Crime and Policing Bill

Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Report (4th Day) (Continued)

20:45

Clause 141: Powers of senior officers to impose conditions on protests

Amendment 374

Moved by

[Baroness Doocey]

374: Clause 141, page 182, line 42, at end insert—
“(4) After section 14, insert—“14ZZA Imposition of conditions: live facial recognitionPrior to imposing conditions under either section 12 (imposing conditions on public processions) or 14 (imposing conditions on public assemblies), the senior officer of the police force in question must confirm that live facial recognition will not be in use, unless a new statutory code of practice for the use of live facial recognition surveillance in public spaces in England and Wales has previously been presented to, and approved by, both Houses of Parliament.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that police cannot use live facial recognition technology when imposing conditions on public assemblies or processions under sections 12 or 14, unless a new, specific code of practice governing its use in public spaces has first been formally approved by both Houses of Parliament. It is intended to safeguard public privacy and civil liberties by requiring democratic oversight before this surveillance technology is deployed in such contexts.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 374 seeks to place statutory guardrails on the use of live facial recognition, echoing the recent calls from the Equality and Human Rights Commission. We recognise that this technology can assist the police in tackling serious crime, but it must be used responsibly. Its rapid spread into everyday policing before essential safeguards or parliamentary scrutiny are in place raises profound constitutional concerns, particularly in the policing of dissent. Amendment 374 addresses the most contentious use of this technology, at protests and public assemblies. It would prohibit live facial recognition when police impose conditions under the Public Order Act unless and until Parliament had approved a new statutory code of practice. These are moments when people exercise their fundamental rights to free expression and peaceful assembly; rights which depend on participants feeling safe from tracking or retrospective profiling.

This Bill already tightens protest offences and curbs anonymity; layering unregulated facial scanning on top of those restrictions risks further shrinking the space for lawful dissent. Many people will have perfectly legitimate reasons to think twice before attending a demonstration if they know their face may be scanned. Without clarity on how watch-lists used at protests are compiled, people have no way of knowing whether they are being flagged for genuine risk or for the views they hold. At a protest, the chilling effect is not just about being scanned; it is the fear of political profiling. If the Government cannot clearly define who is a legitimate target for facial recognition at a peaceful assembly, then such deployments are, by definition, arbitrary and cannot meet the legal test of necessity and proportionality.

Operationally, the emerging concerns around false positives and the significantly increased risk to those from minority-ethnic backgrounds are a real headache for policing large public gatherings. Deployment without a code of practice will likely result in dozens of wrongful stops to verify identities, with confrontations that divert officers from real security threats and de-escalating crowds. We have already seen how damaging these errors can be. Just in the last few weeks, an innocent south Asian man was arrested at his home in Southampton for a burglary 100 miles away in Milton Keynes. He was handcuffed and held for nearly 10 hours because he was wrongly matched to CCTV footage by a Home Office algorithm that its own research shows produces significantly higher false positives for black and Asian faces. Last month, a man was publicly ejected from his local supermarket after staff misinterpreted a facial recognition alert.

These are not minor glitches to be shrugged off. They are serious violations that erode public trust, particularly in communities already wary of state power. The Government’s consultation is welcome, but it is far too slow for the pace of change we see on our streets. Until Parliament has set clear rules, Amendment 374 is both necessary and proportionate. We must ensure that Parliament, not oblique algorithms, decides the limit of state power. I beg to move.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, we are talking today about live facial recognition at protests and why the police must not be allowed to use it until Parliament has agreed a clear and democratic code of practice. At its heart, Amendment 374 is about power and trust. Live facial recognition is not just another camera on a street corner; it is a mass surveillance tool that can scan every face in a crowd, compare people in real time against a watch-list and permanently change what it feels like to stand in the public square. Once you normalise all that at protests, you change the character of protest itself.

If people think that simply turning up at a demonstration means that their face can be scanned, logged and potentially mismatched to a suspect list, some will decide that it is safer to stay at home. That is a direct, chilling effect on the right to protest, to assemble and to speak out against, or for, the Government. We should not let that happen by stealth through a patchwork of local decisions and internal guidance that most citizens will never see. That is what is happening at the moment.

The technology itself is far from neutral. We know that facial recognition systems can and do get things wrong. They perform differently across age groups and ethnicities. A false match in the context of a protest is not a minor inconvenience. It can mean being stopped, questioned, detained or stigmatised in front of your friends, your colleagues or your community, not because of something you did but because an algorithm made a guess. Allowing that at political protests without proper rules and oversight is an invitation to injustice.

It is not enough to say, “Trust the police. We have internal policies”. The question here is not whether any particular chief constable is well-intentioned; it is whether the state should be able to scan and track people at political gatherings without Parliament having debated, defined and limited that power. In a democracy, if the Government want tools that can alter the balance of power between citizen and state, they must come to Parliament, set out the case and accept constraints.

That is why a publicly debated statutory code of practice matters. It is where we answer basic questions that are currently left in the grey zone. In what circumstances, if any, is live facial recognition at a protest justified? Who sets the watch-lists and on what criteria? What happens to images of people who are not of interest? Are they actually deleted? If so, how quickly? Who can access them and for what purposes? What independent oversight exists when things go wrong? Until those questions are answered openly, the use of live facial recognition at protests rests on unpublished risk assessments and technical documents that ordinary citizens cannot challenge and that elected representatives cannot easily amend. That is the opposite of how intrusive powers should be operated in a liberal democracy.

We should also be honest about the precedent. If we accept live facial recognition at protests now, without a code, it will be used more often and for more purposes later. Once the infrastructure is there and the practice is normalised, it will be very hard to row back. The time to set limits is before the rollout, not after the abuses. Police should not have, without parliamentary approval, the ability to quietly turn every protest into a data-harvesting exercise, watching not just the few who pose a risk but the many who are simply exercising their rights.

The principle is simple: if live facial recognition is to be used at all in the context of political protest, it must be under a clear and democratically approved code of practice, debated in Parliament, tested against our human rights obligations and subject to real oversight and redress. Until that is in place, the police should not be allowed to deploy this technology at protests.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

This is another context where there has to be a fair balance between competing interests. One can easily see that the use of live facial recognition is a vital policing tool. However, as has been explained, it has an adverse impact on privacy. What concerns me is that the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act require not merely that steps taken are necessary and proportionate, which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, rightly referred to, but it is a requirement that any restrictions or provisions in such a context must be prescribed by law.

I am very concerned that having police authorities and police officers exercising a pure discretion, without any statutory guidance or code of practice, may well fail that legal test of prescribed by law, because of the uncertainty and the excess of discretion. Therefore, the Government would be well advised in this sensitive context to ensure that there is statutory guidance and a statutory code of practice. The Minister may be unable to accept this amendment, but I hope he will be able to tell the House that steps will be taken to provide clear guidance to police authorities as to the use of this technology.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 374, which I have signed, but also to Amendment 430, which I tabled.

The use of live facial recognition in our public spaces is an extraordinary expansion of state power that currently exists in a legal vacuum. We are not Luddites on these Benches; we recognise the utility of technology, but we must ensure that live facial recognition is a targeted tool used under the rule of law and not a blanket surveillance net that chills the right to move freely and anonymously in our streets. The use of live facial recognition technology in public spaces poses a profound challenge to our civil liberties that cannot be met purely by internal police guidance. We are witnessing a fundamental shift in the nature of British policing—a shift, if you like, from the line-fishing of traditional human observation to the deep ocean trawling of automated mass surveillance.

Amendments 374 and 430 collectively seek to provide the democratic and judicial safeguards currently missing from what the experts have called a regulatory lacuna or legislative void. Amendment 374 prohibits the use of LFR during public assemblies or processions, unless a specific code of practice has been approved by both Houses of Parliament, as my noble friends have explained. In a free society, individuals should not have to pay the price of handing over their sensitive biometric data just to engage in democratic protest. We must safeguard public privacy and civil liberties by requiring democratic oversight before this technology is deployed against those exercising their right to assembly. We cannot have policing by algorithm without democratic oversight.

The current lack of oversight creates a documented chilling effect. Research by the Ada Lovelace Institute indicates that nearly one-third of the public are uncomfortable with police use of LFR, and up to 38% of young Londoners, for instance, have stated they would stay away from protests or public events if they knew that this technology was being used. We cannot allow our public squares to become spaces where citizens are treated as walking barcodes or a nation of suspects.

Critically, Amendment 430 would establish that the use of LFR in public spaces must be limited to narrowly defined serious cases and require judicial approval. It would provide the fundamental safeguards our society requires. It would prohibit the use of LFR by any authority unless it was for the investigation of serious crimes and had received prior judicial authorisation specifying the scope and duration of its use. We must ensure that this technology is used as a targeted tool, not a blanket surveillance net.

21:00

The Government maintain that internal police authorisation is sufficient. However, the 2020 Bridges judgment found the existing legal framework woefully inadequate, noting that far too much discretion is left to individual officers regarding where LFR is deployed and who is added to watch-lists. The constitutional principle is clear: if the police require a judicial warrant to invade a single home, they should certainly require judicial approval before scanning the sensitive biometric data of tens of thousands of innocent citizens in a public square.

Furthermore, we must challenge the narrative that this is a precise tool. Independent reviews have found that the Met’s trials were verifiably accurate in only 19% of cases and approximately 87% of alerts generated by its system. We cannot allow technological deployment to race ahead of democratic deliberation. These amendments would ensure that this technology is used proportionately and under the rule of law. We must act now to prevent what has been rightly called a shortcut to a widespread surveillance state. I should just say that National Physical Laboratory studies confirm the problems. While the most recent NPL study last year noted improvements in algorithm performance, it confirmed that demographic differentials persist. Specifically, when settings are adjusted to a standard threshold, false positive rates remain higher for individuals with darker skin tones compared to those with lighter skin tones.

The Government often cite minimal discrepancies at specific technical settings. However, in operational use, police forces frequently lower the similarity threshold to increase the number of matches, which exponentially increases the risk of misidentification for women and minority groups. For all these reasons, we need to introduce the controls set out in Amendments 374 and 430.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support these amendments because it is very important that live facial recognition should be subject to legal oversight and judicial oversight; there should be a law. We should see such amendments in the context of an overall parliamentary democracy which believes in lawful freedom of expression, whether it is in Parliament, the newspapers or public places. Live facial recognition without a proper legal framework could be used in an undemocratic fashion. Police, sadly, will find evidence very often for whomever they wish to convict. I know that is not necessarily the case, but if you are under pressure as a police officer to make your case stick, you will trawl whatever evidence you can to get it through to the stage of being investigated. I urge your Lordships to support these amendments because they will strengthen our democracy, and it is important that people should feel that they live in a free country, not in one subject to the sort of powers we see exercised in other countries, such as China.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments returns us to an issue debated at some length in Committee: the use of live facial recognition technology in policing. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling these amendments on this important topic.

As set out in Committee, we on these Benches cannot support proposals that would severely restrict or pre-empt the operational use of live facial recognition by law enforcement. Live facial recognition is an increasingly important tool in modern policing. Used lawfully and proportionately, it has already demonstrated its value in identifying serious offenders, locating wanted individuals and preventing violent crime before it occurs. It has been deployed particularly effectively in high-risk environments such as transport hubs and major public events, where rapid identification can make a decisive difference in protecting the public.

That does not mean that safeguards are unnecessary. There must always be a careful balance between the protection of civil liberties and the need to equip police with effective tools to tackle serious crime. The use of new technologies must be proportionate and subject to appropriate oversight, but the amendments before us would go significantly further than that. In different ways, they would either prohibit particular uses of the technology, place rigid statutory barriers in its way or create restrictions that would unnecessarily impede the ability of the police to deploy it where it may be most needed. Amendment 374 would prohibit the deployment of live facial recognition in the context of public assemblies or impose extensive prior authorisation requirements. It risks tying the hands of the police at precisely the moments when rapid and flexible operational decision-making may be required.

We must recognise the points raised in Committee that the Government are currently consulting on the future regulatory framework for live facial recognition. To attempt to settle these questions piecemeal through amendments to this Bill would risk creating an incomplete or inconsistent framework. While the concerns raised by noble Lords are legitimate and deserve careful consideration, we should not default to restricting a technology that has already shown its potential to disrupt serious criminality and protect the public. The challenge is not to prohibit its use but to ensure that it is deployed responsibly, lawfully and proportionately. For those reasons, we cannot support the amendments in this group. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling these amendments and to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for supporting some of the arguments that I will make in response to them. The noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Strasburger and Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, have all put their finger on their concerns around the use of this technology.

I will begin by providing a view of what live facial recognition does. It allows for real-time location of individuals of interest to the police. It scans the faces of those passing a camera in real time, comparing faces against a predetermined, specific watch-list of, potentially, wanted criminals, vulnerable missing persons or individuals posing risks to public safety. If no match is made—this goes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, made—currently, the scanned face is deleted instantly. Every deployment and every specific bespoke watch-list for that deployment must have a defined policing objective, be supported by clear intelligence and ultimately be determined by humans.

Noble Lords will be aware that the use of facial recognition technology in all circumstances, including in live facial recognition, is already subject to safeguards, including those provided in the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act. I agree that there needs to be a framework, which is the nub of what I think all noble Lords have said in this debate.

