Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Sharkey sends his apologies; he is at a funeral and will read Hansard with great attention. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for supporting me on Amendment 167. I think it is the first time in 15 years that I have degrouped an amendment to stand by itself, but I can see no other way to ensure a clear answer from the Government: will they put their money where their mouth is?

The Committee has discussed qualified assets and, while I do not intend to repeat the discussion, I hope that everyone understands how high risk a portfolio of such assets is. The Financial Services Regulation Committee, in January, titled its look at the private equity markets as Private Markets: Unknown Unknowns. Some 75% of firms invested in by venture capital fail. Complex infrastructure is both high risk and illiquid; we can think HS2, the Elizabeth Line—four years delayed and £4 billion over budget—and Hinkley Point, which seems to run out of money time after time. If someone with a substantial pension wants to invest in such assets, that is fine with me, but the Mansion House Compact —or accord, I do not care which terminology is used—covers only auto-enrolment default fund pension schemes. These are vehicles for those with the narrowest shoulders, with low incomes, small pensions and little financial knowledge. The downside risk for them means poverty.

The Government have assured us, and those pension savers with the narrowest shoulders, that under the Mansion House Compact, and by putting 10% of their pensions into qualified assets, they will be winners—to quote the Minister on the first day in Committee:

“with an average earner potentially gaining up to £29,000 more by retirement”.—[Official Report, 12/1/26; col. GC 205.]

No warning of the downside was mentioned and clearly, to the Minister, the downside does not seriously exist. I challenge that. I am always very wary of promises of low-risk, high-return investments.

The Government have argued that the Mansion House Compact, combined with the provisions in this Bill, brings great benefits because risk can in effect be eliminated by the structures that have been introduced and the use of large providers. I want to challenge some of those shibboleths. Large providers have explained to me that they can enhance pensions and use qualified assets safely through lifestyle investing, where more is invested into high-risk assets early in the life of the pension, switching later to low-risk investments. If I lose £100 in the first year that I save in a pension, the loss is compounded through the life of the pension and I will have thousands less to get me through retirement. If I lose £100 the day before my pension matures, I lose £100. Early losses are never made up by later gains because they in no way enhance the performance of other assets in the portfolio. If you lose on A, there is no sudden guarantee that you will gain on B. Lifestyle investment is a marketing tool to sell schemes to the financially anxious.

The Government and the Minister argue that the risks in qualified assets can be mitigated away through diversification. For a fund fully invested in good-quality assets, such as the FTSE 100 or the S&P 500, I see the argument for diversification to manage risk, but diversification loses its effectiveness in high-risk portfolios, as everyone should have learned from the collateralised debt obligation scandal that triggered the financial crisis in 2008. Let me illustrate with an extreme example. I go to the casino, maybe several casinos. I play the slot machine, roulette and blackjack. I am beautifully diversified. But we all know that I will still lose my money.

The Government’s case that pensioners with the narrowest shoulders should be 10% invested in qualified assets really depends on assumptions that it makes about asset allocation. The argument is that the pension companies involved would employ the best experts to pick winners among those qualified assets. Some experts are better than others, though I note that they all will find statistics and present them to show that they have the Midas touch.

I note the analysis of the Government Actuary’s Department, which shows that over time and on average—that is a key word—virtually every model portfolio tested delivers similar results. But there is a catch, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, pointed out last week—the GAD’s conclusion underscored its uncertainty. It said that

“there is considerable uncertainty, particularly with the assumptions for projected future investment returns”.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, also quoted from the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, which made the point even more forcefully. I could not work out what the mean looked like when I looked at that work done by the government department. Obviously, the mean really matters because an average can be made up of a few big winners and a lot of small losers. It is the losers in the high stakes game of qualified assets that worry me.

I am not attempting to stop the Mansion House Compact and the Government’s plan to put 10% of the assets of auto-enrolment default funds into qualified assets even though they are unlisted, opaque, high-risk and illiquid. My amendment would simply require the Government to provide a safety net for those who are in no position to live with the downside in these investments.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, last week said that

“the inevitable corollary of mandation”,

which is where he was focused,

“is responsibility for the outcome”.—[Official Report, 26/1/26; col. GC 284.]

But I regard the Mansion House Compact as very much a government-driven agreement designed by the industry to head off even more coercive action and so I think that the same principle applies: “responsibility for the outcome”.

