Lord Hanson of Flint
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Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments returns us to an issue debated at some length in Committee: the use of live facial recognition technology in policing. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling these amendments on this important topic.
As set out in Committee, we on these Benches cannot support proposals that would severely restrict or pre-empt the operational use of live facial recognition by law enforcement. Live facial recognition is an increasingly important tool in modern policing. Used lawfully and proportionately, it has already demonstrated its value in identifying serious offenders, locating wanted individuals and preventing violent crime before it occurs. It has been deployed particularly effectively in high-risk environments such as transport hubs and major public events, where rapid identification can make a decisive difference in protecting the public.
That does not mean that safeguards are unnecessary. There must always be a careful balance between the protection of civil liberties and the need to equip police with effective tools to tackle serious crime. The use of new technologies must be proportionate and subject to appropriate oversight, but the amendments before us would go significantly further than that. In different ways, they would either prohibit particular uses of the technology, place rigid statutory barriers in its way or create restrictions that would unnecessarily impede the ability of the police to deploy it where it may be most needed. Amendment 374 would prohibit the deployment of live facial recognition in the context of public assemblies or impose extensive prior authorisation requirements. It risks tying the hands of the police at precisely the moments when rapid and flexible operational decision-making may be required.
We must recognise the points raised in Committee that the Government are currently consulting on the future regulatory framework for live facial recognition. To attempt to settle these questions piecemeal through amendments to this Bill would risk creating an incomplete or inconsistent framework. While the concerns raised by noble Lords are legitimate and deserve careful consideration, we should not default to restricting a technology that has already shown its potential to disrupt serious criminality and protect the public. The challenge is not to prohibit its use but to ensure that it is deployed responsibly, lawfully and proportionately. For those reasons, we cannot support the amendments in this group. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling these amendments and to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for supporting some of the arguments that I will make in response to them. The noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Strasburger and Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, have all put their finger on their concerns around the use of this technology.
I will begin by providing a view of what live facial recognition does. It allows for real-time location of individuals of interest to the police. It scans the faces of those passing a camera in real time, comparing faces against a predetermined, specific watch-list of, potentially, wanted criminals, vulnerable missing persons or individuals posing risks to public safety. If no match is made—this goes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, made—currently, the scanned face is deleted instantly. Every deployment and every specific bespoke watch-list for that deployment must have a defined policing objective, be supported by clear intelligence and ultimately be determined by humans.
Noble Lords will be aware that the use of facial recognition technology in all circumstances, including in live facial recognition, is already subject to safeguards, including those provided in the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act. I agree that there needs to be a framework, which is the nub of what I think all noble Lords have said in this debate.
The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will know that the Government had a 10-week consultation for that very purpose—to look at the issues of a legal framework where law enforcement use of biometrics, facial recognition and similar technologies could be used. The consultation ended on 12 February. I give the House an assurance that the Government intend to respond to it by the summer; we have more or less a 12-week deadline from the end of its closing, but it will be by the summer. The consultation is clear that the Government need to design a new framework and assess how the police use technologies such as facial recognition. It needs to ensure that there are safeguards, as noble Lords have mentioned, around the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, that we protect these rights and that facial recognition technology is demonstrably proportionate to the seriousness of the harm being addressed.
We are currently considering the consultation and, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, said, that should take its course. However, we intend to set out our proposals in due course, which will be subject to scrutiny by both Houses of Parliament. I hope noble Lords accept that it would not be appropriate to pre-empt the outcome of the consultation or the proposals that Government will bring forward, which we will ensure have new legal framework for the use of facial recognition technology by law enforcement agencies.
While I think that the points made by noble Lords have real merit, I hope that, with the comments I have made and the reassurances I have given, we will save the difficult debate about regulation, how it operates and what the proposals mean for a proper legal framework for another day, which will come very soon. I hope the noble Baroness will—
Lord Strasburger (LD)
Before the Minister sits down, could he give the House some indication of when the day will come when we have a debate on some meaningful proposals? Could he also tell the House whether those proposals will cover the use of this technology by the private sector—which is happening a lot already in retail—as well as the public sector?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
As I have tried to indicate to the noble Lord, we have had a consultation that finished on 12 February, and we intend to respond to it by the summer. Currently, what that response will be is to be formulated, so I will not give him chapter and verse on when and how. However, if legislation is required, we will look at that at the earliest opportunity, as we always do.
