bank of England’s regulatory regime when making decisions, which would be inappropriate, as the FCA and PRA are independent bodies with their own objectives. That said, effective co-operation between the regulators is, of course, important. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

At this hour, the only thing to do is to withdraw the amendment. I thank the Committee.

Amendment 79 withdrawn.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, this and the following group dwell on the same territory; I will make my main intervention in the next group alongside my detailed amendments. I am sorry that I had to separate them out, but that was only because of the Chief Whip’s speaking-time restrictions on non-movers, which ironically mean that the debate will take longer overall. I have both general points and points on the substantive amendments. I agree very much with many other speakers, and in particular the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Noakes. Overall, the Bill is extraordinary for the manner in which it does and undoes many things with questionable process.

My general approach on the point about the Consumer Credit Act is straightforward: I do not object to using the FCA to modernise and speed up redress mechanisms. We are already seeing that in practice with the motor finance commission cases, but that experience also contains a very clear warning. Here I depart from what the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, would wish to have. In the first instance, the FCA made rules that were not in line with statute. It said that commission did not have to be disclosed unless asked about. We have ended up with a situation where firms which thought they were following the rules have been caught out because the statute said something different.

The moral lesson is simple: if you find yourself thinking, “Oh good, I don’t have to tell them about this nice little earner”, something is already unfair. In practice, some car salesmen discussed bonuses, quotas and commissions with customers, sometimes linking them to discounts. I have personal experience of that. But if the statute had not existed, what would have happened? The logic is that the old way, non-disclosure, might have continued because the FCA rules permitted it and it had not spotted the unfairness. For all that we have some very capable regulators, we have been shown that they are not infallible and they are not legislators—a point we will return to repeatedly as we go through the Bill. From time to time, they hit the barriers of their remits, perimeters and institutional roles.

Our system is not to delegate unconstrained power to regulators. Parliament sets the framework, regulators operate within it and, when necessary, the court interprets. Yet here, we are being asked to legislate for an automated substitution to set in train an unseen process that Parliament can no longer influence, that has no predetermined scope and whereby courts lose jurisdiction. That is constitutionally unsound and unsupportable. I will return to the detail in the next group but the principle is clear. As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, said, Parliament should not sign away rights and protections without knowing what will replace them.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

It is a great privilege to wind up for the Lib Dems. People will know from Second Reading that I am very strongly of the same mind as the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes and Lady Bowles, and I think the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, takes a very similar view on this first clause. The others speak with some sense of diplomacy; I will be slightly more direct, because, from my perspective, the Bill, by repealing the CCA, basically removes consumer credit protection from law and moves it to the FCA rulebook with no meaningful accountability and, frankly, little visibility.

Peers will remember that in 2021, many of us in this House and the other place were getting very frustrated with the FCA. It had some very good people but it was definitely neglecting consumer protection, and this House consequently passed an amendment to instruct the FCA to consult on a duty of care. The FCA chose not to consult on a duty of care, despite that direct instruction. It consulted instead on what it said was the equivalent, which was a consumer duty, the key difference being that a duty of care has a meaning in law, with a private right to action. In other words, an individual can turn to the courts if he or she believes that they have been wronged. This is a right that, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, the FCA, at the behest of the industry, did not want the consumer to have, despite it being a long and very well-established tradition in English law.

The Bill now achieves the wholesale removal of credit protection from the law and into the rulebook of the FCA, and it is obviously an extension of that deliberate process to remove paths to redress for consumers. The Committee will be aware that consumers cannot take civil action against the FCA: it is immune. It is correct that it should be immune from action by those whom it regulates in the market, but it is also immune from action by consumers. As we go on through the Bill, will see that same process of undermining redress in future groups of amendments—very much so when we are dealing with the FOS.

When I have talked to members of the Government on this issue, they seem surprised at my comments because they see the FCA as a real champion of the consumer. Indeed, the industry will say the same thing. However, perhaps I have a longer memory, as does this Committee.

Do Members here remember the issue of payday lenders—the very widespread abuse of individuals who were entering into incredibly high-priced credit and were finding themselves continuously in debt trouble? When the issues were put to the FCA by Members of Parliament, by complainants and by whistleblowers, the only action that the FCA agreed to take was to make some minor adjustments to the rules on rollover. It argued that payday lenders had an important part to play within our credit system. It took action in this House in 2015, when a Minister broke with the Government’s perspective and decided to support a move that had been made from the Labour Benches by the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell. It was the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, who spoke for the Government, and he decided that enough was enough and that the only way to deal with payday lenders was to shut them down. That action was put into law, and it improved the whole credit environment that we live in today and eliminated a really serious abuse. As I read the Bill, people will lose that opportunity. When people claim that the FCA is a champion of credit, and they cite the consumer duty, they do not realise that it does not incorporate that very traditional English right to turn to the courts.

Even if today one accepted that the FCA, in its currents design and with the relevant people in place, was indeed a consumer champion, that could easily change, because we are relying totally on FCA culture. In the 1990s—I often go back to that decade—the financial regulators demonstrated the most extraordinary degree of deference to the financial sector. Frankly, the 2007 crash could not have happened without that deference. Many of the lessons of that crash are being undermined by this Bill, throughout which there is a return to deference—this time in the name of growth.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I would like to join in this discussion because it is probing thoughts. I shall make a few comments on Amendment 17A, because the issue overlaps with an amendment of mine that comes later in the main FOS group.

Amendment 17A raises an important point about limitation periods and the concept of when a relationship ends. It seeks to preserve the six-year limitation period for unfair relationship claims, running from the end of the creditor-debtor relationship. I understand the intention, but it exposes a deeper difficulty. The end of a relationship is not, or may not be, the same as the end of rights and it is certainly not the same as the end of enforcement powers. In many cases, firms retain continuing benefits or enforcement rights long after the consumer’s remedies have expired. Debts can be sold, pursued, securitised or enforced years after the practical relationship has ended, yet the consumer’s ability to challenge an unfair relationship may already have fallen away. That is an asymmetry.

As I said at Second Reading, while I understand the industry’s desire to get a grip on long-tail risk and liabilities, especially where regulators are interested in it, that cannot be done off the back of consumers. If we are to move parts of the Consumer Credit Act into the FCA rules, at the very least those rules must be required to secure, as far as reasonably practicable, symmetry between the duration of rights, remedies and redress available to consumers and the duration of rights, remedies, enforcement powers or continuing benefits to firms arising from the same act, omission or relationship. Without that symmetry, we risk creating a regime where firms retain long-tail powers but consumers lose long-tail protections. Limitation periods cannot be considered in isolation from the underlying rights. The two must move together or we distort the balance that Parliament intended. That is why the statutory framework has a place.

The FCA has already announced, a year or so back, a shift in emphasis to allow more risk in the interests of growth, which is a recurring theme. That was an important statement by the FCA and it feeds into the need for proportionate regulation and acceptance that there may be more failures, which Parliament must accept, but it cannot mean a bias advantage towards business in ways where firms retain recourse against consumers while consumers lose recourse against firms.

