Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 24th February 2022 Lords Chamber

Secondly, and separately, I strongly support the proposition from my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. She has tabled a probing amendment to give the Minister the opportunity to put the Government’s position: what are they doing about the lack of confidence in the criminal justice system, particularly but not only in relation to the prosecution of sexual offences? Everybody in this Chamber knows that the figures for prosecutions of serious sexual offences against women are lamentable and have got worse. A few days ago, the Director of Public Prosecutions said that reforms have been made and things are going to be much better. People are doubtful about this. As with local justice, it is really important that the Government set out what they are doing. If there is a widespread sense that this is not enough, even though my noble friend says that hers is simply a probing amendment, a proper, across-the-board inquiry into how crimes against women are dealt with may well be appropriate.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, as a former magistrate, I warmly support the first point made by my noble and learned friend. The differences in offences, their nature and conduct vary enormously in general, from area to area and region to region. To understand not only the offence but its cause and, therefore, what a suitable disposal might be is really important.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group seek reviews or consultations in three quite disparate areas. The first, in Amendment 30 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, concerns the single justice procedure. The second, in Amendment 37 from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, concerns a call for an inquiry into the treatment of women and girls in the criminal justice system. The third, in Amendment 54 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, concerns local justice areas.

First, as to the single justice procedure, there is no reason in principle to oppose Clause 5, which is the related provision in the Bill. It simply extends the procedure to corporations—and it is probably an anomaly that it did not apply to corporations in the first place. Many of the points that I made during consideration of the first group, relating to a review of the new online procedure, also apply in respect of the single justice procedure. It would be sensible for the single justice procedure to be the subject of the same review, consultation and consideration as the new online procedure.

I join the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his helpful account today, and the help that he gives to the House generally as a practising magistrate and with his very important experience in the magistrates’ court. The magistracy is an extremely important part of our criminal justice system. I forget the precise statistic, but magistrates’ court deal with some 96% of all criminal cases. They are a crucial point of disposal.

I accept, as he did, that the single justice procedure has been of considerable use in minor cases generally, but he also pointed to the impersonality of that procedure and the lack of flexibility that it has in dealing with particular cases. It is valuable in minor cases and in cases such as television licence evasion, which I understand is one of the areas for which it is used. It has been particularly helpful with Covid regulations during the pandemic. However, we should not forget that imposing financial penalties remotely—for example, in the case of television licence evasion—can end up with people being severely penalised for failure to pay and even sent to prison. There is also significant evidence that that particular offence and its enforcement affect women disproportionately.

This brings me to the second area in which a review is sought in this group, Amendment 37, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, which seeks a judicial inquiry into the criminal courts’ treatment of and service to women and girls. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, spoke to it too. In debates on the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, now back in the other place for further consideration of our amendments, I moved an amendment seeking the establishment of a women’s justice board. It had significant and widespread support around the House, and for me it is a matter of great regret that despite having the personal support of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, the Labour Party was not prepared to vote for the measure. If the measure had been supported by the Labour Party, we might have succeeded on that Division. That is a major reform for which I will continue to press. I hope that the support of those who supported it across the House in that Bill will continue to be forthcoming in future attempts, because it is one way to have a significant effect on addressing the difficulties of women and girls within the criminal justice system. Meanwhile, I of course support the noble Baroness in her Amendment 37.

