Protection of Freedoms Bill
Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts(12 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Lucas
My Lords, the amendments in this group are intended to ask a short trio of questions about how line 36, which is about the admissibility of evidence, will work. First, I want to be sure that it covers civil as well as criminal proceedings because an awful lot of surveillance camera evidence is used in, for instance, parking ticket or traffic enforcement, which are civil proceedings. It is important that if there are rules and regulations being passed about how these cameras should be used, they and the guidance should be equally effective in dealing with traffic enforcement as in dealing with a mugging.
Secondly, if one goes by not general, but certainly frequent, local authority practice, local authorities will rely in civil cases on the fact that most people do not appeal, so the case never comes to court. People pay their fines. Knowing that whenever a particular breach of the code comes to the tribunal the local authorities lose their case, they will none the less continue enforcing because they are losing only 1 or 2 per cent of revenue and the rest of the people are paying up as usual. What the guidance in the code is supposed to do is nullified by the fact that there is no mechanism for spreading the opinion of the tribunal more widely than the individual cases which reach it.
Amendment 104 is intended to propose such a mechanism so that a tribunal can say, “No, you have to stop this. We have seen this five times already and each time we have found for the appellant. You must cease enforcing until you have put this right. We will not allow you to issue any more tickets on the basis of something which we consider to be an unreasonable breach of the code”. The other end of it is that where a tribunal has found a local authority to be in frequent breach of the code and has on each occasion found for the appellant, none the less the local authority will have extracted a very large amount of money out of other people who have not appealed because there is a very substantial disincentive to appeal. If you lose an appeal, you double your fine. There is also a large amount of time taken up in the process of appeal.
I would like to see some mechanism where a tribunal can say to a local authority, in particular, or to other people who are seeking to use camera evidence as the basis of fines, that they must repay not only the appellant but all the other people on whom penalties have been imposed on the basis of the practice that the tribunal disapproves of. I beg to move.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for explaining and introducing his amendments. I recognise that he is focusing on the specific use of surveillance camera technology, particularly in its use for enforcement of parking and traffic regulations. It is probably worth me pointing out for the benefit of the Committee that the surveillance camera code of practice is not intended to include any speed camera technology. I know that my noble friend—
Lord Lucas
My Lords, I am not talking at all about speed camera technology.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I was just about to say to my noble friend that I know that he was not talking about speed camera technology at all. It was just for the benefit of the rest of the Committee. I thought it was an appropriate point for me to make that clear, in case anybody else might not be as clear as my noble friend is on this matter.
I refer first to my noble friend’s Amendment 103, which, as he has explained, seeks to clarify the drafting of Clause 33(3). I believe that the meaning of that subsection is already clear, as “such proceedings” unambiguously refers back to “criminal or civil proceedings” in subsection (2); we simply do not need to repeat those words in subsection (3).
My noble friend’s Amendment 104 suggests that this Bill takes away the right to seek redress where a court has ruled that the code of practice has been breached. We believe this would have significant implications for litigants. In the context of civil proceedings—just to be clear, for example, we might be talking here of someone seeking to enforce the payment of parking charges—a claimant should be able to present all relevant evidence in support of his or her case. Given that the surveillance code of practice will set out guidance rather than rigid requirements for the operation of surveillance camera systems, it would in our view be disproportionate to prevent, as a matter of course, CCTV evidence being presented where a court or tribunal has ruled that there has been a breach of the code.
Clause 33(4) makes it clear that the court should have discretion in taking into account a failure by a relevant authority to have regard to the surveillance camera code in determining a question in any such proceedings. In the context of criminal proceedings, the ramifications of the amendment in terms of the overall fairness of the process are potentially more significant. The effect of the amendment might be to exclude key prosecution evidence or evidence that might exonerate the accused. Our general approach, as I have already explained, should be to leave decisions about the admissibility of CCTV evidence to the court or tribunal in question.
Lord Lucas
My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend for that answer, particularly the sudden inspiration which struck her at the end and which gave me great comfort so far as Amendments 104 and 105 are concerned, which I agree were pushing it a bit. However, I still have concerns on Amendment 103.
I agree that Clause 33(3) refers back to Clause 33(2), but the latter refers to the acts of people who are running surveillance cameras, not to the acts of people who are caught on surveillance cameras. It is not clear to me that the inference that she suggested should be imported into Clause 33(3)—that the civil and criminal proceedings in Clause 33(2) apply—is justifiable, given that they refer to completely different sets of court cases. One is cases taken against people who are using cameras and the other is cases against people who are caught on camera. I should be very grateful if the Minister could write to me to answer that point in detail if she does not have an answer in front of her now.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I would be very happy to take away the points that my noble friend has raised and will, of course, write to him in due course.
Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, the dilemma in front of us is basically to do with the application of CCTV, its value and the safeguards related to its value. I have peculiar experience of this, having headed up an organisation which had probably one of the largest CCTV installations in the UK. I have to say it was introduced before anybody thought about any sort of code, and we built up practice. Our experience was that the benefits massively outweighed the disadvantages. Our other experience was that acceptance by the general public simply grew with time. In London, people are used to CCTV on transport systems, in public spaces and so on. We think that the benefits are enormous.
We are not against the general concept of introducing a code, but we have all made it clear that we think the way this code is being introduced is wrong. The right thing to do is to have an inquiry to understand the extent of the problem, to start working up criteria and so on. However, if the Government insist on introducing this code more rapidly than that, we would be against its extension to all publicly funded areas and to schools and colleges. This is not because we are against extension of the code—as has been rightly pointed out, there are many privately owned CCTV cameras that could sensibly fall within a comprehensive code. What we are against is the extension of that code until the right amount of experience has been gained and investigation has taken place. Otherwise, these crucial areas, particularly schools and colleges, where CCTV is so valuable, will be burdened with a bureaucratic nightmare until we achieve a code that gets the right balance of being bureaucratically light while achieving the effective objectives of public engagement and acceptance. Therefore, in this Bill at this time we do not support these amendments.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I shall start by picking up where the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, left off, and by making the point that there is a lot of support for CCTV in this country. As my noble friend has already made clear today, the Government are certainly not in any way trying to restrict the use of CCTV through the introduction of this Bill. We are trying to introduce a code so that the use of CCTV is clear, and that where it is used the public have clarity in their understanding of its purpose.
I shall address, first, my noble friend’s Amendment 107, which proposes extending the code to all public bodies in receipt of money provided by Parliament. Given the incremental approach that we are adopting, we are not persuaded that the duty to have regard to the code should apply more widely than to local authorities and the police from the outset. All operators of public space CCTV are subject to the requirements of the Data Protection Act. We see local authorities and the police as the operators of publicly owned CCTV systems in public space, and as the bodies who are well placed to set the example for standards of operation. They frequently work in partnership with other CCTV operators and we see their behaviour as a powerful driver for positive change elsewhere.
To place a duty to have regard to the code on every publicly funded body from the outset would be premature. We should see how the code beds in and, drawing on the advice from the Surveillance Camera Commissioner, consider in due course whether the duty should be extended and, if so, to which bodies. Clause 33 contains a provision to enable the duty to have regard to the code of practice to be extended to other bodies by means of secondary legislation, so we do not need to settle this question now. We will not hesitate to make use of this provision if we deem it necessary and beneficial. Any order made to this end will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, and so will need to be debated and approved by both Houses.
At this point, I should refer to the question asked by my noble friend Lord Phillips about the period of review of the code. Subject to any further advice that I receive, I refer him to Clause 35, which refers to reports by the commissioner. Subsection (2)(b) makes it clear that the commissioner will be required to report every 12 months. On that basis, I suspect that any advice or proposals that he might want to make about the extension of the code would therefore be covered in his reports.
I turn now to my noble friend’s Amendment 109, which refers explicitly to educational establishments—schools, colleges and universities. I accept that the use of CCTV in schools and colleges is a potentially emotive issue for a variety of reasons. Some of the examples that my noble friend outlined certainly illustrate that point most clearly. As with any other establishment, we would expect any decision to install CCTV in an educational establishment to be very carefully considered, and the reasons for so doing tightly defined. The new code is intended to assist with these considerations. While we are not proposing that schools be covered by the code at the outset, it is there for all organisations that wish to install CCTV to use and be guided by in determining the purpose of that CCTV, precisely as the noble Baroness says. It is very important that, if a school introduces cameras, it should be clear about why it is choosing to do that.