Under that process, companies may enjoy growth by escaping the consequences of some bad actions, but that gain is extracted from consumers and effectively added to the cost of living. Fleecing consumers is not growth, but I fear that this may be the consequence of the asymmetry in rights that could arise under Amendment 17A. I may return to this issue with my own amendment on Report.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords—

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

Sorry. Were you winding?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Yes.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I just wanted to say that I have a lot to say on the Financial Ombudsman Service but I shall save it all for group 6.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, first, I declare an interest, which perhaps I should have done at the beginning. I am a director of a pension company that is regulated by the FCA. I apologise for not having declared that earlier.

I will reflect on an issue that could arise because the Financial Ombudsman Service is in charge of complaints about pensions. We know that many people who are taking out pensions products may have problems that do not become apparent to them for six or 10 years or beyond. Perhaps we could consider an amendment that would carve out the extent to which the Financial Ombudsman Service deals with a pension complaint in relation to this element of the Bill.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I have only a few comments on this group. As I listened to the comments on Amendment 17A, particularly those of my noble friend Lady Bowles and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, I understood what reminded them of mortgage prisoners. In that case, people who held mortgages with banks that failed, and who were rescued by the Treasury, were then sold on to private holders who were not themselves lenders of mortgages. In effect, they lost the ability to refinance, and so they remained imprisoned in very high-rate mortgages at a time when everyone else was able to remortgage. We can see echoes of that in some of the limitations that would be introduced by these amendments. I am therefore always concerned about those time limitations, particularly in situations where assets can be sold on, as they often and increasingly are today.

Amendment 44, from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, seeks to deal with the issue of consumer redress. If a consumer has been abused in some way and has a moral right to redress—a right in law—should that be lost simply because we have a regulator that fails to act promptly and within a reasonable time? I understand that it is tough for the industry, because it leaves it with uncertainty, but some of these products are life-changing for individual consumers and have life consequences. That is what made me think of mortgage prisoners; their lives were completely ruined by that process.

Where there are such consequences for the individual, it is very concerning to take away the right to redress because there was a delay in the functioning of the regulator. I understand that it means that the industry has to live with uncertainty, but my advice to it is to behave well to your customers. That really is the very best way not to get into these issues.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by considering Amendments 17A and 44. The Government’s reforms to the FOS are aimed at ensuring that the legislative framework in which it operates supports it to perform effectively the role that it was established to do, providing quick, informal and impartial dispute resolution between financial services firms and their customers.

Given the nature of the FOS and the way it operates, it can be effective at resolving the majority of disputes between customers and financial services firms, but it cannot do everything, and some things are more suited to other routes. The alternative routes include the courts and a consumer redress scheme established by the FCA. These routes are more appropriate when addressing systemic issues, such as widespread mis-selling. The reforms that the Bill makes to Section 404 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 are designed to enable the FCA to act quickly to prevent disruption and uncertainty when it finds that a mass redress event has occurred.

Turning to Amendment 17A, I thank the noble Baroness for raising this important issue. I recognise that there have been questions about the time limits that apply to claims brought under Sections 140A to 140C of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 in the light of the Zedra ruling. The Government understand that there is an interest in and desire for clarity in this area. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked me about the Government’s position following the Zedra ruling and its implications for the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The Government’s position remains that the limitation period runs from the end of the credit agreement. That approach provides legal certainty and reflects the nature of these claims. That understanding is consistent with existing case law, including the Supreme Court’s judgment in Smith v RBS.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, there seem to have been two themes in today’s discussion; I will address both because I agree with them both.

The first is on whether we value banking hubs. There have been so many voices that say that we value them, but they are calling for a much-improved framework, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Bennett, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. I suspect that there is a universal consensus that we need to think through this issue, which is exactly why the Richard Lloyd review is now anticipated. I think that most people who see the value of banking hubs in their community—most MPs have been asking for banking hubs in their constituencies—very much appreciate the direction of the Lloyd review. On the background and evidence for the need for banking hubs, I will address some of those issues much more when I discuss community development financial institutions in a later group, so I will not repeat all that.

That does not take away from the fact that we have a constitutional issue here. According to its report, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee is very concerned that the problem has not been clearly identified and that a power as extensive as the one provided for here in the Bill severely compromises effective parliamentary scrutiny. The Select Committee asks for the power to be removed from the Bill. I say to the Government that it is important that there will be some real clarity before this hits the Commons—otherwise, this clause will be very much in trouble.

I support banking hubs. I suspect that I will be very pleased when I read the Lloyd review. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. I cannot just say to Parliament that, if it is something that I like, we do not need oversight, scrutiny and a proper process and that we do not need to consider the role of the regulator versus the democratic decision-making that should be happening in Parliament. This is a very good instance where I suspect that I would be very much in favour of the Lloyd review, but I would be very sad if that is not brought before Parliament for discussion, scrutiny and proper oversight. It is unfortunate that the Bill follows a procedure and process that seems to be completely unnecessary and that does not allow for that oversight. Oversight is valid, whether or not you think you will like what the regulator will do.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 21, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Noakes, would ensure that any government intervention in the provision of in-person banking services is evidence-based, proportionate and properly balanced. It would require Ministers to consider not only the needs of consumers but the legitimate commercial reasons why firms may reduce their physical banking provision.

More widely, Clause 3 raises two distinct but closely related concerns. Our amendment speaks to the first: banks do not close branches simply on a whim. Consumer behaviour has changed profoundly, more banking is conducted digitally, and maintaining a physical network carries substantial costs. The Government may decide that wider social considerations justify intervention, but they cannot responsibly make that decision while ignoring the commercial realities facing the firms they intend to regulate.

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[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I was coming on to that point. The noble Lord asked what the power can do and how that scrutiny can take place. It allows the Government to introduce targeted secondary legislation or to confer functions on the FCA, including the power to make rules in the future. When using this power, the Treasury must have regard to the recommendation made by the Lloyd review.

I think the noble Lord made a point about what legislation could be amended. I can only answer this in part at this time: the Treasury expects to use the power if needed to amend relevant legislation, for example, financial services legislation.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I would just like to clarify this. Is the Minister saying in effect these powers are going to be one time only? Is that the implication?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

No, that is not what I am concluding.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Then I cannot see how they can be narrowed.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister said that they may need the power to change financial services legislation. Since financial services legislation is in the hands of the Treasury, I think we are entitled to a slightly more specific explanation of how the power might be used to change primary legislation. Can he be more specific about which bits of financial services legislation the Treasury will likely use the power for?