I cannot pre-empt the King’s Speech and I cannot give a timetable on that, but I will give a timetable when we respond to the consultation. We should remember that the Government initiated the consultation—we were not forced into it—to get to a position whereby the very issues that noble Lords have mentioned today are considered. With those comments, I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister and all noble Lords who have spoken. I have no doubt at all that everything the Minister said, he actually believes. But it reminds me of when I was on the Metropolitan Police Authority for the first time and I went round all the police stations in London—I think there were 32 at the time, with 32 borough commanders. The first thing I noticed was that, at the time, if you took samples, they had to be stored in a fridge for X number of days at a particular temperature and then they had to be destroyed within another number of days. In almost 60% of the stations I visited, none of this had happened.
So I understand what the Minister is saying: that unnecessary facial recognition photographs will be destroyed instantly. But I would feel much happier if there was some process for ensuring that that is being done and a way of checking that. I am pleased to hear that there is going to be a debate on what guardrails are needed—because they are desperately needed—but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Return to unauthorised encampments: prohibited period(1) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended as follows.(2) In section 60C(3) (offence relating to residing on land without consent in or with a vehicle) for “12” substitute “three”.(3) In section 61 (power to remove trespassers on land)—(a) in subsection (4)(b) for “prohibited period” substitute “period of three months beginning with the day on which the direction was given”;(b) omit subsection (4ZA).(4) In section 62 (supplementary powers of seizure)—(a) in subsection (1)(b) for “prohibited period” substitute “period of three months beginning with the day on which the direction was given”;(b) omit subsection (1A).(5) In section 62B(2) (failure to comply with direction under section 62A: offences) for “twelve” substitute “three”.(6) In section 62C(2) (failure to comply with direction under section 62A: seizure) for “twelve” substitute “three”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause changes the period within which a person directed to leave an unauthorised encampment must not return from twelve months to three.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 375 in my name I pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Whitaker for the discussions we had both in Committee and outside it, which resulted in the amendment being brought forward today on Report.
Amendment 375 addresses the no-return period for individuals directed to leave an unauthorised encampment. This new clause restores the previous three-month period, replacing the 12-month prohibitions introduced by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The Government remain firmly committed to ensuring that communities feel safe, public spaces are protected and unauthorised encampments do not cause disproportionate disruption or distress. At the same time, we must ensure that enforcement powers are applied fairly and in a way that respects the rights of all individuals, including those in the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. I thank my noble friend Lady Whitaker for her campaigning on this issue, and for meeting with me and representatives from the all-party group for Gypsy, Roma and Traveller Communities earlier this year.
As she knows, and as I hope the House will be aware, in May 2024, the High Court found that setting and extending the no-return period to 12 months was incompatible with ECHR rights. This was because of the limited availability of authorised transit sites, meaning that individuals could be placed at risk of criminal sanction even when no lawful alternative was available. In light of this ruling, on their election in 2024 the new Government examined this, and it is right that we use this Bill to remedy that incompatibility.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Let me clear up something straight away. There is not going to be a meeting of minds between me and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on the abolition of the ECHR. I will leave it at that. There is no common ground between us. Yes, we are generally looking at some reforms, but there is no common ground on abolishing the lot, which is what the noble Lord seeks to achieve. There is blue/red/orange water between us on this; I will leave it at that.
On the question raised, I am grateful for the support of my noble friend Lady Whitaker and the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville. We have moved in light of the judgments that were made, and we have instated the three-month period in this legislation. That is the right thing to do in relation to the legislation. I think the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, accepted that, while having a wider target. At the moment, I will take his acceptance of that as support. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, for her support, and I am grateful for the constant chivvying of my noble friend Lady Whitaker on this issue.
In my opening remarks, in anticipation of what would be said, I said that the Government agree that planning appropriately for the housing and accommodation needs of our diverse communities is essential in supporting sustainable and inclusive growth. It is important, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, just reminded the House, that the responsibility to set pitch and plot targets for Traveller sites lies with local authorities, and absolutely right that they must identify specific deliverable sites sufficient for five years against targets. As I said in my opening remarks, a revised National Planning Policy Framework and the Planning Policy for Traveller Sites were published at the end of December 2024, following extensive consultation.
The Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government is currently consulting on a new national planning framework. That consultation runs until 10 March. The noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, and my noble friend Lady Whitaker mentioned the need to look at more sites. That is actively being looked at. Despite the wide reservations of the noble Lord, but with the support of the Liberal Democrat Benches and my colleague Lady Whitaker, I hope that my amendments can be accepted by the House tonight.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Harassment of a person in their home(1) The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 is amended as follows.(2) In section 42 (police directions stopping harassment etc of a person in their home), in subsection (1)(b)—(a) omit the “or” at the end of sub-paragraph (i);(b) after sub-paragraph (ii) insert—“(iii) that they should not have done something they were entitled or required to do; or(iv) that they should have done something they were not under any obligation to do;”.(3) In section 42A (offence of harassment etc of a person in their home), in subsection (1)(b)—(a) omit the “or” at the end of sub-paragraph (i);(b) after sub-paragraph (ii) insert—“(iii) that they should not have done something they were entitled or required to do; or(iv) that they should have done something they were not under any obligation to do;”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment expands sections 42 and 42A of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (protests outside homes) to cover protests about something done in the past.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(1) The Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 is amended as follows.Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 154, page 205, line 6.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I will address Amendment 380 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Strasburger. I am grateful to them for raising an issue that deserves careful consideration. The amendment would prevent authorised persons using information held on the Driving and Vehicle Licensing Agency database for biometric searches using facial recognition technology. It is right to ensure that Parliament scrutinises these emerging powers thoroughly. Public trust in policing is vital, and it is only through open debate and clear safeguards that such trust can be maintained.