Amendment 54 mandates consultation with relevant stakeholders about the abolition of local justice areas before that abolition under Clause 43 can come into effect. I see the merits of abolishing local justice areas. It will remove the boundaries between such areas, which—as the Explanatory Notes suggest—are largely artificial. That ought to enable magistrates’ courts to work on a more unified or at least a more collaborative basis and manage their work more logically. However, I listened with care to the note of caution introduced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. If it is intended by the abolition of local justice areas to destroy the local base of the magistracy, that would be a great step backwards. It is very important that magistrates are dispensing, are seen as dispensing, and understood as dispensing, local justice. While I am completely understanding of the proposal to alter the artificial boundaries so that courts can collaborate on wider areas or narrower areas as appropriate, so that the artificiality is removed, it is very important to preserve the local justice principle. I expect that we will hear more from the Minister about the consultations that have already taken place on this issue in response to the amendment, and I look forward to hearing what he has to say. I hope that he will address that point with care.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I express my support for Amendment 36A. When I was a member of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee we looked into the impact of the pandemic on the criminal courts. What was striking about our activity was the difficulty we had in extracting from the Ministry of Justice any valuable, reliable statistics on what was happening in the criminal justice system. To have a specific statutory obligation to produce data on this important subject is essential if Parliament is to know what the impact of these new provisions will be.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group. My support comes from my experience as a magistrate, and I appreciate the endorsements of the role of the magistrate from all around the Committee. As those who frequent magistrates’ courts will know, they are places where invariably vulnerable and some other defendants are simply not able to understand or cope with the requirements of the legal system, as my noble friend Lord Ponsonby described, so effectively they do not have a fair trial. With regard to increasing the powers of magistrates in Clause 13, magistrates too are not experts, and that is partly the point of them. In my view, the safeguards in Amendments 35 and 36 would be very useful against inadvertent injustice.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I have very considerable concerns, which have also been expressed by the Delegated Powers Committee, about the Secretary of State being able in effect to double the length of time that a prison sentence can last in relation to both summary offences and either-way offences. How long a person goes to prison for as a result of a magistrates’ court sentence is a considerably important factor in determining which cases are tried by a jury and which are tried by the magistrates’ court. If there is to be a change in the powers of the magistrates’ court of this dimension, it should always be done by primary legislation and not by regulatory powers. I oppose the proposal that the Secretary of State could in effect double the sentencing power of the magistrates’ court and think that should be left to primary legislation. For that reason, I support the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 7th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. Indeed, I rise with great trepidation among such distinguished and learned speakers. I will make a brief contribution from a different perspective: that of a former civil servant whose advice was liable to judicial review, and that of a former member of the employment tribunal whose decision was similarly placed.

There are some useful reforms in the Bill, but in the time allowed I shall confine myself to those proposals which make me uneasy, where I hope amendments can be negotiated. My starting point, as we were taught in the Civil Service, is that judicial review is the way in which an ordinary individual—a citizen—can remove a state action that was illegally made. We had a very well-written booklet, The Judge Over Your Shoulder, which set out the procedures necessary for a legal and democratic government or administrative decision to be reached, and how the court would examine them in a review. Proper consultation was often a key factor. I should emphasise that it was reassuring to know that damaging mistakes could be rectified and that the courts could legitimately pay attention to how we did things, although naturally we tried to avoid this happening. However, officials work under pressure much of the time, and so do Ministers. It is to be expected that mistakes are made and that political purposes can override legitimacy. While national policy is about aggregates, justice is for individuals.

Clause 1 immediately raises questions: the incentives for suspended and prospective quashing orders would be a problem for the aggrieved citizen because, as I understand it, the alleged wrong could not be righted while it was actually happening. The range of powers of the court to decide would be more constrained, and it would have to take into account some arguably extra-legal factors like the convenience of administrators. What might have happened if the proposed reforms were in place over the outfall of raw sewage into the rivers? I wonder if our ratification of the Aarhus convention is now in question.

Clause 2 also makes me uneasy. Removing one of the powers to appeal against a tribunal decision carries an obvious risk of injustice. There have been cases of abused tied domestic employees and deportation which succeeded under the current system, which would not have been allowed under the Bill.

I have one last question. When I was a magistrate, it was clear that many defendants were people who could not grasp the legal system we live in. That is not to say that they might not also have intended to do wrong, but among them were people who could not cope with the requirements of an orderly life and who were in several ways vulnerable. What arrangements will the Government make for people who cannot manage or have no access to the digital communication which would be obligatory under the Bill?

The Bill needs very careful scrutiny. Administrative law affects the public in a very direct way. We should be extremely careful about impairing the ability of communities and individuals to call the state to account, whether it is about protecting the environment, asylum, depriving people of benefit, or any condition the state imposes. I do not see the democratic or constitutional argument for fettering judges in the way the Bill proposes. We should allow their discretion to decide proportionate remedies. It is surely the birthright of citizens of a democracy for the rule of law to have enough force to maintain that democracy.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I wonder whether the interesting amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, might not have some unintended consequences that I, personally, would find very welcome. What if the “unlawful activity” included acts contrary to the Human Rights Act and the Equality Act? What if the landlord was trying to turf out Gypsies and Travellers who had no other home to go to? I believe that he will no doubt have an answer to that question.

More generally, on Clause 63—and I agree wholeheartedly with what the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, said—the openness of the terms, so eloquently laid out by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, amount to a tremendous allowance for prejudice. We should be in no doubt that this is very common. The hate crime reporting organisation, GATE Herts, funded by the then MHCLG, has ample evidence of explicitly Nazi sentiments being used whenever a Traveller or Gypsy community wanted to move on to a site. Stereotyping is the norm in these records. We heard examples in your Lordships’ House last week of whole communities being tarred by one incident. It is the same as somebody saying that white people should be barred from walking on the street at night because of a few incidents of night-time vandalism; it is that kind of remark, and it is prejudice. If such a remark urges violent action—the removal of Gypsies and Travellers—surely it is illegal.