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Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

28: After Clause 3, insert the following new Clause—
“Access to affordable credit(1) The Financial Conduct Authority must—(a) within 12 months of the passing of this Act, establish, publish and maintain a framework for assessing and rating the performance of relevant deposit takers in providing access to affordable credit, and(b) annually publish updated ratings and scores produced by the Authority under the framework.(2) The framework must—(a) assess the extent to which relevant deposit takers serve the credit needs of individuals, households and small businesses, including those who are underserved by mainstream financial services, and(b) enable comparisons to be made between relevant deposit takers.(3) In developing the framework, the Authority must have regard to—(a) the distribution of lending across income groups, geographic areas and customer characteristics,(b) the availability of affordable credit to consumers who may otherwise be at risk of financial exclusion,(c) the provision of affordable credit to small and medium-sized enterprises, and social enterprises,(d) the extent to which a bank supports access to affordable credit through partnerships, referral arrangements and funding agreements, with credit unions, Community Development Finance Institutions or other community-based lenders, and(e) such other matters as the Authority considers relevant to the objective of promoting access to affordable credit.(4) For the purposes of subsection (2), the Authority may—(a) make use of regulatory data already collected by it, including product sales data,(b) require relevant deposit takers to provide such information as it reasonably considers necessary for the purposes of the framework, and(c) make different and proportionate provision for different sizes of business.(5) For the purposes of this section, “relevant deposit takers” are—(a) banks, within the meaning given of section 2 of the Banking Act 2009;(b) building societies, with the meaning of section 119 of the Building Societies Act 1986;which meet an Authority-set threshold for the total volume of personal and small and medium business lending.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the FCA to establish a framework assessing banks’ and building societies’ provision of affordable credit, including via partnerships with credit unions and CDFIs. It uses existing regulatory data where possible, with proportionate requirements for firms of different sizes.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, Amendments 28 and 29 are in my name. Amendment 30 is in the name of my noble friend Lady Bowles and I am very supportive of it, but I am going to focus my remarks on Amendments 28 and 29.

I thank the Fair Banking for All campaign, a coalition of 38 organisations co-ordinated by Finance Innovation Lab, bringing together civil society organisations, anti-poverty groups, community development financial institutions, fintech researchers and people with lived experience of financial exclusion. Their work on drafting Amendments 28 and 29 assures that these amendments work in law and in practice.

Access to affordable credit, which is the subject of these two amendments, is now one of the biggest challenges we face in the UK. Millions of individuals and businesses are excluded from fair and affordable credit despite being financially viable. More than 3.5 million people are handling this by taking out high-cost credit. The consumer duty on banks does not result in any attempt by banks to fill this market failure, nor have they been directed to do so by the FCA.

My focus has been very much on SMEs, which need credit to grow as the backbone of our communities and the source of new jobs. The Federation of Small Businesses records that more than half of all small businesses rate the availability of affordable credit as poor. When I talk to conventional banks about these customers, they say to me that they are very open to lending to small businesses, then I quickly find that they mean they will offer high-priced loans backed by property, not cash flow, and they want personal guarantees from the owners of the SME. It is a consequence of a change in the business model of the high street banks, as, in many ways, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, acknowledged earlier. Local banking as we once knew it has disappeared. Decisions are made by bankers or algorithms which do not know the customers or the businesses except on paper. They do not know that Jo has a convincing expansion plan or that Jane always repays her debts. They are detached from the reality of individual banking that is able to take individual proposals into consideration.

Adding to that, small businesses have become suspicious of the banks. The way the banks behaved to customers following the 2008 financial crisis—I mean small customers—shocked many people. They seized assets even when loans were being paid on time and in full, because various property-to-value or loan-to-value ratios had changed with the fall in property values in that era. Paying on time and in full would seem to me to suggest that you are a viable customer, and finding that your loan was called in and the asset seized was really destructive.

Many people thought that challenger banks and new fintechs would be willing to provide credit where conventional high street banks failed. That has not turned out to be true. The new players market themselves primarily to the same pool of SME businesses that the banks seek to service. Indeed, they have now taken a 60% share of that market, because new challenger banks and fintechs typically offer better products and efficiency. However, the access to finance problem has remained and indeed worsened. It has not been resolved by the entry of these new players.

I am pleased that the Bill makes some small moves to improve the situation by expanding the role of credit unions and mutuals and strengthening open banking but, frankly, it does not begin to touch the scale of the problem. My Amendments 28 and 29 follow the pattern of the United States, which dealt with the issue of exclusion head on with the Community Reinvestment Act 1977. In effect, the Act led to the creation of a layer of community development financial institutions, mostly CDFI banks and credit unions, which tackle the problems of exclusion by the big banks.

In the USA, there are now 1,400 CDFIs extending across the whole nation, which manage more than $450 billion in loans, both to small businesses and to individuals. They provide advice, financial education, patient lending and individual assessment. They are also the backbone of economic success in the United States by providing stability in any economic crisis, making sure that disadvantaged communities, including rural areas, are not ignored and growing the businesses of the future. The big American banks, which so opposed the scheme originally because they were required to fund it to remedy exclusion, are now strong supporters, realising that the CDFIs develop their customers of the future.

We have CDFIs in the UK and the British Business Bank, which is an enthusiast, has an ENABLE fund from the Government of £150 million over two years to expand the sector and an ENABLE growth guarantee scheme to reduce borrowing costs. But we still have only some 60 CDFIs in the UK, lending by different estimates something between £250 million and £400 million a year. That is an important contribution, as CDFIs report that 94% of the businesses receiving their loans have previously been rejected by a bank, but, frankly, it is a pathetic number compared to the US.

The Government have set up a UK community finance partnership taskforce to develop partnerships between banks and CDFIs. It is chaired by Bob Annibale, the former director of inclusive finance at Citibank who is a very strong advocate for this agenda, but frankly, I am fed to the teeth of small steps. My Amendment 28 follows the US pattern and would require the FCA to set up a rating system to measure the performance of banks and building societies in providing affordable credit to individuals, households and small businesses, and rating it against appropriate measures to test for exclusion. Rating systems such as this are not a US invention. Similar set-ups are used in the UK by the care inspectorate and the food and health inspectorate.

Amendment 28 would set up the framework of the rating system. Amendment 29 goes beyond that and would enable the FCA to require a proportionate remedy where any bank or building society falls below the threshold required by the FCA. Benchmarking is critical: the language permits the banks to avoid changing their business model. This speaks in a sense to something that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, raised earlier, which is that banks have changed fundamentally and we are not asking them to change back. What we are doing with this system is giving them the opportunity to find another way to deal with the exclusion, so the language permits the banks to avoid changing their business model and instead allows them to support other arrangements for affordable credit, including credit unions and CDFIs. As I have said, the model is tried and tested in the United States and is understood by every major bank.

I anticipate that some people will say that this proposal is a burdensome data-gathering exercise for the banks, but it is not. In 2013, this House passed an amendment, drafted by me and my noble friend Lord Sharkey, to set up a voluntary scheme for banks to report most of the relevant data—and by postcode, so it was very granular—to UK Finance. With a few tweaks, the relevant data for the rating scheme proposed in Amendment 28 is already available and in usable format. The problem is that the data has not been used to create a remedy: another example of the way the FCA does nothing in the face of market failure without being dragged kicking and screaming, usually by this House. That is why the remedy amendment, Amendment 29, is so important.

At Second Reading, a number of Peers spoke out in support of CDFIs and credit unions. Many of us recognise that the high street banks will never return to their local roots and that dragging them to lend when it does not fit their business model means poor service. New challenger banks and fintechs have not filled the gap. The Government are committed to a growth agenda. I can think of few measures that would drive growth more rapidly and sustainably across all parts of the country to fix the loss of local and community banking than these amendments. I beg to move.

