Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 11th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Despite that, his amendment rightly draws the attention of your Lordships’ House to the list of safe countries under Section 80AA, and that is an important part of the Act. To conclude, I simply ask the Minister a couple of questions about that list. Do the Government have plans to expand the list to better reflect the number of safe countries there are across the world? Will he set out the process of engagement that exists between the Foreign Office and the Home Office to ensure that that list is kept up to date?

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Browne of Ladyton and Lord Cashman for the amendment today, and to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, for his support. I was pleased to have the opportunity to meet my noble friend outside the House to hear his concerns at first hand. I again wish the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, all the best for a speedy recovery and return to this place.

Amendment 59 seeks to change the way in which Section 59—that is confusing, I know—of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 would, if fully commenced, amend the inadmissibility provisions of Sections 80A and 80AA(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. I am grateful to my noble friends for the consideration they have given to this matter and I acknowledge the importance of the issues raised.

As my noble friend has said, Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act has not been fully commenced. The Government have been clear that we are retaining it to allow for flexibility—that goes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord German, made—in its future implementation in a way that best assists us to address the significant challenges brought by asylum and migration.

Section 59 itself will, if commenced, amend Section 80A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, with the effect that the existing inadmissibility provisions in respect of asylum claims made by EU nationals will extend to human rights claims made by nationals from a wider list of countries set out in Section 80AA(1) of that Act. The first part of the amendment in my noble friend’s name seeks to change the duty at Section 80A to a power, and to add an explicit provision allowing the power to be exercised only where it would not result in a person’s human rights being breached. I understand why my noble friends Lord Cashman and Lord Browne of Ladyton put forward this amendment, but, as I hope to explain, it is not necessary and could prevent us implementing Section 59 in a different, more robust way.

Those bringing this amendment are aware of the provision currently set out in Section 80A of the 2002 Act which displaces the duty to declare an EU asylum claim inadmissible in the event that exceptional circumstances are identified. Although Section 80A(5) sets out some examples of when an exceptional circumstance will arise—currently in respect only to certain EU claims—these examples are not exhaustive or indeed rigid. Exceptional circumstances can already be applied more broadly, on a case-by-case basis, to ensure fairness and lawfulness in all EU asylum claims, and well-established case law already sets this out very clearly.

If Section 59 is commenced in its current form, updated policy guidance will be published to set out clearly how the exceptional circumstances safeguard should be applied for all claim types, taking account of the different considerations due in asylum and human rights claims. This will allow us to robustly and promptly process unmeritorious asylum and human rights claims at the earliest juncture, but—and this is the important point that goes to my noble friend Lord Cashman’s point—whenever necessary, it will allow us to divert claims from inadmissibility action and instead consider them substantively, ensuring that individuals’ rights under the refugee convention and the European Convention on Human Rights are maintained. It is not our objective to not have those rights upheld.

This amendment seeks to impose a duty for the Secretary of State to remove a country from the list at Section 80AA(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act if that country no longer satisfies the rules in that section. I say to my noble friend that the intent of this amendment is clear and commendable. It is well understood—this goes to the point made by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu—that countries’ conditions may change, and that may mean that a country previously assessed as safe can no longer be regarded as such. It is for that reason—the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, was seeking further clarification on the power in Section 80AA(6)(b), under which regulations to remove countries from the list can be made—that if Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act is commenced in its current form, and the list at Section 80AA(1) has effect, it is unquestionable that a country assessed to be unsafe would be removed from the list by the Secretary of State under regulation. In the short term, however, ahead of regulations being made in such cases, the exceptional circumstances safeguard would apply, displacing that inadmissibility duty and allowing the claim to be considered substantially.

Noble Lords have asked why we are keeping inadmissibility under Section 80A of the Nationality and Immigration Act as a duty, rather than a power. While the exceptional circumstance provision does admit a measure of discretion, allowing for individual risks or changes in circumstance to be taken into account, the overall duty provides for greater consistency and focus in processing such claims.