The DVLA database contains photographs and personal information provided by millions of law-abiding citizens for the specific purpose of licensing drivers, and it is therefore entirely understandable that noble Lords should question whether it is appropriate for that information to be used in other contexts, particularly the context of advanced biometric searches. The principle that personal data should not be repurposed without clear justification is one that many of us across the House share.
However, while the concerns behind this amendment are sincere and valid, I fear that it is unnecessary and ultimately misguided. It would risk undermining the ability of our police and law enforcement agencies to prevent and investigate serious crime. First, it is important to recognise the operational value that carefully regulated facial recognition tools can provide to modern policing. The technology, when used responsibly, can assist officers in identifying suspects in serious crime, locating dangerous offenders and protecting the public in situations where time is of the essence. It can be particularly valuable when investigating crimes involving unidentified individuals captured on CCTV or other images.
The police already rely on a range of databases and identification tools to perform these tasks. Photographs from custody suites, passport records and other lawful sources have long assisted the police in identifying suspects and victims alike. Facial recognition technology represents in many ways a technological evolution of that long-standing investigative practice. The amendment before us would place a blanket prohibition on the use of DVLA images for biometric searches involving facial recognition. Such prohibition risks creating an artificial and potentially harmful limitation on investigative capability. If a suspect’s image appears on CCTV and the only high-quality image available for comparison is contained within a DVLA database, the amendment would prevent police even conducting that comparison. We must ask ourselves whether that is a proportionate outcome.
Secondly, it is worth emphasising that the use of facial recognition technology by police forces in the United Kingdom is not taking place in a regulatory vacuum. The deployment of such technologies is already subject to a framework of legal safeguards, oversight and guidance. Police forces must operate within the boundaries of data protection law, including the principles established under the UK general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018. Their activities are subject to oversight by bodies such as the Information Commissioner’s Office and, where appropriate, the courts. Moreover, the use of live facial recognition by police has already been subject to significant judicial scrutiny. The courts have made it clear that deployments must be proportionate and transparent, and accompanied by appropriate safeguards. That jurisprudence has helped shape operational guidance and policing practice in this area.
Given that context, I question whether it is wise for Parliament to impose a sweeping statutory ban in relation to one database. Doing so risks pre-empting the careful regulatory balance that is already evolving through legislation, oversight and case law. That does not mean that the concerns raised by the amendment should be dismissed—far from it. The growth of biometric technologies demands a clear and robust legislative framework. Many Members across this House have rightly called for greater clarity about how facial recognition should be governed in the future. I feel the same. Questions of transparency, accountability, accuracy and bias must continue to be examined with great care.
However, those broader questions should be addressed through a comprehensive approach to biometric governance rather than through a single amendment targeting one database in isolation. If Parliament concludes that additional statutory safeguards are required for facial recognition technology then we should consider them holistically, ensuring that any rules are consistent, proportionate and grounded in operational reality. A piecemeal prohibition risks creating unintended consequences while failing to resolve the underlying policy debate.
For those reasons, while I commend the spirit in which the amendment has been brought forward, I regret that I cannot support it. Instead, I hope that the House will continue the broader necessary conversation about how facial recognition technologies should be regulated, ensuring that we protect civil liberties and the ability of our police to keep our communities safe.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, this has been a useful debate. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling the amendment, and to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for speaking in support of it. I am grateful for the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which echo some of the points that I will make. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed to one of the arguments that I will make: that access to the data will be subject to a statutory code of practice to ensure that its use is appropriate.
I remind noble Lords of the purpose of Clause 154: it is simply about bringing legislation up to date, which is what I said in Committee when we debated this matter. As a result of technical changes to the way police and law enforcement access driving licence data, it has become clear that we need to improve the DVLA data access regime by setting out clearly in statute—which is what Clause 154 does—which persons can access DVLA driving licence data. The legislation provides additional clarity on this issue.