My amendment is simple:

“Upon the individual becoming entitled to receive retirement benefits under the scheme, the trustees or managers must obtain an actuarial assessment of—


(a) the net investment return attributable to the qualifying assets held within the default arrangement over the period during which the individual’s rights were so invested, and


(b) the net investment return that would have been achieved over the same period had those assets instead been invested in a prescribed benchmark fund”.


In the amendment, benchmark fund

“means a diversified, low-cost equity index fund of a description specified in regulations”.

If the benchmark fund would have performed better, the Government make up the difference to the pensioner. The calculation, despite what the Minister said, is very simple, requires no new data and can be crafted straightforwardly. Pension schemes would just code it into their normal reporting.

If the Minister and the Government are right, and investment in qualified assets, as structured under the Mansion House Compact and in this Bill, benefits and does not harm pensioners in auto-enrolment default schemes—those people I described at the beginning with the narrowest shoulders and least able to take risk—it costs the Government absolutely nothing to sign up to this protection provision. If the Government believe their own words, accepting my amendment means taking no risk at all for the Government or taxpayer. My amendment only costs the Government money if they are wrong in the promises that they are making. The amendment would certainly give peace of mind to the poorest pensioners and strengthen their confidence to save and to invest.

We all want auto-enrolment to better serve low earners, but that requires shaping policy around the capacity of low earners to take risk. I ask the Government to put their money where their mouth is and provide the pension value protection described in my amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise for not being able to be here last week for Amendment 142. I am grateful that the Minister responded to it regardless of that. I have added my name to Amendment 167. I will try to be very brief because the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has explained it with her usual clarity, and the amendment covers some of the same ground that we debated in the last group—although it attacks the problem from the other direction.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Report stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, as we have heard, this group relates to the measures in the Bill which would give the DWP the ability to require banks and other financial institutions to trawl all accounts that they hold to identify and provide information on accounts that have received certain benefits and which meet certain criteria as defined by DWP, all without any suspicion of wrongdoing. This is done by means of an eligibility verification notice, which can require periodic reporting—the noble Baroness did not mention this when she described it. For example, it could be daily, although there has been no clarity from the department or the Minister yet as to the periods that are intended. I should reiterate at this point: this is a much better Bill, and the safeguards are much greater than the last time we saw these clauses, but there is more to go.

I would like to make one other little correction to the noble Baroness on her example of universal credit. Her example was that the eligibility criterion that would be provided by DWP to the banks would be £16,000, because that is the limit. In fact, it could be a much lower number, because under the Bill:

“The eligibility indicators may be criteria to be met by a single account or by”


a number of “accounts combined”. For the universal credit example it might be £10,000 or £8,000, or something of that nature. In that situation, it is even more likely that eligibility indicators would be flagged for innocent people, but that is just a wrinkle within the Bill.

I think many of us are nervous about the introduction of what is effectively the suspicionless trawling of benefit recipients’ accounts, even with the safeguards that are there. However, I understand and have an awful lot of sympathy for the need to reduce fraud and error, and the need for the department to have the tools to do that. Amendment 45A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and others, would—as I think we are about to hear—remove the provision altogether. My approach in this group and the next has been to seek to strengthen the safeguards that surround the use of the powers rather than to remove them altogether.

To that end, I have tabled one amendment in this group, Amendment 49, which the noble Baroness has already alluded to. I am grateful to both the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their support. It is very simple: it requires that the Secretary of State may issue an eligibility verification notice only if satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to do so for the purposes set out in the Bill. It was quite surprising that this basic safeguard was not already in the Bill, because the same wording already appears in relation to all the other powers it creates. I had assumed that this was a drafting error or oversight, as I cannot imagine any reason why it should not be there in relation to these powers.

I am very pleased to say that, since I tabled Amendment 49, the Minister has tabled Amendment 48, which she has mentioned. That amendment does much the same thing, although it does not restrict the necessity and proportionality to the purposes of the Bill. That is regrettable, but I can live with the Minister’s version and I am grateful to her for doing this following the constructive discussions we have had on a range of issues throughout the process, for which we are very grateful.