The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will know that the Government had a 10-week consultation for that very purpose—to look at the issues of a legal framework where law enforcement use of biometrics, facial recognition and similar technologies could be used. The consultation ended on 12 February. I give the House an assurance that the Government intend to respond to it by the summer; we have more or less a 12-week deadline from the end of its closing, but it will be by the summer. The consultation is clear that the Government need to design a new framework and assess how the police use technologies such as facial recognition. It needs to ensure that there are safeguards, as noble Lords have mentioned, around the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, that we protect these rights and that facial recognition technology is demonstrably proportionate to the seriousness of the harm being addressed.

We are currently considering the consultation and, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, said, that should take its course. However, we intend to set out our proposals in due course, which will be subject to scrutiny by both Houses of Parliament. I hope noble Lords accept that it would not be appropriate to pre-empt the outcome of the consultation or the proposals that Government will bring forward, which we will ensure have new legal framework for the use of facial recognition technology by law enforcement agencies.

While I think that the points made by noble Lords have real merit, I hope that, with the comments I have made and the reassurances I have given, we will save the difficult debate about regulation, how it operates and what the proposals mean for a proper legal framework for another day, which will come very soon. I hope the noble Baroness will—

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down, could he give the House some indication of when the day will come when we have a debate on some meaningful proposals? Could he also tell the House whether those proposals will cover the use of this technology by the private sector—which is happening a lot already in retail—as well as the public sector?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As I have tried to indicate to the noble Lord, we have had a consultation that finished on 12 February, and we intend to respond to it by the summer. Currently, what that response will be is to be formulated, so I will not give him chapter and verse on when and how. However, if legislation is required, we will look at that at the earliest opportunity, as we always do.

I cannot pre-empt the King’s Speech and I cannot give a timetable on that, but I will give a timetable when we respond to the consultation. We should remember that the Government initiated the consultation—we were not forced into it—to get to a position whereby the very issues that noble Lords have mentioned today are considered. With those comments, I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and all noble Lords who have spoken. I have no doubt at all that everything the Minister said, he actually believes. But it reminds me of when I was on the Metropolitan Police Authority for the first time and I went round all the police stations in London—I think there were 32 at the time, with 32 borough commanders. The first thing I noticed was that, at the time, if you took samples, they had to be stored in a fridge for X number of days at a particular temperature and then they had to be destroyed within another number of days. In almost 60% of the stations I visited, none of this had happened.

So I understand what the Minister is saying: that unnecessary facial recognition photographs will be destroyed instantly. But I would feel much happier if there was some process for ensuring that that is being done and a way of checking that. I am pleased to hear that there is going to be a debate on what guardrails are needed—because they are desperately needed—but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 374 withdrawn.

Amendment 375

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

375: After Clause 142, insert the following new Clause—
“Return to unauthorised encampments: prohibited period(1) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended as follows.(2) In section 60C(3) (offence relating to residing on land without consent in or with a vehicle) for “12” substitute “three”.(3) In section 61 (power to remove trespassers on land)—(a) in subsection (4)(b) for “prohibited period” substitute “period of three months beginning with the day on which the direction was given”;(b) omit subsection (4ZA).(4) In section 62 (supplementary powers of seizure)—(a) in subsection (1)(b) for “prohibited period” substitute “period of three months beginning with the day on which the direction was given”;(b) omit subsection (1A).(5) In section 62B(2) (failure to comply with direction under section 62A: offences) for “twelve” substitute “three”.(6) In section 62C(2) (failure to comply with direction under section 62A: seizure) for “twelve” substitute “three”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause changes the period within which a person directed to leave an unauthorised encampment must not return from twelve months to three.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 375 in my name I pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Whitaker for the discussions we had both in Committee and outside it, which resulted in the amendment being brought forward today on Report.

Amendment 375 addresses the no-return period for individuals directed to leave an unauthorised encampment. This new clause restores the previous three-month period, replacing the 12-month prohibitions introduced by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The Government remain firmly committed to ensuring that communities feel safe, public spaces are protected and unauthorised encampments do not cause disproportionate disruption or distress. At the same time, we must ensure that enforcement powers are applied fairly and in a way that respects the rights of all individuals, including those in the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. I thank my noble friend Lady Whitaker for her campaigning on this issue, and for meeting with me and representatives from the all-party group for Gypsy, Roma and Traveller Communities earlier this year.

As she knows, and as I hope the House will be aware, in May 2024, the High Court found that setting and extending the no-return period to 12 months was incompatible with ECHR rights. This was because of the limited availability of authorised transit sites, meaning that individuals could be placed at risk of criminal sanction even when no lawful alternative was available. In light of this ruling, on their election in 2024 the new Government examined this, and it is right that we use this Bill to remedy that incompatibility.

21:15

Amendment 375 does exactly that. It amends the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 to reinstate the three-month no-return period that operated successfully for many years. It also does the same for the new offence in Section 60C, added by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. This strikes a more proportionate balance by maintaining an important enforcement tool for police, while ensuring that individuals are not penalised in circumstances where alternative sites are in scarce supply, and maintaining a three-month maximum stay. Let me be clear that this change does not weaken police powers to respond to unauthorised encampments that cause damage, disruption or distress. The full suite of powers introduced by the 2022 Act remains in place. This amendment simply ensures that those powers operate proportionately and in a manner compliant with human rights obligations.

I know that my noble friend Lady Whitaker may well also speak on the amendments on the important issue of the lack of permitted sites. Before she does, I will say that the Government agree that planning appropriately for the housing and accommodation needs of diverse communities is essential. Planning policy is clear that local authorities should assess the need for Traveller sites. This includes a responsibility to set pitch and plot targets for Traveller sites and provide five years-worth of sites against targets.

There is a revised National Planning Policy Framework which is currently out for consultation through the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government until 10 March. However, I will listen to what my noble friend says, and what anybody from the Liberal Democrats says in support of their amendments. I thought I would just use these introductory comments to both move the amendment and say that we recognise that the National Planning Policy Framework needs to be examined, and that is why it is currently out for consultation on the very issue that the amendments address. I beg to move.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I first declare an interest as president of Friends, Families and Travellers and the Advisory Council for the Education of Romany and other Travellers, and co-chair of the relevant APPG. It is in that connection that I applaud these amendments. They right an acknowledged wrong, a breach of the Human Rights Act, the remedy for which was fought for in the courts by a brave Romany Gypsy, Wendy Smith. They will give our few remaining nomadic families some limited means of continuing to live in the way the courts have agreed they are entitled to.

As my noble friend the Minister said in the meeting he called to discuss the amendment, for which I, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, who is not in his place, our colleagues in the NGOs, Wendy Smith’s barrister and the few thousand Travellers affected—and it is only a few thousand—are very grateful, it is “a stage in a journey”. That journey is the path to equal treatment and the end of the dwelling discrimination which comes from the lack of permitted sites. The actions to move farther along in the journey through greater provision of sites do not lie with his department, but my noble friend the Minister has helpfully said something more about the future. If he has any details on timing and more precise allocation of responsibility, we should welcome them. As I said, they are not inherently matters for his department, but I would like to hear the whole Government supporting this. I commend these amendments.

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a member of the APPG for Gypsies, Travellers and Roma, and speak in support of Amendments 375, 466 and 468. I thank the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, for his introduction to this important group of amendments. As has been said, this is the start of a journey to reach equality of access to services for those currently living a nomadic life.

Several noble Lords across the Chamber made representations against the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, brought in under the previous Government in 2022 and subsequently ruled to be a breach of the Human Rights Act. Those who objected listed the effect the new restrictions would have on family life, those with health issues and access to education, et cetera. In a society that purports to uphold the rationale of equality for all, it is unacceptable to discriminate against those who follow a different lifestyle from the majority of us.

I have long campaigned for legislation to require every local authority to provide permitted permanent sites for Gypsies and Travellers alongside permitted temporary stopping sites for those who travel as part of their culture and way of life. This has always been rejected by Governments of different political persuasions, and I welcome the Minister’s comments this evening on the provision of sites in the future.

I am now lucky enough to live in an area that has adequate, decent provision for those identified as Gypsy, Roma or Traveller. Several of those sites are within a short walk of my home. I am delighted that those people are able to be married in the church in which I also worship, and that they are able to grieve the passing of their loved ones in the same environment. Everyone should be able to access education for their children, alongside healthcare for their elderly, even if they are moving from area to area around the country. A stopping place or site which allows this to happen should be a right, and not left to a local landowner to permit for short periods.

This small group of amendments is not a magic wand to ensure that sites appear overnight, but it is a step in the right direction to help families raise their children in a relatively safe environment. I support the Minister’s amendments.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity for debate that the Government’s Amendment 375 has afforded us. This is obviously a highly contested issue but, before we start, I put on record the very specific nature of the issue we are debating. In 2024, the High Court declared that a specific section of the Conservative Party’s Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 was incompatible with Article 14, the prohibition of discrimination, and Article 8, the right to private life, of the European Convention on Human Rights. That section extended the prohibition on returning to land covered by requests to leave from three to 12 months. That is why the Government are now attempting to reverse that change. The judgment did not, as claimed in Committee, nullify that no-returns order.

I will make His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition’s position clear: although we accept that the law as it currently stands renders the continuation of the current offence of returning to or re-entering prohibited land untenable, we would ultimately rather that the human rights law that has caused this incompatibility be repealed and the offence upheld. It is not racial discrimination to uphold one of the fundamental governing systems of our society. As perhaps some noble Lords in the Chamber will want to hear, private property has been a continuous thread throughout our history that has galvanised peace and prosperity in our country. Remove the right to private property and you create a system that favours freeloaders and fraudsters.

In the judgment, the presiding judge spoke of a balanced structure between the property rights of landowners and occupiers and the interests of Travellers. The increase in a no-returns order from three to 12 months would supposedly disproportionately affect the balance in favour of landowners. I do not believe that the interests of trespassers should be equally balanced with those of landowners and occupiers, if at all. That does not pertain to the Gypsy Traveller community; it does not matter who the people are. Declaring that the right to private property should trump the subjective desires of an individual or group does not have a racial element. It is an entirely neutral law and fundamentally liberal, in that it affords the same freedoms to all.

It is true to the latter point that it is disheartening to see the party that was once the vehicle of Manchester liberalism now supporting such a partial and anarchic view of the world. Therefore, if the law posits that upholding the belief in private property and enacting its enforcement in law is considered wrong, the law should be repealed. If the law ascertains that private property undermines an abstract theory of human rights and that the latter should prevail, the law should be repealed. If the law favours the human rights of the infringer over the victim, the law should be repealed. If the law is able to overturn the decision of a sovereign, elected Parliament acting of its own volition, the law should almost certainly be repealed.

Therefore, although we welcome the Government’s attempt to find a compromise between our legal commitments, we are unfortunately of the opinion that they are amending the wrong Act entirely. They are still rather dogmatic in their commitment to this outdated doctrine, but they are simply kicking the can down the road and delaying the inevitable. Whether the courts allow a three-month no-return period is immaterial; there would still exist an extrajudicial doctrine that has the ultimate say over the United Kingdom’s Parliament. There will simply be an appeal to this amendment, and if that is unsuccessful, they will find themselves facing the ECHR in another challenge to another Act.

We are sympathetic to the Government’s attempt at a balancing act, but they are targeting the symptoms over the cause. That cause is the ECHR enshrined in the Human Rights Act. The ECHR has served its purpose, but the fact that it now favours rule-breakers over rule-takers shows that it does so no longer. The Government must recognise this truth, and I suspect that deep down they do. They should follow the advice of the Conservative Party and leave the ECHR. Perhaps the Minister will reply bearing good news.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Before the Minister replies, I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that the rule-breakers are not those who want to return within three months; they are the local authorities that have statutory obligations to provide proper sites for Travellers but are failing to do so.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I accept that, to a certain degree.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Let me clear up something straight away. There is not going to be a meeting of minds between me and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on the abolition of the ECHR. I will leave it at that. There is no common ground between us. Yes, we are generally looking at some reforms, but there is no common ground on abolishing the lot, which is what the noble Lord seeks to achieve. There is blue/red/orange water between us on this; I will leave it at that.

On the question raised, I am grateful for the support of my noble friend Lady Whitaker and the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville. We have moved in light of the judgments that were made, and we have instated the three-month period in this legislation. That is the right thing to do in relation to the legislation. I think the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, accepted that, while having a wider target. At the moment, I will take his acceptance of that as support. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, for her support, and I am grateful for the constant chivvying of my noble friend Lady Whitaker on this issue.

In my opening remarks, in anticipation of what would be said, I said that the Government agree that planning appropriately for the housing and accommodation needs of our diverse communities is essential in supporting sustainable and inclusive growth. It is important, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, just reminded the House, that the responsibility to set pitch and plot targets for Traveller sites lies with local authorities, and absolutely right that they must identify specific deliverable sites sufficient for five years against targets. As I said in my opening remarks, a revised National Planning Policy Framework and the Planning Policy for Traveller Sites were published at the end of December 2024, following extensive consultation.

The Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government is currently consulting on a new national planning framework. That consultation runs until 10 March. The noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, and my noble friend Lady Whitaker mentioned the need to look at more sites. That is actively being looked at. Despite the wide reservations of the noble Lord, but with the support of the Liberal Democrat Benches and my colleague Lady Whitaker, I hope that my amendments can be accepted by the House tonight.

Amendment 375 agreed.

21:30

Amendment 376

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

376: After Clause 142, insert the following new Clause—
“Harassment of a person in their home(1) The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 is amended as follows.(2) In section 42 (police directions stopping harassment etc of a person in their home), in subsection (1)(b)—(a) omit the “or” at the end of sub-paragraph (i);(b) after sub-paragraph (ii) insert—“(iii) that they should not have done something they were entitled or required to do; or(iv) that they should have done something they were not under any obligation to do;”.(3) In section 42A (offence of harassment etc of a person in their home), in subsection (1)(b)—(a) omit the “or” at the end of sub-paragraph (i);(b) after sub-paragraph (ii) insert—“(iii) that they should not have done something they were entitled or required to do; or(iv) that they should have done something they were not under any obligation to do;”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment expands sections 42 and 42A of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (protests outside homes) to cover protests about something done in the past.

Amendment 376 agreed.

Amendment 377

Moved by

[Lord Faulks]

377: After Clause 142, insert the following new Clause—
“Lawful or reasonable excuse defence for public order offences(1) This section applies to any offence that makes conduct unlawful unless there is an excuse for it and specifies either that the excuse must be a lawful excuse or that it must be a reasonable one.(2) A person has no excuse for the conduct if—(a) it is intended to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity, or(b) it is designed to influence the government or public opinion by subjecting any person, or their property, to a risk, or increased risk, of loss or damage.(3) It is immaterial that there are or may be other excuses or reasons for the conduct or that its main purpose may be different.(4) In this section “conduct” includes any act or omission.(5) For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, this section must be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies when a person has a lawful or reasonable excuse to a public order offence.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, this group of amendments was due to be heard last Wednesday. We were sent away just before midnight but reassured that they would be heard first thing on Monday. Well, it is 9.30 pm; I suppose that is first thing.

Amendment 377 is an important amendment, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Godson, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Davies. It is about lawful or reasonable excuse for public order offences. It is not particularly easy for a legislature to say what could constitute a reasonable excuse. However, the law is currently in a mess. The culprit is the Ziegler case, in which the Supreme Court, by a majority, said that whatever Parliament might say, it was necessary for a court to decide for itself, using the vexed issue of proportionality as a separate assessment, it would seem. Paragraph 59 of the leading judgment describes the process of proportionality as a

“fact-specific inquiry which requires the evaluation of the circumstances in the individual case”.

There has been widespread criticism of the Ziegler case. The courts have been backing away from it—for example, the Colston statue case in the Court of Appeal and last week in two cases, R v ABJ and R v BDN. Policy Exchange, the think tank, has mounted a long-standing campaign against the incoherence that the Ziegler decision has generated. There is absolutely no reason, from Strasbourg’s point of view, why national Governments should not decide on the sensible and appropriate limits on the law in relation to protest. Many noble Lords will remember the 2023 legislation and the provisions concerning tunnelling, major obstruction to transport networks and interfering with key national infrastructure. I was always concerned that superimposing on all these very specific offences the defence of lawful or reasonable excuse without giving any definition was, in effect, simply asking courts, “Do you think that there was a reasonable excuse?” but not saying how they were to approach that issue. I tabled amendments, together with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, without success, to clarify the issue so that courts could know what questions they should ask of themselves other than whether they liked the protest.

During the debate on this provision in Committee, no noble Lord from any party seemed to agree with the Ziegler decision or seek to defend it. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, seemed to dislike the amendment on one particular ground—that it purported to oust the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. I understand his loyalty towards the European Court of Human Rights, but the amendment does not seek to do that. It seeks to confirm that, in our view—I think that it is pretty uncontroversial—this amendment complies with the European Convention on Human Rights. It respects a balance of the various rights, and the House will know only too well that Articles 10 and 11 are qualified rights. It is clearly important that the law in relation to protests should take into account not only the rights of protesters but those of all those parties whose lives could be completely upset by the exercise of those rights and, of course, the police, who have to interpret the law and administrate the law, so coherence is most important.

I then looked again at what the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, had to say in response to this group. I want to be fair to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, who has been indefatigable in the course of this Bill, dealing with any number of amendments, and often with large groups. I do not blame him altogether for not seizing on the Ziegler point with any great detail, but I fear that his answer was simply not good enough. He merely said

“the Government are not persuaded that this amendment is needed. Public order offences have been developed to ensure that those reasonable excuse defences apply only when appropriate and respect the need to balance”,—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/26; col. 1634.]

et cetera. It was a perfectly fair statement of what the aims of any Government are but not an answer to the inadequacy of the Ziegler case. Therefore, I ask the Minister directly—sorry, it is not going to be the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, replying, as he is getting a well-earned rest, but the noble Lord, Lord Katz—whether he says, on behalf of the Government, that the Ziegler decision was correct, or does he accept, like almost any other legal commentator, that the decision was unfortunately wrong, as other judges seem now to accept? If that is the case, the law is incoherent, and it must be changed.

I fear I must join my noble friend Lord Pannick and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who is not currently in his place, in saying that it is simply not good enough to say that we must wait until the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, speaks on the subject—if he were to speak on the subject, because, of course, that may be some time in the future. Then there is the vexed question of legislative time.

We need to sort out the law in relation to protest. This amendment, whose drafting has not been criticised in any way, states what could or should constitute a reasonable excuse or lawful excuse. The time has come to clarify the law for everybody’s sake. I beg to move.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to my noble friend Lord Faulks’ amendment and I support it. To repeat a point I made on an earlier amendment, the police generally need simplicity, not complexity. Generally, Ziegler created complexity in what, in that case, was the simplest of offences. It was all about wilful obstruction of the highway. That used to be fairly straightforward. It was on a highway; it got obstructed and it was done wilfully: that was the offence. That is all that had to be proved. Of course, it is used not only in cases of protest, but Ziegler said that, in the case of protesters blocking the highway, that simple test could not be applied; it had to consider further issues. In fact, what it said was that the person could be convicted of obstructing the highway only if the prosecution could persuade the court that a conviction would be a proportionate interference in his or her convention rights, which, in effect, shifted it for the police to prove proportionality when someone was blocking the highway.

My point is that, although we understand the intellectual background to that, it has left the law in such a confused position that the cops do not know whether to enforce it at the moment of the crime. That is never a good position to be in. There is a secondary issue, which is that senior officers often become involved in planning for marches that are to happen in the next week or two weeks. They probably have a little bit more time to consider these issues, but frankly, the police have always used discretion. People block the highway fairly regularly; we all do. If you stop in your car, if you are walking on the highway, you can block it, so they do not arrest everybody who blocks the highway. They do not arrest every protester who is walking on the highway and clearly is obstructing it. That is what marchers do; it happens all the time. Of course, it becomes a bit tricky when a group within the protest decides to sit down in the middle of Oxford Circus and want to stay there for some time. That, I think we might all accept, is unreasonable. The police will try to persuade them. At some point, they might want to intervene and say, “Actually, I think you need to move or, alternatively, you are going to get arrested. There is a consequence to what you are doing. That’s your right, but there will be a consequence”.

I am afraid this judgment has left the police really confused. This is about obstruction of the highway, but it applies to all the different aspects of public order law. I do not think that it is fair to ask the police to start balancing human rights on the street. Of course, there is the issue of reasonableness, which is where discretion comes in—they are not going to arrest everybody and should exercise their powers only if somebody refuses to move or repeatedly causes an aggravation to the simple offence—but the danger of this judgment is that the law is confused and the police are caught in the middle. This amendment is an opportunity to clarify it. I think that is reasonable and I support it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, criticism of the Ziegler decision is well-founded and well-taken, but the law has moved on. For example, in the Supreme Court’s abortion services case, 2022 UKSC 32, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, speaking for a seven-judge Supreme Court, said at paragraph 42:

“The decision in Ziegler was widely understood as having established that every criminal conviction of protesters involved a restriction upon their Convention rights, and must be proved to be justified and proportionate on the basis of an assessment of the particular facts. As explained, that understanding was mistaken”.


The law has moved on.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, recognised, there have been a number of more recent cases in which the courts emphasised, in the context of protest, that it is sufficient that Parliament has laid down a particular offence. It is therefore not necessary for the prosecution to prove proportionality on the facts of the individual case. It may well be that more clarity is required in this area, but the House should proceed on the recognition that Ziegler, for all its faults, is not current law.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for the elegant way that he introduced this amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for explaining his perspective on it. In effect, it was a police perspective, given that the police find it difficult to apply the law as it was thought to be after Ziegler. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for explaining that the law has moved on since Ziegler.

I do not propose to get into the argument of precisely what the law is in the light of Ziegler as subsequently interpreted. I am concerned with the way that this amendment addresses the question of reasonable excuse. This is achieved by, in effect, spelling it out in proposed new subsection (2), which says:

“A person has no excuse for the conduct if … it is intended to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity”.


That hides within it an open question about the meaning of intention in that context. It is for that reason that I do not support the amendment as drafted.

It may well be that a person recognises that conduct that is otherwise perfectly lawful, particularly in a context of peaceful protest, may inevitably carry the consequence of provoking or inconveniencing other members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity. That comes back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made in the context of obstructing the highway. Any obstruction or interference with traffic or movement or getting to work, or any delay, could all be intended consequences of lawful protest. What worries me is that this amendment, as drafted, would acknowledge that intention and say that there could be no excuse. It is not then a question of weighing up any excuse in the light of what the courts may consider to be an excuse in any particular case; the question is what the intended consequence would be, and the intended consequence may appear to the people charged with the conduct to be entirely reasonable, though intended, and may objectively be entirely reasonable, though intended.

21:45

The position is made worse by proposed new subsection (3), which would provide that:

“It is immaterial that there are or may be other excuses or reasons for the conduct or that its main purpose may be different”.

The main purpose of a peaceable protest is to make a point. It may be, objectively, that making that point in a peaceable protest is a reasonable excuse for conduct that might amount to obstruction.

In a direct answer by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, to the point I made in Committee about the ouster of the Human Rights Act, he suggested that I was wrong. In fact, proposed new subsection (5) can be read in no other way. It says that:

“For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, this section must be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.

The Human Rights Act provides that a restriction that is necessary for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others is or may be legitimate. If this proposed new subsection were to in effect outlaw the application of the Human Rights Act, it would be operating as an ouster. It would be predetermining the very issue that the Human Rights Act requires to be considered before restrictions are authorised by law.

Irrespective of any argument on Ziegler, I suggest that the effect of this proposed new clause as drafted is inconsistent with the Human Rights Act and is in fact a dangerous clause. The same goes for the proposed new clause that is specifically about the obstruction of the highway—it is part of the same argument in that narrow context. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that it is difficult to decide on, but, sometimes, the courts are there to decide difficult issues.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in R v ABJ and R v BDN has thrown the law of public protest into even greater confusion. That case relates to two protesters prosecuted under Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000 for expressing public support for Hamas, a proscribed organisation. The appellants claimed that their charges under the Act represented a disproportionate interference with their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court unanimously dismissed this appeal and, in doing so, ruled that the Section 12(1A) offence in the Terrorism Act does not represent a disproportionate interference with the convention rights.

I raise this ruling because it highlights the confusion around protest law ever since the Supreme Court delivered a different ruling in the case of DPP v Ziegler in 2021. We have discussed the implications of the Ziegler ruling in this House on a number of occasions. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has again reminded us of the details in that case. There is a clear tension between the court’s ruling in Ziegler and its ruling last week.

The court has made it clear that the Ziegler logic does not apply to the Terrorism Act defence but has not yet rectified the damaging consequences of the Ziegler decision. The basis of the court’s reasoning in Ziegler was the lawful excuse defence in Section 137 of the Highways Act 1980. In Committee, my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and I tabled amendments to remove the reasonable excuse defences from a number of Acts that are used to prosecute highly disruptive protesters, including the Highways Act and the Public Order Act 2023, and from this Bill.

When I spoke to those amendments, the Minister said that,

“the reasonable excuse defence is necessary in these instances to ensure an appropriate balance between protecting the wider community and the right to protest”.—[Official Report, 13/1/26; col. 1633.]

It is clear that the balance has not been made. I have not tabled those amendments to remove the reasonable excuse defences again, apart from Amendment 377B, which would remove the reasonable excuse defence from Section 137 of the Highways Act. I can think of no possible excuse for anyone purposefully to block the highway unless they are authorised to do so, such as the police or officers of National Highways. Removing that defence would render the issue in Ziegler null and void since that defence was the issue under consideration by the court.

However, I accept that the problem has now grown. The Supreme Court’s decision in the Ziegler case means there is now judicial precedent, and defence lawyers up and down the country have been lining up to utilise that argument so their clients can get off scot free. That is why I will be supporting Amendment 377 from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. While I would prefer to remove those defences entirely, it would be better that the clarity in the law provided by Amendment 377 was made. His amendment would apply more widely than mine and therefore, I am happy to admit, provides a more substantial solution to the problem.