The measure will enable us, through secondary legislation made under these new powers—this goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—to expand the purposes for which DVLA data may be accessed automatically to include policing or law enforcement purposes. This means that the police will have another tool to cut crime and keep the public safe, in line with the commitment by chief officers to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry when investigating an offence. I emphasise that access to the data will be subject to a statutory code of practice to ensure that its use is appropriate.
We are clear that there will be strong safeguards around the use of DVLA data, which, as I have said, will be introduced via regulations made under the new provisions. We debated earlier government Amendment 382, which ensures that these regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure in both Houses, in line with a recommendation from the Constitution Committee.
We want to ensure that officers undergo training prior to being able to access information. The police are already legally required to consult with local communities. Extensive audits of who has accessed DVLA driving licence data are maintained. It is already standard practice that each time the DVLA driver database is accessed by a police officer, the details of what information is accessed and for what purpose is logged. This will continue to be the case once the revised measure is implemented.
On the issue of facial recognition technology, I want to make it clear to all noble Lords who have signed this amendment, including the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that police forces do not conduct biometric facial recognition searches against images contained on the DVLA database. Officers use the DVLA database for day-to-day policing matters. Anybody who has watched a police programme on a Monday night—when they get the opportunity in the recess to do so—will have at some point seen a police officer pull over a car and look at an individual who says, “I haven’t got my licence with me”, and tell them they are Jimmy Jones of X address. The police officer then wants to check that they are Jimmy Jones of X address, and so they access the DVLA database. Nine times out of 10, on the police shows that I watch on a Monday night during recess, it is a false name, and therefore there is police action accordingly. That is the purpose for which the police currently use the database.
As I said in our earlier debate on Amendment 374, the use of facial recognition technology in all circumstances is currently subject to safeguards, such as the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act. As I have said in previous discussions, any use of facial recognition technology will be subject to the outcome of the consultation that we finished on 10 February. That will be completed in about 12 weeks and, by the summer, we will have government proposals which the noble Baroness, along with both Houses of Parliament, can scrutinise, to achieve some view on whatever the Government propose following the outcome of that consultation.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that, if the amendment were agreed by the Government tonight then the police officer who stopped somebody on the street—potentially a drunk driver, an unlicensed driver or a driver with no insurance—would not be able to access the DVLA database. That goes to the very points that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made in his speech.
This is not about mass surveillance. It is about using the DVLA database in an appropriate way—logged, recorded and monitored by the police to ensure that we check that person A is actually the right person who can drive that vehicle at that particular time. It is not, with due respect to noble Lords, mass surveillance. It is proper use of police technology to ensure that the DVLA database helps catch bad actors in the act of doing bad things. I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, there is no chance at all that I am going to withdraw the amendment, but I think the Minister knows that. We are not on the same page on this. How on earth can the Government justify taking information that people have given for one purpose and using it for something else? It is totally and utterly disgraceful. People have given their photographs to get a driving licence; it is wrong that they can now be repurposed to be checked by police. Just let me finish the sentence. There is nothing wrong with the Government, in their consultation, saying to people, “We want to repurpose the DVLA driving licence database because it would be really helpful to police. Would you be willing to agree to this?”, but they did not say that. They have just taken it.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Does the noble Baroness think that a police officer, at 11 pm, on a street here in Westminster, should not access the DVLA database to check that the person is who they say they are? If she thinks that, she would really be blowing a hole in every Monday night television programme that I have ever watched.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I suggest that the Minister has been watching too many of these television programmes. There is a complete lack of transparency. The Information Commissioner’s Office had to learn about the use of passport databases through media reports, rather than Home Office disclosure, even though this appears to have been happening since 2019. It is just so completely and utterly wrong. If people had given their information for it be used for those purposes, it would be fair enough and no problem at all, but they did not and the Government have taken it without permission. The whole situation is absolutely appalling.
There is the potential for 50 million drivers to be put on a permanent database and to be checked every single day. Of course, the police want it; I would want it if I were the police. It will make their lives so much easier. It will make it very easy for them to check everything they need to check, but that should not be the purpose of this.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(3A) The requirement in subsection (3) may be satisfied by consultation carried out wholly or partly before this section comes into force.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the Secretary of State’s duty to consult in preparing a code of practice under section 71B of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (inserted by clause 154) may be satisfied by pre-commencement consultation.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Code of practice relating to non-criminal hate incidentsIn the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, omit—(a) sections 60 and 61 (code of practice about police processing of personal data relating to hate incidents), and(b) the italic heading before section 60.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment repeals sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.
Lord Hanson of Flint
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 383, which repeals the statutory code relating to non-crime hate incidents issued under Sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. Consideration of the review undertaken by the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council has shown that to be the appropriate policy to take forward. The interim findings of the review commissioned, in conjunction with the College of Policing, by the former Home Secretary were published in October. They were clear that the existing system no longer operates as intended and should be replaced with a clearer, more proportionate model.
