Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Lawlor and Lord Frost

Committee stage
Friday 30th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 72 and 80 in my name. I will not say anything about autonomy other than to mention to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that although it is a philosophical concept which was drafted in recent centuries, academic philosophy is very divided on how worthwhile it is as a concept.

I begin with my Amendment 80, which would substitute some detail for the very vague requirement that death within six months can reasonably be expected. We have already heard in the Committee, from everybody—not only today but on other days—that certain diagnosis is a very inexact science, and that diagnosing someone as having six months is very inexact.

We have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, in opening, that conditions can differ, patterns can differ and patients can differ—we also heard that from the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. Therefore, each patient must be assessed on an individual basis.

Against that, my Amendment 80 proposes that the difficult job of assessment is done by two consultants specialising in the relevant area, and it pins down that the expectation should instead be an 80% probability. If the sponsors are in earnest that those eligible really should be those who are within six months of death, they should be pleased to accept an amendment that tries to overcome the inexactness of such judgments by requiring confirmation by two of the most qualified experts in the area, and they should accept that an 80% likelihood is what, in this context, can reasonably be expected.

I move on briefly to Amendment 72. The Bill already refuses eligibility for assisted suicide when a condition that in itself is diagnosed to lead to death within six months can be reversed. My amendment takes the next logical step by limiting eligibility to cases where the condition not only cannot be reversed but cannot be relieved, controlled or ameliorated; I am adding to what has already been proposed in that group. The amendment aims to substitute a constructive, optimistic approach to treating illness, rather than one that writes off the patient and points them on the path to suicide.

That requirement—that, when steps can be taken to relieve, control or ameliorate a disease, the patient can no longer be considered for assisted suicide—will remove many otherwise difficult cases from this murky area and allow the mechanisms to operate as best they can for those for whom the Bill, on its face, intends them: people whose deterioration is inevitable.

There is an even more pressing reason than those two to accept this amendment: unless we positively exclude from eligibility patients whose condition could be relieved, controlled or ameliorated, we set up the conditions in which the relief, control and amelioration of terminal illnesses will become increasingly rare. We have heard of some remarkable instances today, not least from the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell of Surbiton—whom I am delighted to see back. Why would an overburdened health service try to give some extra months of life, give a higher degree of relief of pain, or ameliorate or arrest the progression of the disease, when it is so much easier to direct the patient, either implicitly or by expectation, towards assisted suicide?

What about relatives—even no more than ordinarily unscrupulous or greedy ones, or merely selfish ones—for whom the speedy death of their loved one is likely to seem desirable? We may also reasonably fear an overzealous state service committed to the task of accelerating the pathways of such unfortunate cases to their ends. My amendment guards against those consequences—some of the worst of a Bill so rich and varied in its capacity for harm.

[Lord Frost (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I rise to introduce Amendment 84, which has already been touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer. I am grateful to, and thank, the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, for his support.

This group, as we have heard, is primarily about the definition of terminal illness. My amendment in this group touches on a somewhat different but related and important point, which is whether the terminal illness criterion—the existence of terminal illness—is in itself sufficient as a criterion. I am doubtful that it is, and that is why I have proposed this amendment.

As your Lordships know, there are two different models around the world for the kind of law that we are considering. Both include a terminal illness criterion. One type also has a suffering criterion, and that is the model used, as has been said, in Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere. The second type does not; it rests entirely on the concept of autonomy—the belief that if you know or have been told that you are going to die soon, you have the right to ask the state to allow you access to assisted suicide. I will say more about this autonomy point in a moment.

To state the obvious, the Bill is based on the second of those two models, but one of the problems is that much of the campaign for it is based on the first model—the assumption of a suffering criterion. Hence my amendment would introduce the concept of unbearable suffering that could not be relieved by treatment. It is probing; it aims to test the reasoning behind the preference of the Bill’s supporters for that type of model.

My amendment would do four things, and some of what I am about to say has already been touched on, so I will be brief. First, it would align the legal test in the Bill with the public justification for the Bill. It is clear that the campaign around the Bill bases much of its work on the need to deal with suffering and, if suffering is the moral foundation offered to the public, it should be in any eventual statute. It is clear from all the discussion around the Bill that many voters believe it already is in the Bill, and it should be.

Secondly, it would stop drift and the slippery slope. The problem here is that, if the real justification for access to assisted suicide is autonomy, what is the justification for the robustness of the six-month limit? We have heard that provisions in the Bill are vulnerable to court rulings, judicial review and the existence of the ECHR—although there is, of course, a way of resolving that particular problem—other broader principles and specific legislation such as the Equality Act. A suffering-led criterion would help Parliament to draw and defend a clear and principled line.

