Trade Bill

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Lansley

Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 15th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 15 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed. It is in essence very similar to Amendment 19 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. Great minds, as it were, think alike. I should give notice that, given the breadth of the agreement, I am minded to press the matter to a Division, unless the Minister concedes.

If anyone thinks for a moment that dispute resolution in a trade deal is a minor issue, I would point them to the impasse in the UK-EU trade negotiations. A trade dispute resolution goes to the very heart of any trading relationship, and that sits behind these two amendments. Traditionally, disputes under a trade agreement have been adjudicated through arbitration schemes—which are generally labelled investor-state dispute settlement, or ISDS—rather than a court system. To say that this has become problematic is an understatement. Decisions have a history of being inconsistent, they award compensation that can undermine domestic law, they typically act in secret, and they cannot be appealed.

ISDS arrangements are no longer fit for purpose. They have led to public suspicion and, frankly, hindered the drive to increase global trade; they were a major reason for the collapse of the TTIP negotiations. For this reason, during its time in the EU, the UK was instrumental in pushing for the replacement of ISDS with a multilateral investment tribunal and appellate mechanism—the appellate part being very important—thereby removing any suspicion of bias and providing for appeal. The EU has been clear, even with the UK’s departure, that it intends to pursue this change, and it has been introduced in a number of its revised and latest trade agreements, notably, but not exclusively, with Canada.

I would argue, and I think many others were arguing, that the UK needs to remain at the forefront of this change. I am afraid that I am unclear whether the terms that the EU has agreed with Canada over dispute resolution have been replicated in our trade deal with Canada. Perhaps the Minister will enlighten me. The EU-Canada deal gives us a template. It will appoint 15 judges to hear cases on a rotational basis: five from the EU, five from Canada and five from among third-country nationals—in other words, neutrals. The rules ensure transparency of proceedings and clear standards of investor protection. But they also limit the grounds on which an investor can challenge a decision made by a state. For example, a challenge cannot be made simply on the grounds that profits are affected.

Amendment 15 would ensure that in all future trade agreements, the UK agrees with its trading partners at least on the principle of moving to such a mechanism for dispute resolution—it would be even better if it actually achieved it, but at least the principle is agreed. Amendment 15 also ensures that in the interim, until the new system is in place, the UK does not depend on arbitration systems to resolve trade disputes but is heard in the courts and tribunals of the UK. Amendment 19 follows a similar path of logic.

Effectively, these amendments stop the abuses associated with ISDS. I suspect that future speeches will provide some significant illustrations of the problems that have occurred. These amendments provide an incentive and create an opportunity to achieve the goal of a multilateral tribunal system. For that reason, I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I am very pleased to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. We are grateful to her and to the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, for raising this important issue. Since we touched on these issues in Committee, events have moved on a bit, which allows us to further explore the Government’s approach. I do not support the amendments, but they create a very good opportunity for the Government to tell us more about their approach to investor-state dispute settlement in the negotiation of international trade agreements.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, just to put Canada in context, that the Government did lay the Canada-UK agreement last Thursday, which I have had a chance to look at. What it effectively does, across a wide range of chapters, is incorporate the EU-Canada partnership agreement. But in this respect, on investor protection, it says that this is not to come into force. It says there will be a period of time during which the United Kingdom and Canada will review what their investor protection arrangement should look like, and, if they agree within something like a three-year period, they will replace what is in the current EU-Canada agreement.

Although the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said that the EU-Canada agreement is a model, it is not the model she is looking for in her amendment. The tribunal is a bilateral investor protection arrangement, with judicial members from the two parties plus independent members, but it is not multilateral. What it does say, in Article 8.29, is that both parties agree—and here the words are reflected in her amendment—

“to pursue with other trading partners the establishment of a multilateral investment tribunal and appellate mechanism for the resolution of investment disputes.”