Non-crime hate incidents were originally introduced following the landmark Stephen Lawrence inquiry. Their intent—to gather information to prevent crime, support investigations and safeguard the vulnerable—remains as relevant today as it did 30 years ago, and we remain committed to safeguarding against hostility and collecting information to support an effective policing response. However, the environment in which policing operates has evolved significantly since that inquiry and over time non-crime hate incidents have expanded beyond their original intention. The growth of social media in particular and online polarisation has drawn the police into disputes that fall outside their core duties. Police officers must be able to focus on catching criminals, cutting crime and ensuring public safety, and the present statutory code has not provided the clarity needed to support that focus. It must therefore be revoked.
The College of Policing—I am pleased to see its chair, the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, in his place—and the National Police Chiefs’ Council are clear that the current system is not fit for purpose. They intend to set out a more appropriate framework that ensures that recording is proportionate, clearer and firmly focused on the most serious incidents to ensure the police are not drawn into matters they should not be drawn into. It will do this by tightening the definition of an incident, raising the recording threshold, moving from recording all incidents that are a cause for concern to capturing only those that relate to core policing purposes. These reforms will be supported by robust guidance and training so that the incidents are handled appropriately. The new framework has been developed by police experts in consultation with community representatives. It will, I believe, strike the right balance between safeguarding vulnerable communities and protecting lawful freedom of expression by ensuring that recording is consistent and focused on genuine risk.
The amendment before the House today repeals the statutory framework to facilitate the introduction of a new framework. Commencement will be timed to ensure an orderly transition aligned with the introduction of the replacement framework. As I have indicated to the House previously, further detail will be set out following the publication of the college’s final report, which I expect in very short order in the coming weeks. The report is going to the National Police Chiefs’ Council for consideration next week and I expect it to be published by the College of Policing shortly afterwards.
Amendment 383 will end a system that policing experts agree no longer works. However, the original intention behind non-crime hate incidents to help prevent crime and safeguard the vulnerable remains important. Our commitment to tackling hate remains, as witnessed by the amendments we brought forward last week that were approved by this House, but the mechanism by which the police assess and record information will change, with a higher threshold for police involvement. We will continue to safeguard our communities but through a clearer, more proportionate framework that works. When that is brought forward, I will make sure that the results are published and that noble Lords, as well as Members of the House of Commons, can see the outcome of that final report once the National Police Chiefs’ Council has issued it for clearance. The amendment enables the changes that I have explained.
I will respond to Amendment 387B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Young, once I have heard noble Lords, but for now I beg to move the amendment.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I support Amendment 387B. I declare my interest as a director of the Free Speech Union.
I am grateful to the Minister for summarising the final report of the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council on non-crime hate incidents, for the courtesy he has shown me and the co-sponsors of this amendment in the run-up to this debate, and for arranging for me and others to be briefed by Sir Andy Marsh and his team at the College of Policing about the recommendations in the final report, which I will get to shortly.
As I made clear to the House in Committee, I have long-standing concerns that the investigation and recording of non-crime hate incidents has been a huge waste of police time and had a chilling effect on free speech. According to a report for Policy Exchange published in November 2024, police in England and Wales are spending an estimated 60,000 hours a year investigating and recording NCHIs—non-crimes. That is time that could be spent solving actual crimes. Based on FoI requests submitted by the Telegraph and others, the Free Speech Union estimates that over a quarter of a million NCHIs have been recorded since they were first introduced in 2014, and that is in England and Wales alone. That is an average of more than 65 a day.
Why so many? Because if a hate incident is reported to the police by a member of the public, they have little choice but to record it as an NCHI. All that is required is that the victim, or indeed any witness, believes that the incident in question was motivated by hostility towards one or more of the victim’s protected characteristics. No additional evidence is required. Examples include a man accused of whistling the theme tune to “Bob the Builder” whenever he saw his neighbour, a woman who said on social media she thought her cat was a Methodist, and two schoolgirls who told another girl in the school playground that she smelled like fish.
It is hard not to laugh, but for the people who have had NCHIs recorded against them it is no laughing matter. If you apply for a position or a voluntary role that requires you to carry out an enhanced Disclosure and Barring Service check, an NCHI can show up on your record. That is why I say that NCHIs have had a chilling effect on free speech. People are rightly concerned that, if they say something that another person takes offence at, it can permanently blot their copybook and may prevent them getting a job as a teacher or a carer, or volunteering at a charity like the Samaritans. There is also the broader concern that the amount of time the police are spending on investigating and recording non-crimes is undermining public confidence in the police.