Thirdly, it is relatively—not totally, but relatively—easy to identify unbearable suffering. As has been noted, it is usually obvious from demeanour and body language when there is frequent and unbearable pain. This helps distinguish between qualifying and non-qualifying reasons for access to assisted dying, such as social pressures. This is vital given that we have already heard from the sponsor how widely drawn some of those criteria might ultimately be.

Fourthly, it has to be noted that, with a small number of exceptions, most other jurisdictions that use these laws have a suffering criterion: Australia, the proposed legislation in France, now happily stalled for the time being, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, the rejected legislation in Slovenia, New Zealand, Colombia and so on all have a suffering criterion, and for a good reason.

He has touched on it before, but when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, responds to the debate on this group, perhaps he could explain in greater depth why he is so insistent on an autonomy-only Bill, whether he recognises any limits on autonomy, and whether and why he is content to rest on autonomy as a justification while allowing campaigners to make a case based on suffering.

I want to say a few words on the justification of autonomy because it is so crucial and the Bill’s sponsors have been clear on the importance they attach to it. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has been quoted before but it needs repeating:

“the essence of the Bill is autonomy. You have a choice … Once you satisfy that requirement—obviously, the safeguards have to be complied with—that is the essence of the Bill. It is autonomy”.

We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who is not in his place, about the importance of choice in this area. That is really another way of expressing the same issue.

Proponents of the Bill have, at times, been perhaps a little dismissive of those of us who have religious convictions and suggest that we should not bring them to this debate. But I suggest that the belief in autonomy is also an a priori conviction with no more or no less right be heard unchallenged. It is surprising perhaps to find Ayn Rand-like views of the importance of individual autonomy emanating from the Labour Benches. It is a view that one can have, but I suggest that very few people do in fact have such views in practice.

Product Regulation and Metrology Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Lawlor and Lord Frost

Report stage
Wednesday 5th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, in moving my Amendment 43A, I of course support the amendments from my noble friends Lord Sharpe and Lord Frost in this group, to one of which I have added my name. My amendment would require the Government to place before Parliament a report on whether scientific—which includes technical—evidence supports a regulation covered by the Bill, because assessment of risk and for safety should be based on objective evidence, technical and scientific.

The regulations for sanitary and phytosanitary, SPS, explicitly mention scientific evidence, whereas reference to science is not typically found in regulations on technical barriers to trade, or in the chapters in FTAs. They are often implied by wording: for example, a requirement that regulations on risk are based on documented and objective evidence. For international trade agreements, such evidence is assumed. Either our goods conform with internationally agreed standards or, if they derogate, they should draw on scientific and technical evidence to show that they conform to an agreed standard. There are good reasons for this.

Such objective evidence and assessment is not only needed to assess risk objectively but is implied in the WTO framework, on which many trade agreements are based. They have to be WTO-compliant. The WTO’s own Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, TBT, requires that, where appropriate, parties

“specify technical regulations based on product requirements in terms of performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics”,

one aim being to ensure that regulations, standards, testing and certification procedures followed by WTO members do not create “unnecessary obstacles” to trade. That is certainly one of this country’s enduring free trade objects.

My amendment would promote a number of benefits and aims. It would help to focus attention on real risk, on the basis of provable evidence and that alone. It would make for transparency: those who produce, market or buy a product could know where they stand and trust the measures assessing risk. It would avoid saddling producers and consumers with costs for unnecessary, overburdensome obligations that result from the political attempt to tie the UK to unproven regulations, which may flout WTO international trade law, to protect their own products against competition from another trading partner.

In products, the contents of which may include some agricultural content, it will help the UK to keep its eye on the evidence and purpose. I commend my noble friend Lord Sharpe’s amendment, which would specifically require that a statement on the need and purpose for such regulations be made. I have already mentioned one example in Committee, which is the difference between UK REACH and EU REACH regulations. The stated purpose is vital to the difference in how one is more burdensome than the other.

My amendment would also reflect the way the UK has moved to make the most of international trade opportunities in our trade treaties, with, for example, the CPTPP. The UK can help shape these, as a leader of the oldest rules-based international trade order, while trading globally as one of the world’s oldest and most successful free-trade economies. Above all, it would avoid obliging businesses to follow the EU’s code-based precautionary principle. That may be unrelated to evidence and often driven by officials, while being costly to producers and raising prices sky-high for consumers, making some countries uncompetitive in world markets and the product not safer but, in many instances, less safe. I therefore beg to move.