The public consultation that we carried out earlier this year received over 100 responses, which are available on the Home Office website. Analysis of the responses received found that comments on the use of CCTV in schools were minimal. While there were some respondents who argued that the code should be made mandatory for all operators, none put forward a specific case for compliance with the code to be made mandatory for schools. Similarly, in relation to the amendment of my noble friend Lady Randerson regarding higher education institutions, there were no calls in the public consultation relating to universities or further education colleges and there are no specific concerns that we are aware of.
I assure your Lordships that the detail of the code will be developed in consultation with interested parties and, as part of that dialogue, we will consider whether any issues associated with surveillance camera systems within schools or healthcare settings require specific reference within it. When using CCTV on their premises, schools, colleges, universities and indeed all public bodies—including government departments—must adhere to the requirements in the Data Protection Act. Noble Lords will be well aware of the existing powers of the Information Commissioner to enforce compliance through a regulatory action policy.
There are therefore already safeguards in place for the privacy of students and the wider public. We trust the proprietors of schools, colleges and universities and their heads of institution to comply with those requirements, and for schools, where appropriate, to consult with parents on any deployment of CCTV.
I hope that by giving the assurance that we recognise the importance and value of CCTV; by outlining that the introduction of the code is to provide some clarity in terms of its use; and by explaining that there is an option to extend the code beyond the relevant authorities outlined already in the Bill but that we will not do so prematurely, I have addressed all the points that have been raised by noble Lords in the debate today. I hope my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Randerson
I thank my noble friend for that answer. I realise that every organisation concerned is subject to the Data Protection Act, but the point about the code is that one prevents the kind of problems to which I referred; one prevents breaches of the Data Protection Act by encouraging public bodies to follow good practice, behaviour and procedures.
I ask the Minister to give further consideration to the issue of schools and educational institutions. She referred to the lack of response in the consultation on the issues associated with schools, but perhaps the Government may consider that in many people’s minds when they talk about local authorities, they encompass schools as well. However, in the modern world that is less and less so.
It is clear from the legislation that the Government are not including schools at this stage but I would ask them to give further consideration to the matter. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Protection of Freedoms Bill
Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts(12 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, these government amendments are to remedy an anomaly in the definition of regulated activity for adults. The Bill provides that regulated activity relating to adults can be broadly split into six categories, one of which is the provision of personal care. The personal care definition currently includes “physical assistance” with the care of,
“skin, hair or nails (other than nail care provided by a chiropodist or podiatrist)”,
which is on page 64 of the Bill.
These amendments will remove the current exception,
“other than nail care provided by a chiropodist or podiatrist”,
as the exception creates an anomalous situation where chiropodists and podiatrists are in regulated activity because they are regulated healthcare professionals except when providing nail care. The amendments will achieve the Government’s policy aim that chiropodists and podiatrists are wholly within regulated activity and therefore within the scope of the revised vetting and barring scheme. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I hope that we can dispose of this quickly. Clause 72 deals with information about barring decisions and my question is about the consent given by the object, if I can put it that way, of an inquiry who may consent to the provision of information when that consent, we are told in proposed new Section 30A(4) of the 2006 Act,
“also has effect in relation to any subsequent … application by”,
the same inquirer. I would be grateful if the Government can confirm that, in this context, consent can be withdrawn. I would read it that way and think that it is implied. However, there is certainly one example within the Bill: Clause 27, concerning biometric information of children in school, which deals with the consent of the parent and which says in terms that consent,
“may be withdrawn at any time”.
If it is necessary to spell that out in Clause 27, I would like to be quite certain that consent can be withdrawn effectively under the proposed new section contained in Clause 72. I beg to move.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for her explanation in moving her amendment. Clause 72 introduces proposed new Section 30A into the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. That section will allow regulated activity providers and others with a specified connection to a person to ask the Secretary of State whether that person is on the relevant Independent Safeguarding Authority barred list, or lists. For this, the person must provide their consent to the release of information about them. Proposed new Section 30A specifies that consent given for one such check would serve as consent for subsequent checks about that person made by the same party, as my noble friend has already explained. The aim of that final provision is to reduce bureaucracy for employers and others. If a person has consented to the provision of information, it makes no sense for an employer to have to seek a new declaration from them every time that they need to do a new check. Clearly, however, the consent must be valid.
In moving her amendment, my noble friend seeks to specify that prior consent will not be valid for future checks if that consent has been withdrawn. Our view—this is where I hope to be able to give my noble friend the assurance that she seeks—is that the current drafting of the Bill achieves this policy intention. If consent has been withdrawn then, according to the terms of the clause, there is no consent and the employer would have no basis to proceed. Operationally, employers will need to confirm that they have valid consent, or they will not be entitled to carry out a check.
It is probably worth mentioning, while I have the opportunity, a wider point in the context of Clause 72. Consent could be freely given, given the potential detrimental consequences to an individual. This was something which the Information Commissioner raised in a letter that he sent quite widely to noble Lords between Second Reading and Committee. He was seeking some clarification on this. Importantly, there is only a certain degree to which the state can and should intervene in the relationship between employer and employee. Naturally, if an employer should do anything untoward, an employee has access to the appropriate legal remedies but we do not anticipate that most employers would seek to coerce their employees.
The alternatives in this case are a system where consent needs to be given or one where it need not be. We choose the former because while pressure by an employer can never entirely be ruled out, it is better than information about someone being given to a third party without their knowledge. As the Information Commissioner noted in the briefing that he provided, a barred list check under proposed new Section 30A is only one of various ways for an employer to discharge their duty to check barred status so, should consent ever be an issue, there are alternatives. However, it is worth pointing out that criminal records checks themselves require the person who is the subject of the check to make the application.
Overall, I hope that what I have been able to say provides reassurance to my noble friend that the policy intention of her amendment, with which we agree, is catered for in the current drafting and that she will therefore feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the Minister read my mind. I had wondered whether to draw to the attention of the House the points made by the Information Commissioner, and I thank her for answering them without my asking. Her response on what is meant by “consent” is helpful, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Goodhart
My Lords, we have just heard one of the most remarkable statements that has been made in your Lordships’ House that I can remember since being here. Now it is time to move to much more ordinary amendments.
The amendments in this group are concerned with rehabilitation of offenders. The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act was enacted back in 1974. I have had an interest in this subject because I am, and was in 1974, a member of JUSTICE, the law reform and human rights organisation. JUSTICE supported the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, particularly through the work of Paul Sieghart, who was then its executive chairman. It managed, after a great deal of effort, to get the Act through the Houses of Parliament.
The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act gives a new chance to people who have been convicted of minor or moderate offences and have not repeated other offences during a reasonable period after their release. This gives them a better chance of getting a decent working job than if they were required to admit their offences to their prospective employers. The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act has been a very obvious success in the 37 years since it was enacted. It can benefit not only potential employers but also other people as well, because ex-prisoners who are unable to obtain a decent job are more likely to revert to crime than those who can get such a job.
Unfortunately, some employers have found a way of getting access to the past record of a rehabilitated person which is technically legal but plainly contrary to the purposes of the Act. The main way in which this happens is through Section 9(3) of the Act, which allows official documents containing full records of the offence to be provided to rehabilitated criminals and also to anyone else at the specific request of the rehabilitated offender. That means that any prospective employer can ask the prospective employee to authorise the official disclosure of his or her record. If the prospective employee authorises the disclosure of the criminal record, he or she is very unlikely to be appointed by the new employer. If the prospective employee refuses to disclose his or her record, then he or she is equally unlikely to be appointed.
This was plainly not what was intended when the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act was introduced, nor was it intended at any time since. The correction of this defect is the purpose of my Amendment 71A. In the course of drafting this amendment, I have consulted the Information Commissioner’s office; I have had a good deal of assistance from that office both in relation to Amendment 71A and to the other amendments in this group. I believe that an amendment to the Protection of Freedoms Bill with the aim of my Amendment 71A would help the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act to continue its work which has, as I said, been very successful.