The Minister’s other amendments also introduce small but useful tweaks to the safeguards, although I am not sure I would go as far as she does on their effect. With thanks to the Minister for her engagement, I will not move Amendment 49, but I should be clear that I do not believe that Amendment 48 and the others she has tabled remove the need for the changes we will discuss in the next group. We will have those discussions then, and I will obviously reflect on what she has said in the meantime.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has amendments in this and other groups, several of which I have signed, to try to ameliorate or provide safeguards for some of the most intrusive elements of the current draft of the Bill. I also have great sympathy with the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, around the issue of transparency, which is very evidently absent from most of the Bill. I will support those individuals if they press their amendments.

My Amendments 45A, 65 and 74A, in contrast to those of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, are not nuanced. They would simply remove Clauses 75 and 76 and Schedule 3, in effect eliminating the requirement for banks to look into claimants’ bank accounts. They would destroy the principle that the Bill establishes: that a group of people, defined by the common characteristic that they are in receipt of benefits, should have a more limited right to privacy and data protection than the rest of the community.

I am also very concerned when banks become investigative agents of the state. I regard these as lines we simply should not cross. I know that the Minister does not share that view and is very content that those in receipt of benefits should be under a level of surveillance that is considered inappropriate for the rest of the community. To her credit, she has limited some of the most abusive features of the Bill that we received from the Commons, but she still asserts the underlying principle.

I also realise that this is very much a paving Bill for the intrusions that will follow the introduction of the digital ID. That scheme provides the tools that enable the state to carve out for surveillance any variety of groups of people whom it deems unworthy of sharing the general rights accorded under the law. I have tabled what are killer amendments, in effect, because the public need to know what exactly is at stake and what line has been crossed. I will not press my amendments, but I am also determined that the issues will not be quietly tidied away.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Committee stage
Wednesday 4th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I will very quickly make a couple of comments on Amendments 9 and 10. First, on Amendment 9, I have an amendment later in Committee that inserts a reasonableness point in a similar way, so I support this. However, I wonder whether this amendment is actually in the wrong place; I suggest that it ought to be in the initial line—“the Minister should reasonably consider”—as opposed to “reasonably proportionate”, but that is a small issue. I support the concept of Amendment 9.

Amendment 10 is quite important. This issue has been raised by the banking industry, and there is a very real concern that the receipt of a notice might provide reasonable grounds for the financial services firm to know or suspect that the customer has defrauded the public sector. In that situation, the failure to take action, for example to close or restrict the account, might conflict with wider anti-money laundering obligations and, possibly—I am not sure this is right—the corporate criminal offence of failure to prevent fraud. That might include having to exit customer relationships and so on.

So there is a very real concern from the financial services industry here. I am sure that that is not the intention of the Government in this situation but it is something that we need to think about, as the receipt of a notice cannot be seen as reasonable grounds to suspect fraud, because that would set all sorts of hares running against people who might be entirely innocent.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will just pick up the issue that has been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. We are dealing tomorrow with a statutory instrument that attempts to provide safeguards against banks and other organisations deciding to close people’s bank accounts or to deprive them of other financial services. It is often the people who are under the most financial pressure who find it difficult to get banked in the first place. They can get a basic bank account if they are lucky, but to get a bank account with any of the features that make financial life reasonable is exceedingly difficult. I therefore share the noble Lord’s concern that we do not start a hare running.

Banks are eager to offload people who do not have a lot of exciting and interesting activity. If this notice gives them an excuse to do that, I can see that an awful lot of banks will seize that opportunity, so I raise this as an issue to be wary of. In fact, we have an SI going in the opposite direction tomorrow, so this is really for the Government to make sure that one hand knows what the other hand is doing.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Monday 12th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I want to ask the Minister a question that arises from this change. First, though, it is over six months since we debated these amendments. That does seem like an awfully long time for the Bill to disappear into limbo and come back, particularly when other Bills are being rushed through this House.

I wanted to ask the Minister to explain more about whether the resolution process could be used for larger banks, but I think he has actually answered that question. I am not sure his answer gives me an awful lot more confidence or comfort, but I am not going to oppose the Commons amendments. However, in the last six months, various comments have come from the PRA or the Bank of England about the fact that this Act, as it will be, may allow them to take some banks out of the MREL process. I wondered if the Minister might wish to comment on that and whether there are any consequences the other way round.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I have to say that I appreciate the explanation that we have just had from the Minister, but I and others remain disturbed by the Government’s decision not to accept the amendment, which was not just rational but well crafted, introduced by your Lordships in this House. The underlying Bill was initially presented to the House as providing a mechanism to save significant small banks from failing by recapitalising them from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, rather than having to turn to the taxpayer. Regulated banks, as this House will know, are then required to replenish the FSCS when it is depleted for any reason, but, because the thrust of the language was around small banks—that was the intent, and that was the discussion that is in all the notes—this House very much agreed to it, with just a few probing points engaged with.