Following the Minister’s remarks last Wednesday on police guidance in this kind of situation, she expressed some surprise at the use of the term “gold-plated”. Is “gold-plated” not a dog-whistle call to opponents of human rights? Most of us are proud of the Human Rights Act 1998, and how it reinforced our position as a leader in establishing a human rights culture after the Second World War. Be that as it may, the Human Rights Act, and behind it the European Convention on Human Rights, is our law—either one complies with the law or not. Gold-plating of human rights is not a term understood in law, and its implications, in this context, are to diminish any putative offence against the Human Rights Act. I think that Clause 63 is not helpful and should go.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Clause 63 amends Section 61 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Section 61 addresses the situation that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, alluded to on Wednesday—at Hansard col. 1313—when he told us that, 25 years ago, as a Member of Parliament, he was rung by a very distressed farmer in his constituency, whose land was being trespassed on. I make that 1996, but perhaps it was before the 1994 Act was effective.

As my noble friend Lady Brinton has said, Section 61 of the 1994 Act provides a power to remove trespassers on land. I will quote subsection (1):

“If the senior police officer present at the scene reasonably believes that two or more persons are trespassing on land and are present there with the common purpose of residing there for any period, that reasonable steps have been taken by or on behalf of the occupier to ask them to leave and … that any of those persons has caused damage to the land or to property on the land or used threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards the occupier, a member of his family or an employee or agent of his, or …that those persons have between them six or more vehicles on the land, he may direct those persons, or any of them, to leave the land and to remove any vehicles or other property they have with them on the land.”


Subsection (4) states:

“If a person knowing that a direction under subsection (1) … has been given which applies to him … fails to leave the land as soon as reasonably practicable, or … having left again enters the land as a trespasser within the period of three months beginning with the day on which the direction was given, he commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both.”


That is the law now, unamended by this Bill.

As many noble Lords said on Wednesday, what is the problem that Part 4 is trying to solve, when there are clearly adequate powers already in existence? Clause 63 simply brings Section 61 of the 1994 Act into line with the rest of Part 4 of the Bill. For the reasons so thoroughly and persuasively argued on Wednesday, this clause, like the rest of Part 4, should not stand part of the Bill.

Section 68 of the 1994 Act, as amended by the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, is the offence of aggravated trespass, where

“A person commits the offence of aggravated trespass if he trespasses on land and, in relation to any lawful activity which persons are engaging in or are about to engage in on that or adjoining land, does there anything which is intended by him to have the effect … of intimidating those persons or any of them so as to deter them or any of them from engaging in that activity … of obstructing that activity, or … of disrupting that activity.”


I am getting the sense of hunt saboteurs, HS2 protestors or, perhaps, those protesting against genetically modified crops, rather than Gypsy, Roma and Travellers. Section 68 appears to me to refer to deliberate interference with lawful activity by means of trespass, rather than coincidental interference; for example, ploughing a field that travellers are trespassing on. Unlike the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, I am not a lawyer, but perhaps the Minister can clarify the difference between Section 68 and what we have been talking about up until now.

As far as Amendment 150 is concerned, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, explained, it attempts to correct an error in existing legislation. I agree with the noble and learned Lord that the activity being disrupted should be and needs to be unlawful, rather than the trespasser simply asserting that he believes that it should not be happening. I am not sure that the accused should have to prove that they were not trespassing. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has said, that seems to be going perhaps a bit too far. We support the amendment in principle, in as far as the activity on the land that is being disrupted needs to be unlawful, rather than just being asserted as being unlawful.

As we leave this part of the Bill, I want to again acknowledge the long and tireless campaign by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, to defend Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. I fear that, at Report, we may need to adopt a different approach than simply removing all the clauses in Part 4 from the Bill, in the light of what the Minister said on Wednesday, at Hansard col. 1330, when she quoted from the Conservative Party manifesto:

“We will give the police new powers to arrest and seize the property and vehicles of trespassers who set up unauthorised encampments, in order to protect our communities. We will make intentional trespass a criminal offence.”


That is very interesting wording. New powers do not necessarily mean more draconian powers. I respectfully suggest that on Report this House should bring forward new powers that provide the necessary protections for all our communities, including Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. For example—I quote from the manifesto—it could be argued that making

“intentional trespass a criminal offence”

entirely supports Amendment 135 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, providing that, where Travellers have no suitable legal pitch on a relevant caravan site situated in the local authority’s area, the trespass should not be regarded as intentional.