Turning to the other amendments in my name, I can quickly get away from Amendment 76B, which turns out to be out of date. I believe its objective has already been dealt with and it would not, in any event, have furthered my objective. My aim in Amendment 84, as in Amendment 71A, is to protect rehabilitated offenders from other circumstances in which their criminal record might be disclosed in circumstances which do not require disclosure. The legislation involved in Amendment 84 involves not only this Bill and the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act but also significant amendments to the Police Act 1997 and the Data Protection Act 1998.
Clause 84, which accidentally has the same number as my Amendment 84, changes the numbering but not the operation of the Data Protection Act. It is fair to say that Chapter 2 of Part 5, which will improve Clause 84, improves the situation of rehabilitated persons. However, there is one matter in which further improvement should be made, which concerns Section 112 of the Police Act 1997. The Police Act contains provisions that might make possible delay in the commencement of Section 112 of that Act. This possibility continues under Clause 84 as it now stands. It would however be for the benefit of rehabilitation to bring Section 112 of the Police Act into action. This is made clear in a document published by the Information Commissioner’s Office on the same subject as that of Clause 84, which was circulated since the Bill has come to the House of Lords.
I should like to read a brief paragraph from the circulated document. It states:
“The commencement of section 112 of the Police Act 1997 would be welcome. The Commissioner would also continue to stress the importance of introducing an offence of Enforced Subject Access under section 56 of the Data Protection Act as a matter of urgency. The opportunity to introduce these important and long over due measures should not be missed”.
The form of Amendment 84 may need alteration. Certainly, it would require reconsideration because I had to deal with my amendments extremely quickly and they may not yet be correctly worded. But it is my belief that the desirability of the purpose of my amendments is plain. I hope that the Government will be able to consider including them in their amendments. I beg to move.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Goodhart for providing the context and thinking behind his amendments. First, I will focus on Amendment 84, which would require that Section 56 of the Data Protection Act 1998 be commenced at most six months after this Bill becomes law, rather than, as now, no earlier than the commencement of various sections of the Police Act 1997.
As my noble friend has indicated, Section 56 of the Data Protection Act makes illegal what is referred to as “enforced subject access”; that is, when someone, in connection with employment or the provision of goods and services, requires a person or a third party to provide them with information about that person’s convictions, which they will have obtained through a subject access request. This means that if the subject of the request has convictions, they are able to obtain all the information that is held by the police themselves, thus making them the subject of the request. This would be made most likely to the police under Section 7 of the Data Protection Act. This loophole allows employers to circumvent the safeguards in the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act and in the criminal records regime to find out details of somebody’s spent convictions.
I agree with my noble friend that enforced subject access is wrong because it allows employers potentially to coerce employees and hinders the rehabilitation of offenders. Section 75 of the Data Protection Act provides that Section 56 of that Act is commenced only once certain sections of the Police Act, including Section 112, are in force. Section 112 of the Police Act makes provision for “basic” criminal record checks which provide details of any unspent convictions. If the section in the Data Protection Act, if it was commenced, would make it illegal for an employer to make an enforced subject access request, Section 112 of the Police Act makes provision for a basic criminal record check. An employer has another legal and legitimate route to find out information about unspent convictions only. He would be provided with information of unspent convictions and not full access to information which may not be relevant.
While Section 112 is in force in Scotland and Northern Ireland, it has not been commenced in England and Wales. The issue is when we introduce basic checks. Noble Lords may have seen the Written Ministerial Statement published this morning in relation to the Government’s response to Mrs Sunita Mason’s review of the criminal records regime. Mrs Mason recommended the introduction of basic checks by the Criminal Records Bureau in England and Wales. As our response to her makes clear, we accept the principle that basic checks should be introduced in England and Wales, but we do not plan to do so through the Criminal Records Bureau at the present time. We are, however, minded to introduce basic certificates in step with the establishment of the Disclosure and Barring Service, but further work is needed on the implications of doing so.
Meanwhile, some individuals already approach Disclosure Scotland for basic certificates and we are discussing the provision of a full service for all those working in England and Wales through Disclosure Scotland while the long-term position is considered. For these reasons it would not be feasible to introduce basic checks through the Criminal Records Bureau to the timetable set out in Amendment 84 in the name of my noble friend. That said, the question of enforced subject access and the commencement of Section 56 is one to which we will return in the context of our discussions with Disclosure Scotland flowing from Sunita Mason’s review. I hope that what I have said provides some reassurance to my noble friend and encourages him not to press his Amendment 84.
As my noble friend has explained, Amendment 71A would amend Section 9 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act. Section 9 makes it an offence for a public official to disclose information on spent convictions other than in the course of their public duties. They may do so only to the rehabilitated person or someone whom they reasonably believe to be the rehabilitated person, or to a third party to whom that person expressly requests them to make that disclosure. The noble Lord’s amendments would remove the capacity to disclose the information to a third party. From his explanation today, I understand that the intention behind the amendment is further to safeguard against enforced subject access. However, there are likely to be situations where a person may, quite legitimately and consensually, ask that details of their spent convictions be passed to a third party; for example, a minor requesting disclosure to their parent or guardian or an elderly person requesting disclosure to their carer. We therefore believe that the better approach is simply to commence Section 56 of the Data Protection Act at the appropriate time.
On the basis of that information, I hope that my noble friend has the assurance he is looking for and that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
“Additional grounds for refusing an application to be registered
After subsection (3) of section 120AA of the Police Act 1997 (refusal, etc. of registration on grounds not related to disclosure) insert—“(4) Subsection (6) applies if an application is made under section 120 by an individual who—
(a) has previously been a registered person; and(b) has been removed from the register (otherwise than at that individual’s own request).(5) Subsection (6) also applies if an application is made under section 120 by a body corporate or unincorporate which—
(a) has previously been a registered person; and(b) has been removed from the register (otherwise than at its own request).(6) The Secretary of State may refuse the application.””
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, government Amendment 76 inserts a new clause into the Bill that will strengthen the current powers of the Criminal Records Bureau to refuse to register an individual or organisation as a registered body. A registered body is a body or organisation registered by the bureau as being responsible for the countersignature of applications for criminal record certificates. Such a body will typically be a large employer or voluntary organisation—for example, the England and Wales Cricket Board or the Scout Association.
None the less, beyond the minimum requirements for a body currently to be registered by the Criminal Records Bureau, as set out at Sections 120 and 120ZA of the Police Act 1997, the bureau has the power to refuse registration only if it has concerns about an organisation’s ability to properly protect sensitive information that would be disclosed on a criminal record certificate.
Some 4,000 bodies are registered with the Criminal Records Bureau and all must adhere to their conditions of registration, which provide for a framework to ensure that registered bodies operate in a fit and proper manner. These conditions include requirements that application fees are paid within 15 days of invoice; that the organisation can demonstrate that it makes every effort to check that the position being applied for by an individual is eligible for a criminal record check; and that the registered body has verified the identity of the applicant before submitting the application.
The most common reason for the Criminal Records Bureau to be forced to cancel a registered body’s CRB registration is the non-payment of fees. This is usually where the organisation has continually failed to make the necessary payments to the bureau for the submission of applications to it and has repeatedly failed to pay its arrears or made any substantive offer to do so.
Of course, the Criminal Records Bureau will always seek to work with registered bodies as far as possible to address any short-term difficulties where there is an apparent breach of the conditions of registration and before considering any suspension or cancellation action. However, there is a gap in the powers available to the bureau. In practice, this means that an organisation that has previously failed to meet the conditions of registration, such as the non-payment of fees, and has had its registration cancelled can simply re-register, provided that it meets the basic criteria required under Sections 120 and 120ZA of the Police Act. Quite simply, this amendment will close that gap by extending the current powers to allow the Criminal Records Bureau to refuse to register a body that has previously been registered and subsequently removed—for example, due to a breach of the conditions of registration.
For any noble Lords who may be concerned that such organisations will therefore no longer be able to carry out criminal record checks, I assure them that the new clause will not impact on an organisation’s ability to apply for criminal record checks—that is, the original organisation that might use a registered body as an agent by which to apply for a check against it. In such circumstances, the organisation will be able to continue to access the Criminal Records Bureau service through another organisation that is registered satisfactorily with the bureau, typically referred to as an umbrella body. I beg to move.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, government Amendments 77, 78, 79, 80 and 81 make two technical changes to the provisions in Clauses 81 and 82. First, Amendments 79 and 80 provide that a request by the subject of a criminal record certificate, or a person on their behalf, to the Secretary of State or the independent monitor to challenge the accuracy of the information on such a certificate should be made in writing. This is to bring these processes in line with other provisions in Part 5 of the Police Act 1997.