Thank goodness that we have a lot of very good brains in this House. The combination of my noble friends Lady Bowles and Lord Fox and the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes and Lady Vere, realised that there was a significant loophole in the language. We did not realise in the beginning that any of this could be applied to the larger banks; that became clear only as those pursuing the legislation became more aware of the implications of its content. Now we have a Bill that permits the regulator to use the FSCS as its mechanism to rescue large banks. Let us be frank: it completely changes the whole profile of both risks and consequences. The amendment would have effectively closed that loophole.

The larger banks, as the Minister has said, already have their own dedicated process to recapitalise in case of failure, a process that was introduced after the 2008 crisis. The Bank of England requires each large bank to hold a tranche of MREL—in plain English, bail-in bonds—which can be converted to capital by the regulator in case of failure, with the consequence that the bank is thereby rescued. We need to understand why that is not considered by the Government to be an adequate system. The Minister has just said—if I understood him—that the regulators will always require that bail-in bonds are used first, and the FSCS is a resource of last resort. But that is not in the legislation. The legislation allows the regulator to turn first to the FSCS and ignore bail-in altogether. He will be very conscious that the Swiss regulator, with the failure of Credit Suisse, completely ignored the bail-in capability and chose other routes to manage the rescue of Credit Suisse.

Those who hold bail-in bonds—the investors who buy them—are extremely well remunerated for carrying the risk associated with a bail-in bond. I am trying to work out why they can now look at this legislation and begin to assume that they will have the benefits of receiving a risk premium for holding those bonds but never actually find that those bonds are forced into use in case of a failure. How can we rely on just a code to continue to determine that bail-in will be the first resort and not a later resort or no resort at all? Are the Government basically saying that there are now many circumstances they have identified in which bail-in is neither usable nor adequate? I refer to the Swiss example. What are the consequences for financial sustainability if we are saying that bail-in is a slightly busted system? Have there been blandishments from the various investors who have purchased bail-in bonds, trying to pressure the Government into creating an alternate route? What are the consequences for our small- and medium-sized banks if the FSCS is depleted by big bank failure?

The Minister says that the regulators will not ask for an unaffordable contribution from the various banks to replenish the FSCS, but it is our mechanism that ensures small depositors’ accounts. Who is going to do the replenishment if the number is too great to ask the banks to commit to it? I am quite troubled by this change in responsibility for where risk lies that is embedded in the Bill. If the Minister is so sure that the items in the code should be giving us reassurance, why have they not been introduced in this Bill as part of the legislation?

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Report stage
Monday 4th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I support both the amendments in the names of the two noble Baronesses who have just spoken. I probably have a slight preference for Amendment 16 on the expenses—it is more direct—but we need something in the Bill that reminds the Bank of England that it is spending other people’s money, and that it needs to do that carefully and with care. These amendments are aimed primarily at that end, so I support them both.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 7 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles, Lady Noakes and Lady Vere, but I am not as minded to support Amendment 16 for the following reasons. Some in this House will know that I dislike intensely the competitiveness and growth objective that has been attached to the PRA and the FCA. If you were going to set out a pattern to repeat the crash of 2007-08, those two objectives would be essential paving stones on that route, so I do not look to attach that particular amendment to the Bank of England in its overall resolution role in, for example, setting MREL. It should be setting MREL to reduce risk, not to follow the lowest common denominator in the international banking arena.

Ironically, if you take the growth and competitiveness secondary objective and just apply it to recapitalisation, it turns on its head and becomes a risk-reduction tool, because it basically limits the ability of the collapse of one bank to then infect all the other banks within the system. That seems to me to be a risk-reduction strategy, so I am very much in favour of the way in which it has been crafted under Amendment 7. I say that to reassure others in this House who may be afraid that playing fast and loose with the competitiveness and growth agenda is always a risk-increasing agenda rather than a risk-reduction agenda. In this narrow role, it works in the opposite direction.