Amendment 29 (to Amendment 28)

Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

29: After subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) Where a relevant deposit taker receives a score or rating below a minimum threshold prescribed by rules made under this section, the Authority must require the deposit taker to take proportionate remedial action to improve its rating.(4B) The Authority may—(a) make such rules or issue such guidance applying to designated persons as appear to the Authority to be necessary or expedient, and(b) give a direction under this section to a designated person if it considers that it is desirable to give the direction;for the purpose mentioned in subsection (4A).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment to Baroness Kramer’s amendment gives the FCA a duty to ensure, through rules and guidance, that relevant banks and building societies which fall short of a minimum threshold performance in providing access to affordable credit are required to take proportionate steps to remedy the situation.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I beg to move.

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[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 28, 29 and 30 are aimed at increasing access to finance and ensuring that the customers of financial services firms are protected. I recognise the intention behind these amendments. However, I do not believe that either solution is workable.

On Amendments 28 and 29, I agree that data on access to finance and holding the sector to account are important. However, these proposals would introduce a new, prescriptive and burdensome framework on the FCA and firms that I am not persuaded would deliver the desired output.

Amendment 28 would require the FCA to establish a framework to monitor, assess and publicly report on certain banks’ and building societies’ performance in providing access to affordable credit. Amendment 29 would require the FCA to take action against firms that do not meet a minimum standard. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said, this approach resembles the United States’ Community Reinvestment Act 1977, but we should not assume that it would have the same effect here. Our starting point is different: we are working nearly 50 years later, in a digital age, with a far more diversified credit market. In any case, lenders already publish significant data. Chapter 7 of the FCA’s Conduct of Business Sourcebook requires extensive disclosure on personal and business current accounts. We also have the FCA’s Financial Lives Survey, the SME Finance Monitor and the British Business Bank’s annual SME finance publications, among others.

Amendment 29 would require the FCA to act against firms that do not meet a minimum lending standard. Striking the right balance on access to credit has long been a challenge. We want consumers to be able to access credit where it supports financial resilience and businesses to secure the finance needed to grow, but inappropriate credit can lead to overindebtedness, with serious consequences. The amendment could, in effect, compel lending to more vulnerable groups or SMEs. Even a well-designed regime could be a blunt instrument, with a risk of unintended outcomes. It would also represent a significant intrusion into firms’ commercial decisions.

More fundamentally, it is difficult to see how firms could increase lending and take on greater risk without raising prices to reflect that greater risk. If firms do not price risk appropriately, it opens us up to financial stability risks. The FCA would be placed in the invidious position of having to mandate affordable credit, while the mechanism required to expand provision could increase costs and potentially increase risk for the borrower and the firm. That runs directly counter to the intended objective for vulnerable customers and SMEs.

Although I cannot accept these amendments, I stress to noble Lords that the Government are not complacent about financial inclusion or the availability of SME finance. The noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, asked me to set out what the Government are doing, and I am happy that noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, mentioned several of these interventions already. The Government published their Financial Inclusion Strategy last autumn, and we are supporting practical interventions for consumers, including a small sum credit pilot enabling mainstream lenders to test lending to customers outside their usual risk appetite. Monzo was announced as the first participant in the scheme earlier this month.

We have launched a transformation fund for credit unions, alongside common bond reforms in this Bill, to strengthen their lending capacity. We are also advancing targeted SME finance measures to improve competition and supply, including enhancing the consumer credit data sharing scheme through Clauses 41 and 43 of this Bill. We are supporting up to £150 million of lending through the Community ENABLE funding programme over the next two years. We are establishing a CDFI taskforce and working with industry to improve bank referrals. Indeed, tomorrow I am meeting several large asset managers as chair of the place-based impact investment scheme. We will set out next steps on open finance later this summer. This has significant potential to support SME lending across a wide range of providers, alongside broader work with the Bank of England on capital and ring-fencing.

I highlight community development finance institutions, which I know are a priority for the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. In addition to the CDFI taskforce and the Community ENABLE funding programme that this Government have funded, the sector benefits from Fair4All Finance’s affordable credit scale-up programme, which has committed more than £40 million in social investment in England to date. The financial inclusion strategy further includes measures to strengthen community finance, including promoting partnerships with mainstream lenders. Taken together, these measures support access to finance in the UK in an appropriate and responsible way.

Amendment 30 would introduce a new fiduciary duty on firms when carrying out FCA-regulated activities. It would place specific legally binding requirements on firms. I agree with the noble Baroness that it is vital for firms to act in a way that delivers good outcomes for consumers. However, I believe that FCA regulation is able to achieve this, and I am concerned that this new duty would risk creating overlapping requirements, causing confusion and reducing consumers’ access to finance.

The FCA’s consumer duty is designed to set a high standard of protection for retail customers by requiring firms to act to deliver good outcomes in line with the outcome sought by this amendment. It requires firms to put consumers’ needs at the heart of their business, including by acting in good faith, avoiding foreseeable harm and supporting consumers to pursue their financial objectives. In practice, this means that firms must design products and services that meet consumers’ needs, provide fair value, communicate clearly and offer effective support.

I am concerned that the requirements set out in this amendment would risk making more vulnerable customers more expensive and risky to serve, which would reduce their access to products such as credit and insurance. Introducing a novel statutory fiduciary duty, the precise scope of which would fall to be settled through litigation over a number of years, would create significant legal uncertainty. That uncertainty would carry a cost, which firms would be likely to manage by withdrawing from, or repricing, services for higher-risk customers. I recognise that there is some precedent for a fiduciary duty in trust-based pension schemes. However, the dynamics of the market are very different from wider consumer financial services. Typically, employer pension schemes do not choose which individual customers to serve, and the fiduciary duty applies at the membership level.

I genuinely understand the importance of lending for all parts of the economy, and I understand the need for borrowers to be protected, but I am convinced that the Government are taking the right set of actions, and I am afraid that Amendments 28, 29 and 30 would bring significant unintended consequences. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester for signing Amendment 28 and for speaking so eloquently in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Massey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, are both involved in the world of finance and meet international financiers. I will give them a challenge. When they meet American financiers and bankers, whether here or in the United States, will they please raise CDFIs? The noble Lord, Lord Massey, will find that basically everything he said flies completely in the face of the US experience, and I say the same thing to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.

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[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, as we have heard today, the Financial Ombudsman Service—the FOS—plays a vital role in providing quick, informal and impartial dispute resolution between customers and their financial services providers. It offers an accessible route for dealing with complaints that is designed to act as an alternative to resolving cases through the courts, which can be costly, lengthy and a process that often does not work for firms and consumers. The Government are clear that an effective ombudsman provides consumers with confidence in our financial services sector and is a key element of an effective system.

The Government’s review of the FOS found that, although the FOS fulfils its role in the majority of cases, in a small but impactful minority of cases, it has acted as a quasi-regulator. That conclusion was supported by the Financial Services Regulation Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in its report, Growing Pains: Clarity and Culture Change Required, which was published in June 2025. It recognised that the FOS’s

“actions have regulatory impacts by creating precedents that the FCA requires firms to follow”,

and that this

“generates an unacceptable level of uncertainty for firms, stakeholders, and investors”.

I want to be clear that the review was not suggesting that the FOS was acting improperly; rather, it concluded that the way in which the legislative framework operates made such issues unavoidable by creating a disconnect between the FCA’s rules and the FOS’s decisions, giving rise to unpredictability and a lack of certainty across the regulatory environment. That unpredictability is damaging for everyone and harms consumers’ confidence in the financial services products and services they rely on, as well as firms’ confidence to invest and innovate in the UK.

