Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, criticism of the Ziegler decision is well-founded and well-taken, but the law has moved on. For example, in the Supreme Court’s abortion services case, 2022 UKSC 32, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, speaking for a seven-judge Supreme Court, said at paragraph 42:

“The decision in Ziegler was widely understood as having established that every criminal conviction of protesters involved a restriction upon their Convention rights, and must be proved to be justified and proportionate on the basis of an assessment of the particular facts. As explained, that understanding was mistaken”.


The law has moved on.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, recognised, there have been a number of more recent cases in which the courts emphasised, in the context of protest, that it is sufficient that Parliament has laid down a particular offence. It is therefore not necessary for the prosecution to prove proportionality on the facts of the individual case. It may well be that more clarity is required in this area, but the House should proceed on the recognition that Ziegler, for all its faults, is not current law.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for the elegant way that he introduced this amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for explaining his perspective on it. In effect, it was a police perspective, given that the police find it difficult to apply the law as it was thought to be after Ziegler. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for explaining that the law has moved on since Ziegler.

I do not propose to get into the argument of precisely what the law is in the light of Ziegler as subsequently interpreted. I am concerned with the way that this amendment addresses the question of reasonable excuse. This is achieved by, in effect, spelling it out in proposed new subsection (2), which says:

“A person has no excuse for the conduct if … it is intended to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity”.


That hides within it an open question about the meaning of intention in that context. It is for that reason that I do not support the amendment as drafted.

It may well be that a person recognises that conduct that is otherwise perfectly lawful, particularly in a context of peaceful protest, may inevitably carry the consequence of provoking or inconveniencing other members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity. That comes back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made in the context of obstructing the highway. Any obstruction or interference with traffic or movement or getting to work, or any delay, could all be intended consequences of lawful protest. What worries me is that this amendment, as drafted, would acknowledge that intention and say that there could be no excuse. It is not then a question of weighing up any excuse in the light of what the courts may consider to be an excuse in any particular case; the question is what the intended consequence would be, and the intended consequence may appear to the people charged with the conduct to be entirely reasonable, though intended, and may objectively be entirely reasonable, though intended.

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Of course, initially it should probably be restricted to serious crimes, but the alternative of ignoring it seems bizarre, given that most places we go to now have CCTV cameras. Generally, the present method of identification is showing the image around a police station and saying, “Do you know them?” Frankly, it does not work in London, but where technology exists to make that a more efficient and effective process, it honestly would be foolish to ignore it. But I do agree that it should be regulated. What those regulations should be is a matter for debate, but to exclude the possibility altogether is wrong.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that the fact that this access is to be authorised by regulations is a saving grace. We know full well that in this House, fatal Motions virtually never succeed. The Conservative Front Bench may take some comfort from the fact that there would be provision for regulations, but the reality is that once the enabling legislation is passed, regulations will be in the hands of the Government, and nobody can do anything about it.

This is an issue of consent. People who apply for driving licences do so and have done so for many years on the basis that their photographs and biometric data are provided for the limited purpose of applying for a driving licence—that goes for all the information they provide. It is not for the purpose of enabling a trawl for suspects. One can envisage a position where, in some circumstances, authorisation to use information in public hands, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, suggested, may be appropriate, but this is not the place for it to be provided for by regulations subsequent to and consequent upon this enabling clause.

It is a question of public trust. The information and photographs are provided by applicants for driving licences based on the trust that they will be used for that purpose and that purpose alone. To misuse that information to enable a trawl of photographs to see if they might be suspected of some offence, with nobody having any real control over that use, is an abuse of trust. For that reason, I support the amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will address Amendment 380 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Strasburger. I am grateful to them for raising an issue that deserves careful consideration. The amendment would prevent authorised persons using information held on the Driving and Vehicle Licensing Agency database for biometric searches using facial recognition technology. It is right to ensure that Parliament scrutinises these emerging powers thoroughly. Public trust in policing is vital, and it is only through open debate and clear safeguards that such trust can be maintained.

The DVLA database contains photographs and personal information provided by millions of law-abiding citizens for the specific purpose of licensing drivers, and it is therefore entirely understandable that noble Lords should question whether it is appropriate for that information to be used in other contexts, particularly the context of advanced biometric searches. The principle that personal data should not be repurposed without clear justification is one that many of us across the House share.

However, while the concerns behind this amendment are sincere and valid, I fear that it is unnecessary and ultimately misguided. It would risk undermining the ability of our police and law enforcement agencies to prevent and investigate serious crime. First, it is important to recognise the operational value that carefully regulated facial recognition tools can provide to modern policing. The technology, when used responsibly, can assist officers in identifying suspects in serious crime, locating dangerous offenders and protecting the public in situations where time is of the essence. It can be particularly valuable when investigating crimes involving unidentified individuals captured on CCTV or other images.

The police already rely on a range of databases and identification tools to perform these tasks. Photographs from custody suites, passport records and other lawful sources have long assisted the police in identifying suspects and victims alike. Facial recognition technology represents in many ways a technological evolution of that long-standing investigative practice. The amendment before us would place a blanket prohibition on the use of DVLA images for biometric searches involving facial recognition. Such prohibition risks creating an artificial and potentially harmful limitation on investigative capability. If a suspect’s image appears on CCTV and the only high-quality image available for comparison is contained within a DVLA database, the amendment would prevent police even conducting that comparison. We must ask ourselves whether that is a proportionate outcome.

Secondly, it is worth emphasising that the use of facial recognition technology by police forces in the United Kingdom is not taking place in a regulatory vacuum. The deployment of such technologies is already subject to a framework of legal safeguards, oversight and guidance. Police forces must operate within the boundaries of data protection law, including the principles established under the UK general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018. Their activities are subject to oversight by bodies such as the Information Commissioner’s Office and, where appropriate, the courts. Moreover, the use of live facial recognition by police has already been subject to significant judicial scrutiny. The courts have made it clear that deployments must be proportionate and transparent, and accompanied by appropriate safeguards. That jurisprudence has helped shape operational guidance and policing practice in this area.

Given that context, I question whether it is wise for Parliament to impose a sweeping statutory ban in relation to one database. Doing so risks pre-empting the careful regulatory balance that is already evolving through legislation, oversight and case law. That does not mean that the concerns raised by the amendment should be dismissed—far from it. The growth of biometric technologies demands a clear and robust legislative framework. Many Members across this House have rightly called for greater clarity about how facial recognition should be governed in the future. I feel the same. Questions of transparency, accountability, accuracy and bias must continue to be examined with great care.

However, those broader questions should be addressed through a comprehensive approach to biometric governance rather than through a single amendment targeting one database in isolation. If Parliament concludes that additional statutory safeguards are required for facial recognition technology then we should consider them holistically, ensuring that any rules are consistent, proportionate and grounded in operational reality. A piecemeal prohibition risks creating unintended consequences while failing to resolve the underlying policy debate.

For those reasons, while I commend the spirit in which the amendment has been brought forward, I regret that I cannot support it. Instead, I hope that the House will continue the broader necessary conversation about how facial recognition technologies should be regulated, ensuring that we protect civil liberties and the ability of our police to keep our communities safe.