That is why I welcome the recommendations that the Minister has shared with us. It sounds like we have finally seen the back of NCHIs—something that the Free Speech Union has been campaigning for for six years now. Assuming that the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the Secretary of State sign off on these proposals, the kind of incidents that were recorded as NCHIs in the past will in future be recorded, as I understand it, as anti-social behaviour incidents, and only those that meet the higher threshold—that is, that recording the incident is considered necessary for the prevention or detection of a crime or for another policing purpose, and it complies with the new recording guidance.
I am particularly encouraged by what we have heard about the new guidance. We have been assured that it will have due regard to the right to freedom of expression and in that way, we hope, protect the police from being dragged into bad-tempered arguments on social media as well as petty disputes between neighbours. In future, if someone calls a control room to complain about a supposedly offensive remark they have seen on Twitter or overheard across the garden fence, the call handler can say, “I’m sorry, but that’s not a policing matter”. That is all to the good, and I take this opportunity to congratulate the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council on producing such a sensible report. This is a welcome dose of common sense that I hope will go some way to restoring public confidence in the police.
Nevertheless, I do not intend not to press the amendment. Our amendment would not prevent the police recording incidents where doing so served a legitimate policing purpose, even in some circumstances logging those incidents on an intelligent management system. Noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, raised concerns about that during the debate in Committee, and we have adapted our amendment accordingly.
To be clear, this amendment will not prevent the police recording incidents involving a hate element for intelligence-gathering purposes. However, I still have concerns that historic NCHIs could show up in enhanced DBS checks. That is why proposed subsection (5) in this amendment says that the police must not disclose historic NCHIs that would not meet the new higher recording thresholds. I think your Lordships would agree that data entries that would not be made under the new regime, but which are hanging around on police computers, must not be disclosed in enhanced DBS checks.
I have reluctantly come to accept that asking the police to comb through their databases and delete historic NCHIs that would not meet the new recording threshold would be too resource-intensive because of the sheer number that had been recorded, and that demand no longer appears in our amendment. Nevertheless, proposed subsection (5) says that any NCHIs that police come across that would not be recorded under the new regime must be deleted. I do not think that is a big ask, and it would enable people who believe NCHIs have been recorded against their names—trivial incidents that would not be recorded under the new criteria—to ask the police to delete them.
I welcome the assurance that the new recording guidance will have due regard to the right to freedom of expression, but, in the absence of putting any of these recommendations in statute, what guarantee do we have that the College of Policing, under new leadership, or a different Home Secretary, would not dispense with that requirement? Consequently, proposed subsection (4) in the amendment says:
“Guidance in relation to incident recording must have due regard to … freedom of expression”.
That brings me to a broader point. As I understand it, the Government’s plans for taking forward these recommendations—assuming they are signed off—is to include them in guidance, but not statute. The government amendment in this group will repeal the statutory basis for the current NCHI regime, thereby clearing the ground for a new regime to spring up in its place. But that new regime will be wholly reliant on guidance. I do not doubt the Minister will do what he has said he will do with the full support of my noble friend Lord Herbert, the chair of the College of Policing, Sir Andy Marsh the CEO and the chief constables on the national council. But what about their successors? What happens if a more authoritarian Government replace the current one?
The only way to future-proof these recommendations, to guarantee that this new, more sensible arrangement is not short-lived and that NCHIs do not spring back to life, Freddy Krueger-like, in a few years’ time, is to give the new regime some statutory underpinning. Proposed subsection (1) in this amendment drives a stake through the heart of NCHIs and makes sure they cannot be resurrected in the absence of primary legislation to the contrary. No Parliament can bind its successors. Indeed, if the Home Secretary wants to take up some, but not all, of the report’s recommendations, the Government could amend this amendment at Third Reading. In the meantime, I urge them to support these sensible suggestions and put them on a statutory footing.
In my view, too many of the rules governing how public authorities behave are found in guidance when they should properly be in statute. Indeed, the current NCHI regime, which I think we are all agreed is not fit for purpose, emerged from guidance issued by the College of Policing in 2014 and was not put on a statutory footing until 2022, by which time it was too late for Parliament to wrest control over it. A bureaucratic leviathan had been created in the form of ever more voluminous guidance. Let us not make the same mistake again. Something as important as what incidents reported to the police are investigated and recorded and, in some cases, disclosed in enhanced DBS checks is properly a matter for Parliament, which is why I urge your Lordships’ House to support this amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow so many excellent speeches from noble Lords across the House who recognise the problems that non-crime hate incidents have caused. I am very pleased to see that there is much agreement on this matter, and I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, for his update, as it were. I am also particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, for her very important intervention.