It is absolutely right that we, and many others in this Committee, express our outright opposition to Part 4 as drafted but, when we return to these issues on Report, it will be with more sophisticated amendments to take account of the wording in the Conservative Party manifesto—and the convention of not blocking, at least not entirely, commitments made by the governing party in their manifesto—that protect all communities, including Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities.

Marriage: Humanist Ceremonies

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Thursday 21st January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

These are complicated issues. As my noble friend quite rightly says, the Home Secretary has initiated a general inquiry into the use of sharia councils. One area of particular concern is the circumstances in which marriages take place and the fact that there are some people in the Muslim community for whom marriage can be used somewhat oppressively. It is certainly important that all the information is available before we come to any conclusions.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

It is not of course, as the noble Baroness would confirm, that we do not allow humanist marriage—a civil marriage can take place followed by a humanist ceremony. The gravamen of the complaint is that they cannot take place simultaneously.

[Baroness Whitaker]

My Lords, speaking as a humanist, may I ask the Government what the majority of respondents to their consultation on this subject of humanist marriage thought about it?

[Lord Faulks]

The vast majority—well over 90%—were in favour of humanist marriage. Humanists represented by far the greater majority of those who responded to the consultation. Pagans and naturists also responded—the latter, for some reason, were particularly keen on outdoor ceremonies, which might be challenging at this time of year.

Human Rights: UK Application

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Wednesday 18th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I will gracefully decline to answer the last part of the noble Lord’s question. As to the first part, the position is that this Government, and indeed this Parliament, were pioneers in passing the same-sex marriage Act. Since then, the Republic of Ireland has followed suit, the American Supreme Court has accepted the argument, and the European Court of Human Rights has also. We can be proud that we have set the way. We also commended it to the Northern Ireland Executive, both before and after the passing of the legislation, but ultimately this is a question of devolution. The Northern Ireland Executive are capable of making that decision themselves. The matter is the subject of two judicial reviews. At the moment, there is no inclination on the part of the Northern Ireland Executive to take matters forward, and I hope that that changes.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the human rights of Gypsies and Travellers are much better protected in Wales than in England because the Government have created an obligation on local authorities to provide sites? Why can we not do the same thing here?

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Baroness has particular expertise and knowledge of this area, and I defer to her knowledge, as it were, on the ground. The application of the law in relation to human rights should of course be common across England and Wales.

Ministerial Code

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I indicated that from time to time the Prime Minister may clarify duties, just as the Civil Service Code does. That is his prerogative. The duty on the part of Ministers is to obey the law.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I am not clear whether I heard an answer to either my noble friend Lord Dubs’s Question or the question from our Front Bench. Why exactly did the Government change the wording?

[Lord Faulks]

I fear that I will be repeating myself but they have changed the wording because it is a simple summary of what is plainly the position, which is that Ministers have an obligation to obey the law. The code does not change the obligation that comes from the law; it is simply a summary for Ministers.

Humanist Marriages

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, as a Christian who found the changes we made to the meaning of marriage in the previous Parliament somewhat difficult, I completely accept that the law has now been changed. I find it difficult to understand any logical objection to what the noble Baroness is calling for this afternoon. I hope that we can have an early decision on this and hope that my noble friend can reassure me.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Faulks]

I understand what my noble friend says about the approach to marriage which this House approved in the Marriages (Same Sex Couples) Act. It was a significant achievement of the Government. I understand the sense of frustration that he may feel that the Government are not moving swiftly enough. I assure my noble friend that while due speed will be shown in looking at this, because of the wider implications, it is necessary to consider this matter thoroughly.

[Baroness Whitaker]

My Lords, I apologise for my eagerness to ask the Minister my question, which may have seemed discourteous. Does he not recall that there was a substantial measure of support for the legal recognition of humanist marriage and does he not therefore think it would be just to allow it the same grace that is allowed to the Jewish and Quaker communities?

[Lord Faulks]

The exception for the Jewish and Quaker communities is based on the state of affairs in 1753. I agree that there are certain anomalies based on historical facts. There is no feeling on the part of the Government to discriminate against humanist marriages. It is simply a question of looking at the matter overall so that we can make our law consistent.

Access to Justice

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Wednesday 18th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful for what my noble friend says. He may notice that the endorsement on the Theos paper from a former High Court judge says that all barristers should give a tithe of their time and services. I am sure that is not just restricted to Christian barristers and solicitors.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

Following the question from the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, can the Minister compute the whole cost of our justice system, and will he then compare it with the whole cost of the justice systems of other common-law countries?