[Lord Frost (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 56 stands in my name. As it is, I guess, the last time that I will speak on this Bill, perhaps I may use the opportunity to join others in saying thank you to the Ministers for the willingness they have shown to meet us and to show flexibility on parts of the Bill, even if that flexibility has possibly been more evident on its more marginal and peripheral aspects than on the core provisions, which matter so much to us. I thank them anyway for it.

One of those core provisions, which we have debated at length, is of course Clause 2(7), which creates the power to align UK legislation with EU law. My Amendment 56 would ensure that the affirmative parliamentary procedure applied to such secondary legislation under that provision. This is important, as the procedure of legislating by cross-reference to the laws of another entity is certainly, to borrow terminology from another sphere, novel and contentious. Therefore, if it happens—I am sure it is going to happen and probably quite a lot, I fear—it really ought to do so only consciously and according to a procedure that gives both of this Parliament’s Houses the maximum powers to be aware that it is happening and to influence it to the maximum possible. Of course, that is what the affirmative procedure is about. I hope that, even at this late stage, the Ministers might look favourably on this amendment in the interests of respecting the rights and powers of this Parliament.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Baroness Lawlor and Lord Frost

Report stage
Monday 4th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support the aims of the Bill and I hope that it—and they—will succeed, that it will not be challenged and that there will be no further obstacles put in the way of removing people who come to this country illegally and by these dangerous routes.

My Amendment 17 would leave out Clause 2(5) and substitute the text on the Marshalled List. The aim is to tighten the Bill on what may

“prevent or delay the removal to Rwanda of an individual”

under any of the Immigration Acts, the Human Rights Act 1998,

“EU derived law and case law … under sections 2 to 7 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018”

and

“any … provision … of domestic law (including … common law), and … international law”

relevant to the aim, so as to limit legal challenges to the Bill. I do not share the views of those who say that the Bill contravenes the rule of law. Their view rests on assumptions about the role of international law, its place within our own system, the creative approach of the Strasbourg court in applying the convention and the tendency now to accord something of a primacy to courts over Parliament.

These assumptions are contested within the legal profession itself. I will refer to one KC, Anthony Speaight, whose paper was published at the weekend by Politeia, of which I am research director. I therefore declare a special interest in the matter. Speaight explains the comparative novelty of the view, which he dates from Lord Bingham’s 2010 book, that the rule of law requires adherence to international law.

I am not a lawyer. I approach the question as a historian of British political and constitutional history. It is a history, by and large—and certainly in the era since the franchise was extended in the 19th century—of the interplay between Executive and Parliament, with the Government accountable through Parliament to the will of the people, even before the extension of the franchise. At the moment, both the Government and Parliament are intent on being accountable on the matter of curbing illegal immigration. But they are prevented by laws and the judiciary that operates them or, as in the case of the Strasbourg court, interprets them in a manner that takes from and does not protect their liberty, on which good law is based—the freely expressed will of the people who are governed.

On immigration, legal and illegal, the people have spoken loud and clear. They want Britain’s borders controlled and the flow of immigration curbed. Parliament has passed the laws to bring such control, but each Bill it brings forward meets a challenge in the courts. Is removal to Rwanda to be stopped not by a recalcitrant authoritarian monarch or an oligarchic, aristocratic, landowning Parliament, as in the past, but by a judiciary acting—I do not doubt in good faith—to give effect to a cocktail of legislation binding this country from an era whose laws are not our own and from times that are not our own?

There are practical limits to what a good Government can achieve. It is recognised, perhaps more clearly by voters than by rulers, that uncontrolled immigration facilitated by the obstacles now put by the courts, often—as in the case of illegal immigration through asylum claims—has consequences for the economy in terms of the budgetary costs. It puts demands that cannot be satisfied on Britain’s domestic arrangements—not just for processing claims but on every manner of the support that the UK’s people have over the centuries shown to those who, for whatever reason, come to make their lives in this country.

If our constitution is to survive the onslaught of legal challenge, the will of Parliament, reflecting the mandate of the voters, must triumph and, with it, the stability, transparency and accountability it has brought to Britain and its people, rather than be challenged on account of international or our own laws.

This country is no outlier. Across the channel, the political systems of western European neighbours are buckling under the political immediacy of uncontrolled immigration, each seeking to exploit or avoid the system to which in law they are bound under EU law, convention law and the mass of internal legislation to which these have given rise. They also have to take account of Schengen.