I hope that, following the meeting I have had with my noble friend on the issues that he has raised and the debate that we have had today, I have reassured him that although his points are valid, they are covered by the discretion in the legislation currently in place. I hope he will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords who have participated in this short debate. I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Cashman for his contribution to the debate and his continued support on these matters. I thank the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, for repeating the points he made when we debated this in Committee very powerfully. I thank the noble Lord, Lord German, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I would be grateful if he would wish her well in these circumstances and thank her for her unstinting support.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for his personal comments. I am disappointed, as he expected I would be, but not surprised at his contribution to the debate. I recollect that, in Committee, although there were numerous contributions from the Conservative Benches behind him, not one speaker supported the provision in Section 59 of the IMA. Today, there are no speakers at all from his party on the Benches behind him even to support it by their presence, if not by their contribution to the debate.

Behind these amendments is not my legal brain—which has been relaxed for many years—but advice that I got from an expert in the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association. I thank them very much for their support.

I am disappointed by my noble friend’s response. I have no intention of dividing the House on this issue, but I reserve the right to keep it open for the next stage of deliberation. I ask my noble friend, who is generous with his time and support, whether he will reflect on—I think that is the phrase used—the implications of the provisions that I have put before the House and why they are a better resolution to the challenges of Section 59 than the view of those who support him.

I should have thanked my noble friend for his willingness to meet me and others to discuss this. We did our level best to find the time on a very busy day last Wednesday to have that meeting. It probably lasted for about three or four minutes, while I was out of the room—if I remember correctly, I was voting, but then I was voting almost every minute of every day last week. Would it be possible between now and the next stage of deliberation on this Bill to have a meeting at a time when those who have been advising me and those advising him can sit in the same room for a reasonable period of time to go through the implications of the differing approaches?

As I say, I do not intend to divide the House on this matter and therefore withdraw this amendment.

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[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the right reverend Prelate for her speech. We recognise the principle behind this proposal. The good character test has been in place since 1981. It asks applicants for British citizenship to be of good character and is controlled by the guidance issued by the Home Office. The test must safeguard the integrity of citizenship but must also be applied with common sense and humanity.

However, while we understand and respect the intention behind this amendment, I am afraid we cannot support it. It would require the good character requirement to be applied in line with a wide range of international conventions. Decisions on who can become a British citizen should be for the UK Government applying national tests under domestic law. More broadly, we are cautious about references to multiple international bodies and agreements that could, in practice, limit the United Kingdom’s ability to manage its own borders and nationality system. Our view is that the UK must retain the freedom to make its own decisions on immigration and citizenship while still acting with fairness, decency and respect for human rights in our own right.

Of course, we are not opposed to the principle of international co-operation, but our domestic framework is set by Parliament and should serve the national interest. For those reasons, we cannot support the amendment in its form.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford for Amendment 60 and in particular for her courage in bringing her personal experience to the Chamber today. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett, the noble Lord, Lord German, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for speaking in support of the amendment.

The noble Lord, Lord German, indicated that there may be different political parties that may at some point in the future have the power to make changes that he and maybe even I would not find palatable. In the event of either of those political parties that he is concerned about winning an election, they could probably do what they wanted in both Houses of Parliament anyway, taking forward those policies that they probably would have won a mandate on. I may not agree with that point, but his argument not to make a change against the right reverend Prelate’s proposal today, because it might open up a gateway for a future party to exploit that amendment’s acceptance, does not seem to be a sensible way forward. If a Government of any political party, not mine, wish to make a change, they would be the Government. Like me standing at this Dispatch Box, they probably would have the numbers in the House of Commons to take that policy through and the numbers in this Chamber to make that case over a period of time for that discussion. So I do not accept that contention.

Having said that, my concerns are different. British citizenship is a privilege, not a right. The requirement for an individual to be of good character is a statutory one that goes back to 1981 and the British Nationality Act. It is considered reasonable and proportionate when assessing whether to grant British citizenship. On the point that the noble Lord, Lord Harper, made, it is for the Home Secretary to make changes to the discretion in that policy. This amendment seeks to limit that discretion by preventing the consideration of illegal entry into the UK if the person was a child when they entered the UK.