Secondly, Amendments 79 to 81 will ensure that the updating service, which is being introduced by Clause 82, will continue to operate in a given case where a new criminal record certificate is issued following a successful challenge to the accuracy of the information contained on the original certificate. The updating service can be triggered by an application for a criminal record certificate. These amendments will ensure that the service is not unintentionally terminated following the issue of a fresh certificate. I beg to move.
“Inclusion of cautions etc. in national police records
After subsection (4) of section 27 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (recordable offences) insert—“(4A) In subsection (4) “conviction” includes—
(a) a caution within the meaning of Part 5 of the Police Act 1997; and(b) a reprimand or warning given under section 65 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.””
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, Amendment 83 will provide parity with convictions for the recording of cautions, reprimands and warnings on the police national computer. The names database on the PNC contains the national police record of all convictions for recordable offences. It also contains details of cautions, warnings and reprimands. It is this database which is searched by the Criminal Records Bureau when it receives an application for a criminal record certificate. In the case of an application for an enhanced criminal record certificate, a separate search is also run against the police national database, which contains non-conviction information held by local forces.
Clearly, it is essential that the police national computer holds all relevant records. The current position is that cautions, reprimands and warnings are entered on to the PNC by the police using their common-law power to do so, whereas the recording of convictions is expressly provided for in Section 27 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The amendment will simply put the recording of cautions on the same statutory footing as that which applies to convictions. I hope that noble Lords will agree that this is a sensible tidying-up exercise, and I commend it to the Committee. I beg to move.
Prevent Strategy
Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts(12 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I hope noble Lords will find it helpful if I remind the House that the next debate is a time-limited debate and, with the exception of the noble Lord, Lord Noon and my noble friend the Minister, speeches are limited to four minutes. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Hereford has also requested to speak in the gap.
Lord Noon
My Lords, the Government’s revised Prevent strategy was presented to Parliament in June this year. It is an integral part of the broader fight against terrorism and I welcome the opportunity to have this short debate about the implications of this strategy, and of extremism and integration. The thinking behind Prevent was that there needed to be a proactive response to the threat of so-called home-grown terrorists. I do not want to speak about the merits or failure of the original strategy. Other noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Carlile, who provided the important independent oversight for the review of Prevent, are much more of an authority on this issue than me.
I am not a policy man, I am a businessman and I like to speak my mind in a straightforward way, which, in business as in life, is usually the best way. You may be aware that I have been a victim of deadly terrorist attack not once but twice. The extreme fear that I and my family experienced, the shocking uncertainty of being sandwiched between life and death, brought home forcefully the grief and devastation of the families who suddenly, unexpectedly lose loved ones. We have seen this horror here in the UK with the 7 July terrorist attacks in London. What is worse is that the 7/7 attack was carried out by young men born and brought up in the UK. The Prevent strategy is supposed to stop people from ever going down this path. It is about confronting people at an early point so that they do not become extremists.
Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists all have the right to practise their religion freely in Great Britain. The strong civil rights movement here ensures that we can express our religious and political beliefs freely. At the same time, there is a thousand years of tradition of the supremacy of the law—we must abide by the law even as we practise in private the faith of our choice. What has gone wrong is that a tiny minority refuse to accept that. Instead they wish to impose their beliefs on the majority. Noble Lords will agree with me that the majority of Muslims are law-abiding, peaceful and patriotic citizens, as was reported in the Sunday Times on 20 November. I see no conflict between practising Islam and abiding by the rules of the law of this country, and I speak as a Muslim.
I have expressed my views many times, in speech as well as in print. People who do not accept the British way of life should find another acceptable country where they can live happily, and leave us alone. Often they come here as economic migrants and then oppose our common values. In many cases, they are running away from harsh regimes that do not permit dissent. I am a staunch supporter of the British values of democracy, decency, fairness and integration. I say, live and let live. We should give a robust retort to those who oppose integration: we cannot have small, independent enclaves within our country that are a law unto themselves. I agree with the Prime Minister’s words in Munich earlier this year that we have not done enough in standing up to those who oppose our way of life.
I find it confusing that the Prevent strategy makes a distinction between two things. On one hand, the strategy says that having a strong sense of belonging and citizenship makes people more resilient to extremism. Then, on the other hand, it states:
“Policy and programmes to deal with extremism and with extremist organisations more widely are not part of Prevent and will be co-ordinated from the Department for Communities and Local Government”.
Could the Minister tell me what these wider policies and programmes are that are not part of Prevent? Surely these are things that promote cohesion, interfaith dialogue and citizenship. If the success of the programme depends on our sense of belonging—which is what I call integration—then how could this not be a part of Prevent? By separating integration and extremism, the Prevent strategy will create its own pitfalls. How do local councillors know what to do? Where is the guidance that explains how to know the difference between an extremist acting against our country and others who need support and direction to become more integrated? Where is the line drawn between dealing with extremists and promoting integration? Surely these are two sides of the same coin.
What about young people? How will the youth worker or the teacher know what to do? We need a strong initiative for the youth; after all, it is the youth who get lured into extremism at youth clubs and universities. The hunting fields for fresh recruits to terrorism are the stamping grounds of young people. That is where we need to be: to reorient them into a life of decency; to give them a sense of belonging; to make them proud to be British; and to make them see that using religion as an excuse for violence goes against its very tenets.
What about the police? I often speak to them on this issue. I ask them why individuals or groups who are violently opposed to our way of life and the laws of this country are allowed to be here. The police say that their hands are tied; they often have no case. It seems that the human rights of criminals outweigh those of the rest of us law-abiding citizens. Even when they manage to bring such a person to court, the Crown Prosecution Service tells the police that the criminal is the one who needs protection. It strikes me that in trying to make Prevent more focused, the Government have risked making it less effective. Even more seriously, I believe that this fudge makes things much worse. It risks further alienating those communities that feel the most stigmatised and targeted by Prevent, especially the Muslim community.
The danger of focusing only on a certain religious group was made clearer to us by the terrible events in Norway in July this year, when a right-wing extremist not only set off a bomb in the city, killing eight people, but then went on to shoot and kill 69 innocent children and young people who were taking part in a summer school. Such acts of extreme violence are not restricted to ideology, whether religious or political. Rather, these terrible acts are born of hatred, racism and ignorance. We ignore these risks at our peril.
In summary, I have a very simple bottom line, which is that preventing terrorism depends on strengthening integration. In my straightforward way of looking at things, there is definitely a problem because the strategy actually causes confusion about this issue. I welcome the idea that we need to confront people more when they express extreme ideas such as threatening to burn poppies, abusing our brave soldiers returning home from the front line in Basra or asking for Sharia law in this country. Let us not forget honour killing, although I do not know what honour there is in killing. Surely this is not acceptable. We need to go further. We need to ensure that we not only confront these people but that we actually deal with them in order to protect the citizens of this country. We need to be clear that this is about anyone who opposes our way of life, anyone who does not clearly stand up for democracy and freedom of choice. Integration is our greatest strength and we must not allow our resolve to protect it to be weakened by a muddled approach to extremism.
I am sure that noble Lords will have many further issues that they wish to bring to this debate, and I look forward to hearing them.
Protection of Freedoms Bill
Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts(12 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling this amendment, and for the explanation from the noble Lord, Lord Dear. I think that it demonstrates that there is potential confusion in this part of the Bill. The noble Baroness asked about cold cases. I understand the difficulty described by the noble Lord, Lord Dear, in saying whether or not a case has been concluded. However, if in subsection (2) we are saying that,
“material may be retained until the conclusion”,
we need to be a little more specific. The noble Lord talked about the practicalities but also the philosophical nature of these issues. Philosophy is a great thing but when it comes to legislation perhaps it needs to be a little more specific.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee for moving her amendment. It relates to the briefing from the Information Commissioner that was circulated prior to the Committee stage. He expressed some concern that the reference in Clause 2 to the conclusion of the investigation was too open-ended.