There is a large number of amendments before us. I will start with Amendment 31. This proposal would substantially extend the timeframe for bringing complaints to the FOS and would require the FOS to spend even more of its time and resources investigating, considering and attempting to resolve historic cases than it does today. We know from current experience that this would substantially increase costs while delivering comparatively limited increases in redress awarded. Further extending the timeframe beyond 10 years in an open-ended way to accommodate a complainant’s reasonable awareness of an issue would increase uncertainty for firms around historic liabilities, reducing appetite to invest in the UK’s financial services businesses.

The Treasury’s analysis of data from the FOS on historic cases is clear: they are more likely to be withdrawn or abandoned and have lower success rates than the average, often due to limited evidence and information being available. The Government’s analysis concluded that complaints to the FOS that are over 10 years old cost firms, on average, more than £18 million per year in case fees but deliver only £600,000 per year in redress for consumers. This is not a proportionate or balanced approach, nor is it consistent with the FOS’s quick and simple purpose. Extending the timeframes would slow down the FOS’s resolution of cases that are more recent and have a higher chance of being upheld, delaying consumers access to the redress they are owed.

Turning to Amendment 32, the Government considered carefully the options for different time limits to be set in legislation, including a six-year limit, and published their analysis in the impact assessment. Although this is a matter of judgment, the Government concluded that a 10-year time limit would strike the appropriate balance between consumer protection and providing certainty to firms, with a six-year limit resulting in too many people losing access to redress. However, I assure the noble Baroness and the noble Lord that the new limit introduced by the Bill is designed to act as a backstop to the existing limits set in rules made by the FCA. In most cases, the time limit will remain at the existing six years, with the 10-year backstop kicking in for cases where the customer could only reasonably have become aware of the problem at a later date.

On Amendments 33 and 35, the Government agree that, where the cause for complaint may take longer to come to light, such as with pensions, it is important that complaints can continue to be brought to the FOS. This is why the Bill gives the FCA discretion to make exceptions to the time limit in specified circumstances, where it is appropriate to do so. The Government carefully considered their approach to defining these exceptions and determined that the FCA is best equipped to develop proportionate and fair exceptions and to define these in its rules, given the FCA’s supervisory role and oversight of the sector and the level of technical detail that is required for the definitions.

The noble Lord is right to recognise the careful balance needed between ensuring that we do not undermine the certainty that this reform is intended to deliver while maintaining consumers’ trust and confidence that they will have access to redress when things go wrong. The Government are working closely with the FCA as it develops these exceptions and the FCA will set out its proposals in due course.

Amendment 34 relates to cases where there is an ongoing relationship between the consumer and a firm. Some complaints may be about acts or omissions that continue to occur or have effect in the context of an ongoing relationship between a consumer and a firm. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 does not place a restrictive definition on “acts” or “omissions”, so there is no reason why such an ongoing act or omission could not be the basis for a complaint within the time limit. The Government’s reforms in the Bill will not change the FOS’s discretion to identify the act or omission to which a complaint relates for the purposes of applying relevant time limits. It will continue to be for the FOS to make those judgments, based on the circumstances of the case and in line with the rules set by the FCA.

I will now explain the Government’s purpose behind Clause 8 and why it should stand part of the Bill. The noble Lords, Lord Davies of Brixton and Lord Sharkey, asked about the evidence base behind the Government’s policy. The Government’s review found that, in a small but significant minority of cases, the FOS has acted as a quasi-regulator. This means that, in some cases, the FOS has held firms to a standard that is different from those set by the FCA. The majority of responses to the Government’s consultation on the proposals to reform the legislative framework in which the FOS operates were broadly supportive of aligning the FOS’s fair and reasonable test with the FCA rules.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Can the Minister clarify something? Is he saying that, provided you comply with an FCA rule, you are then always fair and reasonable? That is what I am taking away from this. I can list so many examples, such as Libor and mini-bonds—all kinds of things—where the perpetrators ticked every single compliance box. I am curious to know.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I apologise for taking a moment to ask my officials a question; I want to make sure that I give the right answer. Where the FOS has complied with the FCA rules, it still has the discretion to make judgments, as long as it believes them to be fair and reasonable.

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[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

Certainly. We are trying to align the FOS’s “fair and reasonable” test with the FCA rules, but it retains some discretion.

I apologise for taking another moment to consult my officials. For clarity, where the FOS has aligned with the FCA rules, it has to believe that that is the case, and that determination has to be upheld.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

For absolute clarification, “fair and reasonable” must be interpreted by the FOS as a standard that is met if there is compliance with FCA rules. I just want to understand because we can then go back historically and see where FCA rules might not have been perceived as fair and reasonable. It is interesting.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

To pursue that, are we being misled by the use of the word “rules” here? There is guidance as well as rules. The principles are not rules, but the principles have to be followed, and they include things such as treating the customer properly. Is that right? There are some general principles within what the FCA lays down—

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I am not sure that is what the legislation says; I think it says “rules”.

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[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

As one always says in this situation, I will read what the Minister said with care. I have to admit that I was a little disappointed on the “fair and reasonable” test, but on close analysis it may prove to be better. In particular, I hope I will have a copy of the letter. It is clear that the rules include the principles, such as:

“A firm must observe proper standards of market conduct”.


Is it the ombudsman who would decide what was the proper standard of market conduct, or is that one of the issues that will have to be referred to the FCA? I am not expecting an answer now, particularly as—

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I have a question for the noble Lord, Lord Davies. My understanding of the principles is that they sit at the top, and the rules are derived from them. But this is a focus on the rules, so it is only as derived. I do not know, and we will get an answer.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

That is what the Minister will need to make clear in the letter. I urge him to make that point clear. Who decides whether the principles have been followed—or is that one of the issues that have to be referred to the FCA under Clause 7?

On time limits, I am disappointed that the Minister did not address the specific cases that I addressed. Some figures were provided—I will start a war on people providing figures in this sort of debate, because they whistle past your ear and it is very difficult to make a quick assessment. The problem is the counterfactual: if the existing system did not exist, would those same figures apply? The Minister has effectively said that, under this change of rules, some people who previously would have received compensation will not do so. That is absolutely clear from the Minister’s statement, and that is reasonable because the providers will save an even larger sum of money. But of course that is under the existing system. We have to think about what those figures would be under the new system.