Apart from this potentially encouraging people to make false claims about their age to benefit from the provision, the amendment also seeks to ensure that the consideration of good character is compliant with the UK’s international obligations. The right reverend Prelate may not have received it yet, but I sent her a letter this morning which she can have a look at later. In it I say that the good character policy is compliant with our obligations under the refugee convention. Where a person has come directly from a country where they fear persecution, their protection under Article 31 of the refugee convention means that they will not be penalised when their application for citizenship is considered.

I hope that this will partly reassure the right reverend Prelate, but I will say again that the decision-makers are required to take into account the UK’s international obligations, including the refugee convention and the European Convention on Human Rights, when assessing whether a person meets the good character policy. Furthermore, guidance on the good character policy provides for a decision-maker to be able to exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis. It may not find favour across the whole House, but it does include disregarding immigration breaches such as illegal entry if it is accepted that this is outside the applicant’s control. That case is for the applicant to make when they make that decision.

For example, a victim of modern slavery, or a person who is trafficked, or, indeed, going to the very nub of her argument, someone who entered the UK illegally as a child, would not be implicated by the policy and would have that discretion open to them by the decision-maker. I will just emphasise that still further by saying the good character policy does not apply to children under the age of 10 on the date of application.

The amendment would seek also a more generous approach for migrants—

[The Lord Bishop of Chelmsford]

I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. On the question of children, the Minister has just said the policy does not apply to children under 10. What is the logic for applying it to children over 10? I do not understand the distinction, and it would be helpful to.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That is a valid question. I can say to the right reverend Prelate that it will normally—I say “normally”—be appropriate to disregard immigration breaches if it is accepted this was outside the applicant’s control. Given that illegal entry is normally considered outside a child’s control, most children would not be held accountable for their immigration breach. Certainly, as I have said before, no child under the age of 10 at the date of their application would be dealt with in that way. I hope that gives her some reassurance.

I consider that individuals seeking to become British citizens should demonstrate an equal regard to immigration legislation as we expect them to show to other aspects of the law, including the criminal justice system. We do not consider there should be an expectation that a person will benefit in the future from the policy in place when they arrived. This is consistent with the position taken in previous changes to the good character policy, such as the change in 2023 to align the criminality thresholds with the Immigration Rules.

I say again that I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate for bringing her personal experience to the Chamber on Report today, but the Home Secretary makes the policy—they are accountable to the House—decision-makers have discretion, particularly for children aged 10 to 18, and no child under the age of 10 would be impacted.

I hope that gives her the reassurance that the good character test, which the noble Lord, Lord Harper, mentioned, is valid and accountable to the House, but that changing it today would lead to confusion and, potentially, particularly at the borderline areas of the older child, a contention that would cause difficulties for our purpose in life, which is, in the Bill, to try to stop small boats and illegal migrant crossings, and to not provide an incentive for them. I would hope that, on that basis, she could, with all humility, withdraw her amendment.

[The Lord Bishop of Chelmsford]

I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions and for engaging in the debate. Forgive me, I am not going to name individuals, but all the contributions—both those for the amendment and those against it—have been very heartfelt and some of them deeply moving, enabling us to reflect even more widely than the issues specifically pertinent to the amendment.

I have listened with care to the Minister and I want to thank him for his thorough response. However, regrettably, I have not received the assurances that I was hoping for, that the character guidance will adequately prevent a scenario where an immigration caseworker is not having to choose whether to break international law or not, or that, without further changes to the guidance, a child’s right to naturalisation will be safeguarded.

It is not right, I believe, that discretion remains to hold a child responsible for their travel to the UK when they had no control over it, even if that is only a small possibility. As I think I have already clearly expressed, dividing access to citizenship in this way for those who have a legal right to remain in the country will have grievous societal and, I believe, cultural consequences, however unintended. Therefore, I would like, with respect, to test the opinion of the House.