I am sure that we would all wish the police to be able to conclude every investigation swiftly with either a conviction or conclusion that no crime has been committed. But, we would all acknowledge that in reality that is not the case, as the noble Lord, Lord Dear, has explained. There will often be cases when it is impossible to identify a suspect immediately and when evidence must be retained for a significant period in the hope of identifying a suspect in the future. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, referred to cold cases. The case that comes to my mind is the one that has recently been reopened on the murder of Stephen Lawrence.
Evidence, including biometric material, must be retained in these circumstances to enable comparison with the suspect and, for example, to ensure that the suspect’s legal team can examine and probe all the previous police lines of inquiry. If all evidence is not retained in such circumstances, the suspect identified later will be able to argue to the court that the destruction of such material would render it impossible for him to receive a fair trial. In such circumstances, even if Amendment 5 were to be made to the Bill, a chief officer would be unable to certify an investigation as complete, which is I think what the noble Lord, Lord Dear, was referring to. In addition, where it is possible for the police to conclude an investigation the introduction of such a certification requirement for all investigations would impose a new bureaucratic process on the police that would be both unnecessary and, when aggregated across the number of investigations conducted, costly. The illustration given by the noble Lord, Lord Dear, makes that quite clear.
For the reasons I have given, we are unable to accept Amendment 5, and I therefore ask my noble friend to consider withdrawing it.
Baroness Berridge
My Lords, I presume that the amendment relates to the previous paragraph in relation,
“to section 63D material taken … in connection with the investigation of an offence in which it is suspected that the person to whom the material relates has been involved”.
On my reading, there is an enormous safeguard in that once the police become convinced that the person has not been involved, the negative applies. The person’s DNA material is taken but if it is then established that that person was not connected to the offence at all, surely the ability to retain the material in those circumstances fails. Therefore you do not have an enormous amount of material being retained until the conclusion of the proceedings. Will the Minister clarify whether I am correct in my understanding that the police can retain that material until the conclusion of the proceedings but only if they remain convinced that that person is still suspected of being involved in the commission of the offence?
Lord Newton of Braintree
My Lords, perhaps I might intervene briefly. The noble Lord, Lord Dear, made some effective practical points against the amendment. However, I am afraid that I am one of those simple souls who find it easier to look at these matters in relation to an example rather than in a general academic sense. There is a clear-cut case in which some of these issues might have arisen: namely, that of the gentleman in Bristol who was arrested—I forget whether he was charged—for the murder of Miss Yeates. It is now universally agreed that this was a mistake. Somebody else has been convicted and sentenced.
I do not expect my noble friend to be able to answer this because it is a bit of a bouncer, and it applies to all the amendments that we have so far discussed. How would the Government's proposals for retention apply to that case, and what difference would the amendments that have so far been discussed make to the case? I do not know the answer and would have to speculate. I suggest that it might be sensible if the Minister wrote to me about this rather than attempting an answer off the cuff.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Berridge for her intervention. I am pleased to confirm that her analysis of the subsection preceding the one we are discussing is correct. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Newton. I will take his advice, consider his points and be sure to write to him. I have been given some comfort on the way in which we may be able to respond to his query by the intervention of my noble friend concerning the subsection preceding the one my noble friend Lady Hamwee seeks to amend.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, one always knows about one-third of the way into a sentence that a “but” is coming. I anticipated it when the noble Lord, Lord Dear, started to make his comments. I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, about the application of these provisions. That is a safeguard, but it seems to me that it is more of an answer to the noble Lord, Lord Dear, than it is to me.
Of course I understand the practical problems. I said a few minutes ago that all the amendments are probing. The problem often is that when one tables an amendment to probe, it is taken as if one means every word. I am looking for an answer to my underlying question and I am not sure that I have yet heard it. What worries me is that even on the fairly narrow track that the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, identified, there is the possibility of driving a coach and horses through what we all think we are agreeing this afternoon. I do not seek to apply more bureaucracy, but I do seek clarity. I am not yet clear, but there are more stages and I will not make more of a nuisance of myself at this stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, as we have already discussed, among other things Clause 3 sets out the rules governing the retention of the DNA profile of a person arrested for a serious offence but not charged with that offence. In such cases, the police can apply to the biometrics commissioner to retain the DNA in certain circumstances, including where the alleged victim of the offence is a vulnerable adult. The amendment seeks to replace the definition of “vulnerable adult” as used in this context.
Currently, Clause 3 defines a vulnerable adult by reference to Section 60(1) of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. However, as we will come on to when we reach Part 5 of the Bill, Clauses 65 and 66 seek to amend the definition of a vulnerable adult in the 2006 Act to mean any person over the age of 18 in receipt of a regulated activity, for example health or personal care. The changes made by these clauses to the definitions of vulnerable adult and regulated activity put the emphasis on the activity and the person carrying out that activity. It no longer attempts to define vulnerability or label a person as a “vulnerable adult”. As a result, the definition is not particularly helpful in the context of Clause 3.
Amendment 11 therefore draws on the definition in Section 5(6) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, which defines a vulnerable adult as,
“a person aged 16 or over whose ability to protect himself from violence, abuse or neglect is significantly impaired through physical or mental disability or illness, through old age or otherwise”.
We believe that this definition is far more apposite for the purposes of Clause 3. The reason why the amendment inserts the definition in full in new Section 63G(10) of PACE rather than merely referring to the 2004 Act is that our definition refers to persons aged 18 or over, as the definitions in new Section 63G(2), as inserted by Clause 3, already include all those aged under 18.
I hope your Lordships will agree that this definition is sensible, and I commend it to the Committee.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, let me try to explain a little further. We are trying to ensure that, when we refer to “vulnerable adult” in the context of those who are the victims of crime, we are clear about the people who have been affected by the crime against them. Later on in the Bill, in a different context, the term “vulnerable adult” is deployed differently, because it relates to regulated activity and what access a person might have in terms of the activity being carried out at that time. The amendment tries to make sure that, in this context, we define “vulnerable adult” as the person who is the victim, rather than trying to define it in terms of what activity might be used against them, which occurs later in the Bill. I might have to write further to the noble Baroness.
Perhaps I may add that those seeking refuge from an abusive relationship would be covered by the third limb of new Section 63G(2); that is, by being associated with the suspect. However, given the nature of the questions that the noble Baroness has asked and the sensitivity of the topic—I would not want to give anybody the wrong impression about it—it would probably be best for me to come back to her in writing.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
My Lords, before we go to a vote, I respectfully suggest that the noble Baroness considers withdrawing the amendment and bringing it back on Report. I do not wish to vote against it but I should like further confirmation that the people who should be covered by this definition of “vulnerable adult” are properly considered and covered by it.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I think, on reflection, that that would be the right course. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am not sure whether I go down the route of paying the piper but the question of accountability, which this amendment raises, is immensely important. Parliament has decided over the years to agree the appointment of a number of commissioners to provide oversight. For that oversight to work in the best way, the line of accountability is one that one has to look at. I am not sure whether having a single commissioner is practicable, but the issue highlighted by this amendment is a very important one and I am glad that the noble Earl has brought it to the Committee.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, as the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, has explained, this proposed new clause seeks to combine a number of distinct statutory commissioners into a single privacy commissioner. As the noble Earl predicted, I am afraid that the Government are not persuaded that any benefits which may arise from such a merger would offset the disadvantages. Each of the five commissioners listed in subsection (3) of the proposed new clause requires a high degree of knowledge of relevant legislation and procedures to operate in specialist and technical areas.
Before I explain why the Government propose to set up the commissioners in this way, I will address the issue of accountability, as it is one that my noble friend Lady Hamwee raised as well. The noble Earl suggested that his privacy commissioner should be directly accountable to Parliament. The existing commissioners are independent officeholders and there is no question that they discharge their functions without fear or favour. If there were a question of a conflict of interest—I do not accept that there is—it would apply equally to a situation where the privacy commissioner would be directly accountable to Parliament. Parliament is subject to the Data Protection Act and the Freedom of Information Act, and thus to the jurisdiction of the Information Commissioner, so a conflict of interest could equally arise if he reported directly to Parliament. The existing accountability arrangements work well and I see no reason to change them.