I would like to pick up on something that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said in Committee:

“much of the criticism of Ziegler fails to recognise that the courts themselves have understood that Ziegler went too far, and that what Parliament has determined in relation to the law is the governing law”.—[Official Report, 13/1/26; col. 1623.]

I accept his interpretation that the courts by subsequent decisions have recognised the issue of Ziegler, but the decision in Ziegler still stands as case law. It has not yet been overturned. I think that serves as one of the strongest arguments for Parliament to pass Amendment 377 and rectify the error that the courts have themselves acknowledged.

If the European Convention on Human Rights prevents the application of the law as passed by Parliament or prevents the conviction of those who should be convicted, that demonstrates that we should leave the ECHR, but while we remain within the purview of the Strasbourg court and while the Human Rights Act remains on the statute book, the decision in Ziegler needs to be reversed. Therefore, if the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, wishes to divide the House on Amendment 377, he will have our full support.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who took part in this short but important debate, and I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Davies of Gower, for tabling these amendments which seek to narrow the existing lawful or reasonable excuse defences that may be used for public order offences.

It may be helpful to set out how a lawful excuse works in practice. A person is automatically treated as having a lawful excuse only under two specific circumstances. The first is if the defendant honestly believes that the person who is entitled to consent to the damage has given consent or would have consented if they knew of the circumstances—for example, an honest belief that the owner of a car in which a child was locked on a hot day consented, or would have consented, to the defendant smashing the window to get the child out. The second is if the defendant acts to protect their own or someone else’s property and they honestly believe both that the property needs immediate protection and that their actions are reasonable—for example, a person damages one person’s property while accessing the property of another to prevent a fire. It does not matter whether a person’s belief in those circumstances is reasonable or justified; it just needs to be honest.

Whatever the failings of, or, indeed, one’s views on, the Ziegler judgment, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said in his sagacious contribution, case law has moved on and the Supreme Court has made subsequent rulings which chart a clearer path. It is the case that the right to private property will always need to be balanced with other convention rights, such as the right to protest and freedom of expression. This will have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, but leading case law has set out the parameters, and the Court of Appeal did not say that the exercise of a person’s convention rights could never form the basis of lawful excuse for criminal damage.

While I acknowledge the concerns of noble Lords, I have a great deal of sympathy for the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. It is for the Crown Prosecution Service and the courts to decide what may constitute lawful or reasonable excuse in individual cases. Further, the current scope of the defence allows the CPS the necessary flexibility to consider the full circumstances of each case on its merits. The types of behaviour that noble Lords have suggested, such as intimidating or harming members of the public or the risk of damaging property, are unlikely to be considered a reasonable excuse. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

I am grateful to all those who took part in this debate. I think the issues have rather narrowed between those who have taken part in it. For the first time during the course of these debates on this issue, we had some drafting points from the noble Lord, Lord Marks. They have come late, but none the less I will deal with them.

The first point is that the noble Lord did not like my proposed provision that says that it is not an excuse if you intend

“to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity”.

That does not seem to be a very reasonable excuse to me, so it seems a very sensible thing to put in the amendment.

Secondly, the noble Lord did not like subsection (3), where it says that it is immaterial that there may be other purposes. If the defendant does not have a good excuse, it is no good saying, “My overall excuse, because I happen to support Just Stop Oil, is a good one”. You cannot rely on that.

In his final point, the noble Lord stuck to his argument that this was an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Act 1998. I repeat the point that it is not that. Whatever the future may hold, we are still part of the European Convention on Human Rights. But the convention requires the balancing of rights, including that they have to be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This provision reflects all those factors in a perfectly appropriate balance. Therefore, it complies with the European Convention on Human Rights.

I come finally to this point. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, quite rightly said, pointing to a recent judgment of the President of the Supreme Court, that the courts are backing away from Ziegler. I am not surprised. It sits very uneasily with the jurisprudence in this area generally. The decision is almost moribund. But it is time to give it a decent burial. It is time to conclude that the law should be clear, that we can understand what it means and that the police can understand what it means, so that the whole business of putting forward spurious excuses will cease and we can have a proper and sensible law in relation to protest. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

21:57

Division 4

Amendment 377 disagreed.

Ayes: 82

Noes: 151

22:07

Amendments 377A and 377B not moved.

Amendment 377C

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

377C: After Clause 142, insert the following new Clause—
“Extension of notice period for public processions(1) Section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 (advance notice of public processions) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (5) for “6” substitute “28”.(3) In subsection (6) for “6” substitute “28”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would extend the notice period that is required for public processions to take place from 6 to 28 days.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment seeks to extend the notice period for public processions from six days to 28 days. The Government have resisted this; however, the police feel that it is difficult to operate under the current system and would prefer that it was 28 days as opposed to six. On that basis, I think we should be supporting the police, and I beg to test the opinion of the House.

22:08

Division 5

Amendment 377C disagreed.

Ayes: 76

Noes: 185

22:19

Amendment 377D

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

377D: After Clause 142, insert the following new Clause—
“Prohibition of protests(1) Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 (prohibiting public processions) is amended as follows.(2) For subsection (1) substitute—“(1) The chief officer of police may apply to the Secretary of State for an order to prohibit the holding of all public processions (or any class of public processions so specified) for a period of not more than 3 months in any district or part of a district if either of the following conditions are met.(1A) The first condition is that the chief officer of police reasonably believes that the powers under section 12 will not be sufficient to prevent a public procession in the district or part of the district from resulting in –(a) serious public disorder,(b) serious damage to property, or(c) serious disruption to the life of the community.(1B) The second condition is that the procession would place undue demands on the police.”(3) In subsection (2)—(a) omit “a council may with the consent of”;(b) after the first “Secretary of State” insert “may”.”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment relates to the prohibition of protests, where the chief officer may apply to the Secretary of State for an order to prohibit the holding of all public processions, and where he or she considers there may be serious public disorder, damage to property or, indeed, serious disruption to the life of a community. That is an eminently sensible amendment, and the Government have resisted this again. However, I feel that it would be a great tool in the box for police, so I look to divide the House on it.

22:20

Division 6

Amendment 337D disagreed.

Ayes: 68

Noes: 183

22:30

Clause 154: Access to driver licensing information

Amendments 378 and 379

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

378: Clause 154, page 200, line 19, leave out from beginning to “for” and insert—
“(1) The Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 is amended as follows.Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 154, page 205, line 6.

379: Clause 154, page 201, line 13, at end insert—
“(5A) The requirement in subsection (5) may be satisfied by consultation carried out wholly or partly before this section comes into force.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the Secretary of State’s duty to consult before making regulations under section 71 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (inserted by clause 154) may be satisfied by pre-commencement consultation.

Amendments 378 and 379 agreed.

Amendment 380

Moved by

[Baroness Doocey]

380: Clause 154, page 201, line 24, at end insert—
“(7A) Authorised persons listed in section 71A may not use the information referenced in subsection (1) for the purposes of biometric searches using facial recognition technology.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the DVLA database cannot be used for searches using live facial recognition.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 380 erects a vital safeguard. It blocks Clause 154 from handing millions of drivers’ private photos to the police for facial recognition searches without full parliamentary scrutiny and explicit consent. It stops a road traffic database being quietly repurposed for mass biometric surveillance, while still allowing proportionate, tightly regulated data sharing for genuine policing needs.

In Committee, Peers from across the House voiced concerns echoing not just the Liberal Democrats but a wide range of civil society groups, among them Liberty, Big Brother Watch, Justice, StopWatch, Inquest and Privacy International. The Minister still tells us that this is merely a tidying-up exercise with no impact on facial recognition, but the evidence tells a very different story. It points to a plan to funnel photos of over 50 million innocent drivers into a vast facial recognition repository, dismantling vital privacy safeguards.

For anyone who thinks that sounds exaggerated, let me make three points. First, the previous Government explicitly justified an almost identical clause on the basis that it would enable facial recognition searches; they were candid about that intention. If this Government do not share that purpose, they should have no difficulty supporting my amendment.

Secondly, thanks to freedom of information requests, we now know that other civic databases, passports and immigration records are already acting as de facto facial recognition libraries, without public knowledge, consent or a clear parliamentary mandate.

Thirdly, there is a strategic facial match-up project—a joint Home Office and police scheme—to enable facial recognition searches across multiple databases, including non-policing ones. Its existence has yet to be confirmed in public Home Office policy documents, having surfaced only via government tender notices, media reports and oblique spending references. If this project does not exist, I invite the Minister to set the record straight.

Facial recognition turns an ordinary photograph into biometric data, a unique identifier like a fingerprint or DNA, which in law should be retained for criminal justice purposes only under very strict safeguards. The UK does not currently have population-wide biometric databases of innocent citizens. Creating a single, easily accessible policing platform for these civil images runs directly against the European Court of Human Rights’ warning that blanket retention of biometrics is a serious and disproportionate interference with privacy. Plugging the DVLA database into a facial recognition engine also risks creating a honeypot for hostile states and criminals, exposing the lifelong biometric signatures of almost every adult driver.

There are practical problems as well. Driving licence photos are updated only every 10 years, so the database already holds millions of outdated images. Using that kind of so-called “noisy data” for facial recognition inevitably increases the risk of false positives and wrongful stops. We know that this technology is far less precise than DNA and has already contributed to wrongful accusations, yet we are assured that its accuracy is improving. However, there is no timescale for this. The Government are, in effect, asking Parliament to sign a blank cheque for mass access to our biometric data. Amendment 380 simply asks this House not to hand them the pen. I beg to move.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I know a young man who has just got his driving licence. He is very excited and sees it as a rite of passage; he is now a grown-up. He has joined the club of drivers and he shows his driving licence with pride. I can assure noble Lords he has no idea that applying for a driving licence means that he is joining a vast biometric police database, a club of police surveillance, and his mugshot will be treated like one of those Most Wanted gallery of rogues images.

This is a corruption of public trust. The public apply for one thing, only for it to be subverted and used for something else. It seems to me to be duplicitous and behind the backs of the public. Currently, police forces can directly access and search DVLA data only in relation to road traffic offences and must phone the DVLA in relation to other offences. I note that the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would not prevent police forces accessing DVLA data for law enforcement purposes, but it should not be the default position. It is important to create this safeguard to prevent such data being used to conduct, in effect, phishing exercises of facial recognition. Therefore, we need this amendment to be taken seriously and I will be interested in what the Minister has to say.

This is not some paranoid dystopian vision. In a recent submission to the Home Affairs Committee, the National Police Chiefs’ Council stated that police chiefs were indeed seeking access to the DVLA database for facial recognition. That would be a huge expansion of police surveillance powers, granting them access, as we have heard, to the biometric data of tens of millions of citizens. We cannot overestimate how important it is that we do not just nod this through but take seriously the risk to civil liberties. It is why the noble Baroness’s Amendment 380, which creates a safeguard, is so important: to protect the civil liberties and privacy of innocent driving licence holders.

I conclude with a quote from Big Brother Watch, which says that this represents

“a disproportionate expansion of police powers to track and identify citizens across time and locations for low-level policing needs”.

In a way, it is an abuse of the police to ask them to use these underhand methods, and it is therefore vital that there are safeguards in law to prevent this happening, particularly because it is happening behind the backs of ordinary people.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

There is no question, as I understand Clause 154, of a blank cheque, and there is no question here of underhand methods. What the clause requires is that the Secretary of State produces regulations, and the regulations must specify the circumstances in which information may be made available under this section. I am assuming that in due course, the Government are going to bring forward regulations to implement this provision. Those regulations will have to be laid before Parliament, and there will be an opportunity, if any noble Lord wishes to do so, to debate those regulations. I suggest that that is the time to assess whether the regulations contain a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the public interest.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, the DVLA driver database must not be turned into a ready-made line-up for facial recognition systems. This is about more than data protection; it is about the basic relationship between citizen and state. People did not hand over their photographs to the DVLA so that the Government could quietly repurpose them for mass identification; they did so under legal compulsion to get a driving licence.

Using those images to power facial recognition searches fundamentally changes the deal after the fact. It turns a compulsory single-purpose database into an all-purpose surveillance tool, without anyone ever having given meaningful consent. Once you allow the police to run facial recognition matches against the DVLA database, you create the possibility of identifying almost anyone, almost anywhere, from a single image. That goes far beyond investigating named suspects. It enables trawling through the entire driving population to find possible matches, with all the risk of false positives that facial recognition systems already carry. A bad match here is not an abstract error. It is a real person, wrongly flagged, questioned or even arrested, because a machine thought their face looked similar.

The DVLA database is also nearly universal for adults. That makes it uniquely tempting. If we normalise using it for facial recognition in one context, it will not stop there. Today, it might be justified for serious crime. Tomorrow, it could creep into protests, public events or routine inquiries. Once the precedent is set that every licence holder’s image is fair game for search, the barrier to expanding that use becomes paper-thin.

There is also a democratic principle at stake here. When the state wants new investigative powers that are this sweeping, it should come to Parliament and ask for them openly, with clear limits, safeguards and independent oversight. What must not happen is a quiet, technical integration between the facial recognition system and the DVLA database, introduced by secondary legislation and governed mainly by internal policies and obscure memoranda of understanding. This is legislation by the backdoor, not by debate.