Clearly, Canada has done that; it has put into the United Kingdom-Canada rollover agreement the opportunity to consider a multilateral investment court system. But we are not signed up to one, and we will have to see what the Government’s approach will be. The EU and Canada have not actually brought this into force—it has not been ratified—so we have not seen anything final.

Having a multilateral investment court system depends on the consent of parties around the world, and they have not signed up to it. The New Zealand and Australia Governments resisted ISDS in the context of the CPTPP, or TPP 11 as they call it. That makes it difficult for us, in New Zealand and Australia agreements, to invite them to do more than they have already done. On the other hand, Japan has remained consistently supportive of ISDS provisions, and that, I suspect, is probably a simple reason why the EU-Japan comprehensive economic partnership agreement does not have an investment chapter.

I am afraid that the conditions for an amendment to the Bill that sets such a prescriptive approach to international trade agreements on investor protection do not exist. With too many of our leading partners—including, for example, Japan—we would have no agreement that would allow us to sign an agreement if this provision had been in statute. That is especially true where the United States is concerned. Japan does not have a difficulty with ISDS, not least because it has not been a respondent country to a claim. As it happens, only on five occasions have Japanese companies pursued ISDS claims against other countries. When we come to discuss this with the United States, the difficulties are legion because, when I last looked, the United States had 190 claims against other countries and ISDS procedures reported to UNCTAD and was the respondent to 17 claims. It not only adheres to ISDS provisions but uses them a lot. Therefore, it may be difficult to persuade the United States to adopt a multilateral investment court system. The other difficulty is that it would prevent us from pursuing our bilateral investment treaties in the way we have. We may want to continue with that, and assuredly we will. We have over 100 of them, and I do not think we want to let them go, until and unless there is a multilateral investment court system in place.

It would be interesting to know from my noble friend the Minister if the Government have a plan to pursue a multilateral investment court system, as has been the EU’s approach in its negotiations. If so, I would agree, but that does not mean we should have a prescriptive measure in statute that means we cannot agree an international trade agreement with another country, except in the circumstances in which this is incorporated, not only for us but for the other parties. It is an interesting opportunity, but I fear I cannot support Amendment 15.

Trade Bill

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Lansley

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 23rd January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, I do not want to go on at length about this issue, not least because I agree so wholeheartedly with what my noble friend Lord Patten of Barnes has already said. I am always loath to do it and I hope to make it a very rare event, but I voted for the amendment to the withdrawal Bill last April. To that extent, I think this House has made its view perfectly clear: it thinks, in the context of leaving the EU, that to retain membership of a customs union with the EU would substantially mitigate what would otherwise be the damaging economic effects of withdrawal.

I do not want to get into a debate about “the” customs union or “a” customs union but, on the face of it, if we are negotiating to leave but we are negotiating to have a customs union relationship with the EU, it behoves us to negotiate without necessarily subscribing to the customs union because the customs union is a product of the treaty. We would no longer be bound by the treaty, so we have the flexibility to think otherwise. That does not turn us into Turkey, because we might choose to do things quite differently. The EU has chosen not to have agriculture within the customs union with Turkey because it is in its own interests not to do so. We have very different interests and we might choose to pursue them differently. Indeed, as one can see from the structure of the backstop, we might choose to have an arrangement with the EU that was, as Ministers are fond of saying, a “bespoke arrangement” for the management of a customs union. And why not? If we could have such a thing under the backstop, surely we could have it without the backstop.