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That still does not happen here in the United Kingdom, which means that, if the Government have the right to make a decision and speed up a process if a person does not give consent for that examination, that person has no protection under the law. That is worries us on these Benches considerably. With that in mind, and the fact that we do not seem to progress with the scientific evidence, I hope the noble Lord will not press his amendments.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for tabling these amendments. We have indeed been around the Houses, but in trying to reach some common ground, I agree with every noble Lord who has spoken that we need to have some method of assessing age. Children who are placed in settings with adults are at risk, and adults who are placed in settings with children potentially pose a risk. I think there is common ground across the House today on the need to find some mechanism to establish age verification.

Amendments 63 and 64 refer to scientific methods of age assessment, and Amendment 63 places a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to lay regulations under Section 52 of the Nationality and Borders Act within six months of the passing of the Bill. This is one of the reasons, in addition to those that I have given, that I support the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. Regulations have already been made under this power that specify X-ray and MRI methods of age assessment.

Amendment 64 would, in effect, reintroduce Section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act, which the Bill looks to repeal. Under the powers given to the Secretary of State in Section 52 of the Nationality and Borders Act, the Secretary of State would not make regulations to the effect that this amendment seeks to achieve unless and until the specific scientific methods in question were sufficiently accurate to mean that applying the automatic assumption in cases of refusal to consent would be compatible with the ECHR. The specified methods—that is, X-ray and MRI images of certain body areas—do not currently meet this threshold. I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, also emphasised that point, as did the noble Lord, Lord Harper, to some extent.

That does not mean that the Government do not wish to have age verification measures in place. I can assure the House that, in the context of the Government’s wider work to reform age assessment systems, as was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, the then Minister for Security and Asylum set out in a Written Ministerial Statement in the House of Commons, which I repeated in this House in July, that this Government have commissioned work to determine the most promising new and emerging methods of age assessment to pursue them further. As a result of that, currently the work to operationalise X-ray and MRI methods of age assessment have been stood down, because facial age estimation methods—this goes to the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger—are less intrusive, cheaper and faster, and there is no requirement for a physical medical procedure. As I mentioned in Committee, we are not there yet, but facial age estimation technology is currently being explored by the Home Office. It is a potential assistive tool in the age assessment process, and we have commissioned further testing and trialling with the intention of implementing the technology during 2026 if it proves a worthwhile addition to our armoury.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

The last Government produced an expert report in the run-up to our 23 debates on various amendments. Will the Government undertake to have an expert report from doctors and scientists, which would then be published in full, so that Parliament and the wider community can actually see the detail? The Minister is absolutely right to say that AI age assessment is not there yet, and I always worry about passing something that might mean that we do not see the detail when doctors are unhappy.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that it is in the interests of the Government to get technology in place that is less intrusive and more accurate and does not rely on X-rays and MRIs, as we have now, for that physical contact. The question of what that development will be is something that we are working through at the moment, and I am expecting that in the latter part of 2026 I will be able to come to this House—if still in post—to argue the case for the implementation of a better facial age estimation technology. I will, on the basis of what the noble Baroness has said, make sure that I can put into the public domain whatever information I think does not compromise the operation. That is the best I can give her today, but I will reflect on what she said and look at whether I can agree to her request. I do not want to give her an immediate response, because there may be reasons why it is not in our interest to put some of that information into the public domain, because people will always try to subsume facial recognition technology or any other method. I will just reflect on that, if I may.

The key point is that these emerging new methods and the regulations applying the automatic assumption of adult provision for refusal to consent to methods of scientific age assessment as set out in the IMA cannot be laid until the specific methods are sufficiently accurate. Because we do not believe that they are going to be, these amendments are not necessary. For those reasons, I hope that we can share common ground with the noble Lord: his objective, my objective, and I think that of every noble Lord who has spoken, is to ensure that we have accurate age assessment. The methodology he has brought forward in these amendments is not the way forward, but I give an assurance to the House that the exploration of other methods is under way and I will report back when those tests are complete. I urge him, therefore, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a short but important debate, and I am grateful to those noble Lords who have contributed. As I said in my opening remarks, there is clear evidence of adults pretending to be children in order to gain refugee status in the United Kingdom. As boat crossings rise, so does the number of fraudulent asylum claims. This means that there is a high number of unchecked people who should not be here and, perhaps more importantly, a high number of adults in children’s schools. This is a crisis that the Government can and must face head on. Ensuring that people are the age that they claim to be is just one step that we must take to end this crisis, but it is an important step, and Amendments 63 and 64 offer a framework for how it may be done.