If we allow the DVLA database to be searched with facial recognition, we are not just making investigations a little more efficient; we are rebuilding the basic infrastructure of our democracy so that the state can, in principle, put a name to almost any face. We are doing that using images people had no real choice about providing, and for a completely different purpose. So, the line we should draw is simple and firm: the DVLA driver database is for licensing drivers, not for powering facial recognition line-ups. If any Government want to change that, they must come back to Parliament with primary legislation, make their case in public and accept strict statutory constraints. Until then, we should say clearly that turning a compulsory licensing database into a de facto national ID gallery is a step too far for a free society. That is what Amendment 380 does and I commend it to the House.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I do not support the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made the point that there will obviously be regulations, because people do have fears about accessing the DVLA database.

At the moment, the only database that facial comparisons are made against is that of suspects, which is a substantial database of people the police have arrested in the past. It would be a bizarre outcome if the technology existed to find a serial rapist and the only way we could find them was on the DVLA database, but we buried our head in the sand and said that we were not going to look. This is just the start of an investigation, not a conclusion. No one would get charged as a result of being identified by this process, but it may well start an investigation that might exclude or include them. To not take up the possibility that you could identify them, either through the DVLA or other databases, is the wrong way forward.

22:45

Of course, initially it should probably be restricted to serious crimes, but the alternative of ignoring it seems bizarre, given that most places we go to now have CCTV cameras. Generally, the present method of identification is showing the image around a police station and saying, “Do you know them?” Frankly, it does not work in London, but where technology exists to make that a more efficient and effective process, it honestly would be foolish to ignore it. But I do agree that it should be regulated. What those regulations should be is a matter for debate, but to exclude the possibility altogether is wrong.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that the fact that this access is to be authorised by regulations is a saving grace. We know full well that in this House, fatal Motions virtually never succeed. The Conservative Front Bench may take some comfort from the fact that there would be provision for regulations, but the reality is that once the enabling legislation is passed, regulations will be in the hands of the Government, and nobody can do anything about it.

This is an issue of consent. People who apply for driving licences do so and have done so for many years on the basis that their photographs and biometric data are provided for the limited purpose of applying for a driving licence—that goes for all the information they provide. It is not for the purpose of enabling a trawl for suspects. One can envisage a position where, in some circumstances, authorisation to use information in public hands, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, suggested, may be appropriate, but this is not the place for it to be provided for by regulations subsequent to and consequent upon this enabling clause.

It is a question of public trust. The information and photographs are provided by applicants for driving licences based on the trust that they will be used for that purpose and that purpose alone. To misuse that information to enable a trawl of photographs to see if they might be suspected of some offence, with nobody having any real control over that use, is an abuse of trust. For that reason, I support the amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will address Amendment 380 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Strasburger. I am grateful to them for raising an issue that deserves careful consideration. The amendment would prevent authorised persons using information held on the Driving and Vehicle Licensing Agency database for biometric searches using facial recognition technology. It is right to ensure that Parliament scrutinises these emerging powers thoroughly. Public trust in policing is vital, and it is only through open debate and clear safeguards that such trust can be maintained.

The DVLA database contains photographs and personal information provided by millions of law-abiding citizens for the specific purpose of licensing drivers, and it is therefore entirely understandable that noble Lords should question whether it is appropriate for that information to be used in other contexts, particularly the context of advanced biometric searches. The principle that personal data should not be repurposed without clear justification is one that many of us across the House share.

However, while the concerns behind this amendment are sincere and valid, I fear that it is unnecessary and ultimately misguided. It would risk undermining the ability of our police and law enforcement agencies to prevent and investigate serious crime. First, it is important to recognise the operational value that carefully regulated facial recognition tools can provide to modern policing. The technology, when used responsibly, can assist officers in identifying suspects in serious crime, locating dangerous offenders and protecting the public in situations where time is of the essence. It can be particularly valuable when investigating crimes involving unidentified individuals captured on CCTV or other images.

The police already rely on a range of databases and identification tools to perform these tasks. Photographs from custody suites, passport records and other lawful sources have long assisted the police in identifying suspects and victims alike. Facial recognition technology represents in many ways a technological evolution of that long-standing investigative practice. The amendment before us would place a blanket prohibition on the use of DVLA images for biometric searches involving facial recognition. Such prohibition risks creating an artificial and potentially harmful limitation on investigative capability. If a suspect’s image appears on CCTV and the only high-quality image available for comparison is contained within a DVLA database, the amendment would prevent police even conducting that comparison. We must ask ourselves whether that is a proportionate outcome.

Secondly, it is worth emphasising that the use of facial recognition technology by police forces in the United Kingdom is not taking place in a regulatory vacuum. The deployment of such technologies is already subject to a framework of legal safeguards, oversight and guidance. Police forces must operate within the boundaries of data protection law, including the principles established under the UK general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018. Their activities are subject to oversight by bodies such as the Information Commissioner’s Office and, where appropriate, the courts. Moreover, the use of live facial recognition by police has already been subject to significant judicial scrutiny. The courts have made it clear that deployments must be proportionate and transparent, and accompanied by appropriate safeguards. That jurisprudence has helped shape operational guidance and policing practice in this area.

Given that context, I question whether it is wise for Parliament to impose a sweeping statutory ban in relation to one database. Doing so risks pre-empting the careful regulatory balance that is already evolving through legislation, oversight and case law. That does not mean that the concerns raised by the amendment should be dismissed—far from it. The growth of biometric technologies demands a clear and robust legislative framework. Many Members across this House have rightly called for greater clarity about how facial recognition should be governed in the future. I feel the same. Questions of transparency, accountability, accuracy and bias must continue to be examined with great care.

However, those broader questions should be addressed through a comprehensive approach to biometric governance rather than through a single amendment targeting one database in isolation. If Parliament concludes that additional statutory safeguards are required for facial recognition technology then we should consider them holistically, ensuring that any rules are consistent, proportionate and grounded in operational reality. A piecemeal prohibition risks creating unintended consequences while failing to resolve the underlying policy debate.

For those reasons, while I commend the spirit in which the amendment has been brought forward, I regret that I cannot support it. Instead, I hope that the House will continue the broader necessary conversation about how facial recognition technologies should be regulated, ensuring that we protect civil liberties and the ability of our police to keep our communities safe.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a useful debate. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling the amendment, and to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for speaking in support of it. I am grateful for the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which echo some of the points that I will make. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed to one of the arguments that I will make: that access to the data will be subject to a statutory code of practice to ensure that its use is appropriate.

I remind noble Lords of the purpose of Clause 154: it is simply about bringing legislation up to date, which is what I said in Committee when we debated this matter. As a result of technical changes to the way police and law enforcement access driving licence data, it has become clear that we need to improve the DVLA data access regime by setting out clearly in statute—which is what Clause 154 does—which persons can access DVLA driving licence data. The legislation provides additional clarity on this issue.

The measure will enable us, through secondary legislation made under these new powers—this goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—to expand the purposes for which DVLA data may be accessed automatically to include policing or law enforcement purposes. This means that the police will have another tool to cut crime and keep the public safe, in line with the commitment by chief officers to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry when investigating an offence. I emphasise that access to the data will be subject to a statutory code of practice to ensure that its use is appropriate.

We are clear that there will be strong safeguards around the use of DVLA data, which, as I have said, will be introduced via regulations made under the new provisions. We debated earlier government Amendment 382, which ensures that these regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure in both Houses, in line with a recommendation from the Constitution Committee.

We want to ensure that officers undergo training prior to being able to access information. The police are already legally required to consult with local communities. Extensive audits of who has accessed DVLA driving licence data are maintained. It is already standard practice that each time the DVLA driver database is accessed by a police officer, the details of what information is accessed and for what purpose is logged. This will continue to be the case once the revised measure is implemented.

On the issue of facial recognition technology, I want to make it clear to all noble Lords who have signed this amendment, including the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that police forces do not conduct biometric facial recognition searches against images contained on the DVLA database. Officers use the DVLA database for day-to-day policing matters. Anybody who has watched a police programme on a Monday night—when they get the opportunity in the recess to do so—will have at some point seen a police officer pull over a car and look at an individual who says, “I haven’t got my licence with me”, and tell them they are Jimmy Jones of X address. The police officer then wants to check that they are Jimmy Jones of X address, and so they access the DVLA database. Nine times out of 10, on the police shows that I watch on a Monday night during recess, it is a false name, and therefore there is police action accordingly. That is the purpose for which the police currently use the database.

As I said in our earlier debate on Amendment 374, the use of facial recognition technology in all circumstances is currently subject to safeguards, such as the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act. As I have said in previous discussions, any use of facial recognition technology will be subject to the outcome of the consultation that we finished on 10 February. That will be completed in about 12 weeks and, by the summer, we will have government proposals which the noble Baroness, along with both Houses of Parliament, can scrutinise, to achieve some view on whatever the Government propose following the outcome of that consultation.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that, if the amendment were agreed by the Government tonight then the police officer who stopped somebody on the street—potentially a drunk driver, an unlicensed driver or a driver with no insurance—would not be able to access the DVLA database. That goes to the very points that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made in his speech.

This is not about mass surveillance. It is about using the DVLA database in an appropriate way—logged, recorded and monitored by the police to ensure that we check that person A is actually the right person who can drive that vehicle at that particular time. It is not, with due respect to noble Lords, mass surveillance. It is proper use of police technology to ensure that the DVLA database helps catch bad actors in the act of doing bad things. I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, there is no chance at all that I am going to withdraw the amendment, but I think the Minister knows that. We are not on the same page on this. How on earth can the Government justify taking information that people have given for one purpose and using it for something else? It is totally and utterly disgraceful. People have given their photographs to get a driving licence; it is wrong that they can now be repurposed to be checked by police. Just let me finish the sentence. There is nothing wrong with the Government, in their consultation, saying to people, “We want to repurpose the DVLA driving licence database because it would be really helpful to police. Would you be willing to agree to this?”, but they did not say that. They have just taken it.

23:00

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Does the noble Baroness think that a police officer, at 11 pm, on a street here in Westminster, should not access the DVLA database to check that the person is who they say they are? If she thinks that, she would really be blowing a hole in every Monday night television programme that I have ever watched.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

I suggest that the Minister has been watching too many of these television programmes. There is a complete lack of transparency. The Information Commissioner’s Office had to learn about the use of passport databases through media reports, rather than Home Office disclosure, even though this appears to have been happening since 2019. It is just so completely and utterly wrong. If people had given their information for it be used for those purposes, it would be fair enough and no problem at all, but they did not and the Government have taken it without permission. The whole situation is absolutely appalling.

There is the potential for 50 million drivers to be put on a permanent database and to be checked every single day. Of course, the police want it; I would want it if I were the police. It will make their lives so much easier. It will make it very easy for them to check everything they need to check, but that should not be the purpose of this.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The noble Baroness is very eloquently making her case on the basis of a lack of consent. I suggest to her that the police regularly use material that people have not given their consent for them to use—for example, their fingerprints and saliva.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

I do not accept that that is the same as 50 million innocent drivers being put on a database. However, I have given all the arguments and we have had this debate twice. The noble Lord is gesturing. I am sorry; what does that mean?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I was simply saying that, as the noble Baroness has already indicated that she is going to divide the House and given the hour, it would probably be quite useful just to go to that stage.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

I think that is very unfair, because my speeches are probably shorter than those of anybody in this House. The noble Lord should not pick on me because he does not like what I am saying. I do not like being bullied.

I do not believe that what the Government are doing is right and I would like to test the opinion of the House.

23:03

Division 7

Amendment 380 disagreed.

Ayes: 40

Noes: 123

23:14

Amendments 381 and 382

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

381: Clause 154, page 204, line 23, at end insert—
“(3A) The requirement in subsection (3) may be satisfied by consultation carried out wholly or partly before this section comes into force.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the Secretary of State’s duty to consult in preparing a code of practice under section 71B of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (inserted by clause 154) may be satisfied by pre-commencement consultation.

382: Clause 154, page 205, line 6, at end insert—
“(3) In section 76 (subordinate legislation), after subsection (5) insert—“(5A) A statutory instrument containing regulations under section 71 may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for regulations made by the Secretary of State under section 71 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (inserted by clause 154) to be subject to affirmative resolution procedure.

Amendments 381 and 382 agreed.

Amendment 383

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

383: After Clause 154, insert the following new Clause—
“Code of practice relating to non-criminal hate incidentsIn the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, omit—(a) sections 60 and 61 (code of practice about police processing of personal data relating to hate incidents), and(b) the italic heading before section 60.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment repeals sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 383, which repeals the statutory code relating to non-crime hate incidents issued under Sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. Consideration of the review undertaken by the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council has shown that to be the appropriate policy to take forward. The interim findings of the review commissioned, in conjunction with the College of Policing, by the former Home Secretary were published in October. They were clear that the existing system no longer operates as intended and should be replaced with a clearer, more proportionate model.

Non-crime hate incidents were originally introduced following the landmark Stephen Lawrence inquiry. Their intent—to gather information to prevent crime, support investigations and safeguard the vulnerable—remains as relevant today as it did 30 years ago, and we remain committed to safeguarding against hostility and collecting information to support an effective policing response. However, the environment in which policing operates has evolved significantly since that inquiry and over time non-crime hate incidents have expanded beyond their original intention. The growth of social media in particular and online polarisation has drawn the police into disputes that fall outside their core duties. Police officers must be able to focus on catching criminals, cutting crime and ensuring public safety, and the present statutory code has not provided the clarity needed to support that focus. It must therefore be revoked.