[Lord Faulks]

I will certainly not do that calculation at the Dispatch Box, but I think I understand what the noble Baroness is saying, which is that those systems where the judges are more involved—more inquisitorial as opposed to adversarial—may cost more. None the less, we generally believe that our legal aid costs—as is quite right, because we value access to justice—are more expensive than anything which is remotely comparable elsewhere.

Added Tribunals (Employment Tribunals and Employment Appeal Tribunal) Order 2013

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Monday 8th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Monks]

My Lords, we know that the Ministry of Justice is constrained by some very tight budgets and needs to save money. However, it is clear from these orders that it is proposing to save money very much at the expense of the low-paid and the most vulnerable in our society. The argument that was made by my noble friend Lord Beecham about the comparison with the fees at the Supreme Court tells its own story. The fees at the Supreme Court are disproportionately low compared to what will be the position in the tribunals. Therefore, I do not see the Minister’s argument that saving money has to be at the expense of those in the lower income parts of our society compared to those who are much better off and will be taking cases in the higher courts. The burden is in the wrong place.

Secondly, it is clear that this is all about deterring applicants. My noble friend Lord Young will remember debates on another regulation about raising the qualifying period for unfair dismissal. That took 3 million people out of the unfair dismissals scope virtually at a stroke. Now we have got this as well. As people have said, it is not going to deter the well paid executive who can see a crock of gold at the end of the case. Nor will it deter the union member, because we already know that unions are preparing to support their members in appropriate cases by covering the fees. It will be those who are on their own, probably low paid and vulnerable, and who will not find it easy to get a comparable job. They are being told to go away quietly. I think that is a green light to the heartless, careless, poor employer that they can now get away with it when previously they would have had to be more circumspect.

I do not put too much weight on the remissions scheme. The idea that if one has a £3,000 household investment income or savings certainly seems to be unfair because it lumps the household together for those calculations. I think it is still very much an attack on the low-paid, and the remissions scheme is nowhere near adequate to cover that. This is Beecroft by the backdoor. I know the Minister’s party colleague has been very strong in his condemnation of Beecroft, but why is it that these particular measures keep appearing, under a different guise for sure, and we keep seeing these attacks on employment rights in exactly the same spirit that Beecroft meant them in his original report.

I, too, add my voice to that of my noble friend Lady Turner in asking for these regulations to be withdrawn.

[Baroness Whitaker]

My Lords, I just want to speak briefly because I sat on employment tribunals for several years and I do not remember any vexatious claims. Although some were poorly argued, they would actually have done better with a lawyer. Of course conciliation is desirable where it can be arranged, but where it is not, I fear that these regulations will curtail access to justice. I am uneasy about the implication that assertion of rights is an unnecessary burden on business and therefore needs to be disincentivised.

There is exploitation and ill-treatment; I saw plenty of evidence of people sacked when pregnant or being sexually harassed. They were not glamorous bankers in the way that we read about them in the newspapers but, for instance, three cleaners whose lives were made a misery every day and people who were dismissed without a proper reason. The cases we found proved were brought by ordinary poor people who had lost their jobs. How could they afford to bring such cases under these regulations? I cannot imagine that they serve justice or provide that desirable balance between the interests of the employer and those of the employee; they distort it.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Amendment of Schedule 1) Order 2013

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Wednesday 27th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

I think a rough estimate is that it is probably less than £1 million. It was a very small concession, but it was not me who withdrew it.

[Baroness Whitaker]

Before the noble Lord sits down, I am not sure that he quite dealt with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, about a culture change. Does he not agree that these regulations mark a complete reversal of our prior ideas about access to justice and equality before the law?

[Lord McNally]

No, that is why I want to invite a discussion. The term “access to justice” is bandied around very freely. I do not want to provoke him but I see the menacing figure of the noble Lord, Lord Richard, just behind the noble Baroness. He would probably agree that access to justice and access to taxpayer-funded legal aid have never been the same thing and we must not get them confused. Every Government have had to limit this provision. Oh, my God, I see that the noble Lord wishes to speak. As I say, they are not the same thing, but I want this Government and successive Governments to keep the concept of access to justice very much to the forefront of their commitments to the citizen. However, that may be done by adapting the system in a whole manner of ways: for example, in the way that advice is given. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, was rather dismissive of remote advice, but I think that the use of new technologies will give better access to justice. However, having provoked the noble Lord, Lord Richard, I will give way to him.