Like many of my noble friends and many noble Lords around the House, I fully support Amendment 387B tabled by my noble friend Lord Young of Acton and the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger and Lord Hogan-Howe. The amendment would bring about the abolition of the category of so-called non-crime hate incidents. If this were to become the law of the land, NCHIs would be permanently dead. Their recording and retention would end, and we could finally put this well-intentioned but ultimately damaging experiment to bed.
We have had many debates during the passage of the Bill about the various tenets of hate crime laws and aggravating factors based on hostility. Indeed, only last Wednesday, the Government were successful in expanding their enormous web of legislation even further, despite our best efforts to stop them. We have lost that battle for now, but I reiterate my opposition to those provisions. While related to the debate we had last Wednesday, the matter before us now is rather different. Non-crime hate incidents are not hate crimes; they are something quite different. They represent the recording by police of incidents that are not crimes at all.
The House will have heard the background to NCHIs from other noble Lords, so I will not repeat that, but their establishment in 2014 via guidance issued by the College of Policing was motivated by sincere intentions. They were supposed to assist police in identifying patterns of hostility in communities that might escalate into criminal behaviour, and that objective was understandable, but in practice, the policy has drifted far beyond that limited purpose. We now find ourselves in a position where individuals can have a police record created about them for conduct that is entirely lawful, simply because another person perceives it to have been motivated by hostility. That is a very serious matter indeed.
The threshold for the recording of these incidents is ridiculously low. A person needs only to be concerned by another’s conduct in order for them to report such conduct to the police for recording as an NCHI.
The matter has quite rightly received serious scrutiny in recent years, and I particularly want to reference the independent review conducted by the College of Policing and led by my noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs into the use of non-crime hate incidents. The review acknowledged a number of very significant concerns, and it recognised that the recording of such incidents had in some cases created a chilling effect on free expression. It also identified problems with the threshold for recording and the potential for disproportionate interference in the lives of individuals who had committed no crime.
The review led to revised guidance from the College of Policing intended to raise the threshold for recording NCHIs and better protect freedom of expression. I welcome that effort. It was a step in the right direction.
The review also demonstrated something more fundamental—that the concept itself is deeply problematic. We have seen, over the years, a number of examples where the recording of non-crime hate incidents has been plainly vexatious, trivial or disproportionate. In one widely reported case, a former police officer found himself the subject of a non-crime hate incident after engaging in a debate on social media about gender identity. There are several examples that have been given in the debate, so I shall not provide further evidence. There have been cases where individuals have had police records created simply for sharing satirical material online, expressing controversial opinions or engaging in perfectly lawful political debate. We should pause and consider what this means in practice.
In some circumstances, such records may be disclosed during enhanced background checks conducted by the Disclosure and Barring Service. That means that an allegation about a non-criminal matter could potentially affect a person’s employment prospects, particularly in professions involving children or vulnerable adults. There have been documented cases where individuals have feared precisely that outcome.
I also recall the remarks of Ministers during our Committee debates, in which the Government acknowledged the importance of protecting free speech in this area, and the Home Office has repeatedly recognised the need to strike the right balance. Indeed, the Home Secretary herself has spoken publicly about the importance of ensuring that policing does not stray into the regulation of lawful expression. She has emphasised that police officers must focus on real crime and genuine threats to public safety. I agree with those sentiments, but I suggest that the time has come to move beyond incremental reform. The fundamental difficulty is that the concept of a non-crime hate incident places the police in the position of adjudicating perceived hostility in circumstances where no law has been broken. That is an uncomfortable and inappropriate role for the police service.
I put on record my thanks to the Minister for making the time to meet us and to the College of Policing for the briefing it gave on its plans for the future recording of such incidents. It was helpful of the Minister to set out some of that when we opened.
As my noble friend Lord Young of Acton said, the proposals by the college are certainly welcome. It has been clear that NCHIs will not exist any more and that any incident where hostility is a motivating factor will now be recorded as an ASB incident. Critically, these will not be disclosed in enhanced DBS checks. The college has also said that it will be providing updated guidance and training to clarify the higher standards of proof required for the recording of such incidents, and a new triaging method.
This is all welcome, but that does not mean that all is perfect. I still have some concerns and will briefly outline them. My first concern is that, if the abolition of NCHIs is not embedded in statute, there is the possibility of them being brought back to life in the future. All it would take is a change in Home Secretary, or a new Prime Minister, who could reintroduce them by the back door. If all we have is guidance, there is no legal safeguard to prevent them returning. I would feel much more comfortable knowing that they are gone for good and will never be resurrected from the dead.