The College of Policing—I am pleased to see its chair, the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, in his place—and the National Police Chiefs’ Council are clear that the current system is not fit for purpose. They intend to set out a more appropriate framework that ensures that recording is proportionate, clearer and firmly focused on the most serious incidents to ensure the police are not drawn into matters they should not be drawn into. It will do this by tightening the definition of an incident, raising the recording threshold, moving from recording all incidents that are a cause for concern to capturing only those that relate to core policing purposes. These reforms will be supported by robust guidance and training so that the incidents are handled appropriately. The new framework has been developed by police experts in consultation with community representatives. It will, I believe, strike the right balance between safeguarding vulnerable communities and protecting lawful freedom of expression by ensuring that recording is consistent and focused on genuine risk.

The amendment before the House today repeals the statutory framework to facilitate the introduction of a new framework. Commencement will be timed to ensure an orderly transition aligned with the introduction of the replacement framework. As I have indicated to the House previously, further detail will be set out following the publication of the college’s final report, which I expect in very short order in the coming weeks. The report is going to the National Police Chiefs’ Council for consideration next week and I expect it to be published by the College of Policing shortly afterwards.

Amendment 383 will end a system that policing experts agree no longer works. However, the original intention behind non-crime hate incidents to help prevent crime and safeguard the vulnerable remains important. Our commitment to tackling hate remains, as witnessed by the amendments we brought forward last week that were approved by this House, but the mechanism by which the police assess and record information will change, with a higher threshold for police involvement. We will continue to safeguard our communities but through a clearer, more proportionate framework that works. When that is brought forward, I will make sure that the results are published and that noble Lords, as well as Members of the House of Commons, can see the outcome of that final report once the National Police Chiefs’ Council has issued it for clearance. The amendment enables the changes that I have explained.

I will respond to Amendment 387B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Young, once I have heard noble Lords, but for now I beg to move the amendment.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 387B. I declare my interest as a director of the Free Speech Union.

I am grateful to the Minister for summarising the final report of the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council on non-crime hate incidents, for the courtesy he has shown me and the co-sponsors of this amendment in the run-up to this debate, and for arranging for me and others to be briefed by Sir Andy Marsh and his team at the College of Policing about the recommendations in the final report, which I will get to shortly.

As I made clear to the House in Committee, I have long-standing concerns that the investigation and recording of non-crime hate incidents has been a huge waste of police time and had a chilling effect on free speech. According to a report for Policy Exchange published in November 2024, police in England and Wales are spending an estimated 60,000 hours a year investigating and recording NCHIs—non-crimes. That is time that could be spent solving actual crimes. Based on FoI requests submitted by the Telegraph and others, the Free Speech Union estimates that over a quarter of a million NCHIs have been recorded since they were first introduced in 2014, and that is in England and Wales alone. That is an average of more than 65 a day.

Why so many? Because if a hate incident is reported to the police by a member of the public, they have little choice but to record it as an NCHI. All that is required is that the victim, or indeed any witness, believes that the incident in question was motivated by hostility towards one or more of the victim’s protected characteristics. No additional evidence is required. Examples include a man accused of whistling the theme tune to “Bob the Builder” whenever he saw his neighbour, a woman who said on social media she thought her cat was a Methodist, and two schoolgirls who told another girl in the school playground that she smelled like fish.

It is hard not to laugh, but for the people who have had NCHIs recorded against them it is no laughing matter. If you apply for a position or a voluntary role that requires you to carry out an enhanced Disclosure and Barring Service check, an NCHI can show up on your record. That is why I say that NCHIs have had a chilling effect on free speech. People are rightly concerned that, if they say something that another person takes offence at, it can permanently blot their copybook and may prevent them getting a job as a teacher or a carer, or volunteering at a charity like the Samaritans. There is also the broader concern that the amount of time the police are spending on investigating and recording non-crimes is undermining public confidence in the police.

That is why I welcome the recommendations that the Minister has shared with us. It sounds like we have finally seen the back of NCHIs—something that the Free Speech Union has been campaigning for for six years now. Assuming that the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the Secretary of State sign off on these proposals, the kind of incidents that were recorded as NCHIs in the past will in future be recorded, as I understand it, as anti-social behaviour incidents, and only those that meet the higher threshold—that is, that recording the incident is considered necessary for the prevention or detection of a crime or for another policing purpose, and it complies with the new recording guidance.

I am particularly encouraged by what we have heard about the new guidance. We have been assured that it will have due regard to the right to freedom of expression and in that way, we hope, protect the police from being dragged into bad-tempered arguments on social media as well as petty disputes between neighbours. In future, if someone calls a control room to complain about a supposedly offensive remark they have seen on Twitter or overheard across the garden fence, the call handler can say, “I’m sorry, but that’s not a policing matter”. That is all to the good, and I take this opportunity to congratulate the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council on producing such a sensible report. This is a welcome dose of common sense that I hope will go some way to restoring public confidence in the police.

Nevertheless, I do not intend not to press the amendment. Our amendment would not prevent the police recording incidents where doing so served a legitimate policing purpose, even in some circumstances logging those incidents on an intelligent management system. Noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, raised concerns about that during the debate in Committee, and we have adapted our amendment accordingly.

To be clear, this amendment will not prevent the police recording incidents involving a hate element for intelligence-gathering purposes. However, I still have concerns that historic NCHIs could show up in enhanced DBS checks. That is why proposed subsection (5) in this amendment says that the police must not disclose historic NCHIs that would not meet the new higher recording thresholds. I think your Lordships would agree that data entries that would not be made under the new regime, but which are hanging around on police computers, must not be disclosed in enhanced DBS checks.

I have reluctantly come to accept that asking the police to comb through their databases and delete historic NCHIs that would not meet the new recording threshold would be too resource-intensive because of the sheer number that had been recorded, and that demand no longer appears in our amendment. Nevertheless, proposed subsection (5) says that any NCHIs that police come across that would not be recorded under the new regime must be deleted. I do not think that is a big ask, and it would enable people who believe NCHIs have been recorded against their names—trivial incidents that would not be recorded under the new criteria—to ask the police to delete them.

I welcome the assurance that the new recording guidance will have due regard to the right to freedom of expression, but, in the absence of putting any of these recommendations in statute, what guarantee do we have that the College of Policing, under new leadership, or a different Home Secretary, would not dispense with that requirement? Consequently, proposed subsection (4) in the amendment says:

“Guidance in relation to incident recording must have due regard to … freedom of expression”.


That brings me to a broader point. As I understand it, the Government’s plans for taking forward these recommendations—assuming they are signed off—is to include them in guidance, but not statute. The government amendment in this group will repeal the statutory basis for the current NCHI regime, thereby clearing the ground for a new regime to spring up in its place. But that new regime will be wholly reliant on guidance. I do not doubt the Minister will do what he has said he will do with the full support of my noble friend Lord Herbert, the chair of the College of Policing, Sir Andy Marsh the CEO and the chief constables on the national council. But what about their successors? What happens if a more authoritarian Government replace the current one?

The only way to future-proof these recommendations, to guarantee that this new, more sensible arrangement is not short-lived and that NCHIs do not spring back to life, Freddy Krueger-like, in a few years’ time, is to give the new regime some statutory underpinning. Proposed subsection (1) in this amendment drives a stake through the heart of NCHIs and makes sure they cannot be resurrected in the absence of primary legislation to the contrary. No Parliament can bind its successors. Indeed, if the Home Secretary wants to take up some, but not all, of the report’s recommendations, the Government could amend this amendment at Third Reading. In the meantime, I urge them to support these sensible suggestions and put them on a statutory footing.

In my view, too many of the rules governing how public authorities behave are found in guidance when they should properly be in statute. Indeed, the current NCHI regime, which I think we are all agreed is not fit for purpose, emerged from guidance issued by the College of Policing in 2014 and was not put on a statutory footing until 2022, by which time it was too late for Parliament to wrest control over it. A bureaucratic leviathan had been created in the form of ever more voluminous guidance. Let us not make the same mistake again. Something as important as what incidents reported to the police are investigated and recorded and, in some cases, disclosed in enhanced DBS checks is properly a matter for Parliament, which is why I urge your Lordships’ House to support this amendment.

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, as the leader of the local authority, I had to address a public meeting in Wymondham in Norfolk at least 10 years ago, I cannot quite remember. It was about providing accommodation in the local plan for Gypsies and Travellers. I see here in the Chamber this evening at least four former council leaders, and I hope they will sympathise with the dilemma I faced. It is a thorny subject. Not many people have sympathy for Gypsy and Traveller families, but it is one of those hands you are dealt when you become a leader. The meeting was highly charged. I was in the lions’ den, but at least I was able to rely on a briefing from the council solicitor and monitoring officer as to what was the safe ground: the procedure about the local plan, the process about assessing needs, the duty to balance the needs of the settled and travelling communities and the obligations to follow the law. My job was to hold the ring.

I do not think I made any friends that evening, but I was the messenger for a law that not everybody appreciated. But, if the council did not follow the law, who else would? I got out alive and, in the circumstances, I think it probably went as well as it could have. The alternative was probably not to turn up, and that would not have been right at all. So imagine my surprise when I was called to a police interview a few days later to answer for a non-crime hate incident. I was supported by the council’s solicitor, who confirmed that, yes, I had accurately reported the process and the law at the meeting. Right was on my side. But that meant nothing. Perhaps someone in the audience that evening in Wymondham had hurty feelings. Perhaps they had an axe to grind against Gypsies and Travellers. Perhaps they were political opponents. Ironically, perhaps they were prejudiced against me.

23:30

I was invited to apologise to the unnamed and unidentified complainant, and I refused. It was explained that, in the absence of an apology, I would be reported to the prosecutor for a hate crime and would have to defend myself in court. The hate crime, it was explained, was not objective or grounded in the merits viewed through the filter of the law. No, it was solely to be assessed subjectively by the beholder. I was not going to be cowed, so I literally said, “No, go and prosecute me”. I dared them. I would welcome the opportunity to set the record straight. My council chief executive swallowed hard, but I never heard from them again, which shows what a nonsense the whole thing was.

So Amendment 387B, in the name of my noble friend Lord Young and others, shows what a resource-sapping, police-diverting bureaucracy there is around all this. We need the police to focus on real crimes, grounded in the law: something material. As a nation, we have strayed from the path. I recognise what is in the government amendment, but I think we have lost perspective and must wipe the slate clean, literally, for those who have been unjustly tainted by this.

I am not talking about grossly offensive, inflammatory provocations: they are crimes, they should be crimes and they will still be crimes. But this amendment puts an end to the nonsense for people such as council leaders, who are meant to be on your side and to enjoy freedom of expression but are cowed. So I hope that all sides of this House will stand shoulder to shoulder at this late hour with those council leaders who metaphorically put themselves in harm’s way. If we do not stand up for the unfashionably marginalised—people such as the Gypsies and Travellers who are looking for a home under the structure of a local plan, or public servants communicating a difficult message that may not be popular but is the right thing to do—who will? On that basis, I support Amendment 387B.

[Baroness Lawrence of Clarendon (Lab)]

My Lords, I did not intend to speak. I spoke in Committee, and I listened to what the Minister put forward and what the noble Lord on the opposite Bench said about the recording of non-crime hate. It depends on how you see non-crime hate and on who is at the receiving end of it. For me, it led to the murder of my son. For individuals who think they have the right to walk around and talk about especially young black men in a certain way, what starts off as just verbal leads to violence. This is what I tried put across in Committee: people see the verbal as a playground, but it is not necessarily that. After the inquiry, when that was put into a recommendation, it was said that, if those who are on the receiving end—or people around them—perceive it to be something, that is what it is.

If you take that away and do not record it, how do you move forward, if it then moves from something verbal into violence and you have no way of tracking back to where it started from? Okay, so within the report here, it could be said in a way so it comes across to make sure that you do not lose that part of it, because some of it leads to violence and that is what happened to my son. Hence, I take offence when people say that it is just playground talk, because it does not necessarily mean that. So noble Lords should please consider what they are saying here and what implications it has outside, and our children.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

Perhaps I could briefly add something to what the noble Baroness has just said. Just to clarify, I think that the kinds of remarks that she is talking about that were made about her son would be recorded and would meet the new criteria under the anti-social behaviour incident regime, which, as I understand it, is going to replace the NCHI regime. They would remain on a police database in a way that could then be used to detect and prevent a crime: they would meet the new recording threshold. I have no objection to that kind of thing being recorded: I think that it would serve a useful policing purpose. So just to be clear, I am not in any way suggesting that those kinds of remarks should not be included in future—I think that they should be—but I want to exclude the more trivial things from being recorded and having the police waste so much time on them.