Going back to the five commissioners, there is no doubt that in some cases the work of the various commissioners can be related but, in each case, there remain specific and crucial differences where their work remains distinct. To roll up all of the functions of the various commissioners would be to risk watering down the skills and expertise that are brought to bear in each of the areas. Moreover, given the wide diversion of roles and responsibilities of the five commissioners listed in the proposed new clause, I am not convinced that it would be possible for a single individual to provide adequate oversight in any given area—a point which I think that my noble friend Lady Hamwee made.
If a privacy commissioner were to be appointed, I envisage that he or she would quickly need several deputy commissioners, or a large body of support staff, to oversee the specific areas currently overseen by separate individuals. This would create an unwieldy body which, in all probability, would have less influence and impact, compared with the existing commissioners operating in niche areas. We can take the Interception of Communications Commissioner as an example of the specialist knowledge required in this area. That commissioner provides oversight of the intelligence agencies and law enforcement authorities by keeping under review their use of interception powers and their powers to acquire communications data. The role is very specific and the commissioner’s powers to require disclosure by the intelligence agencies, and others, of highly classified information means that it is a highly sensitive post that could not be amalgamated with a range of other, unrelated commissioner functions.
That said, we fully accept that there is a need for these various officeholders to work closely together, and I assure your Lordships that this is already happening. The Public Bill Committee that considered this Bill in the other place heard testimony from the Information Commissioner and the interim CCTV regulator. Both commissioners were clear that where their functions touched on similar areas, they remain adept at establishing and maintaining effective working relationships, so that they can complement rather than duplicate the work of the other. I see no reason to doubt why this cannot continue to be the model in the future.
While there is certainly some common ground between the work of the new Surveillance Camera Commissioner and the Information Commissioner, there are also important differences. The Information Commissioner highlighted, in his evidence to the Public Bill Committee, that his consideration of CCTV is limited to the sphere of data protection and, as such, that his office is not concerned with the effective use of cameras. Indeed, the commissioner saw this separation of functions as advantageous, stating,
“if you are specifically identified as Mr Privacy and expected to come down on the privacy side all the time, it is difficult to make judgments about the release of official information”.—[Official Report, Commons, Protection of Freedoms Bill Committee, 24/3/11; col. 97.]
Furthermore, the noble Earl might remember—I know that he has a great deal of experience in this area—that public confidence in CCTV is driven by both the proportionality and the effectiveness of deployment. The public want, rightly, to see that when surveillance cameras are deployed they help to bring criminals to justice.
In that same evidence session, the deputy Information Commissioner stated that,
“if the cameras do not work, we are not concerned, because cameras that do not work cannot intrude on someone’s privacy and that is what our driver is”.—[Official Report, Commons, Protection of Freedoms Bill Committee, 24/3/11; col. 99.]
I would therefore be concerned about having all these functions under the umbrella of a privacy commissioner. It is important to note that the Information Commissioner plays a key role not only in making sure that personal data are properly protected but that information is freely available to the public in accordance with freedom of information legislation. A single privacy commissioner would undoubtedly tilt the overall balance of the role to the detriment of the Government’s objectives to promote openness and transparency.
In short, it is our view that the five commissioners that are the subject of the amendment all undertake sufficiently distinct roles to justify their separate identities. Where their roles interconnect, I am confident that they will, as now, work together effectively to ensure that they complement rather than duplicate each other’s work. We will of course keep the landscape of commissioners under review but, for the reasons that I have set out, I am not persuaded of the case for a single privacy commissioner. I hope that the noble Earl accepts these arguments and will be prepared to withdraw his amendment, but I am grateful to him for putting it forward in order for us to discuss these matters.
The Earl of Erroll
I thank the Minister for that reply. In fact, what she described was rather what I ended up thinking. I have to admit that the amendment is defective in that it is not quite what I thought; it came quickly from someone else in order to solve the problem of putting something on paper. A single commissioner certainly could not do that job. I had envisaged someone at the top but then four or five departments underneath, some with much higher security ratings than others. It would just be a matter of co-ordination. From that point of view, I am glad to hear from the Minister that this is already happening with the collaboration between the commissioners on the ground. I hope that that will continue with the other commissioners if the structure stays separate. Bringing them together under a single overarching review may still possibly have advantages, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I have just realised that I am about to ask my noble friend a question—my other noble friend.
The amendment would provide that as well as publishing the governance rules of the board, the Secretary of State would publish rules governing its composition. My question is an entirely simple one and there is nothing to be read between the lines. What will be the composition of the board and how will it be brought into the public domain? My noble friend Lady Stowell may say that governance covers composition, but clearly the membership of the board is important. It needs to be appropriate to its functions and the interests reflected in the composition are clearly a matter of public importance and concern. I beg to move.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for this amendment and I hope that my response will provide the reassurance that she is looking for. This is another issue that was covered in the letter from the Information Commissioner sent to several noble Lords before our Committee stage.
The simplest thing for me to do in the first instance is refer to paragraph 130 on page 31 of the Explanatory Notes, which states:
“The principal members of the Board are the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Association of Police Authorities (in future, following the enactment of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill, a representative of Police and Crime Commissioners) and the Home Office, but there is also an independent element to the Board from non-police bodies, such as the Information Commissioner and the National DNA Database Ethics Group”.
I am happy to put on the record that the governance rules set out in new Section 63AB(6) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as inserted by Clause 24, will include the full membership of the board and that members will continue to include an independent element in the form of representation from the Information Commissioner’s Office and the national DNA database ethics group. If any of your Lordships have any suggestions for others that might join the board to strengthen the independent element, I will be happy to receive them. Having heard my remarks, I hope that my noble friend Lady Hamwee will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am grateful for that. It did not occur to me to look at the Explanatory Notes. My noble friend is quite right; I should have done so. Her emphasis on the independent element from non-police bodies is important. As she read out that list it sounded police-heavy. The police have to operate the system so I am not suggesting that they should not be properly represented but as the debates today and throughout the passage of this Bill amply illustrate—if we need that illustration—it is not only the police who have an interest in these provisions and in the operation of handling DNA material, which is the subject of these various clauses. I am not sure that I would feel that it is adequate that there is simply “an independent element” from the bodies referred to. I would like to see “an independent element”—period. There are plenty of organisations which call on the services of, if not the great and the good—they are not necessarily the best—those who are interested and willing to give the public service that is required for this sort of activity, using the wisdom and judgment obtained through public life, or simply through a period of years.
What can I refer to? We have just been abolishing them but standards committees in local government have used an independent element. I am sure that there are plenty of examples but they always escape you on these occasions. Perhaps I can take what my noble friend has said as something of an invitation to explore this a little after the Committee stage. To have elements from what might be regarded as the usual suspects—I do not say that pejoratively—may not serve the purpose as well as we could.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
I just want to re-emphasise that I would be grateful to any of your Lordships who have any suggestions to add on the independent element of the board after today’s debate.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I would also say that it is not uncommon for there to be advertisements for applications using the Nolan principles for an independent element to boards such as this. Perhaps after this evening I shall try to come up with some other examples. I am grateful for that and I put on the record that I am grateful to the information commissioner for the thoughtful way in which he and his office have briefed your Lordships. I warn the government Front Bench that I have not read through to the end of his briefing so there will no doubt be more to come in future parts of the Bill. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill
Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts(12 years, 6 months ago)
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Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I hope I can give some reassurance to my noble friend on the issues that she has raised in her amendments today.
My noble friend’s first amendment relates to Clause 5 and the power to extend a TPIM notice for a further year. As Clause 5 makes clear, a TPIM notice can be extended only if conditions A, C and D are met at the time and the TPIM notice would otherwise expire. In particular, the notice and the measures specified in it must be considered necessary at that point. The Secretary of State cannot reasonably make a decision to extend until shortly before the notice would expire. If she attempted to do so, I am sure that the courts would not uphold her decision. My noble friend might also like to know that decisions on whether to renew control orders have been taken only relatively close to what would otherwise be the expiry date. However, I can also assure my noble friend that any subsequent change in relation to ongoing necessity will be reflected as soon as is practical, by either the relaxation of particular measures or the revocation of the notice as a whole. This is because necessity must continue to be made clear at all stages while the notice remains in place.