Amendment 64 would provide a fair and balanced approach to age assessments. It would not provide the state with overreaching powers to assess anyone who enters the country, but it also would not retreat to the position where the age-disputed person is given the right to deny any form of comprehensive assessment. It would give the relevant authorities the discretion to enforce a scientific test where there are no reasonable grounds not to consent to one. This measure would allow for a fairer immigration system that incentivises honesty, rather than one that rewards fraud.

However, if we are to take away the right to consent when there are no reasonable grounds, then it is just that we also specify which methods may be used to assess age. As I have said, assessing age has become a necessary measure in certain cases, which is why Amendment 64 is so important. Amendment 63 is just as important, as it would allow the Secretary of State to lay out a clear and comprehensive list of scientific methods that may be used to achieve this end.

The current system in place incentivises dishonesty and puts children across the country at risk as a result. These amendments provide a comprehensive framework that goes a long way to resolving that problem, and I hope the Minister considers taking them on board. I have heard what he has said about finding common ground for age assessment, and for now I beg to leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, the importance of family life and family unity is a principle that no one in this House would dispute. The principle already has a firm statutory protection. Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 imposes a clear duty on the Secretary of State to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the United Kingdom. It is a duty embedded in every decision taken by immigration officers and by tribunals that consider appeals.

With the greatest respect to the noble Baroness, the amendment before us would, in effect, duplicate these existing safeguards and reduce them in a way that risks generating uncertainty and inconsistency. It would open the door to litigation and invite the courts to revisit and reinterpret established principles of immigration law. For those reasons, I respectfully urge the House to resist the amendment.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for her Amendment 75. As she outlined, it would impose a duty on the Secretary of State to have due regard to the unity of family in exercising immigration functions. She has raised an important point, but the amendment is unnecessary. I will try to explain for her the reasons why.

The important protections it seeks are already firmly embedded in legislative frameworks and policies, such as Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, the Human Rights Act 1998, and the public sector equality duty derived from the Equality Act 2010. As announced in the immigration White Paper in May, we are exploring further reforms to the family route. As she mentioned, there is already a statutory duty to promote and safeguard the welfare of children in Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. That places a duty on the Secretary of State to make arrangements to ensure that immigration, asylum, nationality and general customs functions are discharged having regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the UK. That every child matters is set out in our statutory guidance.

The Immigration Rules balance the right to family and private life under Article 8 and the right to respect for private and family life under the European Convention on Human Rights. Under Part 5 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, Parliament set out the view of what the public interest requires in immigration cases, engaging the qualified right to respect for private and family life under Article 8. It requires the courts to give due weight to this public interest when deciding such cases.

Where an applicant under the family rules does not meet all the core eligibility requirements, the decision-maker will consider whether there are exceptional circumstances which would render refusal a breach of Article 8. This involves considering whether refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or, indeed, their family. Under Section 149 of the Equality Act, which I mentioned earlier, the Secretary of State must have due regard to eliminating discrimination, advancing equality of opportunity and fostering good relations. Due regard for family unity must not limit the ability of the Secretary of State for the Home Office to remove serious criminals who would do us harm. Article 8 claims, as we will discuss, will succeed only if a deportation’s impact on a qualifying child is unduly harsh. The immigration White Paper confirmed plans to legislate for easier removal of such offenders under Article 8, but not in other circumstances. For those reasons, I respectfully invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I hear so often in this Chamber that the amendments the Opposition have brought are completely unnecessary, it is already in law, and we do not have to worry our pretty little heads about it as it will all be fine. The fact is, it is not. This issue, in particular, will continue to make an awful lot of money for lawyers, who will fight what the Government are doing. However, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.