[Baroness Lawrence of Clarendon (Lab)]

But you would not know until it gets to that point: to violence. If you do not start off with where it starts from, you will never get to the end, whether that is from trivial chat or whatever you want to call it, or playground. Later on, if that same individual or whoever carries on, that leads to violence, and if you have no way of going back to check where that started from, how do you know to be able to prosecute that individual for what he said, going back further to where we are now? That is what we need to be very careful about.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, to follow on from the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, one difficulty that we have had in relation to any discussion such as this is that the police are under an enormous amount of pressure because of the horrible things that happen—understatement of the year—to imagine that all speech can lead to violence. If they see that, obviously they will police all speech and treat everybody’s speech as potentially dangerous and damaging. Once that happens, we no longer live in a free, democratic society. That is quite straightforward.

One thing that I think is very difficult is that the horror of Stephen’s racist murder and the fact that the police did not intervene and there was so much scandal around it means that sometimes people feel very nervous, anxious or worried about saying anything in the name of fighting hate, in case they are somehow implicated in having prejudiced views. I would like to enthusiastically welcome the Government’s Amendment 383, abolishing the statutory basis for non-crime hate incidents, because, over the past few years, when some of us have raised problems with non-crime hate incidents, and with the police policing those incidents—as in attitudes and words—it has felt as though we were banging our heads against a brick wall. So it feels quite good to count this as something of a win, and even to be vindicated, because, to be honest, opposing non-crime hate incidents has meant facing some brickbats, both outside here, in my capacity as the director of the Academy of Ideas, and, to be honest, especially in here. There was a less than subtle inference that opposition to non-crime hate incidents, or indeed a whole range of hate legislation in fact, revealed some lurking bigotry or was proof that we were soft on hate.

Yet here we are, and that is proof of something else that is important: that it is always worth raising issues here and battling on, because sometimes Governments can change their minds and sometimes the College of Policing can change its mind—you can make people look at things again. I also welcome the outbreak of common sense and reasonableness from the College of Policing and the fact that there has been a genuine attempt to get on top of what obviously was not intended from the original non-crime hate incidents—it has got completely out of hand. Despite that, and despite the fact that I am delighted that the notions of freedom of expression and free speech have now been taken seriously by the different bodies, I still have some worries and would like some reassurance and clarification from the Minister.

I am worried about the risk of non-crime hate incidents simply being rebranded. The Government have suggested, as we have heard, that some incidents currently recorded as NCHIs will continue to be recorded as anti-social behaviour incidents. Despite what the noble Lord, Lord Young, explained in terms of the higher threshold, I want to check with the Minister whether the behaviour that will be recorded that way will still be based on the subjective premise of a victim perceiving hostility or prejudice towards protected characteristics.

As so much anti-social behaviour regulation, as we discussed earlier on Report, is prosecuted to a lower evidential standard yet treated as a criminal offence and can lead to criminal sanctions, could this lower threshold be used in such incidents? I am worried about repeating the same problems. Can the Minister also rule out that any such anti-social behaviour hate incidents will be added to the national crime database, disclosed in enhanced DBS checks or investigated in much the same way as NCHIs? I am not sure about that.

One reason why I support Amendment 387B in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, is that it will make it harder to set up an alternative recording system that is NCHIs in all but name. I am also worried about ambiguity and confusion if we leave all this to guidance, as has been mentioned. As I understand it, police forces are not prohibited from continuing to record NCHIs under the Government’s amendment for quite a while, and I am just not sure how this is going to happen.

The statutory basis for NCHIs under Sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act was simply a way for the Secretary of State to issue guidance. Will repealing the statutory basis alone not simply mean that the police will return to the pre-2023 position where they continue with NCHIs under their own guidance? Maybe I have misunderstood that. Even if that happening only temporarily until the Government worked out exactly what to do, I am concerned about this muddled period.

Amendment 387B would rule out this concerning prospect, offer the police some clarity and guarantee the outcome that we all desire. Clarity, or lack of it, has always been a bugbear in relation to non-crime hate incidents. It is why I am so anxious to hear how the Government’s plans will be communicated, and I hope there will be clarity. On the one hand, we have experience of how a lack of clarity led to the growth of NCHIs without any intention for that to happen. Even the current DPP, Stephen Parkinson, admitted to the Times Crime and Justice Commission that until recently he “had no idea” what an NCHI was, was puzzled by it, and had to look up what on earth the term meant. That was the current DPP, noting that even within the police service there has been some surprise at the level of non-crime hate incidents that were being investigated because they did not know what they were.

The last thing police forces need now is to be left in limbo in any way, while consultation, regulations or guidance is sorted out. We know from An Inspection into Activism and Impartiality in Policing published by His Majesty’s inspectorate in September 2024 that there has been inconsistency in the way forces have responded to NCHI guidance. What happens if some of the more EDI-enthusiastic forces carry on spending thousands of hours sifting through online posts, seeking out so-called hate and so on and investigating common everyday interactions as if they are crimes, which I know is not what the Government or the College of Policing intend?

Limbo in law is never good and any ambiguities can lead to the law being flouted. I will give just one comparison. As of October 2025, the start of the academic year, only one university had complied with the Supreme Court judgment clarifying biological sex in relation to the Equality Act. The rest claimed to be waiting for the EHRC code—waiting for guidance rather than complying with their legal obligations. I do not want the same thing to happen.

23:45

I preferred the original Amendment 387. I understand why it has been changed, but I prefer the idea of mandating the deletion of all historic records of NCHIs within three months of Royal Assent. The government amendment does not directly address what will be done with existing records in relation to their ongoing impact on individuals’ job prospects. As we have cited the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, so much, I will quote him here, where he says

“if you’re going to attach someone’s name to these incidents, then you better be sure that there’s a good reason for doing that … Because five years down the line, when they apply for a job, they might not get it. And that might be as a result of a … non-crime hate incident recorded against their name that was entirely baseless, entirely motivated by spite or misunderstanding or whatever”.

How can we make sure that these NCHIs, which could have been recorded against someone’s name based on discredited misplaced statutory guidance from the past, do not punish people now?

I was recently reminded of the noble Lord’s words when I met one of the teachers involved with four pupils in Wakefield who, if noble Lords remember, slightly damaged a Koran in 2023. The police recorded an NCHI against them. Despite the school admitting that there was no malicious intention and one of the pupils was autistic, Inspector Thornton told concerned parents at the local mosque that the damage was being treated as a hate incident. Those young boys are now getting to an age when they will be applying for jobs. Does the Minister agree that it would be a travesty if the records of their NCHIs on the police database were used to stop them getting a foot on the work ladder? I just want to make sure that we do not forget that different type of victim.

[Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)]

My Lords, I draw attention to my entry in the register of interests showing that I am the chair of the College of Policing. We are broadly in agreement about the way forward. There is a large measure of agreement that the current system of non-crime hate incidents is no longer fit for purpose. As the Minister said, under the new proposals in the final report into this matter that the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council have produced, which goes to the police chiefs’ council next week for ratification, non-crime hate incidents will no longer be recorded. They will go.

I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that this will not be a mere rebranding exercise. The threshold of an incident will be significantly increased. Common-sense professional judgment will guide decisions and only where there is a genuine risk of harm and a clear policing purpose will incidents continue to be recorded. The powerful intervention by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, reminds us of the importance of ensuring that, where there is a risk of harm, we must continue to record the incidents. That was the original reason why, as a result of the recommendation of the Macpherson review, this regime was put in place. However, for all the reasons we have discussed, it does not work properly and there is a better approach that will reduce police time.

So far, so good, and I can therefore agree with most of my noble friend Lord Young’s Amendment 387. The one problematic area is the requirement that all records must be deleted after three months. The policy on deletion is a matter for the Government, not for the College of Police or the National Police Chiefs’ Council, but the view of those bodies is that it would be disproportionately burdensome to go back and delete all the existing records.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

Just to be clear, one of the differences between the amendment as originally drafted and this new version is that the new version no longer asks the police to go through all their databases and delete all historic NCHIs. It just asks them to delete those they come across. So, if a person who thinks they have an NCHI recorded against them, like my noble friend, writes to the police, fires off an SAR and discovers they have an NCHI still recorded against their name—and it does not meet the new, higher recording threshold—the police will be obliged to delete it. The amendment does not ask the police to go through records. As my noble friend says, that would be too resource-intensive; all it asks is that, when they come across them, they delete them if they do not meet the new threshold.

[Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)]

Okay; that is helpful. I thank my noble friend, and I am sure the Government will respond to that. But if part of the purpose of this is to ensure that it meets the concern my noble friend set out—that people may, to use his words, be prevented from getting a job because of the release of a non-crime hate incident in an enhanced DBS check—I should point out that the review has not been able to find a single example of a non-crime hate incident being disclosed in an extended DBS check and preventing someone from securing employment. We therefore think the risk of that is very low. The release is a matter for the chief constable’s discretion. Of course, the risk could be made even lower if the new, higher threshold were applied to any future decision, but again, that would be within the Government’s gift to agree. What is already a negligible risk could be made even more negligible, so that would address the concern.

The final question relates to whether non-crime hate incidents will spring back into life, to use my noble friend’s expression. My response is, not so long as I am involved with this, and I am sure I could say the same for the chief executive of the college, Sir Andy Marsh. The serious point, however, is that there clearly has been a change of mood, partly because of the way in which social media has influenced this whole matter. But such action is always within the gift of any future Government, as my noble friend conceded: no Government can bind themselves to changing practice and policy. What matters now is that we put in place a robust regime that works and ensure that the police are focused on the right things.

Therefore, I am very pleased we have this broad agreement about the way forward. I do not think my noble friend’s amendment is necessary, but it is for the Government to respond to that. We must be wary of tying up the police more on this, when we are trying to release their time. We must also be aware of the injunction of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence: that serious incidents must continue to be recorded. We must remember why this regime was set up in the first place. Not every recorded non-crime hate incident has been trivial; they can indicate a building pattern of behaviour and that is what we have to guard against. But the new system will put in place higher thresholds to ensure that the trivial are weeded out, and that, I think, is what we all want.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, given the hour I do not want to detain the House for much longer. In fact, I have deleted the first page of my speech accordingly, and I will address the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, in a moment.

First, this amendment insists that all future incident recording guidance must have due regard to freedom of expression—and that matters. In a liberal democracy, the test is not whether we protect only speech we agree with; it is whether we protect the space for robust, sometimes uncomfortable, debate on race, religion, sex, gender, politics and many other issues.

Police guidance should start from the principle that lawful speech is not a policing problem. Further, it deals with the past as well as the future. It should require that historic non-crime hate incident records which do not meet the proper recording threshold must not be disclosed on DBS checks and must be deleted when discovered. That is vital for natural justice. If we accept that this category has been misused and overused, we cannot leave people’s lives quietly marred by data that should never have been held in the first place. I particularly address these remarks to the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence.

This is not about turning a blind eye to genuine hate crime. On the contrary, by scrapping a vague, perception-based non-crime category, we free up police time and attention to focus on real offences: threats, harassment, violence and criminal damage. We will make the system clearer for victims and for officers. We will be sending a simple message that if you have been the victim of a crime, the law is there to protect you, and if you have merely heard something you strongly dislike, that is not in itself a matter for the police.

At the moment, too many people are unsure where that line lies. They fear that expressing a lawful view on a controversial subject might bring a knock at the door or a mark on their record. That chilling effect is corrosive. It drives honest disagreement underground and pushes some people out of the public square altogether. We should be defending the right to argue and criticise, and to challenge within the law, not encouraging people to outsource every disagreement to the police.

The amendment would preserve the ability of the police to record information where it is genuinely necessary for crime prevention and public safety. It would hardwire respect for freedom of expression into any future guidance. In doing so, it would strengthen civil liberties and good policing. It says that the police are there to deal with crime, not to catalogue lawful opinions. This is a distinction worth defending and I urge the House to support this amendment.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have listened carefully to the contributions from the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Young, on their amendments, and to other speakers around your Lordships’ House. I want to return to the difficult and sensitive issues, raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, of where the boundaries are and protecting the vulnerable versus free speech. We have debated that in some detail, with examples in Committee, so I will not rehearse those. I have two questions for the Minister about the new arrangements.

We are losing from the guidance a useful paragraph that sets out exactly that the risk of significant harm may be greater if the individual who has experienced the incident is considered to be vulnerable, and then directs people to the College of Policing as to how the police do that. I mention this to the noble Lord, Lord Young, who said that everything under the regime that is about to disappear was entirely in the view of the individual who felt that that they were being done. That has not been the case. It has been assessed by the police, following the code of practice.

Can the Minister reassure your Lordships’ House that, in deleting Sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, the police will not lose the balance that we have in the current code that sets out how to determine a vulnerable person from one of the categories covered in the Act, including race, religion, disability and LGBT, and the real risk that a crime may be committed in the future?

The noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, spoke very eloquently. What she did not say, and everyone has assumed, is that it was absolutely obvious from the start, when the verbal attacks started on Stephen and other young people in his area, that it would not have looked like something that should have been recorded. But there is something called a course of conduct, which is very common in harassment and stalking and a number of anti-social behaviours that start to build up, and the police bring in psychologists to look at that behaviour. One of the problems is that we cannot lose that progression. If things stop being recorded, I do not understand how you can do it. There are certainly rules about not using it in DBS checks, but if you lose that information, I really fear that the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, is right to have concerns. So, can I ask the Minister if the Government—

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

The disagreement is not about whether incidents should be recorded because they could form part of a course of conduct which ends in a serious crime. The argument is about where the recording threshold should be placed. Surely the noble Baroness will accept that, if it is so low that the police are recording 65 non-crime hate incidents every day in England and Wales alone, then the threshold is too low.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

The hour is late and I really do not want to get into a debate about that. The point is that the police are going to have to make whatever the new system is work. My worry is that there seems to be a line now that might exclude cases that are important because of the course of conduct which might become a criminal act.