Again, I hope the Minister will write to me about the specific examples, which could be large sums of compensation—in the case of inappropriate personal pensions, £13 billion was paid in compensation. Would that have been possible under the revised rules? I say that because £13 billion is quite a figure to miss out on for ordinary policyholders. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

46: After Clause 13, insert the following new Clause—
“Reimbursement of fraud: liability of technology companies(1) The FCA must make rules providing that, where a person is to be reimbursed in respect of losses arising from an authorised push payment fraud, the cost of that reimbursement is to be borne, in whole or in part, by any relevant technology company on whose service the fraud was initiated, facilitated or communicated.(2) Rules under subsection (1) must provide for—(a) the apportionment of the cost of reimbursement between relevant technology companies and payment service providers, by reference to the extent to which each contributed to the fraud occurring,(b) a process by which a payment service provider that has reimbursed a victim may recover the apportioned cost from a relevant technology company, and(c) the information that a relevant technology company must provide to the FCA and to payment service providers for the purposes of the rules.(3) In making rules under this section, the FCA must have regard to the principle that the cost of reimbursing victims of fraud should fall, so far as is reasonable, on the persons best able to prevent the fraud.(4) In this section—“authorised push payment fraud” means a transfer of funds executed by a payment service provider on the instruction of a payer, where the payer was deceived into giving that instruction;“relevant technology company” means a person who provides—(a) a user-to-user service or a search service within the meaning of the Online Safety Act 2023,(b) an electronic communications service, or(c) any other online service by means of which an authorised push payment fraud may be initiated, facilitated or communicated.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would require the FCA to make rules placing liability for the cost of reimbursing victims of authorised push payment fraud, in whole or in part, on the technology companies on whose platforms the fraud originates, rather than solely on payment service providers, and to apportion that cost according to who is best able to prevent the fraud.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will take that as an encouragement to speak only to my amendment, so I shall just say that the other amendments in the group from the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Hunt, make a great deal of sense to me, but mine is slightly different. They are dealing with the issues of reporting, review duties and requirements; I am addressing the same underlying issue of authorised push-payment fraud, coming from the perspective of who needs to act to prevent that and be on the hook when there is abuse.

The tech firms—and it is primarily the US tech giants—are now major players in the payments system. They are not merely an inanimate part of the plumbing; the way that they set up and police their systems, or fail to, makes them significantly responsible when their platforms are used to initiate, facilitate or communicate fraud. With AI, the risks become yet greater for ordinary people unless proper guardrails are put in place, so we have to look ahead, not just put in place protections for current circumstances and the past.

The financial incentive for tech firms to ignore fraud is huge. Some analysts have estimated that in 2025, in the UK alone, scam ads generated income of £3.8 billion for the tech companies. My amendment dealing with authorised push-payment fraud deals with a sector of that, but a huge one: authorised push-payment fraud in the UK exceeds £576 million a year. Under present legislation, victims are reimbursed most of that money by the banks, but the techs who have provided the mechanisms are off the hook. I think that is preposterous, because the techs are typically best placed to prevent the fraud.

Amendment 46 would require the FCA to apportion reimbursement by reference to which part each player contributed to the fraud occurring. I strongly suggest that, if passed, this amendment would lead to the tech companies suddenly finding that it is in their interest to prevent APP fraud. As I said, I have great respect for the other amendments in this group, but the payment system is a complex one. There are now many new participants and everybody, not just the banks, should be playing their appropriate role in providing both protection and reimbursement. I beg to move.

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In summary, the Government are committed to tackling fraud. I hope I have demonstrated that there is significant ongoing work to tackle this threat and protect victims. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, both gave far better speeches then I could, and covered the whole area substantially. I am grateful to them, but this gives me a few moments to reply.

Did the Minister say that the financial responsibility that will fall on tech platforms is the cost of prevention, detection and removal, and does he consider that all they need to do? He did not answer the question on shared liability or full reimbursement, and I find that reasonably preposterous, to tell you the truth. If these firms were effectively putting in place prevention, detection and removal, we would not have very much APP fraud, and therefore they would not be making very much reimbursement. We are not asking them to double up what they pay but to pay effectively.

There is a lot more that the Government need to take note of on this. They must also remember that the victims are among the most vulnerable people in our society, as well as others who think of themselves as capable and then find they have fallen for a scam.

I suggest that something far more vigorous is required, and it must be effective in making the tech companies respond, because, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said, the history is that tech companies simply absorb the various requirements on them and make little move to act, because of the income that comes when they simply look the other way.

Amendment 46 withdrawn.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 8th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, as the first of the winding speakers, I thank the Minister for his willingness to meet. I suspect that after listening to what has been an extraordinary, exceptional debate with everything a powerful contribution, he now knows that this is not a small, technical Bill that will slide easily through this House.

We have agreed generally that the financial services sector contributes something like 10% of the UK’s economic output, and, consequently, that innovation and growth in this sector matters. However, I want to pick up the point, which others have made, that it is important that we do not repeat the mistakes of the past. This sector brought the UK economy to its knees. My noble friend Lady Northover, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, and to some extent the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, gave us a feel of how damaging it was at the time. To say the world teetered was probably the right phrase, but the consequences have dragged on way beyond that and still have deep impacts today on ordinary people dealing with their cost of living.

Following that crisis, the revised regulation put into the books was based on precautionary principles. I never have objections to streamlining, efficiency and limiting duplication, and I agree that some measures went too far or were too broad, but this Bill fundamentally changes that precautionary approach and replaces the principle with assurances of enforcement action in relation to poor or corrupt behaviour, and with bank failures, as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, described, resolution schemes come to the rescue. I question whether the Bill adequately structures the capacity to make the shift.

In the case of enforcement, I have asked the Minister directly to demonstrate to me that enforcement has teeth. I talked to the City again this morning and, frankly, it laughed. It is one of the reasons why, if we cannot have certification and precautionary principles around “fit and proper”, enforcement is critical. I want to hear much more from the Government on that issue, and that is just one example.

Picking up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe—I disagree with him completely—that in the case of resolution, we do not need ring-fencing because we have a resolution regime in place or we can weaken the one because the other exists. Will the Minister be able to look me in the eye and say that he would activate a bail-in bond scheme if a big bank failed? The consequence would be huge financial instability among those who held those bail-in bonds—I am talking about the insurance companies and pension funds. Many would be on the verge of collapse if we ever exercised bailing in those bonds. That is one of the reasons why, in the financial crises that have happened, no Government have ever taken that step.

That is a minor issue around ring-fencing, though. There are lots of issues there. I will want to pick up the one on intrabank group services—I am just giving notice to the Government—because the removal of the ring-fence there allows services to be brought in from overseas bodies that are not regulated by any UK authority. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, who I know is very concerned about MREL and whether bail-in bonds could ever be used, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, and others on these issues.

I join my noble friend Lord Sharkey in his utter frustration at the undermining of the FOS, the Financial Ombudsman Service, and the narrowing of protection, the narrowing of free and fair redress. We are going to take that on in this Bill. I also join the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in her brilliant speech. My noble friends Lady Bowles and Lady Northover spoke on the same issue, as did the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, in some ways. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, used the word “shock” in relation to the regulatory principles applied by both regulators, which currently sit in primary legislation—proportionality, fairness, responsibility, transparency and, yes, regard to climate change—being removed from primary legislation by this Bill and reduced to elements in a five-year strategy document. Those regulatory principles are Parliament’s instructions to the regulators, but will now have no legal standing. If the regulator does not pursue them, there can be no action in court and no charge of judicial review. It is entirely up to the regulator whether those principles are observed.

I note that it is very clear in the Bill that the strategy document on which we will now depend can be revised at any time with no consultation; the regulators are merely required to note in their annual reports whether they have bothered to have any regard to the principles. The main purpose of this change—we have seen this pressure before from the regulator—is to cut Parliament out of any control over the principles of the regulator and make sure that there is no additional recourse when they are abandoned. This change has to go, and I suspect that will be the verdict of most of this House.