Secondly, it must be explicitly acknowledged that any guidance produced by the College of Policing about the future recording of incidents will have freedom of expression at its heart. If this had been the case when the NCHI regime was created, we might not have seen as many unintended consequences. It is a fairly basic requirement, which is why I am pleased that my noble friend has included that in his amendment.
Thirdly, the issue of historic NCHI recordings needs to be addressed. Given that the Government have now agreed to abolish them, it does not seem right that thousands will still exist and may very well be disclosed in enhanced DBS checks. That is a matter of fairness. Individuals should not carry the burden of a police record relating to conduct that was never a crime in the first place. That has now been acknowledged as a mistake.
However, like my noble friend, I appreciate the point made by the College of Policing: that to require their deletion within a few months, as the original amendment sought, would be a highly labour-intensive process. If our purpose is to prevent the police wasting time and allow them to do their job, requiring them to sit down and trawl through every single file does not make sense. However, where NCHI recordings are discovered, they should be deleted and they most certainly should not be disclosed. It is sensible to have the guarantee in statute.
The college and the Government have made commendable progress and I reiterate that I am genuinely pleased at the direction of travel. However, we still need some guardrails. That is why we on these Benches believe that there must be a provision in legislation to ensure that NCHIs are gone, that they do not return and that the new regime is more transparent, reasonable and respectful of freedom of expression. For that reason, I very much support Amendment 378B and, if my noble friend does press it to a Division, we will follow him into the Content Lobby.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for the discussion and, in winding up this debate, I put on record my thanks to Sir Andy Marsh of the College of Policing for the work he has done on this exercise of examining non-crime hate incidents. I remind the House that we are here today with the amendments I have tabled and with the outline that I have given from the College of Policing response, which the chair of the College of Policing has also endorsed. We are here today because the then Home Secretary, my right honourable friend Yvette Cooper, commissioned that review and asked for a report to be produced. That is why we are here today: we have taken action.
I listened with great interest to the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, talking about his experiences. That was not the responsibility of this Government. We are trying to change that regime. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, that we are trying to change that regime. I say to all noble Lords who spoke that we are trying to change that regime. However, I say to my noble friend Lady Lawrence of Clarendon that, in doing so, we want to ensure that we keep the essence of what that regime was established for: to identify precisely the issues that she mentioned in her very powerful contribution. The intent—to gather information, to prevent crime, to understand tensions, to look at potential areas where tensions could arise, to support investigations and to safeguard the vulnerable—remains as relevant today as it did 30 years ago.
I say to the noble Lords, Lord Lebedev, Lord Fuller, Lord Young of Acton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, who have spoken on this issue, that we understand the issue. However, I hope that we are making some movement to address the concerns, at the same time as keeping the essence of why those non-crime hate incidents needed to be recorded in the first place, and to have the revisions that the College of Policing have brought forward. Once they are endorsed, we will look at how we put those into practice in due course. I hope that will help both the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
I thank the Minister for giving way. I am struggling to understand what the rationale would be for disclosing in an enhanced DBS check an NCHI which, under the new recording thresholds, would not have been recorded. The Minister elided the issue by suggesting that the police—a chief constable—might think in future it would be sensible to disclose relevant information if someone is applying to work with children or vulnerable adults. But if the police would not have recorded that historic NCHI under the new higher recording threshold—because it would not be considered to have any police or intelligence value, or value in the detection or prevention of a crime—what justification could there be for disclosing it in an enhanced DBS check? If there is not one, what will it cost the Government to put it in statute that it cannot happen?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lord is asking for the deletion of historic records. That is the important point I am trying to make. If the chief officer determines that that non-conviction information should be disclosed—I go back to the 4,920 disclosures out of 4.1 million, including all matters for an enhanced DBS check—then it is important that we do not fetter the chief officer’s hands and apply a prohibition to disclose information which may be relevant to individuals. That may be a difference between us and, as the noble Lord, Lord David of Gower, said, we may well test that in a Division when the time comes.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, made the absolutely right point that we need to ensure that we do not repeal Sections 60 and 61 until a replacement framework is in place. We will try to do that. As I said at the start of the debate and in the comments I have just made, it is essential that police and others continue to have the ability to monitor hate and hostility to prevent crime and safeguard the vulnerable. That is also the assurance I give to my noble friend Lady Lawrence.
In summary, the Government’s amendment is designed to repeal the statutory guidance, restore focus and reduce administrative burdens. We have made those changes because of the type of incidents noble Lords referred to. Amendment 387B would risk creating precisely the opposite effect and, for those reasons, the Government cannot support it. I invite the noble Lord not to move his amendment when the time comes, but, in the meantime—tonight—I commend Amendment 383 because, having considered and reviewed the matter, it is the right thing to do. In establishing the new regime, we will make sure that we keep the essence of the important matters from the former regime.