My noble friend has also tabled several amendments to Clause 6 and Schedule 1 in respect of the word “obviously”. These are Amendments 28, 30, 31 and 33 to 35. She seeks to clarify the word “obviously” and proposes deleting it from the phrase “obviously flawed” where it occurs. I can confirm that, in essence, this language is intended to mean much the same as prima facie in the context of what will normally be an ex parte application. In other words, her assumption on this matter is correct.
At the permission stage, the court will normally consider the application in the absence of the individual who is to have measures imposed on him. This is to ensure that the individual is not given advance warning that he is to be made the subject of a TPIM notice. The judge therefore undertakes an initial check at this early stage to ensure that there is nothing in the material presented to him to indicate that the Secretary of State is clearly wrong to think that the statutory test is satisfied, either in relation to having reasonable grounds to believe in terrorism-related activity or the need to impose a notice, or in relation to one or more of the proposed measures. It is a preliminary hearing that in essence ensures that the Secretary of State is not using her powers in an obviously inappropriate way, and therefore is very different to the further stages when the courts would review the actual decision.
The language of “obviously flawed” is well understood and applied by the courts as it is the language that is used in the control orders legislation—it is already there. The Government therefore consider that it is appropriate to continue to use this language. The full court review will, of course, be undertaken after the measures have been imposed. The procedures for that are set out in Clauses 8 and 9.
Finally, my noble friend’s other amendment in this group relates to what would happen in a circumstance where the court determined that only the Secretary of State’s conclusion that condition D is satisfied is obviously flawed—therefore, A and C had been met but D was flawed. This is likely to be where the court identifies that one or more of the individual measures specified in the proposed TPIM notice clearly does not meet the test that it is necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity. In these circumstances the court may give permission to impose a TPIM notice, but may in doing so give directions to the Secretary of State in relation to the measures to be imposed.
The amendment would amplify Clause 6(9) by adding the words,
“including the variation or cancellation of specified measures”.
As my noble friend has explained, she is seeking an assurance from me that this is already the case. She is seeking further information than that which was provided during the passage of the Bill in another place. I can confirm that, as drafted, Clause 6(9) would allow the court to give directions in relation to the variation of the proposed measures set out in the draft TPIM notice. Equally, it would allow the court to direct that a particular measure should not be included in the notice. It should be noted that while the court may give directions in this regard, it will remain the duty of the Secretary of State actually to draft the terms of the measure as this role falls not to the court but to the Secretary of State, with her recognised expertise and responsibility in matters of national security and the measures that are required in order to protect the public. But when doing so following the directions of the court, she will clearly be very constrained in how she conducts that drafting exercise.
I hope that I have provided sufficient assurance to my noble friend and that she will withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, before the noble Baroness agonises over whether she puts this to the vote, the final point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell of Beeston, about the Secretary of State’s responsibilities is well taken. I congratulate her on what is probably her first appearance at the Dispatch Box, certainly in this Committee stage.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts(12 years, 10 months ago)
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The Lord Bishop of Chester
My Lords, I live in the middle of one of our cities so I see the typical culture late on a Friday or Saturday night, or indeed on other nights, and the malign influence on it of the excessive consumption of alcohol. In recent years I have also sat on the streets of Paris or Rome at 10 pm and seen virtually no evidence of the abuse of alcohol. Those who think that this measure is a step too far need to reflect upon the experience of many of our city centres.
Sometimes it is necessary for the law to take a clear stance to change culture. Drinking and driving is a prime example of that, where the law has changed the culture of how people approach the consumption of alcohol and driving to a much more responsible one. This is quite apart from the health benefits, which will be important to the noble Baroness who has moved the amendment. There is a clear case for sending a strong signal, with this or something like it, that I hope will lead to a change of culture on our streets.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I support the principal objectives of this measure. I will not repeat everything that I said in Committee, but when I first heard about the new proposal—I was also at the briefing on Monday that has been referred to—I found that the most powerful and compelling thing about it was its simplicity. It is clear in its aim and simple in its practice, and it encourages responsibility. I know that the Minister feels strongly about alcohol-related crime and takes the issue seriously, so I will want to listen carefully to her response today. The only thing that I want to highlight is that, as with any new measure put in place to tackle the issue of alcohol-related crime, the aspects of simplicity and responsibility in this proposal should be taken account of.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts(12 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Beecham
I confess to being in two minds, having heard my noble friend’s argument for the case, supported by the noble Baroness, but also the objections to the proposed course from the noble Lords, Lord Howard, Lord Dear and Lord Stevens. I can see the force of the objection to the prospect of a limited number of pilots stretching over a number of years, but it is not so much a question of democratic principle being at risk from such an exercise. The concern is around precisely the issue of checks and balances. If it goes through and we have an elected police commissioner, that is relatively straightforward; it is what happens in that context over time that will tell whether the checks and balances that some of us feel are inadequate are sufficient to meet the case. Actually, a limited number of pilot examples might not demonstrate that. The noble Lord has a point in that respect.
To develop a theme that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, advanced, I wonder whether the practice of what is a major constitutional change in the way in which the police service in this country is run could be reviewed after a period of three years. I do not mean on the basis of a number of pilots, but we could take a considered view after three years, say, and look at whether the expectations are being fulfilled. I accept that the Government are genuine in their belief that they have got it right or are getting it right on checks and balances. Without a formal sunset clause, perhaps we could have an indication that that situation would be reviewed and adjustments made, if necessary, around the areas of concern that many noble Lords have voiced about the practice of this new structure, with its implications for accountability and effectiveness, both at local level and in connection with the other concerns about national strategies and the like.
It is less of a formal legislative process that I am suggesting might be considered and more one in which it would be possible to revisit these concerns, taking a broad look across however many authorities will be involved in any new structure and with a view to fine tuning, as it may be, or making perhaps more substantial changes in the light of what will by then be a general experience, which might tell us whether the hopes of Ministers in proposing these changes are being fulfilled. Would the Minister care to consider whether such a process might be acceptable to the Government without necessarily changing the terms of the Bill?
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I do not support this amendment. I said at Second Reading that some noble Lords might want to propose piloting elected police and crime commissioners because it is a radical change from the current system, but I do not believe that that is what is needed. After we have finished properly scrutinising this Bill, we need to get on with it and to do it. We need to implement this change. People want stronger local political leadership in their fight against crime, and they want it now.
I referred at Second Reading to some research that my noble friend Lord Ashcroft, the founder of Crimestoppers, commissioned, which showed unanimity between police officers and the public in their views on crime. One conclusion that that research showed was that they shared a common view on the lack of local accountability.
Recent public attention has been focused more on the justice system rather than on the policing system. In raising the justice system, I am thinking particularly of the Dowler family last weekend. The reason why I raise this is because most of us have never suffered the kind of violent crime of which that family were victims, and we have never had to testify against defendants accused of crime in a court of law, but their experience resonated with people because it illustrated a wider sense of unfairness felt by the law-abiding. It made people ask who is on their side. Tonight we are not talking about the justice system—we are talking about policing—but through this Bill and through implementing elected police and crime commissioners, we have the opportunity to provide an answer. So I do not want us to wait years to address this weakness; I do not want us to wait years to answer people’s questions. I want us to get on with it. For that reason, I do not support piloting and I do not support this amendment.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts(12 years, 11 months ago)
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Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
My Lords, in welcoming this initiative, both as tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and as supported and encouraged by the Mayor of London, I look forward, if this is successful, to the Boris bins where people will go for their regular breathalyser. The initiative could be one that runs. I particularly support this initiative because, as my noble friend Lord Brooke has mentioned, of its recognition of the role that alcohol plays in crime and, especially, in domestic violence.
As an Alcohol Concern report has shown, there is already clear evidence of the link between alcohol and domestic abuse and, indeed, with child protection issues. Alcohol Concern has documented how often the criminal behaviour is repeated if the alcohol abuse is not tackled. It has many examples of its clients saying, “He only hits me when he's been drinking”—and I am afraid it is mostly a he. The response of advisers such as the alcohol support workers is, “If you knew you were going to hit the person you most loved once you have drunk, do you think you'd have that first drink?”. That is the problem—the fact that so many men continue to take that first drink shows how valuable an intervention aimed at offenders could be. The sobriety scheme could play an important role in this, although it is not enough on its own.