That brings me not just to the commissions in this Bill but to its omissions. I am really grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, who raised AI and cyber issues about which I am, frankly, not sufficiently informed, but I am sure he is right that they need to be addressed in this Bill. The omission that exercises my party most is around access to financial services for both small businesses and disadvantaged individuals who are very poorly served at present. These issues were eloquently addressed by the noble Baronesses, Lady MacLeod and Lady Hyde, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, and the noble Lords, Lord Kamall and Lord Sahota, in really powerful discussions.

This Bill takes some necessary steps on credit unions, credit data sharing, and permits action on the anticipated Lloyd review of in-person banking, but it could go so much further and bolster—I am so glad that the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and others have mentioned this—community development financial institutions, including credit unions. With thanks to the fair banking movement, I will propose a rating system to show where there are shortfalls in lending and other financial services. I will then go beyond that to propose remedies, including mechanisms to provide investment into CDFIs for those banks that do not wish to change their lending practices. A revival of local banking, which has largely been discarded in the business models of the big banks, would drive up growth, jobs and living standards in all our communities.

The US tech sector is brilliant at not paying its way at the expense of British competitors. Online platforms facilitating fraud should have reimbursement liability; it should not just be for banks. We hope we can find a way to bring in that change. We also insist that across all recognised payment systems, including big-tech, participants—not just the banks—must be subject to the levy to support financial inclusion. Again, I hope we can bring in language for that.

We should also use this Bill to face up to the expected risks in financial stability. A key concern is the burgeoning private asset market—now $18 trillion strong—and the private credit market discussed by the noble Baroness, Lady Bi. It is interconnected throughout lending, investing and derivatives throughout the regulated financial sector. That private market is opaque; it is an intermingling of excellent credit and complete garbage, and it easily becomes illiquid. I want it to be a clear responsibility of the Bank of England and the PRA to assess the risks of a broad-based credit crunch in private markets. I am also concerned that the regulatory perimeter that excludes small businesses from most FCA protections, may become a serious issue in a private credit crunch. So I will seek to add to the regulators’ principles consideration of the risk arising from these issues.

Digital payments and finance are coming at us fast—we cannot be King Canute but, frankly, we have had enough of scams and money laundering. The noble Baroness, Lady Bi, and, very extensively, the noble Baroness, Lady Hodge, talked about the importance of taking action to deal with enablers, but I think this Bill should also be an opportunity to get the right guardrails in place for crypto. I am very much behind putting requirements on the tech sector, and requiring the stablecoin exchanges to act against fraud, sanctions busting and money laundering. But I am not sure this should be done through Henry VIII powers, and I will give you a reason. I am concerned, for example, that in exchange for putting these requirements on stablecoin exchanges, the Bank of England is proposing to step in as a backstop if they have liquidity problems—they have made that statement publicly. Even in the US and the EU, no Government will touch that offer of a liquidity backstop with a barge pole. It is such a big issue that this is an area where Parliament should be making the decision and not the regulator.

History tells us that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. If we repeat 2007, we lose all our chances to seize the opportunities for the future. So, my colleagues and I will try to make sure that Parliament’s voice remains, the guardrails are in place for the financial sector and even for crypto, and with the tech companies paying their share, and we will see game-changing improvements that achieve access to finance for all communities, individuals and small businesses. Fair and sustainable growth is more than possible and it is what the public expects of us.

British Industrial Competitiveness Scheme

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister will soon trumpet the British industrial competitiveness scheme as being very good for business. But, for all the rhetoric and self-congratulation, this policy will have no meaningful impact on the overwhelming majority of British businesses. By the Government’s own figures, around 99% of firms will see no benefit whatever. So while the Government speak grandly of intervention and support, the reality for most businesses—our small manufacturers, our family firms, pubs, farmers, retailers and countless others—is unchanged. They will go on facing the crippling costs that we heard about in the previous debate, with no help at all from this announcement. Even with the reliefs that have been announced, they are staggered, and the earliest will kick in only in April 2027.

What is the wider context in which this Statement must be judged? It is one not of support for enterprise but of cost, burden and damage inflicted by this Government on British industry. Employers have been hit by increased national insurance contributions. Businesses now face the additional costs of the Employment Rights Act, which, by their own admission, run into the billions, together with the further burden of expanded trade union access to workplaces. That is something many employers will regard, in practice, not as access but as a licence to raid workplaces, disrupt operations and undermine confidence. Having said that, we must acknowledge one delicious irony of the Employment Rights Act: the Prime Minister will be seeing the first high-profile victim of an uncapped unfair dismissal award, which we on these Benches warned about.

The Government will now seek to blame the war in the Middle East, but that explanation simply will not wash. Britain’s industrial electricity prices were already among the highest in Europe and around four times those in the United States—long before this latest crisis. These are not sudden or unforeseeable problems; they are the product of policy failure. They are the result of loading electricity bills with the cost of an energy system increasingly structured around subsidising intermittent renewables, managing grid constraints and paying for mechanisms such as contracts for difference. Those costs were there before the latest conflict, and industry has been warning about them for years.

In what sort of alternative reality does it make sense to have to come up with various schemes—this, the BICS, the supercharger package, the energy-intensive industries compensation scheme, the network charging compensation scheme and all the rest, all of which are of mind-bending complexity and designed to mitigate the effect of the Government’s own policies with taxpayers’ money?

Then we come to domestic energy production. At precisely the moment when Britain should have been strengthening resilience and insulating itself from geopolitical shocks, this Government have moved in the opposite direction. They have imposed a punitive 78% tax burden on North Sea oil and gas producers—a windfall tax on windfalls that, in many cases, simply do not exist. They have halted new licences at exactly the wrong moment, when domestic production is needed most to buffer Britain from volatility abroad. The Jackdaw gas field could provide 6% of Britain’s gas needs. As my noble friend Lord Moynihan noted in the previous debate, there is no case not to do this. The result is plain to see: jobs are being exported, gas is being imported, rigs are leaving, investment is frozen, and capital is fleeing to more stable and more welcoming jurisdictions. Hundreds if not thousands of skilled jobs are being lost and Britain is becoming more, not less, exposed.

The Government will soon blame the high international gas price, which is used to set the domestic electricity price two-thirds of the time. But, as any O-level student knows, increasing supply lowers prices. Will the Government therefore reverse the ban on these licences? Is not the simple truth that the Government have chosen to make this country more vulnerable to geopolitical shocks, including conflict in the Middle East, than it needed to be?

In the other place, the Secretary of State, Peter Kyle, said that this package would deliver for Britain’s manufacturing, but what have the Government done to British manufacturing? The manufacturing base has already been damaged by the Government’s disastrous steel strategy, which has raised the cost of both domestic and imported steel. That matters profoundly for sectors such as the automotive sector, where steel is not incidental but foundational. One cannot claim to back manufacturing on Monday while making core industrial inputs more expensive on Tuesday.

The Secretary of State also cited the support of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, but does the Minister accept that the motor industry is simultaneously being hit by other government policies that are doing real harm? The electric vehicle mandate is imposing enormous costs on manufacturers, and the industry itself has warned of a multi-billion-pound burden—around £6 billion by the SMMT’s own assessment.