Take the case of France. Its political system was practically frozen for two years, haggling over an immigration Bill that many see as promising too little, too late. The problems with which it grapples are immense. Constitutional arrangements and stability are under threat at different levels. Departments are pitted against national powers, as in the recent stand-off with some mayors, who refuse to accept and look after unaccompanied minors because they have no ability to do so. At government level, against the ruling of the Strasbourg court, it is voters against the traditional systems of the political parties, the republicans and the socialists.

In this country, we are free to make our own laws. Other noble Lords will speak to their amendments on the same theme. My amendment aims to tighten the Bill and to pre-empt further challenge. As the Minister mentioned earlier, a core principle and aim of the Bill is to prevent further challenge to the workings of ordered, representative and accountable democracy. It aims to promote the aims of the Bill to delay illegal and unsafe crossings and deter the horrid loss of life, such as the death of a little girl of seven in freezing waters in the channel on Sunday night. I therefore beg to move.

[Lord Frost (Con)]

My Lords, I will also speak in favour of Amendment 17, tabled by my noble friend Lady Lawlor, to which I have added my name. As I said at Second Reading, I support the Bill. I am afraid that the Rwanda policy is a bit of a Heath Robinson arrangement. It shies away from some of the tough decisions needed to solve the problems. But I support the Bill because it is the plan we have, and we must hope it makes a difference.

It can certainly be improved. Most of the amendments discussed today would make it worse rather than better, and less effective rather than more effective. Amendment 17 is one of the few exceptions to that. It aims to provide a more clearly drawn Bill—one that can withstand challenges and fulfil its purpose more effectively, by making clear that no other legal provisions of any kind, whether in domestic or international law, can be used to frustrate the policy.

I do not want to repeat issues that have already been raised in Committee and discussed again at length today, but I will briefly explain why I support this amendment and then make one comment based on my involvement in recent years in the intersection between international and domestic law.

First, it is absolutely clear that this Parliament may legislate against international law, and indeed the Government may act in contravention of international law. As we have already heard, Clause 1(4) makes that clear and nobody is seeking to amend that. It is a long-standing, fundamental element of our constitution. It is not some sort of weird, UK-specific provision; there is good reason for the dualism in our system. First, otherwise Governments could act to create domestic law merely by signing an international treaty and thereby sidestep normal democratic processes. Secondly, it reflects the reality that international treaties are in practice very difficult to adapt to changing conditions because all the parties must agree to changes. It has been suggested by some noble Lords today and in previous debates that that is what should happen and that we should seek to renegotiate the international framework. The refugee convention, for example, has 149 state parties, including such well-known supporters of international law as China, Russia and Iran. Are we going to wait for them all to agree to amend this framework? We are clearly not, but if national Governments accept that they can deal with pressing national challenges only by renegotiating these treaties, they are in effect abandoning their duty to govern their own countries on matters of huge importance.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Debate between Baroness Lawlor and Lord Frost

Report stage
Wednesday 17th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I have added my name to my noble friend Lady Noakes’s Amendment 51A, and I would like to follow on from what she has said. It is important that the legislative momentum for sunsetting, removing or revoking EU legislation be kept up. The reporting requirement on the Government will, as she said, keep up the momentum and help the Government and indeed Parliament to keep track of what has gone, what is yet to go and how further regulations, if any, will be modified.

There is a very good reason for doing this, and it relates to cost. Ultimately, it is people who bear the costs, either through what they pay for goods and services or through their taxes for government compliance costs in dealing, as now, with two systems of law: EU retained law and our own common law.

I hope the reporting requirement will enable us all to know where we are going and help us keep track of getting rid of that which the Government have pledged to get rid of or modify where necessary. That is very important in the interests of efficiency, for everyone, not just businesses. It is also important for transparency. Not only does regular reporting help the momentum; it will make for fairness so that we are all clear about the rules. I hope it will mean greater prosperity, which we need to encourage. In my view, we need to move back more thoroughly to our common-law system, and that is something on which I hope to touch when we consider the next group of amendments.

[Lord Frost (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 51A, to which I have added my name. There is perhaps little to add to what has been said in support of the amendment, other than to recall that the corpus of retained EU law that will be covered by it remains a corpus of law—however normalised, we must hope, by the Bill—that was brought on to the UK statute book in a distinct and different way that did not always enjoy full discussion in this Parliament, as we have said many times. It is logical and reasonable to keep that corpus of law under particular review under this distinct process, so that it can be kept in view of this House and of Parliament. The original purpose of the Bill as introduced by the Government—to review, reform, perhaps revoke and perhaps continue with the legislation—can be kept fully in mind and implemented. To me, that is the logic behind the amendment, and I hope the Government will be able to take that on board.