As my noble friend has just mentioned, alcohol referral schemes need to work alongside the sobriety scheme because people who have failed to tackle their misuse of alcohol are likely to need some assistance to work in parallel with this breath-testing. This may involve just a fairly brief intervention by experienced staff but I hope that the scheme would be allied to the provision of such help. Such help will depend on the provision of resources both by the Greater London Authority, if it happens there, and by the Government. It is deeply discouraging that the Department of Health has just cut by 100 per cent the funding of Alcohol Concern, the national agency on alcohol misuse which not only does the bulk of preventive work in this area but helps to set up and support local voluntary agencies that provide front-line services such as the Camden alcohol service agency, in which I declare an interest as a trustee.
Without Alcohol Concern and other national agencies working to ensure that help is available across London and elsewhere for such people who would enter this scheme, we risk this excellent initiative being undermined by dealing only with short-term sobriety rather than longer-term drinking problems. Nevertheless, I warmly welcome this initiative and congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, on introducing it. I look forward to seeing such a pilot, albeit one that I hope is supported with treatment for those who have failed to manage their alcohol abuse.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I, too, support this initiative introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff—so much so that I have put my name to Amendments 242 and 243. I will not detain the House for long in explaining why but, briefly, I, like everyone else, also have concerns about antisocial behaviour and crimes. They are the sorts of crimes that are often fuelled by alcohol. My interest is in how the people and communities affected by those crimes are impacted in terms of their own morale and their ambitions for themselves and their families. So when I first heard about this initiative proposed by the Mayor of London’s office, it struck me as something which made sense and was worth a go. For that reason, I thought that this proposal was seriously worth considering and I wanted to support it today, not just because of what it is trying to achieve in reducing the kinds of crime that affect people’s lives in a penetrating and long-term way but because the simplicity of the way it operates. As has been described in detail by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, if alcohol is found to have been the primary reason behind a crime, the offender commits to staying sober, is required to take a test twice a day for which he has to pay, and if he fails that test or does not turn up for it, then straightforward consequences occur.
The initiative has a clear aim and is simple in practice. It is inexpensive once the initial set-up costs are covered—it appears, from the information I have received, to be cost-neutral. The evidence shows that it can work; we have seen it work in the places in America where it has been in operation. For those reasons, I support and commend the amendment.
Lord Soley
My Lords, I support the amendment too, but I do not wish to repeat what has already been said in considerable detail about the effects of alcohol on the National Health Service, social services, prisons, police and the general population. I was chairman of the alcohol education centre many years ago at the Maudsley Hospital in south-east London. The problem of alcohol has not changed in its results since the 1970s; however, because of its increased availability in terms of price and outlets, it is now a much greater problem, and we see it on our streets. What I like about Amendment 242 in particular, as well as the other amendments, is that such a scheme can be piloted and evaluated. There have been many attempts to deal with the street problem of alcohol and of other aspects such as drugs, and the experiments do not always work. Evaluation and piloting are, in my judgment, a good idea.
I know that the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, is right about the drugs problem. We should not ignore that, but alcohol is different in one very important respect. It is a very powerful drug—as powerful as many others—but it is socially accepted and expected. That means that people use it without drugs; some use it with drugs but a large number of people use it without drugs and to excess.
My noble friends Lord Brooke and Lady Hayter made the point that it is a question of resources. That is the sort of thing we should build up over a period of time and why I have directed my remarks primarily to Amendment 242. When we see young people on television who are drunk in the street, you know that everyone sitting in front of their television sets is saying, “What do their parents think? What do those kids look like?”. At times like that I make myself think back to how I behaved in my adolescence. I would not like to go into this in too much detail, but—and this is relevant to what the noble Viscount said—I am afraid it is recognised that it is not just a mark of masculinity for men but for women too it is a mark of femininity, in a rather unusual way. That troubles me considerably, because although we all sit in front of our televisions and ask what their parents will say, the reality is that in many cases the parents will not say anything.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts(13 years ago)
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Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, in Committee I plan to participate in debates about a range of issues, including Parliament Square, but today I will concentrate on Part 1 of the Bill and the main issue of elected police and crime commissioners.
I support the idea of elected PCCs because I believe in the power of individual leadership. Yes, we will need strong candidates who are good communicators to come forward with manifestos that are as realistic as they are ambitious, and we will need all the right safeguards to protect the vital principle of police operational independence. If we get the detail of the legislation right, though, I believe that elected PCCs will create an opportunity to renew our fight against crime in a way that unites the police and our citizens.
I am not a policing expert but I am interested in the Bill and the proposal for elected PCCs for two reasons. The first is an interest in the impact of crime, particularly antisocial behaviour and drug-related and drink-related crime, on people’s morale and the ambitions that they might have for themselves and their families. The second is a general interest in people’s lack of confidence in, and their frustration with, our political system.
In preparing for the Bill and deciding whether or not to participate in it, I did a lot of reading and research. That included all the research that was relevant to the proposals in the Bill about PCCs. For me, other evidence not directly about PCCs was more interesting and useful in forming my views. First, in the context of some work that I have been doing for the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, I have been reading a report published in 2006 following an extensive study about declining participation and disillusion in the political system by the Power commission, which was chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. I do not agree with all its recommendations but the analysis that it offers about why people feel disengaged is very interesting. The report’s central point—what it says underlines a wide range of frustrations that people have—is important in the context of our debate today, and it is this: basically, people feel that they do not have enough influence over the decisions that affect them.
Elected PCCs will offer a real say on how crime will be fought in local areas. I believe that PCCs, standing on a manifesto that people can judge, working with the police chief on a strategic plan to deliver what the people have voted for and setting the right budget so that they have the money to do it, are a powerful response to what people feel they need now in our political system.
The second piece of research that I looked at was more recent. It was research into crime and punishment, commissioned by my noble friend Lord Ashcroft. As your Lordships will know, he is the founder of Crimestoppers and the chairman of its trustees. I have no idea what he thinks about elected PCCs; I do not at all want to suggest that he shares my view. However, his research, although about public and police opinion on the proposed reforms to the justice system, was striking for the unanimity of the police and the general public in their views on crime and the remoteness of government. In other words, they shared a view on the lack of local accountability. A key point from the findings of this research was:
“The public felt that what they saw as the failure of successive governments to act on their concerns about crime and punishment were due to politicians being unaffected by crime in their own lives; the constraints of human rights law and the fear of being accused of political incorrectness; the criminal justice system being staffed by unrepresentatively liberal individuals; and lack of money. Police officers felt mistakes were made because governments paid more attention to theorists than to victims and practitioners”.
As has been clear in the debate so far, some senior police officers and former police chiefs are concerned about elected PCCs, particularly the risks of politicisation arising from ill-defined roles and responsibilities. I understand the need for clarity. I have worked in an environment where the distinction between strategic and operational issues is essential. I understand what can go wrong when that is not the case. Although I have never worked in policing, I have some knowledge of that. The evidence suggests that, once clarity is achieved via the memorandum of understanding or the protocol that has been raised previously, agreement on the strategy in pursuit of a shared goal will not be hard to reach. The public and police will unite in their demand that elected police and crime commissioners demonstrate that they are serious about listening to the public and working with the police to fight crime.
Elected PCCs are radically different from what we have now. Some noble Lords have raised questions about piloting. I absolutely see that much effort will be needed to communicate to the public the effect of PCCs and this change to raise awareness of and interest in elections. However, this is achievable. Indeed, a nationwide campaign will build real momentum. The more I think about it, the more enthusiastic I am. Once support grows for elected PCCs so, too, will public concern about some of the Lord Chancellor’s justice reforms, particularly those that might reduce prisoner numbers. Hearing the public’s views on that will be no bad thing. I support elected PCCs because they will offer stronger local leadership in the fight against crime. I look forward to the detailed scrutiny and debates in Committee and on Report, which are of course necessary. I will participate, in particular, in the part relating to Parliament Square; there is need for some amendments to that part of the Bill. However, I have no hesitation in supporting the principle of the Bill and the changes it proposes at this stage.