I do not want to go on at length. I hope that those in this House and beyond who are thinking next week about what is needed to make progress from the impasse that we appear to be in at present will read this short debate. While it exposes some of the difficulties in negotiating a future customs relationship with the EU, two things should become immediately apparent. First, many of the negative consequences of leaving the EU—most especially, leaving without a comprehensive agreement in place—will be dramatically mitigated by being in a customs union. When I talk to businesses, that is absolutely at the top of their wish list, and it is true for manufacturers as well. Secondly, I hope people will realise that this does not preclude us having a trade policy of our own. What are trade policies nowadays? They are generally called comprehensive economic partnership agreements because by and large they are not about tariffs; they are about broader relationships. Especially for the UK, given that we are predominantly a services economy, for the future those agreements should be about services. We should be negotiating trade agreements about services, the movement of capital and investment, and indeed we should have a negotiation with India that includes a discussion about the mobility of workers between India and other countries. That is happening in a very powerful way: the Indians are exporting skilled young people all over the world very successfully, and we should have that in mind as part of an economic partnership agreement with other major economies. If that is true and it also gets us out of having a hard border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, but without creating a new border between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, why would we not want to do this? That is what everyone is trying to arrive at.

For the purposes of next week’s debate there are, therefore, essentially two questions. First: does offering to be party to a customs union with the European Union, as part of the future political declaration, enable us and the European Union to agree in a way that would—as they say in Brussels—have legal force? Would it enable us to put into the political declaration, and have agreed by the European Council, the kind of language and commitments that would allow it to be said that we will not enter into the backstop, if we go down that path in the future treaty? That is what it is all about: not going into the backstop in the first place. We need some reassurance that that will happen. That will automatically solve the essence of the problem associated with the backstop. If we do not have to go into it, we will have solved that issue. We will also have solved the question of unilateral withdrawal or otherwise. If we are in a customs union, we have a right to leave it. If we go into the backstop, we have no right to leave it—as it is currently constructed— and that is a very unhappy place for many who are against the withdrawal agreement at the moment.

The second question is: can we avoid the Turkey situation? It is a bit like when people talk about entering the Norway situation: we do not want to be in a position where we are simply rule-takers. With a customs union, at least we are not rule-takers on financial services and our service industry, but we are none the less rule-takers. We do not want to be in that position. Can we arrive at a customs union where we genuinely have a shared responsibility? I hope we can.

The trouble is, I entirely agree with my noble friend Lord Patten. Nearly a year ago, if only the Government had listened and put into the negotiation—at the time that led up to the White Paper and after it—a discussion about a customs union. Instead they put into the White Paper the suggestion that we could have a customs union, without calling it that, where the rules of origins are effectively waived so that anything that originates in the United Kingdom is treated as if it is European, and anything that originates in Europe is treated as if it is British. This, of course, is a nonsense; the European Union would never accept it. It would never accept that it would raise the money—

[Baroness Kramer]

I am trying to understand the noble Lord. Obviously, the definition of a customs union is quite difficult and I was trying to follow his definition. Does he intend only the narrow definition of a customs union, where it essentially just deals with issues such as tariffs and excise duties, or does he intend it to include the regulatory alignment, as it often does because the terminology gets stretched? If there is not regulatory alignment there still have to be checks, which means we are back to the border problem. Would he explain what he sees as the content of “a customs union” because, if we are not removing the border problem, I struggle to understand his point?

[Lord Lansley]

When I talk about a customs union, I mean—as the WTO would interpret it—where we share a customs territory and an external tariff arrangement, and our tariffs are the same as the European Union’s. A customs union, in my book, does not necessarily imply having the same rules, regulations and standards. If we are in a customs union with the European Union, it does not mean that we do not have a comprehensive partnership agreement with them. I hope we would do and that would embrace everything from data adequacy to having the same standards. Therefore, we would have to work on the basis that we start with and maintain standards at least as good as those inside the European Union, enabling the European Union and ourselves to operate on the basis of open borders. The most important part of that is the absence of a requirement to establish rules of origin, because one is in a single customs territory that allows goods to pass across borders in that way.

I will finish my point. I am losing quite where I was; I think I was just beyond talking about Turkey. We have got to know that we are going to be in a position to be able to negotiate a customs union, that we will be able to withdraw from it in future, and that it will obviate the need for us to have a hard border with the Republic of Ireland. That is a really important position. We need to know these things and we should have had months to negotiate them. As it is, we have to arrive at something in the political declaration in weeks rather than months.