The Government’s rhetoric is one thing, but the reality is quite another. They speak of backing British industry while, in practice, they are crushing parts of our industrial base under the combined weight of energy costs, regulation, mandates and taxation. Will the Government consider abolishing, or at least relaxing, the EV mandate to give much-needed relief to the British automotive sector?

Yes, we welcome the announcement that the carbon price support will be removed from April 2028, but if the Government now accept that this burden damages competitiveness, why on earth are they waiting until 2028? Why must British industry continue to suffer for another two years before any relief is given? British industry needs lower costs, a competitive tax regime and a Government who stop making this country harder in which to invest, to manufacture and to do business.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, this debate picks up from the Oral Question earlier on the IMF, which warned that the global economy is losing momentum as a result of the Iran war, with the UK expected to be the hardest hit of the G7 economies. The Government need to rethink in the shadow of war, not just to watch and wait.

That brings me to BICS. We welcome plans to bring down some of the highest energy prices in the world, and we are pleased that BICS, which benefits 10,000 of the most energy-intensive businesses, will also provide a one-off payment to cover this year. However, the money will not actually come until next year, so when will those businesses, all of which have to plan ahead and need to know the details—indeed, many are negotiating a whole variety of contracts as we speak—find out exactly what they will get, including which benefits and when they will come?

Many other businesses are threatened by rising costs here and now. I am not clear that the Government have recognised the acute energy cost problems for food businesses and agribusinesses, which not only will have a huge impact on the cost of living of ordinary people but, as we are now starting to hear from some reports, might even lead in certain areas to food shortages. Surely this is a call to action, so what action can we expect?

Frankly, many SMEs, the backbone of our communities, are on the brink from many kinds of pressures, as the Government will be very much aware. SMEs are exposed to a deregulated energy market, with very little support to face it. There is widespread concern about a lack of competition, which has the effect of locking them out of good deals by which they can price energy more effectively. SMEs with more than 50 employees do not even have access to the Energy Ombudsman. The hospitality industry is an extreme case right now and, frankly, it is pretty desperate. Will the Government at the very least instruct the CMA to open an urgent investigation into the state of competition in the energy retail market for hospitality? Will they find some quick solutions for all the areas I have covered? We cannot afford for these industries to endure any more stress and potentially curtail or curb their business.

Of course SMEs need to achieve energy efficiency, but we all know that means upfront costs. Will the Government set up an energy security bank as a mechanism to provide SMEs with low-cost finance so that they can invest in energy tech? They can then repay that finance because of the savings they make, so it would be a sensible and appropriate way to generate a circle of financing. With that, we would need a real overhaul of the business rates system. At the moment, firms are penalised if they invest in productive energy saving investments made on their premises. This is surely the opposite of what the Government want. Will they take action on these fronts quickly?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Baroness Lloyd of Effra) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing the topic back to the British industrial competitiveness scheme.

We are making this intervention because the party opposite left us with the highest industrial energy prices in Europe. When it entered office in 2010, electricity prices were 8.42p per kilowatt hour; when it left office in 2024, they were 25.97p per kilowatt hour. It is no surprise that, under the previous Government, output in the UK’s energy-intensive manufacturing industries fell to the lowest level in 35 years. That is why we have to take action. We are learning the lessons of other previous schemes to do so in a way that is responsible, keeps to our fiscal rules and is funded, focused and targeted. That is why the BIC scheme is targeted as it is. It will be of benefit and is aligned with those areas of the industrial strategy that will support the growth in manufacturing that we all want to see.

We have been clear that the conflict in Iran is not our war. We will do everything we can to shield businesses from its worst effects. The BICS has been designed as a long-term measure to support growth and competitiveness in our strategic manufacturing sectors. It is not a short-term response to fluctuations in oil prices. The best way we can progress in that sense is to de-escalate and learn the lessons of the past. Reliance on fossil fuels has caused some of this volatility. In the last decades, we have seen spikes in energy prices caused by fossil fuel shocks, which is why we are committed to our clean power mission. With clean, homegrown power, we will secure better energy security and more resilient energy supply.

I was asked about the position in the North Sea. We value production from the North Sea and its workforce. We will introduce new transitional energy certificates that will enable some oil and gas production in areas adjacent to already licensed fields linked via a tie-back or in areas that are already part of an existing field. Developers can also apply for these transitional energy certificates for production in areas adjacent to already licensed fields linked via a tie-back. But they will not be able to carry out new exploration because, regardless of where it comes from, the price of oil and gas in the UK is determined by international markets. We are price takers, not price makers. The only way to take back control of Britain’s energy and bring down bills for good is with clean, homegrown power.

Drilling in the North Sea is simply too marginal to make a difference to the overall supply of commodities traded in an international market. The North Sea has been in natural decline for the past 25 years. New licences to explore new fields would also take up to 10 years to be developed and would not make any difference to UK domestic energy production now.

The noble Baroness raised a question about the timing and implementation of the payments. In our consultation, we heard strong calls from the industry for the Government’s support to be felt sooner. That is one of the reasons why we have announced that there will be an additional payment for businesses that are eligible for the BICS. That payment will be delivered next year and will reflect the support that businesses would have received had the scheme gone live sooner.

I was asked about the scope of the BICS. It covers 10,000 electricity-intensive manufacturing businesses. Why are more businesses not eligible? The answer is that the BICS is targeted where it will have the greatest impact on growth. It focuses on the highest growth potential sectors identified within our industrial strategy, such as the car industry, aerospace and defence—those most exposed to high electricity prices. It is right that we implement this tailored scheme for them so that we give those businesses a fair shot at winning in the global economy.

On timing, the BICS will be delivered next year, in line with the commitment set out in our modern industrial strategy. The exemptions on bills will take effect from April next year for the renewables obligation and the feed-in tariff levies. Exemptions from the capacity market levy will then kick in from next October. In our consultation paper, we have set out the regulatory changes and the scheme delivery to make sure that the BICS works effectively.

On support for SMEs and the hospitality sector, we are closely in touch with other sectors. We are engaged in supporting the development of high streets and hospitality with sense of place. The scheme will be open to SMEs in those eligible sectors, and I encourage any businesses that are considering whether they are eligible to consult the eligibility checker, which we will make available in the summer, to see whether they qualify, and then to go through the process of applying for the BICS.

The BICS is an excellent targeted scheme that will bring down electricity prices, with an average discount of 25%. For those businesses, it will bring electricity costs in line with other economies in Europe, and it will set us up over the long term as we create the pro-business, pro-investment environment that we need for growth.

Employee Car Ownership Schemes

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Monday 8th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for the question. As I stated previously, as part of our modern industrial strategy we are committed to the automotive sector. Our ability to defer the start date for this particular policy shows that we are in open dialogue. We will continue with that dialogue.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I recognise that there has been an element of contrivance in the usage of the present employee car ownership schemes which the Government are closing down, although the delay is welcome. Right now, so many businesses are under stress, as well as the automotive sector generally. Will the Government be providing some sort of road map for those who are not using this in a contrived way but have a legitimate practice to be able to find a new mechanism to enable them to keep their businesses going? For example, would he find the salary sacrifice scheme approach an acceptable one?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

The Government are committed to fairness in our tax system, so we are open to all those conversations. At the moment, we have set out the policy we intend to commit to.