National Security (State Threats) Bill

Baroness Tyler of Enfield Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, who has such deep expertise in this area. I support this Bill which, as others have said, is long overdue, and draw attention to my membership of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy—a point to which I will return.

It hardly needs repeating that we live in a deeply dangerous and volatile world and face an array of rapidly evolving threats to our national security. Geopolitics is rapidly changing and we must be ready to respond and place the national security of the country at the top of our agenda. As we have already heard, this Bill builds on the National Security Act 2023 and is intended to strengthen the UK’s ability to deter, detect and disrupt threats from foreign states and their proxies, including by introducing a new power to designate bodies involved in foreign power threat activity.

We have also heard that the Bill follows the review by the independent reviewer Jonathan Hall KC into whether existing terrorism powers could be used to address these state threats. Well over a year ago, he found that the terrorism proscription charges would not be appropriate, so instead we have this legislation which will now designate bodies, including proxies, and be applied to bodies such as the IRGC or the Wagner Group.

The geopolitical context is stark. We face very different threats from Russia, China and Iran and must be able to respond to them all individually. It is not a case of one size fits all. Tactics being employed include attempted and actual assassinations, cyber attacks on major British companies and institutions—Marks & Spencer being a case in point—espionage, disinformation campaigns and foreign interference in the UK’s political system. Along with other noble Lords on all Benches, I am sure, I was simply appalled when it was confirmed that Russian proxies set the Prime Minister’s house and car on fire. Our very democracy and the values we hold dear are under threat as never before.

Shocking as that was, it was not an isolated event. We have already heard from others who have quoted the remarks of Ken McCallum, the director general of MI5 who, last year, pointed out that state threats had risen by over one-third and are now equal to or even greater than the threat of terrorism. Back in May 2024, the director general of GCHQ said that the service devoted

“more resource to China than any other single mission”

and that:

“China poses a genuine and increasing cyber risk to the UK”.


Clearly, that deployment of resources is necessary, but it is chilling none the less when you consider that this is a country we also try to court as an economic partner. This twin-track approach, in my view, is fraught with danger and I ask the Minister to set out more clearly the Government’s position in relation to China.

While I share the concerns that have been raised across the House about rushing a Bill through so quickly without adequate scrutiny, I well understand that we need to take action quickly, particularly on being able to designate the IRGC, which has long been the architect of brutal domestic repression, as well as a threat to UK security and the safety of Iranian and Jewish communities across Britain. That is the reason why this legislation should, frankly, have been introduced earlier in the Parliament, so we will need to ensure that there is appropriate post-legislative scrutiny and a statutory review after one year, as proposed by my noble friend Lady Doocey.

This legislation is very relevant and builds on the work carried out by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. As a committee, we have raised concerns about the Russian state using proxy actors to commit sabotage in the UK—that was in our inquiry on the national security strategy—and on internet cables and landing stations, which were part of our subsea cable inquiry. It is also very relevant to the current inquiry that we are conducting on options for punitive deterrence against Russia and trying to impose upstream costs and constraints. I hope that the Government will continue to work closely with the Joint Committee on all these issues.

I would like to finish with a few questions for the Minister. First, it is my hope that the Bill will help with disrupting proxy activity. It appears to reduce the need to prove a chain of connection all the way back to the intelligence services: as long as the Government can prove a link to the proscribed proxy organisation, which might be an organised crime group or some front organisation, apparently that would facilitate a prosecution. Can the Minister assure me that I have got that point correct?

Secondly, the International Institute for Strategic Studies has estimated that 600 Russian officials were expelled by NATO states after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, of whom 400 are thought to be intelligence operatives. As I think the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, pointed out, Russian services have now reportedly adapted to using proxies, organised crime groups and freelancers, likely increasing both flexibility and deniability, but at the cost of decreasing operational professionalism. While much of the discussion around the Bill focuses on Iran at the moment, following threats and arson attacks, can the Minister say whether he feels that these measures will directly assist in our work regarding Russia, which I have just spoken about?

It is relevant that the International Institute for Strategic Studies report, which was published before the Bill, also makes the important point that the ultimate source of aggressive activity is often the intelligence officer running the operation. Arresting the proxy actors might mean that the intelligence officers just find new proxies. How confident is the Minister that intelligence officers from Russia and elsewhere will be deterred by this Bill, or will they simply, as has been suggested, remain untouchable?

Finally, I very much share the concerns that have been raised by my noble friend Lady Doocey, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others, about unintended consequences, specifically the impact on humanitarian organisations and charities. Is the Minister able to give me an assurance that the offences relating to designated bodies do not apply to the activities of impartial humanitarian organisations that are acting and working in accordance with international law?