I did not manage to get quite to the end of my speech. I therefore ask the Minister whether the Government are confident that such a course of conduct under a number of non-crime hate incidents would be visible to the police if the code of practice is repealed and the police stop recording them.

[Lord Lebedev (CB)]

My Lords, I will not take much of your time. First, I fully respect and acknowledge the arguments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, which I feel have been addressed very well from the other side of the House. I support Amendment 387B and endorse the arguments made by noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, in favour of this amendment.

Last July, I was able to raise the widespread concerns so many of us have about non-crime hate incidents—NCHIs—in a short debate in this House. I was encouraged by the widespread support across parties for a robust stance in defence of free speech. Many noble Lords outlined how pernicious NCHIs are. I was grateful to the Minister for his thoughtful engagement on the arguments.

Since that debate, there has been a welcome retreat from the use of NCHIs, with the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and others recognising the inappropriateness of using valuable police time to harass individuals for exercising their right to free speech. Like the noble Lord, Lord Young, I am pleased that police leaders and Ministers now recognise that recording the names of citizens on police databases for actions which are not crimes should be curtailed. That is customary good practice, but it is, in this case, not enough.

We need to ensure that there is appropriate statutory protection for free speech, and we need to ensure that past expressions of opinion, which may have been recorded under a previous regime, cannot be used to blight the future of citizens. Amendment 387B would not only wipe clean the slate but affirm the importance of free speech, the foundational freedom on which all others depend. I commend it to the House.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow so many excellent speeches from noble Lords across the House who recognise the problems that non-crime hate incidents have caused. I am very pleased to see that there is much agreement on this matter, and I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, for his update, as it were. I am also particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, for her very important intervention.

Like many of my noble friends and many noble Lords around the House, I fully support Amendment 387B tabled by my noble friend Lord Young of Acton and the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger and Lord Hogan-Howe. The amendment would bring about the abolition of the category of so-called non-crime hate incidents. If this were to become the law of the land, NCHIs would be permanently dead. Their recording and retention would end, and we could finally put this well-intentioned but ultimately damaging experiment to bed.

We have had many debates during the passage of the Bill about the various tenets of hate crime laws and aggravating factors based on hostility. Indeed, only last Wednesday, the Government were successful in expanding their enormous web of legislation even further, despite our best efforts to stop them. We have lost that battle for now, but I reiterate my opposition to those provisions. While related to the debate we had last Wednesday, the matter before us now is rather different. Non-crime hate incidents are not hate crimes; they are something quite different. They represent the recording by police of incidents that are not crimes at all.

The House will have heard the background to NCHIs from other noble Lords, so I will not repeat that, but their establishment in 2014 via guidance issued by the College of Policing was motivated by sincere intentions. They were supposed to assist police in identifying patterns of hostility in communities that might escalate into criminal behaviour, and that objective was understandable, but in practice, the policy has drifted far beyond that limited purpose. We now find ourselves in a position where individuals can have a police record created about them for conduct that is entirely lawful, simply because another person perceives it to have been motivated by hostility. That is a very serious matter indeed.

The threshold for the recording of these incidents is ridiculously low. A person needs only to be concerned by another’s conduct in order for them to report such conduct to the police for recording as an NCHI.

The matter has quite rightly received serious scrutiny in recent years, and I particularly want to reference the independent review conducted by the College of Policing and led by my noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs into the use of non-crime hate incidents. The review acknowledged a number of very significant concerns, and it recognised that the recording of such incidents had in some cases created a chilling effect on free expression. It also identified problems with the threshold for recording and the potential for disproportionate interference in the lives of individuals who had committed no crime.

The review led to revised guidance from the College of Policing intended to raise the threshold for recording NCHIs and better protect freedom of expression. I welcome that effort. It was a step in the right direction.

The review also demonstrated something more fundamental—that the concept itself is deeply problematic. We have seen, over the years, a number of examples where the recording of non-crime hate incidents has been plainly vexatious, trivial or disproportionate. In one widely reported case, a former police officer found himself the subject of a non-crime hate incident after engaging in a debate on social media about gender identity. There are several examples that have been given in the debate, so I shall not provide further evidence. There have been cases where individuals have had police records created simply for sharing satirical material online, expressing controversial opinions or engaging in perfectly lawful political debate. We should pause and consider what this means in practice.

In some circumstances, such records may be disclosed during enhanced background checks conducted by the Disclosure and Barring Service. That means that an allegation about a non-criminal matter could potentially affect a person’s employment prospects, particularly in professions involving children or vulnerable adults. There have been documented cases where individuals have feared precisely that outcome.

I also recall the remarks of Ministers during our Committee debates, in which the Government acknowledged the importance of protecting free speech in this area, and the Home Office has repeatedly recognised the need to strike the right balance. Indeed, the Home Secretary herself has spoken publicly about the importance of ensuring that policing does not stray into the regulation of lawful expression. She has emphasised that police officers must focus on real crime and genuine threats to public safety. I agree with those sentiments, but I suggest that the time has come to move beyond incremental reform. The fundamental difficulty is that the concept of a non-crime hate incident places the police in the position of adjudicating perceived hostility in circumstances where no law has been broken. That is an uncomfortable and inappropriate role for the police service.

I put on record my thanks to the Minister for making the time to meet us and to the College of Policing for the briefing it gave on its plans for the future recording of such incidents. It was helpful of the Minister to set out some of that when we opened.

As my noble friend Lord Young of Acton said, the proposals by the college are certainly welcome. It has been clear that NCHIs will not exist any more and that any incident where hostility is a motivating factor will now be recorded as an ASB incident. Critically, these will not be disclosed in enhanced DBS checks. The college has also said that it will be providing updated guidance and training to clarify the higher standards of proof required for the recording of such incidents, and a new triaging method.

This is all welcome, but that does not mean that all is perfect. I still have some concerns and will briefly outline them. My first concern is that, if the abolition of NCHIs is not embedded in statute, there is the possibility of them being brought back to life in the future. All it would take is a change in Home Secretary, or a new Prime Minister, who could reintroduce them by the back door. If all we have is guidance, there is no legal safeguard to prevent them returning. I would feel much more comfortable knowing that they are gone for good and will never be resurrected from the dead.

Secondly, it must be explicitly acknowledged that any guidance produced by the College of Policing about the future recording of incidents will have freedom of expression at its heart. If this had been the case when the NCHI regime was created, we might not have seen as many unintended consequences. It is a fairly basic requirement, which is why I am pleased that my noble friend has included that in his amendment.

Thirdly, the issue of historic NCHI recordings needs to be addressed. Given that the Government have now agreed to abolish them, it does not seem right that thousands will still exist and may very well be disclosed in enhanced DBS checks. That is a matter of fairness. Individuals should not carry the burden of a police record relating to conduct that was never a crime in the first place. That has now been acknowledged as a mistake.

However, like my noble friend, I appreciate the point made by the College of Policing: that to require their deletion within a few months, as the original amendment sought, would be a highly labour-intensive process. If our purpose is to prevent the police wasting time and allow them to do their job, requiring them to sit down and trawl through every single file does not make sense. However, where NCHI recordings are discovered, they should be deleted and they most certainly should not be disclosed. It is sensible to have the guarantee in statute.

The college and the Government have made commendable progress and I reiterate that I am genuinely pleased at the direction of travel. However, we still need some guardrails. That is why we on these Benches believe that there must be a provision in legislation to ensure that NCHIs are gone, that they do not return and that the new regime is more transparent, reasonable and respectful of freedom of expression. For that reason, I very much support Amendment 378B and, if my noble friend does press it to a Division, we will follow him into the Content Lobby.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the discussion and, in winding up this debate, I put on record my thanks to Sir Andy Marsh of the College of Policing for the work he has done on this exercise of examining non-crime hate incidents. I remind the House that we are here today with the amendments I have tabled and with the outline that I have given from the College of Policing response, which the chair of the College of Policing has also endorsed. We are here today because the then Home Secretary, my right honourable friend Yvette Cooper, commissioned that review and asked for a report to be produced. That is why we are here today: we have taken action.

I listened with great interest to the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, talking about his experiences. That was not the responsibility of this Government. We are trying to change that regime. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, that we are trying to change that regime. I say to all noble Lords who spoke that we are trying to change that regime. However, I say to my noble friend Lady Lawrence of Clarendon that, in doing so, we want to ensure that we keep the essence of what that regime was established for: to identify precisely the issues that she mentioned in her very powerful contribution. The intent—to gather information, to prevent crime, to understand tensions, to look at potential areas where tensions could arise, to support investigations and to safeguard the vulnerable—remains as relevant today as it did 30 years ago.

I say to the noble Lords, Lord Lebedev, Lord Fuller, Lord Young of Acton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, who have spoken on this issue, that we understand the issue. However, I hope that we are making some movement to address the concerns, at the same time as keeping the essence of why those non-crime hate incidents needed to be recorded in the first place, and to have the revisions that the College of Policing have brought forward. Once they are endorsed, we will look at how we put those into practice in due course. I hope that will help both the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger.

00:15

The main issue that the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, has referred to is the prohibition of the disclosure of any historic records in enhanced disclosure and barring services that do not meet the new incident recording threshold and to require that such records be deleted. I note that the noble Lord has changed the deletion measure, because I think he recognises, having had the briefing that we arranged, that there is a big administrative burden in that deletion. I can tell him that non-crime hate incidents do not appear currently on a basic or standard DBS check. The Home Office is not aware of any evidence to suggest that there is a problem in practice with the disclosure of non-crime hate incidents on enhanced criminal record checks. Enhanced DBS checks are used only for sensitive roles involving work with children or adults.

I hope it will help the House if I say that the figures bear this out. It is extremely rare for any non-conviction or caution to be disclosed. In the figures for DBS checks issued in 2024-2025, of the 4.1 million enhanced certificates, only 0.12% contained disclosure of police information of any kind. Almost all of that was not in the areas that we have talked about this evening, so the figures are extremely small in the first place. However, to go back to the point mentioned by my noble friend Lady Lawrence, it is relevant and important that we should be looking at where there are areas where that could escalate. That is the essence of this, and it is important that we do not lose that in our discussions today.

It is ultimately for chief officers to determine whether the non-conviction information should be disclosed, in line with statutory guidance issued by the Home Office, reflecting the sensitive nature of the information. I do not believe it is appropriate for us to tie officers’ hands and apply a prohibition on disclosing information which may be relevant about individuals who choose to work with the most vulnerable in our society.

The figure for those 4.1 million enhanced DBS checks is just 0.12%—for the record, that is 4,920 disclosures out of 4.1 million—and of that small number not all were NCHIs; some were serious offences. It is a relatively small proportion. The noble Lord’s amendment, as well as originally being administratively difficult, would, in essence, tie officers’ hands in what is a very small percentage of work to be done.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

I thank the Minister for giving way. I am struggling to understand what the rationale would be for disclosing in an enhanced DBS check an NCHI which, under the new recording thresholds, would not have been recorded. The Minister elided the issue by suggesting that the police—a chief constable—might think in future it would be sensible to disclose relevant information if someone is applying to work with children or vulnerable adults. But if the police would not have recorded that historic NCHI under the new higher recording threshold—because it would not be considered to have any police or intelligence value, or value in the detection or prevention of a crime—what justification could there be for disclosing it in an enhanced DBS check? If there is not one, what will it cost the Government to put it in statute that it cannot happen?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord is asking for the deletion of historic records. That is the important point I am trying to make. If the chief officer determines that that non-conviction information should be disclosed—I go back to the 4,920 disclosures out of 4.1 million, including all matters for an enhanced DBS check—then it is important that we do not fetter the chief officer’s hands and apply a prohibition to disclose information which may be relevant to individuals. That may be a difference between us and, as the noble Lord, Lord David of Gower, said, we may well test that in a Division when the time comes.

The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, made the absolutely right point that we need to ensure that we do not repeal Sections 60 and 61 until a replacement framework is in place. We will try to do that. As I said at the start of the debate and in the comments I have just made, it is essential that police and others continue to have the ability to monitor hate and hostility to prevent crime and safeguard the vulnerable. That is also the assurance I give to my noble friend Lady Lawrence.

In summary, the Government’s amendment is designed to repeal the statutory guidance, restore focus and reduce administrative burdens. We have made those changes because of the type of incidents noble Lords referred to. Amendment 387B would risk creating precisely the opposite effect and, for those reasons, the Government cannot support it. I invite the noble Lord not to move his amendment when the time comes, but, in the meantime—tonight—I commend Amendment 383 because, having considered and reviewed the matter, it is the right thing to do. In establishing the new regime, we will make sure that we keep the essence of the important matters from the former regime.

Amendment 383 agreed.

Consideration on Report adjourned.

House adjourned at 12.20 am.